G.R. No.

89075 October 15, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO GEROLAGA, EFREN ATIVO and REMEDIOS RUADO, accusedappellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
In this Decision, this Court emphasizes the need to review the facts and
details of appealed cases with meticulous, laser-like precision. While, as a
rule, the findings of fact of trial courts are accorded great respect by appellate
tribunals, still, the latter must wade through the mass of evidence in order to
ensure that the trial court did not overlook or misapprehend little details that
could spell the innocence of the accused, or at least mitigate their guilt. This
is but consistent with the doctrine that all doubts must be resolved in their
favor. Indeed, it is far better to set free a thousand guilty persons than to
unjustly punish an innocent one.
Realizing that this direct appeal did not have the benefit of the usual
"filtering" layer of the Court of Appeals and noting that the assailed judgment
of conviction for murder was based purely on circumstantial evidence as well
as on an uncounselled confession of guilt, we pored over the evidence,
particularly the voluminous transcripts of stenographic notes, and came to the
ineludible conclusion that indeed the court a quooverlooked and/or
misapprehended some crucial bits of evidence and circumstances which when
properly considered led to the acquittal of two of the appellants, and the
conviction of the third for the less damning crime of homicide instead of
murder.
The Antecedents
The twists and turns of this case are absorbing enough to the mistaken as the
plot of a storybook thriller or a movie script. They are not. Rather, they are the
flesh and blood drama of real life.
For the bizarre fatal stabbing of Antonio Sy on March 21, 1987, appellant
Remedios Ruado-Sy, the deceased's sister-in-law, along with her former
employee, Roberto Gerolaga and her houseboy, Efren Ativo were charged with
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information 1 lodged
with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate on June 15, 1987 and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 5247 reads as follows:
That on or about March 21, 1987, in the morning thereof, at the poblacion of
the municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused conspiring and helping
one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and in
consideration of a price or reward, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one Antonio Sy y Tan with a double bladed
dagger, hitting the latter on the chest, abdomen and other parts of the body,
thereby inflicting wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death.

Contrary to law.
All the accused pleaded "not guilty" during the arraignment on August 4,
1987. The prosecution presented seven (7) witnesses:
(1) Dr. Emilio Quemi who testified and submitted a post-mortem
examination (Exh. "A") and certificate of death (Exh. "C"), which showed that
the victim sustained seven (7) wounds, five (5) of them fatal, to wit: 2
1. Stab wound penetrating, measuring about 3 inches wide located at the
epigastric region.
2. Stab wound, penetrating the abdominal cavity, measuring about 1 1/2
inches, located at the left abdominal wall, a little above and lateral to the
navel.
3. Stab wound, measuring about 2 inches wide, penetrating located at level of
left costal arch, at its lateral side.
4. Stab wound, measuring about two inches, penetrating the thoracic cavity,
located just below the right clavicle.
5. Stab wound, about one inch wide, penetrating, located at little anterior to
the right axillary fossa.
6. Incised wound, measuring about 1/3 inch wide located at the left side of the
thoracic vertebrae at the level of the 6th.
7. Incised wounds, located at the palmar surface of the fingers of the right
and left hand.
(2) Pfc. Estercacias (sometimes spelled "Estercasio") Pimentel, Jr., who was
the first police officer to arrive at the scene of the crime.
(3) Police Sgt. Felix Alonzo
(4) Pat. Tagumpay Mendoza
(5) Mrs. Conchita Sy Chua, younger sister of the victim
(6) Mrs. Benedicta Castillo Sy, and
(7) P/Sgt. Edgardo Tugbo.
On the other hand, testimonial evidence for the defense was given by six (6)
persons:
(1) Pfc. Pimentel who was called back to the stand
(2) Accused Roberto Gerolaga
(3) Co-accused Efren Ativo
(4) Co-accused Remedios Ruado-Sy
(5) M/Sgt. Noli Cabug, and
(6) Emilio Sy, the victim's brother and husband of the accused Remedios R. Sy.
On December 28, 1988, the trial court 3 rendered a Decision finding the three
defendants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and
imposing on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the payment
in solidum of an indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 to the heirs of Antonio
Sy without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The Facts
Thirty-one-year-old Antonio Sy was the youngest brother of Emilio, Arturo,
Jose, Teddy, Anita, Teresita, Norma, Lourdes and Conchita Sy. 4 Antonio was

married to Benedicta Castillo. Childless, the couple lived apart from each
other. Benedicta stayed in Cabangcalan, Aroroy, Masbate where she was
assigned as a teacher while Antonio lived with his eldest brother, Emilio and
the latter's wife, Remedios Ruado, who was also called Remy. While Benedicta
claimed that Antonio was a businessman engaged in buying and selling men's
and ladies' wear for which he earned a net income of around P3,000 a month,
5 his brother Emilio and the latter's wife Remy swore that Antonio was jobless
and that he was dependent on them and given an allowance of P25.00 a day.
Antonio had an insatiable hunger for vices gambling, illegal drugs, women.
Hence, his allowance was always insufficient for his needs. 6
At around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of March 4, 1987, as Remy was
arranging her merchandise in her store on the ground floor of her residence in
Aroroy, Masbate, a boy around fifteen years of age approached her, handed
her a letter and then hurriedly left. As translated by the court stenographer,
the letter in Masbateo reads: 7
MARCH 4, 1987
COMMANDER
NPA HELEN LIPANTO
REMY:
(MEL)
WE WILL ASK HELP FROM YOU WORTH P3,000 PESOS WE WILL EXPECT IN TWO
DAYS.
I AM ONLY ASKING YOU NO ONE MUST KNOW OR INFORM ANYBODY FOR IF IT
HAPPENS MANY LIVES WILL BE LOST? ESPECIALLY THE MILITARY. THEY WILL BE
PITIFUL? AND WE WILL GET YOU IF YOU FAIL? THEN YOU PLACE THE MONEY IN
ENVELOPE IN YOUR GARBAGE CAN AT 9:00 AT NIGHT ON SATURDAY.
THANKS
GOD BLESS YOU = ALL
DON'T BE AFRAID (YOU) WILL NOT BE HURT IF YOU FOLLOW THE ORDER? 8
After reading the letter, Remy gave it to her husband. Emilio decided that (a)
it should be presented secretly to the authorities for entry in the police
blotter, (b) their house should be guarded, and (c) the amount of P3,000
should be given to anyone who could apprehend Helen Lepanto. 9
Accordingly, the couple called the police. When Pfc. Estercasio Pimentel, Jr.
arrived, he was shown the letter. In the presence of Emilio, Remy asked Pfc.
Pimentel's help in having their house guarded and placing their premises
under surveillance. She also asked him "to apprehend and identify" Helen
Lepanto and to bring the letter to the municipal building in order that it could
be officially recorded in the blotter.
Fear gripped the couple. Emilio asked Remy to tell their houseboy, Efren Ativo,
to be vigilant especially at night and to arm himself with a 2" x 2" piece of
wood as a club or weapon. The couple closed their store at 6:00 p.m. instead
of the usual 8:00 p.m. Upon her husband's prodding, Remy set aside P3,000 in
one-hundred-peso bills. 10

Following the instructions in the aforesaid letter, Emilio instructed Remy to

place the P3,000, which was in an envelope, inside the garbage can at about
6:30 p.m. on March 6, 1987. Emilio told one of their sales-girls to inform Pfc.
Pimentel that the money had been placed in the garbage can and that he
should guard it. However, the following day, Pfc. Pimentel returned the money
to them with the information that nobody went near the garbage can that
night. Emilio then told Remy to verify this information with the station
commander. The latter confirmed that their surveillance yielded negative
results. When Emilio was informed of this, he asked Remy to go back to the
station commander and to retrieve the letter in order that it could be
machine-copied in Masbate.
Thus, Remy got back the letter on March 9, 1987, and proceeded to Masbate
to have the letter machine-copied. She returned to Aroroy at around 11:00
p.m. The following day, she met Sgt. Noly Cabug, a member of the 270th
Philippine Constabulary Command in Aroroy, 11 who assured her that he
would uncover the identity of Helen Lepanto. However, in spite of two days'
sleuthing, the intelligence personnel could not produce any result from their
surveillance. 12
While the Sy couple was officially informed that the police had no leads, the
latter in fact harbored some suspicions. In the evening of March 6, 1987, Pfc.
Pimentel and Pat. Cadiz kept watch in the house across from the Sy residence
while Patrolmen Maglente and Tugbo secretly stationed themselves at a street
corner near the Sy residence. At around 9:00 o'clock that evening, Pfc.
Pimentel saw Antonio Sy coming from the house of Benny Tuason. Just before
entering the Sy residence, Antonio approached the garbage can and looked at
it for about five to ten seconds. He peered at the garbage can for two more
times at 9:30 p.m. and then at around 10:00 p.m. when the electric light
was switched off. The police stopped their surveillance at 2:00 a.m. but
Antonio Sy did not return to the garbage can for the fourth time. 13
When Pfc. Pimentel reported this to his chief on March 7, 1987, the latter
concluded that Antonio Sy must have been "Commander Helen Lepanto." But
Pfc. Pimentel himself did not share the same belief otherwise he would have
apprehended Antonio Sy the moment he went near the trash can. That same
day, when Pfc. Pimentel returned the P3,000.00 to Remy, he did not reveal to
her the conversation he had with his chief. 14
At 8:00 o'clock in the morning of March 15, 1987, another boy approached
Remy in her store. The child conveyed the message that she was to prepare
the amount to P3,000 which "they" had not taken on the 6th of March, and to
drop the money on the 20th. The boy hastily left after warning Remy not to
inform the authorities about this new arrangement. As before, Remy related to
her husband what had transpired. Emilio asked her to follow the new orders,
but he insisted that, instead of placing the money in the garbage can, she
should give it to their houseboy, accused Efren Ativo, because he "slept in the

kitchen". Emilio added that anyone who could "identify or apprehend" Helen
Lepanto should be given the money as a reward. 15
At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, accused Roberto
Gerolaga entered the store to buy a t-shirt and some "spare parts." Having
been Gerolaga's former employer, Remy felt free to tell him that she had
received a "threat." She begged him to help "apprehend or identify" Helen
Lepanto.
Gerolaga told Remy that she was asking something dangerous because
Lepanto might be a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit. However, she managed
to convince Gerolaga to help watch over their house. She intimated to him
that whoever could "apprehend or identify" Helen Lepanto, be he a PC soldier,
a policeman or a civilian, would be given a P3,000 reward. Remy further
informed Gerolaga that the money would be placed in the garbage can on the
20th of March and hence, whoever would pick up the envelope in the said
container could be Helen Lepanto or his/her companions. 16
Gerolaga, a 25-year-old minibus conductor who was also known as Edgar, 17
testified that at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 20, 1987, he went
for a walk at the pier, drank beer for about an hour at a little store and then
went to a street corner near the Sy residence. Because he saw no one
approach the garbage can, Gerolaga went back to the pier where there was a
dance. He left the dance at midnight and went back to the bus terminal.
Thence, he returned to the corner to watch the Sy house.
It was then that he saw someone approach the garbage can. The man had a
flashlight which he beamed at the container. Then, as the stranger entered
the gate of the Sy residence, Gerolaga followed silently. The person went to
the well, fetched water and washed his feet. From a distance of about three
(3) meters, Gerolaga greeted him, "Good evening, Commander Helen
Lepanto." Surprised, the man turned his head and exclaimed, "Why do you
know me?" Gerolaga retorted that he knew him very well that he was
Antonio Sy. Immediately, Antonio pulled out a double-bladed knife and tried to
stab Gerolaga but the latter evaded the thrust. He caught Antonio's hand and
held him in a bear hug. Antonio kept on shouting, "I will really kill you, I will
really kill you." Sensing that Antonio was strong, Gerolaga shouted for help.
He twisted Antonio's hands and pushed the one holding the weapon upon
Antonio's chest several times. When Gerolaga felt Antonio weakening, he
released him, and the latter fell on the ground face down.
Gerolaga pulled out the bladed weapon and walked towards the gate. It was
there that he met Efren Ativo. The latter angrily demanded to know what he
was doing inside the premises. Gerolaga told him that he had already
"identified" Helen Lepanto. Gerolaga asked Ativo for the P3,000, but Ativo was
incredulous. So Gerolaga led Ativo to the well near which Antonio lay dead. It
was only then that Ativo went inside the house, took the money and handed it
to Gerolaga.

Gerolaga went to the bus terminal where he took off his bloodied shirt and
pants and placed them together with the weapon in a plastic bag. At 2:00
a.m., he boarded the San Agustin minibus which promptly departed. Arriving
in Luy-a, Gerolaga entrusted the plastic bag to a co-worker, Rafael Francisco,
who alighted there, with instructions that the clothing in the bag should be
washed by Francisco's mother. 18
After Gerolaga left, Ativo, still trembling, closed the gate. At 5:00 o'clock that
morning, he knocked "at the stairs near the door" of Remy's room. He
informed her, her husband and his sister Norma, that Antonio Sy was dead.
Emilio instructed everyone not to touch the body until the authorities arrived.
Ativo summoned Pfc. Pimentel but did not tell him about Gerolaga's
participation. 19
The police officer found the body of Antonio sprawled on the floor. The victim,
lying about a meter away from the well, was still holding a flashlight in one
hand. Pfc. Pimentel examined the body to determine the number of wounds it
sustained. Ten (10) meters from the body, he found a scabbard.
The body of the victim was in a state of rigor mortis and inside a coffin when
Dr. Emilio Quemi, medical specialist at the provincial health office, arrived to
conduct the post-mortem examination.20 In his report, 21 Dr. Quemi indicated
that Antonio Sy sustained five (5) stab wounds in the epigastric region, above
the navel, at the lateral side of the costal arch, below the right clavicle and
the right axillary fossa, and incised wounds at the left side of the thoracic
vertebrae and at the "palmar surface of the fingers of the right and left
hand(s)." He established the cause of death as "shock due to massive
external hemorrhage, caused by multiple wounds."
On March 23, 1987, the Aroroy police received information that Gerolaga had
been looking for Antonio Sy at around 11:00 o'clock "on the night of March 21
(sic)." 22 The police searched for Gerolaga and learned that he had hied off to
Barangay Luy-a. Upon reaching that place at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the
police were told that Gerolaga had proceeded to Crossing, Mandaon, where he
was finally apprehended by Pat. Maglente.
At the police station, the authorities learned from Gerolaga that the doublebladed weapon used in the assault was in the possession of Juanita Amaro,
mother of Rafael Francisco. Juanita Amaro subsequently turned over the 8inch long weapon as well as the pants and shirt of Gerolaga to Pat. Edgardo
Tugbo and Pat. Mendoza. 23
Gerolaga was investigated by Sgt. Felix Alonzo. He readily admitted killing
Antonio Sy, and also implicated Mrs. Remedios Ruado-Sy, saying that she
gave him through Efren Ativo the P3,000 after he killed Antonio Sy. However,
Gerolaga surrendered only P600 24 to Sgt. Alonzo as the rest of the money
had been spent. 25
Before taking Gerolaga's statement, 26 Sgt. Alonzo informed him of his
constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination. However,
Gerolaga told him that he did not as yet need a lawyer. The statement he

made was signed in the presence of his mother Encarnacion Letada Gerolaga
and his cousin Ermila Gerolaga Manlangit, who affixed their thumbmark and
signature, respectively, on the certification appended to the statement. 27
Also on March 23, 1987, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, a fifteen-yearold boy approached Remy in her store. They boy told her that their "head" had
ordered that Remy should write a letter to her in-laws "admitting the killing" of
Antonio Sy. Remy protested, telling the boy that it was her husband's idea that
the P3,000 be given to whoever could "apprehend and identify" Helen
Lepanto, but the boy left immediately. Distraught, Remy told her husband
about the boy's message. Enraged, Emilio asked whether she caused the
killing of his brother. Remy denied the accusation and reminded Emilio of their
agreement to "find ways to identify" Helen Lepanto and to give the P3,000 to
whoever could identify him.
Emilio ordered her to prepare the letter and to follow the instructions of the
NPA as it was the only way by which their entire family could be spared. Remy
went upstairs, prepared the letter and showed it to her husband. The boy
came for the letter at 4:00 p.m. of the same day.
At 5:30 p.m., the boy was back. He told Remy that their head was "not
convinced" by her short letter and that she should make it longer. She should
also include the letter of Helen Lepanto and "state what had happened in our
family." The boy warned her once again that she should not report to the
authorities and that, should be refuse to follow their instructions, "they" would
"get" her and her family.
Again Remy relayed the instructions to her husband. Emilio, expressing pity
for her, told her to follow the NPA instructions, reiterating that this was the
only way to save the family. She went upstairs and prepared the letter on
three sheets of yellow pad paper written back-to-back. 28 As translated by the
court interpreter, it reads:
March 24, 1987
Dear Teresing, Tuache, Ting, Long,
I write you this letter, because I want you to know the truth of Tony's death.
You know, on March 4, Tony sent me a letter. Here you may read, because he
planned to kill me. Good, he was able to tell that to my "Comadre" that during
the Juniors Ball of Chong (daughter of Remy) he would stab me. If luck was
against me I should have been the object of your vigil instead of him. I have
been asking help from "Sto. Nio" to save me because I have still many
obligations yet to my children. I prayed to God that if I am wrong, He should
punish me, but if he is wrong, he should be punished instead.
You know this fellow was used to "Barkadas", gambling, disco and he had also
a girlfriend in Joan's. He was always worried on how to acquire a large amount
of money because of his vices, such was the reason why I prepared myself to
kill or be killed, I told him that if my life was what he was after, it was up to
him to find out who would reach the base first(.) I told your "Manoy" to settle
this case before we repent it. Well in the afternoon of that day Tony and Baby

had an altercation in connection with the construction of his house because

he did not agree to give 1 meter allowance to his elder brother's piece of lot.
But I told them, "It's up to you." Then Baby said, "Mama, get Tony because
this is again a big problem. Manoy, I have prayed to all the Gods in order that
Tony should reform, but there was no good result." I told Norma, you have
given him P50,00. He would go to the disco house, he might be stabbed there
thus all his problems will be finished. The thorns in your heart will also be
pulled. So, God heard our prayer. He met an adversary.
The truth is that last March 4, Tony wrote me a letter, that a person who was
working under me before, would come here to buy spare parts. I did not know
why I was able to tell Edgar that I had a problem because I received a letter
from the NPA Commander, Helen Lepanto. I let him read the letter. "Sus,
Manay Remy, this letter is asking for the amount of P3,000.00, I'm going to
put that person down." "Yes", I answered, "because anyway I am going to be
killed is a matter of who will be the first (sic). "My bayaw" was the one who
sent this to me," said I. "Sus, its difficult, because he is like a snake, a
dangerous one. What do you say? Aba, Manay Remy, what a pity on you! You
are like a cock who is induced to fight but has no chance to win." So, he sided
with me and killed Tony. When he came from the disco house, I handed to him
the reward of P3,000.0 in order that he would not be angry with me. So, it
appears that I am the mastermind, but it was only a matter of who got ahead
if it was a game.
Thanks
You know, Tony had many plans. He wanted to kill Baby. He wanted to kill
Doctor, because according to him, he is the one keeping the papers. Baby, he
said, is tight handed when it comes to money. He got angry with me, because
when I gave him his P20.00 allowance, he wanted P50.00 and later on
P100.00. I told him, "Tony, Baby might be angry with me, because you are
given the amount more than you are allowed," The following morning, I gave
him P300.00 and I said, "This is the last time that I will give you. You ask from
my other in-laws (brother and sisters of Tony). As for me, I don't like to give
you anymore." Aba, by March 4, there was a letter that I would be kidnapped
and somebody was told that I would be killed before the end of March. I was
determined then to kill or be killed for your own good, for my children's good,
and mine. I have many problems yet for my children, that is why I choose to
finish him for he had no problems yet but make trouble to me and to all of us.
It is said that Teresing's worries may last until her death. So, all of us have
threats. We are all in a pitiful situation.
Understand me. I'm writing you this so that you will know.
Thanks
Remy T. Ruado
Even if your younger brother was like a snake in your family, I did not do
anything because he is your blood, I am a different person. Ruado, you know.
But when it come to service I did my best. I sent for Teresing in order to

explain to each an(d) every one of you, but you did not like because you are
only thinking of what I have done. You know, what Tony said, that he would kill
me before the end of March. We competed only as to who would reach the
base first.
Here is his letter on March 4.
NPA
Commander Helen Lepanto
Remy:
Mil:
We are asking from you as a help for us the amount of P3,000.00. You send it
within two days.
I want you not to reveal this to anybody or else many lives will be lost
especially the military. It would be a pity to them and we will get you if you
can not produce this. Then you put the money inside an envelope and placed
it in a trash container, at 9:00 o'clock on Saturday night.
Salamat,
God bless you all.
Don't be afraid. You will not be hurt if you follow my order.
This is the letter that was sent in duplicate.
I have no ill-feeling if you want me to be imprisoned (sic). Just okey. If you
accuse me, just okey also. I'll face you in the government in whatever action
you may take against me. I'm alone, but I think God will not forsake me. But I
tell you that I am like this, because I have given you too much pity. In truth,
Tony has brothers and sisters, but you did not do anything to correct his
mistake, grave or not. Like when he held up your elder brother. You kept that
in secret for he is your blood your surname and you will be put in shame. Now,
it's too late to repent, because he was able to meet somebody to stop his
wrong deeds.
I enclosed you in my two arms. Even if you will not be asked, something is
loosen in your hearts, beginning now. I know that you have an ill-feeling
against me, but if it were in your place, you would find out a remedy.
God will judge us all and God knows how much I loved Tony. Even when Pa had
a letter and telegram not to allow him in the house, I still admitted him,
because I took pity on him. But at the end, I was still bad. Well, my brothers
and sisters I hope you understood me already. We just played chess and I
won. To all of you, forgive me. Okey, if you don't want to see me, God is
responsible to all of you.
Thanks
Sister-in-law 29
After reading the letter, Emilio asked Remy to give it to his younger sisters.
Remy prepared an envelope and was about to deliver it to her sisters-in-law
when, at 9:00 a.m., another unnamed boy came back, asking for the letter. He
returned it to Remy at 10:00 a.m. with the information that his chief

considered the letter to be "alright". Emilio then ordered their daughter

Haydee to deliver the letter to his sisters. 30
In the afternoon of March 24, 1987, as Remy and others were going over the
personal belongings of Antonio Sy which, in accordance with Chinese
traditions and belief, should be burned during his burial, they found a wallet.
Inside it was a letter to a Miss Mecenario which was written in the same
handwriting as the letter sent to Remy by "Helen Lepanto". From Gerolaga's
revelation and this letter, Remy concluded that Helen Lepanto was none other
than Antonio Sy. 31
As earlier stated, the trial court convicted the defendants-appellants of
murder. It discredited Gerolaga's claim of self-defense, hold that Antonio Sy
"was found dead by the police authorities sprawled face upward a meter from
the well holding a flashlight in his right hand." 32 To the trial court, such fact
belied Gerolaga's claim of self-defense because Antonio Sy could not have
pulled the dagger from its scabbard with his right hand holding the flashlight.
The scabbard was found ten (10) meters away from the body of the victim
and not tucked into his waist or near his body, which would have been the
case if the weapon indeed belonged to the victim. Moreover, the court opined
that Antonio Sy, a Chinese businessman, could not have kept a "locally made
dagger and scabbard."
The trial court also faulted Gerolaga for not surrendering to the authorities
immediately. Furthermore, his plea of self-defense "does not square with the
commission of the crime induced by reward or prize." 33
In holding that the three defendants conspired in the killing of Antonio Sy, the
trial court indicted Remy for providing the monetary reward which Ativo
delivered to Gerolaga, the actual assailant. The trial court was convinced of
Remy's culpability by the tenor of the letter she wrote admitting participation
in the crime. As to Ativo, the court a quo emphasized his failure to report the
incident immediately to his employers and to the police authorities.
The defendants filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. 34 They wanted to present on the witness stand one Frankie
Escarlan, Jr. who allegedly witnessed the killing of Antonio Sy. On May 19,
1989, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that the claimed newly
discovered evidence would be merely corroborative of Gerolaga's selfdefense. 35 Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issues
In their well-presented and convincing brief consisting of 166 pages,
appellants specified the following alleged errors of the trial court: 36
(1) The trial court erred by, in, and for, rejecting the valid and clearly tenable
claim of self-defense, and thus, and with patent partiality, it erroneously
rendered its judgment convicting all of the accused in this case, despite the
insufficiency of the evidence for the purpose;
(2) The trial court erred by, in, and for, finding and ruling that conspiracy
obtains in this case, without clear and sufficient factual and legal basis, and

thus, with manifest bias and in grave error, it held all of the accused criminally
liable as co-principals; on the contrary, upon the entire and purely admissible
evidence, the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, conspiracy
does not lie in the case at bar;
(3) The trial court erred by, in, and for, not finding and ruling that each, and
all of the accused acted without freedom, then being under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, in their case, respectively, or
probable death;
(4) The trial court erred by, in, and for, not finding and ruling that accused
Efren Ativo, more so, Remedios Ruado-Sy, acted in obedience to lawful orders
for some lawful purpose in this case at bar;
(5) The trial court erred, consequently, in its decision by, in, and for, having
convicted all the accused for murder through conspiracy, or by, in, and for,
not having acquitted all of the accused herein, upon the ground of reasonable
doubt, it having failed or refused to consider exclusively, only the purely
admissible factual and more credible circumstantial evidence obtaining in this
case, and to observe with liberality, consistent with the proper dispensation of
criminal or penal justice, the law, jurisprudence, and the fundamental
precepts, as are applicable to, or in the case at bar.
In fine, the issues could be condensed into three :
(1) Is Gerolaga's theory of self-defense sufficient, credible and valid?
(2) If not, was the crime committed murder or homicide? More specifically,
were evident premeditation, treachery and/or price and reward amply proven
by the prosecution?
(3) Are appellants Remedios Ruado-Sy and Efren Ativo, who were
unquestionably absent from the crime scene, equally as guilty as appellant
Roberto Gerolaga who while admitting the killing of the victim proffers selfdefense as a justifying circumstances?
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Gerolaga's Theory of Self-Defense
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the prosecution did not (could
not?) present any eyewitnesses to the crime. The circumstances prior to and
those obtaining during the actual commission of the felony were established
mostly by the defense. This happened because of appellants' theory that the
killing was justified by self-defense. As such, the resolution of this case hinges
to a large extent on the credibility of the appellant's witnesses. However,
while the determination of the issue of credibility has always depended on
trial courts and appellate courts are, as a rule, bound by such findings, we
realize that in the present case, the conviction of the accused was based on
pure circumstantial evidence and on an uncounselled confession of guilt. On
account thereof, we were constrained to pore over the evidence, and arrived
at the conclusion that the trial court misapprehended critical bits of evidence
and circumstances which when considered correctly leads to a modification of
the judgment of conviction. We thus emphasize the need for all courts to

scrutinize every bit of evidence with meticulous care and analyze each case
with deliberate precision and thoroughness to spare the innocent and/or
mitigate the penalty of the guilty.
With the foregoing caveat, we shall first pass upon appellant Gerolaga's
theory of self-defense. When such defense is invoked, the burden of evidence
shifts to the accused. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of the prosecution's. Even if the latter were weak, it
could not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the
killing. 37
In the present case, it was duly proven that Gerolaga was unarmed when he
entered the Sy residence to confront the victim. 38 It was also clearly
established, through Emilio Sy, that Antonio owned the double-bladed knife,
its scabbard and the flashlight found at the crime scene. 39 Because Gerolaga
surprised Antonio by disclosing the latter's sobriquet as he was washing his
feet, and because such disclosure came from an intruder in the Sy residence,
it is indeed not improbable that Antonio initially attacked Gerolaga.
However, to appreciate self-defense in favor of an accused, the following
requisites must be concurrently and clearly proven: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. 40 In this case, even if the first and third requisites
were to be appreciated in favor of appellant Gerolaga, the second requisite
had not been met. There was no reasonable necessity to inflict upon Antonio
Sy numerous wounds, five of them fatal. 41 Because Gerolaga himself was
unscathed, the wounds sustained by Antonio Sy certainly negates the
former's claim of self-defense. 42Moreover, the justifying circumstance of selfdefense may not survive in the face of Gerolaga's flight from the crime scene,
his concealment of the weapon and his failure to inform the authorities of the
incident. 43
Second Issue: Murder or Homicide?
The sole key to appellant Gerolaga's exoneration having been disposed off,
appellants' exact criminal responsibility must now be determined.
As defined by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is the crime
committed by a person who kills another "in consideration of a price, reward,
or promise." Said qualifying circumstance of price or reward equally affects
both the offeror and the offeree 44 the former becomes a principal by
inducement and the latter, a principal by direct participation.
In this case, the prosecution attempted to establish that Gerolaga killed
Antonio Sy for the reward. In his brief, the Solicitor General even quoted the
following portion of Gerolaga's testimony to support the theory:
Q And when you said that you are going to help, the help that you are going
to do is to kill Helen Lepanto?
A Yes, sir.

Q And it was also your desire to kill Commander Helen Lepanto because you
will received (sic) the Three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos, is it not?
A Yes, sir. 45
However, that portion of Gerolaga's testimony should have been considered in
the context of his entire testimony as well as all the pieces of evidence
presented at the trial, in the same manner that it should have been
considered under the basic principle in criminal law that all doubts shall be
resolved in favor of the accused. Gerolaga knew the purpose for which Remy
and her husband offered the P3,000.00 reward. Thus, after testifying that he
expressed to Remy his fears about looking for and identifying NPA
Commander Helen Lepanto as the latter might be a member of the dreaded
Sparrow Unit, Gerolaga said:
Q So what did Remedios Ruado say if she said anything?
A Mrs. Ruado answered that she must be helped because this amount asked
by NPA will be given to whoever who (sic) can apprehend that Helen Lepanto.
(Emphasis supplied) 46
Pressed by the prosecution to admit that he "desired" to kill Commander
Helen Lepanto for the reward of P3,000, appellant Gerolaga demurred as
follows:
Q When you entered the gate following that person, you were thinking that
the person you were following was Commander Helen Lepanto? Is that what
you want the Court to understand?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in following him with the intention of killing, you want to tell us that you
do not have any weapon?
A I have no intention to kill him. What I have in mind is to recognize him and
identify him and to report to the policemen.
ATTY. BRAVO (continuing)
Q You mean you were not afraid to follow up (sic) Commander Helen Lepanto
whom you believe to be a member of the NPA when your intention is to kill
him and that Helen Lepanto is armed?
A What I wanted during that night is that to identify and recognize him
because I had knew (sic) him I will (sic) not do harm to him because we were
friends. 47(Emphasis supplied.)
Appellant Gerolaga then proceeded to narrate that it was only when
"Commander Helen Lepanto" spoke that, by his voice, he recognized the
stranger to be Antonio Sy, his friend. But because Antonio Sy immediately
lunged at him with a knife, appellant Gerolaga responded accordingly.
We are thus faced with a situation where self-defense is discredited because
of the number of wounds inflicted upon the victim. However, there are several
circumstances, proven by the defense and unrebutted by the prosecution,
indicating that Gerolaga intended only to identify and recognize, and not to
kill, the victim. These circumstances include appellant Gerolaga's entering the
Sy residence unarmed and the reflex action of Antonio Sy in lunging at the

appellant on account of his unexpected detection and identification. In such a

situation, the law tilts the scales of justice in favor of the perpetrator of the
offense. 48 Consequently, because appellant Gerolaga had been impelled by
the prospect of a monetary reward merely for identifying the source of the Sy
couple's woes, he may not, in the same breath, be deemed as having
intended to kill Antonio Sy for a price. He killed Antonio Sy in reaction albeit
extreme to the violent attack launched by the deceased. The qualifying
circumstance of price or reward in regard appellant Gerolaga may not,
therefore, be counted against him.
In view of the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt showing the evident
premeditation and treachery alleged in the Information but considering his
owning up to the killing of the victim, appellant Gerolaga may be held liable
only for the crime of homicide, not for murder as charged.
The qualifying circumstance of price or reward may not likewise be
appreciated against appellants Ruado-Sy and Ativo. Both testified that the
money was meant to encourage people to "identify and apprehend"
Commander Helen Lepanto. Even Emilio Sy, who was allowed to testify after
his defendant wife had granted permission, 49 swore that his wife did not
entertain any idea of killing Commander Helen Lepanto. She asked only for
the latter's "identification and apprehension." 50 Such fact was buttressed by
Pfc. Pimentel who, after the police had formed the surveillance team, returned
to Remy to ask what police services she needed. He testified as to the
conversation that transpired:
Q What did Mrs. Ruado answer to that?
A Mrs. Ruado said that she will cooperate and she told us that whoever among
us could apprehend Lepanto that Three Thousand (P3,000.00) pesos she (sic)
asked will be given to us as a consideration for our services. 51
Money offered or paid by anyone as a "sort of an expression of . . .
appreciation of sympathy or aid (gratification)," may not be considered as a
recompense for participation in a crime. 52 In the face of the prosecution's
relentless effort to discredit her testimony during the trial, appellant Ruado-Sy
tenaciously stuck to her repeated statement that, in line with her husband's
idea, she intended the P3,000.00 to be a reward for whoever could "identify
and apprehend" Commander Helen Lepanto. That no criminal intent may be
ascribed to her in setting aside the P3,000.00 as reward is supported by the
fact that appellant Ruado-Sy immediately referred the letter of Commander
Helen Lepanto to the police authorities and even offered them the same
amount as a recompense for the identification and apprehension of the author
of the letter.
Third Issue: Culpability of Ruado-Sy and Ativo
Neither may appellants Ruado-Sy and Ativo be held criminally liable on the
basis of appellant Gerolaga's sworn statement implicating his co-accused in
the crime, as it was executed without the assistance of counsel. The right to
counsel has been constitutionalized to curb duress and other undue influence

in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. 53 In accordance with the

provisions of Sec. 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, a waiver of the right to
counsel must be in writing and executed in the presence of counsel. 54
Indeed, any waiver of the right to counsel without the assistance of counsel
has no evidentiary value. 55 Hence, appellant Gerolaga's waiver of the same
right, even if executed in the presence of his mother and cousin, is void and
has no legal effect.
The trial court's reliance on appellant Ruado-Sy's letter of March 24, 1987 as a
basis for her conviction is misplaced. A reading of the letter be-speaks of no
more than the rambling thoughts of a clearly apprehensive wife. That she
admitted she was ready to "kill and be killed" may not be considered as an
accurate gauge of the existence of any criminal intent on her part. The letter
was written under understandably overpowering anxiety and apprehension on
account of her possible liability for the death of Antonio Sy, her in-laws' anger
at her and her fear of reprisal from them, and her failure to neutralize the NPA
threat. Also, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, 56 it was written
three days after the crime had been committed when appellant Ruado-Sy
already had more than an inkling as to the true identity of Commander Helen
Lepanto. Furthermore, her claim that it was returned to her in order that she
could lengthen the letter is buttressed by its format. Appellant Ruado-Sy's
signature appears in the middle of the letter and, in accordance with the
directive given her through the boy-messenger, she incorporated the contents
of the March 4, 1987 letter of Commander Helen Lepanto.
It is immaterial that the order to write the letter was coursed through a boy in
his mid-teens. Under the circumstances, appellant Ruado-Sy could not be
expected to (and would have been foolhardy to) subdue the boy or to cause
his apprehension. We take judicial notice of that fact that in rural areas,
gullible young people are conscripted in the commission of crimes by lawless
elements who, taking advantage of the fear generated by the "swift justice"
allegedly rendered by members of the New People's Army upon those who
refuse to do its bidding, use the name of said organization to attain their
malevolent purposes, even if they may not really be members thereof. While
it has not been clearly established that Antonio Sy was indeed a member of
the NPA, or that he was merely out to collect more money from his own
relatives, appellant Ruado-Sy's actions subsequent to her receipt of the letter
from "Commander Helen Lepanto" showed that she was in fact in the grip of
fear and a sense of helplessness throughout that time, and therefore, we can
only conclude that in all probability, she was psychologically and mentally
unbalanced, and not in complete control of her free will, when she wrote the
letter of March 24, 1987.
Anent appellant Ativo, it is not uncommon for houseboys like him to follow
their master's orders unquestioningly and quite literally. No criminal intent
was proven or could be attributed to him for his act of delivering the "reward"
to appellant Gerolaga. His failure to report immediately the death of Antonio

Sy to his own employers and to the police is explained by the fact that after
he discovered that Antonio Sy was killed and Gerolaga demanded the amount
of P3,000 from him, he, too, was consumed by fear that Gerolaga might kill
him. 57
If at all, appellants Ruado-Sy and Ativo may be held criminally liable only
under the conspiracy theory where the act of one may be imputed to all the
conspirators. 58 Conspiracy, considering the secrecy by which it is usually
hatched, may be established by a chain of circumstances only. 59 However,
like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, it must be established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.60
In the present case, the prosecution attempted to establish conspiracy by
showing that the "reward" of P3,000 was financed by appellant Ruado-Sy and
that appellant Ativo delivered the amount to the killer. However, considering
the unrebutted testimony of appellant Ruado-Sy that, with the approval of her
husband, she set aside the P3,000 as a reward for the identification and
apprehension of Commander Lepanto and the fact that Ativo merely obeyed
the order of his employers to deliver the amount to whoever could identify
and apprehend said NPA commander, no criminal intent to kill Antonio Sy
could be attributed to him. Moreover, as earlier discussed, it was not
indubitably proven that appellant Gerolaga intended to kill Commander
Lepanto and/or Antonio Sy for a price. Hence, no community of criminal
design may be attributed to them. As "there is not other evidence to prove
conspiracy except the affidavit of confession" (which is inadmissible in
evidence), even the Solicitor General admitted that the "lower court erred" in
finding the existence of conspiracy.
In view of the foregoing, appellant Gerolaga's criminal liability is individual
and separate. He shall be liable only for homicide, not murder, as no
qualifying circumstances have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Because no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the killing, he
shall be meted the medium period of the penalty of reclusion temporal. 61 By
the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he shall suffer ten (10)
years of prision mayor medium as minimum penalty to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium as maximum penalty.
Pursuant to current jurisprudence, he shall indemnify the heirs of Antonio Sy
in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50.00).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partially GRANTED. Appellants Remedios Ruado-Sy
and Efren Ativo are hereby ACQUITTED and are hereby ordered RELEASED
immediately, unless they are being detained for some other legal cause.
Appellant Roberto Gerolaga is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide for which he is hereby IMPOSED the indeterminate penalty
of ten (10) years of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal and ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
Antonio Sy, in the amount of P50,000.00. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-17234

