A report to Labour Peers

A Programme for Progress

The Future of the House of Lords and its Place in a
Wider Constitution

Labour Peers Working Group

March 2014

2
Foreword
The House of Lords needs urgent reform. The number of peers, growing fast, is too large. Its
procedures creak. Its image is rendered antediluvian by flummery, and it falls short of what is
required of an effective, modern second chamber.
On the other hand, the present House has many strengths. In particular, it facilitates the
scrutiny of legislation by expert and experienced peers and contributes to the accountability
of the government, without endangering the primacy of the Commons. It is a think again
house, not a yield or we veto house. The task then is to find a model for reform that tackles
the defects of the present House while preserving its strengths. Our group was set up by
Labour Peers to contribute to the discussion of the future of the House of Lords, both within
the Labour Party and more widely. This report sets out our conclusions.
In 2011-12, the present government tried to legislate for an elected second chamber; its
proposals fell apart on detailed examination. We discussed but have not sought to resolve
whether, and in what circumstances, the House of Lords should be elected. Some of us
favour election as appropriate for a House of Parliament in a democratic era. Others
amongst us and we believe this view is shared by a majority of Labour peers believe that
election would lead inexorably to the Lords challenging the primacy of the Commons. We all
agree it should be inconceivable to institute so fundamental a change to the constitution
without submitting any proposal for the verdict of the people in a referendum.
We also agree that reform of the Lords is not an issue that can be tackled in isolation from
other constitutional issues. For example, the future governance of Scotland and Wales has
important implications for Lords reform. So do our future relations with the European Union.
The issue of the use of referendums is not one that is confined to the Lords. Lords reform
also has to be related to the wider question of tackling the apparent deterioration in public
faith in our parliamentary institutions. We therefore propose a Constitutional Commission to
examine these issues in the round during the next parliament. However, we do not think that
the need to set up such a commission in the medium term should delay short term
improvements to the way the House of Lords operates that do not cut across its remit.
We do not put forward our report as the last word in this debate. Rather, we believe we have
provided a balanced framework in which it can be conducted, and a set of positive proposals
for its eventual resolution. We commend the report to the Labour Party, to Parliament and to
our wider civil society.
Julian Grenfell (Joint Chair)
Ann Taylor (Joint Chair)
Alf Dubs
George Foulkes
Joyce Gould
Philip Hunt (ex officio)
David Lipsey
Jenny McIntosh
March 2014

3
Background
Labour Peers felt that although strongly supportive of Labours focus on jobs and growth,
they wanted also to play their part in a widespread consideration across the House of Lords
of further Lords reform. They wanted to ensure that the party gave full and careful
consideration to the complex issues involved in Lords reform well ahead of the political rush
of a general election campaign. Accordingly, a Working Group of Labour peers was
established to consider further reform of the House of Lords.
Labour peers agreed the following terms of reference:
To consider and report on short and long term proposals for the future development and
reform of the House of Lords and its place in the wider constitution, including: its
procedures and practices; the conventions applying to the House; the optimum size of
the House and options for achieving such an optimum size; the future role of the House
and options for its longer term reform.
At its first meeting, the Working Group elected Lord Grenfell and Baroness Taylor of Bolton
as co-chairs. It considered recent work on the issue including that by the Joint Committee of
both Houses on the Governments withdrawn House of Lords Reform Bill 2012.
During the course of its deliberations, the Working Group was assisted by consulting a
number of individuals with particular involvement in the issues. Informality was central to
those discussions, and the individuals concerned gave their views on that basis. The
Working Group extends its thanks to all those with whom it had such discussions, and is
grateful to them for their time, views and advice.
The Working Group did not see its task as duplicating or revising the policy positions that
Labour Peers had adopted in approving the Hunt Report in 2004 or the Grocott Report in
2010. It did recognise, however, that in some cases, circumstances had changed since that
work was completed. In particular, it took the view that the Report of the Joint Committee on
Conventions, chaired by Lord Cunningham of Felling, had substantially changed the
conventions operating in the House of Lords and between the two Chambers when it was
published in November 2006, two years after the Hunt Report.
The Working Group also took the decision that it wanted to consider the future of the House
of Lords and its place in a wider constitution, including any further reform of the House of
Lords, in two distinct but related ways:

first, to consider areas of improvement and reform of the current House of Lords
which, in the main, could be made without primary legislation.
second, to consider areas of improvement and reform for a House of Lords early in
the next parliament. Although this could include non-legislative changes, many of
these reforms would require primary legislation.

The Working Group is a party political group, made up of Labour peers. We believe our
report could be used in two ways: as a contribution to current debates, inside and outside
the House of Lords, on the future of the second chamber following the collapse and
withdrawal of the Coalition Governments Reform Bill, and as a contribution to the process of
developing Labours next General Election manifesto.

4
Recommendations
House of Lords reform in a wider constitutional context.
1. It is a matter of common agreement that there is widespread public disengagement
from our parliamentary system. The problem has many causes and will require wideranging solutions far beyond any necessary to make the House of Lords function
properly. The House of Lords is the wrong place to attempt to resolve those wider
questions and they are beyond the scope of this report. Complex, seemingly
intractable, constitutional issues do not find solutions quickly. Such solutions are
usually the result of deliberation and reflection in order to find sufficiently broad
support to be sustainable in the long term. For example, we discussed but have not
sought to resolve the question of whether or not the House should be elected in
whole or in part. We recommend that this, and other complex constitutional matters
such as devolution, should be considered by a representative body such as a
constitutional commission, which would embark on wide consultation and
engagement, leading to a consensus that would make legislation in the next
parliament possible.
2. In advance of agreement on wider constitutional reform, we believe there are some
simple yet significant improvements to the working and reputation of the House of
Lords that we recommend should be implemented without delay. Such short-term
reform of the House of Lords could make a significant interim contribution to the
wider process of political re-engagement. Our group has chosen, therefore, to make
the following short and medium-term recommendations where appropriate to make
the House of Lords more effective.
Composition: size, membership & appointment
3. We recommend that, as a principle, the House of Lords should have fewer members
than the House of Commons.
4. We recommend that an appropriate goal for the size of the House of Lords, to be
achieved over time, would be 450 members, which we believe would be sufficient to
enable it to carry out its functions.
5. We recommend that the House of Lords Appointments Commission should be
established in statute.
6. We recommend that the House of Lords Appointments Commission and the political
parties adopt, as part of their published criteria in considering individuals for
membership of the House of Lords, a commitment to give proper attention to the
diversity of the United Kingdom.
7. We recommend that political parties seeking to nominate individuals for membership
of the House of Lords should voluntarily adopt new, transparent criteria for the
selection of all nominees. These should be based on those used by the
Appointments Commission for non-political appointments, including:

The ability to make an effective and significant contribution to the work of the
House of Lords, not only in their areas of particular interest, but across the wide
range of other issues coming before the House.

A range of expertise, experience and skills, and the time commitment necessary
to make an effective contribution to the work of the House of Lords.

A strong personal commitment to the principles and highest standards of public

life.

Residence in the UK for tax purposes and acceptance of the requirement to

remain so.

8. We recommend that nobody, no matter how distinguished his or her public service
up to that point, should be appointed to the House automatically. Instead, such
appointments should follow a process as for all other appointments, against a set of
transparent criteria
Abolition of remaining hereditary peers
9. We recommend that the hereditary principle be ended. This need not mean the
disappearance of those remaining hereditary peers whose expertise could be
retained by the House if their peerages were transformed into life peerages, provided
the individuals concerned met the proposed revised age and participation criteria. In
the meantime, we recommend the immediate ending of the system of by-election to
fill vacancies in the hereditary peers group. This would remove the last manifestation
of the hereditary principle from the House. Accordingly, we recommend that Section
2(2)-2(4) of the House of Lords Act 1999 should be repealed.
Introduction procedure
10. We recommend that the House of Lords ends the practice of wearing robes.
Disqualification
11. We recommend that primary legislation should be enacted to align disqualification of
members of the House of Lords with that covering Members of the House of
Commons.
Political balance of the House
12. We recommend that in future no political party, and in particular no party or parties
of government, should seek a majority in the House of Lords and that any creations
of new peers should seek to sustain a broad political balance. Party leaders must
work together to achieve this.
Working peers
13. We recommend that all members of the Lords should be working peers
acknowledging that this is not necessarily a full-time role.
14. We recommend that organisations involved in proposing individuals for membership
of the House of Lords, and individuals accepting nomination (apart from those
currently proposed by the Church of England) should give written undertakings that
they will be fully committed to their role as working peers.
Attendance
15. We recommend that the House of Lords introduces a minimum attendance level for
Members of the House. This should be set at an average of three-fifths of Lords
sitting days in each session of Parliament, excluding exceptional circumstances.
Retirement
16. We recommend that the House of Lords agrees a retirement age of 80 years to
apply at the end of the parliament in which the retiring peer reaches that age. If the

6
application of the retirement age and attendance criteria results in a party political
imbalance, then mechanisms currently exist for the party leaders and the
Appointments Commission to address this.
17. We recommend that the House of Lords considers more formal recognition of the
contribution made by retiring members of the House of Lords.
Procedural reform
18. We recommend that all non-private members legislation be introduced in the House
of Commons for first reading. Bills could then proceed through Commons channels or
be referred through a Commons motion for a second reading and further stages in
the House of Lords before returning to the Commons. We believe that this procedure
would underpin the primacy of the House of Commons and could make all nonprivate legislation subject to the Parliament Act.
19. We recommend that the House of Lords agrees proposals to enable the tabling of a
motion deferring further consideration of a particular secondary measure for three
months, which would require the Government to reflect upon the arguments against
the measure, and if necessary to reconsider it. This would replace the present power
to reject such legislation completely.
20. We recommend that further consideration be given to the modernisation of the
working practices of the House of Lords building on the work of committees such as
that chaired by Lord Goodlad. In particular, a Legislative Standards Committee could
be established, preferably on a joint basis with the Commons.
21. If view of the widespread appreciation the work of Lords Select Committees, we
recommend that there should be more use made of short-term ad hoc committees
on issues where a single departmental approach is too narrow. We believe that this
can be done without impinging on the remit of existing select committees.
22. We recommend a review of the role of Lords Speaker should be undertaken.

7
1

Introduction

1.1

Labours priorities as we head towards the next General Election due in May 2015
are clear. It is rightly concentrating on policies to return the country to prosperity for
the many, not the few. We strongly support that agenda.

1.2

Like all members of the House of Lords, we come from a range of backgrounds and
hold a wide range of opinions. As Labour peers, we work to that end, every day,
scrutinising the Governments programme in precise detail, questioning Ministers,
debating policies and practices, acting as part of a unique national forum in which we
are privileged to participate.

1.3

Reform of the House of Lords has periodically been an issue for Labour over a very
long time, although not necessarily amongst the British public. Those of us who were
Labour MPs, for example, very rarely had the issue of constitutional reform, and
specifically reform of the House of Lords, raised with us on the doorsteps.

1.4

Public opinion polls consistently bear this out, with constitutional reform low amongst
peoples concerns. That was, for example, the clear outcome of the referendum in
May 2011 on changing the voting system for electing MPs to the House of
Commons. As Professor Vernon Bogdanor, one of Britains foremost constitutional
experts, puts it:
The British people remain obstinately concerned with the substance of
politics, not its procedures. That may perhaps be a sign of political maturity.
What cannot be doubted is that constitutional issues do not lie very high on
most peoples list of priorities.1

1.5

Why then, given this low priority, are we putting forward proposals for parliamentary
reform? We have three principal reasons.

1.6

First, our proposals should form part of a continuing debate about the future of
Parliament. While this is not a prominent public issue, getting our governance
structures right in the United Kingdom is important.

1.7

Second, they give voice to Labour peers perspective on the issue. Many individuals
and organisations put forward views on Lords reform; it is wholly legitimate, and
indeed necessary, for Labour peers to do likewise. Of course, as members of the
Lords, we are not disinterested observers. But our views are no less legitimate for
that: in very many cases, Labour peers have long experience of politics and
Parliament, including of both Houses, and it is legitimate for Labour peers to be
putting forward their views on this important issue.

1.8

Labour peers as a group do not necessarily agree on every issue relating to the
future of the House of Lords. The most important consideration for some is whether
any proposed changes will help or hinder the Labour party, and especially a future
Labour government, that anything to make a future Labour government less effective
should not be countenanced. Others believe that Labour has an historic mission to
continue its reform and modernise the constitution, including the House of Lords.
Such a spectrum of views, with many points in between, often crystallises around the
issue of whether the House of Lords should be elected. We know that opinions on

The New British Constitution, Vernon Bogdanor (London, 2009) p7

8
this issue are very often passionately held, and that those holding such strong
opinions are unlikely to be moved from them. Our judgement is that a majority of
Labour peers do not support an elected House of Lords. However, we know too that
a substantial number of Labour peers do support an elected Lords. We respect both
views, and we recognise that on this issue, and no doubt others, there is unlikely to
be clear agreement across the board.
1.9

Our third reason for putting forward proposals now is for Labour peers to make a
contribution to the preparation of policy positions on Lords Reform for the next
General Election manifesto.

Historical context

2.1

Britain is a mature democracy, with a long history. That does not mean it is a country
opposed to change, but many British values and institutions are now reasonably
stable. Freedom, the rule of law and parliamentary democracy are central to our
society. Fairness, tolerance and decency are universally admired. While many issues
are contested from time to time, much has been settled for a long period: the
relationship between executive and legislature, the size and role of the state, the
reach of the judiciary.

2.2

Aspects of the House of Commons come under question from time to time and it
continues to reform itself, including most recently a number of its procedures. The
House of Lords has also seen change including:

in 1911, with the removal of the fiscal powers of the House of Lords and the
shifting of its right to veto to a right of delay (Parliament Act 1911);

in 1949, with further changes to the Houses delaying powers (Parliament Act
1949);

in 1958, with the introduction of life peerages (Life Peerages Act 1958);

in 1963, with changes to peerage succession (Peerage Act 1963);

in 1999, with the removal of the majority of hereditary peers (House of Lords Act
1999); and

in 2004, with the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary
with the ending of the Lords as the final court of appeal, and the establishment of
a new Supreme Court (Constitutional Reform Act 2005) and an elected Lord
Speaker.

2.3

The impact and effect of some of these reforms in particular, the 1958 Life
Peerages Act have been deep, and extensive. But for many, such reforms failed to
address the central issue: the election of members of the House of Lords.

2.4

The argument, in essence, has remained constant. Those favouring the election, in
part or in whole, of the House of Lords argue that in the 21st century, it is
democratically outrageous for any part of a legitimate national assembly to be
anything other than elected. They insist that the system of entering a chamber such
as the House of Lords based on appointment, rather than election, is wholly
undemocratic, outmoded, unacceptable and wrong. They maintain that those who
make the laws of the land should be elected by those to whom the laws of the land
8

9
apply. The argument was put most recently by the coalition Governments Prime
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, in their joint foreword to the white paper
containing the 2011 Bill:
In a modern democracy it is important that those who make the laws of the
land should be elected by those to whom the laws apply. The House of Lords
performs its work well but lacks sufficient democratic authority.2
2.5

On the other side of the argument, opponents of an elected Lords also claim to hold
the more democratic position. For them, the sovereignty of the people is vested in a
democratic Commons giving it primacy over the Lords, and they believe that direct
elections to the House of Lords, in whole or part, would undermine that primacy and
be fundamentally anti-democratic.

2.6

Furthermore, opponents argue, the House of Lords is scrutinising government

legislation in a way the House of Commons does not, and that it therefore provides a
key forum for national debate and discussion. They claim it is more representative of
society than is the Commons, and that the quality of its work would be severely
impaired if its composition were changed and placed in closer thrall to the political
parties.

2.7

The extent of public support for Lords reform is unclear. Research drawn together by
the independent House of Lords Library suggests that there is strong evidence that
the public do not regard reform of the House of Lords as a pressing priority for
politicians to enact.3 Polling evidence suggesting that only 1 per cent of the public
regard Lords reform as a very important issue.

2.8

On electing the Lords, again, public opinion is not clear. There is strong support for
elections, but not unequivocal support. The authoritative British Social Attitudes
Survey (BSAS) has been tracking attitudes to House of Lords reform for some years,
and is the only long-run series to present public polling evidence over time:4

HoL Composition: Public Support

for Elected v Appointed House
50
40
30

All/Most Appointed

All/Most Elected

20

Equal Elected/Appointed
10
0
2000

2002

2005

2007

2011

House of Lords Reform Draft Bill, HM Government White Paper, May 2011, Cm 8077
Public Attitudes Towards the House of Lords and House of Lords Reform, HoL Library, Nov 2011, LLN 2011/034
4
British Social Attitudes survey reports, various: NatCen
3

10
2.9

Though the gap is clear between those supporting a House of Lords that is all or
mostly elected and those supporting a House of Lords that is all or mostly appointed,
support for both these contradictory options rose with the formation of the coalition
Government. While there is no further evidence available yet from the BSA survey
following the failure of the coalitions Bill, anecdotal evidence from MPs considering
the Bill especially from Conservative MPs opposed to it suggested that many
constituents found it all but incomprehensible why the Government should be
focusing on such an issue as House of Lords reform at all, let alone at times of
national economic austerity. The latest BSA survey, looking specifically at the
coalition governments now-abandoned reforms, comments that5
the principle of an elected chamber is widely supported, although not
necessarily to the exclusion of some appointed members
and goes on to say:
While there is relatively little support for a wholly appointed House, as exists
at present, there is no public consensus about what the alternative should
be.

2.10

We believe that the publics interest is far from fully engaged in an issue that is
remote from their everyday concerns. Clearly, the advent of specific proposals in
terms of the coalitions 2012 Bill both increased public awareness of the issue, and
according to many MPs increased public opposition to the Governments
proposals. Lords reform in previous attempts, as well as this last one from the current
government, ran aground on the range of complex details at the heart of the issue,
and in particular over the role and function of the House of Commons and MPs, and
the Commons relations with the Lords, rather than role and functions of the House of
Lords and peers. There is little, if any, public engagement on those issues, leaving
the fundamentals of the argument over Lords reform to continue. For those who
regard the unelected House of Lords as a standing affront to democracy, little or
nothing has changed in the argument; little or nothing, too, for those who regard the
House of Lords as one of the key components, in terms of checks and balances, in
our constitution, and a central if subordinate element of Parliamentary democracy
in Britain.

Recent developments

3.1

Among Labours achievements in Government from 1997 to 2010 was an extensive

programme of constitutional and political reform, in particular:

devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland;

referendums, especially on devolution, and on an elected Mayor and Assembly in
London;
directly-elected mayors in local government;
Human Rights Act 1998;
Freedom of Information Act 2000;
regulation of political parties and establishment of the Electoral Commission; and

British Social Attitudes 29, 2012 Edition, NatCen, pp52

10

11

3.2

3.3

proportional representation for the European Parliament.

As part of that programme of constitutional reform, Labour carried out three major
reforms of the House of Lords:

House of Lords Act 1999: this Act removed the right of the majority of hereditary
peers to sit and vote in the House of Lords;

Constitutional Reform Act 2004: this Act reformed the office of the Lord
Chancellor both as the presiding officer of the House of Lords and the head of the
judiciary, and removed from the House of Lords the final level of appeal in the
United Kingdom court system and instead for the first time in Britain established,
entirely separate from Parliament, a new Supreme Court.

The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, passed in truncated

form as its passage was interrupted by the General Election. It reformed the
Royal Prerogative and put the civil service on a statutory footing.

In addition, Labour took a considerable number of steps towards further reform of the
House of Lords, including:

January 1999: White Paper: Modernising Parliament: Reforming the House of

Lords
January 1999: Establishment of a Royal Commission on Future of the House of
Lords (the Wakeham Commission)
January 2000: Royal Commission Report: A House for the Future
November 2001: White Paper: The House of Lords Completing the Reform
May 2002: Establishment of Joint Committee on Lords Reform
December 2002: Joint Committee First Report: House of Lords Reform: First
Report
February-March 2003: Votes in House of Commons and House of Lords on Lords
reform
April 2003: Joint Committee Second Report: House of Lords Reform: Second
Report
September 2003: Consultation paper: Constitutional Reform: next steps for the
House of Lords
November 2003: Queens Speech Bill to remove remaining hereditary peers
announced
March 2004: Bill abandoned
February 2006: Start of cross-party talks on Lords reform
July 2006: Creation of the Office of Lord Speaker
February 2007: White Paper: The House of Lords: Reform

3.4

Labour and the two other principal UK national political parties, the Conservative
Party and the Liberal Democrat Party, went into the May 2010 General Election with
commitments to further reform of the House of Lords, though the commitments were
significantly different.

3.5

Labours commitment was:

We will ensure that the hereditary principle is removed from the House of
Lords. Further democratic reform to create a fully elected Second Chamber

11

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will be achieved in stages. At the end of the next Parliament one third of the
House of Lords will be elected; a further one third of members will be elected
at the General Election after that. Until the final stage, the representation of all
groups should be maintained in equal proportions to now. We will consult
widely on these proposals, and on an open-list proportional representation
electoral system for the Second Chamber, before putting them to the people
in a referendum.
3.6

The Conservative Partys commitment was:

We will work to build a consensus for a mainly-elected second chamber to
replace the current House of Lords, recognising that an efficient and effective
second chamber should play an important role in our democracy and requires
both legitimacy and public confidence.

3.7

The Liberal Democrat Partys commitment was:

Liberal Democrats will... replace the House of Lords with a fully-elected
second chamber with considerably fewer members than the current House.

3.8

No single party won the May 2010 General Election and a Conservative/Liberal
Democrat Coalition government took office on 15 May 2010, with a legislative
programme which included a provision on House of Lords reform:6
We will establish a committee to bring forward proposals for a wholly or
mainly elected upper chamber on the basis of proportional representation.
The committee will come forward with a draft motion by December 2010. It is
likely that this will advocate single long terms of office. It is also likely that
there will be a grandfathering system for current peers. In the interim, Lords
appointments will be made with the objective of creating a second chamber
that is reflective of the share of the votes secured by the political parties in the
last general election.

3.9

The Government has pursued two courses of action. First, it has continued to make
appointments of working peers, including a number of Ministers, to the House.
Second, the Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the Liberal Democrats, called for
the formation of a cross-party group to take forward further Lords reform. This
committee, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, comprised representatives from
the main political parties, and from both Houses of Parliament. It began meeting in
July 2010, meeting seven times in all, but did not publish any report or conclusions. It
did not meet after November 2010, and it did not produce a motion for Parliament by
December 2010, in line with the coalitions commitment. In effect, the cross-party
approach of the Clegg Committee was abandoned.

3.10

Instead, the Government went ahead with its own proposals, and published them in
May 2011 in the form of the draft House of Lords Reform Bill, and an accompanying
White Paper (the 2011 Bill). In summary, these proposals were:
o
o

A size of 312: 240 elected, 60 appointed and 12 Bishops (ex officio);

No change to scrutiny function;

Programme for Government, Cabinet Office, May 2010

12

13
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
3.11

No change to powers: Commons primacy and financial privilege intact;

One 15 year term of office;
Elected same day as General Election, with qualifications;
Elected by Single Transferable Vote;
Membership peerage link to end;
Members salaries and allowances; and managed by the Independent
Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA);
UK residence requirement
Extension of the franchise to members of the reformed House of Lords;
Single term of three normal parliaments.

The White Paper accompanying the draft Bill said:

We are both strongly persuaded that this is a unique opportunity for our
country to instil greater democracy into our institutions and are fully
committed to holding the first elections to the reformed House of Lords in
2015.7

3.12

The coalition government proposed a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament

to consider the draft Bill and white paper. It was formed of representatives of all the
main political parties in both Houses of Parliament and published its report in April
2012.

3.13

The Joint Committee was sharply divided on many of the key issues in the
Governments Bill, with many of its decisions being approved by only the slimmest of
majorities. Its main conclusions many times on only a majority basis included:

3.14

Supporting an elected House of Lords, though only with commensurate

powers
Agreeing that such an elected House would have a representative function
Rejecting of the Governments simple assertion in the Bill of Commons
primacy
Agreeing to a House which would be 80 per cent elected, 20 per cent
appointed
Disagreeing with the Governments proposal of a House of Lords of only 300
members, and recommending instead a House of 450 members
Supporting proportional representation, though with a particular favoured
system
Accepting 15-year-terms for elected members of the House of Lords
Placing the Appointments Commission on a statutory footing
Putting the issue of an elected House of Lords to the public in a referendum

Twelve of the 26 members of the Joint Committee produced an Alternative Report on

the same day as publication of the Joint Committees own report.8 Its main
recommendations were:

Cm 8077 p6
House of Lords Reform: an Alternative Way Forward, by members of the Joint Committee of both Houses of
Parliament on the Governments draft House of Lords Reform Bill, April 2012. Available from
www.houseoflordsreform.com, and now published additionally by the Campaign for an Effective Second
Chamber, at www.effectivesecondchamber.com
8

13

14

The establishment of a new Joint Committee of Parliament to re-examine the

conventions between the two Houses of Parliament, as recommended by the
Cunningham Committee on Conventions

The establishment by the Government of a Constitutional Convention to consider

the next steps on further reform of the House of Lords and any consequential
impact on the House of Commons and on Parliament as a whole.

