Indian Income-Tax Act S. 42-Scope
Indian Income-Tax Act S. 42-Scope
Indian Income-Tax Act S. 42-Scope
by
Tribunal-Interference by
High
Court,
of
validity,-
HEADNOTE:
The
each
had
a branch at Pudukottai, a
former
native
and
State.
of the
assessee-companies.
Madurai head
moving
T, who
head
figure
was
in
the
of
the
fixed
the Bank.
available
profits
at Pudukottai.
The
of
Income-tax
the
Officer
fixed
deposits made
constructive
at
Pudukottai
amounted
to
branches
of
within
Assistant
to
upheld.
whether of
unit,
Commissioner
The
that
the
branch
only
at
of
in
one
Bank
and
assessees
the
Pudukottai
deposited
branch
to
the
Bank
and
transmission
loans
of
The
rightly assessed.
at interest to
the
held
thatthe
the
had transmitted
advance
assessees.
of
interested.,
funds
branch
assessees
and the
knowledge
of
assessees were
the
question
in
established
favour
assessees
that
there
was any
it
arrangement
was not
between the
Madurai
of
purpose of
advancing moneys to
transactions
there
for
the
and the
and
deposits
in
transferred
out
fixed
in
fact
them
In appeals by the
Commis-
must
In a reference the
High
the
Court
appellate
application
s.
about the
Madras,
Tribunal,
arrangement
the
the
or
money
by
should
or
arise
interest,
lent
at
be
If
all
down
that
deemed
section
to be
lays
interest
charging
of
of
money lent
outside, but brought into British India, was not ultra vires
the
Indian
it
was
extra-
British
India with the knowledge of the lender and borrower and this
gives rise to a real territorial connection.
This knowledge
H. Wadia v.
Commissioner of
Income-tax,
Bombay
17
economic
lift
Court
is
used
&
Co.,
D. 608. distinguished.
JUDGMENT:
B. Sen, A. N. Kirpal, S. P. Nayyar and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in all the
appeals).
R. Venkataraman and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the respondent (in all the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought,
by special leave, from the judgment of the High Court of Madras dated January 8, 1963
in Tax Case No. 108 of 1960.
All the three respondents (hereinafter called the aassessee- companies') are public
limited companies engaged in the manufacture and sale of yam at Madurai. Each of the
assessee-companies had a branch at Pudukottai engaged in the production and sale of
cotton yarn. The sale-proceeds of the branches were periodically deposited in the branch
of Madurai Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'Bank') at Pudukottai a former
native State either in the current accounts or fixed deposits which earned interest for the
various assessment years as follows:
Assessment years MeenakshiRajendra Saroja Mills millsmills Rs. Rs. Rs.
---------------------------------------------------1946-47 1,08,902 25,511 1947-48 1,18,791 24,953 30,620 1948-49 1,50,017 33,632
36,890 1949-50 42,36941,393 195-0-51 1,27,314 41,957 42,092 The Bank aforesaid was
incorporated on February 8, 1943 with Thyagaraja Chettiar as founder Director, the
Head Office being at Madurai. Out of 15,000 shares of this bank issued 14,766 were held
by Thyagaraja Chettiar, his two sons and the three assessee-companies as shown below:
Share holding
1. Thyagaraja Chettiar 1,008
2. Manickavasagam 250
3. Sundaram 250
4. Meenakshi Mills 5,972
5. Rajendra Mills 3,009
6. Saroja Mills 4,177 All the three assessee companies borrowed moneys from the
Madurai branch of the bank and on the security of the fixed deposits made by their
branches with the Pudukottai branch of the Bank. It is the admitted case that the loans
granted to the assessee-companies were far in excess of the available profits at
Pudukottai. In the assessment proceedings of the assessee-companies for the various
years under dispute, the Income-tax Officer was of the view that the borrowings in
British India on the security of the fixed deposits made at Pudukottai amounted to
constructive remittances of the profits by the branches of the assesseecompanies to their Head Offices in India within the meaning of s. 4 of the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter called the 'Act'). Accordingly he included the entire
profits of the assessee-companies including the interest receipts from the Pudukottai
branches in the assessment of the assessee-companies, since the overdrafts availed of by
the assessee-companies in British India far exceeded the available profits. The assesseecompanies appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax. After
examining the constitution of the assessee-companies and the Bank and the figures of deposits and overdrafts,
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner found that the deposits made by the assesseecompanies and other companies closely allied to them formed a substantial part of the
total deposits received by the Bank. He was also of the view that the Pudukottai branch
of the Bank had transmitted the funds so deposited for enabling the Madurai branch to
advance loans at interest to the assessee-companies and that the transmissions of the
funds were made with the knowledge of the assessee-companies who were major
shareholders of the Bank. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner also considered that
the Pudukottai branch of the Bank had no other appreciable transactions except the
collection of funds and on the facts found S. 42(1) of the Act applied to the case. The
assessee- companies took the matter in appeal to the appellate Tribunal -which took
note of the position that the head office and the branch-whether of the assesseecompanies or of the Bank-constituted only one unit and that Thyagraja Chettiar
occupied a special position in both the concerns and the establishment of the branch of
the Bank at Pudukottai was intended to help the financial operations of Thyagaraja
Chettiar in the concerns in which he was interested. After detailed consideration of the
deposits and overdrafts and the inter-branch transactions of the Bank the appellate
Tribunal held that s. 42(1) of the Act was applicable to the facts of the case and that the
assessee- companies must be attributed with the knowledge of the activity of their
branches at Pudukottai and of the remittances made by the Pudukottai branch of the
Bank to Madurai head office, and that the entire transactions formed part of an
arrangement or scheme.