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICOLAS MOJICA Y GIRA, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Salvador J. Lorayes for accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Review of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal finding appellant
Nicolas Mojica guilty of murder and sentencing him to death penalty, and the
accessories.
Appellant Mojica and Primitivo Ala were charged in the said Court with having
murdered prisoner Ruperto Artus y Garcia in Muntinlupa, Rizal, on the 24th
day of March, 1959.
Primitivo Ala Pleaded guilty to the information and was consequently
sentenced to death. This Court affirmed the sentence upon review in G. R. No.
L-15633.
Mojica, on the other hand, did not plead guilty. So trial proceeding, after which
he was found guilty as charged and sentenced to death.
As stated, this is a review of the judge's decision.
It appears that at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 24, 1959,
Gabriel Buclating, one of the leaders of the "OXO gang",[[1]] was stabbed to
death by certain members of the "Sigue-sigue gang"[[2]] inside the New
Bilibid Prisons at Muntinlupa, Rizal. To avenge the death of such leader, a
member of the "sigue-sigue gang", a prisoner named Ruperto Artus, was
stabbed to death two hours thereafter (at about 6:00 p.m.) in Cell No. 1 of
Dormitory No. 3-C of the said prisons. Immediately after the stabbing of said
Artus, Nicolas Mojica and Primitivo Ala, both prisoners and members of the
"OXO gang" offered to surrender to the prison guard, Jose Magkalas. Before
they were brought out of the cell, they were ordered by said Magkalas to
throw out of the window of the cell, the weapons used in the killing, an icepick and a flat and pointed instrument. Both accused, upon coming out of the
cell, had blood on their clothes and hands. At the time Mojica inside the cell,
expressed willingness to surrender to the prison guard, he was holding in his
hands, the flat and pointed instrument, Exh. "A". Both prisoners admitted
having stabbed and killed the prisoner Artus. Benito Geronimo, the officer-incharge of the security guards, took their confession in writing, and the same
was subscribed and sworn to before the Assistant Director of Prisons. Another
prison guard, Benjamin Aman, witnessed the investigation and the taking
down of the confession.
In Mojica's confession, it is related that:
This afternoon at about 6:00 p.m., 24 March 1959, after having heard that one
of our leaders in the OXO gang, GABRIEL BUCLATIN was stabbed to death by
members of the Sige-Sige gang, I and prisoner PRIMITIVO ALA, decided to kill

a tagalog prisoner inside our dormitory called RUPERTO ARTUS in revenge to

the death of our leader.
Q. How did you effect the killing of Ruperto Artus?
A. While Artus was standing inside Cell No. 1 of Dormitory 3-C, I
immediately stabbed him on the waist followed by my co-prisoner PRIMITIVO
ALA with the use of an improvised weapon made out of steel drum.
Q. How many times did you stab prisoner ARTUS?
A. Four times, sir.
Q. In what part of the person of ARTUS was hit?
A. On the stomach and on his sides.
Q. When did you decide to kill Artus?
A. We decided to kill Artus immediately after the killing of Buclatin at about
4:15 p.m., 24 March 1959.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Why did you want to kill Artus, had you any altercation or
misunderstanding with him?
A. We had no ill-feeling against each other, I only want to revenge the
killing of Mayor Abing meaning GABRIEL BUCLATIN.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Are you a member of the OXO gang?
A. Yes, sir, I have a tattoo with number 11 as membership of the gang.
Q. When did you join the OXO gang?
A. In 1957, sir.
Q. Do you have something more to say, add, or retract from this
statement?
A. No more, sir.
Q. Are you willing to sign this statement?
A. Yes, sir. (Exh. B).
xxxxxxxxx
During the trial, Mojica admitted being a member of the "OXO gang". He,
however, denied the commission of the crime, claiming that he had signed
the extrajudicial confession because he had been beaten by men in khaki
pants whose identities he did not know. He further claimed that his surrender
was, likewise, only forced upon him by leaders of the "OXO gang", namely
Fortunato Birotiao, Cresencio de la Cruz, Francisco Brillantes and Rodolfo
Ibaez; that these threatened him with death should he refuse to admit the
killing. He explained that his hands had blood in them because his coaccused, Primitivo Ala smeared them with his (Ala's) bloody hands.
Upon review of the records, we find substantial evidence corroborating the
extrajudicial confession of Mojica. The murder weapon he described in the
extrajudicial confession was the very same weapon he was seen holding in his
hands inside the prison cell by prison guard, Jose Magkalas, and the same
weapon which appellant Mojica threw out of the cell window upon orders of
the prison guard. In this extrajudicial confession, he admitted having stabbed

the deceased on the sides and the stomach. The deceased was found to have
suffered stab wounds on said parts. Moreover, those parts of appellant,
Mojica's narration (in the extrajudicial confession) concerning the participation
of his co-accused, Ala (aside from the fact that said co-accused confessed to
the crime before the lower court and was thereby convicted), are also
corroborated by the testimony of the prison guard, Jose Magkalas.
As to the voluntariness of the execution of the extrajudicial confession, there
is no question that it had been voluntarily made. The statement was
subscribed and sworn to before the Acting Assistant Director of Prisons before
whom appellant could have complained had there really been any irregularity,
or any violence used upon him. Furthermore, appellant could not identify the
people who allegedly forced him to execute the admission. As to his surrender
to the prison guard thru intimidation by the leaders of the "OXO GANG", his
explanation is unconvincing. He could have sought protection from the prison
authorities once he was out of the cell; he could have revealed to the same,
the frame-up against him, and pleaded for separation from the vicious gang.
The explanation relative to the blood in his hands contradicted the testimony
of his co-accused Ala. While Mojica said that it was Ala who had placed blood
on his hands, the latter (Ala) said that it was Fortunato Birotiao who placed
blood on the hands of Mojica. The presence, though, of blood on Mojica's
clothes was not at all explained.
The testimony of Primitivo Ala pointing to Fortunato Birotiao Jose Garcia,
Rodolfo Ibaez and Francisco Brillantes as the perpetrators of the crime is
completely inconsistent with his plea of guilty when he was arraigned for said
crime in the lower court. When his judgment of conviction was brought before
this Court en consulta in case G.R. No. L-15633,[[3]] we found upon study of
the case that he had adequate knowledge of the nature of the charge against
him, of the meaning of his plea of guilt and of the consequence thereof. And
we affirmed the judgment of conviction against him.
The element of conspiracy attended the commission of the instant crime. Both
the extrajudicial confessions of appellant and of convict Primitivo Ala as well
as the latter's judicial confession contain statements to the effect that they
had agreed to kill the deceased Artus to avenge the death of a leader of the
"OXO gang". The circumstance of evident premeditation attended the
commission of the crime. There is ample evidence of how and why the crime
was planned, sufficient time[[4]] having been shown to intervene between its
inception and execution. There is also treachery. Two men stabbing another
forty times in vital parts or the body cannot but insure the death of the latter.
Also, the attack on the victim was sudden. As Mojica has described in his
extrajudicial confession, the victim was just standing inside the cell when
appellant suddenly, stabbed him on the waist followed by his co-accused
Primitivo Ala.
Considering that Primitivo Ala appellants co-accused, has been sentenced to
die, (despite his judicial confession which is a mitigation), considering that the

conspiracy has been shown, and considering that the crime was committed
while the accused was serving sentence, the extreme penalty of death
necessarily is in order.
The judgment en consulta is affirmed in all parts and respects.
[G.R. No. 118320. October 15, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO
CABODOC y ESTRADA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused-appellant Rodolfo Cabodoc was tried for the crime of murder in
Criminal Case No. 537-91 of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Branch 12,
under an information whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of May, 1991, at about 4:30 oclock in the
afternoon, at Sitio Mainit, Barangay Pulanbato, Municipality of San Juan,
Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a fan knife (balisong), with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said
weapon one Randy Pendel y Galang, suddenly and without warning, thereby
inflicting upon the latter the following wounds, to wit: 1). 2.5 cm. incised
penetrating wound 9th ICS mid-axillary line left directed upward 2). 5 cm.
incised wound nipple line perforating the pericardium and left ventricle (6 cm.
Length) perforating the left lungs (lower lobe 8 cm. Length), which directly
caused his death.[1]
The accused filed a petition for bail and reinvestigation.[2] The motion for
investigation was denied on 18 November 1991.[3]
At his arraignment on 20 February 1992, the accused entered a plea of not
guilty, and the court forthwith set the case for pre-trial and hearing of the
petition for bail.[4] At the hearing of the said petition, the prosecution
presented as its witnesses Virgilio Galang; Danilo Matira; PO2 William Perez of
the Philippine National Police of San Juan, Batangas; Alejandro Pendel; and Dr.
Marilyn Tejada. The prosecution then rested its case for purposes of the
petition for bail.
In its order of 31 January 1994,[5] the trial court denied the petition for bail,
having found that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong. At
also denied on 7 March 1994[6] the accuseds motion to reconsider[7] the
order denying the petition for bail.
On 8 March 1994, the prosecution manifested that it would offer no further
evidence and moved that it be allowed to adopt the evidence it had presented
during the hearing of the petition for bail. Since the defense did not object,
the trial court granted the motion. Upon the other hand, the accused, through
his counsel de parte, Atty. Ernesto Maiquez, offered to change his plea of not
guilty to the crime charged to that of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide.

The prosecution objected, and the trial court denied the offer. Thereupon,
Atty. Maiquez waived the presentation of evidence on behalf of the accused
and rested the case for the defense.[8]
The facts narrated by the witnesses of the prosecution are concisely
summarized in the Brief for the Appellee submitted by the Office of the
Solicitor General as Follows:
On May 28, 1991, at about 5:00 a.m., Danilo Matira and victim Randy Pendel
went to the house of Lucy Razon at Sitio Mainit, Barangay Pulangbato, San
Juan, Batangas to attend a fiesta. There were many people at that house. At
about 12:00 noon, appellant arrived and ate at the house of Lucy (TSN, Mar. 8,
1993, pp. 22-25). At about 1:00 p.m., appellant opened his balisong and
uttered the words I will kill him (refering to Randy Pendel). At that time,
appellant was about two (2) arms stretch away from Pendel (TSN, Mar. 8,
1993, pp. 26-27). Matira took the balisong away from appellant. Later, Matira
returned the balisong to appellant who then left the place (TSN, March 8,
1993, pp. 27-28).
At about 4:30 p.m. of the same day (i.e., May 28, 1991), Virgilio Galang was
walking along the road at Sitio Mainit. Galang then saw Pendel walking inside
the fence of the house of Renato Samarita. Galang called and invited Pendel
to walk with him. At that point, Galang suddenly saw appellant coming from
behind Pendel with an open balisong (TSN, Mar. 8, 1993, pp. 4-6). Pendel
happened to turn and thus face appellant (napaharap) (TSN, Mar. 8, 1993, 6,
18). Appellant suddenly stabbed Pendel with his balisong, hitting him (Pendel)
on the left side of the chest (TSN, Mar. 8, 1993, p. 6). Pendel stepped
backwards with his arms raised until he reached a santol tree. Appellant
again stabbed Pendel with the balisong, hitting Pendel once more on the left
side of the chest (TSN, Mar. 8, 1993, p. 7). As Pendel fell down near the
santol tree, appellant tried to stab him for the third time. However,
appellants balisong hit the santol tree instead which cause it to break.
Appellant then ran outside the fence of Samarita and fled to the south, taking
with him the handle of his balisong the blade or pointed portion of appellants
balisong was left on the santol tree (TSN, Mar. 8, 1993, p. 8). The people on
the vicinity shouted that help be extended to Pendel. Pendel was brought to
San Juan Emergency Hospital for treatment (TSN, Mar. 8, 1993, p. 9). He was
operated on but died during the operation (TSN, Nov. 16, 1993, p. 22).
Meanwhile, PO2 William Perez who was then in the house of his brother-in-law,
which is about six (6) meters away from the place of the incident, heard the
shouts of the people and went to the place of the incident (TSN, July 27, 1993,
p. 7). When PO2 Perez reached the placed of the incident, the people pointed
to appellant who was then running as the one who stabbed the victim (ibid, p.
6). PO2 Perez arrested appellant. Matira arrived and handed to PO2 Perez a
balisong (Exh. C) and told him that this is the balisong taken at the scene
of the incident (TSN, July 27, 1993, p. 4).

Dr. Marilyn M. Umali-Tejada of San Juan District Hospital, San Juan, Batangas,
examined the cadaver of the victim and issued a Post-Mortem Examination,
the pertinent portion of which reads:
Findings:
1. 2.5 cm. incised penetrating wound 9th ICS mid-axillary line left directed
upward.
2. 5 cm. incised wound nipple line perforating the pericardium and left
ventricle (6 cm. length) perforating the left lungs (lower lobe 8 cm. length).
3. Hemothorax 4 liters
4. (+) Alcoholic Breath
Cause of Death:
Cardio Respiratory Arrest Secondary to Fatal Stabbed [sic] Wound (Exh. H;
Record, p. 25).[9]
Mr. Alejandro Pendel, father of the victim, testified that in connection with the
death of his son, he spent P46,000.00[10] for hospital expenses,[11] funeral
and burial expenses, and expenses during the nine-day novena, the 40th day,
and the one-year anniversary.[12]
On 14 July 1994, the trial court promulgated a decision dated 14 June
1994[13] whose disposition against the accused reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, RODOLFO CABODOC y ESTRADA,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Murder, as
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, and sentenced [sic] him to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and its accessory penalties, to indemnify
the heirs of Randy Pendel in the amount of P50,000.00 for his death and to
pay the amount of P46,00.00 as actual damages and the costs.
The trial court held that the killing was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery because the victim was unarmed and the attack
was sudden, unexpected, without warning, and without provocation. It
disregarded the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, which was
also alleged in the information, because the prosecution failed to show that
the accused ha[d] a prior plan to kill Pendel.[14]
The accused in his brief submits the following assignment of errors:
A.
APPELLANTS CONVICTION IS
NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN
RENDERED WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
B.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PROSECUTION SUCCEEDED IN PROVING
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED
C.

ASSUMING THAT A CRIME WAS COMMITTED,

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE SAME WAS AGGRAVATED
BY TREACHERY
I
The first assigned error is founded on the claim of the accused that he was
not given an opportunity to be heard and to rebut the evidence for the
prosecution, and that his previous counsel acted with impropriety when he
arbitrarily waived the presentation of evidence for the defense. He then prays
that he be granted a new trial to afford him his constitutional right to due
process and to prevent a failure of justice.
The kernel issues thus raised are (a) whether the original counsel of the
accused was incompetent or otherwise had committed gross negligence in
waiving the presentation of the evidence for the defense, and (b) whether
such incompetence of gross negligence can be a ground for new trial.
As to the first, the accused has no proof whatsoever of the incompetence of
his previous counsel. The transcripts of the stenographic notes of the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses show that the counsel for the accused
lengthily cross-examined the witnesses to raise doubts on their credibility. As
to gross negligence, all that the accused has against his former counsel is the
following statement of the trial court in the decision:
[T]he defense waived the presentation of its evidence. It did not even bother
to present and/or offer the exhibits it had marked during the trial and merely
submitted its case for decision (page 4, Decision).
These so-called exhibits which the defense had caused to be marked as
Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4 were Exhibits A, B, E, and F,
respectively,[15] of the prosecution, which the trial court admitted. The
defense had them marked as its own during the cross-examination of the
witnesses who testified thereon. Therefore, their offer in evidence by the
defense was not even necessary. No substantial right of the accused was
affected thereby. Presumably, his counsel had deliberately decided not to
offer them in evidence as a matter of strategy to avoid being bound by all the
contents therein which were in fact unfavorable to the accused, especially
Exhibits A and B, which were the sworn statements of witnesses Virgilio
Galang and Danilo Matira, respectively, positively identifying the accused as
the perpetrator of the crime.
The incompetence or gross negligence of the accuseds original counsel
cannot be deduced from the latters decision not to present any evidence on
behalf of the accused. In the absence of any evidence to support it, that
deduction would be nothing more than an unadulterated speculation. In favor
of the said counsel is the presumption that, as an officer of the court, he
regularly performs the duties imposed upon him by his oath as a lawyer and
by the Code of Professional Responsibility. It must be stressed in this
connection that on 8 March 1994, after the prosecution had finally rested its

case, the original counsel, without objection on the part of the accused,
informed the trial court of the accuseds desire to change his plea of not guilty
to that of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. The trial court promulgated
its decision only on 14 July 1994. The accused had more than four months to
rectify any perceived error of his counsel in waiving the presentation of
evidence either by asking leave of court to withdraw the waiver or to secure
the services of a new counsel who could take the appropriate action on the
accuseds behalf.
The accused did not.
Neither did he ask for a
reconsideration of the judgment on ground of denial of due process.
The right to be heard by himself and counsel,[16] a personal right guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights to an accused, just like any other personal right, may be
waived.[17] The accused has not shown that the waiver of his right to present
his evidence was improvident. It is even logical to conclude that the waiver
was the product of a careful thought to obviate undue exposure of a weak
case. Since he had solemnly announced through his counsel that he was
willing to change his plea to that of guilty to the lesser crime of homicide,
taking the witness stand in defense against the charge of murder in view of
the rejection by the court of the offer might expose him to vigorous crossexamination, which might only enhance the evidence for the prosecution. His
counsel might have thought that the evidence for the prosecution had only
proved the crime of homicide, which, in fact, is the accuseds thesis in the
third assigned error.
It is, of course, to be conceded that if the accused had proved the gross
incompetence or gross negligence of his original counsel, we would be
prevailed to yield to his plea that he be granted a new trial under our
pronouncement in Jose vs. Court of Appeals,[18] which the accused relies
upon, to wit:
Petitioner asserts, and correctly so, that the authority of respondent appellate
court over an appealed case is broad and ample enough to embrace
situations as the instant case where the court may grant a new trial or a
retrial for reasons other than that provided in Section 13 of [] Rule [124], or
Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. While Section 13, Rule 124, and
Section 2, Rule 121, provide for specific grounds for a new trial, i.e., newly
discovered evidence, and errors of law or irregularities committed during the
trial, Section 11, Rule 124 quoted above does not so specify, thereby leaving
to the sound discretion of the court the determination, on a case to case
basis, of what would constitute meritorious circumstances warranting a new
trial or retrial.
Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgate[d] to aid and not to
obstruct the proper administration of justice, to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispense
justice, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical
rules, shorn of judicial discretion.

Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case from
them for the purposes of justice, or, in a proper case, disregard them. In this
jurisdiction, in not a few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in criminal
cases on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness,
negligence or incompetency of counsel, improvident plea of guilty,
disqualification of an attorney de officio to represent the accused in the trial
court, and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered
into by both the prosecution and the defense.
Characteristically, a new trial has been described as a new invention to
temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice.
II
In the second assigned error, the accused assails the finding of the trial court
that the evidence of the prosecution has not established his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He injects doubts on such evidence by asserting that
motive was not proved. Well-entrenched is the rule that the prosecution need
not prove motive on the part of the accused when the latter has been
positively identified as the author of the crime.[19] As this Court previously
said, lack of motive for committing the crime does not preclude conviction,
considering that, nowadays, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons
have been killed or assaulted for no reason at all.[20]
The accused likewise submits that the prosecution failed to establish corpus
delicti; there being no showing of any direct link between the accused and the
weapon alleged to have been used in the crime in that none of its witnesses
testified, much less identified, such weapon.
The argument does not persuade. If the counsel for the accused had spent a
little more time on the transcripts of the stenographic notes of Matiras
testimony, he would find that Matira did in fact testify on and identify the
balisong; thus:
ADDITIONAL DIRECT EXAMINATION OF PROSECUTOR
Q
You said during your direct examination that [the] third stab blow
delivered by the accused Rodolfo Cabodoc landed on the santol tree which
caused the cutting of the said balisong, after the accused Rodolfo Cabodoc
delivered stab blows which the same landed to the santol tree what happened
next?
A
The balisong was thrown away, tumalsik.
xxx
Q
You stated that the knife you saw that it was thrown away, how far was
the knife from the body of the victim when you said it was thrown away?
A
More or less two arms stretches.
Q When you saw that this knife was thrown away what did you do?
A
I pick[ed] up the balisong.
Q Then what did you do?
A
Then I gave the balisong to William Perez.
Q Who is this William Perez?

A
The policeman, maam.
xxx
Prosecutor
We would like to make it of record that PO2 William Perez is present in Court.
We would like to request for the order of this Court that the said fan knife in
his possession be delivered to this representation.
Court
Do you have with you the fan knife?
Prosecutor
PO2 William Perez delivered and gave the said fan knife to this representation.
We would also want to make it of record that the said fan knife be given to the
trial prosecutor, it is wrapped in a white paper properly stapled with the
writing suspect Rodolfo Cabodoc; victim Randy Pendel on or about 281630,
May 1991 at Sitio Mainit, Brgy. Pulang Bato, San Juan, Batangas. May we be
allowed to open this knife, We would like to make it of record that the trial
prosecutor is already opening the white paper wrapping the fan knife.
Atty. Maiquez
We would like to manifest nothing has been said in his affidavit regarding the
fan knife that he was the one who picked up.
Q
If this fan knife which you said you pick[ed] up and gave to PO2 William
Perez will be shown to you, will you be able to recognize the same?
A
Yes maam.
Q I am showing to you a fan knife, what relation has this to the fan knife you
said you pick[ed] up to [sic] the scene of the incident and immediately
delivered to PO2 William Perez?
A
This is the balisong maam.
Prosecutor
We would like to make it of record also your Honor, that the fan knife, part of
the fan knife has been cut, your Honor.
Q
What relation has this to the fan knife you said you delivered to PO2
William Perez?
A
I gave the balisong because he is a policeman.
Q
Is this the fan knife that you delivered to PO2 William Perez which you
pick[ed] up at the scene of the incident?
A
I pick[ed] that up after it was thrown away.
Prosecutor
For Purpose of identification we would like to request that this fan knife that a
tag be put and the same be marked as Exhibit C, and the blade itself, you
Honor, be marked also as Exhibit C-1.
Court
Mark it.[21]
While the accused has correctly restated the elements of corpus delicti, he
entirely forgot that the prosecution need not even produce the weapon used
in the commission of the crime to prove corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the

body (material substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the
corpse of the murdered man or the charred remains of a house burned down.
In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was
committed. It is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been
proved, for example, a man has died or a building has been burned, and (b)
that some person is criminally responsible for the act.[22]
For conviction of an accused in criminal cases, it is enough for the prosecution
to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed
and the accused is the author thereof. The production of the weapon used in
the commission of the crime is not a condition sine qua non for the discharge
of that burden, for the weapon may not have been recovered at all. If the rule
were otherwise, many criminals would go scot-free because in many cases,
for obvious reasons, these malefactors hide, tamper with, or destroy such
weapons. The efforts then of our law enforcement authorities to rid our
society of criminals and to maintain peace and order would be seriously
hamstrung and impeded, and much injustice would be caused to the victims
of crimes, their families, and society itself.[23]
III
The third assigned error is equally without merit.
The trial court correctly ruled that the killing was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery because the attack by the accused on the unarmed
victim was sudden, unexpected, without warning, and without provocation.
The victim was totally unprepared; he was unable to put up a defense. All
that he was able to do after the first thrust of the balisonghit him on the left
side of his chest was to move backwards with raised hands as if to plead to
the accused to stop attacking him. Obviously, the accused employed means
or methods in the execution of the crime which tended directly and specially
to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the victim might have made. All the elements then of treachery as defined in
Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code were established beyond doubt.
Upon the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the trial
court erred in not appreciating the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation, which was also alleged in the information. The following
requisites must be proved before evident premeditation[24] may be
appreciated: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime,
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination, and (c) sufficient lapse of time between such determination
and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[25] To
justify the inference of deliberate premeditation, there must be a period
sufficient in a judicial sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and
reflection, and sufficient time to allow the conscience of the actor to overcome
the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warning.[26] The
Office of the Solicitor General then argues that the prosecution was able to
prove these requisites of evident premeditation; thus:

First. It was established that at about 1:00 p.m. of May 28, 1991, at the house
of Lucy Razon, appellant opened his balisong and uttered the words I will kill
him (referring to the victim); at that time, appellant was about (2) arms
stretch away from the victim; appellants attack on the victim was avoided
because of Matiras intervention (TSN, Mar. 8, 1993, pp. 26-28). At that point
in time, it was manifest that appellant was determined to kill the victim.
Second. At about 4:30 p.m. of the same date (i.e., May 28, 1991), at the
vicinity of the house of Renato Samarita, appellant stabbed the victim to
death (TSN, May 8, 1993, pp. 4-8; 18). The stabbing of the victim by
appellant is an act manifestly indicating that appellant had clung to his
determination to kill the victim. Finally, there was sufficient lapse of time (3
hours) between the determination (1:00 p.m. of May 28, 1991) and execution
(4:30 p.m. of May 28, 1991) to allow appellant to reflect upon the
consequences of his act (People vs. Mostoles, 85 Phil. 883). In fine, the
circumstance of evident premeditation should be appreciated against
appellant.[27]
We agree. There was, at the very least, three and a half (3 ) hours that had
lapsed from the moment the accused had indubitably demonstrated his
determination to kill the victim, thereby manifesting a decision which could
have been earlier or just then made. The sudden attack at 4:30 p.m. proved
beyond cavil that the accused had clung to his decision to kill the victim. The
3 -hour period was sufficient to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act. in People vs. Mojica,[28] we ruled that the lapse of one hour and
forty-five minutes (from 4:15 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.) from the inception of the plan
to the execution of the crime satisfied the last requisite of evident
premeditation.
Summing up, the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation -- both alleged in the information -- attended the killing of
Randy Pendel. Since treachery is enough to qualify the killing to murder,[29]
evident premeditation should be considered only as a generic aggravating
circumstance.[30]
The penalty for murder in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death.
With the presence of the generic aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation, which was not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, the penalty imposable pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code is the greater penalty, which is death. However, since the
accused committed the offense in question before the effectivity of R.A. No.
7659,[31] death penalty cannot be imposed in view of Section 19(1), Article III
of the Constitution. The penalty next lower in degree, i.e., reclusion perpetua,
should instead be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision
dated 14 June 1994 of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City in
Criminal Case No. 537-91 finding accused RODOLFO CABODOC y ESTRADA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of murder and

sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties; to indemnify the heirs of Randy Pendel in the amount of
P50,000.00; and to pay the amount of P46,000.00 for actual damages and the
costs is AFFIRMED, except as to that part stating that no aggravating
circumstance was proven, which is hereby deleted.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 109660. July 1, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. * ROMEO NELL
alias Omeng, DANNY ANGELES alias Danny Fake and JOHN DOE,
accused,ROMEO NELL alias Omeng, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After an accused has openly admitted the killing, the gravamen of the
prosecutions case cannot be disbelieved anymore. Thus, the accused must
prove all the elements of self-defense clearly and convincingly. He must rely
on the strength of his own evidence, and not on the weakness of the
prosecutions.
This is an appeal from the December 11, 1992 Decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Criminal Case No. 10341-V-90
convicting Appellant Romeo Nell of murder.
Together with Danny Angeles, alias Danny Fake, and one John Doe,
appellant was charged with murder in an Information dated June 11, 1990
which reads:
That on or about the 24th day of March 1990, in the municipality of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, armed with a bladed instrument
and with intent to kill one Reynaldo Laureano y Nuque, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and stab with the said bladed
instrument they were then provided the said Reynaldo Laureano y Nuque,
hitting the latter on his body, thereby causing him serious physical injuries
which directly caused his death.[2]
Only appellant was arrested while the two other accused remained at large.
During his arraignment on May 13, 1992, he pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused guilty of
the crime of Murder as principal, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Reynaldo Laureano in the sum
of P50,000.00; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]

The Facts Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution actually presented two versions of the incident: one by Rosini
Espejo-Cenon and another by Benjamin Laureano. Although both versions
undoubtedly pointed to appellant as the assailant, they materially differed as
to the participation of the other accused and the events which led to the fatal
stabbing of the deceased.
Prosecution Witness Rosini Cenons testimony was summarized by the trial
court as follows:[4]
x x x On March 24, 1990 at about 10:00 p.m. she was washing clothes in
front of their house. From across the street, at a distance of 6 meters she saw
the accused Romeo Nell alias Omeng, pointing to him in Court, stabbed (sic)
Reynaldo Laureano. Romeo Nell was with Danilo Angeles alias Danny Fake.
The victim when stabbed was just resting by sitting in front of an already
closed store. Romeo made a thrust at Reynaldo with a panaksak but
Reynaldo was able to run away. Romeo followed him. Some liquor drinkers
noticed Reynaldo being chased so they threw bottles at Romeo who was hit at
the nape and stumbled. Danny Fake tried to help Romeo. Before Romeo was
able to stand up, Danny Fake was able to pull Reynaldo and immersed him in
a canal. Then Romeo who was already up stabbed Reynaldo upon orders of
Danny Fake. Reynaldo was hit on the chest by Romeo who even repeatedly
moved the bladed weapon inside the body to and fro. After Reynaldo was
stabbed and they saw he was no longer moving, Danny Fake kicked Romeo
saying Putang ina mo ano pa ang hinihintay mo, sumibat ka na. Romeo then
ran together with another man who was half naked from waist up. Danny
Fake then shouted, bakit hindi tulungan ito ng mga bumato sa kanya while
holding a veinte nueve knife. Then Danny Fake left. Somebody went down
and helped Reynaldo. She (witness) shouted tulungan ninyo si Rey. He was
brought to the hospital but he died. She saw all the incident because of the
light from the stores which were still open then.
In contrast, Prosecution Witness Benjamin Laureano, the victims brother,
described the events differently. His testimony was presented in the appealed
Decision as follows:[5]
x x x On March 24, 1990 x x x (a)t about 10:30 p.m. of said date he was
fetching water at Abalos St., about 20 meters away from their residence. He
was told by among (sic) those fetching water with him that there was trouble
going on at the corner of Abalos St. and Concepcion St. which is about 20
meters away. He went there to look, with Boyet Manansala. Upon reaching
the place he saw his brother Reynaldo and Romeo quarreling. He pointed to
the accused Romeo in Court. He had known Romeo before the incident
because he used to borrow tools from their neighbors. He saw Romeo and
Reynaldo struggle with each other and then Romeo ran out (sic) of the corner
towards the market. After the accused ran away his brother Reynaldo chased
him. He asked his brother Reynaldo to go home because Reynaldo was not
able to run far and was not able to catch the accused. His brother and he

(sic) went home. His brother again went down the house and drunk beer in a
store in front of their house. He was with Junior Cenon. Romeo Nell arrived.
He saw Romeo because he (witness) was then lifting the container of water for
their house. Romeo chased his brother with a bladed weapon. When he
caught up with him they struggled with each other first. His brother was hit
and knelt in the canal. Romeo Nell stabbed him and kicked him. His brother
was hit on the chest once. Romeo Nell ran away. He saw all this from a
distance of 8 meters. He went upstairs to ask help from his brothers. When
they all went down Romeo Nell was no longer there. They brought Reynaldo
out of the canal to the Santisimo Rosario Hospital. He was dead on arrival.
He gave a statement to the police (Exh. B, B-1).
On cross examination, Benjamin Laureano testified as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
When he saw his brother being stabbed he could not go near because Romeo
had a companion and a look out.
xxx
xxx
x x x
Dr. Prospero Cabanayan conducted the autopsy on the victim. He testified
that the victim died of severe hemorrhage due to an eleven-inch stab wound
below the right collarbone, penetrating the big blood vessels direct to the
heart, and two puncture wounds located at the chest almost near the armpit.
[6] The stab wound could have been caused by a sharp, single-bladed
instrument while the puncture wounds, by a pointed instrument.[7] From the
location of the wounds, he opined that it was possible that the victim was
lying down, facing the assailant who was standing.[8]
The prosecution presented Francisca Sagnip, the sister of the victim, as
rebuttal witness. She testified that:[9]
On March 26, 1990 at about 8:00 A.M., [s]he was at the police station to
present the kitchen knife which she found at the canal at Abalos St., Marulas,
Valenzuela. She found it on March 26, 1990 at about 7:30 A.M. She identified
the kitchen knife (Exh. H).
On cross examination she testified that she was not present when her brother
was stabbed. It was after the report was made to the police that the latter
went to the scene and investigated. They found no kitchen knife. She was
alone when she found the knife. She believes it was the one used by his (sic)
brother.
Evidence for the Defense
Appellant justifies his act by invoking self-defense.
His testimony is
synthesized in the Appellants Brief:[10]
x x x [O]n March 24, 1990 while plying his tricycle he saw Reynaldo
Laureano at about 5:00 to 6:00 p.m. He let his two passengers alight.
Reynaldo approached him for beer money and he told him he will give him
later. He just started plying his tricycle. Reynaldo got angry saying hindi
puede. Reynaldo said he needed to drink and if he will not give, something
bad will happen to him. Reynaldo said Ako ang may hawak ng Abalos St.

and Reynaldo boxed him as he said these. He fought back. While they were
boxing each other, Reynaldos brother Benjamin and a certain Junior arrived.
He ran because Benjamin had a knife. The three gave chase. They failed to
catch him. He went home. He left his tricycle on the road. After one hour, he
tried to retrieve it but did not pass Abalos St. He was able to retrieve his
tricycle and went home. He rested for 4 hours before plying his tricycle. That
was about 10:00 p.m. He met for the second time Reynaldo Laureano
because he passed by Abalos St. He saw Benjamin, Junior, and Reynaldo
Laureano drinking beer, sitted (sic) on a bench on the side of the street near
the house of Reynaldo Laureano. Upon his return trip, the three blocked his
way. He was forced to stop. They were again asking for money particularly
Reynaldo while the two were just standing by. He requested that he be
allowed not to give because his trip was destroyed and that he has his family
to feed. Reynaldo approached him to box him. He jumped towards his
tricycle to get his screw driver to defend himself because one of them already
pulled out a knife while Junior was holding a bottle of beer and hit him on the
head. Junior is the brother in law of Rosini Espejo. After he was hit with a
bottle of beer, his vision became dark and he started stabbing Reynaldo.
Benjamin and Junior ran away when they saw Reynaldo was hit. He boarded
his tricycle and went home. He stabbed Reynaldo even if it was Junior who hit
him with a bottle of beer because Reynaldo was poised to box him. When he
started stabbing, he hit Reynaldo. He did not tell this to the police. He was
afraid he would be incarcerated. He was thinking of his children as his wife is
abroad. The incident happened on March 24, 1990. He was arrested on April
27, 1992. He did not hide but just continued plying his tricycle. The father,
brother and sister of Reynaldo were often his passengers. The reason why
they did not cause his arrest is because people there knew that the deceased
is a trouble maker and a salot in their place. The testimony of Espejo which
gave a different version that he had a companion is not true. She just
testified that way because her brother in law is involved in the case. He had a
screw driver because he uses it as a tool for adjustment of the contact point
of his tricycle. x x x (TSN, November 4, 1992, pp. 3-19).
Ruling of the Trial Court
In rejecting the claim of self-defense, the trial court held that the evidence of
the prosecution was more credible than that of the appellant. Prosecution
Witnesses Benjamin Laureano and Rosini Cenon gave two versions of the
facts, but the trial court accepted Benjamins testimony rather than Rosini
Cenons because the former gave his statement to the police immediately
after the stabbing incident at ten minutes past one oclock early morning of
March 25, 1990. Rosinis statement, on the other, hand was executed two
days later, on March 27, 1990, after her brother-in-law Junior Cenon was
implicated in the stabbing by appellant.

Unlike Benjamins story, appellants version was not only uncorroborated; it

was also incredible. The trial court opined that, even if the victim was a drug
user and a troublemaker, appellants actions were not justified.
The lower court also held that the killing was qualified by evident
premeditation. It found that the appellant and the victim had a quarrel that
ended when the former ran away from the latter. Later on, appellant returned
and stabbed the victim.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant claims self-defense. He ascribes the following errors to the trial
court:[11]
I
The trial court erred in categorizing the crime committed as murder instead of
homicide.
II
The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant on the ground of
self-defense under paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. We do not agree with appellants claim of
self-defense, but we find that the prosecution has not established evident
premeditation beyond reasonable doubt. We shall now discuss the errors
assigned by the appellant in inverse order.
Assessment of Appellants Credibility by the Trial Court
By interposing self-defense, appellant shifted the burden of proof, thereby
obligating himself to show that his act was justified and that he incurred no
criminal liability therefor.[12]Consequently, he must establish clearly and
convincingly all the elements of self-defense, relying mainly on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions; for even if
the latter was weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of
the killing.
The trial court, however, did not find appellants uncorroborated testimony
credible. The time-tested doctrine is that a trial courts assessment of the
credibility of a witness[13] is entitled to great weight-- even conclusive and
binding on this Court, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence. Credibility is a matter that
peculiarly falls within the province of the trial court as it had the opportunity
to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses at the time
of their testimony.[14] Thus, assigning value and weight to each testimony is
within its jurisdiction.[15]
The trial courts assessment of the credibility -- or the lack of it -- of appellant
and his version of the incident appears supported by the records. Five crucial
points are worth noting.
The first point is the matter of the weapon used. Appellant claimed that he
used a six-inch screwdriver to stab the victim.[16] The medico-legal officer
described the two instruments which could have inflicted such wounds as a

single-bladed weapon and an instrument with a sharp point.[17] A screwdriver

fits neither of the two descriptions. Based on appellants description, it was
as an old screwdriver with a blunt end and rounded on the side.[18] He did
not even present in evidence this alleged implement to show that it fitted
either of the two descriptions.
Second, appellant would like us to believe that it was Benjamin who wielded a
knife -- one of the weapons that, according to the medico-legal officer, could
have caused the wounds of the deceased. He thus wants to imply that it was
Benjamin who fatally stabbed his brother. This allegation is not only illogical;
it runs counter to the established fact that the quarrel was between the victim
and the appellant, not Benjamin. Appellant has not shown any plausible
reason, argument or evidence why Benjamin should kill his own brother.
Third is appellants choice of victim. He testified that he was hit on the head
with a beer bottle by one Junior Cenon. Why then did he attack the victim
who, according to him, was only poised to box him. Clearly, it was Junior who
had hit him and was probably holding a bottle of beer broken by then. The
more imminent threat against his life was posed by the armed Junior, not the
unarmed victim.
The fourth point is the matter of flight. Although he claimed that he did not
go into hiding after the incident, he also admitted that he fled from the scene
of the crime in his tricycle.[19]Flight, in jurisprudence, is a strong indication of
guilt,[20] although its converse does not necessarily imply innocence.[21]
That he feared being imprisoned as he had children to take care of does not
exempt him from these legal precepts. He even intentionally failed to report
the incident to the police, negating his claim of self-defense.[22]
The fifth point is the failure of the defense to raise the extortion theory and
Benjamins complicity therein during the latters testimony. The failure to
raise a theory that would have gravely impaired Benjamins credibility creates
a very serious doubt on the veracity of appellants present allegations.
Thus, we cannot blame the trial court for not putting much faith in appellants
testimony. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of
a credible witness but must be credible in itself.[23]
Failure to Prove Requisites of Self-Defense
An accused must also establish by clear and convincing evidence[24] the
requisites of self-defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.[25] These, appellant failed to prove.
Self-defense, by its very nature, requires the attendance of unlawful
aggression initiated by the victim.[26] Unlawful aggression is an assault or
attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner which
places the accuseds life in actual peril.[27] It must be such that it puts in real
danger the life or personal safety of the person defending himself.[28] It

cannot be merely an imagined threat or a threatening or intimidating attitude.

