3&epublic of tbe tlbilippines

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<tourt

Jlllanila
FIRST DIVISION
JENNY F. PECKSON,

G.R. No. 198534

Petitioner,
Present:
SERENO, C.J,
Chailperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
REYES,JJ

-versus-

ROBINSONS SUPERMARKET
CORPORATION, JODY GADIA,
ROENA SARTE, and RUBY ALEX,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

X-------------------------------------------------------------------------DECISION
REYES, J.:
For resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the
2
Decision dated June 8, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 109604 affirming the Decision 3 dated February 25, 2009 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case
No. 00-11-09316-06/NLRC LAC No. 002020-07, which upheld the
dismissal 4 by the Labor Arbiter (LA) on May 30, 2007 of Jenny F. Peckson's
(petitioner) complaint for constructive dismissal.

Rollo, pp. 11-32.

Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guarifia Ill, with Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas,
Jr. and Manuel M. Barrios, concurring; id. at 522-532.
3
Penned by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles, with Commissioners Perlita B. Velasco
and Romeo L. Go, concurring; id. at 330-336.
4
Issued by LA Arthur L. Amansec; id. at 453-459.

Decision

G.R. No. 198534

Antecedent Facts and Proceedings

The petitioner first joined the Robinsons Supermarket Corporation
(RSC) as a Sales Clerk on November 3, 1987. On October 26, 2006, she
was holding the position of Category Buyer when respondent Roena Sarte
(Sarte), RSCs Assistant Vice-President for Merchandising, reassigned her to
the position of Provincial Coordinator, effective November 1, 2006.5
Claiming that her new assignment was a demotion because it was
non-supervisory and clerical in nature, the petitioner refused to turn over her
responsibilities to the new Category Buyer, or to accept her new
responsibilities as Provincial Coordinator. Jody Gadia (Gadia) and Ruby
Alex (Alex) were impleaded because they were corporate officers of the
RSC.
In a memorandum to the petitioner dated November 13, 2006,6 the
RSC, through Sarte, demanded an explanation from her within 48 hours for
her refusal to accept her new assignment despite written and verbal
demands. Sarte cited a company rule, Offenses Subject to Disciplinary
Action No. 4.07, which provided that [d]isobedience, refusal or failure to
do assigned task or to obey superiors/officials orders/instructions, or to
follow established procedures or practices without valid reason would be
meted the penalty of suspension.
The petitioner ignored the 48-hour deadline to explain imposed by
Sarte. On November 23, 2006, Sarte issued her another memorandum,7
reiterating her demand to explain in writing within 48 hours why she
persistently refused to assume her new position, and warning her that this
could be her final chance to present her side or be deemed to have waived
her right to be heard.
In her one-paragraph reply submitted on November 27, 2006,8 the
petitioner stated that she could not accept the position of Provincial
Coordinator since she saw it as a demotion. As it turned out, however, on
November 9, 2006, the petitioner had already filed a complaint for
constructive dismissal9 against RSC, Sarte, Gadia and Alex (respondents).
On November 30, 2006, Sarte issued an instruction to the petitioner to
report to RSCs Metroeast Depot to help prepare all shipping manifests for
Cagayan de Oro and Bacolod, but as witnessed by RSC employees Raquel
Torrechua and Alex, she did not obey as instructed.10 Again on December 8,
5
6
7
8
9
10

Id. at 77.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 123.

