Current Issues

Copenhagen and beyond –

January 25, 2010 a glass half full
Energy and climate change

The glass is half full. The Copenhagen Accord has disappointed many
observers of the negotiations, particularly as no legally binding agreement was
reached and no specific reduction targets were agreed upon. Still, the Accord
addresses many crucial elements of a framework for tackling climate change and
was drafted by the heads of state and government of leading emerging markets
and the US and agreed by many industrial countries. For these countries the
Accord may acquire politically rather than legally binding force. What is more, the
fact that the Accord is not legally binding at this time might turn out to be an
advantage, as it provides scope for improvement over the course of 2010 ahead of
the COP-16 in Mexico. In that sense, the glass is half full rather than half empty.

Uncertainties about carbon markets. The greatest near-term risk stemming

from the Accord concerns the future of carbon markets. In order to reduce
uncertainties it is necessary to make quick progress on both carbon market reform
and financing of international mitigation projects.

National policies remain key drivers. Many countries have embarked upon
their own climate policies. The Copenhagen Accord does not end these policies or
slow down the momentum that was gained in the run-up to Copenhagen. The
weeks ahead will of course reveal countries‗ willingness to register ambitious
policies and thus keep up the momentum.

Trend towards renewable energies and energy efficiency unbroken.

The deployment of renewable energy technologies depends now more on
Author
Caio Koch-Weser* incentives created by national policy and regulatory frameworks, energy security
Vice Chairman, concerns, as well as rising energy prices. These factors will continue to favour
Deutsche Bank Group renewable energies in the coming months and years.
+44 20 7545 0494
[email protected]
Building trust is crucial. A strengthening of public-private finance partnerships
*The author would like to thank
contributors to the paper:
as well as bilateral agreements can be catalysts for rebuilding trust, and Europe
Sabine Miltner, Mark Fulton, should play a leading role, here. For future conferences, it might be reasonable to
Adam Sieminski, Mark Dominik, break down the discussion into smaller, still complex topics, for example by
Tobias Just
separating mitigation and adaptation issues.
Editor
Tobias Just
Technical Assistant
Sabine Berger
Deutsche Bank Research
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Copenhagen and beyond – a glass half full

Copenhagen and beyond – a glass half full

The Copenhagen Accord leaves us with a choice – we can decide
whether the glass is half full or half empty. The majority of the
analysis has been negative, both on the outcome as well as the way
forward. Two reasons for such pessimism stand out. First, there was
no legally binding agreement, and second, there was no agreed
global emissions reduction target. Despite these two glaring
deficiencies, we believe that the ―glass is half full‖ and that the
The glass is half full Accord presents a meaningful interim result which offers a way
forward if trust can be restored and public-private collaboration on
climate change can be launched in earnest.
The assessment that the glass is half full is based on at least three
factors:
1. The coalition of those prepared to take mitigation actions
expanded to include the key emerging markets (China, India,
Brazil and South Africa), and coverage was extended to all
sectors, most notably forestry and agriculture;
2. The Copenhagen Accord was drafted by the heads of state and
government of these four countries plus the President of the
United States – an unprecedented outcome in international
negotiations;
3. The very fact that the Accord is not legally binding leaves room
for improvement on the substance of the Accord.
Importantly, the political understanding that underpins the Accord
could provide an important foundation for a more ambitious
international agreement. Breaching this agreement will bring with it
political consequences – diplomatic responses, efforts at public
shaming. In that sense, the Accord is politically binding – and
Even a legally not-binding document commits the countries who agreed to it to adhere to it. Significantly,
can be politically binding the absence of a binding international agreement places
responsibility for action squarely on national authorities as well as
on the private sector.
While the Accord lacks the detail many had been hoping for, it also
avoids the pitfalls of a weak legally binding agreement, which would
have most likely been the alternative. Our research has shown that
the policies and targets announced by countries ahead of
Copenhagen would add up to emissions reductions by 2020 that are
about half as ambitious as those required for the 450 ppm pathway,
i.e. a 14 Gt CO2e reduction or 25% compared with a business-as-
usual scenario.
Why was there not enough trust among the Parties to improve upon
the earlier announcements and agree an ambitious deal? Many
policymakers and observers have been disappointed that in the end
no mention was made either of the 50 percent global reduction
target by 2050 (which science suggests to be broadly consistent
with a 2 degree Celsius limit on the rise in temperature) or the 80
percent reduction for the developed world. However, such a
construct would have defined an emissions reduction target for the
developing world – but without giving other countries a say in this.
What is more, it would have implied emission allowances by 2050
for the developed world that are almost 2.5 times higher than for the
developing world. The large emerging market emitters in particular
took issue with this.
Trust needs to be restored.

