Written Evidence From CCCU Final
Written Evidence From CCCU Final
Written Evidence From CCCU Final
4. On devolution we highlight:
a. A codified constitution is necessary to protect devolved powers and parliamentary
sovereignty.
b. Welsh finances should be decided by an independent body or committee within the
National Parliament occupied by Welsh Members of Parliament.
c. More flexibility should be offered in regards to the powers held by devolved bodies.
d. Amendment procedures regarding changes to the powers of devolved bodies require
further reform before the constitution is codified.
e. A further list of powers needs to be attached to the constitution regarding devolved
powers; this should detail additional powers that are used when their necessity is
imperative.
f. A clear distinction between the roles of First Ministers within the National Parliament and
devolved bodies is crucial for ensuring separation of their work.
g. The third option fails to encompass demands for the votes MPs partake in, such as
English votes for English laws (EVEL).
h. The proposed constitution also fails to clarify the process for the secession of a region in
the UK.
i. The proposed constitution needs to include the possibility of constituency boundary
changes if independence is gained by one of the assemblies.
j. The impact of constituency boundary changes on certain political parties and interests
requires assessment.
Parliamentary reform
The importance of parliamentary reform
5. Reform in the United Kingdoms National Parliament, specifically the committee system
and House of Lords, is necessary for the democratic representation of the countrys
citizens. Although Labour in 1997-1998 abolished hereditary peers and incorporated
European Union legislation into UK law, Parliament continues to be subject to debates
about its representativeness. A codified constitution would ensure the advantages of a
Second Chamber remain, including its expertise and oversight, while creating a legitimate
and democratically elected bicameral legislature.
Role of committees
6. In part (3), section (23) of the proposed constitution, clause (7) refers to a joint committee
of both Houses of Parliament to examine public bills (7(a)) and subordinate legislation
(7(b)). The role of committees, particularly select, needs to be expanded. Select
2
committees were created 30 years ago, yet are now, more powerful and independentminded than ever before.1 Meg Russell also argues they are an integrated part of the
policy-making process by exposing decision-making to rigorous tests, and by
encouraging more careful consideration of options.2 They are highly influential in the
oversight and accountability of both Houses of Parliament. Hence, the committee system
needs defining and strengthening to ensure the role of committees is actively appreciated
in a codified constitution.
Role of the Second Chamber
7. The illustrative constitution incorporates several clauses regarding the Second Chamber,
specifically its role of scrutiny. However, in clause (3) of part (3) section (18), it suggests
it would be comprised of 240 members, although current life peers would keep their
positions in the meantime. This raises several questions: Who currently in the House of
Lords will be excluded? What expertise and insight will be lost? What impact would a
second chamber similarly composed to the House of Commons have on parliamentary
oversight of the legislative process and executive? A codified constitution needs to
protect, as well as the oversight of Parliament, the expertise and independence in
lawmaking. The House of Lords currently provides this through the law lords, church
bishops, and life peers, which naturally balance the House of Commons partisan
expertise and accountability. If the membership of the Second Chamber is reformed, it
requires further changes ensuring these aspects are maintained and utilised.
8. The proposed constitution already excludes one increasingly influential group: the
crossbenchers. Crossbench peers personify the House of Lords. Meg Russell explains
they bring expertise, independence from party, and reasoned debate to Parliament. 3 This
could be lost, particularly if electoral reform is applied to the Second Chamber in a
codified constitution. Reform is needed to strengthen this component of the House of
1 Mark DArcy. (2011) Time to salute the post-2010 election Parliament, BBC News Politics. Accessed on:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14330865.
2 Meg Russell & Meghan Benton. (2012) Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight Commitees: The
Select Committees in the British House of Commons, Parliamentary Affairs, 66, 772-797 (p.793).
3 Meg Russell & Maria Sciara. (2008) Independent Parliamentarians En Masse: The Changing Nature and
Role of Crossbenchers in the House of Lords, Parliamentary Affairs, 62 (1), 32-52 (p.49).
