722

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Villa vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 87416. April 8, 1991.

CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z.
LORAYES, respondents.
Courts; Jurisdiction; Criminal Procedure; Information; Since
the information alleges that the offense was committed in Makati,
the same is controlling, and it sufficiently vests jurisdiction upon the
RTC of Makati.In the case of People v. Hon. Manzanilla (156
SCRA 279 [1987] cited in the case of Lim v. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487
[1988]), the Supreme Court ruled that jurisdiction or venue is
determined by the allegations in the information. The information
under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was
committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is
controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case
and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or
information in court which initiates a criminal action (Republic v.
Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
Same; Same; Criminal Law; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22;
Bouncing Checks; Venue; In offenses involving violations of the
Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22), the determinative factor in
determining venue, is the place of the issuance of the check.
Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the
Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case of People v.
Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that the determinative factor (in
determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. On the
matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the
Ministry of Justice, citing the case of People v. Yabut (76 SCRA 624
[1977], laid down the following guidelines in Memorandum Circular
No. 4 dated December 15, 1981, the pertinent portion of which
reads: (1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check

was executed and delivered; (2) the place where the check was
written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it
was executed, as what is of decisive importance is the delivery
thereof which is the final act essential to its consummation as an
obligation; x x x (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel
Chua, October 28, 1980). (See The Law on Bouncing Checks
Analyzed by Judge Jesus F. Guerrero, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol.
7. Nos. 11 & 12, October-De-

_______________
*

SECOND DIVISION.

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VOL. 195, APRIL 8, 1991

723

De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

cember, 1983, p. 14). It is undisputed that the check in question was
executed and delivered by the petitioner to herein private
respondent at Makati, Metro Manila.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Foreign checks, provided they
are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable
outside thereof, are within the coverage of the Bouncing Checks Law.
However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn
against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is
therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency
involved in the case. As the trial court correctly ruled in its order
dated July 5, 1988: Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22),
foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the
Philippines though payable outside thereof x x x are within the
coverage of said law.
Statutes; Where the law does not make any exception, courts
may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify
it.It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where
the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish.
Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something unless compelling
reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. v. IAC,
150 SCRA 520 [1987]).

Same; Courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of

the legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a
statute of doubtful meaning.More importantly, it is well
established that courts may avail themselves of the actual
proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining the
construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca v. City of
Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what
a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision
during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be
adopted (Arenas v. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]).

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court

of Appeals. Melo, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
San Jose, Enriquez, Lacas, Santos & Borje for
petitioner.
Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent.
724

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

PARAS, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and
**
set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated
on February 1, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071 entitled
Cecilio S. de Villa vs. Judge Job B. Madayag, etc. and
Roberto Z. Lorayes, dismissing the petition for certiorari
filed therein.
The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court
of Appeals, is as follows:
On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged
before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z.
LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a Depositors Trust Company
Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987, payable to herein

complainant in the total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to

P50,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he had no
sufficient funds in or credit with drawee bank for payment of such check
in full upon its presentment which check when presented to the drawee
bank within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently
dishonored for the reason INSUFFICIENT FUNDS and despite receipt
of notice of such dishonor said accused failed to pay said ROBERTO Z.
LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days
after receiving said notice.

After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on

direct examination, petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on
the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged; and (b) That no offense was committed since
the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation
created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to
Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency).
_______________
**

Penned by Associate Justice Jose A. R. Melo and concurred in by

Associate Justices Manuel C. Herrera and Jorge S. Imperial.

725

VOL. 195, APRIL 8, 1991

725

De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued its first questioned
orders stating:
Accuseds motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied for lack of
merit.
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks,
provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though
payable outside thereof, or made payable and dishonored in the
Philippines though drawn and issued outside thereof, are within the
coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn against
current accounts in foreign currency.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was

subsequently denied by respondent court in its order dated
September 6, 1988, and which reads:
Accuseds motion for reconsideration, dated August 9, 1988, which was
opposed by the prosecution, is denied for lack of merit.

The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn against

current accounts in foreign currency (Proceedings of the Batasang
Pambansa, February 7, 1979, p. 1376, cited in Makati RTC Judge (now
Manila City Fiscal) Jesus F. Guerreros The Ramifications of the Law on
Bouncing Checks, p. 5). (Rollo, Annex A, Decision, pp. 20-22).

A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the

aforequoted orders dated July 19, 1988 and September 6,
1988 was filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals
wherein he contended:
(a) That since the questioned check was drawn against
the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank,
respondent court has no jurisdiction over the same
or with accounts outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the Philippines and that Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 could have not contemplated extending its
coverage over dollar accounts;
(b) That assuming that the subject check was issued in
connection with a private transaction between
petitioner and private respondent, the payment
could not be legally paid in dollars as it would
violate Republic Act No. 529; and
(c) That the obligation arising from the issuance of the
questioned check is null and void and is not
enforceable within the Philip726

726

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

pines either in a civil or criminal suit. Upon such premises,

petitioner concludes that the dishonor of the questioned
check cannot be said to have violated the provisions of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. (Rollo, Annex A, Decision, p.
22).
On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex A, Decision, p. 5)

A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed

by the petitioner on February 7, 1989 (Rollo, Petition, p. 6)

but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated March 3, 1989 (Rollo, Annex B, p. 26).
Hence, this petition.
In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second
Division of this Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p. 81).
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional
Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in
question.
The petition is without merit.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested
for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding
cases (Velunta v. Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147
[1988]).
Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the
action, over the subject matter, over the person of the
defendant, or over the issues framed in the pleadings
(Balais, v. Balais, 159 SCRA 37 [1988]).
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
statute in force at the time of commencement of the action
(De la Cruz v. Moya, 160 SCRA 538 [1988]).
The trial courts jurisdiction over the case, subject of this
review, can not be questioned.
Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
specifically provide that:
Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or
information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the
727

VOL. 195, APRIL 8, 1991

727

De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof
occured at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place wherein it was committed constitutes an essential
element of the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense
charged.
Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to
existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients

thereof took place.

In the case of People v. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279

[1987] cited in the case of Lim v. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487
[1988]), the Supreme Court ruled that jurisdiction or
venue is determined by the allegations in the information.
The information under consideration specifically alleged
that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila
and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest
jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The
Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the
person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or
information in court which initiates a criminal action
(Republic v. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of
the Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case of
People v. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that the
determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of
the issuance of the check.
On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22, the Ministry of Justice, citing the case of People
v. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the following
guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December
15, 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads:
(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was
executed and delivered; (2) the place where the check was written,
signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it was
executed, as what is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof
which is the final act essential to its consummation as an
obligation; x x x (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel
Chua, October 28, 1980). (See The Law on Bouncing Checks
Analyzed by Judge Jesus F. Guerrero, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol.
7. Nos. 11 & 12, October-December, 1983, p. 14).
728

728

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

It is undisputed that the check in question was executed

and delivered by the petitioner to herein private
respondent at Makati, Metro Manila.
However, petitioner argues that the check in question
was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a

foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing

Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the
currency involved in the case. As the trial court correctly
ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks,
provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines
though payable outside thereof x x x are within the coverage of said
law.

It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that

where the law does not distinguish courts should not
distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law
does not make any exception, courts may not except
something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it
(Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. v. IAC, 150 SCRA 520
[1987]).
More importantly, it is well established that courts may
avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative
body to assist in determining the construction of a statute
of doubtful meaning (Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125
[1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision
of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during
the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be
adopted (Arenas v. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318
[1978]).
The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show
that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to
whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The
discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa
fully sustains this view, as follows:
x x x
xxx
x x x.
THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is
recognized.
MR.TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed.
MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of
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VOL. 195, APRIL 8, 1991

De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

729

the Gentlemen who interpellated that any check may be

involved, like U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are talking about
checks in our country. There are U.S. dollar checks, checks
in our currency, and many others.
THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.
MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker,
and this check may be a check in whatever currency. This
would not even be limited to U.S. dollar checks. The
check may be in French francs or Japanese yen or
deutschunorhs. (sic.) If drawn, then this bill will apply.
MR. TUPAY. So, it include U.S. dollar checks.
MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
xxx
xxx
(p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Italics
supplied, for emphasis).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento
and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Note.Jurisdiction to try a criminal case is determined
from the allegations in the information. (People vs.
Masilang, 142 SCRA 673.)
o0o
730

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