In the course of its judgment, the appellate Tribunal observed as follows:
"Even so, it seems to us, we cannot escape the fact that Thyagaraja Chettiar, his two sons
and the three Mills had a preponderant, if not the whole, voice in the creation, running
and management of the Bank. We cannot also forget that Pudukottai is neither a cotton
producing area nor has a market for cotton; except that it was a non-taxable territory,
there was nothing else to recommend the carrying on of the business in cotton spinning
or weaving there. There is yet another aspect to which our attention was drawn by the
learned counsel for the assessee. That being, a non-taxable area, there were many very
rich men there with an influx of funds to invest in banks and industries. By the same
token, it appears to us it was not necessary for the Madurai Bank which was after all a
creation of certain people which started with a small capital of Rs. 32,800 to have gone
to Pudukottai for opening a branch. If there was an influx of money in Pudukottai
Sup.C.I./66-14 because of the finances, nobody would have agreed to borrow money
from it. At any rate, it is clear it would have had no field for investment in Pudukottai
the only source of investment being outside Pudukottai." The appellate Tribunal further
stated: "But having regard to the special position of Thyagaraja Chettiar and the balance
sheets of the bank referred to above and the lack of investments in Pudukottai itself of'
the moneys borrowed there, it seems more reasonable to conclude that the bank itself
was started at Madurai and a branch of it was opened at Pudukottai only with a view to
help the financial operations of Thyagaraja Chettiar and the mills in which he was vitally
interested."
At the instance of the assessee-companies the appellate Tribunal referred the following
question of law for the determination of the High Court:
"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the taxing of the entire
interest earned on the fixed deposits made out of the profits earned in Pudukottai by the
assessee's branches in the Pudukottai branch of the Bank of Madurai is correct?"
The High Court answered the question in favour of the assessee-companies holding that
it was not established that there was any arrangement between the assessee-companies
and the Bank whether at Pudukottai or at Madurai for transference of moneys from
Pudukottai branch to Madurai and the facts on record did not establish that there was
any transfer of funds between Pudukottai and Madurai for the purpose of advancing
moneys to the assessee-companies. The High Court further took the view that the
transactions represented ordinary banking transactions and there was nothing to show
that the amounts placed in fixed deposits in the branch were intended to, and were in
fact transferred to head office for the purpose of lending them out to the depositor
himself.
On behalf of the appellant Mr. Sen submitted at the outset that the High Court was not
legally justified in interfering with the findings of fact reached by the appellate Tribunal
and in concluding that there was no arrangement or scheme between the lender and the
borrower for the transference of funds from Pudukottai to Madurai. In our opinion,
there is justification for the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant and the
High Court erred in law in interfering with the findings of the appellate Tribunal in this
case. In India Cements Ltd., v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras(1) it was pointed
out by this Court that in a reference the High Court must accept the findings of fact
reached by the appellate Tribunal and it is for the party who. applied for a reference to
challenge those findings of fact first by an application unders. 66(1). If the party
concerned has failed to file an application under s. 66(1) expressly raising the question
about the validity of the findings of fact, he is not entitled to urge before the High Court
that the findings are vitiated for any reason. We therefore proceed to decide the question
of law raised in these appeals upon the findings of fact reached by the appellate
Tribunal.