January 25, 2010 3

 Current Issues

What does the Accord entail?

On the positive side, the Accord includes:
— The 2 degrees Celsius limit and (unspecified) deep cuts in line
with science and equity to achieve this goal; review in 2015 with
the option to tighten to 1.5 degrees;
— Fast start funding of USD 30 bn for the period 2010-12, of which
50% will be spent on adaption; and the goal of mobilizing (public
and private) finance of USD 100 bn per year by 2020;
— Agreement to start REDD+ mechanism;
— Targets for developed countries which will be entered into a
registry and subjected to international monitoring, reporting and
verification (MRV);
No future legally binding document — Nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) for developing
countries to be entered into a registry; increased frequency and
improved methodology for communicating these actions;
domestic MRV via international consultation;
— Internationally funded NAMAs subject to international MRV;
— Pursuit of opportunities to use markets for achieving cost-
effective abatement action.
On the negative side, the Accord makes no reference to a future
legally binding instrument. Its bottom-up approach does not ensure
that emissions will be reduced by as much as we need for a 450
ppm pathway. There is no global 2050 reduction goal embedded in
the Accord nor was there a decision on the future of the Kyoto
Protocol or reform of the Clean Development Mechanism.

Uncertainties about carbon markets

Viable carbon market is crucial Uncertainty about the future of carbon markets presents the greatest
near-term risk stemming from the Accord. Disappointment
immediately following the conclusion of Copenhagen contributed to
a drop in carbon prices by about 10%. Since early January, the
market has recovered virtually all of the earlier losses. On the
positive side, the Accord states that the Parties should pursue
opportunities to use markets to achieve cost-effective abatement.
This language could be interpreted as being as close as one can get
– under the circumstances – to an agreement on linking of markets.
This is especially so in light of the commitment to raise USD 100 bn
from public and private sources. It is clear that this amount of
funding cannot be raised without the development of a viable carbon
market.
On the negative side, the absence of any language on reform of the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the lack of specificity
concerning carbon finance mechanisms in general – be they for
REDD or technology – are leading to uncertainties about even the
most established market of all, the European Emissions Trading
Uncertainties even for European
Scheme, by undermining demand for post-2012 Certified Emission
Emission Trading Scheme
Reductions (CER) and new project development.
The High Panel set up by the Accord should move quickly and
include CDM reform in its work agenda. It is important that such
reform be tackled quickly for at least two reasons: First, the current
CDM cannot deliver the tons of CO2e reduction demanded by
existing and contemplated trading systems. For example, legislation
passed by the U.S House of Representatives included up to 1 Gt of
offsets from international sources alone. By comparison in 2008, the
CDM delivered roughly 325 m tons. And second, without a

4 January 25, 2010

Copenhagen and beyond – a glass half full

multilateral mechanism there is a risk that individual trading

schemes will define their own standards, as already contemplated
under legislation passed by the U.S. House of Representatives.
Europe in particular should have an incentive to strengthen the
multilateral mechanism the EU ETS has relied on.

