The requisites of consignation are as follows:

1. The existence of a valid debt.

2. Valid prior tender, unless tender is excuse [sic];

3. Prior notice of consignation (before deposit)

4. Actual consignation (deposit);

5. Subsequent notice of consignation;

Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the
creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment and generally requires a prior tender of
payment. In order that consignation may be effective, the debtor must show that: (1) there was a
debt due; (2) the consignation of the obligation had been made because the creditor to whom tender
of payment was made refused to accept it, or because he was absent or incapacitated, or because
several persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due or because the title to the
obligation has been lost; (3) previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person
interested in the performance of the obligation; (4) the amount due was placed at the disposal of the
court; and (5) after the consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof.
Failure in any of these requirements is enough ground to render a consignation ineffective

Consignation is made by depositing the proper amount to the judicial authority, before whom the
tender of payment and the announcement of the consignation shall be proved. All interested parties
are to be notified of the consignation. It had been consistently held that compliance with these
requisites is mandatory.

In Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Toyota Bel-Air, Inc.,17 the Court enumerated the
requisites of a valid consignation: (1) a debt due; (2) the creditor to whom tender of payment was
made refused without just cause to accept the payment, or the creditor was absent, unknown or
incapacitated, or several persons claimed the same right to collect, or the title of the obligation was
lost; (3) the person interested in the performance of the obligation was given notice before
consignation was made; (4) the amount was placed at the disposal of the court; and (5) the
person interested in the performance of the obligation was given notice after the
consignation was made.

Articles 1257 and 1258 of the Civil Code state, respectively:

Art. 1257. In order that the consignation of the thing due may release the obligor, it must first
be announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation.

The consignation shall be ineffectual if it is not made strictly in consonance with the
provisions which regulate payment.

Art. 1258. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of judicial
authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper case, and the
announcement of the consignation in other cases.
The consignation having been made, the interested parties shall also be notified thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)

The giving of notice to the persons interested in the performance of the obligation is mandatory.
Failure to notify the persons interested in the performance of the obligation will render the
consignation void. In Ramos v. Sarao,18 the Court held that, "All interested parties are to be
notified of the consignation. Compliance with [this requisite] is mandatory."19 In Valdellon v.
Tengco,20 the Court held that:

Under Art. 1257 of our Civil Code, in order that consignation of the thing due may release the
obligor, it must first be announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of the
obligation. The consignation shall be ineffectual if it is not made strictly in consonance with
the provisions which regulate payment. In said Article 1258, it is further stated that the
consignation having been made, the interested party shall also be notified
thereof.21 (Emphasis supplied)

In Soco v. Militante, et al.,22 the Court held that:

We hold that the essential requisites of a valid consignation must be complied with fully and
strictly in accordance with the law, Articles 1256 to 1261, New Civil Code. That these Articles
must be accorded a mandatory construction is clearly evident and plain from the very language of
the codal provisions themselves which require absolute compliance with the essential requisites
therein provided. Substantial compliance is not enough for that would render only a directory
construction to the law. The use of the words "shall" and "must" which are imperative, operating to
impose a duty which may be enforced, positively indicate that all the essential requisites of a valid
consignation must be complied with. The Civil Code Articles expressly and explicitly direct what
must be essentially done in order that consignation shall be valid and effectua

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 84330 May 8, 1991

RAMON Y. ASCUE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (8th Division) and RAMON ANTONIO, SALVADOR SALENGA and
ULIPIA FERNANDEZ, respondents.

Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.

Urbina & Associates Law Office for private respondent.

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails the decision * respondent Court of Appeals,
dated 25 July 1988, rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 12765, which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, dismissing the appeal filed with the latter court for being
premature and holding, in any event, that the proper remedy was a special civil action for certiorari.

The present case is related to G.R. No. 78438,** as the two (2) cases arise from the same complaint
filed by private respondents against the petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch
29.