The conclusions of the Constitutional Convention should be put to the British

people in a referendum

The Government should take over and bring to the statute book the proposals for
reform put forward by Lord Steel of Aikwood, together with other proposals such
as those brought forward by Baroness Hayman, the former Lord Speaker, and
proposals for reform of working practices in the House of Lords, brought forward
by the Leaders Group on the issue, chaired by Lord Goodlad.

3.15

The Government announced it would take the Joint Committees work into
consideration, and published a further version of its House of Lords Reform Bill in
June 2012 (the 2012 Bill). This version abandoned completely Clause 2 of the
original Bill, which sought to maintain the primacy of the House of Commons simply
by asserting it on the face of the Bill.

3.16

The revised Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on June 27, 2012. Labour
announced that it would support the Bill at Second Reading in the Commons, but
would not support the Commons programme motion, allocating time for
consideration of the Bill. The Government attacked Labours position, but several
Conservative MPs began to make clear that they too would not support a programme
motion on the Bill. On 9 July, the Government put forward both the Second Reading
of the Bill and the programme motion. By 10 July, though, it became clear that the
Government was going to lose the programme motion in the House of Commons and
withdrew it. The Bill went to a vote on its Second Reading, which was carried with
Labour support by a majority of 338. However, 91 Conservative MPs voted against
their partys three-lined whip to support the Bill, while a further 19 Conservative MPs
abstained.

3.17

The Deputy Prime Minister on September 3 made a statement to the House,

withdrawing the Bill, and confirming there would be no further government attempts
to reform the House of Lords ahead of the next general election taking Lords reform
off the national political agenda until at least then.

3.18

Work by organisations such as the Constitution Unit at University College, London,

continued, including the publication in autumn 2013 of a major new study by the UCL
Constitution Unit of the modern House of Lords. Within the House itself, work
continued by a range of individuals and groups including, but not limited to: the Lord
Speaker; the former Lord Speaker, Baroness Hayman; the Leader of the House; the
cross-party Campaign for an Effective Second Chamber, led by Lord Norton of Louth
and Lord Cormack; the Clerk of the Parliaments, originally for the Campaign for an
Effective Second Chamber but subsequently more widely; a group of peers, including
former Cabinet Secretary Lord Butler of Brockwell and former Labour Minister Lord
Filkin, seeking to promote procedural change in the Lords as proposed by a Leaders

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Group chaired by the former Conservative Chief Whip in the House of Commons,
Lord Goodlad; and by a range of individual peers, including Lord Steel of Aikwood.

Role & functions of the House of Lords

4.1

Parliament is the single representative body for the whole of the United Kingdom,
and is the legislative body for UK-wide legislation and legislation for those parts of
the UK not covered by separate representative and legislative assemblies in
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

4.2

The gradual introduction of the universal franchise established the House of

Commons as the principal representational, legislative and debating forum for the
UKs Members of Parliament, elected by the people through common suffrage.
Within Parliament, the House of Commons is the dominant chamber.

Commons Primacy
4.3

The primacy of the Commons mainly consists in:

It being the means of formation of the UK government. The Monarch asks the
leader of the largest party in the Commons to become Prime Minister and form a
government. It stays in office for as long as it commands the majority support of
Members of the House of Commons, or it resigns, although this has been made
more complicated by the introduction of fixed term parliaments.

Its ability to give final approval to legislation. Whilst the House of Lords can have
an impact upon legislation started in either House, it has no ability to give final
approval. The House of Lords can delay legislation but only by one year.

Its right to raise taxes and vote money for expenditure. The powers of the House
of Lords over financial matters were restricted by the Parliament Act of 1911. The
Lords can delay the passage of a money Bill but only for a month, and can
amend it, but the Commons is not obliged to consider such amendments.

4.4

While legislation can begin its parliamentary passage in the House of Lords and the
upper House can impact upon legislation started in either House, it has no ability to
give final approval to legislation.

4.5

We believe that this is and should remain the role of the House of Lords and, in
legislative terms, the main powers of the House of Lords should remain constrained
by the Parliament Acts with the main functions of the House of Lords remaining. They
are the following:

to scrutinise, consider and revise the work of the House of Commons;

to hold the government of the day to account; and

to provide an important national forum for matters of public debate, often on

issues with an ethical dimension;

In particular, the Lords has the power to delay a Bill into a subsequent
parliamentary session, and until not less than 13 months has elapsed from the
date of the Second Reading of the Bill in the first session.

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Legislation
4.6

The House of Lords shares with the House of Commons responsibility in the UK
Parliament for UK-wide legislation. The method of processing legislation in each
House with reading, committee, and report stages is very similar, although the
roles of the two Houses are distinct. Formally, the House of Commons can subject all
legislation to close examination. In practice, the government majority and the
scheduling powers of government business managers are such that the
consideration of legislation in detail is often curtailed. In the Lords, as legislation
makes its way through Parliament, it is subject to close consideration and scrutiny,
with not just individual clauses but individual sentences and individual words
examined and debated in depth. The House of Lords also has the ability to delay
legislation, to ask the Government and the House of Commons to think again.

Scrutiny
4.7

As well as considering closely the components of the Governments legislative

programme, the House of Lords scrutinises the work of the Government by asking
oral and written questions of ministers, by responding to government statements, and
by debating key issues of government policy. Oral questions in the House of Lords
differ in their format and impact to those in the House of Commons. In the House of
Commons, the Prime Minister answers a range of questions from members in the
chamber every week as does the Leader of the Commons. There is no specific
question time for the Leader of the House of Lords. In the House of Commons,
questions to departmental Secretaries of State and their junior ministers come up on
a rota basis, usually about every month. In the House of Lords, questions can be
tabled for any day for any department, so that daily question time in the Lords will
feature a range of questions, almost always to a range of different government
departments and government spokespeople. Like the House of Commons, the
House of Lords has a range of different select committees in choosing which
committees to maintain or introduce, the Lords tries not to replicate those in the
Commons which includes regular questioning of government.

Deliberation
4.8

The House of Lords is a forum for national public debate. Select committees of the
House of Lords conduct inquiries into matters of public policy and produce reports on
these issues that are then open to debate in the House of Lords. An example of this
is the European Union Select Committee. Party and non-party groupings in the
House of Lords have reserved, allocated time within the overall schedule of House of
Lords in which they debate issues of government or public policy, or politics.
Individual members of the House of Lords can table debates on matters of interest to
them. The House of Lords is able to draw upon wisdom, expertise and experience
from many walks of life providing a direct link to wider civil society. This allows its
deliberations a depth and character that are not always evident in the more
pressured environment of the House of Commons. This is not to say the House of
Lords is a non-political chamber indeed most of its members also have party
affiliations, accept a party whip and may speak and vote on behalf of their parties.

4.9

This broader composition gives the House of Lords a further, more loosely-defined
function that of conduit to civil society. Direct elections by the people means that

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the House of Commons is specifically representative of the people. The House of
Lords, as an unelected chamber, has of course no such representativeness. Peers
are members because they receive an individual Writ of Summons from the Monarch
to attend the House. Accordingly, members of the House of Lords do not speak on
behalf of anyone but themselves.
4.10

Except for a number of office holders, members of the House of Lords are not
salaried. Many members have employment elsewhere; many retain connection with
their professions and/or have connections with a range of organisations and people
outside parliament. However, rules governing the conduct of members of the House
of Lords mean that they are rightly prohibited from acting as paid advocates in the
House for interests from beyond the House.

Powers of the House of Lords

5.1

All legislation must be passed by both Houses of Parliament. As second chamber,

the House of Lords has many important functions, particularly proposing the
amendment of legislation and making government think again. However, its powers
to reject legislation outright are limited. Exceptions include legislation to extend the
length of a parliament, and secondary legislation.

5.2

The House also has wider powers to delay legislation. Conscious of the primacy of
the House of Commons, the Lords uses these powers sparingly and with discretion.
The House of Commons can generally insist that such legislation is passed after a
delay of one session. However the potential for delay can persuade the House of
Commons to accept amendments passed by the Lords.
In regard to secondary legislation, we recommend that a power to delay is
substituted for the present power to reject. Otherwise, we support the retention by
the House of Lords of its current powers over legislation.

Legislation
5.3

The principal powers of the House of Lords in relation to vetoing legislation are:

a veto over any legislation introduced into Parliament in the House of Lords. The
Parliament Act 1911 can only apply to a Bill passed by the House of Commons
and only then if the Commons has already approved it.

The consent of the House of Lords is required to extend the life of Parliament
beyond five years. Though the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011 set a five year
term for a Parliament, going beyond five years still requires the consent of the
House of Lords.

The consent of the Lords is needed for a local and personal Bill.

The Lords possesses a veto over subordinate, secondary, legislation because

the Parliament Act 1911 refers only to public bills.