Decision

G.R. No. 198534

2006, Sarte issued a similar instruction, citing the need for certain tasks from
the petitioner in preparation for the coming Christmas holidays, but the
petitioner again refused to heed.11
As culled from the assailed appellate court decision,12 the petitioner
argued before the LA that the true organizational chart of the RSC showed
that the position of Category Buyer was one level above that of the
Provincial Coordinator, and that moreover, the job description of a
Provincial Coordinator was largely clerical and did not require her to
analyze stock levels and order points, or source new local and international
suppliers, or monitor stock level per store and recommend items for
replenishment, or negotiate better items and discounts from suppliers, duties
which only a Category Buyer could perform. She also claimed that she was
instructed to file a courtesy resignation in exchange for a separation pay of
one-half salary per year of service.
The respondents in their position paper denied the correctness of the
organizational chart presented by the petitioner. They maintained that her
transfer was not a demotion since the Provincial Coordinator occupied a
Level 5 position like the Category Buyer, with the same work conditions,
salary and benefits. But while both positions had no significant disparity in
the required skill, experience and aptitude, the position of Category Buyer
demanded the traits of punctuality, diligence and attentiveness because it is a
frontline position in the day-to-day business operations of RSC which the
petitioner, unfortunately, did not possess.
The respondents also raised the petitioners record of habitual
tardiness as far back as 1999, as well as poor performance rating in 2005. In
addition to her performance rating of 2.8 out of 4.0 in 2005 equivalent
to below expectation, the petitioner was found to be tardy in June and July
2005, 13 times, and for the entire 2005, 57 times; that she was suspended
twice in 2006 for 20 instances of tardiness and absences from July to
September 2006 alone.13 We also note that the petitioner was suspended for
seven (7) days in September and October 2005 for deliberately violating a
company policy after she was seen having lunch with a company supplier.14
In her affidavit,15 respondent Sarte denied that the reassignment of the
petitioner as Provincial Coordinator was motivated by a desire to besmirch
the name of the latter. She asserted that it was made in the exercise of
management prerogative and sound discretion, in view of the sensitive
position occupied by the Category Buyer in RSCs daily operations, vis--vis
11
12
13
14
15

Id. at 124.
Id. at 522-532.
Id. at 107-119, 225-226, 268, 308.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 230-231.

Decision

G.R. No. 198534

the petitioners below expectation performance rating and habitual

tardiness.
In dismissing the petitioners complaint, the LA in its Decision16 dated
May 30, 2007 ruled that job reassignment or classification is a strict
prerogative of the employer, and that the petitioner cannot refuse her transfer
from Category Buyer to Provincial Coordinator since both positions
commanded the same salary structure, high degree of responsibility and
impeccable honesty and integrity. Upholding the employers right not to
retain an employee in a particular position to prevent losses or to promote
profitability, the LA found no showing of any illegal motive on the part of
the respondents in reassigning the petitioner. The transfer was dictated by
the need for punctuality, diligence and attentiveness in the position of
Category Buyer, which the petitioner clearly lacked. Moreover, the LA ruled
that her persistent refusal to accept her new position amounted to
insubordination, entitling the RSC to dismiss her from employment.
A month after the above ruling, or on June 22, 2007, the petitioner
tendered her written forced resignation,17 wherein she complained that she
was being subjected to ridicule by clients and co-employees alike on account
of her floating status since the time she refused to accept her transfer. She
likewise claimed that she was being compelled to accept the position of
Provincial Coordinator without due process.
On appeal, the NLRC in its Decision18 dated February 25, 2009
sustained the findings of the LA. It agreed that the lateral transfer of the
petitioner from Category Buyer to Provincial Coordinator was not a
demotion amounting to constructive dismissal, since both positions belonged
to Job Level 5 and between them there is no significant disparity in terms of
the requirements of skill, experience and aptitude. Contrary to the
petitioners assertion, the NLRC found that the position of Provincial
Coordinator is not a rank-and-file position but in fact requires the exercise of
discretion and independent judgment, as well as appropriate
recommendations to management to ensure the faithful implementation of its
policies and programs; that it even exercises influence over the Category
Buyer in that it includes performing a recommendatory function to guide the
Category Buyer in making decisions on the right assortment, price and
quantity of the items, articles or merchandise to be sold by the store.
The NLRC then reiterated the settled rule that management may
transfer an employee from one office to another within the business
establishment, provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary,
benefits, and other privileges, and the action is not motivated by
16
17
18

Id. at 453-459.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 330-336.