[29]
In this case, unlawful aggression was not established by the defense.
Appellant merely proved that the victim, Benjamin and Junior Cenon were
extorting beer money from him. The manner of extortion described by
appellant, however, does not show how appellants life or limb was placed in
any peril as to justify his killing of Reynaldo.
Even if we consider that a threat to his life or limb could have been imminent
because Benjamin held a knife, still appellant did not state that the latter
threatened him with the deadly weapon. In fact, Benjamin did not threaten
him at all. Appellant admitted that after his head was hit with a bottle of
beer, his vision dimmed and he started stabbing the victim who was allegedly
approaching and about to box him. Based on said testimony, we fail to see
any peril to appellants life or limb that could have justified his having killed
the victim.
In self-defense, there should also be reasonable necessity for the action taken
as well as the means used. The latter requires a consideration of (1) whether
the aggressor was armed, (2) the nature and quality of the weapon used, and
(3) the physical conditions and sizes of both aggressor and the person
defending himself.[30] Appellant was armed while his three alleged assailants
were not competently shown to have been armed. His claim is that Benjamin
had a knife and that Junior Cenon and the victim held a bottle of beer each.
But allegation is not evidence and, in the absence of the latter, we cannot
agree with appellant that his alleged aggressors were similarly armed.
Therefore, the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the aggression from the victim and his companions was not proven in
this case.
Clearly, the justifying circumstance of self-defense cannot be sustained.
Appellant failed to prove unlawful aggression by the victim or to demonstrate
the reasonable necessity of the means he employed to defend himself.[31]
Evidence of Premeditation, Treachery and Abuse of Superior Strength
However, the trial court erred in appreciating evident premeditation based
solely on the fact that appellant returned to the crime scene four hours after
his first quarrel with the victim. Evident premeditation indicates a stubborn
adherence to a decision to commit a felony. It requires a showing of: (1) a
previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) overt act(s)
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a
lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual
execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of
his acts.[32] Evident premeditation connotes a deliberate adherence to a plan
to commit a crime.
Returning to the scene of an earlier fight about four hours later does not
establish these elements. Mere lapse of time is not equivalent to evident
premeditation.[33] Time and again, we have held that evident premeditation

cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing to murder in the absence of

evidence, not only of sufficient lapse of time, but also of the planning and
preparation to kill when the plan was conceived.[34] The prosecution
evidence simply showed that after the fight was broken up, appellant returned
to kill the victim. From said circumstances, we cannot deduce with certainty
that appellant clung to a decision to kill the victim.
Treachery and abuse of superior strength were not discussed in the trial
courts Decision. Since they were alleged in the Information, the Court pored
over the records to find any evidentiary support therefor. However, we are
also unable to appreciate treachery from the prosecutions narration of
events. Benjamin was bringing several containers of water into their house
when the incident occurred.
Thus, because his attention was focused
elsewhere prior to his brothers stabbing, he was not in a position to say that
appellant attacked his brother suddenly and without warning. He did see,
however, that appellant chased his brother with a bladed weapon and that
they struggled with each other first before appellant stabbed his brother. In
effect, he admitted that when appellant attacked the victim, the latter was not
without a chance to defend himself. The prosecution failed to establish that
the appellant employed means, methods or forms which tended directly and
specially to insure the commission of the killing without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.[35]
The record is also bereft of proof that appellant and his companions took
advantage of their collective strength to overwhelm their victim.[36] Superior
strength is not appreciated by the mere fact of superiority in the number of
malefactors, but rather by the deliberate employment of excessive force
which is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked.[37] Note also must be made of the fact that the victim was not
alone.
In sum, appellants testimony suffers seriously from want of credibility. Even if
we ascribe credibility to appellants testimony, however, we still cannot
accept his plea of self-defense, for he failed to prove all the requisites thereof.
While the appellant failed to prove self-defense, the prosecution likewise
failed to show any qualifying circumstance. In this light, appellant should be
convicted only of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
without any generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED.
Appellant is
CONVICTED of homicide, not murder, and is SENTENCED to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prisin mayoras minimum and fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusin temporal as maximum. The trial
courts disposition requiring the appellant to indemnify the heirs of Reynaldo
Laureano in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128114. October 25, 2000.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER CANDO Y
PAGDANGANAN, ARNEL VARGAS Y MAGTANGOB, AND WILBERTO
RAPCING Y BRONOLA, accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Robbery with Homicide; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery;
The essence of treachery lies in the adoption of ways that minimize or
neutralize any resistance which may be put up by the offended party.There
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. The conditions which
must concur before treachery can be appreciated are: (a) the employment of
means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (b) that said means of execution be deliberately
and consciously adopted. The essence of treachery lies in the adoption of
ways that minimize or neutralize any resistance which may be put up by the
offended party. The killing of the sleeping victim herein was attended by
treachery since he was in no position to flee or defend himself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When treachery obtains in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic
aggravating circumstance, robbery with homicide being a case of a composite
crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code.
The presence of treachery, though, should not result in qualifying the offense
to murder, for the correct rule is that when it obtains in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic
aggravating circumstance, robbery with homicide being a case of a composite
crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Same; Evident Premeditation; Elements; Evident premeditation
is inherent in crimes against property, but it may be considered in robbery
with homicide if there is premeditation to kill besides stealing.For evident
premeditation to exist, the prosecution must prove with clear and convincing
evidence the following elements: (1) the time when the offenders decided to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to
his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination
and execution to allow them to reflect upon the consequences of their act and
allow their conscience to overcome the resolution of their will. Evident
premeditation is inherent in crimes against property, but it may be considered
in robbery with homicide if there is premeditation to kill besides stealing. The
prosecution clearly proved the intention to rob and to disable the victim, but
not the intention to kill him. As Vargas testified, the victim was still alive when
they left him rolling on the floor. Thus, evident premeditation cannot be

appreciated where the prosecution failed to establish that the accused killed
the victim pursuant to a preconceived plan.
Same; Same; Alternative Circumstances; Intoxication; Intoxication may be
considered mitigating if it is sufficiently shown that (a) at the time of the
commission of the criminal act, the accused had taken such quantity of
alcoholic drinks as to blur his reason and deprive him of certain degree of
control, and (b) that such intoxication is not habitual, or subsequent to the
plan to commit the felony.The alternative circumstance of intoxication,
however, should be considered as mitigating, it having been sufficiently
shown that (a) at the time of the commission of the criminal act, they have
taken such quantity of alcoholic drinks as to blur their reason and deprive
them of certain degree of control, and (b) that such intoxication is not
habitual, or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony.
Same; Same; Elements.As to the crime committed, the prosecution amply
established the following elements of robbery with homicide: (a) the taking of
personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against
a person, (b) the property taken belongs to another, (c) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi, and (d) on the occasion of
the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, in its generic sense,
is committed. It matters not that the victim was killed prior to the taking of
the personal properties of the victim and the other occupants of the house.
What is essential in robbery with homicide is that there be a direct relation,
and intimate connection between robbery and the killing, whether the latter
be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be committed at
the same time.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; The rule is well-established that whenever homicide
has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of the robbery,
all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as
principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although
they did not take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they
endeavored to prevent the homicide.The rule is wellestablished that
whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the
occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery
will also be held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless
it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. While Cando
was bashing the head of the victim, and placing the personal items in his bag,
nary a peep .could be heard from Vargas and Rapcing. Their act of simply
watching Cando shows their moral assent and complete acquiescence to the
commission of the crime.

Same; Same; Exempting Circumstances; Compulsion of an Irresistible Force;

The compulsion in order to be exempting must be of such a character as to
leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense.Appellant
Vargas claims that he was threatened at knife point to join appellant Cando in
the commission of the crime. He is in effect invoking the exempting
circumstance of compulsion of an irresistible force under Article 12, par. 5 of
the Revised Penal Code. We have held that the compulsion must be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or selfdefense. Vargas had several opportunities to prevent the killing and to
escape, but he chose to remain with his coconspirators, and even willingly
drove the get-away vehicle.
Same; Same; Flight; The Court has long held that flight is an indicium of guilt,
but non-flight is not necessarily an indicium of innocence.As to appellant
Rapcing, the fact that he did not go into hiding after the alleged incident does
not make him an innocent man. We have long ruled that flight is an indicium
of guilt, but non-flight is not necessarily an indicium of innocence.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 95-142748, convicting appellants of the crime
of robbery with homicide, sentencing them to death, ordering them solidarily
to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00, and to return
the personal belongings taken from the victim and other offended parties. In a
related case, Criminal Case No. 95-142749, appellants were acquitted of the
charge of carnapping.
Appellants Cando and Rapcing, aged 40 and 28 respectively, were employed
as candlemakers at the Rosarian Candle Factory located in Paco, Manila.
Appellant Vargas, aged 20, was employed as a delivery boy. The victim, Luis
D. Remoriata, was the caretaker ("katiwala") in said factory.
The facts based on the records are as follows:
In the afternoon of May 13, 1995, Vargas, Rapcing and one Nonoy Sayson
were having a drinking session at a canteen in front of the factory. At around
9:30 P.M., Cando joined the group. Upon the prompting of Vargas, Cando went
to the factory to get his salary. Cando came back angry because he was
unable to get his salary from the secretary, nor was he able to get a loan of
P100.00 from the caretaker. Apparently, Cando already had previous
misunderstandings with the caretaker, so this time, he threatened to kill the
caretaker. The group continued their drinking session.1

At around 11:00 P.M., Vargas, Rapcing, and Cando, armed with two knives and
carrying a shoulder bag, climbed the fence of the factory. They walked on the
galvanized iron roof towards the other building. One by one, they slipped
through a narrow window at the side of the building. The trio proceeded to the
victim's room, which was lighted by a fluorescent lamp. Cando picked a piece
of lead pipe and told Vargas to pull open the door where the victim's mosquito
net was attached. When Vargas pulled open the door, the mosquito net
snapped and Cando struck the victim on the head with the lead pipe. The
victim awakened and Cando demanded money from him. When the victim
replied that he had no money, Cando struck him again with the lead pipe.
Blood oozed from the victim's head. Cando asked the victim if he recognized
him. The victim weakly replied "Yes, You are Roger (Cando)." Thereafter,
Cando repeatedly hit him with the lead pipe until he became unconscious.
Cando placed the victim's radio cassette in his bag. He went upstairs to get
more items and the keys of the Cimarron van. Thereafter, the trio went
downstairs to where the van was parked. Vargas, the only one who knew how
to drive, sat on the driver's seat. Cando and Rapcing opened the gate, then
pushed the van outside. Once they were out of hearing range, Vargas gunned
the motor and the two clambered into the van. Cando sat on the passenger
side while Rapcing sat at the back. Cando prevailed upon the group to
proceed to Quiapo to visit his girlfriend, but they could not locate her so they
just drove around until daybreak. When they reached Hemady Street in
Quezon City, they abandoned the van. The trio boarded a jeep going to Taft
Avenue and went their separate ways.2 It was then already early morning of
May 14, 1995.
At around 6:00 A.M., Mrs. Norma Chu, the factory owner, discovered the dead
body of Luis Remoriata. The factory van was also missing. A hysterical Mrs.
Chu called the Barangay Captain, who in turn reported the incident to the
police. Upon investigation, the police found a bakawan firewood stained with
blood some ten meters away from the victim's body. The police also called a
funeral parlor to get the body of the victim.3
In the meantime, the van was discovered by Barangay Kagawad Mejia, who
called up the telephone number posted at the side of the van. The owner, Mrs.
Chu, arrived with three NBI Agents who took pictures of the van and lifted
fingerprints from it.4
The very next day, May 15, 1995, Mrs. Chu lodged a complaint5 with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Based on her complaint, the NBI
dispatched a team of agents to the crime scene. The NBI recovered a
bloodstained steel pipe behind the door of the room. Upon learning from Mrs.
Chu that appellants Cando and Vargas had previous skirmishes with the

victim, on May 16, 1995, the NBI agents picked up Vargas from the factory
and brought him to their office for questioning.6
Vargas readily admitted his participation and pinpointed appellants Cando and
Rapcing as his co-perpetrators. He likewise executed an extrajudicial
admission7 and waiver of his rights under Articles 124 and 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.8
Acting on the lead, the NBI agents picked appellant Cando at his house in Libis
St., Caloocan City. Appellant Cando invoked his right to remain silent.9 He
executed a waiver of rights under Articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.10
Thereafter, appellant Rapcing was also arrested at his house in Cristobal St.,
Looban, Paco, Manila.11 Rapcing admitted complicity in the crime, and
executed an extrajudicial admission12 corroborating the story of Vargas. He
also executed a waiver of his rights under Articles 124 and 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.13
During custodial investigation, the three were assisted by Atty. Isidro T.
Gamutan, a lawyer who happened to be at the NBI because he was following
up a case.
On May 17, 1995, appellant Vargas executed a second extrajudicial
admission14 stating that Cando gave him the bag containing the stolen items
for safekeeping and that he brought the bag to his sister-in-law's house in
Kahilum, San Andres Bukid, Manila. He accompanied the NBI agents to the
house and gave them the bag which bore Cando's name.15
On May 23, 1995, appellants were charged with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide under the following Information:16
"The undersigned accuses ROGER CANDO y PAGDANGANAN, ARNEL VARGAS y
MAGTANGOB and WILFREDO RAPCING y BROOLA of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide, committed as follows;
That on or about May 13, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by hitting one LUIS D.
REMORIATA with steel pipe and wood on the head several times and at the
same time forcibly taking away from him the following, to wit:

or in the total amount of P13,820.00 belonging to said Luis D. Remoriata and

under his personal care, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
aforesaid amount of P13,820.00, Philippine Currency; that on the occasion of
the said robbery and by reason thereof, the herein accused, in pursuance of
their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the said LUIS D.
REMORIATA, and as a result thereof, he sustained physical injuries which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death.
Contrary to law.
ALEJANDRO G. BIJASA
Asst. City Prosecutor"
On August 29, 1995, upon arraignment, appellants entered their respective
pleas of not guilty.17 Joint trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Norma C. Chu, the
factory owner; (2) NBI Agents Serafin Gil, Mario Garcia, Gregorio Tomagan; (3)
NBI Photographer Cecilio Datinguinoo; (4) NBI Fingerprint Examiner Elter Yano;
(5) Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer; (6) Atty. Isidro Gamutan,
counsel of appellants during custodial investigation; (7) Barangay Kagawad
Alejandro Mejia.
Mrs. Norma Chu testified that when she discovered the body of the victim, the
quarters was in disarray, and the victim's clothes and radio were missing.
Later, her husband and son informed her that their wallets which they placed
on top of the TV in the sala upstairs, and two other wristwatches were
missing. She also identified the van which was recovered from Hemady St. in
Quezon City as the one belonging to the factory.18
Serafin Gil testified that he took down the statement of Mrs. Chu and
supervised the custodial investigation of appellants.19 Mario Garcia took
down the statements of Vargas and Rapcing.20 Gregorio Tomagan testified
that he was present during the taking of the two statements of appellant
Vargas dated May 16 and 17, 1995.21 Cecilio Datinguinoo testified that he
took pictures of the van while the NBI agents were lifting fingerprints from the
van.22 Elter Yano testified that he managed to lift six (6) fingerprints from the
cimarron van, tagged as "Q-1" to "Q-6". He testified that "Q-1" which was
lifted from the air freshener found in the van was identical to the left index
fingerprint of appellant Vargas (Exh. "DD"). Likewise, "Q-2" which was lifted
from the victim's stereo cassette was identical to the right ring fingerprint of
Cando (Exh. "EE"). The other prints were unidentifiable.23

Dr. Manuel Lagonera testified that the cause of death was "blunt head
injuries" and that the victim sustained the following injuries:24
"1. Triangular lacerated wound, with contusions at the periphery, measuring
3x2. 8x2.5 cms, right forehead.
2. Deep lacerated wound, right forehead, above the right eyebrow, measuring
7x1.9 cms.
3. Lacerated wound, right zygomatic region, measuring 4.2x1.5 cms.
4. Deep lacerated wound, left frontal region, measuring 7x2.5cms.
5. Lacerated wound, left fronto-temporal region, measuring 2.5x2 cms.
6. Deep lacerated wound, angle of the mouth, right, measuring 4.5x2 cms.
7. Hematoma, both upper eyelids.
8. Deep lacerated wound, vertex, measuring 9x3 cms.
9. Lacerated wound, left occipital region, measuring 7x3 cms.
10. V-shaped lacerated wound, right external ear, measuring 3x2.5 cms.
11. Abrasion, right anterior shoulder, measuring 4x1.8 cms.
12. Semi-circular contusion, right supra-clavicular region, measuring 3.5x3.2
cms.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. There was extensive sub-aponeurotic hematoma with multiple fractures of
the cranial vault. Epidural hematoma over the left parietal lobe of the brain
with massive sub-arachnoid hemorrhage.
2. Right anterior and middle cranial fossae were fractured.
3. The stomach was empty."
Atty. Isidro T. Gamutan testified that he happened to be at the NBI when the
three accused were scheduled for custodial investigation. The Chief of the
Anti-Carnapping Unit requested him to give legal assistance to the three

accused. He asked the accused why they were being investigated, and
explained to them their rights. When he was satisfied that the accused
understood their rights, he assisted them in executing their extrajudicial
statements.25
Alejandro Mejia, Barangay Kagawad at Barangay Kristong Hari, Quezon City
testified that he found the abandoned van with a flat tire. He contacted the
owner through the telephone number printed on the side of the van. The
owner arrived with three NBI agents who examined the van.26
For the defense, appellants testified. Appellant Cando stated that he finished
Grade III, cannot read, but can write his name. He denied any participation in
the killing, but claimed that Vargas and Rapcing knew about the incident. He
said that on May 13, 1995, he reported for work at the factory at 2:00 P.M.
until 10:00 P.M. He went home in Libis St. Caloocan City, where he slept until
around 11:00 A.M. the following day. He denied joining the drinking session.
On May 14, 1995, he reported for work at around 12:00 NN until 2:00 P.M.. He
identified as his the bag containing the stolen items. He further identified the
contents of the bags, the air freshener which was taken from the van, the two
wristwatches belonging to the son and daughter of Mrs. Chu. He admitted that
he and the other two appellants offered to pay to the widow of the victim
damages for his death.27
Appellant Vargas, for his part, admitted participation in the killing, but claimed
that he was forced by Cando at knife point to participate. He further claimed
that it was only Cando who killed the victim by hitting him with an iron bar. He
admitted, however, that he agreed to drive the Cimarron because he wanted
to practice driving.28
Appellant Rapcing recanted his extrajudicial admission. He denied any
knowledge or participation in the killing since he was stone drunk ("lasing na
lasing"). He claimed that he just slept inside a Tamaraw pick-up parked
outside the factory. Further, he claimed that the finding of guilt is inconsistent
with the fact that he never went into hiding after the alleged incident.29
On December 27, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision30 convicting the
three (3) appellants of Robbery with Homicide with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, and sentencing them
to suffer the penalty of death. Appellants were acquitted of the charge of
carnapping.
Hence, the present automatic review. In their consolidated brief,31 appellants
raise the lone assignment of error that

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AGGRAVATING

CIRCUMSTANCES OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND TREACHERY ATTENDED
THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
In praying for the reduction of the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua,
appellants contend that the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation,
as there was no time for cool reflection since their minds were hazy with the
influence of liquor. Appellants further dispute the existence of treachery since
the killing of Remoriata was merely "on the spur of the moment."
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that evident premeditation
clearly attended the commission of the crime but said aggravating
circumstance, being inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide, should
not be appreciated separately.32 Treachery qualified the killing since the
victim was sleeping at the time he was attacked. In addition, the generic
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling should be appreciated.
The principal issue for resolution is whether the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation attended the commission of the offense?
Secondarily, we must also determine whether all the elements of robbery with
homicide were proved beyond reasonable doubt.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.33 The
conditions which must concur before treachery can be appreciated are: (a) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) that said means of
execution be deliberately and consciously adopted.34 The essence of
treachery lies in the adoption of ways that minimize or neutralize any
resistance which may be put up by the offended party.35 The killing of the
sleeping victim herein was attended by treachery since he was in no position
to flee or defend himself.36
The presence of treachery, though, should not result in qualifying the offense
to murder, for the correct rule is that when it obtains in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic
aggravating circumstance, robbery with homicide being a case of a composite
crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code.37
For evident premeditation to exist, the prosecution must prove with clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (1) the time when the offenders
decided to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit

has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the consequences
of their act and allow their conscience to overcome the resolution of their
will.38 Evident premeditation is inherent in crimes against property, but it
may be considered in robbery with homicide if there is premeditation to kill
besides stealing.39 The prosecution clearly proved the intention to rob and to
disable the victim, but not the intention to kill him. As Vargas testified, the
victim was still alive when they left him rolling on the floor.40 Thus, evident
premeditation can not be appreciated where the prosecution failed to
establish that the accused killed the victim pursuant to a preconceived
plan.41
The alternative circumstance of intoxication, however, should be considered
as mitigating, it having been sufficiently shown that (1) at the time of the
commission of the criminal act, they have taken such quantity of alcoholic
drinks as to blur their reason and deprive them of certain degree of control,
and (b) that such intoxication is not habitual, or subsequent to the plan to
commit the felony.42
As to the crime committed, the prosecution amply established the following
elements of robbery with homicide: (a) the taking of personal property is
perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person, (b) the
property taken belongs to another, (c) the taking is characterized by intent to
gain or animus lucrandi, and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, the crime of homicide, in its generic sense, is committed. 43 It
matters not that the victim was killed prior to the taking of the personal
properties of the victim and the other occupants of the house. What is
essential in robbery with homicide is that there be a "direct relation, and
intimate connection between robbery and the killing, whether the latter be
prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be committed at the
same time. 44 The rule is well-established that whenever homicide has been
committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those
who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals
of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not
actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they
endeavored to prevent the homicide. 45 While Cando was bashing the head of
the victim, and placing the personal items in his bag, nary a peep could be
heard from Vargas and Rapcing. Their act of simply watching Cando shows
their moral assent and complete acquiescence to the commission of the
crime.
Appellant Vargas claims that he was threatened at knife point to join appellant
Cando in the commission of the crime. He is in effect invoking the exempting
circumstance of compulsion of an irresistible force under Article 12, par. 5 of

the Revised Penal Code. We have held that the compulsion must be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or selfdefense. 46 Vargas had several opportunities to prevent the killing and to
escape, but he chose to remain with his co-conspirators, and even willingly
drove the get-away vehicle.
As to appellant Rapcing, the fact that he did not go into hiding after the
alleged incident does not make him an innocent man. We have long ruled that
flight is an indicium of guilt, but non-flight is not necessarily an indicium of
innocence.47
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 9 of R.A.
No. 7659, the penalty for robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being one mitigating circumstance of intoxication, and one
aggravating circumstance of treachery, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua.48 The existence of one aggravating circumstance merits the award
of exemplary damages under Art. 2230 of the New Civil Code.
We likewise order that the personal properties which are in custodia legis be
returned to the offended parties.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, in
Criminal Case No. 95-142748 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellants
ROGER CANDO Y PAGDANGANAN, ARNEL VARGAS Y MAGTANGOB, and
WILBERTO RAPCING Y BROOLA are hereby found guilty of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordered solidarily to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to return to the
owners thereof the cash and the vehicle and other effects taken by the
appellants, as well as to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., is on leave.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN LEE y AMOSO, QUIRINO VIRAY, JR. y COLLADO, and JUAN
LAROSA y GONZALES, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Blesila O. Quintillan for defendants-appellants.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In an Information filed with the then Criminal Circuit Court of Manila on 8 July
1981, accused Ruben Lee y Amoso, Quirino Viray, Jr. y Collado, and Juan
Larosa y Gonzales, were charged with the crime of Robbery in Band with
Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries, committed as follows:
That on or about June 22, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together with one GERONIMO GERDAD
(deceased) and others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown,
and helping one another, all armed with unknown caliber firearms and bladed
weapons, by employment of craft, that is, pretending to be bonifide (sic)
passengers of a jeepney, bearing plate No. 632 CS, PUJ, driven by BERNABE
POYUAON, and at nighttime purposely sought to better accomplish their
objectives, with intent of (sic) gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation upon persons, to wit: by then and there simultaneously
announcing it was a hold-up and pointing their respective weapons, guns and
knives, to the driver and other passengers of the said jeepney, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob, and carry away the
following, to wit:
From:
RODRIGO CONDE One (1) wallet, black, valued
at P35.00 with 1 -dollar bill;
BERNABE POYUAON Cash money of P50.00;
ANNABELE JAVIER Wallet, wristwatch and
necklace valued not less than
P5.00;
WONG NGAW Seiko Wallet, valued at
P25.00; with SSS ID card and
other papers and cash money
of P200.00 and
PERPETUO AQUINO Cash Money of Pl0.00.
or all in the total amount of P325.00, more or less, belonging to the aforesaid
driver and passengers of the said jeepney, against their will, to the damage
and prejudice of the said owners, in the aforesaid amount of P325.00, more or
less, Philippine Currency; that by reason or on the occasion of the said
robbery and for the purpose of enabling the said accused to take, rob, and
carry away the said amount, in pursuance of their conspiracy, the said
accused with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked,
assaulted and used personal violence upon the passengers of the said
jeepney, by then and there taking possession of the steering wheel and
driving the vehicle away, firing shots at the crew of the mobile patrol car who
(sic) gave chase of the said accused, and hitting, as a consequence, the
following hold-up victims, to wit: LEOPOLDO ESPELLEGO, who sustained

mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death thereafter; GINA SALVADOR, who sustained a gunshot wound at the
back, thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries which required and
will require medical attendance for a period of more than thirty days and
incapacitated and will incapacitate the said Gina Salvador from performing
her customary labor during the said period of time; and WONG NGAW and
PERPETUO AQUINO, both of whom sustained physical injuries which have (sic)
required medical attendance for a period of not less than one day but not
more than nine days and incapacitated the said Wong Ngaw and Perpetuo
Aquino from performing their customary labor during the same period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-49 (81).
Each of the accused entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment on 7
September 1981. 2
At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Gina Salvador and Rodrigo Conde, two (2) of the jeepney passengers; Pfc.
Florentino Bagallon, the investigating policeman; and Drs. Marcial C. Cenido
and Narciso Adraneda, Jr., the examining physicians. The defense presented
the three (3) accused. Thereafter, on 26 August 1983, the trial court (now
Branch XLVI, Regional Trial Court of Manila) promulgated its decision 3 finding
the accused guilty of the crime charged and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the decision reads in full as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Ruben Lee y Amoso, Quirino Viray,
Jr. y Collado and Juan Larosa y Gonzales, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery in band with homicide and multiple physical injuries
which is aggravated further by craft and nighttime and herebysentences them
to suffer the Penalty of DEATH; to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased Leopoldo Espellego the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of the
latter, and to the robbery victims, the following sums: Rodrigo Conde, P35.00;
Wong Ngaw, P225.00; and Perpetuo Aquino, P10.00 all of which were not
recovered. They are also ordered to pay their proportionate shares of the
costs of suit.
The .45 caliber paltik, Exhibit W, and the .32 caliber Sentinel revolver, Exhibit
W-1, which bears Serial No. P 5803, are hereby confiscated in favor of the
government and the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to cause delivery of the
same to the Firearms and Explosives Section, Philippine Constabulary, Camp
Crame, Quezon City.
Atty. Fernando Mangubat is hereby awarded the sum of P500.00 as attorney's
fees.
Pursuant to the governing law then in force, 4 the case was elevated to this
Court for automatic review.
The conviction is based on the following findings of fact of the trial court:

June 22, 1981, at about 2:30 o'clock a.m., a passenger jeepney with Plate No.
632 CS, PUJ, driven by Bernabe Poyuaon, was on its way from Rizal Avenue,
Manila to Baclaran, Metro Manila. In the jeepney as passengers while it was
already nearing the Philippine General Hospital along Taft Avenue were some
13 persons who were seated as follows: On the left seat (which is directly
behind the driver) were a male passenger immediately behind the driver,
Leopoldo Espellego, Annabele Javier, Gina Salvador, and a male passenger
who was seated just at the entrance of the jeepney, in that order. On the right
seat beginning from the entrance of the jeepney were a male passenger,
Maria Lourdes Javier, Rodrigo Conde, Perpetuo Aquino and Wong Ngaw, also in
that order. Beside the driver were two male passengers.
xxx xxx xxx
The jeepney was travelling southward along Taft Avenue when the passenger
seated last on the left seated near the entrance of the jeepney and who
turned out to be the accused, Ruben Lee, drew out a gun and first poked it at
Gina Salvador who was to his left and then waived (sic) said gun at the other
passengers, at the same time announcing a hold-up as follows: "Mga putang
ina ninyo, huag kayong sisigaw, hold-up ito" (Sons of bitches, don't shout. This
is a hold-up). Simultaneously, the passenger seated in front of Ruben Lee who
turned out to be Quirino Viray, Jr. drew out a knife and poked it at Maria
Lourdes Javier who was to his right; the passenger seated just behind the
driver who turned out to be Geronimo Gerdad drew out a gun and pointed it at
the driver; and the passenger seated further from the driver drew out and
poked a knife at the driver.
The announcement of the hold-up frightened the passengers and Ruben Lee
ordered them to hand over their wallets, watches and other valuables. He
ordered Geronimo Gerdad to collect the things of the passengers near him.
Gina Salvador gave the following to Ruben Lee: her Seiko 5 Men's watch worth
P500.00; her Chinese gold necklace worth P200.00; cash amounting to
P800.00; and her handbag worth P15.00. From Rodrigo Conde was taken a
wallet worth P35.00 and containing one Australian dollar, From the others,
including that of the driver, were taken cash which were (sic) handed over to
Geronimo Gerdad.
When approaching Pedro Gil Street, Ruben Lee ordered the driver to turn right
towards Roxas Boulevard and upon reaching Mabini Street, the jeepney was
noticed by the crew of Police Mobile Patrol Car No. 221 as Pedro Gil is a oneway street Patrol Car No. 221 tailed the jeepney and signalled it to a stop.
Upon orders of Ruben Lee, the jeepney driver stepped down to talk nicely to
the policemen (who stopped their car about seven meters behind) by telling
the latter that they entered the street by accident. At the same time, Ruben
Lee warned the passengers to keep quiet, otherwise he will shoot them.
Once the jeepney driver left to talk to the policemen, Ruben Lee also stepped
down, placed his gun on his seat and ordered Quirino Viray, Jr. to take hold of
it, and proceeded to the driver's seat, started the jeepney and drove off

towards Roxas Boulevard, turned left and sped towards Baclaran. Mobile Patrol
Car No. 221 (with the jeepney driver on board) followed suit with its sirens
blowing and at the same time alerting other patrol cars through its radio. The
jeepney, with Ruben Lee on the wheels, turned left towards the airport and on
reaching a dark roard, turned back. At this juncture, Ruben Lee ordered one of
the passengers thrown out in order to distract the attention of the pursuers.
So that the passenger beside him was thrown out. However, said passenger
was not hurt; instead he ran away after hitting (sic) ground. With the mobile
patrol car in pursuit, the jeepney sped back to Roxas Boulevard and towards
the Luneta with the holduppers taking potshots at the pursuers. And because
the passengers heard shots coming from behind, they were either down on
the floor or were stooping from their seats, for fear that the policemen might
shot (sic) directly at them. The jeepney finally stopped at Marvex Drive in
Balintawak, Quezon City. The hold-uppers jumped out of the jeepney and
engaged the pursuing policemen in a shoot out. Ruben Lee pointed a gun at
Gina Salvador's back and fired. When the firing subsided, one of the holduppers, Geronimo Gerdad, was found seriously wounded and a .22 caliber
revolver (Exhibit W-1) was found near his body. One of the passenger victims,
Leopoldo Espellego, was seriously wounded while three others were wounded,
namely: Gina Salvador who suffered a gunshot wound; Wong Ngaw, with
lacerations and abrasions (see Exhibit F); and Perpetuo Aquino, with a
lacerated wound (See Exhibit G). One patrol car brought Gerdad and
Espellego to the Chinese Memorial Hospital where both were pronounced
dead on arrival. Gina Salvador, Wong Ngaw and Perpetuo Aquino were
brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where they were treated. 5
Through their counsel de oficio appointed by this Court, accused-appellants
filed their Brief 6 on 22 March 1985.
The People, through the Solicitor General, filed the Appellee's Brief 7 on 12
September 1985.
Pursuant to Section 19(l), Article III of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines which provides that any death penalty already imposed shall
be reduced to reclusion perpetua, this Court, in a letter to the accused dated
20 April 1988, asked them whether they still wished to continue with their
case considering that the death penalty is no longer imposable and their
death sentences had been automatically commuted to reclusion perpetua. 8
In their letter to this Court dated 2 May 1988, accused Ruben Lee and Quirino
Viray manifested their willingness to accept the sentence of Reclusion
Perpetua. 9 Accused Juan Larosa, however, in a letter to this Court dated 29
April 1988, manifested that he wanted to continue with his appeal. 10
In view of the foregoing, this Court promulgated on 25 May 1988 the following
resolution:
G.R. No. 66848 (People vs. Ruben Lee, et. al.)Considering the pleadings filed
in this case, the Court Resolved to NOTE: (a) the letter of compliance filed by
accused-appellants Ruben Lee and Quirino Viray signed in the presence of

witnesses, dated May 2, 1 988, stating that they are willing to accept the
sentence of reclusion perpetua in consonance with the provision of Section 19
(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution; and (b) the letter of compliance filed
by accused-appellant Juan Larosa dated April 29, 1988 stating that he wants
to continue his case as an appealed case.
Said resolution became final on 17 June 1988 and Entry of Judgment was
correspondingly made.
This review should then be limited to the case of accused Juan Larosa.
In the Appellant's Brief, accused Juan Larosa assigns the following errors: 11
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED LAROSA IS GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT WHEN HE WAS NOT
PROPERLY AND CREDIBLY IDENTIFIED AS PARTICIPANT (SIC) IN THE CRIME;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF
THE ACCUSED;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER BY ACCUSED.
We shall take them up in the order they are presented.
A. In support of the first assigned error, Larosa claims that the two (2) alleged
eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution, namely, Gina Salvador and
Rodrigo Conde, were not able to identify him.
Indeed, as correctly pointed out by Larosa, Gina failed to mention him. While
she was very specific as to the role and participation of accused Ruben Lee
and Quirino Viray, she candidly admitted that she "could no longer recall the
hold-upper who was sitted (sic) in front (sic) of the jeep." 12 However,
prosecution witness Conde positively identified Larosa as the holdupper sitting
on the front seat of the jeep. On direct examination, he testified as follows:
Fiscal Belmonte:
Q When you boarded the jeep, were there passengers?
A Yes, Sir.
Q When you boarded the jeep, were these three already there?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened next?
A When the jeep reached at the PGH, the three drew guns, Sir.
Q Did thev say anything?
A Yes, Sir, they said, this is a hold-up.
Court:
Q Who among the three drew a gun?
A Ruben Lee, Your Honor.
Q Who else?
A The other one sitting near the driver, Sir.
Fiscal Belmonte:

Q Is that other one in this Courtroom?

A Yes, Sir.
Court:
Q Point to him?
A Larosa, Your Honor. 13
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Belmonte:
Q Do you know if there was any passenger of that jeep fell (sic) down?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where was that passenger sitted (sic) at the time that he was fell (sic)
down?
A We were on our way to MIA when that passenger fell down, Sir.
Q Why did he fall down?
A Because he was pushed by one of the holduper (sic), Sir.
Q Do you know who was that holduper?
A Larosa, Sir. 14
On cross-examination, this witness immediately aborted the defense counsel's
attempt to show that the light of the jeep was put off, hence, it was
impossible for him to see the holduppers clearly. Thus:
Atty. Mangubat:
Q By the way when these holduper (sic) announced that it was hold-up, did
they order the driver to put out the light?
A No, Sir. 15
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequent attempts on the part of the cross-examiner to discredit Conde
proved futile. His testimony was given full faith and credit by the trial court
and We find no reason to overturn such a finding. Well-entrenched is the rule
that appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial
court since the latter are in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying, unless it is found that the trial courts have plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. 16
Equally settled is the rule that conviction may be based on the lone testimony
of an eyewitness, when the testimony is credible. 17
B. In respect to his second assigned error, Larosa would have Us believe that
at 2:00 a.m. of 22 June 1981, he was at his house sleeping with his family. 18
However, accused relies merely on his own testimony and his alibi is not
corroborated by anybody else.
We have ruled time and again that alibi is a weak defense for it is easy to
concoct and fabricate. 19 Alibi cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face
of the positive identification by credible witnesses that the accused
perpetrated the crime. 20 In the case at bar, We find no reason to depart from

this doctrine for the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the
accused Larosa.
C. In his last assigned error, Larosa claims that he voluntarily submitted to the
custody of the police and offered no resistance when the police accosted him.
We agree with the Appellee that this contention has no basis. Before Larosa
and the other holduppers could even be apprehended, they engaged the
pursuing police authorities in a shootout and only gave up upon realizing that
they were already surrounded by residents and tanod members in the vicinity.
21
For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and should show the
intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities,
either: (1) because he acknowledges his guilt, or (2) because he wishes to
save them the trouble and expense necessarily included for his search and
capture. 22 In the absence of these two (2) reasons, and in the event that the
only reason for accused's supposed surrender is to insure his safety, his arrest
being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and hence, not voluntary.
23
The trial court correctly appreciated against the accused the generic
aggravating circumstances of band and craft. Nighttime, however, was
erroneously taken against him.
A crime is committed by a band whenever more than three (3) armed
malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense. 24 In
the case at bar, commission by a band was properly appreciated as it has
been shown that when the holdup was staged, Ruben Lee, Quirino Viray,
Geronimo Gerdad (deceased), and accused Larosa were all armed with guns
and knives.
Craft is likewise present herein since the accused and his cohorts pretended
to be bona fide passengers of the jeep in order not to arouse suspicion.
However, once inside the jeep, they robbed the driver and the other
passengers. 25
As to nighttime, there is no showing that it was purposely sought for or taken
advantage of to facilitate the commission of the offense or for the purpose of
impunity. 26 There's no proof that they waited for the night to commit the
crime. Besides, as testified to by Rodrigo Conde, the light of the jeep was not
put off. Obviously, they did not seek the darkness of the night and were not
afraid of the light.
The robbery and the resulting deaths of Leopoldo Espellego and Geronimo
Gerdad (holdupper) and physical injuries of Gina Salvador, Wong Ngaw, and
Perpetuo Aquino are included in one (1) special complex crime of robbery with
homicide and physical injuries, defined and penalized under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, it being evident that the deaths and injuries occurred by
reason of or on occasion of the robbery. 27 The penalty provided for therein is
reclusion perpetua to death. Considering the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of band and craft or disguise, the greater penalty, which is

death, shall be applied. 28 However, in view of the provisions of the 1987

Constitution abolishing the death penalty, 29 accused Larosa is entitled to the
reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Finally, conformably with the new policy of this Court, 30 the civil indemnity of
P12,000.00 is increased to P50,000.00. However, considering that the
judgment against Ruben Lee and Quirino Viray, the other convicted
holduppers herein, had become final and executory as of 7 June 1988, they
are solidarily liable with Juan Larosa up to the amount of P12,000.00 only.
Anything in excess of said amount is the sole liability of accused Larosa.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-49
(81) finding the accused, Juan Larosa and his co-accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries,
as defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects, except as above modified. As modified, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and the civil
indemnity for the death of Leopoldo Espellego is hereby increased to
P50,000.00, the first P12,000.00 of which the accused Juan Larosa shall be
jointly and severally liable with his co-accused, and for the remaining
P38,000.00 he shall be solely liable.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODOLFO ASPILI,
ERNESTO MAGBANUA, EDUARDO MENDOZA, RODOLFO SALES,
ROBERT AGUIRRE and PACIFICO REBUTIDO,Accused-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Enrique A. Javier, Sr. counsel de oficio for Accused-Appellants.
1. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIMES; SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY
WITH HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED WITH RAPE, COMMITTED IN THE CASE AT BAR;
PENALTY THEREOF; SAID CRIME NOW DESIGNATED AS PIRACY IN PHILIPPINE
WATERS. The Court finds, at the outset, that the trial judge erred in
designating the offense committed by the appellants as rape with homicide
aggravated by robbery in band. For one, neither in law nor in jurisprudence is
there an aggravating circumstance as robbery in band. More importantly, the
evidence shows that what was committed is the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide aggravated by rape. The overwhelming evidence
reveals that the original design of the malefactors was to commit robbery in
order to facilitate their escape from the penal colony. Their original intent did
not comprehend the commission of rape. Hence, the crime of rape cannot be
regarded as the principal offense. In this case, since it attended the
commission of robbery with homicide, the rape is deemed to aggravate the
crime but damages or indemnification for the victim may be awarded. (See

People v. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136 [1958]; People v. Tapales, 93 SCRA 134 [1979]).
Instead of ignominy, it is the rape itself that aggravates the crime (People v.
Mongado, 28 SCRA 642 [1969]). With respect to the deaths of Daisy Gonzales
and Yolanda Arque, the appellants are clearly liable therefor since, as held by
this Court in People v. Mangulabnan, (99 Phil. 992 [1956]) it is immaterial that
the death of a person supervened by mere accident, provided that the
homicide is produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery. Since rape and
homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, the offense committed by the
appellants is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, aggravated
by rape, punishable under Paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). It does not matter if the technical name assigned to the offense is
rape with homicide and with robbery in band, for the real nature of the crime
charged is determined not by the title of the complaint, nor by the
specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated, but by
the facts recited in the complaint or information. (See People v. Oliviera, 67
Phil. 427 [1939]) As the acts constituting robbery with homicide were clearly
set forth in the complaint and proven during trial, then the appellants may be
held liable for such crime, regardless of the erroneous designation of the
offense. In passing, it may be mentioned that the crimes committed by
appellants are now denominated as piracy in Philippine waters, punishable
under Presidential Decree No. 532. We find it unnecessary to retroactively
apply the provisions thereof in favor of the appellants because the acts
committed by them are likewise punishable therein by reclusion perpetua.
2. ID.; AGGRAVATIG CIRCUMSTANCES; RECIDIVISM, IN BAND AND ABUSE OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH, ALSO ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR; NOCTURNITY
AND CRAFT, NOT CONSIDERED. We find no merit in the appellants
contention that the lower court erred in considering recidivism as an
aggravating circumstance. All the appellants are recidivists. They were
serving sentence at the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony by virtue of a final judgment
of conviction when they committed the above-mentioned offenses. Rodolfo
Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza and Pacifico Rebutido have
previously been convicted of the crimes of frustrated homicide, serious
physical injuries, theft, and murder and trespass to dwelling, respectively.
Both Rodolfo Sales and Roberto Aguirre have previously been convicted of
robbery in band. We likewise uphold the trial courts finding that the crime
was aggravated because it was committed by a band. All the six appellants
were armed when they boarded the vessel and perpetrated their dastardly
acts. There is also abuse of superior strength, since most of the victims were
women and children ranging from 2 to 9 years old. However, the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and craft should not have been considered by the
lower court. There was no showing that the appellants purposely sought the
cover of night when they committed the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide. Neither did the appellants employ craft, since they had already

boarded the vessel when they pretended to buy Tanduay Rum in exchange for
the dried fish and chicken they were carrying. Even without such pretense,
they could nonetheless have carried out their unlawful scheme.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS; REQUIREMETS
AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF RIGHT TO
COUNSEL HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT AND DO NOT APPLY TO
CONFESSIONS TAKEN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973. The interlocking
extrajudicial confessions executed by the appellants are admissible even if
they were not informed of their right to counsel. These confessions were all
taken in January 1970, long before the 1973 Constitution took effect. Article III
Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, for the first time, concretized the present
right of persons under custodial investigation to counsel, how to be informed
of such right and the effect of non-compliance. The requirements and
restrictions surrounding this constitutional guarantee, however, have no
retroactive effect and do not apply to confessions taken before January 17,
1973, the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. (See Magtoto v.
Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 [1975])
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellants seek a reversal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Palawan, 4th Judicial Region, Branch 48, finding them guilty of the crime of
rape with homicide, with the aggravating circumstances of robbery in band,
taking advantage of nighttime, recidivism, abuse of superior strength and
craft.
The facts for the prosecution are summarized by the Solicitor General, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On December 28, 1969, the M/L Elsa left Puerto Princesa City for Dumaran,
Palawan. On board were Catalino Nadayao, the patron of the vessel; Pepito
Severino and two other crew members; and thirteen (13) passengers among
whom were Narcisa Batayola, Daisy Gonzales, Josie Gonzales, Yolanda Arque,
Wenifredo Magallanes, a certain Bunag and several children ranging from two
(2) to nine (9) years of age. All in all, 17 persons were on board M/L Elsa with
some cargoes consisting of liquor like tanduay, beer, coke, etc. The vessel left
Puerto Princesa at 3:00 oclock in the morning, navigating towards the
lighthouse but due to big waves and strong winds, the launch was forced to
seek shelter at Balon, Sta. Lucia, Puerto Princesa City, arriving thereat about 6
to 7:00 oclock in the morning where they were stranded because of the bad
weather and the damaged rudder of the launch (TSN, 2-18-70, pp. 169-176).