The antecedent facts of this case as revealed by the records of the present petition and those of
G.R. No. 78438, are as follows:

1. On 25 July 1986, private respondents (as plaintiffs) filed a complaint with the Metropolitan
1

Trial Court of Manila, Branch 29, alleging therein the following: that private respondents
Salvador Salenga, Ramon Antonio, and Ulipia Fernandez are the lessees of petitioner,
occupying Nos. 948, 950 and 952 of the leased premises located in Pepin St., Sampaloc,
Manila, respectively; that their respective monthly rentals thereon are P635.00, P950.00 and
P950.00; that petitioner-defendant refused to collect the rentals for the months of May, June
and July, 1986 except the P 1,500.00 which petitioner-defendant collected from respondent
Antonio which represented rentals for the month of May, and one-half rental for June, 1986;
that the aggregate amount (of) rentals that became due is P 5,625.00 which petitioner
refused to receive; that hence, private respondents sought the consignation of the said
amount with the metropolitan (trial) court;

2. The petitioner-defendant filed a motion to dismiss complaint on the ground that it is the
2

regional trial courts, not metropolitan trial courts, which have jurisdiction over consignation
cases, the subject matter of litigation being incapable of pecuniary estimation;

3. In the Order of the metropolitan (trial) court, dated 17 October 1986, the motion was
dismissed (denied), ruling that the amount consigned (i.e. P 5,625.00) being well below P
20,000.00, the inferior court had jurisdiction, besides which a motion to dismiss is a
prohibited pleading. 3

4. Petitioner-defendant appealed the order to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52,
which, in its decision dated 20 March 1987 dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was
premature and in any event, the remedy was a special civil action for certiorari; 4

5. On 23 June l987, petitioner-defendant filed with this Court, a direct appeal docketed (as)
G.R. No. 78438, from the judgment of the RTC, Manila, Branch 52, dated 20 March 1987. In 5

the resolution dated 19 August 1987, this Court resolved "to REFER the case (G.R. No.
78438) to the Court of Appeals which has concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the said petition, it appearing that no special and important reason had been cited to justify
the Court's taking cognizance of the petition at the first instance.

6. Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated 19 August 1987, but
which motion was denied by this Court in resolution dated 31 August 1988. Meantime, even
before the Court resolved to deny the said motion, the respondent Court of Appeals, in its
6

decision dated 25 July 1988, dismissed the petition (G.R. No. 78438, which was docketed
CA-G.R. SP. No. 12765).

7. On 9 September 1988, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari docketed G.R. No. 84330, questioning the aforesaid decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals. 7
The appellate court in its now assailed decision ruled as follows: first, that the jurisdiction of a court
in consignation cases depends on the amount consigned, consignation being merely a form of
payment and the opposite of a demand by a creditor for payment; second, that the RTC dismissed
8

petitioner's appeal based on procedural rather than on substantive grounds, is of no moment, as

what is decisive is that the complaint for consignation was filed in the proper court (Metropolitan Trial
Court).

In the present petition (G.R. No. 84330), petitioner raises the following arguments, to wit:

A. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that consignation cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts and that the amount consigned determines said
jurisdiction;

B. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in refusing to resolve the issue of whether or not
appeal and not a special civil action is the proper recourse when a motion to dismiss
grounded on lack of jurisdiction, is denied;

C. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in issuing its decision of July 25, 1988, in spite of
its awareness of incidents still pending before this Honorable Supreme Court, thus inflicting
upon the litigants the not inconsiderable burden of more expenses, duplication of pleadings
and additional work-load on both court and parties. 9

The petition is not impressed with merit.

As to the first contention, petitioner submits that the action at bar is one for consignation, and it is the
Regional Trial Court, not the Metropolitan Trial Court, which has jurisdiction over the same,
10 11

inasmuch as the subject matter of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; and that the amount
actually consigned (P 5,625.00 in this case) is of no moment.

We do not agree.

Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the
12

creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment and it generally requires a prior tender of
payment. Two (2) of the requisites of a valid consignation are (1) that there is a debt due, and (2)
13

the amount due is placed at the disposal of the court. Thus, where no debt is due and owing,
14

consignation is not proper. In a valid consignation where the thing sought to be deposited is a
15

sum of money, the amount of the debt due is determinable. Clearly, the subject matter (i.e.
the amount due) in consignation cases is capable of pecuniary estimation. This amount
sought to be consigned determines the jurisdiction of the court.

In the case at bar, the amount consigned being P5,625.00, the respondent metropolitan trial court
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the same, in accordance with Section 33(l) of BP Blg. 129,
previously quoted.

As to petitioner's arguments Nos. 2 and 3, considering the reasons for which G.R. No. 78438 was
referred by this Court to respondent appellate court, as stated in the resolution of the Court dated 19
August 1987, and further taking into account that no reversible error was committed by respondent
Court of Appeals, we find no compelling reason to overturn the riling in the questioned decision.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 25 July 1988, rendered in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 12765, which affirmed the judgment of the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 52, dated 20 March 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED, and the petition in this G.R. No. 84330 is
accordingly DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.