Decision

G.R. No. 198534

discrimination or bad faith or effected as a form of punishment without

sufficient cause. It ruled that the respondents were able to show that the
petitioners transfer was not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial, but
was prompted by her failure to meet the demands of punctuality, diligence,
and personal attention of the position of Category Buyer; that management
wanted to give the petitioner a chance to improve her work ethic, but her
obstinate refusal to assume her new position has prejudiced respondent RSC,
even while she continued to receive her salaries and benefits as Provincial
Coordinator.
On petition for certiorari to the CA, the petitioner insisted that her
transfer from Category Buyer to Provincial Coordinator was a form of
demotion without due process, and that the respondents unjustifiably
depicted her as remiss in her duties, flawed in her character, and unduly
obstinate in her refusal to accept her new post.
In its Decision19 dated June 8, 2011, the CA found no basis to deviate
from the oft-repeated tenet that the findings of fact and conclusions of the
NLRC when supported by substantial evidence are generally accorded not
only great weight and respect but even finality, and are thus deemed
binding.20
Petition for Review in the Supreme Court
Now on petition for review to this Court, the petitioner maintains that
her lateral transfer from Category Buyer to Provincial Coordinator was a
demotion amounting to constructive dismissal because her reassignment was
not a valid exercise of management prerogative, but was done in bad faith
and without due process. She claims that the respondents manipulated the
facts to show that she was tardy; that they even surreptitiously drew up a
new organizational chart of the Merchandising Department of RSC, soon
after she filed her complaint for illegal dismissal, to show that the position of
Provincial Coordinator belonged to Job Level 5 as the Category Buyer, and
not one level below; that the company deliberately embarrassed her when it
cut off her email access; that they sent memoranda to her clients that she was
no longer a Category Buyer, and to the various Robinsons branches that she
was now a Provincial Coordinator, while Milo Padilla (Padilla) was taking
over her former position as Category Buyer; that for seven (7) months, they
placed her on floating status and subjected her to mockery and ridicule by
the suppliers and her co-employees; that not only was there no justification
for her transfer, but the respondents clearly acted in bad faith and with
discrimination, insensibility and disdain to make her stay with the company
intolerable for her.
19
20

Id. at 522-532.
Acebedo Optical v. National Labor Relations Commission, 554 Phil. 524, 541 (2007).

Decision

G.R. No. 198534

Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
This Court has consistently refused
to interfere with the exercise by
management of its prerogative to
regulate the employees work
assignments, the working methods
and the place and manner of work.
As we all know, there are various laws imposing all kinds of burdens
and obligations upon the employer in relation to his employees, and yet as a
rule this Court has always upheld the employers prerogative to regulate all
aspects of employment relating to the employees work assignment, the
working methods and the place and manner of work. Indeed, labor laws
discourage interference with an employers judgment in the conduct of his
business.21
In Rural Bank of Cantilan, Inc. v. Julve,22 the Court had occasion to
summarize the general jurisprudential guidelines affecting the right of the
employer to regulate employment, including the transfer of its employees:
Under the doctrine of management prerogative, every employer has
the inherent right to regulate, according to his own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments,
working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work supervision,
transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and
recall of employees. The only limitations to the exercise of this
prerogative are those imposed by labor laws and the principles of equity
and substantial justice.
While the law imposes many obligations upon the employer,
nonetheless, it also protects the employers right to expect from its
employees not only good performance, adequate work, and diligence, but
also good conduct and loyalty. In fact, the Labor Code does not excuse
employees from complying with valid company policies and reasonable
regulations for their governance and guidance.
Concerning the transfer of employees, these are the following
jurisprudential guidelines: (a) a transfer is a movement from one position
to another of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in the service
or a lateral movement from one position to another of equivalent rank or
salary; (b) the employer has the inherent right to transfer or reassign an
21
22

Tinio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171764, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 533, 539.
545 Phil. 619 (2007).