While at the aforementioned place, near the site of the Sta. Lucia Penal
Colony, in the afternoon between one and three oclock, two persons went
aboard the M/L Elsa. They were identified by Josie Gonzales as Pacifico
Rebutido and Rodolfo Aspili, and after Pepito Severino handed to them the
liquor they left the launch (TSN, 8-26-70, pp. 437-442).
It was later established that said two accused together with the other four,
namely: Ernesto Magbanua, Rodolfo Sales, Roberto Aguirre and Eduardo
Mendoza, all convicts colonists of Sta. Lucia Penal Colony, had been
drinking liquor (tanduay) since the morning of December 28, 1969 even as
they hatched the plan to escape from the Penal Colony with the use of M/L
Elsa. The buying of the tanduay served also the purpose of acquainting the
herein accused that the crew and passengers of M/L Elsa were innocent,
peaceful and unarmed (TSN, 11-26-40, pp. 307-312).
Between 7 and 8 oclock in the evening of the same day, the six accused
carried out their agreed plan to escape and, fully armed with pistols and
boloes, they boarded the launch bringing with them chicken and dried fish.
Upon boarding the launch, they placed themselves in strategic positions.
Magbanua talked to the patron of the launch who ordered the engine
operator, Pepito Severino, to fetch four bottles of tanduay. While in the act of
handing the tanduay to Magbanua, the latter suddenly thrust his bolo at
Severinos abdomen, at the same time pointing a pistol at him shouting
walang kikilos (nobody moves). This prompted Severino to jump into the sea,
after seeing also the rest of the accused draw their bolos. Witnessing all these
hostile acts and having evaded a stab by Rodolfo Sales who nevertheless
chased him, Catalino Nadayao was constrained to jump overboard. Some
passengers and the rest of the crew who were frightened by the shouting of
Magbanua and the ensuing commotion likewise jumped into the sea (TSN 220-70, pp. 183-193; 3-17-70, pp. 196-197). Among the passengers who
jumped overboard were Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque.
Only five persons were left in the launch who did not jump overboard. Josie
Gonzales tried to jump overboard but Ernesto Magbanua, one of the accused,
prevented her by holding both arms. Magbanua pulled and dragged her. Josie
struggled to free herself but to no avail. Magbanua succeeded in dragging her
over the cargoes where he pinned her down. While in that lying position he
forcibly raped her for about five to ten minutes. At that time, Magbanua was
pointing a gun at Josies head. After Magbanua was through, Rodolfo Sales
approached her, took off his pants and laid on top of her for about 3 to 5
minutes. At the time Sales was raping Josie, Magbanua was still holding her
and pointing a gun at her. After Sales, Pacifico Rebutido approached her and
likewise raped her. Josie tried to evade but she was already weak and only felt
pain (TSN, 8-26-70, pp. 458-463; 8-27-90, pp. 1-23).

On the other hand, Narcisa Batayola likewise attempted to jump but

Magbanua also held her at the back portion of her dress and told her to return
to the place where she and the other children were originally hiding. She saw
the accused ransacking the cargoes and taking the contents thereof. Moments
later, Roberto Aguirre then with a pistol held Narcisa on the shoulders while
Eduardo Mendoza held her legs and wrestled her down. Aguirre had sexual
intercourse with her followed by Mendoza. Thereafter, Rodolfo Aspili brought
her out toward a sawali and right there and then made her lay down in a
slanting position. When Aspili was having sexual intercourse with her, nobody
was holding her but she could no longer resist as she was already exhausted
and weak (TSN, 11-16-70, pp. 147-167).
Subsequently, the six accused left the launch and boarded their banca.
Thereafter, Josie and Narcisa together with the children jumped into the water
and swam to the bakawan to hide. They were rescued by the Baracuda
Launch. In the process, the dead bodies of Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque
were found.
Necropsy examination on the cadavers of Daisy and Yolanda showed that both
died of suffocation by drowning as blood was coming out from their nose,
mouth and opening of both ears due to rapture of tempanic membrane (TSN,
2-17-70, pp. 109-124).
Dr. Dueas, the examining physician, likewise found that Josie Gonzales and
Narcisa Batayola both had undergone sexual penetration recently.
Subsequently, both Josie Gonzales and Narcisa Batayola filed separate
complaints charging the herein, six accused with the crimes of Rape with
Homicide and Robbery in Band." (Brief for the plaintiff-appellee, pp, 2-8, Rollo,
p. 334)
On the basis of the above-mentioned alleged acts committed by the accused,
the following criminal cases were filed:cralawnad
1. Criminal Case No. 3
for
Rape with Homicide and with Robbery in Band
COMPLAINT

"The undersigned complainants, after having been duly sworn to oath in

accordance with law, accuse RODOLFO ASPILI, ERNESTO MAGBANUA,
EDUARDO MENDOZA, RODOLFO SALES, ROBERTO AGUIRRE and PACIFICO
REBUTIDO, of the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND WITH ROBBERY IN
BAND, committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 28th day of December, 1969, in Sitio Balon, Sta. Lucia
Sub-Colony, Municipality of Puerto Princesa, Province of Palawan, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
who are all serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment in the Iwahig Penal
Colony, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, conspiring and confederating together and
helping one another, forcibly boarded the motor launch named M/L ELSA
which was then at anchor seeking shelter in the vicinity due to bad weather
and while on board the said vessel the accused Ernesto Magbanua, Rodolfo
Sales, and Pacifico Rebutido, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with deliberate intent and lewd designs and by means of
force, violence and intimidations using guns and boloes for the purpose, had
sexual intercourse one after the other with the herein complainant JOSIE
GONZALES, a minor 13 years of age, against her will, she being one of the 17
passengers aboard the said vessel while the rest of the accused were either
having carnal knowledge with another victim NARCISA BATAYOLA, likewise a
minor 15 years of age, by means of force and intimidation and against her
will; while the others were ransacking the baggages of the passengers and on
the occasion of such acts of the accused, panic took place aboard the said
vessel thus forcing the other passengers to jump overboard for fear of bodily
harm, and as a consequence thereof, DAISY GONZALES age 15, and YOLANDA
ARQUE, age 9, both passengers of the said vessel were drowned; and further
on the occasion thereof, all the accused took and carried away, unlawfully and
feloniously and against the will of the owners thereof, cash amount of money,
personal belongings and cargoes aboard the vessel amounting to no less than
TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency."
CONTRARY TO LAW and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by
an armed band, in an uninhabited place, recidivism and or reiteration, with
evident premeditation, superior strength and with the use of craft, fraud or
disguise, and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4111 in relation to Article 160 of the same
Code." chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
SGD. PABLO GONZALES SGD. JOSIE GONZALES
Father-Complainant Complainant
(Rollo, pp. 15-16)

2. Criminal Case No. 4

for
Rape with Homicide and with Robbery in Band
COMPLAINT
"That on or about the 28th day of December, 1969, in Sitio Balon, Sta. Lucia
Sub-Colony, Municipality of Puerto Princesa, Province of Palawan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
who are all serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment in the Iwahig Penal
Colony, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, conspiring, confederating together and
helping one another, forcibly boarded the motor launch named M/L ELSA
which was then at anchor seeking shelter in the vicinity due to bad weather
and while on board the said vessel, the accused Roberto Aguirre, Eduardo
Mendoza and Rodolfo Aspili, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with deliberate intent and lewd designs and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, using guns and boloes for the purpose had
sexual intercourse, one after the other, with herein complainant, Narcisa
Batayola, a minor 15 years of age, against her will, she being one of the 17
passengers aboard the same vessel while the rest of the accused were either
having carnal knowledge with another victim, Josie Gonzales, likewise a minor
13 years of age, by means of force and intimidation and against her will; while
the others were ransacking the baggages of the passengers and on the
occasion of such acts of the accused, panic took place aboard the said vessel,
thus forcing the other passengers to jump over board for fear of bodily harm,
and as a consequence thereof, Daisy Gonzales age 15 and Yolanda Arque, age
9, both passengers of the said vessel were drowned; and further on the
occasion thereof, all the accused took and carried away unlawfully and
feloniously and against the will of the owners thereof, cash amount of money,
personal belongings and cargoes of the vessel amounting to no less than
P2,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"Contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstances of night time, by an
armed band in an uninhabited place, recidivism and/or reiteration, with
evident premeditation, superior strength and with the use of craft, fraud or
disguise, and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 4111 in relation to Art. 160 of the same Code.
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Philippines, January 7, 1970

(SGD.) CRISTITO ARQUE (SGD.) NARCISA BATAYOLA Y ARQUE Guardian-UncleComplainant Complainant"

(Rollo, pp. 179-180)
The facts for the defense
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

are

summarized

by

their

counsel

as

"The true facts of the cases are those testified to by Ernesto Magbanua,
Eduardo Mendoza, Roberto Aguirre, Rodolfo Sales and Manolo Espino stated
briefly hereunder as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
At about 9:00 oclock in the morning of December 28, 1969, Ernesto
Magbanua and Roberto Aguirre left their nipa hut at Santa Lucia Penal Colony
and went to the Prison Brigade of the said colony to get their dirty clothes. At
the brigade they met three (3) private persons, passengers or crews of Motor
Launch Elsa. They were eating Camote Cassava with the Capataz of the
colony on duty, a certain person called Rudy.
From the brigade, Magbanua and Aguirre proceeded to the hut of Pacifico
Rebutido. There they saw Pacifico Rebutido, Rodolfo Aspili, Rodolfo Sales and
Eduardo Mendoza drinking tanduay which were brought to Rebutidos hut by
the three (3) private persons from the Motor Launch Elsa.
At about 6:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same date, Ernesto Magbanua
and his companions returned to the colony brigade for the usual daily
checking and counting of prisoners. After the checking-up, the group returned
to the nipa hut of Pacifico Rebutido and there planned to escape from the Sta.
Lucia Penal Colony situated in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. They agreed to hire
the Motor Launch Elsa anchored about ten (10) arms length from the wharf
of Sta. Lucia Penal Colony in Balon, Puerto Princesa, Palawan with money,
chickens and dried fish.
At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of that date the group, defendantsappellants herein, went to the Motor Launch Elsa using the banca of the
colony and bringing with them money, chickens and dried fish. Ernesto
Magbanua boarded the launch ahead of the rest, talked to the patron of the
launch to bring them to liberty and offered money, chickens and dried fish for
their fares. His companions likewise boarded the motor launch, Rebutido
being the last to board the same at the time when the patron of the launch
was still thinking and considering the offer of Magbanua. But when Rebutido
reached the deck of the launch, he stepped on a loose board and fell inside
the engine room. The impact of his fall was so loud that the patron jumped
overboard into the sea shouting to his crews and passengers to likewise jump

into the sea. Only two women, a man and small children remained in the
launch. Magbanua told the remaining persons on board the launch not to
jump overboard because they did not have bad intentions.
Magbanua and his companions then searched for those who jumped into the
sea for anyone who may not know how to swim in order to save him. And they
found a small boy about nine (9) years of age struggling to swim. They saved
him by using a pole and pulling him towards the launch. When asked why he
jumped overboard, the boy said that he jumped because he heard the Captain
of the launch shouting to them to jump into the sea.
When the herein appellants found no more persons on the sea around the
launch, Rodolfo Aspili and Eduardo Mendoza went down to the engine room
with one male passenger of the launch and tried to start the engine. It was at
that moment when Magbanua who remained on the deck saw Josie Gonzales
at the prow of the launch. He asked her to accomodate him for a sexual
intercourse, but Josie pointed him instead to Narcisa Batayola saying that
Batayola is the one having experience on the matter. When told that he
(Magbanua) did not like Batayola, Josie agreed to a sexual intercourse if
Magbanua will not harm her. She undressed herself when told to undress.
Then Magbanua opened the zipper of his pants and let Josie hold his penis.
While Josie was holding his penis, Magbanua made her lie down. He inserted
his penis inside the vagina of Josie who complained of pains. It took Magbanua
about five (5) minutes to insert only two inches of his penis inside the vagina
of Josie Gonzales. At that same moment, Rodolfo Sales and Pacifico Rebutido
pulled Magbanua up from Josie Gonzales reminding Magbanua that their
agreement was only to escape and what he was doing to Josie Gonzales was
not part of their agreement.
At about the same time that Magbanua was having sexual intercourse with
Josie Gonzales, Roberto Aguirre was also having sexual intercourse with
Narcisa Batayola. Before the intercourse, Aguirre saw Batayola about to jump
into the sea. He prevented her from jumping overboard by holding her. Then
he went around the deck of the launch to see if there were still persons
swimming on the water, leaving Batayola at the prow of the launch. Seeing
none, he returned to Batayola and asked her to have sexual intercourse with
him. At first Batayola refused. But later she undressed herself when told to
undress. Aguirre made her lie down and he inserted his penis inside the
vagina of Narcisa Batayola without any difficulty. He made two successive
sexual intercourse with Narcisa Batayola, after which they both dressed up.
They were in that situation when Rodolfo Sales and Pacifico Rebotido arrived,
pulled Aguirre away and they boarded their banca because they saw someone
flashlighting the premises at the shore. Magbanua also called Aspili and
Eduardo Mendoza at the engine room and they likewise boarded their banca

and proceeded to the mangrove swamp to escape. On the way, they noticed
that Aspili was left behind." (Appellants Brief, pp. 3-6)
The two cases were consolidated and, after hearing, the lower court rendered
judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape with homicide. The
dispositive portion of the decision is set forth below:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, haloed by the illuminating light of all aforegoing facts, laws,
jurisprudence and arguments, this Court finds all the herein accused, namely:
Rodolfo Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza, Jr., Rodolfo Sales,
Roberto Aguirre and Pacifico Rebutido guilty of the crimes of Rape with
Homicide, with the aggravating circumstances of Robbery in Band, taking
advantage of nighttime, recidivism, abuse of superior strength and craft, in
the above-entitled Criminal Case No. 3, beyond reasonable doubt, and
sentences all of them to Reclusion Perpetua, and all, likewise, guilty of the
same but separate crime with all the same aforementioned aggravating
circumstances, in the above-entitled Criminal Case No. 4, beyond reasonable
doubt and imposes upon all of them, another separate penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua, both penalties to be served successively, with all its accessory
penalties too in both cases, further, all same six (6) herein accused are
sentenced and ordered to pay actual damages jointly and solidarily as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. P265.00 to Josie Gonzales;
2. 24.00 to Narcisa Batayola;
3. 36.00 to Pepito Severino and
4. P1,675.00 to Catalino Nadayao, for and the other passengers, named by
him to have suffered losses, in an amount corresponding to each,
respectively,
and furthermore, the same six (6) aforenamed accused are sentenced and
ordered to pay, jointly and solidarily, moral damages, in the amount of
P25,000.00 to each of Josie Gonzales and Narcisa Batayola, their heirs and
assigns respectively, as moral damages, and ultimately to indemnify in the
same manner, the parents, their heirs and assigns of deceased Daisy
Gonzales and Yolanda Arque, the amount of P30,000.00 for each and every
death of the said two (2) deceased, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency in all the aforecited civil liabilities. It is further directed that an
alias warrant of arrest be issued against Rodolfo Sales and Pacifico Rebutido
and not to be returned until they were in the custody of the law." (Rollo, pp.
290-291)

We agree with the trial court that the prosecution correctly presented the
facts of the case.
The appellants raise the following assignments of errors:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
I
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS HEREIN ARE RAPE WITH HOMICIDE WITH THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF ROBBERY IN BAND, NIGHTTIME, SUPERIOR
STRENGTH, RECIDIVISM, AND CRAFT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
HEREIN CONSPIRED TO COMMIT THE OFFENSES OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND
CONVICTING ALL OF THEM OF THE SAID CRIMES." (Rollo, pp. 326-327)
The Court finds, at the outset, that the trial judge erred in designating the
offense committed by the appellants as rape with homicide aggravated by
robbery in band. For one, neither in law nor in jurisprudence is there an
aggravating circumstance as robbery in band. More importantly, the evidence
shows that what was committed is the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide aggravated by rape.
The records disclose that the appellants took control of the vessel M/L Elsa by
threatening the crew and passengers with their boloes and pistols. (TSN, pp.
452-459, August 26, 1970; pp. 137-148, November 16, 1970) Narcisa
Batayola, a prosecution witness, testified that after the commotion that
ensued when appellants wielded their weapons, some of the appellants
immediately started ransacking the cargoes and taking the contents thereof
(TSN, p. 148, November 16, 1970) These acts of the appellants therefore
manifest an unlawful intent to gain, through violence and intimidation of
persons, by taking the vessel and personal property of the crew and
passengers, which comprises the crime of robbery.
The overwhelming evidence reveals that the original design of the
malefactors was to commit robbery in order to facilitate their escape from the
penal colony. Their original intent did not comprehend the commission of
rape. Hence, the crime of rape cannot be regarded as the principal offense. In
this case, since it attended the commission of robbery with homicide, the rape
is deemed to aggravate the crime but damages or indemnification for the

victim may be awarded. (See People v. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136 [1958]; People v.
Tapales, 93 SCRA 134 [1979]). Instead of ignominy, it is the rape itself that
aggravates the crime (People v. Mongado, 28 SCRA 642 [1969]).
With respect to the deaths of Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque, the
appellants are clearly liable therefor since, as held by this Court in People v.
Mangulabnan, (99 Phil. 992 [1956]) it is immaterial that the death of a person
supervened by mere accident, provided that the homicide is produced by
reason or on occasion of the robbery.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Since rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, the offense
committed by the appellants is the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, aggravated by rape, punishable under Paragraph 1 of Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). It does not matter if the technical name
assigned to the offense is rape with homicide and with robbery in band, for
the real nature of the crime charged is determined not by the title of the
complaint, nor by the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have
been violated, but by the facts recited in the complaint or information. (See
People v. Oliviera, 67 Phil. 427 [1939]) As the acts constituting robbery with
homicide were clearly set forth in the complaint and proven during trial, then
the appellants may be held liable for such crime, regardless of the erroneous
designation of the offense.
With the foregoing pronouncements, the Court no longer deems it necessary
to deal with the appellants argument in their first assignment of error that
assuming arguendo that they are guilty of committing rape, the crimes of
rape and homicide should be viewed as separate and distinct offenses. We
have already ruled that the crime committed is the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, the rape being considered merely as an aggravating
circumstance.
We find no merit in the appellants contention that the lower court erred in
considering recidivism as an aggravating circumstance. All the appellants are
recidivists. They were serving sentence at the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony by
virtue of a final judgment of conviction when they committed the abovementioned offenses. Rodolfo Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza and
Pacifico Rebutido have previously been convicted of the crimes of frustrated
homicide, serious physical injuries, theft, and murder and trespass to
dwelling, respectively. Both Rodolfo Sales and Roberto Aguirre have previously
been convicted of robbery in band.
We likewise uphold the trial courts finding that the crime was aggravated
because it was committed by a band. All the six appellants were armed when
they boarded the vessel and perpetrated their dastardly acts. There is also

abuse of superior strength, since most of the victims were women and
children ranging from 2 to 9 years old.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
However, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and craft should not
have been considered by the lower court. There was no showing that the
appellants purposely sought the cover of night when they committed the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Neither did the appellants
employ craft, since they had already boarded the vessel when they pretended
to buy Tanduay Rum in exchange for the dried fish and chicken they were
carrying. Even without such pretense, they could nonetheless have carried out
their unlawful scheme.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the appellants contention
that there was no conspiracy in the commission of rape becomes immaterial
in view of the fact that all of them directly participated in its commission.
Appellants Magbanua, Sales and Rebutido took turns in raping Josie Gonzales,
while appellants Aguirre, Mendoza and Aspili ravished Narcisa Batayola. The
Court accords more weight and credence to the testimonies of complainants
Gonzales and Batayola. These two girls, 13 and 15 years old respectively,
would not subject themselves to the rigors of a public trial if they were not
motivated by an honest desire to punish their assailants. Moreover, their
narrations were corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Juanito Duenas who
physically examined Gonzales and Batayola and found that both indeed had
just undergone sexual penetration.
The interlocking extrajudicial confessions executed by the appellants are
admissible even if they were not informed of their right to counsel. These
confessions were all taken in January 1970, long before the 1973 Constitution
took effect. Article III Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, for the first time,
concretized the present right of persons under custodial investigation to
counsel, how to be informed of such right and the effect of non-compliance.
The requirements and restrictions surrounding this constitutional guarantee,
however, have no retroactive effect and do not apply to confessions taken
before January 17, 1973, the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. (See
Magtoto v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 [1975])
At any rate, even without considering these extrajudicial confessions, the
Court is convinced that the guilt of appellants has been incontrovertibly
established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.
The Court, however, finds that the trial judge erred in imposing upon the
appellants two separate penalties of reclusion perpetua, both penalties to be
served successively. The basis for this imposition by the lower court is its

finding that the appellants are guilty of two crimes of rape with homicide, one
for the rape of Josie Gonzales and the other for the rape of Narcisa Batayola.
We have already pronounced, though, that the rape committed is merely an
aggravating circumstance. Since the appellants are found guilty of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by rape, recidivism, in
band and abuse of superior strength, then, applying Article 294, paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code, only one penalty of reclusion perpetua should have
been imposed.cralawnad
In passing, it may be mentioned that the crimes committed by appellants are
now denominated as piracy in Philippine waters, punishable under Presidential
Decree No. 532. We find it unnecessary to retroactively apply the provisions
thereof in favor of the appellants because the acts committed by them are
likewise punishable therein by reclusion perpetua.
Considering the perversity accompanying the crime, the heinous nature not
only of the offense but its manner of commission, and the refusal of the
accused to learn from their earlier convictions, the Court strongly feels that
the sentences herein imposed must be fully served. Any official who goes over
any applications for pardon or parole is urged to read the records of the case
before acting on the applications.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 3 and 4 is
AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The appellants are found guilty of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide with the aggravating circumstances
of rape, recidivism, in band and abuse of superior strength and are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of actual
damages is hereby affirmed. The awards representing indemnity for the
deaths are increased to P50,000.00 for each victim while the moral damages
for the rapes are increased to P30,000.00 for each victim.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34355 July 30, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADELANDO RAMOS, alias Bayot, accused whose death sentence is under
automatic review.
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for accused.
Acting Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General
Octobio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Felix M. de Guzman for appellee.
PER CURIAM:

The Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu in its decision of September 27, 1971
convicted Adelaido Ramos of rape with murder, sentenced him to death and
ordered him to pay the heirs of Leonora Sipalay an indemnity of twelve
thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 417).
The judgment of conviction was based on his plea of guilty, extrajudicial
confession and testimony. He did not appeal. The case was elevated to this
Court for review en consulta.
In the evening of August 17, 1971, Ramos, an iliterate twenty-two-year old
farmer, married with three children, slept in the house of his first cousin,
Rogelio Sipalay, located at Sitio Capilla (Consaguibo), Barrio Tigbawan,
Tabuelan, Cebu. Ramos, who hailed from Ormoc City, was temporarily residing
with his family at Camotehan, Villahermosa, a Barrio near Tigbawan. Ramos
went to Rogelio's house ostensibly to get the chicken which the latter had
promised to give him.
At around six-thirty in the morning of the following day, August 18, Rogelio
invited Ramos to take a bath at the well near the house of his father, Juan
Sipalay. After the two had walked some distance, Ramos told Rogelio that he
was going to return to the latter's house because he had allegedly forgotten
his comb. Rogelio told him to hurry so that they could take a bath together.
On arriving at Rogelio's house, Ramos revealed to Leonora Estanero, the wife
of Rogelio, that the latter was robbed of his cow and that he (Ramos) had
eluded the robbet's, That fictitious tale scared Leonora. She told Ramos not to
leave her. He asked her to give him Rogelio's pistol so that he could defend
her in case the robbers would come to the house. She complied with his
request.
At the suggestion of Ramos, Leonora and her two children, left the house and
took refuge on the top of a hill. Leonora carried the baby, Ronabeth, one year
and three months old, while Ramos carried the older one, Gerlito, four years
old. After being ensconced in that secluded area, Ramos, who had courted
Leonora when she was still unmarried, reminded her of their past romance
and proposed to have sexual congress with her.
Leonora, who was four months pregnant, refused to have any criminal
conversation with him. On this point, there is some discrepancy in the record.
According to the confession of Ramos and his testimony at the preliminary
investigation, he succeeded in raping Leonora. He pleaded guilty to the
information for consummated rape with murder. The municipal health officer
speculated that "there is a possibility of consummated rape because of
forcible tearing of the panty and the whitish substance or specimen sent to
the laboratory for analysis" (Exh. G).
However, when Ramos testified after arraignment, he declared on direct
examination that he did not have carnal intercourse with Leonora. On crossexamination, when he was confronted with his extrajudicial confession that he
raped her, he conceded that he "attempted to rape her" and that he was not
able to consummate the rape (16 and 20 tsn).

After the rape or attempted rape, Leonora slapped him. She shouted for help.
To avoid discovery, Ramos killed her and her two children with his bolo
(sundang). He cut the ear lobe of Nora, took her earrings and placed them
inside his wallet.
He went to his home at Sitio Camotehan and apprised his wife, Magdalena
Nu;ez, that he had killed Leonora and her children. He asked his wife to
escape with him because he expected that the police would arrest him. As she
was in fairing health, she reluctantly went with him to hide in an uncultivated
area (libon).
The police, accompanied by Miguel Canciran, Ramos' brother-in-law,
discovered the hiding place but Ramos was able to escape. He was arrested
later at Barrio Ilihan, Tabogon, Cebu on his way to Leyte.
The autopsy disclosed that the lobule of Leonora's left ear was cut: that her
neck was almost severed from her body, leaving only two millimeters of skin,
that she sustained a circular wound on her left shoulder, and that she had
wounds on the fingers, an indication that she tried to parry the bolo thrusts.
Her uterus was enlarged.
Gerlito sustained a fourteen-centimeter incised wound in the skull. He had
also a wound in the mastoid region. His neck was almost severed. Ronabeth
had an incised wound in the neck which left only a small portion of skin in the
neck before it would be completely separated from the body. Evidently,
Ramos in a murderous frenzy intended to behead his three victims.
The chief of police charged Ramos in the municipal court with robbery,
multiple murder and rape. The robbery was based on the statement of Rogelio
Sipalay that, on returning home, he discovered that the sum of P1,200 which
he was keeping inside the loka-loka was missing and that the coins deposited
in the piggy bank (puyo-puyo) were also missing.
Aside from Rogelio's statement and the extrajudicial confession of Ramos, the
police took the statements of Ramos' wife and his brother-in-law, Canciran.
The district state prosecutor filed an information for rape with murder with the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength, uninhabited place, "disrespect to sex" and deliberately
augmenting and causing other wrongs not necessary for the commission of
the crime.
For the killing of the children, Gerlito and Ronabeth, two informations for
murder were filed against Ramos (Criminal Cases Nos. 418 and 419). He
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two reclusion perpetuas. He did not
appeal.
At the arraignment, Ramos was assisted by three counsels de oficio, one for
each of the three cases. In the instant case for rape with murder, his counsel
de oficio manifested that after conferring with Ramos, the latter informed his
counsel that he was willing to plead guilty. After the information was read to
Ramos in the Cebuano dialect, he pleaded guilty.

The trial court asked him whether he understood the meaning of his plea of
guilty, whether he admitted all the material allegations of the information,
and whether he was aware of the gravity of the charge. He gave a "yes"
answer to those questions.
Then, the trial judge informed Ramos that death would be the penalty
imposible on him. He was asked whether he still wanted to plead guilty. He
answered yes, When the same question was repeated, he answered: "That is
up to the Honorable Judge."
After that dialogue, Ramos was placed on the witness stand. As already
stated, he testified that he committed only attempted rape. He admitted
having hacked to death Leonora and her children under the circumstances
already narrated.
The fiscal presented in evidence the bolo used by Ramos, his wallet
containing the pair of earrings, his bloodstained polo shirt and pants, his
extrajudicial confession, the necropsy report and the death certificate for
Leonora Estabero-Sipalay.
The trial court, proceeding on the assumption that Ramos had consummated
the rape, convicted him of rape with murder aggravated by abuse of
superiority, disregard of sex, despoblado and cruelty. It appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty which offset only one of the four
aggravating circumstances. Hence the death penalty was imposed.
In this automatic review of the trial court's decision, counsel de oficio
contends that Ramos' plea of guilty was not an admission that he committed
rape with murder and that the trial court erred in holding that Ramos was
guilty of that complex defense beyond reasonable doubt. Counsel insinuated
that Ramos made an improvident plea and that, since he denied having
consummated the rape, there should have been a full dress trial.
We hold that even if the crime committed by Ramos is categorized as
attempted rape with homicide, death is still the penalty that should be meted
to him under the penultimate paragraph of article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2632 and 4111.
The appreciation in his favor of the extenuating circumstance of voluntary
confession of guilt would not alter the result because when the Code
prescribes a single indivisible penalty like death, it is imposable regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the crime (Art, 63, Revised Penal Code).
Inasmuch as Ramos in has testimony admitted having committed at least
attempted rape with homicide (which being used in a generic sense includes
murder), it cannot be justifiably argued that he had made an improvident plea
of guilty.
He is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape with homicide, an
offense included in the charge of rape with murder. He cannot complain that
he was not duly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.

Craft and fraud (astucia y fraude), despoblado, abuse of superiority and

cruelty aggravated that special complex crime. Treachery, evident
premeditation and disregard of sex, which were alleged in the information, are
not aggravating.
Although no offended party filed a complaint against Ramos, we hold that, like
robbery with rape, rape with homicide or attempted or frustrated rape with
homicide can be prosecuted de oficio. That is the ruling in People vs. Yu, 110
[Phil. 793, 797].
Ramos, in entering a plea of guilty with the knowledge that he would be
sentenced to death, realized the horrendousness or monstrosity of his crimes
which included abortion, Because of his fiendish and atrocious misdeeds, the
full weight of retributive justice should be brought to bear upon him.
WHEREFORE. the judgement of he lower court is affirmed with the
modification that the designation of the special complex crime committed by
the accussed should be attempted rape with homicide and not rape with
murder. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
NAPOLEON ANTAZO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
ALAMPAY, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari directed against the decision dated October 21,
1976 rendered by the Court of Appeals, affirming the conviction of the
petitioner herein for the crime of estafa by the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
in Criminal Case No. 3-26-M. Petitioner prays that the judgment of the courts
below which he assails be set aside, and that his acquittal be decreed by this
Court.
The antecedent facts of this case disclose that petitioner Napoleon Antazo, a
resident of Binagonan, Rizal, a lawyer and a retired municipal judge, was the
owner of a parcel of land known with an area of 1,452 square meters known
as Lot No. 2 of Psd-9594, situated at Barrio Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal and
covered by TCT No. 147525.
In May, 1965, Mariano Medina expressed his interest to buy a portion of said
lot from Napoleon Antazo. Antazo and Medina proceeded to the site of the lot
and the latter decided to buy a portion of said property, more particularly
described as Lot No. 2-A-2 which has an area of 295 square meters.
Subsequently, Antazo and Medina entered into a contract of Purchase and
Sale on June 18, 1965. Under this contract, Napoleon Antazo in consideration
of the amount of P4,277.00 to be paid to him in installment by the spouses
Medina, bound himself to sell the aforementioned Lot 2-A-2; Napoleon Antazo

likewise obliged himself to deliver to the said Spouses Medina the title to this
portion of land "free from all liens and encumbrances" upon full payment by
the said vendees of the purchase price. In their said contract of purchase and
sale, it was, however, expressly stipulated therein that before the completion
of the installment payments by the vendees, the ownership of the property
would remain with Napoleon Antazo.
On August 19, 1965, the vendor, Napoleon Antazo, without the knowledge or
consent of Mariano Medina, mortgaged to the Binagonan Rural Bank for the
amount of THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) PESOS, the entire Lot No. 2-A, thus
including Lot 2-A-2 which earlier, was agreed to be sold to the Medinas. This
mortgage to the Binagonan Rural Bank significantly was discharged only on
August 14, 1971.
On July 16, 1966 the Medinas completed their payment of the installments on
Lot 2-A-2. Thereupon they demanded from Napoleon Antazo, the delivery of
the title for Lot 2-A-2 and the execution of the corresponding absolute Deed of
Sale for said property.
On August 12, 1966 Napoleon Antazo executed a deed of absolute sale for the
lot in question with a statement in his Deed of Conveyance that the subject
land sold is "free from all liens and encumbrances". At that point of time,
there was, however, still an existing mortgage thereon in favor of the
Binagonan Rural Bank.
Despite several demands by the vendees Medinas on vendor Antazo, said
vendor failed to deliver to them a separate title covering Lot 2-A-2. Sometime
in 1970, the Medinas went to the Register of Deeds of Rizal to investigate the
title of the land sold to them by Antazo and it was then that they discovered
that there was a mortgage lien on said land in favor of the Binagonan Rural
Bank and that aside from this encumbrance, there was also a levy on
execution upon the same land by virtue of the decision of the City Court of
Manila, in Civil Case No. 134430, entitled Philippine National Bank, versus
Napoleon Antazo, inscribed on September 27, 1967 on the title of the land.
The Medinas through their lawyer, wrote a letter on February 2, 1970, to
Napoleon Antazo demanding the delivery to them of a clear title to Lot No. 2A-2. No reply was made by Antazo to said letter-demand notwithstanding his
receipt thereof. Thus, on May 4, 1971, predicated on the facts above-recited,
Napoleon Antazo was charged with the crime of estafa before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, Makati. Said criminal case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 326-M.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered its decision on August
14, 1971, the dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Napoleon Antazo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of estafa, defined and penalized
under paragraph 2, Article 316, Revised Penal Code and there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, hereby sentenced him to suffer an
imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor and to pay
a fine of P4,277.00 representing the price of the purchased lot paid by
Mariano Medina to the defendant with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency at the rate of P2.50 a day, but shall not exceed 1/3 of the principal
penalty, nor shall it be more than one (1) year and to pay the costs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner herein appealed the aforestated decision to the Court of
Appeals. On October 21, 1976, the Fifth Division of said Appellate Court
affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification but only as to the
subsidiary imprisonment of the accused-appellant in case of his failure to pay
the imposed fine due to his insolvency, which the Court of Appeals fixed at the
rate of EIGHT (P8.00) PESOS for every day he should serve, but not to exceed
one-third of the principal penalty, which shall not also exceed one year.
The facts of this case do not appear to be disputed. The principal issue that
should be resolved is whether on the facts found by the courts below, the
petitioner, Napoleon Antazo, should be adjudged guilty of misrepresentation,
fraud or deceit. The Court of Appeals in its decision stated the following:
We fully agree with the observation of the trial court that "as a lawyer and an
ex-municipal judge at that, who is conversant with the intricacies of the law, it
is likely that the accused inserted the aforementioned phrase to fully convince
the complainant of the supposed non-existence of any liability on the disputed
property."
In his fourth assignment of error, defendant-appellant Napoleon Antazo vainly
tried to raise an issue by pointing out that the trial court erred in not applying
the ruling of the Court of Appeals-decided case of People vs. Pedrasa (62 O.G.
5571). But we have scrutinized the facts involved in both cases-in that and in
the instant case-and We cannot but fully agree with the argument of the
Solicitor General that the ruling of this Court in People vs. Pedrasa cannot be
made to apply in the present case. Even assuming 'that the case of People vs.
Guanio (CA 67 O.G. 4231) did not expressly supersede the Pedrasa case, still,
the facts of this case and the Pedrasa case differ substantially. In the latter
case the appellant (Pedrasa) was no longer the owner of the land at the time

he sold it to the complainant (Vera). Neither was the mortgage on the same
land valid. ... . (Decision of the Court of Appeals; CA-G.R. No. 15653 CR, Rollo,
pp. 34-35).
We are in complete accord with the observation and pronouncements made
by the court below in its decision.
Petitioner, however, has raised as before this Court the following questions
which he submits to be a legal issue.
Was there fraud and deceit constitutive of Estafa under Article 316,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code committed by Petitioner when he
entered into a Contract of Purchase and Sale on June 18, 1965, on installment
basis, and thereafter executing a Deed of Absolute Sale on August 12, 1966
upon completion of the installment payments but prior to the redemption of
the mortgage constituted on the entirety of the subdivision lot of which the
property in question was included? (Memorandum for Petitioner, Rollo, p.
119).
The submission of the petitioner herein is that the instant case estafa has not
been committed. Petitioner contends that during the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, no payment was made either coetaneously or subsequently by
the private complainant as full payment had already been made in
accordance with the Contract of Purchase and Sale of June 18, 1965. Although
Petitioner acknowledges his failure to comply with his obligation to deliver the
title of the purchased lot free from all liens and encumbrances, he argues that
he is NOT guilty of the fraud or deceit for which he could be indicted for estafa
because a mere promise to perform a thing is not a representation which
constitutes a deceit and failure to perform such promise does not change its
character. Petitioner maintains that the intention to defraud must exist
coetaneous with the alleged deceitful act, citing the pronouncements in this
regard made in the case of People vs. Villarin, CA-G.R. No. 10598-R, October
31, 1953, 50 O.G. 262).
We find these contentions of Petitioner untenable. We uphold rather the
argument of the public respondent People that there are two stages in the
sales transaction involved in this case, namely: the first stage was when
Medina entered into a contract of Purchase and Sale on June 18, 1965, with
the Appellant herein, for the purchase of the lot in question for P4,277.00, of
which P1,500.00 was to be paid in advance by Medina; that this Contract of
Purchase and Sale is, merely a contract to sell for it is expressly stated therein
that ownership of the property would be retained by Vendor Napoleon Antazo,
until the full payment of the price has been made by the Medinas. Until the
full price is paid, the obligation of the seller to transfer ownership and deliver

a clear title to the property would not yet arise. It is our view however that
there already attaches even at that time the inherent commitment of the
vendor that the corresponding clear and valid title would be transferred by
him to his vendee upon accomplishment by the latter of the stipulated
conditions agreed upon by them.
The second stage would be on August 19, 1965 when appellant mortgaged
the property to the Binagonan Rural Bank, presumably with the intention of
redeeming it prior to the completion of the installment payments by
complainant. When complainant Medina paid the last installment on the
purchase price on July 16, 1966, and then demanded the execution of an
absolute deed of sale covering the purchased property and the delivery of the
title of said land to him, Petitioner Napoleon Antazo prepared and executed
the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit B) containing the express warranty that the
lot in question is free from all liens and encumbrances when it was not in fact
so at that time. It was then still mortgaged in favor of the Binangonan Rural
Bank and there was also a levy on execution on the same land on account of
the decision of the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 134430, entitled
"Philippine National Bank vs. Napoleon Antazo" (Exhibit C-2), duly inscribed on
the title of said property on September 27, 1967, It cannot be said that there
was no money or consideration paid for when the deed of Absolute Sale was
executed on August 12, 1966. Such document of sale or conveyance was
executed by petitioner because full payment had already been effected
previously by complainant Medina, who therefore, demanded that the
corresponding deed of sale be made.
It would be at this second stage of the transaction when deceit was exercised
by Appellant Antazo, a former Municipal Judge of Angono, Rizal. He placed an
express warranty in the Deed of Absolute Sale that the lot in question is free
from all liens and encumbrances, when it was not so in fact.
As fraud involves acts or spoken or written words by a party to mislead
another into believing a fact-to be true when it is not in fact that express
warranty in the Deed of Absolute Sale covering the lot in question (Exhibit B)
that said land is "free from all liens and encumbrances" constitutes the false
representation or deceit and one of the elements giving rise to the crime of
estafa. (People vs. Galsim 107 Phil. 303).
Petitioner Antazo cannot rightfully claim that no damages on Complainant
Medina was brought about by the false warranty made in the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Mariano Medina's damage inherently consists in his inability to
receive a property free from encumbrances. As the rightful vendee, he would
acquire title to the property but subject to the restrictions of the existing liens.
When Mariano Medina entered into a contract of purchase and sale on June