Section 42 of the Act states as follows:
"All income, profits or gains accruing or arising whether directly or indirectly through or
from any money lent at interest and brought into the taxable territories in cash or in
kind shall be deemed to be income accruing or arising within the taxable territories This
section accordingly requires, in the first place, that any money should have been lent at
interest outside the taxable territory. In the second place, income, profits or gains
should accrue or arise directly or indirectly from such money so lent at interest, and, in
the third place, that the money should be brought into the taxable territories in cash or
in kind. If all these conditions are fulfilled, then the section lays it down that the interest
shall be deemed to be income accruing or arising within the taxable territories. This
section was the subject-matter of interpretation by the Federal Court in A. H. Wadia v.
Chettiar and the mills in which he was vitally interested. The Tribunal found that
Pudukottai branch of the Bank had transmitted funds deposited by the assesseecompanies for enabling the Madurai branch to advance loans at interest to the
assessee,companies and the transmission of the funds was made with the knowledge of
the assessee-companies who were the major shareholders of the Bank. In the context of
these facts it must be held that the entire transactions formed part of a basic
arrangement or scheme between the creditor and the debtor that the money should be
brought into British India after it was taken by the borrower outside the taxable
territory. We are accordingly of the opinion that the principle laid down in Wadia's(1)
case is satisfied in this case and that the Income-tax authorities were right in holding
that the entire interest earned on fixed deposits was taxable.
In the course of argument Mr. Venkataraman contended that even if Thyagaraja
Chettiar, a Director of the assessee- companies, knew in his capacity as Director of the
Madurai Bank that money placed in fixed deposit by the assessee- companies would be
transferred to the taxable territory, that knowledge cannot be imputed to the assesseecompanies and so it cannot be said that the transfer was part of an integral arrangement
of the loan transaction. In support of this argument learned Counsel referred to the
decision. of the Court of Appeal in David Payne & Co. Ltd., In re. Young v.
(1) 17 I.T.R. 63.
David Payne & Co. Ltd.,(1) We are unable to accept the argument of the respondents as
correct. The decision in David Payne & Co's (1) case, has no bearing on the question
presented for determination in the present case. In David Payne & Co's (1) case, supra,
the question at issue related to the powers and duties of Directors and it was held that
because the same person is a common director of two companies, the one company has
not necessarily notice of everything that is within the knowledge of the common
director, which knowledge he has acquired as director of the other company. In the
present case the question at issue is entirely different. The appellate Tribunal has, upon
examination of the evidence, found that the transference of funds from Pudukottai to
Madurai was made as part of the basic arrangement between the Bank and the assesseecompanies and that Thyagaraja Chettiar who was the moving figure both in the Bank
and in each of the assessee- companies had knowledge of this arrangement. It is well
established that in a matter of this description the Income- tax authorities are entitled to
pierce the veil of corporate entity and to look at the reality of the transaction. It is true
that from the juristic point of view the company is a legal personality entirely distinct
from its members and the company is capable of enjoying rights and being subjected to
duties which are not the same as those enjoyed or borne by its members. But in certain
exceptional cases the Court is entitled to lift the veil of corporate entity and to pay
regard to the economic realities behind the legal facade. For example, the Court has
power to disregard the corporate entity if it is used for tax evasion or to circumvent tax
obligation. For instance, in Apthorpe v. Peter Schoenhofen Brewing Co.(2) the Income
Tax Commissioners had found as a fact that all the property of the New York company,
except its land, had been transferred to an English company, and that the New York
company had only been kept in being to hold the land, since aliens were not allowed to
do so under New York law. All but three of the New York company's shares were held by
the English company, and as the Com- missioners also found, if the business was
technically that of the New York company, the latter was merely the agent of the English
company. In the light of these findings the Court of Appeal, despite the argument based
on Salomon'S(3) case, held that the New York business was that of the English company
which was liable for English income tax accordingly. In another case-Firestone Tyre and
Rubber Co. v. Llewellin(4)--an American company had an arrangement with its
distributors on the Continent of Europe -whereby they obtained supplies from the
English manufacturers, its wholly owned subsidiary. The English company credited the
American with the price received after deducting the costs plus 5 (1) [1904] 2 Ch. D.
608.
(3) [1897] A.C. 22.
(2) 4 T.C. 41.
(4) [1957] 1 W.L.R. 464.
per cent. It was conceded that the subsidiary was a separate legal entity and not a mere
emanation of the American parent, and that it was selling its own goods as principal and
not its parent's goods as agent. Nevertheless, these sales were a means whereby the
American company carried on its European business, and it was held that the substance
of the arrangement was that the American company traded in England through the
agency of its subsidiary. We, therefore, reject the argument of Mr. Venkataraman on this
aspect of the case.
For the reasons expressed we hold that the question referred to the High Court by the
appellate Tribunal must be answered in favour of the Income-tax Department and
against the respective assessee-companies and these appeals must be allowed with costs.
Y.P.
Appeals allowed.