Lords in order that the partisanship and representation in the lower chamber is balanced.
Additionally, even before any reform occurs in either chamber of Parliament, absenteeism
at voting and similar issues should be assessed and dealt with. This may lead to
resolutions about electoral reform.
A Directly Elected Second Chamber?
9. The proposed constitution represents progress for House of Lords reform, particularly in
respect to a directly elected Second Chamber (part (4) section (27) and clauses (7) to (9)).
Its failure to specify which electoral method would be used though suggests the existing
first-past-the-post system to elect the House of Commons would remain in usage. The
current method distorts results, which with members elected on a plurality, can mean
individuals have illegitimate mandates on which they represent their constituencies. In
contrast, a more proportionally representative electoral method will not only provide a
stronger and more democratic chamber but also a greater representation of the UKs
increasingly multiparty system.
10. In addition to parties, two groups in present danger of being underrepresented are ethnic
minorities and women. The 2011 census held in the United Kingdom showed ethnic
minorities made up 12.9% of the population. 4 In contrast, there were only 44 peers in the
House of Lords from an ethnic minority. This ratio of 44 out of 801 equates to
approximately 5.4% of the membership of the House of Lords. 5 Similarly, the United
Kingdom has a ratio of 50.8% women to 49.2% men. 6 Comparing this to the 24.4% of
female peers in the House of Lords, allows the underrepresentation of women in the
chamber to be viewed.7 Therefore, electing the Second Chamber through a proportional
representation system would significantly benefit these groups.
4 Wood, J. & Cracknell, R. (2013) Ethnic Minorities in Politics, Government and Public Life, House of
Commons Library, p.2. Accessed on: www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn01156.pdf.
5 Ibid, p.6.
6 Office for National Statistics. (2012) 2011 Census: Population and household estimates for the
United Kingdom. Accessed on: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/census/2011/censusdata/index.html.
7 Parliament. (2014). Membership and principal office holders. Accessed on:
http://www.parliament.uk/about/faqs/house-of-lords-faqs/lords-members/.
4
10 Keating, M. (1998). Reforging the Union: Devolution and constitutional change in the United Kingdom.
Oxford University Press, 28 (1), 217 234 (p.217).
devolved bodies. For example, Wales has frequently faced budget cuts decided by
Westminster. Welsh finances should instead be legislated on by an independent body or a
committee in Westminster composed of Welsh MPs. Similarly, financial devolution in
Scotland under the Barnett formula has been shaped by block grants from Westminster. 11
Inequalities of funding are present in national decisions; devolved regions are affected by
this despite the National Parliament being governed by a different political party to the
one running the assembly. Such assessments obviously require inclusion in the proposed
constitution.
14. The UK currently lacks a single document that regulates political institutions and their
relationship with devolved assemblies. More flexibility regarding the powers held by the
devolved bodies is needed. The proposed constitution fails to include capacity to discuss
the possibility of government restructuring within the devolved regions, which would
allow for the development of further devolved powers. For example, constitutional reform
would be required if Wales wished to mirror the Scottish Parliaments expansion of
devolution. Constitutional change, however, will only occur under special majority
procedures. Hence, there must be an easier procedure for passing constitutional
amendments and expanding the devolved settlements. This raises questions of
parliamentary (and popular) support though as most MPs represent English constituencies
and are unlikely to support the administering of further powers to devolved assemblies.
Devolved powers
15. Although the proposed constitution encompasses the existing devolution arrangement, a
broader settlement is required. The proposed constitutional framework fails to offer a
different settlement to the Scotland Act, Government of Wales Act and Northern Ireland
Act. Clauses (1) and (2) in part (6) section (32) lists the areas devolved assemblies can
legislate on in their territories but excludes the capacity for devolved powers in other
issues. Additionally, clause (2) excludes the devolved assembly of Wales, only referring
to Scotland and Northern Ireland. A further list detailing additional powers for urgent
circumstances would ensure devolved bodies are not criticised for taking crucial decisions
on demand by the population or in a state of emergency.
11 The Smith Commission was set up following the Scottish Referendum to examine how further
devolved powers, including financially, could be provided for Scotland.
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16. The proposed constitution discusses devolution in vague terms. Part (6) section (31)
clause (3) is unclear regarding rules about the devolved assemblies; an elusive conception
of laws, claiming the devolved powers cannot work outside the constitution, is offered.
Section (33) clause (5) refers to the devolved executives but is vague concerning the
shared powers of the First Ministers of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and their
representatives in Westminster. A clear distinction between the powers of the National
Parliament and the devolved assemblies is crucial. Before there can be a codified
constitution, there should be a clear list of powers held by the First Ministers within the
National Parliament to ensure separation of their institutions.
Devolution or Independence?
17. The illustrative blueprint reflects the lack of analysis about independence of devolved
regions in the United Kingdom and disregards the West Lothian Question. Before there is
a codified constitution, a debate about English votes for English laws (EVEL) is required
and then, if agreed on, EVEL needs to be included in the proposed constitution.12 In the
meantime, though, it lacks clarity about the process for the secession of a devolved
region, which could affect important institutions in the UK, currently including England,
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It also does not discuss what would happen to the
national identity of those remaining or whether the seceded territory requires a new name.
This was a major question leading up to the Scottish Referendum. Although a name may
not seem important, it maintains a strong national identity and therefore, without the
clarity of names that national identity is lost. The written constitution needs to rectify this
problem.
18. Similarly, little thought has been given to effects of independence on subsequent
elections. The proposed constitution dismisses the impact of independence on the number
of MPs, and the size and number of constituencies. Most likely, constituency boundaries
would need changing to ensure the number of MPs remains consistent. In contrast, the
number of MPs may need to be reduced. These issues need resolution in the written
constitution to ensure the effects are understood and can swiftly be resolved. Specifically,
it should include capacity for changing constituency boundaries if independence is gained
12 We are aware that the government proposed three options for EVEL in December 2014, including
the suggestion that England should set its own tax rates. The proposed constitution should reflect such
changes.
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by a region of the UK. Currently, there are 59 constituencies in Scotland, 40 in Wales and
18 in Northern Ireland with an average of 68,175 voters per constituency. 13 It can be
argued that, if the boundaries remain the same a particular party might find it harder to be
elected. Therefore, the illustrative blueprint should provide capacity for boundary change,
as well as protection for all parties and interests in the National Parliament and these
constituencies, who may lose representation following a regions secession.
Conclusion
19. In sum, we conclude the United Kingdom needs a codified constitution. We prefer the
written constitution in illustrative blueprint (3) of the committees report, A New Magna
Carta? but suggest some crucial areas have been overlooked and are ill-defined. For
example, as the focus of this submission shows, major representative and structural
changes to the House of Lords and devolved regions are needed before a codified
constitution is considered or written.
20. Both Houses of Parliament need to reform. The committee system and the role and
oversight by the second chamber need reinforcing before a codified constitution is
created. There are issues such as absenteeism, which need solving first and then
significant electoral reform in the House of Lords, while simultaneously, maintaining the
expertise, independence, and oversight aspects. Devolution, on the other hand, requires
greater debate and discussion before there is a written constitution. With long-standing
and recent calls for further devolved powers to different regions of the UK, solutions need
to be found for financial and electoral regulation of devolved assemblies, as well as
greater clarity about their powers. Moreover, the proposed constitution, currently
excluding important issues such as the role of First Ministers and secession, need clearer
definitions for devolution matters.
21. By focussing on parliamentary reform and devolution, we believe there are individuals,
groups, and processes within the UKs institutions which need their interests protected if
there is to be a codified constitution. We hope the above provides some illumination on
how a codified constitution, which allows for the democratic functioning of the UK, can
be created.