18, 1965 he did not expect that the petitioner herein would later impose
encumbrances on the property. It can be logically assumed that herein
vendees would have refrained from buying the land or declined to pay the
installments agreed upon if they had any inkling that encumbrances would
later be imposed on the property by their vendees. For this Court to condone
the conduct of the petitioner-appellant would encourage mischievous
practices, conducive of much harm to prospective real estate buyers.
The other argument of the petitioner is that the complainant Mariano Medina
must be considered to be fully aware of the encumbrances of title of the
property in question as such facts are recorded in the Register of Property of
Rizal at the time of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on August 12,
1966. On the premise that the registration of the mortgage in favor of the
Binangonan Rural Bank in the Register of Deeds is a notice to the whole world
of its existence, petitioner therefore submits that complainant must be
presumed in law to have already knowledge of said encumbrance before he
completed his payments for the land, negating any inference of deceit for
which he could be held criminally liable for.
This contention of petitioner is devoid of merit. For said offense to be
committed, it is only enough to consider his false pretenses or
misrepresentations in the deed of sale that the subject Lot No. 2-A-2 is
unencumbered when in fact a mortgage lien still exists in favor of the rural
bank. That such encumbrance is recorded assumes no significance. What is
pertinent and relevant is the fact that such false representations of petitioner
no less served as the ingredients of deceit foisted on the complainant vendee.
Our laws do not compel a vendee to make an inquiry or to undertake an
investigation in the Office of the Register of Deeds, to ascertain the status of
the property involved. The vendee can rely on the manifestations made to
him by his vendor whom he can presume to be trustworthy. What is important
is that the vendee must be dealt with in good faith by his vendor and the
conduct of the petitioner herein in connection with the sale of the subject lot
manifestly disclose the contrary. The suppression of material information and
the false representations by petitioner that the property which complainant
paid for is free from liens and encumbrances is clearly a deception to put off
or forestall the petitioner's appellants' concommittant obligation to deliver a
clear title to the land sold.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. L-37400 April 15,1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee.

vs.
SABANGAN CABATO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reubin L. Maraon for accused-appellant.
CORTES, J.:
Accused-appellant Sabangan Cabato appeals from the judgment of the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Zamboanga del Norte finding
him guilty of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE in Criminal Case No. 307.
The facts of the case are as follows:
In an INFORMATION dated February 12,1971, the Provincial Fiscal of
Zamboanga del Norte accused Sabangan Cabato of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
committed as follows:
That in the evening on or about the 25th day of January, 1971, ... the said
accused SABANGAN CABATO, conspiring, confederating and working together
with two (2) other DOES who are stin at large, all armed with firearms and
stones and with intent of illicit gain by means of force, violence and
intimidation against persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the dwelling house of one VICTOR GUINIT and once inside
attack, hold tight and squeeze the mouth of Id Victor Guinit, and hug his wife
Herminia Ames Guinit, and then rob them of cash money (coins) in the
amount of P300.00; ... that in pursuance to (sic) their evil motives, during and
on the occasion of said robbery, the above-named accused taking advantage
of their superior strength and of the darkness of the night to better
accomplish their purpose and with intent to kill by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, strike with stones for several times said HERMINIA AM-ES GUINIT
thereby inflicting upon her several abrasions and contusions... which caused
her death on the spot;. .
xxx xxx xxx
CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation, dwelling, superior strength, and without respect due to
ages of the victims (spouses) and due to the sex of Herminia Ames Guinit
[Rollo, pp. 9-101.
Upon arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded NOT GUILTY.
During the hearings in the Trial Court, the prosecution, relying heavily on the
eyewitness account of Victor Guinit, established that:
xxx xxx xxx
Offended party Victor Guinit, 69 years old, widower, testified that he knows
accused Sabangan Cabato personally; that witness pointed to accused in
open court, that on January 25, 1971, his wife was his only companion in their
house; that at around 7:30 p.m., three persons came to their house while they
were taking supper; that his wife brought food to their dog; that they have

two lamps in the house, one lamp near the bed, and another lamp brought by
his wife; that the two persons [who] hugged him covered his mouth; that the
robber hit his mouth with a stone causing s tooth to fell out (sic); that one of
the robbers grappled with his wife, and the mask covering the face fell out
(sic) and his wife recognized accused Sabangan Cabato; that his wife shouted.
'Sabangan, do not kill us, we will give you the money,- that the accused was
at a distance of three meters from him; that accused Sabangan Cabato said:
"Get your money; that she (deceased) said: "Victor, we will give the money in
the piggy bank"; that his wife went down; that later the deceased said: "Victor
I do not know where you put the money; that the robbers untied him and he
went downstairs; that he got the money and gave the same to one of the
bandits; that one of the bandits said, let us go upstairs, and got (sic) the
paper bills, we want P3,000.00; that the money given to the bandits were
their saving (sic) for five years consisting of coins which were proceeds from
the sale of the bananas; that the deceased and accused Cabato went to the
kitchen; that they told the bandits that we do not have paper bills an of the
bandits struck d that they do not have P3,000.00; that one of the bandits
struck him with a pistol while the other boxed him that one of the bandits
struck the back of his head with a stone and his teeth fell out that the accused
and his companions left the house; that he noticed that wife was already
dead; that he gave the stones to the police (Exh. C, C-1, C-2); that after the
bandits left, he untied himself, that he called for held but nobody came; that
he went to his two married sons who were living uphill; that the land owned
by them is two hectares; that the two bandits wore masks. [CFI Decision, pp.
5-6,] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, the accused vehemently denied his alleged participation in
the gruesome crime and testified to the effect that:
xxx xxx xxx
...he [Cabato] knew offended party Victor Guinit and his wife since he was
young; that the home of the Guinit is one kilometer away from his house; that
he visited them before as a neighbor; that the Guinit has (sic) children named
Felix and Isco who are living at tambalang ; that he never committed the
crime of robbery with homicide attributed to him; that on January 25, 1971, he
was gathering corn in their farm in the interior at Balatan, Salug together with
his father-in-law; that he left Tambalang bound for Balatan at 6:00 A.M., the
same day; that he gathered corn and returned to Tambalang at 5:00 P.M. and
then pastured his carabao and stayed in his house the whole night; that on
January 25, 1971, in the evening, he did not know of any robbery; that on
January 26, 1971, he was informed by their neighbors of the robbery; that he
was Hold that the victims were the Guinits; that as a moslem he did not go to
the Guinit to give alms as they are prohibited; that be met the son of Guinit
named Felix Guinit in the house of Isco; that he went Isco Guinit to find out if
the report of the robbery of the parents of Isco is true; that Isco Guinit told

him that the robbers were not Identified; that the amount taken was P80.00;
that on January 29th, he was arested at the market of Tambalang;...[CFI
Decision, pp. 12-13].
xxx xxx xxx
Faced with the issue of whether or not the accused was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime-barged, the Trial Court had to first settle the
question concerning the positive Identification of Sabangan Cabato as one of
the robbers who killed the deceased Herminia Ames Guinit.
Weighing and evaluating the evidence on record, the Trial Court rendered the
following decision:
xxx xxx xxx
There exists no doubt that accused Sabangan Cabato was clearly Identified as
one of the participants in the gruesome crime that took place in the residence
of Victor Guinit on January 25, 1971. By his own admission, accused Sabangan
Cabato is well-known to the Guinit family for their houses are only one
kilometer apart. Accused Cabato visited the house of the deceased at least
two times. Besides, during the incident in question, there were two kerosene
lamps in the house of Victor Guinit which illuminated their home such that the
solicitors were clearly seen. Another factor that clinched the Identification of
the accused, Sabangan Cabato, is the fact that when the deceased, Herminia
Guinit grappled with the accused Cabato, the mask woman by the accused
Cabato fell so much so that the deceased exclaimed, "Sabangan do not kill us,
we will give you the money.
According to the evidence, accused Sabangan Cabato brought the deceased
to the kitchen in order to compel her to divulge the whereabouts of the
P3,000.00 paper bills. But the deceased denied they had any other money
except the coins inside the bamboo tube in the approximate sum of P300.00,
which led the accused, Cabato, to strike the deceased with the stone in the
head which caused cerebral hemorrhage (Exh. A) leading to her death.
From the findings of the Sanitary Inspector who examined the injury suffered
by deceased Herminia Guinit, the cerebral hemorrhage was caused by hitting
the head with a hard object presumably a stone (Exh. C, C-1, C-2) which were
(sic) found in the kitchen near the dead body.
The contention of the defense that Victor Guinit was unable to Identify any of
the perpetrators for the police blotter (Exh. 1) is devoid of merit.
According to Patrolman Mananguil and Llenes, they were informed by Victor
Guinit on January 28,1971, that accused Cabato was one of the robbers who
perpetrated the crime. The investigation was conducted in the Office of the
Chief of Police and on the 29th day of January, 1971, accused Cabato was
brought for Identification in the Municipal Building of Salug. Although accused
Cabato was together with-any persons, Victor Guinit pinpointed him as one of
the robbers.
The accused defense is alibi, claiming that he was in Barrio Balakan, in the
house of his in-laws gathering corn. But his testimony must be rejected for

lack of sufficient corroboration. Outside of his lone testimony, no other

witness was presented to substantiate his alibi. [CFI Decision, pp. 15-17.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Maintaining his innocence, accused appeals the decision assetting that his
guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. His Identification by the
prosecution witness Victor Guinit allegedly lacked definiteness and
concreteness not to mention that it was tainted with serious inconsistencies
[Brief for the Accused, p. 1]. These alleged. inconsistencies painstakingly
narated by accused.-appellant cannot overturn the finding of guilt by the Trial
Court.
Accused-appellant alleged that Victor Guinit, in his cross-examination,
declared that he recognized the accused when the place of cloth which
covered the latter's mouth fell down as a result of the grappling by the
deceased [TSN, June 8, 1972, p. 2]1. But in his examination in chief, he
testified that he recognized the, accused as early as when the robbers were
still at the recognized the accused as early as when the robbers were still at
the door [TSN, Jure 8, 1972, p, 14]. This is allegedly incredible because when
the robbers were at the door, they still had their marks on Brief for Accused,
p, 4].
A close perusal of the direct examination of Victor Guinit would show that the
Identification of Cabato was indeed made when the latter's mask fell down.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, what did you do when you noticed that after your wife opened the
door, Sabangan Cabato bumped your wife with two (2) other persons?
A The two (2) other persons passed towards me and hugged me; one of them
covered my mouth with his palm and I was hit by a piece[of stone] on my
nape and one of my teeth fell down.
Q Now what about this Sabangan Cabato, what did he do?
A He grappled with my wife.
Q And what happened while [he was.] grappling with your -wife?
A During the course of the grappling, my wife happened to scratch Sabangan
Cabato's face and the piece of cloth used as mask fell
Q Now, how far were you from your wife and Sabangan Cabato, while the two
(2) were grappling each other?
A About three (3) meters.
Q Now, from that distance, were you able to recognize and Identify the person
grappling with your wife?
A Yes.
Q How were you able to recognize him?
A Because his mask fell down. [TSN, June 8, 1971, pp. 14-15.]
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant further pointed out that Guinit, in his cross-examination,
testified that he was unconscious for 20 minutes after he was struck with a

stone by one of the robbers [TSN, June 8, 1972, P. 24). Accused alleged that if
Guinit was unconscious, it was physically impossible for him to see what
happened in the kitchen between the deceased and the accused nor to see
the falling down of the mask.
However, the Identification of the accused was made by Victor Guinit even
before the former proceeded to the kitchen with the deceased. The sequence
of events as culled from the records would reveal that when the deceased was
opening the door to feed the dog, three masked men bumped her on their
way into the house. Once inside, two of the masked men hugged Victor Guinit
while the third grappled with Herminia. During the course of the grappling, the
wife happened to scratch the face of the masked man as a result of which the
mask fen down. This was when the Identity of the accused was revealed to
the couple with the wife exclaiming, "Sabangan, do not kill us. We will give
you the money." [TSN, June 8,1972, p. 15.] At that precise time, Guinit was
only three meters away from his wife. Afterwards, Guinit proceeded to where
the money was hidden then he went back into the house to hand over the
money. Not being satisfied, the robbers demanded for paper bills which the
couple denied possessing. This was when the two robbers whose Identities
were not revealed, beat Guinit while Cabato went to the kitchen with
Herminia.
The other inconsistencies alleged by the accused to buttress his appeal
centered on minor details.
Conceding that there may have been inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution, these far from being badges of fraud and fabrication, can
justifiably be considered as a manifestation of good faith and a confirmation
of the fact that the witness was not a rehearsed witness. It is a truism that the
most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes but such honest lapses do
not necesssarily impair his intrinsic credibility. [People v. Alcantara, L-26967,
33 SCRA 812; People v. Canada, G. R. No. 63728, Sept. 15, 1986, 144 SCRA
121]. Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses due only to inaccurate
expressions or honest mistake or observations are not fatal. [People v.
Demalate, L-38960, March 30, 1982, 113 SCRA 353; People vs. Delavin, G.R.
Nos. 73762-63, Feb. 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 257]. When they lie.
Further, there was not even an iota of evidence presented by the accusedappellant ascribing to prosecution witness Guinit any motive or intent to
implicate the former as the person who killed his wife. The testimonies of both
the prosecution and the defense, in fact would picture the Guinits and the
Cabatos as neighbors on good terms. As the accused himself narrated, the
Guinits were neighbors whom he used to visit since he was young. In this
light, Guinit's testimony becomes more credible. As was held in one recent
case:
xxx xxx xxx
We have no doubt about the credibility of Rolando Blanco [the witness"). ...
The recorda do not show any improper motive on his part to falsely implicate

the appellants in this diabolic crime. In fact, Antonio Guilbao is his first cousin.
They were, all positively identified by Blanco. [People v. Ladrera, G.R. 55339,
May 21, 1987, 150 SCRA 113, 123-124.]
Accused's admissions would negate any improper motive for Guinit to testify
falsely against him. In this
Summing up, the alleged inconsistencies brought forth by the accused boil
down to the question of the eyewitness' credibility.
Time and again, it has been held that the Supreme Court respects the trial
court's findings on credibility of witnesses [People v. Palon, L-33271, Feb.
20,1984,120 SCRA 529; People v. Dava Nos. L-41642-41645, May 15, 1987,
149 SCRA 582]. The appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the
lower court for the latter is in a better position to gauge the credibility of
eyewitnesses. [People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 65152, Aug. 30,1984,131 SCRA
501] "The matter of assigning value to declarations at the witness stand is
best and most completely performed by a trial judge who, unlike appellate
magistrates can weigh such testimony in the light of the defendant's
demeanor, conduct and attitude at the time and is thereby placed in a more
competent position to discriminate between the true and the false" [People v.
Bermudez, L-30931, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 629, People v. Laganzon, L47118, May 21, 1974, 129 SCRA 333, 347].
In this case, the decision of the trial court clearly outlined the evidence for
both prosecution and defense. The trial judge had observed the demeanor of
both prosecution and defense witnesses on the witness stand and found
nothing amiss with the credibility of the prosecution witness.
Accused interposed alibi as his defense claiming that he was in Balakan
gathering corn with his wife and in-law [TSN, Dec. 13,1972, PP. 10-11].
Considering however that the Identification of the accused was positively
established, accused's defense of alibi becomes weak.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses by an accused especially if there is direct
testimony of an eyewitness Identifying the accused as the culprit. [U.S. v.
Garcia, 9 Phil. 434 (1907); People v. Coronado, G.R. No. 68932, Oct. 28, 1986,
145 SCRA 250; People v. Inot, 36790, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 322]. It is
rarely given credence because it is easily fabricated [People v. Millarpe G.R.
No. 69281, Feb. 25,1985,134 SCRA 555; People v. Petil, G.R. No. 70223, Mar.
31, 1987,149 SCRA 92]. Uncorroborated alibi, as in this case, is not credible
against positive Identification (People v. Jones, G.R. No. 61165, June 24,1985,
134 SCRA 166; People v. Canturia, G.R. No. 67598, Oct. 11, 1985,139 SCRA
280]. Alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the
accused himself without any corroboration from his wife or in-law.
xxx xxx xxx
Absence of such corroboration, in the light of the categorical statement of one
of the victims, . . . , that he saw [accused] stab Luisita Apostol because there
was a lighted post at the place of the incident ... is fatal to the defense.
[People v. dela Cruz, G.R. Nos. 71044-45, Mar. 16,1987, 148 SCRA 582, 589].

xxx xxx xxx

The Court now addresses itself to the aggravating circumstances alleged by
the plaintiff-appellee to have attended the commission of the crime.
The prosecution argues that since "the attack was by a robust man of 29
years with a huge stone against an ageing defenseless woman" (Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 15], abuse of supe prior strength should aggravate the
crime.
The records of the case are bereft of any information with respect to the
physical conditions of both the accused and the victims. Thus, abuse of
superior strength cannot be considered. This aggravating circumstance
depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is considered
whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assessing a situation of superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of by
him in the commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of the
defense available to the person attacked [People v. Cabiling, L-38091 Dec. 17,
1976, 74 SCRA 285, 303].
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that there was indeed a notorious
inequality between the ages, sizes and strength of the antagonists and that
these notorious advantages were purposely souhgt for or used by the accused
to achieve his ends.
However, the Court considers dwelling as an aggravating circumstance since
it has been proven that, indeed robbery with homicide was committed inside
the house of the offended parties. Dwelling is aggravating in robbery with
violence or intimidation because this class of robbery can be committed
without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended party's house
[People v. Mercado, L-39511, April 28,1980, 97 SCRA 232; People v. Dajaresco,
L-32701, June 19, 1984, 129 SCRA 576; People's vs. Gapasin, G.R. No. 52017,
Oct. 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 178].
Likewise, the Court considers disguise as another aggravating circumstance.
The accused, together with two others, wore masks to cover their faces. There
could have been no other purpose for this but to conceal their Identities
particularly for Cabato who was very much known to the offended parties. The
fact that the mask subsequently fell down thus paving the way for Cabato's
Identification will not render this aggravating circumstance inapplicable. In a
recent case, the Court held 'that Darwin Veloso and his five (5) companions
wore masks [which eventually fell down] to conceal their Identities during the
commission of the crime constitutes disguise" [People v. Veloso, L-32900, Feb.
25, 1982, 112 SCRA 173, 182].
Robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is
punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. However, in view of Sec. 19 (1),
Art. III of the 1987 Constitution the supreme penalty of death can no longer be
imposed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the

judgment sentenced the accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA but is MODIFIED insofar as the civil indemnity is concerned which is
hereby increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 87163. March 29, 1995.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
CASINGAL and REYNALDO HILUM, accused-appellants.

ROLANDO

Criminal Procedure; Bail; An order granting or refusing bail must contain a

summary of the evidence offered by the prosecution.A reading of the Order
dated October 6, 1987, granting the Motion for Admission to Bail, shows that
it does not contain a summary of the evidence offered by the prosecution. We
have held in People v. Nano, 205 SCRA 155 (1992) that [a]n order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence offered by the
prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own
conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to
indicate guilt and thereby cause the continued detention of the accused.
Otherwise, the accused must be released on bail.
Same; Same; The order had no recital of any evidence presented by the
prosecution nor a pronouncement that the evidence of guilt of the accused
was not strong.It is apparent that the aforementioned order was defective in
form and substance. There was no recital of any evidence presented by the
prosecution nor a pronouncement that the evidence of guilt of the accused
was not strong. Hence, the said order should not be sustained nor given any
semblance of validity.
Evidence; Requisites for Circumstantial Evidence to be Sufficient to Support a
Conviction.For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt (People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 517 [1986]).
Guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that the
requisites therefor are present: namely, (1) there must be more than one
circumstance; (2) the inferences must be based on proven facts; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the
guilt of the accused (People v. Bacus, 204 SCRA 81 [1991]).
Same; Witnesses; Testimony; The defense failed to prove that the bad
relationship between Casingal and Labuac had reached such intensity as to
cause the latter to falsely attribute a heinous crime to the former.The

defense tried to discredit the testimony of Labuac by showing ill motive on her
part. Three defense witnesses testified as to the bad relationship between
Casingal and Labuac. The evidence shows that the mother of Casingal, Bituin,
knew of the bad blood between the two but she continued to retain the
services of Labuac. It is not natural for a mother to continue the services of a
mere housemaid, who would only disobey her children, on the pretext that it
was hard to find another housemaid. The defense failed to prove that this bad
relationship between Casingal and Labuac had reached such intensity as to
cause the latter to falsely attribute a heinous crime to the former. On the part
of Hilum, there was no showing of ill motive on the part of Labuac to implicate
him.
Criminal Law; Murder; Flight of the Accused; The sudden flight of both the
appellants to Samar, the day after the discovery of Gos body was to hide
their complicity in crime. Flight evidences a guilty conscience.This Court
finds no reason for the hurried departure of Casingal to Samar for him to
continue his studies, considering that as testified by him, he enrolled only in
the month of June 1985 at the Leyte National High School in Tacloban City.
This only means that the sudden flight of both appellants to Samar, the day
after the discovery of Gos body was to hide their complicity in crime. Flight
evidences a guilty conscience (Anciro v. People, 228 SCRA 629 [1993]).
Same; Homicide; Evident Premeditation; Crime committed is only homicide for
failure to prove the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength.We, however, find that the crime committed is
only homicide and not murder for failure to prove the qualifying circumstances
of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. The prosecution
postulates that as early as April 9, 1985, there was already a decision to kill
Go, made at Ligaya Beach Resort in Batangas. However, Casingal was not
with the group that went to the resort.
Same; Same; Abuse of Superior Strength; To take advantage of superior
strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the
means available to the person attacked to defend himself.The fact that
there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that
the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no
proof of the relative strength of the aggressors andthe victim. To take
advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means available to the person attacked to defend himself
(People v. Alitao, 194 SCRA 120 [1991]). Neither can the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime be appreciated in the instant case. The evidence
does not show that nighttime was deliberately and purposely sought to
facilitate, or that it actually facilitated, the commission of the crime (People v.
Empacis, 222 SCRA 59 [1993]). [People vs. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37(1995)]

QUIASON, J.:
This is In appeal in the decision of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 68, Passim Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 63632.
finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
I
The information charging Rolando Casingal and Reynaldo Hilum of the crime
of murder reads as follows:
That on or about the 17th of April 1985, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, at night time, a circumstance
deliberately sought to insure success in the commission of the crime, armed
with a lead pipe, kitchen knife and ice pick, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation, and with abuse of superior strength did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Eduardo Go
on his chest and different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon the latter
stab wounds which directly caused his death (Rollo, p. 9).
Both accused, assisted by their counsel, pleaded not guilty to the information.
After trial, on January 10, 1989, the court a quo rendered a decision convicting
appellants for the murder of Eduardo Go. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds both accused Rolando
Casingal and Reynaldo Hilum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and
there being no other aggravating circumstances sentences both accused to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory penalty (sic)
provided for by law and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Eduardo Go
jointly and severally the following sums:
1. P30,000.00 for the death of the deceased;
2. P98,202.00 for actual damages;
3. P200,000 00 for moral and exemplary damages; and
4. cost of suit.

The bail bonds for the temporary liberty of both accused are cancelled, and
they are ordered committed to the National Penitentiary pending final
resolution of this case (Rollo, p. 46).
II
On April 16, 1985, at about 10:00 P.M., Rolando Casingal arrived home at No.
2 Katarungan St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. He was accompanied by
Reynaldo Hilum. His mother, Rosa Bituin, was not at home at that time as she
had to spend the night at Fairview, Quezon City.
Casingal asked Jesusa Labuac, a housemaid, for a cassette tape. After giving
the cassette tape to Casingal, Labuac went upstairs to sleep. Later, she was
awakened by a noise coming from the first floor which she described as
"kalabugan" and shouts of "tama na, tama na."
Labuac did not dare go downstairs because she was afraid of Casingal, who
used to manhandle her. She just slept until 5:00 A.M. Looking out of the
window, she saw the two appellants in the garage standing near the Toyota
car of Eduardo Go. The car's trunk was open and she saw a body resembling
that of Go slumped inside.
Hilum entered the house carrying some things. Going back to the yard, he
opened the gate to allow Casingal to drive the car out.
After appellants left, Labuac went downstairs and saw blood stains scattered
on the floor of the living room. She saw a blanket with blood stains in a basin
placed outside the kitchen.
Labuac cleaned the blood stains on the floor. When appellants returned,
Casingal warned Labuac not to tell anyone that she saw Go. Hilum then
washed the blood-stained blanket.
Armando Boloran, an employee of the Asian Development Bank, saw Go's car
parked near the bank's premises at Pasay City. After seeing blood dripping
from the trunk of the car, he reported his finding to a security guard of the
bank, who, in turn, contacted the Pasay City Police.
When Bituin returned home at 6:00 P.M. of April 17, she went to the room of
Casingal, which was splattered with blood stains on the walls and ceiling.

In the morning of April 18, Labuac saw in the newspapers a picture of Go's
cadaver inside the trunk of his car. After reading the newspapers, Casingal
remarked: "Malinis ang goma."
Casingal and Hilum left that day for Samar, after getting a sketch prepared by
Bituin.
Dr. Bienvenido Muoz who conducted an autopsy of Go's cadaver, testified
that Go died from acute, massive hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab
wounds. He found more than 100 stab wounds in Go's body. The possible
instrument used was a sharp pointed single bladed instrument, like a
"balisong," kitchen knife or any similar instrument.
Both appellants denied having killed Go. Their version of the incident was as
follows:
While appellants were drinking in Casingal's bedroom at around 10:00 P.M. of
April 16, 1985, they saw a big dog standing at the door of the house. They
decided to catch the dog and butcher it for their "pulutan." After catching the
dog, they brought it inside the bedroom, but it was able to get away and run
to the dining room and sala. Hilum was able to stab it several times, causing
its blood to drip on the floor.
Casingal told Labuac that if somebody would inquire about a lost dog, she
should not tell that it was butchered by them. Earlier that day, Casingal had a
heated argument with Labuac when the latter refused to follow his order. As a
result, Casingal boxed her. Labuac tried to stab Casingal with a kitchen knife
but was prevented from doing so by Hilum. Labuac even threatened "Putang
ina mo, makakaganti rin ako sa iyo at gagapang ka rin."
Casingal surmised that the reason he was sent to Samar was because Labuac
told his mother about the dog which they butchered, the drinking spree and
the quarrel which took place earlier between them.
At around 6:00 AM. of April 18, 1985, appellants took a bus to Basay, Samar.
They reached Basay at around 8:00 A.M. of April 19, 1985 and stayed in the
house of Guillermo Bacha, a relative of Casingal.
On June 6, 1985, Casingal left Samar for Tacloban to pursue his studies.
On June 13, 1985 at around 11:30 P.M., Casingal was arrested by several
policemen and constabulary soldiers. On June 14, 1985, Hilum was arrested in
Samar.

III
Appellants contend that the decision convicting them is void for the judge who
penned it, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, was not the one who heard the case.
Furthermore, the stenographic notes of the testimonies of several prosecution
witnesses were not yet transcribed when the decision was rendered.
Before the rendition of said judgment, no less than four judges heard the
case. Judge Otilio Abaya heard the prosecution witnesses; while Judges
Demetrio M. Batario, Zenaida Baltazar and Julio R. Logarta heard the defense
witnesses.
The prosecution filed a Motion to Defer Promulgation of Judgment on the
ground that the transcripts of stenographic notes of prosecution witnesses, Dr.
Bienvenido Muoz, Cpl. Leandro Abel and Jesusa Labuac (on crossexamination), had not bees transcribed by stenographer Morita San Juan, who
migrated to the United States. The defense opposed the motion for being
dilatory, but admitted the testimony of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, based upon his
Medico-Legal Certificate and the testimony of Jesusa Labuac, based on her
"Salaysay" given to Cpl. Leandro Abel. Having obtained an unfavorable
judgment, the defense reversed its position and is now questioning the
rendition of the judgment without the complete transcription of the
stenographic notes.
In a resolution dated February 26, 1990, this Court ordered the retaking of the
testimonies of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, Jesusa Labuac (on cross-examination)
and Cpl. Leandro Abel. A reading of the retaken testimonies of Dr. Bienvenido
Muoz and the cross-examination of Jesusa Labuac shows that their
testimonies do not materially differ from the Medico-Legal Certificate and
"Salaysay," respectively, admitted in evidence. But even without the retaking
of the testimony of these prosecution witnesses, there was no more
impediment for the judge to decide the case based on the Medico-Legal
Certificate and "Salaysay."
The testimony of Cpl. Leandro Abel should not affect the outcome of the case
because this dealt only with the circumstances of the arrest of appellants and
their extrajudicial confessions. The trial court ruled the confessions as illegal
for having been obtained in violation of the accused's right to counsel. Hence,
their testimony, even if presented, would not have affected the outcome of
this case.
Appellants try to capitalize on the granting of bail by Judge Logarta after the
prosecution had rested its case. They contend that this only shows that the

evidence of guilt is not strong and, therefore, there is no legal basis for Judge
Pano to convict them of the crime of murder.
A reading of the Order dated October 6, 1987, granting the Motion for
Admission to Bail, shows that it does not contain a summary of the evidence
offered by the prosecution. We have held in People v. Nano, 205 SCRA 155
(1992) that "[a]n order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of
the evidence offered by the prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge
should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so
presented is strong enough as to indicate guilt and thereby cause the
continued detention of the accused. Otherwise, the accused must be released
on bail."
It is apparent that the aforementioned order was defective in form and
substance. There was no recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution
nor a pronouncement that the evidence of guilt of the accused was not strong.
Hence, the said order should not be sustained nor given any semblance of
validity.
In People v. Nano, supra. at 161, we stated that:
Admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in
accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal principles, . . . . In
other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the
confines of procedural due process, i.e., after evaluation of the evidence
submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a
product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not circumstantial evidence is present
to warrant the conviction of appellants for the killing of the victim.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with
the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt (People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 517 [1986]). Guilt may be
established through circumstantial evidence provided that the requisites
therefor are present: namely, (1) there must be more than one circumstance;
(2) the inferences must based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused
(People v. Bacus, 204 SCRA 81 [1991]).
The following circumstances point to the guilt of both appellants:

(1) At around 10:00 P.M. of April 16, 1985, Casingal and Hilum were together
drinking inside the former's room. Hilum had been staying in the house of
Casingal for one month.
(2) On that same night, Jesusa was awakened by a "kalabugan" and shouts of
"tama na tama na" coming from the room of Casingal.
(3) At around 5:00 A.M. of April 17, 1985, Labuac saw Go's car parked inside
the garage and inside the car's trunk a body resembling that of Eddie Go
("parang kay Eddie Do").
(4) Hilum placed something inside the garbage can and burned the same with
gasoline.
(5) Casingal, with Hilum as a passenger, drove Go's car.
(6) The dining room and sala were splattered with blood. A blood-stained
blanket was soaked in a basin.
(7) Upon arrival, Casingal told Labuac not to tell the relatives of Go that the
latter went there.
(8) Hilum destroyed and burned the bed of Casingal and washed the bloodstained blanket.
(9) The body of Go inside the trunk was found at around 7:12 in the morning
of April 17, 1985 in Pasay City by Armando Boloran.
(10) Both accused left for Samar on April 18, 1985.
Appellants' claim that what they killed was a dog is not worthy of credence. It
is not usual to kill a dog inside one's bedroom. No howling was heard despite
the defense's allegation that the dog ran to the dining room and sala after it
was stabbed. Appellants failed to present the person to whom they allegedly
sold the dead dog for "pulutan" on April 17, 1985.
The defense tried to discredit the testimony of Labuac by showing ill motive
on her part. Three defense witnesses testified as to the bad relationship
between Casingal and Labuac. The evidence shows that the mother of
Casingal Bituin, knew of the bad blood between the two but she continued to
retain the services of Labuac. It is not natural for a mother to continue the
services of a mere housemaid, who would only disobey her children, on the
pretext that it was hard to find another housemaid. The defense failed to

prove that this bad relationship between Casingal and Labuac had reached
such intensity as to cause the latter to falsely attribute a heinous crime to the
former. On the part of Hilum, there was no showing of ill motive on the part of
Labuac to implicate him.
This Court finds no reason for the hurried departure of Casingal to Samar for
him to continue his studies, considering that as testified by him, he enrolled
only in the month of June 1985 at the Leyte National High School in Tacloban
City. This only means that the sudden flight of both appellants to Samar the
day after the discovery of Go's body, was to hide their complicity in crime.
Flight evidences a guilty conscience (Anciro v. People, 228 SCRA 629 [1993]).
We, however, find that the crime committed is only homicide and not murder
for failure to prove the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength.
The prosecution postulates that as early as April 9, 1985, there was already a
decision to kill Go, made at Ligaya Beach Resort in Batangas. However,
Casingal was not with the group that went to the resort.
The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se
establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there
being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. To
take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force
out of proportion to the means available to the person attacked to defend
himself (People v. Alitao, 194 SCRA 120 (1991). Neither can the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime be appreciated in the instant case. The evidence
does not show that nighttime was deliberately and purposely sought to
facilitate, or that it actually facilitated, the commission of the crime (People v.
Empacis, 222 SCRA 59 [1993]).
The award of P200,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages in the trial
court's decision is deleted. There was no evidence that the crime was
committed with the attendance of any aggravating circumstances; hence, no
exemplary damages may be awarded. On the other hand, the award of moral
damages by the trial court is unexplained and unsupported in the court's
decision.
In the absence of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed is only
homicide. The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal. There were no mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellants are
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of prison
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion

temporal as maximum. The award of P30,000.00. as indemnity to the heirs of

the victim is increased to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification
above indicated.
SO ORDERED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENATO DAEN, JR.,
a.k.a. "NONOY DAING," Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT NECESSARILY
IMPAIRED BY BLOOD RELATIONSHIP TO VICTIM. This Court has ruled often
enough that blood relationship of a witness to the victim does not by itself
impair the credibility of the former. The circumstance that Bernardino Lazo
was a cousin of the unfortunate Mario Ponce does not ipso facto make Lazo a
biased witness whose testimony must be discarded. To warrant rejection of
the testimony of a relative, it must be clearly shown that, independently of
the relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective or that
improper or evil motives had moved the witness falsely to incriminate the
appellant. Appellant Renato Daen did not do so.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INCONSISTENCIES EXPLAINED; NO SIGNIFICANCE TO POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED. The inconsistencies alleged by the defense
in respect of the testimony of Bernardino Lazo, are more apparent than real.
To the extent that inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to the
Court to relate to details of peripheral significance which do not negate or
dissolve the positive identification by Lazo of Renato Daen as the perpetrator
of the crime. The failure of Lazo specifically to state in what particular part of
the body Mario Ponce had been stabbed by appellant Daen, did not render
Lazos testimony either incredible or doubtful. Time and again this Court has
acknowledged that different human minds react differently when confronted
with a sudden and shocking event. A witness may sometimes ignore certain
details which at the time appeared to him as insignificant but which, to
another person under the same circumstances, would seem noteworthy. The
stabbing to death of Mario Ponce had occurred on 9 September 1990, about
two (2) years before the trial of the case began in 1992. Considering the lapse
of time between the occurrence of the incident and the hearings on the
criminal case, one can hardly fault the witnesses if they are unable to narrate
the details of the occurrence with absolute accuracy and completeness. A
witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection
down to insignificant and minute details. In People v. Santito, Jr., G.R. No.
91628, 201 SCRA 87 [1991] the Court had noted that: "Testimonial

discrepancies could be caused by the natural fickleness of memory which

tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, credibility as they erase any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony. It would have been more suspicious if the
witness had been able to pinpoint with clarity or describe with precision the
exact sequence of events. The most candid witness oftentimes makes
mistakes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair his intrinsic
credibility."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; REQUISITES;
NOT COMPLETE IN CASE AT BAR. The Court, is unable to accept the trial
courts holding that the killing was attended by treachery. Treachery as a
qualifying circumstance is properly found when two (2) conditions concur: (1)
the employment of means, methods, or manner of execution which would
ensure the offenders safety from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of
the offended party, that is, that the latter had no opportunity to defend
himself or react against the offender; and (2) that such means, methods, or
manner of execution had been deliberately or consciously chosen. In the case
at bar, the prosecution did not, to the mind of the Court, establish the
presence of the second condition. Although the testimony of prosecution
witness Lazo tended to show that the victim had been surrounded by
appellant Renato Daen and five (5) others, one of whom had pinned down the
victims hands, there was no showing that such manner of execution had been
deliberately chosen, designed and brought about. Neither can it be contended
that the attack upon Mario Ponce was sudden and unexpected, without the
slightest provocation on his part. The evidence showed that the stabbing
incident had been immediately preceded by confrontation between the victim
on the one hand and the appellants group on the other, and that the victim
had in fact suddenly shoved back one of the group with such force that the
latter fell to the ground. It appears to the Court that, all the circumstances
considered, the stabbing was probably the result more of a sudden impulse of
the moment generated by the altercation during the confrontation, than the
outcome of conscious design or choice on the part of appellant Daen and his
group. We believe that the prosecution failed to establish with moral certainty
the presence of treachery in this case. The well-settled rule is that
circumstance which would qualify a killing to murder must be proved as
indubitably as the killing itself.
4. ID.; ID.; TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH; PRESENT IN CASE AT
BAR. We find that the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of
superior strength, as alleged in the Information, attended the killing of Ponce.
Where it is shown that the attack had not been made with alevosia, the
number of appellants group and the concertedness of their acts vis-a-vis a
defenseless person may constitute abuse of superior force. In the present
case, appellant Daen undeniably took advantage of the presence of members

of his group, which presence facilitated the stabbing of Mario Ponce.