Money Bills
5.4

The House of Lords can delay the passage of a money bill for a month, under the
terms of the Parliament Act 1911. The Lords can amend a money bill, but the
Commons is not obliged to consider such amendments. The powers of the House of

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Lords in relation to money bills were particularly restricted by the 1911 Parliament
Acts following a major crisis over a budget.
Delay
5.5

The House of Lords can currently delay the passage of a Bill, in strictly governed
ways:

If the Commons passes a public bill which is not a money bill or a bill to extend
the life of a Parliament, in two successive sessions, whether in the same
Parliament or not, and the House of Lords rejects the Bill in both of them, then on
the second rejection the Bill can be presented for Royal Assent.

Such a Bill must be sent to the Lords at least one month before the end of each
of those sessions.

A year must pass between the date of the Commons second reading of the bill in
the first session and the date on which it passes its Commons stages in the
second session.

5.6

So the Lords is able to delay a Bill into a subsequent session, and until not less than
13 months have elapsed from the date of the second reading of the Bill in the first
session.

5.7

Constitutional experts suggest that these provisions amount to significant powers for
the House of Lords, but that the Lords, though retaining these powers, by a large
chooses not to use them recognising the primacy of the House of Commons. The
number of times the Parliament Act has been deployed, for example, is very small,
and the number of times the Lords has rejected secondary legislation is also small.
We support the House of Lords retaining these powers, and accordingly, with the
exception in paragraph 6.3 above on delegated legislation, we make no
recommendation for change to the powers held by the House of Lords.

Composition of the House of Lords

Membership
6.1

The House of Lords is made up of two elements: the Lords Spiritual, and the Lords
Temporal. The Lords Spiritual are the 26 Bishops of the Church of England, and the
Lords Temporal are life peers under the Life Peerages Act 1958, together with the
small number of hereditary peers who remain in the House as a result of a political
agreement reached to secure the passage of the House of Lords Act 1999.

6.2

Most peers are members of the House by virtue of appointment peerages granted
to them, predominantly by the political party system. A small number of peers are
appointed under a system independent of the political system. Amongst the
remaining 92 hereditary peers, there is a provision in the House of Lords Act 1999
under which, following the death of an hereditary peer, there is an election for their
replacement.

6.3

Peers in the House, whether life or hereditary, are in the House as individuals, but
most are participants in the system of groupings which operate in the House: the
main political parties and a substantial minority of peers who sit on the crossbenches

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of the House, as independent non-party affiliates who have a limited degree of
collective organisation.
Diversity
6.4

Britain has a long history of diversity, and of fairness and tolerance, though inevitably
it has witnessed failures in all these areas as well. Parliament, and perhaps even
more so the House of Lords, has long been seen as dominated by members who are
overwhelmingly white, male and older. In recent years this has been changing with,
for example, many more women MPs, but Parliament still has a long way to go to
match the diversity of the country.

6.5

Attempts have been made to assess both Houses in terms of sex, religion, race,
ethnicity, disability, culture, and previous or current employment9. Such assessments
suggest the House of Lords is actually more diverse than is often imagined, that it is
more diverse now than it has been in the past and that it is actually more diverse
than the Commons.

6.6

We believe that greater diversity in the House of Lords should be pursued as a goal.
Emphasis needs to be placed on diversity on grounds of gender, faith, race, ethnicity
disability, culture and on occupation, expertise and experience too. Diversity criteria
also need to be widened, for example by the introduction of geographical diversity,
since membership of the House of Lords is heavily skewed towards the south east of
England.

6.7

We believe, in common with the Joint Committee and the Alternative Report group,
that the best means of increasing diversity is for diversity, very broadly defined, to be
among the criteria used by the House of Lords Appointments Commission in
considering individuals for membership.

6.8

We recognise, though, that there is a difficulty here. When the House of Lords
Appointments Commission was first established, there were no particular restrictions
placed on the number of individuals it was meant to recommend for appointment.
Following a number of appointments recommended by the Commission to serve as
independent crossbench peers, there was a feeling that too many peers were
entering the House by this means. Some current crossbench peers in particular felt
that their limited collective services were coming under strain. More recently the
present Prime Minister has instructed the Commission to reduce the number of peers
it recommends each year, and as a result the number has dropped back from an
average of six a year to two a year. Such scaling back makes it difficult for the
Commission to make progress on diversity when the numbers of individuals it is able
to recommend is so small and should be reversed.
We recommend that the House of Lords Appointments Commission and the
political parties, adopt as part of their published criteria in considering individuals
for recommendations for membership of the House of Lords, the diversity of the
United Kingdom.

See, for example, on employment background: Analysis of Existing Data on the Breadth of Expertise and
Experience in the House of Lords Report to the House of Lords Appointments Commission, by Meg Russell
and Meghan Benton, UCL Constitution Unit, March 2010

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Lords spiritual
6.9

The Lords Spiritual are an historic and longstanding element of the House of Lords.
Historically, the Churchs place in the House of Lords stems from its part in the very
first parliaments. Under the current arrangements, the established Church of England
has 26 places in the House. The UKs other established church, the Church of
Scotland, is not formally represented in the House of Lords, nor is any other faith,
although leading figures in some other faith groups have received life peerages.

6.10

We recognise that there are strong arguments in favour and against the presence of
Church of England bishops in the Lords. Indeed, they were expressed by different
members of the Labour Peers Working Group. We make no recommendation for any
immediate action on a subject where there are such clearly divergent views, and
believe that these are issues for further and deeper consideration in the future.

6.11

We do, however, believe that one change could and should be made. At present the
independent House of Lords Appointments Commission does not explicitly include
diversity, including faith diversity, in the published criteria it applies when considering
individuals to recommend for membership of the House. We believe that this is a gap
in the criteria, as did the members of the Joint Committee on the Governments 2011
House of Lords Reform Bill, and the members of the Joint Committee who produced
the Alternative Report. Like them, we believe that diversity ought to be specified as
one of the criteria.

Size of the House of Lords

6.12

At the time of publication, the House of Lords has a total of 83510 members,
comprising 666 life peers, 87 hereditary peers, 26 bishops and 56 peers who are for
a variety of reasons mainly because they have taken voluntary leave of absence
from the House classified as ineligible members: that is, members who are not
eligible to scrutinise legislation, table questions and debates and carry out the normal
functions of a member of the House.

6.13

10

The size of the House of Lords has varied over time. The current membership is far
from the highest it has ever been and far from the lowest. The all-time peak was at
1,296, which was reduced immediately to 667 in 2000 following the passage of the
1999 House of Lords Act that removed the great majority of hereditary peers.
Membership has been steadily increasing since then and its current 835 is 25% up
from its 2000 level.

Figures supplied by House of Lords Library.

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Number of peers in each year since 1958

1400
1200
1000
800
Peers

600
400
200
0

6.14

Following the failure of the coalitions Bill, and faced with the prospect of further
inflows of party political peers, the Lord Speaker attempted to raise the issue of the
size of the House and see if there might be prospect of a consensus on a way
forward.11 Some inside and outside the Lords have considered the issue of some
kind of arrangement for members of the House akin to severance payments in
business and industry. The Clerk of the Parliaments the most senior official in the
House of Lords drew up a business case on this issue12, including a system of
modest subvention that would be self-financing within two years. There is a view that
such a system would attract public hostility in current difficult economic
circumstances; many believe such a scheme to be wrong in principle, whatever the
circumstances. However, in the light of the considerable financial savings to be made
by the House, and in order to achieve a reduction in its size, further consideration
might be given to the business case outlined by the Clerk of the Parliaments.

6.15

While none of these approaches to reducing the numbers has so far found
widespread favour, we believe there is a strong need to improve the House by
reducing its size. Clearly, this could be done by legislation. But in the absence of
such legislation, we believe that some steps forward could and should be taken in the
meantime.

6.16

We believe that two main principles should govern the size of the House as follows:
o

First, the House of Lords should always be smaller in number than the House of
Commons. The House of Commons is the dominant House of Parliament, and its
dominance rests primarily on the fact that, unlike the Lords, it is elected. We
believe that while this remains the case it should be reflected in the relative size
of the two Houses. The current House of Lords, at 812 members, is obviously
considerably larger than the present size of the House of Commons, at 650

11

Were In Danger of Becoming a Place of Ridicule, op cit

Membership of the House of Lords: Steps which the House might take, by David Beamish, Clerk of the
Parliaments, HoL December 2012
12

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members. We believe that, over time, an objective for the House of Lords should
be to reduce itself in size to a level below that of the House of Commons.
o

Second, the functions of House of Lords should determine its size. The House
needs a sufficient number of members to enable it to discharge its functions as a
revising and scrutinising body.

6.1

Library figures for 2012 revealed that the House had some 680 backbenchers. The
remaining members of the House comprise the frontbench teams for the main
political parties. As well as serving and working in the chamber on legislation and on
questions and debates, many backbench members of the House serve on
committees of the House. In December 2012, there were 431 places on committees
and sub-committees of the House. Of those 431 places, 54 were filled by
frontbenchers, officeholders of the House and the Convenor of the crossbench peers.
That meant there were 377 places on committees and sub-committees filled by
backbench peers. One in four backbenchers were sitting on two or more committees
or sub-committees. A total of 305 backbenchers held no committee or sub-committee
places.

6.2

Various proposals have been put forward concerning an appropriate size for the
House of Lords. In its House of Lords Reform Bill 2011, for example, the Government
proposed a House of Lords of 300 members. 13 The Joint Committee on the Bill, and
the Alternative Report from a number of members of the Joint Committee, proposed
a House of 450 members14, and accordingly, the Government in its revised House of
Lords Reform Bill 2012 accepted that recommendation, and also proposed a House
of 450 members.15

6.3

Second chambers around the world operate with a range of different sizes16, ranging
from 60 in Ireland to over 320 in Italy. Perhaps the best known is the United States
Senate, with 100 members. The size of the House of Lords, prior to the 1999 Act that
removed the majority of the hereditary peers, dwarfed all other second chambers,
and even now the House of Lords is still considerably larger than other second
chambers.

6.4

The history of House of Lords reform over the past 100 years17 suggests that
gradualist, rather than radical, reform tends to be the most successful, and we
believe it to be the most fruitful again. We believe that gradualism is likely to prove
the most fruitful again.

6.5

Accordingly, we believe it is right to indicate a desirable goal for the size of the House
a target to reach over a period of time. While there is an arbitrary element in any
target selected, we believe that by applying the principles of the House of Lords
being smaller than the House of Commons, and the House of Lords needing
sufficient members to enable it to carry out the functions required of it, an appropriate
goal to reach in terms of the size of the House would be a total of 450 members, as

13

House of Lords Reform Bill 2011

Joint Committee, op cit. Alternative Way Forward, op cit
15
House of Lords Reform Bill 2012, op cit
16
Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from Overseas, op cit.
17
House of Lords Reform Since 1911: Must the Lords Go?, by Peter Dorey and Alexander Kelso (London, 2011);
The House of Lords 1911-2011: A Century of Non-Reform, by Chris Ballinger (Oxford, 2012)
14

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recommended by the Joint Committee. We believe that a membership at this level,
while still larger than many second chambers around the world, would meet the clear
need for a smaller House, while still allowing it sufficient members to carry out all its
functions. Though a membership of 450 would require almost halving the present
size, if reached over time by a range of measures such as we set out in this Report,
then it would be a target that would be moderate, sensible and achievable.
We recommend that an appropriate goal to be adopted for the size of the House of
Lords, to be achieved over time, would be a House of 450 members.
Political balance
6.6

At the time of publication, the parties of the coalition government in the House of
Lords, taken together, have the largest number of seats 302 compared with 222 for
Labour. There are also 182 crossbenchers, 26 Bishops, and 33 others. Looking at
the purely political seats, the coalition government has a clear majority: 58 per cent of
the political vote, compared with 42 per cent for non-governing party members. The
formation of the coalition government, operating as a single entity in both Commons
and the Lords, reversed what had been for many years a clear convention in the
House of Lords that no single party should have a majority in the Lords.

6.7

This convention came into place because of a political commitment given by Labour.
In its manifesto for the 1997 General Election, Labour said of the House of Lords:
No one political party should seek a majority in the House of Lords.

6.8

Labour believed that in order for the House of Lords to carry out properly one of its
key roles as a vital element of the checks and balances in the British constitution, it
was important that no single party should seek a majority in the Lords. The Labour
Government elected in 1997 stood by that commitment as a point of principle, even
though operationally it made the passage of its legislative programme more difficult.
We support that principle, and believe that such a clear convention ought to be
revived and applied in future.

6.9

While the current coalition government is not a single party, the nature of coalition
means that, in the main though with some very marked exceptions the two
parties in government are acting as a single entity. The effect of this has been clear:
instead of the House of Lords acting as one of the important constitutional checks
and balances on the Government, it has become something of a rubber stamp, with
which the Coalition has been able to sweep legislation through the chamber,
subverting the constitutional role of the House on a number of issues.

6.10

Labour and individual crossbenchers, working together, have occasionally combined

to defeat the coalition, though in most cases such defeats have been reversed in the
Commons when the coalition has applied its majority there. But in many cases, it has
not needed to do so because of its combined voting strength in the Lords.

6.11

This problem is worsened by the declared policy of the coalition, as set out in its
Programme for Government, that in advance of large-scale reform of the Lords:
Lords appointments will be made with the objective of creating a second
chamber that is reflective of the share of the votes secured by the political
parties in the last general election.

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6.12

The net effect of pursuing this policy, as well as simply increasing the overall size of
the House, as this Report discusses elsewhere, would be to increase the coalitions
numbers by a further 179 peers. Such an increase would see the coalition with 481
peers in the House, compared with 222 for the Opposition among the political
peers, that would see the coalition with 68 per cent of the votes, compared with 32
per cent for the Opposition: more than double those of the Opposition.

6.13

The coalitions policy, applied in this way, distorts even further the political balance
that we believe should apply in the House of Lords. We believe that a better balance
is provided not by taking the position applying in terms of votes in the House of
Commons at the last general election, but by taking a more balanced approach over
time.

We recommend that in future, no one political party or governing combination of

parties should seek a majority in the House of Lords.
Appointments to the House of Lords
6.14

Currently, there are four means of entry to the House of Lords:

6.15

Appointment by the Prime Minister as an independent or party political peer, of

which there are a number of sub-categories:

Working peers on a party list, appointed by the Prime Minister, from lists
compiled by individual political parties, to a target number set by the
Prime Minister

Individuals brought in directly as government Ministers

Non-political appointments, such as former Cabinet Secretaries

Peers on a resignation or dissolution honours list a resignation list of a

resigning Prime Minister, now by convention awarded by their successor;
a dissolution list at the end of each parliament, given to resigning, or
defeated, MPs

Appointment as an independent crossbench peer by the non-statutory House of

Lords Appointments Commission

Appointment to the fixed number of 26 seats in the House for Archbishops and
Bishops of the Church of England; five are ex officio (the Archbishops of
Canterbury and York, and the Bishops of London, Durham and Winchester), with
the remaining selected by the church on the basis of seniority

Election following the death of one of the 92 hereditary peers remaining in the
Lords. For 75 of these places, the electorate is formed by the remaining members
of the deceased peers party or grouping, while for a further 15 places the
electorate is all members of the House, with a final two places reserved for Royal
officeholders.

Individuals appointed to the House of Lords in the main regard their place in the
Lords as both a privilege and as a priority: the priority being to contribute fully to the
work and activities of the House. Indeed, many reshape their lives to ensure that
membership of the House of Lords, and participation in its work becomes the
dominant element of their lives.
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6.16

Some do not see it in those terms. First, a small number regard membership of the
House as either the culmination of their lives before they entered the House, or part
and parcel of those lives. They see it as an honour and a privilege, but not
necessarily as something to which they are either prepared, or are able, to devote a
substantial amount of their time. For these Members of the House, attendance and
participation, excepting key voting divisions, can be very low. Second, some on the
cross benches see their membership as explicitly a means by which their particular
experience and expertise can be brought into Parliament. Many in this position take
the view that membership of the House does not give them the right to examine other
issues, and they tend to constrain their own involvement to areas in which they
believe their experience and expertise gives them a proper role.

6.17

We understand these and similar views. But we believe that membership of the
House of Lords does indeed place obligations on individuals, and that all members
should only consider accepting it on the basis that they will play a full part in the
working and operation of the House. We believe that, leaving aside Bishops,
nominating organisations should only put forward candidates on the explicit basis of
their being working peers. Individuals accepting nomination on this basis should give
an explicit undertaking to that effect.

6.18

Furthermore, there are a number of posts in public life that, by custom and practice at
least, usually attract an automatic seat in the House of Lords on retirement. This is
done by direct nomination by the Prime Minster to the Queen rather than through the
Appointments Commission. Former Cabinet Secretaries and Chiefs of the Defence
Staff are two examples.

We recommend that nobody, no matter how distinguished his or her public

service up to that point, should be appointed to the House automatically. Instead,
such appointments should follow a process as for all other appointments, against
a set of transparent criteria.
We recommend that organisations involved in proposing individuals for
membership of the House of Lords should do so only on the basis that their
nominees should be working peers.
We recommend further that individuals accepting nomination for membership of
the House of Lords, apart from those being proposed by the Church of England,
should only accept nomination on the basis that they will be working peers.
We recommend that individuals accepting nomination for membership of the
House of Lords give explicit, written undertakings to the organisation nominating
them that they will be working peers.
Remaining hereditary peers
6.19

The method of entry for hereditary peers is set out in statute, in the House of Lords
Act 1999. That provision was a political arrangement reached by the main political
parties to cope with circumstances at the time. For some, this arrangement was an
important guarantee because it ensured that the removal of the majority of hereditary
peers was part of a process of reform, and not simply an end in itself. For them, the
arrangement is a way of ensuring that what was called at the time Stage Two reform

25

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would be completed. For others, the arrangement was a guarantee of the opposite:
that is, they believed that in the House of Lords Act 1999 Labour was only interested
in removing the hereditary peers, and that as a result. Stage Two reform would in
practice never go ahead.
6.20

We believe there is no longer any justification for the replacement election of

hereditary peers; such an arrangement is unsustainable in the longer term. It has
certainly not led to further reform. We believe that even though provided for in
statute, it would not be impossible, if the will were there, for all those involved in this
process to refrain from enacting it. But we accept that this is unlikely. We therefore
believe that the provision should be repealed.

6.21

We believe that the hereditary principle should be ended. This need not mean the
immediate loss of membership of those remaining hereditary peers whose expertise
is of value to the House and its work. Such a contribution could be retained by the
House if some of the remaining hereditary peerages were transformed into life
peerages, provided the individuals concerned met the proposed revised age and
participation criteria set out in sections 7 and 8 of this report.

6.22

These two measures, the transition of remaining hereditaries peerages into

(qualifying) life peerages, coupled with the immediate ending of the system of byelection to fill vacancies in the remaining hereditary peers group, would remove the
last manifestation of the hereditary principle from the House, something supported by
all parties.

We recommend that Section 2 (2) 2 (4) of the House of Lords Act 1999 should be
repealed.
House of Lord Appointments Commission
6.23

Appointments of independent, crossbench peers apart from those non-political

appointments made by the Prime Minister are now primarily made through a
system of recommendation by an independent panel, the House of Lords
Appointments Commission (HOLAC). HOLAC is a non-statutory body, established by
a former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, with the aim of bringing some transparency,
clarity and openness to what had been at best a discreet process and one that was in
practice remarkably opaque. HOLAC has representatives serving on it from all three
major parties in the House of Lords, and is chaired by an independent, crossbench
peer. Since its inception in May 2000, 63 new peers have been appointed by the
Prime Minister of the day on the basis of recommendations from HOLAC.

6.24

HOLAC has two functions. The first is to recommend nominees for membership of
the House of Lords. The second is to vet, on propriety grounds alone, nominees
proposed by the political parties for membership of the Lords. Party nominees are
tested with a small number of agencies, principal among them Her Majestys
Revenue and Customs. HOLAC assesses nominees specifically on propriety issues,
not on suitability for membership of the House.

6.25

We do not believe that HOLAC has been entirely successful in making appointments
that fully reflect the diversity in society and the regional balance of the UK. It has,
though, set clear criteria for its appointments.

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6.26

HOLAC would like to be placed on a statutory footing and we would support

measures to underpin its independence with appropriate terms of reference that
ensure its visible independence.

We recommend that the House of Lords Appointments Commission should be

established in statute with appropriate terms of reference that ensure its visible
independence.
6.27

6.28

In advance of such a change, we believe there is scope for an extension of HOLACs

approach to the appointment of members of the House of Lords in order to improve
the present method of appointment of political peers. Currently, HOLAC applies a set
of clear and published criteria for its appointments. Though the criteria are limited,
they are at least open and transparent. HOLAC seeks to recommend nominees:

with the ability to make an effective and significant contribution to the work of the
House of Lords, not only in their areas of particular interest and special expertise,
but the wide range of other issues coming before the House;

with a record of significant achievement within their chosen way of life that
demonstrates a range of experience, skills and competencies;

who are willing to commit the time necessary to make an effective contribution to
the work of the House of Lords. The Commission recognises that many active
members continue with their professional and other working interests and this can
help maintain expertise and experience;

with some understanding of the constitutional framework, including the place of

the House of Lords, and the skills and qualities needed to be an effective member
of the House for example, nominees should be able to speak with independence
and authority;

who are able to demonstrate outstanding personal qualities, in particular, integrity

and independence;

with a strong and personal commitment to the principles and highest standards of
public life;

who are and intend to remain independent of any political party. Nominees and the
Commission will need to feel confident of their ability to be independent of partypolitical considerations whatever their past party-political involvement. For this
reason, all nominees are asked to respond to the questions on political
involvement and activities which are similar to those used for most public
appointments;

who are resident in the UK for tax purposes and accept the requirement to remain
so.

By contrast, the means by which party political peers are appointed is wholly opaque
and closed. The first public appearance of any names comes at the conclusion of the
process, when a list of new peers is published by the Prime Ministers Office. Before
that happens, the process of selection, of lobbying for selection, of individuals being
proposed or proposing themselves, of the need to make selections for party
management or other reasons, is largely invisible.

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6.29

We recognise the need for discretion in this process. Individuals might not wish the
fact that they were being considered by their party, or that they wished their party to
consider them, to be known either publicly or more widely in the party than the
handful of individuals actually involved in the selection process. Not all individuals,
when asked to consider going to the House of Lords, can or wish to do so.

6.30

But a high degree of discretion could still be maintained even with the introduction of
a greater element of clarity. As we understand it, HOLAC itself would not wish to
extend either their remit to include the system of political appointments to
membership of the House of Lords. We respect that viewpoint, but believe that, short
of such an extension, the HOLAC approach can still be extended in a way that would
improve the present system.

6.31

We believe that political parties seeking to nominate individuals for membership of

the House of Lords should voluntarily adopt new, transparent criteria for the selection
of all nominees. These should based on those used by the Appointments
Commission for non-political appointments, including:

the ability to make an effective and significant contribution to the work of the
House of Lords, not only in their areas of particular interest, but across the wide
range of other issues coming before the House;

a range of expertise, experience and skills, and a willingness to commit the time
necessary to make an effective contribution to the work of the House of Lords;

a strong personal commitment to the principles and highest standards of public

life;

residence in the UK for tax purposes and accept the requirement to remain so.

6.32

The voluntary introduction and application of such a set of criteria would give an
unprecedented degree of rigour and openness to the selection of working political
peers, without in any way compromising the integrity and independence of HOLAC. It
would make public, open and transparent standards consistent across most
appointments to the House of Lords. The application of the criteria to individuals
would make it apparent that new peers would only be appointed on the explicit
understanding that they would be working peers, willing and able to give the amount
of time and participation that working in the House of Lords requires.

6.33

For individuals, being nominated on the explicit basis of such criteria would confirm
their willingness to accept the disciplines of being a working peer.

Participation

7.1

Though the overall size of the House of Lords seems very large not all peers attend
all the time. Some have other commitments, employment or voluntary activities, or
are for other reasons not able to attend.

7.2

As discussed in paragraph 6.34, we believe that organisations nominating, and

persons accepting nomination should only do so on the basis that the individual is
willing to be a working Peer and participate fully.

7.3

Current levels of participation are markedly higher than they used to be. Most peers
take their responsibilities seriously, attending and participating regularly. The

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overwhelming majority of members are active, though with differing levels of
participation. Many work hard in the Chamber where attendance is most visible.
Many are highly involved in committee work. Members who accept a party whip are
expected to attend and vote regularly.
7.4

Attendance figures, published by the House, on their own, do not give a true picture
of participation. We believe that the emphasis should be on participation rather than
attendance, which requires active intervention in the work and proceedings of the
House and its committees, rather than merely on attendance. However one
disadvantage of the large size of the House is that opportunities for full participation
are somewhat limited.

Retirement

8.1

Bishops excepted, there has historically been limited provision for member of the
House of Lord to retire. In principle, peers remain members unto death. They may
take leave of absence from the House but retain the right to return even after a gap
of some years. Since 2011, however, peers have been enabled to apply for
permanent retirement under a voluntary retirement scheme (see chapter 1, para 32
et seq of the Companion to the Standing Orders). To date, however, only four peers
have applied under this scheme.

8.2

This leads to a large and comparatively elderly House. The average age of members
is 70, the age at which judges in the UK are required to retire. More than one peer in
10 is more than 85 years old, though some of these do not attend regularly. Of
course, many of these older peers bring wisdom and experience to the House but
some may continue, out of a sense of duty, beyond the point that makes sense for
them or for our national governance.

8.3

In the ten years to December 31st 2013, according to figures supplied by the House
of Lords Library, 180 peers died (of whom 17 elected hereditary peers and one
bishop were automatically replaced). This represents an average of 18 a year. But
over the same period, new appointments averaged 33 a year. In other words, there
were nearly twice as many new peers appointed as had died, driving up the size of
the house.

8.4

We have proposed a two-pronged approach: a retirement age, and simultaneously,

reflecting our emphasis on the importance of participation in the work of the House
minimum levels of attendance. We believe those who fail to match up to those levels,
save for good reason such as absence on parliamentary or other public business, or
through illness, should cease to be members of the House.

8.5

So far as retirement is concerned, an appropriate age has to be decided. There is a

balance to be struck between the desirability of preserving the qualities brought to
the House by some older members and the need for renewal. We believe that the
age of 80 strikes this balance. However, we do not think it would be right that all
peers over 80 should instantly be asked to leave the House.

8.6

Accordingly, we believe peers should retire at the end of the parliament during which
they attain the age of 80. This would have a significant effect on the size of the
House. If this rule had applied at the last General Election then 90 peers would have
left in May 2010. A further 96 would leave on the date of the next General Election,
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7th May 2015. The combination of death and compulsory retirement would on its own
mean that, even with the present rate of creation of new peers, the House would
shrink in size.
8.7

Of course it should also be open to any peer who so chooses to retire before
reaching the age of 80.

8.8

It may be that such a provision would affect the political balance of the House. If so,
mechanisms already exist for the Prime Minister and the Appointments Commission
to address it as we discussed earlier.

8.9

However a retirement age alone would not reduce the size of the House sufficiently
Moreover, it would be both unfair and unhelpful to the work of the House if some
peers who continued to contribute actively to the work of the House were retired
under this rule, while others who are not regular attenders remained as members.

8.10

We have therefore proposed a second rule: that those peers who do not participate
sufficiently in the work of the House should no longer sit as members. Since
participation cannot be easily measured, we propose attendance as an appropriate
proxy measure.

8.11

In line with our emphasis that all peers should be working peers, we would set the
bar quite high. We propose that, save in exceptional circumstances, any peer who
fails to attend an average of at least three out of every five sittings over the course of
a parliamentary session, should cease to be a member.

8.12

We do not propose that this rule should be introduced with retrospective effect. It
would be unfair if peers who had proceeded according to present rules and
expectations found they had ceased to qualify for membership under the new rules
and expectations. New nominees for peerages will meanwhile be able to decide
whether or not to accept in full knowledge of these new rules.

8.13

Our modelling suggests that this combination of a 60% attendance requirement and
retirement at the end of the parliament at which a member attains the age of 80
should produce a House at or near the target size of 450 (see earlier section on size
in paragraphs 7.15-7.24). This will, however, depend on prime ministerial restraint
over new appointments.

8.14

Retired peers would keep their titles. Sympathetic consideration should be given to
whether they should also retain visiting rights as former members, for example to use
the library, as is the case for those hereditary peers who ceased to be members as a
consequence of the 1999 reform of the Lords or retired permanently under the
voluntary retirement scheme.

We recommend that early legislation should be enacted to introduce a

combination of a retirement age of 80, to take effect at the end of the parliament in
which a member reaches that age, and an attendance requirement of an average of
60% of sessions.

Disqualification

9.1

As with retirement, because most members of the House of Lords are members for
life, there is no provision for outright disqualification. However, following adverse

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publicity about expenses in 2009, the House took powers to suspend members for
the length of a parliament. Previously, it had not been possible to suspend any
member for longer than one parliamentary session.
9.2

We accept that the provisions of the Life Peerages Act 1958 and the force of the Writ
of Summons mean that, without primary legislation, there can be no enforced
disqualification. Members cannot, under present provision, be required to leave the
House permanently.

9.3

The House of Commons has a provision for disqualification. MPs are automatically
disqualified from membership of the House of Commons if they are sentenced to
more than one years imprisonment or detention for an offence committed in the UK
or elsewhere. Though the Commons has not used this power for some years, it has
in the past been applied for such offences as perjury, fraud, corruption and forgery.

9.4

We believe it appropriate to apply a similar provision to members of the House of

Lords, accepting that it could not be applied retrospectively to any current members
of the House.
We recommend that primary legislation should be enacted to align disqualification
of members of the House of Lords with that covering Members of the House of
Commons.

10

Constitutional Commission

10.1

The constitution is the UKs hidden wiring18: vital for the good governance of a
healthy body politic and harmonious society, yet few people care how it works and
fewer still actually understand it. Changes to the constitution are rarely a high priority
for anyone save the most obsessed, especially during a time of economic strain.
Fundamental Lords reform should not be a top priority for an incoming Labour
Government.

10.2

Constitutional reform only works well, perhaps only works at all, when it is the
product of consensus, conducted away from partisan political processes and
electoral considerations. The very existence of the House of Lords, its role, its future
place in the constitution, and especially how its membership should be determined,
have been the subject of many decades of contention. Such issues will not be
resolved quickly and they may never be resolved at all without the establishment of a
Constitutional Commission to allow their consideration away from the political
ferment.

10.3

Accordingly, we propose that such a Constitutional Commission be established. It

should report within two years of inception in order to make legislation possible within
the next parliament. There are various models including:

18

One based on the Scottish Constitutional Convention that led to Scottish

devolution with an independent chair and a membership drawn from all
parties and none and with substantial civic society representation.

Coined by Peter Hennessy in The Hidden Wiring: Unearthing the British Constitution, (1996)

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An alternative, suggested by Lord Morris of Aberavon, would draw its

membership from senior main party representatives to ensure high-level
agreement, tempering this with sophisticated public consultation.

A hybrid option might balance senior politicians, independent representation

and sophisticated public consultation.

10.4

The remit of the Commission would be to consider Britains evolving constitutional

settlement as a whole. This would include devolution; the outcome of Scotlands
2014 referendum on independence; questions concerning English governance in the
contest of wider powers for the nations of the United Kingdom, and including regional
government. These all provide the context within which wider questions of the place
of the Second Chamber within the constitution will fall to be determined. These
include its functions and composition, including the question of direct election (and
the electoral system), indirect election or nomination; the relationship with all other
UK chambers, especially the House of Commons and the implications for formation
of governments; legislative activity; scrutiny of the executive, and representation of
the people. The Convention should also consider what could be learned from
international comparisons.

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Referendum

11.1

Referendums are relatively rare in British politics. Only two full national referendums
have taken place on continued membership of the equivalent of the European
Union in 1975, and on proposals in 2011 to change the voting system for the election
of MPs to the House of Commons. But referendums are increasingly part of UK
political life, such as the commitments given in enacting the EU Lisbon Treaty on
further significant relationship changes between the UK and the rest of the EU.

11.2

In its 2010 General Election manifesto, Labour promised to put significant further
reform of the House of Lords to the British people in a referendum. We strongly
support that. Major constitutional change to British democracy and governance, not
only merits but requires to be put to the British people in a referendum.

11.3

In pursuing its case in relation to the House of Lords Reform Bills 2011 and 2012, the
coalition government sought to dismiss Labours point about a referendum, saying
there was no need to put the issue to the public because an elected House of Lords
had been a feature of all three main parties manifestos in the 2010 General Election.
In fact, because no one party won the 2010 General Election, the manifestos of all
three major parties were rejected by the British electorate. At the same time, the
Liberal Democrats in particular believed that a change of the order of an alteration to
the system used for electing MPs to the House of Commons should be put to the
people of Britain in a referendum. If a move to an Alternative Vote system for one
House of Parliament is deemed to require a referendum, we believe that a move to,
for example, an elected House of Lords should also merit one.

We recommend that any major further reform of the House of Lords, and particularly
of its composition, should be put to the people of the United Kingdom in a
referendum, and only implemented if approved in a referendum.

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12

Conclusion

12.1

The House of Lords is an invaluable component of the UK body politic yet in several
regards it is in urgent need of improvement. Some of the larger questions
surrounding the Lords and its place in the constitution can only be addressed in a
wider forum such as a constitutional commission. We hope the political parties will be
able to recognise such a need and address it collectively.

12.2

In the meantime, there are many ways in which the House can reform itself by
introducing practical improvements to its working practices than can benefit the
public. Not all will require legislation; many could be implemented quite quickly.

12.3

We believe that taken together these recommendations, long and short term,
constitute a radical yet viable programme for reform of the House of Lords.

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