Impact on national policies

All countries have been asked to report their commitments and
plans for climate action by January 31, 2010. Many of these targets
were announced prior to Copenhagen. Others were announced in
the course of the meetings. For example, Japan announced that it
would register a target of 25% reduction below 1990 levels, and
Brazil signed into law its target of reducing GHG by 39% compared
to a business-as-usual scenario.
There are already many market incentives to support clean
technologies (where German companies occupy a leading position).
All major countries have formulated goals to increase their share of
renewable energies, increase the energy efficiency of their
economies, reduce wastage of natural resources and the like.
Among developing economies, green growth will accelerate in
countries already committed to such a growth path such as Mexico,
Korea and Ghana.
Moreover, governments will be driven not just by the climate debate
itself but by the realization that the green economy generates
investment and jobs – low-carbon growth and prosperity – and can
improve national competitiveness. For some countries energy
Green economy as job engine security has also been a key driver of policies, notably the key
players in the Copenhagen Accord, the US and China. The renewed
steep rise in oil prices to over USD 80/bbl will only reinforce the
debate over energy security and the diversification away from high
carbon fuels.
In the United States, the outcome at Copenhagen has been seen as
slightly positive as a result of major emerging market economies
agreeing to mitigation targets and MRV (monitoring, reporting and
verification), two significant political demands that President Obama
is credited with helping to deliver. Nevertheless, passage of a
comprehensive economy-wide climate bill in 2010 remains an uphill
battle. At the same time, Congressional leaders remain focused on
green energy incentives and mandates that can be tied to job
creation.
Implications for the energy sector
Market trends support move towards Moves toward energy efficiency and alternative energies
renewables (renewables) continue to be supported by market trends, including
the (unexpectedly) fast recovery of energy prices, especially for oil.
— Energy efficiency and renewable energies will of course remain
on the agenda, in the short term as well. The Copenhagen
outcome will therefore have an only limited negative impact on
the growth of renewable energies.
— Manufacturers of new green technologies – such as German and
Swiss engineering companies – had pinned their hopes on
Copenhagen providing an additional boost for their innovative
climate solutions. We think their future-oriented products (e.g.
more efficient and cleaner power plants, modern solutions for the
production and use of wind, biomass, solar or geothermal
energy) will find markets perhaps even sooner than they
expected.

January 25, 2010 5

 Current Issues

— In western Europe the use of fossil fuels will remain subject to

tightened regulation, regardless of the Copenhagen Accord:
1. The currently debated life extension of German nuclear power
plants could make investments in coal or gas-fired plants less
likely.
2. The North Seas Countries‘ Offshore Grid Initiative, launched
jointly by nine states at the end of 2009, will bring 100 GW of
green (wind, tidal and hydro) power to the European electricity
market and help Europe to meet the EU‘s 20-20-20 targets. The
EUR 30 bn project can replace the construction of around 100
coal-fired plants.
Tighter regulation in US as driver — Last year, several U.S. utilities announced the early retirement of
older coal facilities in anticipation of a tighter regulatory
environment. In addition at the state level, numerous permits for
new coal power plants were withheld in order to avoid
subsequent liability. Going forward, we believe that some form of
climate/energy legislation or EPA (Environment Protection
Agency) greenhouse gas regulation will act to constrain US
reliance on carbon fuels. Alternative energy tax credits,
renewable electricity standards, and the clean energy bank
proposals are still very much in political favour. If a
comprehensive cap-and-trade bill proves too ambitious in 2010, it
is possible that environmental groups may coalesce around a
narrower approach that covers power utilities and refiners only.
— Business anticipates change in other areas as well. For example,
at the end of December, 15 major Canadian, German, US and
Mexican airlines agreed to procure bio-based and synthetic jet
fuel from two U.S. providers. While non-binding, this agreement
importantly paves the way for alternative fuel purchase
agreements.
— Large scale industry initiatives like Desertec, which aims to
deliver CSP (Concentrating Solar Power) electricity from the
Sahara to Europe, combine business interests with political
objectives such as energy diversification and energy security.
Public-private collaboration on projects such as Desertec and the
like will be crucial elements of our energy future.
Building trust and a way forward
One way for the most advanced countries to contribute to a trust-
building exercise is to register and implement policies that have
been conditionally flagged, such as the 30% reduction by 2020 in
Europe and the 25% reduction in Australia. If climate or energy
legislation is passed in the United States before the middle of 2010,
this would also be a crucial trust builder.
It is also important that developed markets do not introduce
protectionist measures in the name of climate policy, be they in the
form of trade barriers, product standards that favour local producers
or even requirements to buy domestic products.
At the same time, other leading emerging market economies, in
particular China and India, should take note of Brazil‘s decision to
implement a binding target domestically and take similar action. This
would also help to build trust internationally while respecting
sovereignty and common but differentiated responsibility.
The second way for introducing trust is to mobilize funding. The
Accord establishes a new ―Copenhagen Green Climate Fund‖ to
manage the amounts pledged in Copenhagen. It provides that the

6 January 25, 2010

Copenhagen and beyond – a glass half full

Fund will be part of the Convention‘s Financial Mechanism.

However, this is not possible without a COP decision. Unless all
Parties can agree, at the next COP or later, money raised under the
Accord will have to be managed outside the Convention.
Launching public-private finance partnerships will be crucial to the
rapid identification of areas other than forestry for the fast-start
funds committed in Copenhagen. Rapid deployment will be the sine
qua non for rebuilding trust between developing and developed
countries.
Bilateral funding mechanism European countries and other leading economies should therefore
quickly explore bilateral funding mechanisms, in particular those that
will leverage maximum amounts of private capital to support
mitigation action in emerging markets. For example, a public-private
fund that helps co-finance the feed-in tariff in the host market that
would at the same time make investment more attractive for private
investors and help boost exports.
In addition, creative public-private mechanisms must be put in place
to address the significant risks investors face when it comes to large
scale deployment of renewable technologies as well as the shortage
of capital, especially on the debt side.
Three-pronged approach More generally, the experience to date suggests that in order to
make meaningful progress on a legally binding agreement during
the course of 2010, a three-pronged approach should be pursued:
1. The UNFCCC must be willing to distil the lessons taught by the
Road from Bali to Copenhagen in order to achieve greater
success at COP-16 in Mexico at the end of the year. One of the
conclusions may well be to separate the discussions concerning
the financing of adaptation from discussions regarding future
mitigation actions;
2. Meaningful progress was made, but too late, in smaller
groupings. The G20, the MEF (Major Economies Forum) and
even ad hoc groups such as the one that drafted the Accord
should be key for hammering out substantive and detailed
understandings on mitigation in the months ahead. Carbon
market reform must become an integral part of the discussions;
3. Bottom-up actions from the private sector as well as bilateral
agreement between countries on financing technology transfer
and mitigation – building on examples of the Norwegian forestry
fund – are important components for progress in the absence of
a fully-fledged international treaty.

Caio Koch-Weser (+44 20 7545 0494, [email protected])

January 25, 2010 7

 Current Issues

Appendix*

Key elements of the Copenhagen Accord

1. Action should be taken to limit the increase in global temperature to no more than 2°C against pre-industrial levels, and – crucially –
retains the Kyoto principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities'
2. Global emissions should peak as soon as possible. While 'recognizing that the time frame for peaking will be longer in developing
countries'
3. There should be enhanced action on adaptation
4. Annex-1 countries should submit non-binding quantified economy-wide emissions-reduction targets for 2020 to the UNFCCC by end-
January 2010
5. Non-Annex-1 countries should submit nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) to the UNFCCC by end-January 2010, and
that non-Annex-1 countries should report their emissions and actions to the UN every two years; it further states that only actions
benefiting from international support should be subject to international verification
6. Measures and mechanisms (including REDD-plus, 'to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries) should
be established immediately to cut emissions from deforestation
7. The COP has decided 'to pursue various approaches, including opportunities to use markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of,
and to promote mitigation actions', and that 'developing countries, especially those with low emitting economies should be provided
incentives to continue to develop on a low emission pathway'
8. Developed countries should provide USD 30 bn in financing to developing countries by end-2012, with this number rising to USD 100
bn per year by 2020 from both public and private sources, and that 'a significant portion of such funding should flow through the
Copenhagen Green Climate Fund' (see point 10 below);
9. 'A High Level Panel will be established under the guidance of and accountable to the Conference of the Parties to study the
contribution of the potential sources of revenue, including alternative sources of finance, towards meeting this goal'
10. A Copenhagen Green Climate Fund should be established to administer the financial mechanism to be established under the
Copenhagen Accord
11. A Technology Mechanism should be established 'to accelerate technology development and transfer in support of action on adaptation
and mitigation'
12. 'An assessment of the implementation of this Accord is to be completed by 2015', and that this 'would include consideration of
strengthening the long-term goal referencing various matters presented by the science, including in relation to temperature rises of
1.5°C'
*
See Lewis, M. and I. Curien (2009). It‘s tough at the COP: After the confusion, uncertainty…, Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research. December 20, 2009.

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