Decision

G.R. No. 198534

employee for legitimate business purposes; (c) a transfer becomes

unlawful where it is motivated by discrimination or bad faith or is effected
as a form of punishment or is a demotion without sufficient cause; (d) the
employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee.23 (Citations omitted)

In Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation v. NLRC,24 it was

held that the exercise of managements prerogative concerning the
employees work assignments is based on its assessment of the
qualifications, aptitudes and competence of its employees, and by moving
them around in the various areas of its business operations it can ascertain
where they will function with maximum benefit to the company.
It is the employers prerogative, based on its assessment and
perception of its employees qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to
move them around in the various areas of its business operations in order
to ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the
company. An employees right to security of tenure does not give him
such a vested right in his position as would deprive the company of its
prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where he will be
most useful. When his transfer is not unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor
prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or a
diminution of his salaries, benefits, and other privileges, the employee
may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.25

As a privilege inherent in the employers right to control and manage

its enterprise effectively, its freedom to conduct its business operations to
achieve its purpose cannot be denied.26 We agree with the appellate court
that the respondents are justified in moving the petitioner to another
equivalent position, which presumably would be less affected by her
habitual tardiness or inconsistent attendance than if she continued as a
Category Buyer, a frontline position in the day-to-day business operations
of a supermarket such as Robinsons.
If the transfer of an employee is not
unreasonable, or inconvenient, or
prejudicial to him, and it does not
involve a demotion in rank or a
diminution of his salaries, benefits
and other privileges, the employee
may not complain that it amounts
to a constructive dismissal.

23
24
25
26

Id. at 624-625.
253 Phil. 149 (1989).
Id. at 153.
Blue Dairy Corporation v. NLRC, 373 Phil. 179, 186 (1999).

Decision

G.R. No. 198534

As we have already noted, the respondents had the burden of proof

that the transfer of the petitioner was not tantamount to constructive
dismissal, which as defined in Blue Dairy Corporation v. NLRC,27 is a
quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, or an offer involving a demotion in rank and
diminution of pay:
The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without
grave abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and
fair play. Having the right should not be confused with the manner in
which that right is exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the
employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker. In particular, the
employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion
in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits.
Should the employer fail to overcome this burden of proof, the employees
transfer shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal, which has been
defined as a quitting because continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer involving a demotion in
rank and diminution in pay. Likewise, constructive dismissal exists when
an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has
become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with no option but to
forego with his continued employment.

Thus, as further held in Philippine Japan Active Carbon

Corporation,28 when the transfer of an employee is not unreasonable, or
inconvenient, or prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a demotion in
rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits and other privileges, the
employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.29
But like all other rights, there are limits to the exercise of managerial
prerogative to transfer personnel, and on the employer is laid the burden to
show that the same is without grave abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the
basic elements of justice and fair play.30 Indeed, management prerogative
may not be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an
undesirable worker.31
Interestingly, although the petitioner claims that she was
constructively dismissed, yet until the unfavorable decision of the LA on
May 30, 2007, for seven (7) months she continued to collect her salary while
also adamantly refusing to heed the order of Sarte to report to the Metroeast
Depot. It was only on June 22, 2007, after the LAs decision, that she filed
her forced resignation. Her deliberate and unjustified refusal to assume
27
28
29
30
31

Id.
Supra note 24.
Id. at 153.
Blue Dairy Corporation v. NLRC, supra note 26.
Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. v. NLRC, 334 Phil. 84, 93 (1997).

Decision

G.R. No. 198534

her new assignment is a form of neglect of duty, and according to the LA, an
act of insubordination. We saw how the company sought every chance to
hear her out on her grievances and how she ignored the memoranda of Sarte
asking her to explain her refusal to accept her transfer. All that the petitioner
could say was that it was a demotion and that her floating status embarrassed
her before the suppliers and her co-employees.
The respondents have discharged
the burden of proof that the
transfer of the petitioner was not
tantamount
to
constructive
dismissal.
In Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. v. NLRC,32 a machinist
who had been employed with the petitioner company for 16 years was
reduced to the service job of transporting filling materials after he failed to
report for work for one (1) day on account of an urgent family matter. This
is one instance where the employees demotion was rightly held to be an
unlawful constructive dismissal because the employer failed to show
substantial proof that the employees demotion was for a valid and just
cause:
In case of a constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of
proving that the transfer and demotion of an employee are for valid and
legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity. Particularly, for a
transfer not to be considered a constructive dismissal, the employer must
be able to show that such transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or
prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a
diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits. Failure of the
employer to overcome this burden of proof, the employees demotion shall
no doubt be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal. x x x.33
(Citation omitted)

