Arceta v. Mangrobang

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 152895
June 15, 2004
OFELIA V. ARCETA, petitioner,

vs.
The Honorable MA. CELESTINA C. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge,
Branch 54, Metropolitan Trial Court of Navotas, Metro Manila,
respondent.
x--------------------------x
G.R. No. 153151 June 15, 2004
GLORIA S. DY, Petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable EDWIN B. RAMIZO, Presiding Judge, Branch 53,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For resolution are two consolidated1 petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for a
temporary restraining order. Both assail the constitutionality of the
Bouncing Checks Law, also known as Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
In G.R. No. 152895, petitioner Ofelia V. Arceta prays that we order the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Navotas, Metro Manila, Branch 54, to
cease and desist from hearing Criminal Case No. 1599-CR for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, and then dismiss the case against her. In G.R. No. 153151,
petitioner Gloria S. Dy also prays that this Court order the MeTC of
Caloocan City to cease and desist from proceeding with Criminal Case No.
212183, and subsequently dismiss the case against her. In fine, however,
we find that what both petitioners seek is that the Court should revisit and
abandon the doctrine laid down in Lozano v. Martinez,2 which upheld the
validity of the Bouncing Checks Law.
The facts of these cases are not in dispute.
1. G.R. No. 152895
The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with
violating B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 1599-CR. The accusatory portion of said Information reads:
That on or about the 16th day of September 1998, in Navotas, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make or draw and issue to OSCAR R. CASTRO, to apply on account or for
value the check described below:
Check No.:
82270
Drawn Against:
The Region Bank
In the Amount of: P740,000.00

Date:
December 21, 1998
Payable to:
Cash
said accused well-knowing that at the time of issue Ofelia V. Arceta did not
have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment, which
check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for reason
"DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS," and despite receipt of notice
of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee with the face
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the
Information quashed on the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was unconstitutional.
She reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a move
would be an exercise in futility for it was highly unlikely that the trial court
would grant her motion and thus go against prevailing jurisprudence.
On October 21, 2002,4 Arceta was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the
charge. However, she manifested that her arraignment should be without
prejudice to the present petition or to any other actions she would take to
suspend proceedings in the trial court.
Arceta then filed the instant petition.
2. G.R. No. 153151
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet against
Gloria S. Dy for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed by the
MeTC of Caloocan City as Criminal Case No. 212183. Dy allegedly
committed the offense in this wise:
That on or about the month of January 2000 in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make and issue Check No. 0000329230 drawn against
PRUDENTIAL BANK in the amount of P2,500,000.00 dated January 19,
2000 to apply for value in favor of ANITA CHUA well knowing at the time of
issue that she has no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check was
subsequently dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and with
intent to defraud failed and still fails to pay the said complainant the amount
of P2,500,000.00 despite receipt of notice from the drawee bank that said
check has been dishonored and had not been paid.
Contrary to Law.5
Like Arceta, Dy made no move to dismiss the charges against her on the
ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was unconstitutional. Dy likewise believed that any
move on her part to quash the indictment or to dismiss the charges on said
ground would fail in view of the Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a petition
with this Court invoking its power of judicial review to have the said law
voided for Constitutional infirmity.
Both Arceta and Dy raise the following identical issues for our resolution:
[a] Does section 1 really penalize the act of issuing a check subsequently
dishonored by the bank for lack of funds?
[b] What is the effect if the dishonored check is not paid pursuant to section
2 of BP 22?
[c] What is the effect if it is so paid?
[d] Does section 2 make BP 22 a debt collecting law under threat of
imprisonment?
[e] Does BP 22 violate the constitutional proscription against imprisonment
for non-payment of debt?
[f] Is BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power of the state? 6
After minute scrutiny of petitioners submissions, we find that the basic
issue being raised in these special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus concern the unconstitutionality or invalidity of B.P. Blg. 22.
Otherwise put, the petitions constitute an oblique attack on the
constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law, a matter already passed
upon by the Court through Justice (later Chief Justice) Pedro Yap almost
two decades ago. Petitioners add, however, among the pertinent issues
one based on the observable but worrisome transformation of certain
metropolitan trial courts into seeming collection agencies of creditors
whose complaints now clog the court dockets.
But let us return to basics. When the issue of unconstitutionality of a
legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota
of the case.7 Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court
assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an
act of Congress. With due regard to counsels spirited advocacy in both
cases, we are unable to agree that the abovecited requisites have been
adequately met.
Perusal of these petitions reveals that they are primarily anchored on Rule
65, Section 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In a special civil action
of certiorari the only question that may be raised is whether or not the
respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.9 Yet nowhere in these petitions is there any allegation
that the respondent judges acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A special civil action for certiorari will
prosper only if a grave abuse of discretion is manifested. 10
Noteworthy, the instant petitions are conspicuously devoid of any
attachments or annexes in the form of a copy of an order, decision, or
resolution issued by the respondent judges so as to place them
understandably within the ambit of Rule 65. What are appended to the
petitions are only copies of the Informations in the respective cases,
nothing else. Evidently, these petitions for a writ of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus do not qualify as the actual and appropriate cases
contemplated by the rules as the first requisite for the exercise of this
Courts power of judicial review. For as the petitions clearly show on their
faces petitioners have not come to us with sufficient cause of action.
Instead, it appears to us that herein petitioners have placed the cart before
the horse, figuratively speaking. Simply put, they have ignored the
hierarchy of courts outlined in Rule 65, Section 4 11 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Seeking judicial review at the earliest opportunity does not
mean immediately elevating the matter to this Court. Earliest opportunity
means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should
have been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Thus,
the petitioners should have moved to quash the separate indictments or
moved to dismiss the cases in the proceedings in the trial courts on the
ground of unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22. But the records show that
petitioners failed to initiate such moves in the proceedings below. Needless
to emphasize, this Court could not entertain questions on the invalidity of a
statute where that issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and
adequately argued.12 Taking into account the early stage of the trial
proceedings below, the instant petitions are patently premature.
Nor do we find the constitutional question herein raised to be the very lis
mota presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is
doubtful, speculative or argumentative. 13 We have examined the

contentions of the petitioners carefully; but they still have to persuade us
that B.P. Blg. 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision
of the Constitution. Even the thesis of petitioner Dy that the present
economic and financial crisis should be a basis to declare the Bouncing
Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant consideration. As we
stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there exists a
most compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the financial
system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as
currency substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading
and financial communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial
courts may be burdened immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that
fact is immaterial to the alleged invalidity of the law being assailed. The
solution to the clogging of dockets in lower courts lies elsewhere.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines

June 15, 2004

OFELIA V. ARCETA, petitioner,

The Region Bank

In the Amount of: P740,000.00

December 21, 1998

doubtful, speculative or argumentative. 13 We have examined the

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