Appellants group numbered more than five" (5) male persons, two (2) of
whom were armed with bladed weapons: the victim Mario Ponce was
unarmed, surrounded by this group and his hands were held on to by at least
one member of the same group as Daen lunged at him with a knife. The
slaying of Mario Ponce must still be characterized as murder.
5. ID.; MURDER; PROPER PENALTY HEREIN. Under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. There being no generic aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, that penalty in its medium period, that is, reclusion perpetua, is
properly imposable.
6. ID.; ID.; PROPER INDEMNITY HEREIN. The indemnity for death to which
the heirs of Mario Ponce, Jr. are entitled, should be raised to P50,000.00 in
consonance with recent jurisprudence of the Court. The award by the trial
court of P30,000.00 as actual damages should, upon the other hand, be
reduced to P3,500.00 which is the only amount that was evidenced by a
receipt. The award of moral damages is subsumed in the civil indemnity for
death; to the extent, however, that the award exceeds P50,000.00, it is bereft
of sufficient factual basis.
FELICIANO, J.:
Renato Daen, Jr., Raul Henson, Roland Henson, Francisco Suyat, Noning Suyat
and Nonoy Onse were charged with the murder of Mario Ponce, Jr. in an
Information which read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 9th day of September, 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill, with treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of MARIO PONCE, JR y
LAZO, by then and there, stabbing the latter on the different parts of his body
with the use of bladed weapons, thereby inflicting upon said MARIO PONCE JR
y LAZO, serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
said victim, in such amount as maybe awarded to them under the provisions
of the Civil Code." 1
Only Renato Daen, Jr. and Raul Henson were tried, as the rest of the group
charged remained at large. After the prosecution had rested its case, counsel
for accused Raul Henson filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which the trial court
granted in an order dated 8 February 1993 dismissing the Information as

against Raul Henson. In due time, the trial court found the remaining accused
Renato Daen Jr. guilty of the crime charged, sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
P30,000.00 as actual damages plus P100,000.00 as moral damages. 2
From the evidence submitted to it, the trial court found that in the afternoon
of 9 September 1990, the victim Mario Ponce, Jr. complained to Virgilio Yap,
Barangay Captain of Escopa I, Project 4, Quezon City, that his (Marios) rooster
had been stolen. Ponce pointed to "Nonoy Daing," Nonoy Onse, Francisco
Suyat and Noning Suyat as the persons who had probably taken his rooster.
These four (4) persons were then attending a birthday party.
The four (4) pointed out by Ponce were called by Barangay Captain Yap for a
conference. At this meeting, which was held near Ponces residence, Ponce
was unable to pinpoint who among the group of four (4) had actually taken his
rooster. No one in the group admitted having taken the bird. The meeting
ended at around 5:00 p.m.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The group of Renato Daen returned to the place where the party (basically a
drinking session) was going on, a place about ten (10) houses away from the
residence of Mario Ponce. The trial court summarized the succeeding events
in the following manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"At around 9:00 in the evening, Nonoy and Noning Suyat left the party
uttering: Bakit sa akin ibinibintang ang nawawalang manok? Nakakainis
yung taong yon. This was the version of accused Nonoy Daing whose real
name is Renato Daing [should be Daen].
According, however, to Lamberto Vergara, not an accused here but also in the
aforementioned group of male persons, the accused Noning Suyat and Nonoy
Onse were the ones who left the drinking session at around 9:00 oclock in the
evening.
As the two [did not return] for quite a while, their friends, namely, Accused
Renato [Daen] and Ronald Henson followed them to the house of Mario Ponce.
They were in turn followed by Lamberto Vergara and Roberto Nabual to the
same place, that is, in front of the 2-storey residence where Mario Ponce lives.
There an altercation ensued and someone in the group of those who went to
the Ponce house from their drinking session at the birthday party stabbed
Mario Ponce. Mario sustained two frontal stab wounds at the right costal
region. The neighbors helped in bringing Mario to the hospital in a tricycle but
he expired early next morning." 3

According to the Medico Legal Report submitted by the prosecution, the

victim, Mario Ponce, Jr., sustained two (2) frontal stab wounds at the right
costal region. 4
The trial court was thus presented with the problem of determining who,
among the several persons temporarily congregated in front of the house of
Mario Ponce, Jr., had in fact stabbed Ponce to death.chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual law library
The prosecution presented Remily Ponce, sister of the deceased victim, and
she testified that she was at the balcony of their house with her cousin
Bernardino Lazo when she saw the group of Renato Daen having a heated
argument with her brother right in front of their house and just below the
balcony. The argument erupted into a commotion, but she did not see who
had stabbed her brother.
Prosecution witness Bernardino Lazo, a cousin of the victim, was more
specific. Lazo testified that he was at the balcony of the second floor of their
house and saw the whole incident. He declared that he saw Noning Suyat and
Mario Ponce talking and drinking with each other just outside the Ponce
house, when Ronald Henson soon followed by other members of Renato
Daens group, arrived. A commotion ensued soon after the groups arrival.
Renato Daen and five (5) other persons surrounded the victim and someone
held the latters hands. Renato Daen then stabbed Mario Ponce twice with his
left hand. Witness Lazo also testified that among the group, he saw two (2)
persons armed with knives, to wit: Renato Daen and Nonoy Onse.
Renato Daen denied that he had stabbed the victim. Daen claimed that
Noning Suyat, and not he (Renato Daen) had knifed the victim in the stomach.
The testimony of the defense witnesses was summed up by the trial court in
its decision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"According to herein accused Renato Nonoy Daing [should be Daen], he,
Nonoy Onse and Ronald Henson followed Nonoy [should be Noning] Suyat to
the house of Mario Ponce. There they saw Suyat and Mario arguing. Mario
then pushed Suyat so violently that Suyat fell to the ground. Suyat then drew
his knife and lunged at Marios stomach. After that, Suyat told the three
(Daing, Henson and Onse) not to tell anyone and threatened them if they do
not follow his advice.
Mr. Lamberto Vergara, another defense witness, testified that [Noning] Suyat
together with Nonoy Onse left the party that night. When they did not return,

Renato [Daen] and Ronald Henson were asked by the celebrant to follow the
two. Vergara followed suit.
Mr. Vergara saw Suyat and Mario talking while Henson was standing nearby
and [Daen] and Onse were conversing with each other. Then at a certain point
of their conversation, Mario said to Ronald Henson: Putang ina mo. Ronald
went towards Mario but Suyat stopped Ronald Henson. It was then that Mario
pushed Suyat who fell down and hit a wall. When Suyat stood up he pulled out
a knife and stabbed Mario.
According to Mr. Vergara, the victim was stabbed only once by Suyat only. He
saw this when he turned his head as he was then leaving the place when
Mario said: Putang ina mo.
A third defense witness Robert Nabual, testified that it was Suyat, Ronald
Henson and Nonoy Daing who returned to the house of Mario Ponce from
where the birthday party was being held. He followed the trio. When Mr.
Nabual arrived at Mario Ponces house he saw [Noning] Suyat and Mario Ponce
having an argument. Then Mario pushed [Noning] Suyat who fell on the
ground. [Noning] then stood up and stabbed Mario. Nonoy Daing was there
during that whole time at a store buying cigarette.
After [Noning] Suyat has stabbed Mario, Rodel Henson also stabbed Mario who
fell down. Thereafter, according to Mr. Nabual, Suyat and Henson ran away.
These two accused like their co-accused, with the exception of Raul Henson (a
brother of Rodel) and Renato [Daen] having remained at-large to date.
According to Mr. Nabual, Accused Renato [Daen] was also shocked by the
incident so he had to help [Daen] home after the body of Mario was taken by
a tricycle to hospital." 5
Renato Daen, Jr. is now before this Court appealing his conviction, claiming
that the court a quo had erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) in convicting [him] of the crime of murder on the sole basis of the biased
testimony of prosecution witness Bernardino Lazo, cousin of the deceased
Mario Ponce, Jr.; and
(2) in convicting [him] of the crime of murder because neither treachery nor
evident premeditation had attended the killing, contrary to the conclusion of
the trial court.
In respect of the first supposed error, we note that the trial court had explicitly
appraised the conflicting testimony of the prosecution and defense witnesses

and had carefully concluded that prosecution witness Mr. Bernardino Lazo was
more credible than the defense witnesses:chanrobles law library : red
"After a considerable thought and reflection on the conflicting evidence the
court is of the opinion that the testimony of Mr. Bernardino Lazo is more
credible than that of Renato [Daen], Lamberto Vergara, and Renato Nabual.
First. The testimonies of the three defense witnesses are contradictory to each
other on the vital fact of who returned to the house of Mario Ponce to confront
him. Accused [Daen] said that it was Suyat alone who left the party. It was
only much later when he, Ronald Henson and Onse followed Suyat.
But according to Mr. Vergara, it was Suyat and Onse who left the party and it
was only much later, on request of the celebrant, that [Daen] and Henson
followed suit.
But then, according to Mr. Nabual, it was Suyat, Henson, and [Daen] who left
the party and then Mr. Nabual followed them to the Ponce house.
Second. According to [Daen], Suyat stabbed Mario only once. He saw no one
else who stabbed Mario. This was also the testimony of Vergara.
Yet, the medical findings show that Mario was stabbed twice.
Mr. Nabual testified that it was Suyat and Ronald Henson who stabbed Mario
once each and then the duo ran away.
There is here again a contradiction about a vital portion of the incident at bar
among the defense witnesses.
Third. According to Mr. Nabual, there were two persons who stabbed Mario,
namely, Suyat followed by Ronald Henson. But according to Mr. Vergara and
accused [Daen] it was only Suyat who stabbed Mario. This is once more a
major contradiction.
From the foregoing major inconsistencies of the defense witnesses thus easily
gleans a great motive to move [Daen] away from the case.
Yet, it is quite clear that [Daen] was one of those who, after drinking a good
amount of wine had returned to the house of Mario with several others
evidently to confront Mario for suspecting their group of stealing his rooster.
The excuse offered that [Daen] merely wanted to fetch Suyat back to the
party is a limp one. For, admittedly [Daen] never even bothered to bring
Suyat back to the party as, according to [Daen], he merely watched from a

store while Mario and Suyat were arguing. And this excuse is even
unbelievable because [Daen] admitted on cross that he was just right beside
Marios side.
The testimony of Lazo, although a cousin of the victim is the more credible
one. It was delivered frankly and naturally. Mr. Lazos lack of ulterior motive is
disclosed quite clearly by the fact that he frankly relieved accused Raul
Henson of any criminal responsibility although Raul is a brother of accused
Ronald Henson who according to defense witness Nabual stabbed Mario." 6
The defense has presented to this Court neither factual circumstances nor
argument which would compel it to overturn the conclusions reached above
by the trial court.
This Court has ruled often enough that blood relationship of a witness to the
victim does not by itself impair the credibility of the former. 7 The
circumstance that Bernardino Lazo was a cousin of the unfortunate Mario
Ponce does not ipso facto make Lazo a biased witness whose testimony must
be discarded. To warrant rejection of the testimony of a relative, it must be
clearly shown that, independently of the relationship, the testimony was
inherently improbable or defective or that improper or evil motives had
moved the witness falsely to incriminate the appellant. 8 Appellant Renato
Daen did not do so.
Instead, appellant Renato Daen pointed to certain claimed inconsistencies in
the testimony of prosecution witness Bernardino Lazo which, the defense
contended, rendered Lazos testimony of doubtful veracity. Firstly, Lazo
testified that he was alone on the balcony of his home when he witnessed the
stabbing of Mario Ponce, while Remily Ponce had testified that she was also on
the same balcony with Lazo at that time. Secondly, Lazo stated that when he
spoke to the victim, the latter was already unable to talk. On crossexamination, however, Lazo said that the victim was able to say "Nasaksak
ako." Further, appellant contended that Lazo, who had testified that he had
witnessed the whole incident, did not know in what specific part of the body
Ponce had sustained the stab wounds.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
We have examined the record of this case, and we consider that the
inconsistencies alleged by the defense in respect of the testimony of
Bernardino Lazo, are more apparent than real. Further, to the extent that
inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to the Court to relate to
details of peripheral significant which do not negate or dissolve the positive
identification by Lazo of Renato Daen as the perpetrator of the crime.

Thus, while witness Lazo had stated that he was alone on the balcony when
he observed the commotion and the stabbing below, and while witness Remily
Ponce had declared that she was with her cousin Lazo on the balcony at that
time, neither statement put in question the presence of eye-witness
Bernardino Lazo at the critical time and place. Both witnesses agreed and in
fact confirmed that Lazo was indeed on the balcony of the Ponce house at the
time of the stabbing. At most, the presence of Remily Ponce might perhaps
have been questioned by appellant Daen; but this would not offer any real
comfort to appellant since Remily could not and did not testify as to the
identity of the attacker who had stabbed her brother.
In respect of the second supposed inconsistency, Bernardino Lazo had
testified that immediately after being stabbed, Mario Ponce went up the house
and told his stunned relatives that he had been stabbed. When, however,
Lazo spoke to the victim, Mario was no longer able to respond. 9 Remily Ponce
corroborated Lazos testimony on this point. Remily stated that after the
commotion in front of their house had erupted, her brother struggled upstairs,
told their family that he had been stabbed, and then collapsed on the floor. 10
The failure of Lazo specifically to state in what particular part of the body
Mario Ponce had been stabbed by appellant Daen, did not render Lazos
testimony either incredible or doubtful. Time and again this court has
acknowledged that different human minds react differently when confronted
with a sudden and shocking event. A witness may sometimes ignore certain
details which at the time appeared to him as insignificant but which, to
another
person
under
the
same
circumstances,
would
seem
noteworthy.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The stabbing to death of Mario Ponce had occurred on 9 September 1990,
about two (2) years before the trial of the case began in 1992. Considering
the lapse of time between the occurrence of the incident and the hearings on
the criminal case, one can hardly fault the witnesses if they are unable to
narrate the details of the occurrence with absolute accuracy and
completeness. A witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with
perfect recollection down to insignificant and minute details. 11 In People v.
Santito, Jr., 12 the court had noted that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Testimonial discrepancies could be caused by the natural fickleness of
memory which tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, credibility as they
erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. It would have been more
suspicious if the witness had been able to pinpoint with clarity or describe
with precision the exact sequence of events. The most candid witness
oftentimes makes mistakes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair
his intrinsic credibility." 13

The Court, however, is unable to accept the trial courts holding that the
killing was attended by treachery. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance is
properly found when two (2) conditions concur: (1) the employment of means,
methods, or manner of execution which would ensure the offenders safety
from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the offended party, that is,
that the latter had no opportunity to defend himself or react against the
offender; and (2) that such means, methods, or manner of execution had been
deliberately or consciously chosen. 14 In the case at bar, the prosecution did
not, to the mind of the Court, establish the presence of the second condition.
Although the testimony of prosecution witness Lazo tended to show that the
victim had been surrounded by appellant Renato Daen and five (5) others, one
of whom had pinned down the victims hands, there was no showing that such
manner of execution had been deliberately chosen, designed and brought
about. Neither can it be contended that the attack upon Mario Ponce was
sudden and unexpected, without the slightest provocation on his part. The
evidence showed that the stabbing incident had been immediately preceded
by confrontation between the victim on the one hand and the appellants
group on the other, and that the victim had in fact suddenly shoved back one
of the group with such force that the latter fell to the ground. It appears to the
Court that, all the circumstances considered, the stabbing was probably the
result more of a sudden impulse of the moment generated by the altercation
during the confrontation, than the outcome of conscious design or choice on
the part of appellant Daen and his group. We believe that the prosecution
failed to establish with moral certainty the presence of treachery in this case.
The well-settled rule is that any circumstance which would qualify a killing to
murder must be proved as indubitably as the killing itself. 15
Although the Information had charged evident premeditation on the part of
the accused, the trial court did not find the presence of that circumstance.
Indeed, the elements of this modifying circumstance were clearly wanting in
the instant case.
Nevertheless, we find that the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of
superior strength, as alleged in the Information, attended the killing of Ponce.
Where it is shown that the attack had not been made with alevosia, the
number of appellants group and the concertedness of their acts vis-a-vis a
defenseless person may constitute abuse of superior force. 16 In the present
case, appellant Daen undeniably took advantage of the presence of members
of his group, which presence facilitated the stabbing of Mario Ponce.
Appellants group numbered more than five (5) male persons, two (2) of
whom were armed with bladed weapons: the victim Mario Ponce was
unarmed, surrounded by this group and his hands were held on to by at least
one member of the same group as Daen lunged at him with a knife. The

slaying of Mario Ponce must still be characterized as murder.chanrobles virtual

lawlibrary
Under Article 248 of the Revised penal Code, 17 murder is punishable by
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. There being no generic
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, that penalty in its medium period,
that is, reclusion perpetua, is properly imposable.
Turning to the civil aspect of the crime, the indemnity for death to which the
heirs of Mario Ponce, Jr. are entitled, should be raised to P50,000.00 in
consonance with recent jurisprudence of the court. The award by the trial
court of P30,000.00 as actual damages should, upon the other hand, be
reduced to P3,500.00 which is the only amount that was evidenced by a
receipt. 18 The award of moral damages is subsumed in the civil indemnity for
death; to the extent, however, that the award exceeds P50,000.00, it is bereft
of sufficient factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding Renato Daen, Jr. guilty of
the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Mario
Ponce the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity for death; and another
amount of P3,500.00 in concept of actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 115686. December 2, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO
MALABAGO y VILLAESPIN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dipolog City, Branch 10 which imposed the penalty of death on accusedappellant, Pedro Malabago y Villaespin, in Criminal Case No. 6598, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Pedro Malabago guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE as defined and penalized under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. With reluctance and a heavy heart
therefore, inspired by the personal feeling and view of the undersigned with
respect to the wisdom of the penalty of death for any crime, the court finds
itself with no other alternative but to impose the penalty provided for by the
express mandate of the law which is now restored under Republic Act No.
7659. The accused (Pedro Malabago y Villaespin) is hereby sentenced to
DEATH for the terrible crime he has committed and, to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the sum of P50,000.00 conformable to the recent jurisprudence
on the matter (People v. Sison, 189 SCRA 643).
Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED
DIPOLOG CITY, Philippines, this 10th day of May 1994.
(Sgd.)
WILFREDO C. OCHOTORENA
Acting Presiding Judge1
In an information dated January 7, 1994, accused-appellant was charged with
the crime of parricide committed as follows:
That in the evening, on or about the 5th day of January 1994, at Barangay
Gulayon, Dipolog City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable
cause, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hack and strike
with a bolo one Letecia R. Malabago, his lawfully wedded wife, hitting the
latter on her face and neck, which caused the victims instantaneous death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim, in the amount of
P30,000.00 as death indemnity, and also moral and exemplary damages in
the amounts to be established during the trial.2
The following facts were established by the prosecution: On January 5, 1994,
at about 7:00 in the evening, Guillerma Romano, appellants mother-in-law,
was tending her sari-sari store in Barangay Gulayon, Dipolog City. The Store
and its premises were lit by a kerosene lamp and the fluorescent light from
the adjoining house of Dodong Opulentisima. Guillermas daugther. Letecia
Romano Malabago, arrived and sat on one of the benches outside the store.
She had just come from selling some jackfruit. Allandel, Letecias fourteenyear old son, appeared and sat on the bench facing her. He listened to his
mother and grandmother who were conversing. A few minutes later, accusedappellant came and interrupted his wife and mother-in-laws conversation. He
and Letecia began arguing. Guillerma turned away but heard the couples
altercation over money and appellants jealousy of someone. Suddenly,
Guillerma heard a loud sound and she thought that appellant slapped Letecia
on the face. Letecia cried out Agay! Looking out the store window,
Guillerma saw Letecias face bloodied with a slash along her right ear.
Appellant was facing Letecia, and with a bolo in his hand, struck her again,
this time hitting the lower left side of her face, from the lips down to the neck.
Letecia fell to the ground. Guillerma rushed towards her daughter and
shouted for help.3 She was lifeless.
Appellant fled to Dodong Opulentisimas house. Dodong Opulentisima later
called the police. They came, fetched appellant and brought him to their
station.4 On investigation, the police found a bloodied bolo in the pineapple
plantation near appellants house.5
Letecia was found to have died of cardio-respiratory arrest; shock
hemorrhage, massive; hack wounds, multiple.6
Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime. He claimed that on January 5,
1994, he was in the poblacion of Dipolog City. He alleged he did not know
who hacked his wife and had no means of finding the culprit because he was

placed in jail after her killing.7 He claimed through his son, Allandel, as
defense witness, that Guillerma testified against him because she was against
their marriage. He was then jobless.8 The proccedings show that Guillerma,
together with her husband, catalino, and appellants and Letecias three
children namely, Allandel, Aljun and Alex later signed as affidavit of
desistance and moved to dismiss the case against him.9
The trial court upheld the prosecution and on May 10, 1994 convicted
accused-appellant of parricide and sentenced him to death pursuant to
republic Act No. 7659.
Before us appellant assigns the following errors:
I
The sentence of death imposed by the trial court on the appellant is an
unconstitutional penalty for being violative of fundamental human rights and
is, thus, null and void.
II
The judgment of conviction is null and void for having been rendered by a trial
court ousted of jurisdiction because of the grave violations of the appellants
rights to due process committed by no less that the presiding judge himself as
shown by his conduct at trial.
III
Assuming without conceding that the trial court was not ousted of jurisdiction,
it nevertheless gravely erred in convicting the appellant of parricide
considering that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt as demonstrated by:
(a)
The prosecutions failure to prove the legitimate marital relation
between appellant and the victim;
(b)
The prosecutions failure to prove the fact and cause of death;
(c)
The prosecutions failure to establish the chain of custody over the
alleged instrument of death;
IV
Assuming without conceding that the trial court was not ousted of jurisdiction,
it nevertheless gravely erred in convicting the appellant when it arbitrarily
and selectively gave full weight and credence only to Guillerma Romanos
inculpatory but inconsistent and inadmissible testimony and disregarded her
exculpatory statements.
V
Assuming without conceding that the trial court was not ousted of jurisdiction,
it nevertheless gravely erred in peremptorily dismissing the appellants
defense of alibi as inherently weak.
VI
Assuming without conceding that the finding of parricide is correct, the trial
court nevertheless gravely erred in appreciating the existence of treachery as
an aggravating and qualifying circumstance.
VII

Assuming without conceding that the finding of parricide is correct, the trial
court nevertheless gravely erred in refusing to consider the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the appellant, despite the
prosecutions failure to contradict and challenge the appellants claim of this
mitigator.
VIII
Assuming without conceding that it was not ousted of jurisdiction, the trial
court nevertheless gravely erred in awarding civil indemnity arising from the
death of Letecia Malabago considering that the prosecution failed to prove
said death as a fact during trial.10
We affirm the trial courts findings with modification
The crime of parricide defined in Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act 765911 states:
Art. 246. Parricide. -- Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants,
or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed
by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other
descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.12
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the
victim.13 In the case at parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage
certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate. However, oral evidence
of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not
objected to.14
Guillerma Romano testified on direct examination that:
PROSECUTOR MAH:
Q On January 5, 1994 at about 7:00 in the evening, can you still recall where
you were at that particular time?
A I was in my store.
Q While you were in your store at that particular time and date, can you still
remember if there was an unusual incident [that] happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please tell us what that incident was about?
A At that moment, I heard a loud sound (paka).
Q Did you investigate what that loud sound [was] all about?
A I did not mind because they are husband and wife.
Q What was that loud sound about?
A I thought it was a slap on the face but she was nit by a bolo.
Q What was that incident about?
A There was an altercation between husband and wife.
Q After the altercation between husband and wife, what happened?

A I saw the hacking two times and I saw blood.

Q Who was hacked?
A My daugther Letecia was hacked by Pedro Malabago.
xxx xxx
x x x.15
Guillerma Romanos testimony on direct examination affirmed the narration in
her affidavit taken the day after the incident. The affidavit was adopted by
the prosecution as its Exhibit A and it reads in part:
Q What is your purpose in coming to the Office of the Investigator of the
Dipolog City Police?
A To file a complaint against Pedro malabago y Villaespin, 42 years old and a
resident of Gulayon, Dipolog City,
Q What is your complaint against said person?
A He hacked to death my daughter who is his wife with the use of a bolo.
Q How many times did the suspect hack his wife, Letecia R. Malabago?
A Twice, hitting the victim on the right side of her face and on the neck
resulting in her instanteneous death.
xxx xxx
x x x.16
Appellant did not object to Guillermas testimony and sworn statement that he
and Letecia were husband and wife.17 Appellant himelf corroborated
Guillermas testimony, to wit:
COURT: (to the witness)
Q You are Pedro Malabago, the accused herein?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is your relation to the late Letecia Romano Malabago?
A She was my wife, your honor.
Q You mean to say you were legally married to Letecia Romano Malabago?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who solemnized the marriages?
A Mayor Barinaga, your honor.
Q When?
A In the year 1970, your honor.
Q Who were the witnesses, could you still remember?
A I can only remember Sergio Vidal, your honor.
Q But then you were legally married by civil ceremony officiated by Mayor
Barinaga?
A Yes, your honor.
xxx
xxx
x x x.18
The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased is an
admission against his penal interest. It is a confirmation of the semper
praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husbands and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.19
Appellant alleges that the prosecution failed to establish the fact and cause of
Letecias death because Dr. Dominador Celemin, the City Health Officer who

signed the death certificate, did not personally examine her cadaver.20 It is
content that the consent of the death certificate issued by Dr. Celemin is
hearsay.21
Letecias death certificate is not the only proof of her death. Guillerma, in her
affidavit, stated that her daughter died as a result of the hack wounds.22
Called also as a hostile witness to the defense, she testified:
COURT
Q At the time, you actually saw the accused hacked (sic) the bolo to (sic)
your daughter?
A Yes, you honor.
Q In fact, you witnessed the blood oozing on the face of your daughter?
A Yes, your honor.
Q In other words, you actually saw the accused herein hack the bolo to your
daughter, am I right?
A Yes, your honor.
Q And the cause of death of your daughter was hacking of Pedro Malabago?
A Yes, your honor.
Q I have observed a while ago while you were testifying, you were crying.
Why?
A Because of worries that Pedro had done to my daughter.
Q
You mean to say, you cried because your daughter was killed by her
husband?
A Yes, your honor.
xxx xxx
x x x.23
Appellant affirmed on cross examination that his wife died as a result of the
hacking, thus:
FISCAL MAH: (to the witness)
Q Mr. Witness, you know Letecia Malabago because she was your wife?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where is she now?
A She is already buried in the cemetery.
Q You mean to say she is already dead?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the cause of her death?
A She was hacked, sir.
Q Hacked by whom?
A I do not know who hacked my wife.
xxx xxx
x x x.24
Accused-appellant also claims that the trial court showed partiality to the
prosecution by unduly interfering in the presentation of evidence. By asking
questions, the judge allegedly elicited prejudicial admissions from witnesses
without affording appellants counsel the right to examine them on their
answers to the court, in violation of appellants constitutional right to due
process and right against self-incrimination.25

The records disclosed that the questions the trial judge propounded were
made mainly to clarify what the prosecution and defense witnesses had
testified on direct and cross examinations. The essential elements of the
crime of parricide like appellantss marriage to Letecia, the cause of Letecias
death and appellants participation therein were facts already established by
the prosecution in its evidence in chief. Using his discretion, the trial judge
questioned the witnesses to clear up obscurities in their testimonies ans
sworn statements.26 The wise use of such discretion cannot be assailed as a
specie of bias.
A judge is called upon to ascertain the truth of the controversy before him.
He may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and
prevent unnecessary waste of time27 and clarify obscure and incomplete
details after the witness had given direct testimony.28 After all, the judge is
the arbiter and he ought to satisfy himself as to the respective merits of the
claims of both parties in accord with the stringent demands of due process.29
In the case at bar, the trial judge had strong reasons to question the material
witnesses who executed affidavits of desistance contradicting their previous
stance. If to the mind of the parties, the trial judge was unduly interfering in
their presentation of evidence, they were free to manifest their objection.
They were likewise free to ask redirect questions from their witness after
interrogation by the trial court. In the instant case, however, they never
manifested that the questions of the trial judge had traversed the allowable
parameters. Even assuming that some of the questions were incriminating,
we cannot hold that the witnesses were compelled to incriminate themselves.
The records show they answered the questions of the court freely and
voluntarily and without any objection from their respective counsels.
The prosecution evidence is based solely on the testimony of Guillerma
Romano.
Nonetheless, her testimony is clear, spontaneous and
straightforward. Her inconsistencies are minor and inconsequential and they
are not incongruous with her credibility.30 Her testimony was not eroded even
when she was presented by the defense as a hostile witness. She admittedly
signed the affidavit of desistance for the sake of her three grandchildren and
this is understandable in light of the circumstances of the case. Allandel and
his brothers pled that she withdraw the complaint because they did not want
their father to be in prison.31 Deep in her heart, however, Guillerma wanted
justice for her daughter and thus, she testified for the prosecution.32 The fact
that she objected to her daughters marriage to appellant is too flimsy a
reason to impel her to testify against the father of her grandchildren.
We agree with the trial court that appellants defense of alibi is weak and
unconvincing. Appellant was positively identified as the one who hacked his
wife to death. Moreover, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime on that fateful evening. The poblacion of Dipolog City is
merely four kilometers from Barangay Gulayon and this distance may be
traversed within a few minutes by motorized vehicle.33

Be that as it may, we find that the trial court erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of treachery. For treachery to be present, two
conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution which
would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive and rataliatory acts of
the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the
means, method and manner of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted by the offender.34 It is true that appellant hacked his wife who was
then unarmed and had no opportunity to defend herself. However, the
evidence does not show that appellant deliberately and consciously employed
this particular mode of attack to ensure the killing of the victim. The
unembroidered facts reveal that appellant hacked his wife in the midst of a
sudden, unscripted heated argument. This precludes the idea that appellant
priorly planned to kill his wife. Indeed, appellant was not carrying his bolo at
that time. The bolo was hanging in its usual place on one of the posts of the
sari-sari store.35 Treachery, to be appreciated, must spark an attack that is
deliberate, sudden and unexpected not where it is prefaced by an unforeseen
heated argument with the victim standing face to face with her assailant.36
The trial court also erred in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. In answer to questions by the trial court, appellant
declared:
COURT: (to the witness)
xxx xxx
xxx
Q Do you have suspects as to the alleged killers of your wife?
A I have no suspect, your honor.
Q Because you denied killing your wife, you did not surrender to the police
authorities?
A I surrendered because I was accused of killing my wife.
Q Immediately after the incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was it placed in the police blotter that you surrendered?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you give the name of the person or police officer to whom you
surrendered?
A I forgot the name, your honor.
Q Are you telling the truth?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx
x x x.37
Appellant testified that he voluntarily surrendered to the police when they
fetched him at Dodong Opulentisimas house. The prosecution did not dispute
appellants claim of voluntarily surrender. Guillerma herself testified that
without any resistance, appellant went with the police when they fetched him
at Dodongs house.38 Indeed, appellant did not escape after Dodong
Opulentisima called the police. Instead, he voluntarily placed himself at the
disposal of the police authorities.

In the absence of an aggravating circumstance39 and the presence of a

mitigating circumstance the penalty imposable to appellant is reclusion
perpetua.40 Considering the death of the victim, a civil indemnity of
P50,000.00 must be awarded to her heirs.
In light of the above disquisitions, the Court need not resolve the alleged
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, as amended. Nonetheless, the Court
expresses its appreciation to the scholarly arguments of our amici curiae,
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on the
constitutional aspects of R.A. No. 7659, as amended. Death not being the lis
mota of the instant case, the Court has to await for more appropriate case to
pass upon the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, as amended.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is affirmed with the
modification that the penalty of death imposed by the Regional Trial court of
Dipolog City, Branch 10 on accused-appellant Pedro Malabago y Villaespin in
Criminal Case No. 6598 is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NESTOR
ESCANDOR and FIDEL ESCANDOR, accused-appellants.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
NESTOR ESCANDOR and FIDEL ESCANDOR appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Masbate[1] finding them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of
TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS of prision mayor as
minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and
RECLUSION PERPETUA, respectively, and to pay jointly and severally the
heirs of the victim Sabino Huelva the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00), and to pay the costs.[2] They impute to the trial court four
alleged errors, substantially reduced as follows: (1) insufficiency of the
prosecutions evidence to sustain conviction; (2) disregard of appellants
respective defenses of self-defense and alibi; (3) failure to appreciate the
testimony of Sgt. Arturo Aparejado; and (4) misappreciation of material facts.
The facts as borne out by the evidence on record and succinctly summarized
in the appellees brief, are as follows:
On 02 December 1988, at about 7:00 oclock in the morning (TSN, 27 June
1989, p. 1), the victim Sabino Huelva y Maglente and his three (3) children
Glenn, Madelyn and Gil were walking along a trail in Cagara, Baleno, Masbate
from their house towards their farm located in Sitio Banayong, Baleno,
Masbate (Id., pp. 1-3). Gil and Madelyn were walking ahead followed by Glenn
who was then trailed by the victim (Id., p. 5). They met appellants, father and
son Fidel and Nestor Escandor, who were walking towards the opposite
direction.
As the two groups passed each other, appellant Nestor Escandor suddenly
and without any warning shot the victim in the back (Id., p. 3). x x x.

When the victim tried to get up, he was again shot at, this time by the other
appellant , Fidel, hitting the victim in the upper right breast and causing him
to slump to the ground (Id.). As soon as they heard the first shot, Madelyn
and Gil Huelva, two of the victims children, scampered away (Id., p. 7). After
the incident, Glenn Huelva immediately rushed home to inform his mother,
Erlinda Huelva, that his father was killed by appellants (Id., p. 9). Without
wasting time, Erlinda and Glenn went to seek the help of a barangay
councilman of Cagara, Ernesto Rapsing, who accompanied them to the scene
of the crime (Id., pp. 9-10). On their way, Erlinda, Glenn, Rapsing, Roque
Hermina and Marcelita Caballero, met appellant Fidel Escandor who came
from the direction of the crime scene and apparently was then on his way
home (Id., p. 10). Upon arrival at the scene of the crime, they found the
victim already dead.
At about 9:00 oclock a.m. of the same day, after having been informed of
the shooting incident, Pat. Jesus Huelba, Jr. together with P/Sgt. Arturo
Aparejado, Pfc. Oscar Rejuso, Pfc. Jesus Esquilona and Pat. Santiago Aguilar, Jr.
proceeded to the crime scene to investigate (TSN, 04 August 1989, pp. 2-3).
The police investigators found the victim lying face down and bearing
gunshot wounds (Id., pp. 3-4; Exhs. A-2 & A-3, Records, p. 72. Pat Huelva,
no relation to the victim (Id., p. 7), proceeded to do a sketch of the crime
scene (Id., p. 4; Records, p. 72).[3]
Initially, appellants assail the credibility of Glenn Huelva, the prosecutions
lone witness, by pointing out his relationship with the victim and as such his
testimony is tainted with bias. Aside from this general averment in their brief,
however, not an iota of evidence was ever presented at the trial to prove this
charge. Relationship with the victim per se is not proof of prejudice.[4] Nor is
it a sufficient motive to testify falsely.[5] At any rate, the issue hinges on the
trial courts assessment of the witness credibility. Factual findings of the
lower court especially on the credibility of the witnesses is generally accorded
great weight and respect on appeal,[6] as the trial court is in the best position
to make an honest determination of the witnesses deportment during trial.[7]
In this case, the trial court, in giving full faith and credence to the testimony
of Glenn, observed that he testified in a straight forward manner. We find
no cogent reason to hold otherwise.
Appellants additionally impugn Glenns credibility by citing what they call
marked inconsistencies in certain portions the latters testimony which is
hereunder reproduced:
x x x
xxx
xxx
Q: You said you shouted after your father was killed. You mean also that
your brother and sister shouted?
A: They ran away.
Q: They ran away before the actual shooting?
A: Yes sir.
Q: That would be all your honor.

COURT:
Q: Why did they run before the shooting?
A: They ran away after my father was shot.
Q: You mean to say, they ran away after your father was shot?
A: Yes your honor.[8] (Underscoring supplied).
We find the purported inconsistencies more apparent than real. As correctly
averred by the appellee in its brief, Glenns answers to the questions
propounded by the trial court should be considered as a clarification or
rectification of his earlier answer to appellants counsel that his brother and
sister ran away before the shooting.[9] Besides, the alleged inconsistencies do
not affect the substance of Glenns testimony. It refers only to minor and
insignificant details of the incident and not to the established fact that Glenn
was then present at the place of the commission of the crime and actually
witnessed the appellants assault on Sabino. It, thus, reinforces rather than
weakens Glenns credibility as minor inaccuracies suggest that the witness is
telling the truth.[10]
Appellants also characterize as unbelievable Glenns steadfast assertion that
the killing of Sabino was not preceded by any exchange of words the latter
and the appellants. They likewise assail as contrary to human experience the
conduct of Glenn, his brother Gil and sister Madelyn in failing to warn, aid or
defend their father from the assaults.
We are not persuaded by these arguments. There is nothing unusual in the
manner of assaulting a person even if no altercation between the victim and
the assailant immediately preceded the attack. In fact, judicial notice can be
taken of the normal predisposition of those with criminal intent to execute
their sinister plan in a way least expected in order to insure its execution. In
this case, knowing that Sabino was then carrying a bolo, appellant Nestor
Escandor suddenly and without any warning shot Sabino from behind. The
execution of the appellants plan was achieved with greater ease and without
risk to themselves. On the other hand, it is not contrary to human experience
if Glenn, his brother Gil and sister madelyn, were all dumbfounded by the
event they witnessed. Neither will this fact militate against Glenns credibility.
The testimony of an eyewitness who, while the crime is taking place, made no
outcry and exerted no effort in order to help the victim will not be rendered
unbelievable by such fact alone.[11] Witnessing a crime is an unusual
experience which elicits different reactions from the witnesses and for which
no clear-cut standard form of behavior can be drawn.[12] In this case, Glenn,
Gil and Madelyn must have been so shocked in witnessing the swift assault on
their father that they failed to make an outcry. The failure of Glenn, on the
other hand, to rush to his fathers defense is understandable considering that
Glenn was only seventeen years old at that time. In the face of two persons
old enough to be his father[13]and who were both armed with guns Glenn
could not be expected to rush to his fathers rescue even if he was then
armed with a bolo. Moreover, Glenn was not totally unmoved by the incident

as the records disclose that after witnessing the gruesome murder of his
father, he immediately ran towards their house to tell everything he saw to
his mother.[14] His actuations at that time cannot be characterized, therefore,
as less normal under such circumstances.
Appellants Fidel Escandor and Nestor Escandor invoke alibi and self-defense
respectively.
Appellant Fidels defense of alibi is unacceptable. He was positively identified
by Glenn Huelva as the companion of Nestor in the morning of December 2,
1988,[15] and the one who fired the shot that hit Sabino on his right breast.
[16] Against positive identification, alibi cannot prevail.[17] But even granting
that he was at his house in the morning of the incident, this alone in the
absence of other substantial evidence, is insufficient to remove the cloud of
guilt, for by his own admission his house and the scene of the crime are only
60 meters apart,[18]and there is nothing to show that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the place of the commission of the crime.
Nor will Nestors contention that he merely acted in self-defense prosper. One
who sets up self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence.[19]
Hence, if the evidence for the defense is of doubtful veracity, conviction is
imperative,[20] the accused having admitted the killing. Here, Nestor claims
that Sabino was the aggressor. He shot Sabino twice, first on his hip when the
latter was about to hack him (Nestor) with a bolo, and the second on his right
chest.[21] Be that as it may, the physical evidence however runs roughshod
over Nestors claim of self-defense. Dr. Conchita Ulanday, the Medical health
officer of Aroroy, Masbate, who conducted the post mortem on the body of
Sabino[22] testified thus:
x x x
xxx
xxx
Q: The number one wound, where was the point of entry?
A: It is on this portion, the point of entry (witness pointing the upper portion
of her right chest).
Q: No. 2, where was the point of entry?
A: Still in the chest 2-3 inches a distance.
Q: No. 3?
A:
The point of entry was at the back, lower part of the back (witness
pointing [sic] the side of her back)
Q: No. 4?
A: All point (sic) of entry No. 4 to 9 (sic) at the back.
Q: it is only wound (sic) 4-9 at the back?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now in conducting Dr. this port (sic) mortem examination, did you probe
the wounds?
A: Yes, sir, as I said I was able to determine the location of the wounds.
Q: You did not specifically states (sic) in your report the depth of the wound?
A: I did not sir.
Q: Why?

A: It was all penetrating wounds.