In the case at bar, we agree with the appellate court that there is
substantial showing that the transfer of the petitioner from Category Buyer
to Provincial Coordinator was not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial
to her. The petitioner failed to dispute that the job classifications of
Category Buyer and Provincial Coordinator are similar, or that they
command a similar salary structure and responsibilities. We agree with the
NLRC that the Provincial Coordinators position does not involve mere
clerical functions but requires the exercise of discretion from time to time, as
well as independent judgment, since the Provincial Coordinator gives
appropriate recommendations to management and ensures the faithful
implementation of policies and programs of the company. It even has
influence over a Category Buyer because of its recommendatory function
32
33

334 Phil. 84 (1997).

Id. at 95.

Decision

10

G.R. No. 198534

that enables the Category Buyer to make right decisions on assortment, price
and quantity of the items to be sold by the store.34
We also cannot sustain the petitioners claim that she was not
accorded due process and that the respondents acted toward her with
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain as to force her to forego her
continued employment. In addition to verbal reminders from Sarte, the
petitioner was asked in writing twice to explain within 48 hours her refusal
to accept her transfer. In the first, she completely remained silent, and in the
second, she took four (4) days to file a mere one-paragraph reply, wherein
she simply said that she saw the Provincial Coordinator position as a
demotion, hence she could not accept it. Worse, she may even be said to
have committed insubordination when she refused to turn over her
responsibilities to the new Category Buyer, Padilla, and to assume her new
responsibilities as Provincial Coordinator and report to the Metroeast Depot
as directed. This was precisely the reason why the petitioner was kept on
floating status. To her discredit, her defiance constituted a neglect of duty,
or an act of insubordination, per the LA.
Neither can we consider tenable the petitioners contention that the
respondents deliberately held her up to mockery and ridicule when they cut
off her email access, sent memoranda to her clients that she was no longer a
Category Buyer, and to the various Robinsons branches that she was now a
Provincial Coordinator on floating status and that Padilla was taking over
her position as the new Category Buyer. It suffices to state that these
measures are the logical steps to take for the petitioners unjustified
resistance to her transfer, and were not intended to subject her to public
embarrassment.
Judicial review of labor cases does
not go beyond the evaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence upon
which labor officials findings rest.
Finally, as reiterated in Acebedo Optical,35 this Court is not a trier of
facts, and only errors of law are generally reviewed in petitions for review
on certiorari criticizing decisions of the CA. Questions of fact are not
entertained, and in labor cases, this doctrine applies with greater force.
Factual questions are for labor tribunals to resolve.36 Thus:

34
35
36

See CA Decision; rollo, p. 530.

Supra note 20.
Id. at 541.

G.R. No. 198534

11

Decision

Judicial Review or labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation

of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which its labor officials' findings
rest. As such, the findings of facts and conclusion of the NLRC are
generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even clothed
with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence. This Court finds no basis for deviating
from said doctrine without any clear showing that the findings of the
Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, are bereft of substantiation.
Particularly when passed upon and upheld by the Court of Appeals, they
are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and will not normally
be disturbed.
xxxx
As earlier stated, we find no basis for deviating from the oft
espoused legal tenet that findings of facts and conclusion of the labor
arbiter are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even
clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, without any clear showing that such
findings of fact, as affirmed by the NLRC, are bereft of substantiation.
More so, when passed upon and upheld by the Com1 of Appeals, they are
binding and conclusive upon us and will not normally be disturbed;
x x x. 37 (Citations omitted)

It is our ruling, that the findings of fact and conclusion of the LA, as
affirmed by the NLRC, are supported by substantial evidence, as found by
the CA.

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, the Decision of the Court

of Appeals dated June 8, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 109604 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson
37

Id. at 541-543.

Decision

12

G.R. No. 198534

~~t&~

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

~~~.
Associate Jt~l<
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice