MMDA v Bel-Air Village

Association, Inc.
Posted on November 18, 2012
GR 135962
March 27, 2000
FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open
its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day,
respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would
be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO
and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of
the perimeter wall.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state
endowed with police power.
HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and
has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one endowed with
powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing
the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the
sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its
inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGUs corporate
powers] provided under the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the
MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and not a political unit of
government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power.
The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the
rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the
LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and
police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the
opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

Rodolfo Ganzon vs Court of

Appeals
November 3, 2011
No comments

Facebook

Twitter

Pinterest

LinkedIn

Email

200 SCRA 271 Political Law Control Power Local Government

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on
grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued
several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against
him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to
the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the
1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and
remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and
strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can
suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her
control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because
legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the
President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over
executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control
and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and
extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be
reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good
of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon
is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspensio
Province of Batangas vs. Romulo
Posted on November 20, 2012

GR 152774
May 27, 2004
FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the Program for Devolution
Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions
and services devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-
99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999.
The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects
eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other
requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the
subsequent release of the corresponding funds.

Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void
certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001,
insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) &
imposed conditions for the release thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions
infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:
Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a
withholding of a portion of the IRA they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by
LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, the State shall ensure the local autonomy of
local governments. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the
Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been interpreted
to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays
down the rules in the doing of an act the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or
redo the act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but
has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally
impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national
taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the just share shall be automatically
released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs arent required to perform any act to
receive the just share it shall be released to them without need of further action. To subject its
distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this
constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national
internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd
preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.

The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991
not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate lawand not
through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill
matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified
sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit any provision therein which
is intended to amend another law is considered an inappropriate provision. Increasing/decreasing
the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit the
Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal
autonomy of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy they
enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in local
autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.

Ismael Mathay, Jr. vs Court of

Appeals
January 7, 2013
No comments

Facebook

Twitter

Pinterest

LinkedIn

Email

117 SCAD 352 Law on Public Officers Appointment in the Local Government
Appointing Power Cannot be Usurped by CSC
In November 1972, Presidential Decree No. 51 was signed into law. PD 51 created a Civil
Service Unit (CSU) office in cities. Pursuant to said law, then Quezon City mayor Brigido
Simon appointed officers in the QC-CSU. Meanwhile, an ordinance in QC was passed
providing, among others, that the personnel of the CSU shall be automatically absorbed into
the QC Department of Public Order and Safety (QC-DPOS). During the term of the next
mayor, Ismael Mathay, Jr., it was determined that PD 51 never became a law because it was
never published. Mathay then did not renew the contracts of the QC-CSU personnel, at the
same time, they were not reappointed to the QC-DPOS. Mathay was then sued by the QC-
CSU personnel before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Eventually, the CSC
Commissioner ruled that based on the QC ordinance, Mathay should reinstate the CSU-
personnel to QC-DPOS.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the CSC Commissioner is correct.
HELD: No. The ordinance is invalid for when it provided for automatic absorption of the QC-
CSU personnel to the QC-DPOS, it divested the mayor the power to choose as to who should
fill said office. Just like in the national government, the local sanggunian can only create an
office, it cannot choose the personnel who should fill such office that is a power vested in
the local chief executive (mayor). This is also clearly provided for in the Local Government
Code. The power to appoint is vested in the local chief executive. The power of the city council
or sanggunian, on the other hand, is limited to creating, consolidating and reorganizing city
officers and positions supported by local funds. The city council has no power to appoint. Had
Congress intended to grant the power to appoint to both the city council and the local chief
executive, it would have said so in no uncertain terms.
On the other hand, the CSC Commissioner cannot order the mayor to reinstate the QC-CSU
personnel to the QC-DPOS. Such would be an encroachment of the mayors right to choose
as to who should be appointed. Further, the CSU never came into existence for it has no legal
basis to speak of. It created no right hence the QC-CSU cannot invoke any. It is axiomatic
that the right to hold public office is not a natural right. The right exists only by virtue of a law
expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it.

Cordillera vs COA 181 SCRA 495

Facts

The constitutionality of E.O. 220 was assailed which created the Cordillera Administrative Region
(CAR) on the ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an Organic Act by the Congress and the
creation of autonomous region in the Cordillera conditional on the approval of the act through a
plebiscite.

Issue

Whether or not CAR is a territorial and political subdivision?

Whether or not E.O 220 is unconstitutional?
Held

It was held that the CAR is not an autonomous region in Cordillera contemplated in the Constitution.
It was created not as a public or political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality
like the provinces, cities or municipalities. It is neither vested with the powers granted to public
corporations.