COURT:
Q: 2 to 7, 4 to 9 are all penetrating wounds?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
FISCAL:
Q: Any of these wounds could cause death even rendering (sic) a medical
assistance?
A: Yes, sir.[23]
Sabino sustained no less than nine (9) wounds, most of which were located at
the back portion of his body. Their number, not to mention their location,
indeed disproves self-defense.[24]
Finally, we are in agreement with the trial court in disregarding the testimony
of Sgt. Arturo Aparejado, one of the police officers who attempted to
corroborate Nestors claim of self-defense to the effect that when he arrived
at scene of the crime he found the lifeless body of Sabino with a bolo on his
hand.[25] Evidently, this is belied by the sketch (Exhibit A)[26] of the crime
scene prepared by Patrolman Jesus Huelva, Jr. upon Sgt. Aparejados
instruction himself which showed otherwise.[27] Absent any clear showing
that Patrolman Huelva, Jr. deliberately omitted in Exhibit A some material
facts, the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duty stands with
full force.[28]
From the foregoing, it is beyond doubt that appellant are guilty of murder. We
agree with the trial courts appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery in view of the fact that the initial assault on Sabino was made from
behind and was unexpected.[29] Appellants undoubtedly employed a method
in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution without risk to themselves arising from the defense which Sabino
might make.[30] However, we can not stamp with approval the trial courts
imposition of the penalty ofreclusion perpetua on Nestor Escandor in view of
the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which
should instead be in its minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal
maximum.[31] Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
appellant Nestor is entitled to a minimum penalty of prision mayor maximum
to reclusion temporalmedium, the range of the penalty mext lower to that
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.[32]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Nestor Escandor is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum as the minimum penalty, to twenty years (20) of reclusion
temporal maximum as the maximum penalty, together with all the accessory
penalties provided by law. The penalty of reclusion perpetua meted to
appellant Fidel is AFFIRMED. The award of indemnity in favor of the heirs of
Sabino Huelva is hereby raised to FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) in
line with the current jurisprudence.[33]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO

ESTANISLAO, ROGELIO ESTANISLAO, and FELINO ESTANISLAO
[Deceased],accused-appellants.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
On 3 July 1990, the 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur
charged Armando, Rogelio and Felino all surnamed Estanislao, with the
murder of one Sergio Montejo, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about January l9, 1990, in the late afternoon thereof, at Poblacion,
Municipality of Libmanan, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab Sergio Montejo with a
sharp bladed instrument, hitting the latter on his left chest that caused his
instantaneous death.
That as a consequence of the death of said Sergio Montejo, his heirs sustained
damages which will be proved later in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
When arraigned, all accused pleaded not guilty.[2]
On 22 May 1992, the trial court issued an order dismissing the criminal aspect
of the case against accused Felino Estanislao due to his death on 9 October
1990.[3]
On 21 March 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29 of Libmanan,
Camarines Sur rendered a decision[4] of conviction, the dispositive part of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, accused Armando Estanislao and Rogelio Estanislao are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua together with the
accessory penalties and for them, including the estate of the deceased
accused Felino Estanislao, to pay jointly and severally an indemnity to the
heirs of Sergio Montejo in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) ONLY and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
A motion for reconsideration of the judgment finding the accused-appellants
guilty of murder was denied on 6 September 1994[6] and a Notice of Appeal
was seasonably filed with, and given due course by the trial court.[7]
The evidence for the prosecution based mainly on the testimony of Fe
Pearedondo tends to prove that on 19 January 1990 at around five oclock in
the afternoon while she (Pearedondo) was at the eatery owned by a certain
Jun Badilla and while Badilla, another unnamed person and the victim Sergio
Montejo were drinking beer, the accused Rogelio Estanislao arrived.

When the victim Montejo stood up from the drinking session to relieve
himself, accused Rogelio Estanislao suddenly uttered, Tara Sergio! after
which Rogelio suddenly stabbed the victim Sergio Montejo and thereafter fled.
Pearedondo likewise testified that she saw Armando and Felino Estanislao,
whom she had earlier seen within the vicinity of the store, approach the
victim immediately after the stabbing, carrying wooden sticks locally called
palomaria. When the two (2) found out that the victim had fallen down with
a stab wound, they then also fled.
Araceli Montejo, the victims wife, testified that the relationship between the
Estanislaos and the Montejos had turned sour since 18 November 1989 when
her husband (the victim) had advised the Estanislaos to vacate the property
of the Montejos that they were occupying since the Montejos were going to
use the property. She testified that on 11 January 1990, only a week before
the stabbing incident, her husband and Armando Estanislao had a fist fight
where the latter was aided by the two (2) other accused, Felino and Rogelio
Estanislao. The fight was broken up by the timely arrival of police officers
which prevented the accused from further attacking the victim Sergio
Montejo.
The victims widow likewise testified that Rogelio Estanislao
threatened to kill her husband while she was trying to stop the fight.[8]
The defense on the other hand had a completely different version of the
incident.
Accused-appellant Rogelio Estanislao while admitting that he was holding the
bladed weapon that killed the victim interposed the defense that the latter
was accidentally hit when he (Rogelio) was trying to parry an attack on
himself.
Rogelio testified that at around five oclock in the afternoon of 19 January
1990 at Barangay Poblacion, Libmanan, Camarines Sur, he passed by an
eatery (carinderia) where the owner, a certain Jun Badilla, one Gerry Balces
and the victim Sergio Montejo were having a drinking spree. As he passed by,
he heard the victim say in the native dialect, Here he comes, attack him
now!. It was then that Montejo and Balces threw beer bottles at him and
Montejo pulled out a fan knife (balisong) saying I will finish you!. Jun Badilla
likewise attacked him with a bolo. Rogelio then stated that he was able to
grab hold of a small wooden table locally known as papag which he used to
parry the attacks of the two (2) assailants. He declared that the victim was
hit by the bolo of Jun Badilla when he parried the latters attack and the bolo
accidentally hit the victim. Defense witness Dionisio Munda corroborated
Rogelios version of the incident.
Accused-appellant Armando Estanislao relied on his defense of alibi. He
testified that on the date and time of the incident, he was at the house of a
certain Leonor Amores working as a hired laborer.
Amores confirmed Armandos alibi but admitted that the distance from her
house to the crime scene can be negotiated in five (5) minutes on foot or two
(2) minutes by trimobile.

Accused-appellants assign the following errors to the trial court:

I
WHEN IT RELIED UPON THE LONE, UNCORROBORATED AND INADEQUATE
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS FE PEAREDONDO IN CONCLUDING
THAT APPELLANT ROGELIO ESTANISLAO EMPLOYED TREACHERY IN ATTACKING
THE VICTIM.
II
WHEN IT RELIED UPON THE DUBIOUS TESTIMONY OF OFFENDED PARTY
ARACELI MONTEJO IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE EXISTED EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION THAT QUALIFIED THE OFFENSE TO MURDER.
III
WHEN IT INFERRED THE EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY AMONG THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS FROM MERE RELATIONSHIP AND SPECULATION.
IV
WHEN IT DISREGARDED APPELLANT ROGELIO ESTANISLAO S CLAIM OF SELFDEFENSE EVEN WHEN HIS TESTIMONY WAS NEVER REBUTTED AND
THEREFORE TACITLY ADMITTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
V
WHEN IT CONVICTED THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AS CHARGED.
[9]
Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erroneously relied on the
testimony of Fe Pearedondo which was not only uncorroborated but also
based on assumptions and contained accounts of events which were
improbable.
It is argued that the prosecution should have presented the persons allegedly
drinking with the victim at the time of the incident.
Accused-appellants likewise contend that witness Pearedondo only assumed
that the reason the victim stood up was to relieve himself, which assumption
lacked any basis.
Appellants also maintain that it is improbable for accused Felino and Armando
Estanislao to loiter near the scene of the incident as early as 4:30 in the
afternoon of 19 January 1990 since the former was an infirm and ailing man
who died during the trial of the case while the latter walks with a limp and
there would have been a danger of their being violently accosted by the
victim and his drinking companions.
Appellants then assail the finding of the trial court that treachery and evident
premeditation accompanied the killing.
The settled rule is that appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings
of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses, considering that it is
in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during
trial.[10]
In the present case, there is no showing that the trial court overlooked certain
facts which could have materially affected its appreciation of the testimony of

prosecution witness Fe Pearedondo. Her testimony was clear, unequivocal

and consistent. The issues raised by appellants regarding assumptions and
improbabilities pertain to matters which are extraneous to her straightforward
narration of how accused-appellant Rogelio Estanislao suddenly stabbed the
victim Sergio Montejo, after which he immediately fled.
Accused-appellant Rogelio Estanislao for his defense contends that he was
holding a wooden table (papag) and a knife he had grabbed possession of
from one of the victims drinking buddies. He maintains that the victim
Montejo was accidentally stabbed when he was parrying the attacks against
him.
Appellant Rogelios defense that the victim was accidentally stabbed is
defeated and negated by his own testimony.
On direct examination, Rogelio Estanislao first testified that the victim
attacked him with a knife while Jun Badilla attacked him with a bolo he had
pulled from his scabbard. He was then able to get hold of a wooden table to
defend himself. While parrying the attacks against him, the victim (Montejo)
was hit by the bolo of Badilla which he had blocked with the papag.[11]
Later however, Rogelio stated that he was not sure if it was the bolo of Badilla
or the knife which the victim had earlier attacked him with, but which the
latter dropped and which he picked up and was then holding together with the
papag, which struck the fatal wound on Sergio Montejo. He also stated that
the victim was attacking him with a lead pipe while Badilla was attacking him
with his bolo.[12]
On cross-examination, Rogelio had yet another version of the incident. He
stated that Badilla was not yet holding a bolo when Sergio attacked him with a
knife. Rogelio narrated that Sergio first dropped the knife before Badilla got a
bolo from the stall and attacked him.[13]
The differences in the three (3) versions of the incident are irreconcilable and
unexplained. Thus, against the uncontested and consistent testimony of the
prosecution witnesses, his defense must fail.
Moreover, if it were indeed true that it was the victims (Montejo) group that
first attacked Rogelio Estanislao, it is not explained why the latter did not file
criminal charges against his alleged attackers.
The presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery has been adequately
shown. The attack on Montejo although preceded by a warning (Tara
Sergio!) was undoubtedly sudden and unexpected and prevented the
unsuspecting victim, who had just stood up, from defending himself.
Evident premeditation on the other hand was not substantially shown.
The requisites of evident premeditation are: l) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime must be adequately shown; 2) an act to
show that the offender clung to his determination and 3) a sufficient lapse of
time between the determination and the execution to allow the offender to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.[14]
Not all of said requisites have been adequately shown in this case.

On the criminal liability of Armando Estanislao, the trial court based his
conviction on the inference that there was conspiracy between the father
(Felino), whose criminal liability was extinguished by his death during trial of
the case, and the two (2) sons, Rogelio and Armando.
Conspiracy may be inferred from the joint and simultaneous acts of several
accused aimed at a common purpose.[15]
We are not convinced that conspiracy between Rogelio and the two (2) other
accused can be logically inferred from the acts of the latter.
It is undisputed that Armando and Felino Estanislao did not commit any
positive act to show unity of purpose with Rogelio. Their mere presence in the
crime scene, absent other proof to support the allegation of conspiracy,
cannot be considered an indication of their being conspirators.[16] Nor can
relationship with Rogelio and their carrying wooden sticks be considered as
badges of conspiracy. The doubt in this case should be resolved in favor of
the accused-appellants.
Finally, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be
appreciated in favor of accused-appellant Rogelio Estanislao. The trial court
correctly held that Rogelios surrender after a warrant of arrest had been
issued and almost two (2) months after the incident was not spontaneous and
therefore deserves no consideration.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Armando Estanislao is hereby ACQUITTED based on
reasonable doubt;
2. The liability of the estate of Felino Estanislao for the death of the victim is
SET ASIDE for being without basis;
3. Accused-appellant Rogelio Estanislao is declared guilty of murder and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-51363 : July 25, 1981.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FEDERICO
CUISON Y PRESTOZA, Accused-Appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
It is manifest even from a cursory reading of the record and the evidence that
this is one of the cases where the automatic review of death sentences by this
Court is more than justified. It is a necessity. Such an observation becomes
even more warranted considering the comprehensive and scholarly thirtythree page manifestation of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 1 on behalf
of the People of the Philippines, with the categorical plea that the judgment of
conviction finding appellant Federico Cuison guilty of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to death be reversed. Considering that in the past year, only

in People v. Andag, 2 did he make such a recommendation, although in five

other decisions 3 this Court likewise acquitted the accused, it becomes even
more evident why the judgment should be reversed and the accused set free.
4
Had there been a greater awareness of the compelling force of the
constitutional presumption of innocence 5 on the part of the then trial judge,
now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Onofre Villaluz, the sentence
certainly should have been one of acquittal. It is the submission of the brief
for appellant: "The records of this case will show that the prosecution never
presented a witness or witnesses pointing to the accused as the one who
killed the victim. Neither did the prosecution establish the possible motive or
reason why the accused appellant should kill the victim, who is his compare.
This is significant and highly relevant. The prosecution merely relied on the
extra-judicial confession of the accused-appellant, which as earlier said has
never been corroborated by other evidence and which confession was secured
by means of threat and intimidation. The trial court should have acquitted the
accused of the charge of murder and should have ordered the filing of the
appropriate criminal complaint of murder against Magtanggol Emeterio,
Ricardo Vidana and Baltazar Vidana, in the light of the uncontradicted
testimony of the accused, Nelia Coronia, the surviving wife of the victim and
the victim 's uncle, Mr. Fabian Manahan, that the three have the most possible
reason or motive to kill the victim. Magtanggol Emeterio had reason or motive
to kill the victim in the face of the undeniable existing illicit relationship of his
wife with Rosendo Coronia, Jr. To avenge his honor, Magtanggol Emeterio had
to eliminate or kill Rosendo Coronia, Jr., to stop once and for all that amorous
relationship his wife had with the victim." 6 It may be said that necessarily the
appellant is expected to deny his guilt and to make light of whatever evidence
may be presented against him. That is true although in this particular case,
portions of the testimony cited in the brief, from the widow as well as the
father of the deceased, did cast grave doubt on the guilt of appellant. What
has an effect, conclusive in character, is the submission in the exhaustive
manifestation of Solicitor General Mendoza, with full support from the
evidence on record, that the testimony of accused-appellant of what
transpired, judged in the light of the evidence coming from prosecution
witnesses, is entitled to greater credence and belief, being more "reasonable
and believable." 7
Such a conclusion is based on the following propositions: "First: To begin with,
there appears to be no sufficient motive for appellant to kill his kumpadre
Rosendo Coronia, Jr. Instead, the three suspects, namely: Magtanggol
Emeterio, Ricardo Vidania and Baltazar Vidania had strong motive to kill the
victim . cra . Second: The nature, number and location of the wounds
sustained by the victim, as testified to by prosecution witness Dr. Gajardo,
numbering about seven, and located on the different parts of the body of the
deceased, inexorably indicate that two or three, not only one, assailants

attacked the victim and inflicted the said wounds sustained by the latter, one
of which was a fracture of the parietal or temporal cranad(back) part of the
skull . cra . The cause of the victim 's death is 'cardio respiratory arrest due to
shock and hemorrhage as a result of the fracture of the skull ' . cra . Dr.
Gajardo concluded rightly that hard instruments or objects were used in
hitting the victim, like club, stick, stone, bamboo club if hard, and that it was
possible that two or three persons might have assaulted and killed the victim .
cra . Third: Appellant 's 'flight ' to Pangasinan and his inaction or silence
before and after having witnessed the felonious death of his kumpadre
Rosendo Coronia Jr. were satisfactorily explained by him . cra . Fourth: The
extrajudicial confession of appellant was secured from him by the San Mateo
police investigators under circumstances showing deceit, duress, violence,
intimidation and involuntariness, while appellant was in a state of fear and
quandary; hence the same should be rejected as void and inadmissible . cra .
Fifth: Subsequent developments in this criminal case only serve to
demonstrate the innocence of the appellant of the crime charged against
him . cra . Sixth: The prosecution 's evidence judicially confirms the truth of
the appellant 's claim of non-participation in the commission of the crime in
question and his charge against the three suspects, namely: Magtanggol
Emeterio, Ricardo Vidania and Baltazar Vidania as the real culprits or killers of
the deceased Rosendo Coronia, Jr." 8
It is difficult to understand how, in the light of the above, the accused was
convicted. The explanation, but certainly not the justification, lies in the
acceptance of the version of the prosecution. As narrated in the decision: "The
prosecution presented evidence to prove that on April 29, 1978, at around
9:00 o 'clock in the morning, at Barrio Ampid, San Mateo, Rizal, a certain
Ricardo Vidana, also of the same barrio, unearthed a dead man from a well
cranad(balon); that Ricardo Vidana reported the matter to Patrolmen Basilio
San Jose and Eduardo Ano, and when the policemen reached the place they
instructed Ricardo Vidana to take out the body of the victim and they
recognized the latter as that of Rosendo Coronia, Jr., who had been missing
since April 20, 1978 in the evening; that the policemen investigated the
surroundings and there they saw a piece of bamboo and a big stone
cranad(malaking bato) near a hut not far from the place where they
unearthed the body of the victim; that they learned that the owner of the said
hut cranad(kubo) was Federico Cuison, a friend and kumpadre of the victim;
that said Federico Cuison was not in his house, neither was he in any part of
San Mateo, but they were informed that he left for Pangasinan, his hometown;
that Patrolman Ano, together with Patrolman Gonzalo Dandalo, went to
Pangasinan and there they found Federico Cuison; that outright, Federico
Cuison admitted having killed Rosendo Coronia, Jr., and burying his body not
far from his hut on the 20th of April, 1978, at 11:30, more or less in the
evening; that upon reaching San Mateo, Rizal, the accused Federico Cuison
executed an extra-judicial statement before Patrolman Ano, at the Police

Headquarters, stating the following: 'inaamin ko po naman na ako ang

pumatay kay Rosendo Coronia, Jr. '. cra .; that Renato Donato, a resident of
Bo. Ampid, San Mateo, Rizal, knows the victim, Rosendo Coronia, Jr., and
testified that on the night of April 20, 1978, between the hours of 9:00 and
10:00 o 'clock, he saw the victim and the accused together enjoying a drink at
Aling Vita 's Store of said barrio and he was offered a glass of gin; that after
drinking, he left and promised to be back after taking home the two women
companions; that he returned as promised but on the way he met the victim
and the accused going out of the store, so they walked all together until they
reached the approach of the bridge cranad(puno ng tulay) at Ampid where he
separated from the two and the latter entered the way to Pag-asa Compound
leading to the hut of the accused Cuison; that after that incident he did not
see the victim anymore and he was informed that the victim was missing
since that evening of April 20, 1978, together with the accused; that later, on
April 29, 1978, he learned and saw the body of Rosendo Coronia, Jr., dug out
from a wellcranad(balon)." 9
Reference is made anew to what was stated in the brief for accused-appellant.
The two prosecution witnesses, the two closest relatives of the victim, the
widow and the father, absolved the accused-appellant of the crime imputed to
him. Moreover, the private prosecutor, Attorney Eleazar Castillano, moved for
the dismissal of the case. Thus: "Immediately after the defense rested its
case, private prosecutor Atty. Castillano orally moved for the dismissal of the
case and the acquittal of the accused Federico Cuison of the crime charged,
stating that the antecedent facts and circumstances as revealed by the
evidence adduced during the trial point clearly to the three persons, namely:
Magtanggol Emeterio, Ricardo Vidania and Baltazar Vidania as the real
malefactors who feloniously killed the victim, Rosendo Coronia, Jr.; that the
three suspects have a motive to kill the victim; while the accused Federico
Cuison had none; and that the accused Federico Cuison is a victim of frameup . cra . This time, Fiscal Angeles opposed the manifestation and motion of
private prosecutor Atty. Castillano, for being made without his prior
permission, and he insisted on the conviction of the accused based on the
evidence adduced by the prosecution . cra ., but he did not touch on the
evidence introduced by the prosecution which tended to absolve the accused
of the crime charged." 10
Had there been greater care shown by the trial judge, certainly the judgment
could not have been one of conviction, much less one imposing the death
penalty. To reiterate what was set forth at the beginning, such judgment must
be reversed and the accused acquitted.
1. To repeat, the constitutional presumption of innocence had not been
overcome. That is to view the actuation of the trial judge as well as of Fiscal
Zosimo Angeles charitably. There is need to stress anew that both the
prosecuting arm of the government and, equally so, trial courts should be
ever alert lest in their desire to see that a crime be properly punished, the

wrath of the law falls on one whose offense had not been duly proved and
therefore convicted without due process of law. 11 As so well put in the
Manifestation of the Solicitor General: "We have shown above that the
prosecution witnesses themselves, no less than the widow, father and uncle of
the victim, testified to an incident wherein Magtanggol Emeterio almost
caught both the deceased Rosendo Coronia, Jr. and his cranad(Emeterio 's)
wife in love tryst at the house of the appellant, thus proving that the three
suspects have a strong motive to kill the victim pursuant to their criminal
conspiracy to make the victim pay for his misdeed cranad(atraso), while a codetainee of the appellant testified to the continuing threat of Baltazar Vidania
against appellant to kill him and his family if ever he would squeal on them as
the killers of his kumpadre . cra . The foregoing declarations of said
prosecution witnesses, which are adverse to the prosecution 's cause, confirm
the version of the defense as to how Rosendo Coronia, Jr. was killed
feloniously by the abovenamed three suspects, as testified to by appellant .
cra . , which he further explained in detail in his second written statement
given to Pat. Ernesto Garcia, police investigator of the San Mateo Police
Department, on July 28, 1978 . cra . It should be noted that the trial fiscal,
State Prosecutor Zosimo Angeles, who was present throughout the
proceedings of this criminal case in the court below, never objected to the
presentation of the above-named four prosecution witnesses and to their
adverse declarations in court. And there is no showing why their declarations
in open court may be doubted or vitiated. Such being the case, the
prosecution is bound by the declaration of its own witnesses which tended to
absolve appellant of the crime charged, thus rendering the prosecution 's
cause, as testified to only by Pat. Ano, weak and unavailing. As a matter of
fact, private prosecutor Atty. Eleazar Castillano, after the defense rested its
case, found the prosecution 's evidence weak and doubtful that there and
then in open court he orally moved for the dismissal of the criminal case or for
the acquittal of the appellant of the crime charged, stating that the evidence
adduced during the trial clearly reveal that three persons, namely:
Magtanggol Emeterio, Ricardo Vidania and Baltazar Vidania are the real
malefactors who conspired in killing the victim Rosendo Coronia, Jr.; that the
three suspects have the strong motive, while appellant has none, to kill the
victim; and that appellant is a victim of a frame-up . cra . While it is true that
the private prosecutor did not have the prior permission or authority from the
trial fiscal to make the manifestation and motion to dismiss or to acquit the
appellant . cra . , yet the trial fiscal, in opposing the private prosecutor 's
motion, did not touch on the evidence introduced by the prosecution which
tended to absolve the appellant of the crime charged." 12
It suffices to recall People v. Dramayo. 13 Thus: "Accusation is not, according
to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even
called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only

if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence.

Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this
Court has always been committed. There is need therefore, for the most
careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary,
independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the
judge below and thereafter the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion
that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under
such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be
satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a
crime. What is required then is moral certainty." 14
2. The trial judge, in arriving at the sentence of conviction, made much of the
alleged extra-judicial confession by the accused. Reference to the
manifestation of the Solicitor General is enough to demonstrate why such
should not have been the case. The extra-judicial confession in legal
contemplation is worthless. Again, there is need to stress that both the
prosecuting arm and trial judges must not disregard the authoritative
pronouncements of this Tribunal on the matter. On this point, the
manifestation of the Solicitor General had this to say: "It should be stressed
here that Pat. Ano was also not telling the truth when he declared that
appellant verbally admitted to them while they were still in Pangasinan that
he killed his kumpadre Rosendo Coronia, Jr. Pat. Ano could not decide when
appellant made the verbal admission: whether on the occasion immediately
when they found him inside a house at San Jacinto, Pangasinan or inside the
jeep during their trip back to San Mateo from Pangasinan . cra . Pat. Ano
himself admitted in his testimony that appellant, despite their asking
questions why he killed his kumpadre, merely begged of them: 'ang sabi niya
sa headquarters daw siya magpapaliwanag '. cra .; thus appellant did not
make any verbal admission at that time. Instead, he told the police
investigators who found him in Pangasinan that he did not kill his kumpadre,
and that he could not tell them the real culprits at that time because Baltazar
Vidania cranad(who made the threat to kill him and his family if he would
squeal on them) was present, who came along with the police investigators to
Pangasinan . cra . The truth of the matter, therefore, is that appellant merely
pleaded with the police investigators who saw him in Pangasinan that he be
allowed to explain at the police headquarters in San Mateo, Rizal, the reasons
why he came to and hid in San Jacinto, Pangasinan after he had witnessed the
felonious killing of his kumpadre in the late evening of April 20, 1978 in Bo.
Ampid, San Mateo, Rizal. But when they arrived at San Mateo, Rizal on that
day, April 29, 1978, Baltazar Vidania was always seen with the police
investigators when the latter were questioning him . cra . Thus, appellant

decided to remain tight-lipped regarding the circumstances surrounding the

death of his kumpadre. On May 5, 1978 when he was being questioned by the
police investigators, he refused to admit having something to do with the
killing of his kumpadre. According to the appellant, police investigators Pat.
Eduardo Ano and Pat. Ernesto Garcia inflicted acts of violence upon his body
cranad(binugbog), which caused him to make the verbal admission that he
killed his kumpadre . cra . This is perhaps the verbal admission referred to by
Pat. Ano in his testimony. Then came the day, May 6, 1978, for the taking of
appellant 's extrajudicial confession. Earlier during the said day, appellant was
warned by Baltazar Vidania when the latter went to the former 's cell at the
municipal jail of San Mateo, reminding him of his previous threat . cra . And
even before the formal investigation could start, appellant saw Baltazar
Vidania inside the investigation room at the police headquarters, together
with the police investigators, and Baltazar Vidania approached him and
whispered to him that if he would squeal or point on them as the killers of his
kumpadre, the three of them would kidnap him . cra . Besides the presence of
Baltazar Vidania, appellant had the misfortune of being assisted by a lawyer
whose interest was adverse to his cranad(appellant 's) cause. Pat. Ano
declared that appellant had a lawyer by the name of Atty. Juan Moreno of San
Mateo, Rizal, during the investigation; that he saw Atty. Moreno and the
appellant talk to each other three times; that it was Atty. Moreno, after talking
to the appellant, who announced that they could start the investigation; and
that he was sure Atty. Moreno was assisting the appellant during the
investigation as the latter 's counsel . cra . But Atty. Juan Moreno, testifying as
a defense witness, declared that he was the private prosecutor during the
preliminary investigation before the municipal court of the very criminal
complaint against appellant for the murder of Rosendo Coronia, Jr. cra . .
According to Rosendo Coronia, Sr., father of the said deceased, testifying as a
prosecution witness, Atty. Juan Moreno was their lawyer involving the case of
the felonious death of his son before the municipal court, and that Atty.
Moreno was already handling the case of his son when he cranad(Atty.
Moreno) went to the police headquarters of San Mateo . cra . Despite this
conflict of interest, Atty. Moreno admitted in open court that he used to visit
the appellant at the jail of San Mateo during the time he was the private
prosecutor of the case against the appellant . cra . Pat. Ano claimed that all
his questions asked of the appellant, which became the basis of the latter 's
extrajudicial confession . cra ., were freely answered by the appellant in the
presence of Atty. Moreno . cra . But Atty. Moreno contradicted or debunked
Pat. Ano 's claim, saying that he cranad(Atty. Moreno) was present only before
the formal investigation started. He admitted having talked to the appellant
who told him cranad(Atty. Moreno) that he cranad(appellant) preferred to
declare before the judge in open court; hence, he left the investigating room.
He was not, Atty. Moreno maintained, present when appellant 's extrajudicial
confession was being reduced to writing . cra . Under the foregoing

circumstances, appellant then had no alternative but to make his forced, but
still qualified confession, . cra . More revealing are certain features of the
extrajudicial confession . cra . which render the same of doubtful validity. With
the clear and emphatic answer of the appellant to the third question, wherein
he pleaded that he be allowed instead to tell everything before a judge or
court, the police investigators should have stopped there and then the taking
of his written confession. But the police investigators insisted on making him
say something about the verbal admission appellant had made the previous
day after he was subjected to bodily harm. Thus, the fourth question was
asked, and the appellant, still nurturing the fear of the threats from the
suspects and the bodily harm that may again be inflicted upon him by his
police tormentors, reiterated his previous short verbal admission, if only to put
a stop or end to the investigation right there and then . cra . Since there is no
eyewitness to the killing, if they have zeroed their suspicion upon the
appellant as the culprit, the police investigators should have asked from the
appellant and included in the said extrajudicial confession, the background
and surrounding circumstances, motive, and other facts involving the
felonious death of Rosendo Coronia, Jr. and appellant 's flight to Pangasinan.
Appellant 's extrajudicial confession . cra . lacks the details of the killing of the
victim as well as the burying of the latter 's dead body. Even the joint police
affidavit or report of police investigators Pat. San Jose and Pat. Ano . cra . is
absent of these important and necessary details. By itself, the extrajudicial
confession . cra . does not provide the reasons and circumstances to convince
a magistrate with an impartial mind to conclude that appellant is guilty of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt." 15 A confession of that character,
to repeat, is not deserving of any credence. The reliance of the trial judge
therefore on such an alleged admission was misplaced. He failed to accord
deference to what has been the unbroken rule in this jurisdiction from the
case of United States v. delos Santos, 16 a 1913 decision. A later case, People
v. Bagasala 17 speaks to this effect: "Certainly, however, where the
confession is involuntary, being due to maltreatment or induced by fear or
intimidation, there is a violation of this constitutional provision. Any form of
coercion, whether physical, mental or emotional thus stamps it with
inadmissibility. What is essential for its validity is that it proceeds from the
free will of the person confessing." 18 What was said later in the opinion is
quite appropriate for the manner the trial judge discharged his function: "It is
unfortunate that the lower court failed to abide by the authoritative doctrines
that ban the use of involuntary confessions in accordance with the
constitutional provision against self-incrimination which, in the language of
Justice Sanchez, should be 'mandatory ', being 'a valuable and substantial
right. '" 19 Then, too: "The above testimony notwithstanding, the lower court
could still look upon such confession as free of any infirmity. Clearly, that was
error, as pointed out by appellant. The constant course of decisions of this
honorable Tribunal, true to the meaning of the self-incrimination clause,

forbids the admission of any confession obtained under such circumstances. It

would be to render nugatory a valuable constitutional right if judges of the
courts of first instance display less than full sensitivity to its command. A
conviction resting on such proof, and such proof alone, certainly cannot be
allowed to stand." 20
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court dated February 16, 1979, is
reversed, and the accused, Federico Cuison y Prestoza, is acquitted. This
decision is immediately executory, and he is therefore to be set free forthwith,
unless he is held for some other valid charge or charges in accordance with
law. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Ministry of Justice for its
information and guidance insofar as an investigation of the true facts of this
gruesome killing is concerned with reference to the following-named
individuals, Magtanggol Emeterio, Ricardo Vidana and Baltazar Vidana
referred to, its attention being particularly invited to their alleged
participation. No costs.
G.R. No. 6432
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO BALAGTAS and
GREGORIO JAIME, defendants-appellants.
G.E. Campbell for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The defendants in this case, Pedro Balagtas and Gregorio Jaime, were
convicted of the crime of murder by the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila, Hon. Charles A. Low presiding, and each sentenced to the maximum
penalty of death. Jaime appealed, and the case as to Balagtas is before us en
consulta.
The two defendants lived in the same house on Calle Lemery, district of
Tondo, city of Manila. About dark on the 4th day of May, 1910, the deceased,
Simeon Flores, visited the house where the defendants were living and about
thirty minutes after arriving the deceased and the two defendants left the
house, going toward Gagalagin, passing along Calle Lemery where they saw
Valentin Franco and Braulio Capulong conversing in front of Franco's house.
Franco asked Balagtas where they were going and received the reply: "We are
just going there," without mentioning any particular place. When the
deceased and the two defendants arrived at the place on Calle Gagalagin
where the street car track crosses, the three turned and entered a narrow
street (callejon) which leads to the railroad track. They continued some
distance along this street, walking in single file, the deceased being in the
center. When they were about ninety yards from any house and while in an
obscure place on the railroad track, at about eight o'clock at night the
deceased was knocked down, and while down was struck two or three blows
in the face and rendered practically unconscious. While in this unconscious
condition, but still groaning, the two defendants, one taking him by the head

and the other by the feet, carried him across the embankment, which was
alongside the railroad track, and threw him into a small pond of water, face
downward. The defendants then returned to their house. The deceased
remained in that position until the following day when his body was found
there by the policemen Hartpence and Solis who conducted the body to the
morgue where it was later identified as that of Simeon Flores by Valentin
Franco, a friend and neighbor of the deceased.
No one except the deceased and the two defendants were in that immediate
vicinity when this crime was committed so as to how and under what
circumstances the deed was executed we must look to the confessions and
testimony of the defendants and the wounds upon the body of the deceased.
Pedro Balagtas was arrested on the morning of May 6, 1910, and Gregorio
Jaime was arrested on that same afternoon. Each of these defendants, in the
presence of George R. Hartpence, Catalino Fernandez, and Eugenio Dizon, on
the same day of their arrest, gave a detailed statement leading up to and the
cause of the death of Simeon Flores. In his confession, Pedro Balagtas stated
that the deceased was knocked down by Gregorio Jaime, and while upon the
ground Jaime struck him two or three times in the face; while, on the other
hand, Jaime stated that these acts were performed by Balagtas. These two
men were taken by Hartpence separately and each pointed out the exact
place where the killing occurred.
Pedro Balagtas, testifying in his own behalf, said:
I had come from work I was doing at 6 o'clock and Simeon Flores called
Gregorio Jaime and myself. i went with them and while we were walking,
Simeon Flores bought some vino and gave it to Gregorio. Then we walked
towards Gagalagin and when we got in front of the switch we turned into an
alley. When we went into this alley Simeon Flores said he was going to see a
friend of his on Calle Solis; that he was going to a duplo party; we kept on
walking until we got to the railroad tracks. i was walking ahead and suddenly I
heard them quarreling behind me. I did not pay attention to them at first
because, in the first place, I am sick and I did not want to meddle in their
affairs. When they were quarreling I suddenly heard Simeon Flores fall behind
me and I looked back and saw Simeon Flores with his face down on the
ground. I heard Simeon Flores ask Gregorio Jaime why Gregorio did not give
him the things he promised to give him.
Gregorio pulled the body to where there was water and he asked me to help
him and said if I didn't help him he would implicate me too. As I could not fight
with him I helped him with my arms. He took hold of both knees of the man
and I took hold with my one arm and I pushed the body into the water. He
(Flores) was still groaning. I never had a fight with him (Flores) and we never
quarreled. He (Gregorio Jaime) killed Simeon Flores with a piece of wood
something like a board was all I could see. Gregorio and Flores had been
drinking some vino.
Q.
Why did you not notify the officers about that?

A.
He (Gregorio) told me that if I should report this matter I could never be
sure of my life.
Q.
Did you make any confession to him (Hartpence)?
A.
I told him exactly what I have stated here. I told him that. I pointed out
the place to him where this crime was committed.
The other defendant, Gregorio Jaime, related what occurred in the following
language:
When I returned from work about 6 o'clock on the evening of May 4, Pedro
Balagtas and Simeon Flores were at my house. He, Pedro, asked me to loan
him ten cents. He said he was going to send for some vino so he could start
his meal. I gave him the ten cents and gave it to my wife and sent my wife to
buy some vino. When the vino arrived he took his supper and Simeon Flores
drank some vino. Then after he had his supper Pedro said, let us go to the
duplo, and Simeon Flores said, "That is right, let us take Gregorio with us." I
asked them where the duplowas and Pedro said, "At my compadre's house, at
Palampo." Then we started and dressed up and went to Calle Lemery; we met
on our way Valentin Franco and another man and Valentin Franco asked Pedro
where he was going and Pedro said, "We are just taking a walk." Then we
walked on towards Gagalagin. When we got down on the other side of the
bridge there is aChino store and the two of them went in and drank some
vino. When we got into the alley I saw that Pedro has a club, and I asked Pedro
where he had that club because I did not see it before, and he said he had it
stuck inside his shirt. I asked him why we had come through Gagalagin
because I understood we were going to Palampo; he said he was going for a
friend; he was going to get a friend there. We walked on ahead through the
fish ponds in the direction of the railroad tracks, When we came near the
railroad track we went towards the place where there was a pond and from
there went toward Calle Solis. When we were some distance from the railroad
track, about from here to that house (indicating Justice Johnson's house,
estimated at one hundred yards distance), I was ahead of them and they were
together by the railroad track. I heard a noise and I turned my face and I saw
Simeon Flores with his face down. And I saw Pedro Balagtas strike him again
on the neck with a piece of wood, a square piece of wood. When I saw him
strike Simeon Flores again with the piece of wood I ran away and Pedro called
me and said, "Why are you running away? If you don't some back I will report
you as one of the authors of this." So in view of that I returned to that place
where he was and I stood at a distance from him about that far (five feet). I
stood there and I saw Pedro turn over the body of Simeon Flores and strike
him again three times on the neck. He told me when we went back to the
house that the reason he killed Simeon Flores was because he had ill feelings
for him.
Q.
Did you help put the body into the water?
A.
He asked me to help him and I pushed the body, but I did not use my
arms to help him.