It was created by virtue of E.O. 220 primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the covered areas. CAR in nature is a regional coordinating agency of the
national government. E.O. 220 is not unconstitutional since the constitutional guarantee of local
autonomy pertains to the administrative autonomy of the local government units through the
decentralization of government authority. The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy for the ARMM. The
purpose of CAR is to serve as a transitory coordinating agency that will prepare the stage for political
autonomy for the Cordilleras. It does not diminish the local autonomy of the covered provinces and
cities. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Ordillo vs. COMELEC

Doctrine:A REGION is made up of more than one constituent unit - province.Facts:January 30,
1990, the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra andKalinga-Apayao and the
city of Baguio held a plebiscite pursuant to RA6766 entitled "AnAct Providing for an Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."COMELEC showed that the creation of CAR was
approved by a majority of 5,889 votesfromthe Ifugao Province onlyand rejected by 148,676
votes in the rest of the provincesand city.February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
2259 stating that the Organic Actfor the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of
the votes cast in theprovince of Ifugao only. In consideration of the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the
provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR

Ruling:
No, in constuing the word region in Article X Sec 15 of the 1987 Constitution it includes provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas, that a region is to be made up of two or more constituent unit.
Therefore, Ifugao itself cannot solely constitute a region.
Metropolitan Traffic Command West Traffic District vs. GonongGR No. 91023,
July 13, 1990

Cruz, J.

GR Nos. 95203-05, December 18, 1990 Sarmiento, J.

Atty. Dante David claims that the rear license plate of his car was removed by
petitioner while his vehicle was parked inEscolta. He filed a complaint in the RTC of
Manila. He questioned the petitioners act on the ground that not only was thecar
not illegally parked but that there was no law or ordinance authorizing such
removal. The lower court ruled that LOI 43,which the defendant (petitioner)
invoked, did not empower it to detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates or
motorvehicles illegally parked and unattended. It merely authorizes the removal of
said vehicles when they are obstacles to freepassage or continued flow
of traffic on streets and highways. Moreover, the said LOI had been PD 1605.The
petitioners pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB from implementing its Order
mandating a provisional increase inthe prices of petroleum and petroleum products.
The Order, which was in pursuance to EO 172, was a response to theseparate
applications of Caltex, Pilipinas Shell and Petron Corporation for the Board
to increase the wholesale posted pricesof petroleum products. Petitioners submit
that the Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction and without proper notice and hearing.

Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the LGC

Held: No. Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such
measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the
completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard.

The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national
legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal.
To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a
valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations. According to
Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.

A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the
first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does
not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations
committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree
authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions.

Torralba vs Municipality of Sibagat

Post under Creation of LGUs , Local Government , Political Law Case Digests

FACTS:

Batas Pambansa 56, enacted February 1980, created the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of
Agusan del Sur. Petitioners assail its validity for being violative of Section 3, Article XI, 1973
Constitution:

Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

Petitioners argued that the LGC must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation
of any province, city, municipality, or barrio and since no LGC had yet been enacted as of the
date BP 56 was passed, the latter could not have possibly complied with any criteria when
the Municipality was created.

The Local Government Code came into being only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56
was enacted, the code was not yet in existence.

HELD:
The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor
was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3,
Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of
territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the Local Government Code.
It contains no requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for
the creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality
does not preclude the enactment of a Local Government Code. What the Constitutional
provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of
local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum
before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the
creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a
plebiscite called for the purpose.

The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was
conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of
the new local government unit. In fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not questioned herein.
The officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are
performing their functions. A dejure entity has thus been created.

The power to create a municipal corporation is legislative in nature. In the absence of any
constitutional limitation, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for
the more efficient administration of government. The creation of the new Municipality was a
valid exercise of legislative power vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang
Pambansa. (Torralba vs. Municipality of Sibagat, G.R. No. 59180. Jan. 29, 1987 147
SCRA 390)

RP v City of Davao (Environmental Law)

Republic of the Philippines v City of Davao

GR No. 148622

September 12, 2002

FACTS:

On August 11, 2000, The City of Davao filed an application for a Certificate of Non- Coverage (CNC) for
its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB), Region XI.

ISSUES:

(1) Is an LGU like Davao exempt from the coverage of PD 1586?

(2) Is the project entitled to a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC)?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

Section 15 of Republic Act 7160,[5] otherwise known as the Local Government Code, defines a local
government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity
with law.

Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or
operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative

RULING:

(1) NO, IT IS WITHIN THE COVERAGE OF PD 1586. Found in Section 16 of the Local Government
Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the people's right to a balanced ecology. Pursuant to this, an
LGU, like the City of Davao, cannot claim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic
endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the environment,
which is the very same objective of PD 1586.

Case Digest: Tobias v. Abalos

Posted: August 4, 2010 in Case Digests
Tags: case, constitution, digest, law

0
G.R.No. L-114785 08 December 1994

PONENTE: BIDIN, J.
FACTS:

Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized

City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite

was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of

the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas 7, 911 voted no.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)

HELD/RULING:

For the purposes of discussion, lets breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution.

Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its

conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the one-title-one-subject rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not

impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec).

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise

fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila

area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those

who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or

organizations.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless

otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be

increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative

districts based on the standard provided in this section.

The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon

and enacted the assailed law.

The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.