Q.
Who took the clothes off the deceased?
A.
When we were near the ditch he asked me to help him and I saw Pedro
Balagtas take off his clothes.
Q.
What did you do that for?
A.
I don't know what he did it for because the train was coming and then I
told him "The train, the train is coming now," but he did not leave the place.
When I saw the train coming I started to run away and he followed me,
carrying with him the clothes.
The body of the deceased was examined on May 5 by Dr. Oscar Teague who
holds an M. D. diploma from the University of Berlin. The doctor, who was
called as a witness, on being asked to state the result of his examination, or
autopsy, replied as follows:
It was the body of a large Filipino man. There was indication that the man had
been dead for some time. I found on the lower side of the face, just below the
jaw, three wounds each about two centimeters and a half long, the edges of
the wounds being smooth, with no contusions. There was considerable
swelling of the right side of the face and on the right side of the neck
extending almost from the right ear down to the lower part of the neck. On
cutting through the skin of this region there was found to be a large amount of
blood underneath the skin and outside of the blood vessels. On seizing the
jaw about the middle it was found to be easily moved from side to side and on
passing my finger into the mouth I found that the jaw was completely
fractured in two places. On the right side about two centimeters from the
median line from the middle and on the left not quite so far. On the back of
the neck, just below the lower mark of the hair line there was a wound about
six centimeters long. This passed clean through the skin and the edges were
smooth. There was no contusion in the neighborhood of this wound.
The internal organs with the exception of the lungs were, so far as I could
determine, uniform. the man had been dead for some time, but so far as I
could determine the organs were all uniform. The lungs were full, very largely
extended. On opening the chest they pulled bulged forward whereas ordinarily
the lungs are collapsed and on following up the bronchial tubes I found
particles of food matter vegetable food matter extending deep into the
lungs, especially into right one. Evidently the man had been vomiting and
inhaled these particles into the lungs. The wound at the back of the neck was
slight. The wounds under the jaw were not a nature to indicate that they were
the cause of the death. There was a considerable loss of blood but I would not
consider that it was enough lost to cause death. But considering from the
lungs the cause of death may have been from suffocation. The fact that the
blood inside of the heart was not clotted would also indicate that suffocation
may have taken place. But I am unable to state definitely the cause of death.
It may have been from a contusion of the brain, this being evidently a severe
blow which caused the fracture of the jaw. There was not hemorrhage in the
brain, nor fracture at the base of the skull. The wounds were evidently made

with a cutting object of some kind as they were about the same length; the
three wounds under the jaw could have been made by the same instrument.
The general direction of the wounds indicate that the instrument passed
through the skin and went directly to the jaw. There was no indication that the
jaw was dislocated at the swing, and the large blood vessels of the neck, so
far as I could determine, were not injured. The wounds were the cause of this
death the direct cause possibly. The indications were such that death may
have been due to suffocation. The disturbed condition of the lungs and the
blood in the heart were all evidences of suffocation.
There is no material difference between the confessions made by the
defendants in the presence of Hartpence, Fernandez and Dizon and their
testimony given on the trial. The defendants themselves do not contradict
each other in a number of material details. They practically agree as to the
time that they, in company with the deceased, left the house, the route
travelled, the house and place of the killing, and as to their return together.
While they agree that at the time Flores was knocked down they were walking
in single file, with the deceased in the middle, they do not agree as to which
one was in front nor as to which one knocked the deceased down. Balagtas
says that he was walking in front; that he heard them (the deceased and
Jaime) quarreling behind him; that he heard Flores fall and that when he
looked around he saw Flores with his face on the ground and Jaime striking
him two or three times while he was down. Jaime testified that he was ahead
and that Balagtas, who was behind, knocked Flores down. They both admit
having assisted in throwing Flores' body into the water.
The record clearly establishes the guilt of each of the defendants as principals
of having caused the violent death of Simeon Flores. The trial court qualified
this came as murder, saying:
The element of treachery is clearly shown by the evidence, and also that of
premeditation. There are also two aggravating circumstances, to-wit; that the
crime was committed at night and in an uninhabited place.
If there were present in the commission of this crime either one of the
qualifying circumstances alevosia or known premeditation the crime
would be that of murder. There is not the slightest proof in the record to show
that the defendants had, prior to the moment of the killing, resolved to
commit this crime, nor is there any proof that the death of Flores was the
result of meditation, calculation, or reflection. But on the contrary the record
discloses that the defendants were, before leaving the house, engaged in a
friendly conversation with the deceased, bought and drank somevino, and
agreed to go out for a walk an visit the duplo a debating society. On their
way to this place they stopped and conversed with Valentin Franco, and also
they, or at least two of them, stopped in a tienda and took another drink. In
the absence of proof of overt acts showing that the defendants had meditated
upon the commission of this crime prior to its execution, it was error to hold

that the deed was committed with known premeditation. (U.S. vs. Donoso, 3
Phil. Rep., 234.)
The Attorney-General is the opinion that there was present the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia.
There is treachery (alevosia) when the culprit commits any crime against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend to directly and specially insure it without risk to the person of the
criminal, arising from the defense the injured party might make. (No. 2, art.
10, Penal Code.).
It is not contended that the defendants did, prior to or at the commencement
of the attack, use or employ any means or methods which can legally be
regarded as treacherous. But it is insisted that the fact that the defendants
threw the deceased into the water, face downward, while he was still alive
and in a helpless and defenseless condition, constitutes treachery. With thus
proposition we can not agree. When the body was examined by the doctor,
three wounds, each about two and one-half centimeters in length, were found
on the lower part of the face. The jaw was fractured in two places. There was
also on the back of the neck, just below the hair line, another wound about six
centimeters in length which passed through the skin. On cutting through the
skin at three places near these wounds a large amount of blood outside of the
vessels, was found. The internal organs, except the lungs, were uniform. The
doctor was not certain whether the wounds, or the suffocation, or both, was
the cause of the death of the deceased. But assuming that the deceased
would have recovered from the effects of the four wounds, if he had not been
thrown into the water yet we still think that the proofs fail to show that there
was present treachery, as the knocking down the deceased, striking him while
on the ground, and throwing him into the water were all done in so short a
time and one movement followed the other in such rapid succession,
constitute one and the same attack. In order that treachery may be
considered as a qualifying circumstance to raise the classification of the
crime, or as an aggravating circumstance to augment the penalty, it must be
shown that the treacherous acts were present at and preceded the
commencement of the attack which caused the injury complained of. After the
commencement of such attack and before its termination an accused person
may have employed means or methods which were of a treacherous
character, and yet such means or methods would not constitute the
circumstance of alevosia. One continuous attack, such as the one which
resulted in the death of the deceased Flores, can not be broken up into two or
more parts and made to constitute separate, distinct, and independent
attacks so that treachery may be injected therein and considered as a
qualifying or aggravating circumstance.
Nocturnity is not necessarily an aggravating circumstance, and the same
should be taken into consideration according to the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime. Where it is not evident that the

defendants had purposely sought the nighttime to perpetrate the crime,

nocturnity can not be considered as an aggravating circumstance. While it is
true that the defendants in the case under consideration killed the deceased
about eight o'clock at night, it is not shown that they purposely sought this
hour for this purpose.
As to the aggravating circumstance of the crime having been committed in an
uninhabited place, also taken into consideration by the court below, the
record discloses that this crime was committed on the railroad tracks, within
90 yards of inhabited houses. The houses were sufficiently near for the
inmates to have heard calls for help if the deceased had cried out in a loud
voice.
An uninhabited place is one where there are no houses at all, a considerable
distance from town, or where the houses are scattered at a great distance
from each other. (U. S. vs. Salgado, 11 Phil. Rep., 56.).
In the commission of this crime there not having been present any of the
qualifying circumstances set out in article 403 of the Penal Code, the crime
must be classified as that of homicide, and in the absence of any of the
extenuating or aggravating circumstances mentioned in articles 9 and 10 of
said code, the penalty must be imposed in its medium degree.
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, reversed and each of the
defendants is condemned to fourteen years, eight months, and one day
reclusion temporal, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P1,000, to the accessory penalties as provided by law,
and each to pay one-half of the costs. So ordered.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN GANZAGAN,
JR. Y MADAYAG,Accused-Appellant.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF; SHIFTED TO THE ACCUSED
WHO INVOKES SELF-DEFENSE. It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal
law that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies squarely on the
shoulders of the prosecution. Conviction must rest, not on the weakness of
the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. In cases, however, where
the accused admits committing the crime but invokes self-defense to escape
liability, the rule is reversed and the burden of proof is shifted to the accused
to prove the elements of his defense.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES;. SELF-DEFENSE; ELEMENTS.
In claiming self-defense appellant needs to convincingly establish that: (1)
Servillano acted with unlawful aggression towards him; (2) the means he
employed to repel such aggression was reasonable; and (3) he did not
sufficiently provoke Servillano towards aggression. If appellant fails to

discharge this burden of proof, his conviction shall of necessity follow, on the
basis of his admission to the killing.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION, CONSTRUED. Unlawful aggression,
which is an indispensable element of self-defense, is an assault or attack, or a
threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the
accuseds life in actual peril. It is an offensive act positively strong and
determinative of the aggressors intent to cause harm or injury. It presupposes
a material attack which is impending or at the point of happening, and not
merely an intimidating attitude or stance.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION CEASES WHERE ASSAILANT WHO WAS
DISARMED FLEES; ABSENCE OF IMMEDIATE DANGER TO LIFE OF APPELLANT
WHERE HOSTILITIES RESUMED WHERE APPELLANT WAS THE ARMED
PROTAGONIST. In the case at bench, appellant testified that after the initial
bolo attack on him, he was able to take possession of the weapon and run
away from Servillano. At that point, the unlawful aggression against him
effectively ceased. When hostilities resumed five minutes later, appellant was
the armed protagonist, and Servillanos act of trying to wrest the bolo back
from him cannot be considered as unlawful aggression. Appellant no longer
faced any imminent or immediate danger to his life and limb from his
opponent. There was no unlawful aggression by Servillano. Appellant had
nothing to repel. Therefore, he cannot successfully posit the view that he was
merely defending himself when he killed Servillano.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIM BELIED BY FIVE (5) GAPING WOUNDS ON VICTIMS NECK,
RUNNING FROM THE BACK OF THE HEAD TO THE NAPE EXPOSING SEVERED
MUSCLES, VEINS AND ARTERIES. Parenthetically, appellants claim of selfdefense is further belied by the physical evidence in the case, specifically the
number, location and severity of the hacked wounds found on Servillano. Dr.
Gonzales found five (5) gaping wounds on Servillanos neck, running from the
back of the head to the nape which exposed and severed the muscles, veins
and arteries in the neck area. These indicate clearly that appellants act was
no longer one of self-preservation, "but a determined effort to kill his
victim."cralaw virtua1aw library
6. ID.; CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS; ABSENCE OF QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
MAKES THE KILLING HOMICIDE. The circumstances that qualify murder
must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself. The presence of treachery
and evident premeditation must not be deduced from mere presumption or
sheer speculation. Unfortunately, in the case at bench, that is exactly what
the trial court did in concluding that both qualifying circumstances are
present. Absent the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident

premeditation, the crime committed by appellant is not murder, but homicide,

as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
7. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; CONSTRUED. Article 14
(16) of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery thus: "There is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make." (Italics ours.) Its essence lies
in the adoption of ways that minimize or neutralize any resistance which may
be put up by the offended party.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. In the present case, the
prosecution failed to present any witness to testify as to the manner by which
Servillano was attacked by appellant. Their sole eyewitness, Elino Manuel,
only saw the actual hacking of the victim by appellant, and not the events
that led to it. The records provide no basis for the trial courts finding of
treachery. (People v. Bachar, 170 SCRA 700 [1989]).
9. ID.; ID.; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; ELEMENTS. Evident premeditation
suggests the deliberate hatching of a plan to execute a crime. Its elements
are: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt
act/acts manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination;
and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its
actual execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the
consequences of his acts.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEGATED BY ABSENCE OF DIRECT EVIDENCE OF THE
PLANNING AND PREPARATION TO THE KILL VICTIM. Time and again, we
have held that evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify a
killing to murder in the absence of direct evidence of the planning and
preparation to kill when the plan was conceived. In the case at bench, the
prosecution failed to prove with any certainty that appellant had planned and
prepared to kill Servillano previous to the fatal hacking. The records are bereft
of any indication of such a plot. Furthermore, the findings of the court a quo
that appellant was already armed with a bolo when he went to the Manuel
residence looking for Servillano and that he waited in ambush for the latter,
are totally unfounded. These were never mentioned in the testimony of
prosecution eyewitness Elino Manuel.
DECISION

PUNO, J.:
In order for conviction to lie, all the elements of the crime must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of murder, it is incumbent upon the
prosecution to muster the evidence required by the Constitution to show not
only that the unlawful killing was perpetrated by the accused, but also that
any of the attendant circumstances that qualify it to murder exists. If it cannot
be proven with moral certainty that at least one of the qualifying
circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is
present, the prosecution fails in its task, and the accused must be freed from
liability for murder.
The case at bench commenced upon the filing on June 13, 1988 of an
Information before the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, 1
charging appellant JUAN MADAYAG GONZAGA, JR. 2 of murdering SERVILLANO
VILLANUEVA MANUEL, JR., as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 1st day of April 1988, in the evening, at Barangay
Bayaoas, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being then armed with a single bladed bolo, called "Panabas", measuring
about 26 inches including its handle, with deliberate intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and hack one Servillano Manuel, Jr. y
Villanueva,
inflicting
upon
him
the
following
injuries,
to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Significant External Findings:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Abrasion, both knees; abrasion, right shoulder, lateral aspect; abrasion,
right forefinger and middle finger; abrasion, chin, right half; abrasion with
ecchysmosis, right temple near right eye;
Gaping wound, neck, left half, middle half, with exposed and severed
muscles, veins and arteries, measuring 11 cms x 4 cms.;
Incised wound, forehead, right half, above right eyebrow with exposed
bone, measuring 6 cms. x 2 cms.;
Incised wound, forehead, middle, measuring 5 cms. x 1 cm., with exposed
wound;

 Incised wound, forehead, left half, with exposed bone, measuring 5 cms. x
1 cm.;
Gaping wounds (5) nape and back of skull, beginning from back of head
going down to nape;
Wound #1: measures 6 1/2 cms. x 1 cm.;
#2: measures 7 1/2 cms. x1 1/2 cms.;
#3: measures 3 cms. x 1 1/2 cms.
#4: 12 cms. x 1 1/2 cms.
#5: 6 cms. x 11/2 cms.
"Significant Internal Findings:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Neck, left half, lateral aspect; severed jugular vein and carotid artery;
Fracture, linear, right frontal bone, 6 cms. long;
Fracture, linear, middle half of frontal bone, 2 cms. long;
Fracture, linear, left half of frontal bone. 5 cms. long;
which accused the death of Servillano Manuel, Jr., y Villanueva as a
consequence, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Appellant was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the charge levelled against
him. Trial ensued.
The records show that appellant and Servillano Manuel, Jr. lived in the same
neighborhood in Sitio Las Vegas, Barangay Bayaoas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. 3
During his lifetime, Servillano worked as a kristo, or cockpit bet caller, and as
a collector in carnival shows. 4 Before his arrest, appellant was working parttime as a laborer. 5
The prosecution produced an eyewitness in the person of ELINO MANUEL, 6
Servillanos younger brother. Elino narrated that sometime after five oclock in
the afternoon (5:00 p.m.) of April 1, 1988, appellant came. to their house
looking for Servillano. 7 Failing to find him there, appellant boxed the door of
the Manuel residence twice and left in a huff. "Hutdon mong tanan, patyon

mong tanan," he uttered in Visayan as he left. 8 Chills ran down Elinos spine.
In his mind, he translated appellant threat: "I will kill you all!" 9
Fearing for his brothers life, Elino rushed to the corner of Las Vegas Road and
Sison Street, where he expected Servillano to pass on his way home from the
poblacion. Unfortunately, he was wrong, for Servillano opted to take an
alternate route back to their house. 10
After waiting in vain at the corner for about an hour, Elino headed home. On
his way, he caught sight of appellant hacking Servillano with a bolo about
fifteen (15) meters from where he was. Servillano was then stooped forward
and away from appellant, with his head down and backside pointed upward.
11 Immobilized by shock, Elino witnessed appellant strike Servillano four
times, and then throw aside the bloodied bolo he used. Appellant escaped onboard a tricycle, together with his brother-in-law, Ernesto Adame. 12
Servillanos body was autopsied on the morning of April 2, 1988, by rural
health unit physician DR. RAMON GONZALES, JR., 13 who found the cause of
death to be "irreversible shock due to arterial hemorrhage caused by the
hacking wound, neck." 14 His findings were reduced to a written report, 15
the contents of which are quoted in and incorporated into the Information filed
against Appellant.
The defense did not challenge the result of the autopsy conducted on
Servillanos body, and did not question the medical findings as to the cause of
death. Appellant, in fact, admitted that he inflicted the fatal hacked wounds
on Servillano. However, appellant sought shelter behind the doctrine of selfdefense. He and his wife, MARILOU GANZAGAN, 16 related a completely
different version of what transpired on the day Servillano died.
The Ganzagas testified that at around five o clock in the afternoon (5:00 p.m.)
of April 1, 1988, they were at home. Marilou was then downstairs, preparing
some bilo-bilo, while appellant was on the upper level of the house watching
over their two-month-old infant daughter. 17 Suddenly, Servillano Manuel, Jr.,
who was visibly upset, barged into their house, looking for appellant. 18 He
left hurriedly without waiting for appellant to come down. 19
Not long after, Servillano returned to the Ganzagan residence. 20 This time,
he was armed with a bolo, with which he stuck the house near the kitchen. 21
Appellant confronted Servillano who cursed 22 and abruptly assaulted the
former with the bolo. He delivered an overhead hacking blow 23 to appellant,
who stepped back and parried the same with his right arm. The tip of the bolo
hit the appendage and produced a three-centimeter nick on it. 24 Marilou
rushed out of their house onto the street, screaming for help. None came to

her aid, as everyone was attending a procession along the Urdaneta-Asingan

provincial road. 25 When she returned to their house, neither appellant nor
Servillano was there. 26 She did not think to lack for the two, and merely
remained inside their house. 27
Meanwhile, after a brief tussle with Servillano, appellant was able to wrest the
bolo away from him. With bolo in hand, appellant ran to the middle of the
street. 28 He stopped when he remembered his baby, who was left alone in
their house. 29 For the next five minutes appellant stood transfixed on the
road. 30 The impass was broken by Servillano who renewed his attack. 31 In
trying to grad the bolo back from appellant, Servillano stumbled and fell
forward, face down and with his backside pointing up. 32 It was then that
appellant hacked Servillano several times. 33
Appellant fled from the scene of the crime. He went into hiding, 34 and a
week passed after the incident before his wife saw him again. 35 Much later,
during the pendency of the trial against him, appellant jumped bail. 36
In rebuttal, the prosecution submitted in evidence a certification of the death
of the Ganzagas four-month-old son, Michael, on January 15, 1988, barely
two-and-a-half (2 1/2) months before Servillanos killing.
At the close of trial, the court a quo decided against appellant. It
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The killing was qualified by evident premeditation and treachery because
when (appellant) went to the house of the victim armed with a bolo looking for
the latter who was not around, he had already the intention to kill him and
said intention to kill was never abandoned as he waited for the arrival of the
victim whom he saw along the road. There was treachery as the accused
hacked the victim by the neck several times and the sudden and frontal
attack on the forehead, thus causing his bones on the forehead to be exposed
as shown in the medical certificate . . . The exposure of the bones would only
show that the hacking was therefore so strong enough as to insure his
premeditated intention to kill the victim.
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing discussion, this Court believes that
the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the (appellant) beyond
reasonable doubt. Pursuant to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court
hereby finds the (appellant) Juan Ganzagan, Jr., guilty of the crime of Murder
and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, considering the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution (Art. III, Section 19(1)), and with all the
accessory penalties provided by law; and to pay the civil liability of

P50,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased; and moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, with costs.
"SO ORDERED." (Citations omitted) 37
Appellant now sets forth the following assigned errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
"I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING SELF-DEFENSE AS A GROUND
FOR ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
"II
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS AT ALL GUILTY, THE TRIAL
COURT NEVERTHELESS ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM FOR MURDER INSTEAD OF
ONLY
HOMICIDE
CONSIDERING
THAT
NEITHER
THE
QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE
OF
TREACHERY
NOR
PREMEDITATION
WAS
DULY
ESTABLISHED." 38
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant is not guilty of murder.
Appellant reiterates his reliance on the doctrine of self-defense to justify the
killing of Servillano. He argues that he was able to prove all the elements of
defense of self, namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
We are not persuaded.
There are strong reasons to doubt the defense version of the facts that led to
the killing of Servillano. The account of the Ganzaga spouses is inconsistent
with the common experience and observation of mankind. 39 Especially
difficult to accept are the following assertions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) On the fateful afternoon of April 1, 1988, appellant was preparing bilo-bilo
on the second floor of their house because he was looking after their twomonth-old infant daughter. This is highly peculiar, since according to the
records of their parish church (Exh. "F", Original Records, p. 227), their fourmonth-old infant son, Michael died barely two-and-a-half months prior to
Servillanos killing;

(2) While appellant and Servillano were grappling for possession of the latters
bolo, Marilou ran out to seek help. She said that she only ran to a distance of
fifty (50) to one hundred (100) meters from their house, but it took her thirty
(30) minutes to return home (TSN of November 22, 1993, pp. 5, 9, 10);
(3) None heeded Marilous call for help because everyone else in their entire
neighborhood was attending a procession on the main road (Ibid., at p. 5);
(4) When Marilou returned home and found neither her husband (appellant)
nor Servillano there, she did not either out of worry or curiosity even try
to find out what had happened to them (Id., at pp. 5, 12);
(5) After he succeeded in taking the bolo away from Servillano, appellant ran
out of their house to the middle of the road, where he stopped and stood
doing nothing for five minutes. On cross-examination, he claimed that he
stopped because he remembered that their infant daughter was left alone in
their house. But, he did not attempt to return to their home anyway;
(6) It took Servillano five minutes to reach appellant, who was standing fifteen
(15) meters from where they had previously been wrestling, because he
(Servillano) was drunk (TSN of November 23, 1993, p. 20); and
(7) When Servillano finally caught up with appellant, he did not attack the
former immediately although he thought that Servillano was again armed with
a weapon. Instead, he waited until Servillano stumbled face down while trying
to wrest the bolo away from him (appellant).
Furthermore, appellants self-contradictions and vacillations in his testimony
are patent and numerous. These were exposed in his cross-examination,
where he was confronted and asked to explain several of his contradictory
statements, viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"FISCAL VENIEGAS:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q On April 1, 1988 at about 5:00 oclock, Servillano Manuel was drunk and he
came to you in your house and extorted money from you, is that correct?
"WITNESS:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A Yes, sir.
"Q As he used to do in the past everytime he is drunk?
"A Yes, sir.

"Q And he was asking money from you?

"A Yes, sir.
"Q How did he try to ask you for liquor money? Will you quote what he said?
"A He told me, Will you give me money because I got short in the other side
and I need some more money.
"Q Is that (during) the first time that he came or on the second time when he
returned to your house?
"A The first time, sir.
"Q The first time, when you were upstairs, making bilo-bilo?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And he was talking to you?
"A He talked with my wife, sir.
"Q So, it was not you from whom he was asking money, but it was your wife?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q But you said the first time that he came, you testified that he was asking
for you name and later he was asking for you from your wife.
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Then he left and later on, after about 30 minutes, he came back?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And you went down because as you were upstairs, you went down and
asked him why he was asking you. Correct?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And Servillano Manuel without saying a word hacked you immediately. Is
that correct according to your testimony?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q Then you wrestled and wrested the bolo from him and you ran to the
street. Is that correct?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And in your earlier testimony there is no point in time when you talked to
him and (when he) asked you for wine money. Is that correct?
"A Yes, sir.
"x

"Q When Servillano Manuel returned to your house as you said, did he also
ask where you were from your wife?
"A Not anymore because he immediately hacked the post in the doorway.
"Q And at that time, you got irked and you went downstairs?
"A I went down. He was the one who got mad. I just went down the stairs.
"Q What did he tell you when he came back if any?
"A He said, vulva of your mother.
"Q Because you asked him why he was looking for you, correct?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And he answered, Okinnam (vulva of your mother)?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q In direct examination, you said that when Servillano returned after half an
hour after the first time that he came to your house, you went down your
house, asking him why he hacked the post and you said he did not answer
and immediately hacked with a bolo on your right hand. Do you remember
having said that?
"A Yes, sir.

"Q Why did you say that he answered you vulva of your mother? Are you
changing your previous testimony?
"A Immediately before he hacked me, he said vulva of your mother.
"Q In other words, your previous testimony that he did not say anything
before he hacked you is not correct?
"A That is true.
"Q But you did not tell the Court that he said vulva of your mother.
"A He said that.
"Q But you did not mention to the Court in the first time.
"A Because I am nervous.
"x

"Q Now, in your direct testimony, you said that after wresting the bolo from
Servillano, you ran towards the road and you stood there for five (5) minutes
after which Servillano Manuel came to you and attacked you. Do you
remember having stated that?
"A That is why I pause for five (5) minutes in the road, because I thought of
my baby in the house whom I wanted to protect because he might harm the
baby instead.
"Q But you also left your wife in the kitchen with your baby upstairs, correct?
"A She was not there anymore because as soon as we fought with Servillano
Manuel, my wife became hysterical and she ran away.
"Q When you were at the road, you thought of your baby as you said. That is
why you stayed there for five (5) minutes?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And then it was at that time that Servillano Manuel appeared and tried to
kill you as the intention as you said was to kill you.
"A Yes, sir.

"Q But he was already unarmed because you had already wrested the bolo
from him?
"A Yes sir, because during that time, I thought that he still had some arms
with him because it was quite dark already.
"COURT
"Q When you were standing there at the road, Servillano approached you?
"A Yes, Maam.
"Q When he approached you, why did you say that Servillano has intention to
kill you?
"A When Servillano Manuel came and approached me, he was so mad. I
thought he was armed and it was quite dark then, so I decided to hack him.
"Q When you decided to hack him, what did you use? The bolo you wrested
from him?
"A Yes, Maam.
"Q Did he grapple for the possession of the bolo from you in the road?
"A He tried to wrest the bolo from me while we were in the road.
"x

"Q Will you demonstrate how he grappled the bolo again?

"A While I was holding the bolo downward and I was standing by the road,
Servillano Manuel came and lunged forward to get the bolo from my hand,
and in that instance, he stumbled to the ground.
"Q Will you demonstrate how Servillano stumbled?
"A As he lunged forward to get the bolo from my hand, I moved my hand
which held the bolo away from him. So, he fell to the ground, face down.
"Q With the buttocks up?
"A (The witness demonstrated how Servillano Manuel fell to the ground, face
down with his buttocks up.)

"FISCAL VENIEGAS:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q And Servillano Manuel was in that position when you hacked him?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Could you tell the Court in the first blow when you hacked him, where did
you hack him? What, part of his body?
"A His face and his arm.
"Q You mean that in that position with face on the ground, you hacked his face
and his hand?
"A When Servillano came towards me he tried to wrestle the bolo away from
me. That is why I lunged the bolo to his face. That is why his face and arm
were hit.
"Q At the same time, the face was hit?
"A I cannot recall.
"Q So, it is not true that when he came at you after you were standing there
for five (5) minutes and you concluded his intention to kill you when he
wrested the bolo, that he fell to the ground as you said?
"A The first time he tried to wrestle the bolo from me, I immediately hacked
him on the fact and the second time, he tried to wrestle (was when he fell
down).
"Q But in the demonstration, you demonstrated only one attempt on his part
to wrestle the bolo from you. Is that correct?
"A Yes, sir.
"x

x" 40

In any event, even granting the defenses factual assertions, we are still
unimpressed theory of self-defense.
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that the burden of proving the
guilt of the accused lies squarely on the shoulders of the prosecution.
Conviction must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength

of the prosecution. 41 In cases, however, where the accused admits

committing the crime but invokes self-defense to escape liability, the rule is
reversed and the burden of proof is shifted to the accused to prove the
elements of his defense. As held in the case of People v. Boniao, 217 SCRA
653 (1993):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"By invoking self-defense, the appellant admitted killing the four (4) victims.
The burden is, therefore, upon him to prove the existence, by clear and
convincing evidence, of its essential requisites . . .; otherwise stated, the onus
probandi was thus shifted to him . . . He just rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution . . ., for even if
the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after he himself admitted the
killing . . ." (Citations omitted)
Thus, in claiming self-defense, appellant needs to convincingly establish that:
(1) Servillano acted with unlawful aggression towards him; (2) the means to
employed to repel such aggression was reasonable; and (3) he did not
sufficiently provoke Servillano towards aggression. If appellant fails to
discharge this burden of proof, his conviction shall of necessity follow, on the
basis of his admission to the killing.
Unlawful aggression, which is an indispensable element of self-defense, 42 is
an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate
manner, which places the accuseds life in actual peril. 43 It is an offensive
act positively strong and determinative of the aggressors intent to cause
harm or injury. 44 It presupposes material attack which is impending or at the
point of happening, and not merely an intimidating attitude or stance.
In the case at bench, appellant testified that after the initial bolo attack on
him, he was able to take possession of the weapon and run away from
Servillano. At that point, the unlawful aggression against him effectively
ceased. When hostilities resumed five minutes later, appellant was the armed
protagonist, and Servillanos act of trying to wrest the bolo back from him
cannot be considered as unlawful aggression. Appellant no longer faced any
imminent or immediate danger to his life and limb from his opponent.
There was no unlawful aggression by Servillano. Appellant had nothing to
repel. Therefore, he cannot successfully posit the view that he was merely
defending himself when he killed Servillano.
Parenthetically, appellants claim of self-defense is further belied by the
physical evidence in the case, specifically the number, location and severity of
the hacked wounds found on Servillano. Dr. Gonzales found five (5) gaping
wounds on Servillanos neck, running from the back of the head to the nape

which exposed and severed the muscles, veins and arteries in the neck area.
These indicate clearly that appellants act was no longer one of selfpreservation, "but a determined effort to kill his victim." 45
Appellant next postulates that even if self-defense were unavailable to him,
he should only have been found guilty of committing homicide, and not
murder. He claims that neither treachery nor evident premeditation, which are
alleged in the Information, are present in the case at bench.
We are convinced.
The circumstances that qualify murder must be proven as indubitably as the
killing itself. The presence of treachery 46 and evident premeditation 47 must
not be deduced from mere presumption or sheer speculation. Unfortunately,
in the case at bench, that is exactly what the trial court did in concluding that
both qualifying circumstances are present.
Article 14 (16) of the
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Revised

Penal

Code

defines

treachery

"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, method, or form in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make." (Emphasis
ours)
Its essence lies in the adoption of ways that minimize or neutralize any
resistance which may be put up by the offended party.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any witness to testify as
to the manner by which Servillano was attacked by appellant. Their sole
eyewitness, Elino Manuel, only saw the actual hacking of the victim by
appellant, and not the events that led to it. The records provide no basis for
the trial courts finding of treachery. As we held in the case of People v
Bachar, 170 SCRA 700 (1989) 48 :jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Not a single eyewitness to the stabbing incident had been presented by
the prosecution. Thus, the record is totally bereft of any evidence as to the
means or method resorted to by appellant in attacking the victim. It is
needless to add that treachery cannot be deduced from mere presumption,
much less from sheer speculation. The same degree of proof to dispel
reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may be reached
respecting the attendance of alevosia."cralaw virtua1aw library

Evident premeditation suggests the deliberate hatching of a plan to execute a

crime. Its elements are: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the
crime; (2) an overt act/acts manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the
crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon
the consequences of his acts.
Time and again, we have held that evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated to qualify a killing murder in the absence of direct evidence of the
planning and preparation to kill when the plan was conceived. 49 In the case
at bench, the prosecution failed to prove with any certainty that appellant had
planned and prepared to kill Servillano previous to the fatal hacking. The
records are bereft of any indication of such a plot. Furthermore, the findings of
the court a quo that appellant was already armed with a bolo when he went to
the Manuel residence looking for Servillano and that he waited in ambush for
the latter, are totally unfounded. These were never mentioned in the
testimony of prosecution eyewitness Elino Manuel.
Absent the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation,
the crime committed by appellant is not murder, but homicide, as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the conviction of appellant JUAN MADAYAG GANZAGAN, JR.
by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 48 in Criminal
Case No. U-4850 is AFFIRMED, but he is found GUILTY of the lesser crime of
HOMICIDE. The appealed Decision, dated December 6, 1993, is MODIFIED so
that appellant shall instead suffer the penalty of from twelve (12) years of
prison mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
G.R. No. 1255
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. FELIPE ABAIGAR,
defendant-appellant.
Fermin Mariano for appellant.
Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
MAPA, J.:
The testimony of the witnesses and the confession of the accused himself
show unquestionably that the latter stabbed Constantino Nabaonag to death
while he was bound, and therefore unable to defend himself against the
aggression. This circumstance constitutes alevosia, and the offense is
therefore properly classified as murder, defined and punished by article 403 of
the Penal Code. It follows, therefore, that the judgment of the court below now
before us in consultation is correct, in so far as it finds the defendant guilty of
the crime of murder.

This judgment condemns the accused to the penalty of death, the court
considering that the crime was committed with the aggravating
circumstances of deliberate premeditation, the employment of means tending
to add ignominy to the necessary effects of the acts, and the commission of
the crime with the assistance of armed men.
The opinion of the court in this regard does not meet with our approval. There
was no premeditation, because an examination of the record shows that the
purpose of killing Constantino arose suddenly in the mind of the defendant,
and was instantaneously carried into effect, upon information that the
deceased had spoken ill of the defendant.
The accused says: "As soon as I heard of this I became furiously enraged; I
seized my dagger and killed him at once." This part of the defendant's
testimony was not disproven in the course of the trial. The determination to
kill was, then, followed immediately by the execution of the crime; and
consequently between the determination to commit the act and its actual
commission there was no opportunity for the cold, meditative, and persistent
reflection, which constitutes premeditation, which is essentially different from
a simple determination of the will, which is always presumed in the
commission of every offense.
The circumstance of ignominy was not present because no means were
employed nor did any circumstances surround the act tending to make the
effects of the crime more humiliating. Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining
to the moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury
caused by the crime. The fact that the deceased was killed in the presence of
his wife is the circumstance which the court below had in view when declaring
that this circumstance had concurred.
Furthermore, the evidence shows that the crime was not committed with the
assistance of armed men. The testimony of the accused, corroborated by that
of the witness for the prosecution, Francisco Abadiano, is that the crime was
committed by the defendant alone, without assistance from any one. It is true
that in the house near the place where the crime was committed there were
ten men armed with daggers, according to the statements of the witness
referred to, and five without arms, according to the accused, but as these men
took no part, directly or indirectly, in the commission of the crime, and it does
not appear that they heard the conversation which caused the sudden
determination on the part of the accused to kill the deceased, and still less
that they had in any way participated in this determination, we can not, within
the law, find that this circumstance concurred in the commission of the crime
prosecuted for the purpose of augmenting the criminal responsibility of the
accused. The mere casual presence of armed men, more or less numerous,
near the place of the occurrence does not constitute an aggravating
circumstance when it appears that the defendant did not avail himself in any
way of their aid, and did not knowingly count upon their assistance in the
commission of the crime.

In the present case, there being no circumstancial tending to modify the guilt
of the defendant, the penalty is that prescribed by article 403 of the Penal
Code in its medium grade, to wit, the penalty of life imprisonment, and not
the penalty of death imposed by the court.
For the reasons stated we reverse the judgment in so far as it condemns the
defendant to death, and impose upon the latter the penalty of life
imprisonment, and condemn him to the payment of an indemnification of
1,000 Mexican pesos to the heirs of the deceased, together with the costs of
this instance.
THE UNITED STATES, complainant and appellee, vs, TEODORO DE
LEON, defendant and appellant.
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE.Where the
deceased was removed by violence from his house by order of the defendant,
was tortured and maltreated by defendant, and was taken by the latter to the
place where his lifeless body was found a few days later, the evidence shows
guilt of defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. ID.; ID.; ; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.The fact that the deceased
was bound while killed constitutes the qualificative circumstance of alevosa
and raises the crime to the degree of murder, while the presence of the
additional aggravating circumstances of extreme cruelty and needless
humiliation makes it necessary to impose the extreme penalty.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bataan.
The facts appear in the opinion of the court.
Vicente G. Azaola, for appellant.
Assistant Attorney-General Constantino, for appellee.
WlLLARD, J.:
On the 28th of June, 1897, Don Julio Banson was in a small hut with his wife
and child. Two men, called Fabian and Tolome, now deceased, presented
themselves, apparently unarmed. After entering the hut they drew their bolos,
bound the said Banson, and compelled him to go with them. Upon reaching a
point near the fields of said Banson where five servants of his were working,
the two kidnappers forced the said servants to proceed with them. At that
point the defendant joined them, appearing from behind a knoll where he had
concealed himself. Upon so appearing he exclaimed, according to one
witness: "It was written that you were to fall in my power;" according to

another witness: "Thanks be given that I have caught you, now you are in my
hands;" according to another, "Thanks be given that you have fallen into my
power." The defendant then beat him with the butt of a gun which he carried
until they arrived at a place called Bulutong, where he made the five servants
place themselves in single file and ordered Don Julio to kneel before them and
maltreated the latter brutally, saying: "Give me the amount of the cedula
which you collected; now you will pay me for the blows which I received in the
tribunal." Not satisfied with torturing the deceased by himself he ordered
Tolome to give him a blow upon the chest with a bolo. Don Julio begging for
mercy, the defendant sent one of the servants to the wife of the deceased to
ask for $1,000 for his ransom. After the servant had been sent all were led to
a place called Cosme and upon arriving there the defendant ordered Fabian
and Tolome to conduct Don Julio to a ditch. At the same time the witness and
his three companions were given their liberty by the defendant, who remained
with his two companions and with Don Julio. Don Julio was never afterwards
seen alive and his headless body was found two or three days later in this
same place.
No eyewitness has testified to the killing of Banson by the defendant, but the
violent death of the former is proved, and that the defendant is responsible
for such death as principal admits of no reasonable doubt. In conformity with.
an apparently preconceived plan, Banson was violently taken from his house
by two armed servants or dependents of the defendant; he was bound and
cruelly wounded and beaten by the defendant and his henchmen at his order,
and he was taken by the defendant to the place where a few days later his
headless body was found. This evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant
as principal.
From the evidence there appears the qualifying circumstance of treachery. To
show this it is only necessary to mention the fact that the deceased was
bound. There is present also the generic circumstance No. 6 of article 10. The
evidence shows that the defendant was beaten into a state of almost
insensibility, not with the intention of then killing him but to cause him
unnecessary suffering as a preliminary to the killing. There is present also the
twelfth generic circumstance of article 10, proved by the fact that the
deceased, a land owner, was forced to kneel in front of his four servants
drawn up in line before him.
The writer of this decision is also of the opinion that there is present the
seventh generic circumstance, article 10, that of "acting with known
premeditation." But it is not necessary to so decide as the two other
circumstances raise the penalty to the maximum grade.

For the reasons above stated the judgment of the court below is reversed and
we adjudge that the defendant is guilty of the crime of murder with the sixth
and twelfth aggravating circumstances of article 10 of the Penal Code, and we
condemn him to the penalty of death with indemnification of $1,000 to the
widow and heirs of the deceased and with costs of both instances. In case of
the nonexecution of the penalty imposed through the pardon of the accused,
it shall then be understood that he is condemned to perpetual absolute
disqualification and subjected to the vigilance of the authorities during his life,
unless these accessory penalties be specially remitted by executive clemency.
The case is remanded to the court below with instructions to proceed therein
in accordance with law. [United States vs. De Leon, 1 Phil., 163(1902)]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAFAEL
SAYLAN alias PAEL, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Witnesses; Credibility; Supreme Court; Heavy reliance by
Supreme Court on determination by trial judges on the question of credibility
of witnesses.This is a typical rape case. Only the participants could directly
testify on the alleged sexual abuse and the accused alleges consent on the
part of the complainant. The question of credibility arises and under the
circumstances We have to rely heavily on the determination made by the trial
judge who observed the demeanor of the witnesses while before Us is only
the cold transcript of what they said.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Findings and conclusions of trial court entitled to
great respect.We have said above that the findings and conclusions of the
trial court are entitled to great respect.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Appellants defense that sexual intercourse was
by mutual agreement, utterly incredible, being contrary to reason and
common sense; Complainants version has indicia of credibility.The claim of
the appellant that the sexual intercourse was mutually agreed is utterly
incredible. If it were true that Mrs. Agno consented to have coitus with the
appellant, her conduct thereafter defies understanding because it is contrary
to reason and it has not been shown that Mrs. Agno, a school teacher, was
bereft of common sense. For if it was true that the sexual act was indeed
mutually desired and performed why did she complain not only to her
husband but also to the authorities? An affair such as that claimed by the
appellant is carried out in a discreet manner. On the other hand, the version of
the complainant has indicia of credibility. For her version bared her shame to a
small community and her exposure was necessary only because she had to
reveal the truth. No, We simply cannot believe the appellants version.

Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Abuse of superior strength not

aggravating, as it is inherent in the crime of rape, and absent evidence that
the accused purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime.The
trial court disregarded superiority because it is inherent in the crime of rape
or is absorbed in the element of force. It also did not consider nocturnity
there being no evidence that the accused purposely sought it to facilitate the
commission of this rape.
Same; Same; Same; Despoblado or uninhabited place, present, as the
accused dragged the victim to a carabao trail about 10 meters from the
junction; Presence of occasional passersby does not destroy the place as
being uninhabited.Despoblado was present according to the trial court
because: The accused dragged the offended party, at the point of a dagger,
to the carabao trail, about 10 meters from the junction, but 40 to 50 meters
below to better attain his purpose without interference, and to better secure
himself from detection and punishment (U.S. vs. Vitug, 17 Phil. 1). Even the
junction where the two children were left is already 400 meters from the
nearest house. While there may be occasional passerby, this does not destroy
its being an uninhabited place. (People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 87). (Id. p. 62.)
We hold that the trial court for the reasons stated correctly held that the crime
was committed in an uninhabited place.
Same; Same; Ignominy, aggravating, as appellant used not only the
missionary position but in the dogs way of sexual intercourse.The trial court
held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the
missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior, but also The same
position as dogs do i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was
no ignominy because The studies of many experts in the matter have shown
that this position is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to
by couples in the act of copulation. (Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if the
sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.
Same; Same; Reiteration, not aggravating; Reason.The trial court also held
that there is no reiteracion because one of the offenses, namely Robbery in
Band, for which the accused has been penalized, was committed after the
commission of this rape case, and the penalty imposed on the other offense of
Frustrated Homicide, is lighter than the penalty for rape. (Id., p. 63.)
Same; Same; Penalty; Damages; Death penalty for rape commuted to
reclusion perpetua for lack of votes, indemnity awarded to offended party
increased to P20,000.The judgment under review is modified in the sense
that the appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of
death and the indemnity to be paid to the offended party is increased to
P20,000.00. [People vs. Saylan, 130 SCRA 159(1984)]

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental in Criminal Case No. 52-M which imposed the
death penalty.
RAFAEL SAYLAN was accused of the crime of rape in the sworn complaint of
Eutropia Agno said to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of January, 1972, at more or less 7:00 o'clock in
the evening, at Sitio Craser, Malinao, Jingo City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with deliberate
intent to have sexual intercourse, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally with the use of a dagger, force and intimidate Eutropia Agno y
Arcay, to remove her pantie and to lay down on the ground and with the use
of a dagger, force and intimidation succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with Eutropia Agno y Arcay, a woman of good reputation and against her will.
That the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the
aggravating circumstances of: abuse of superior strength, nighttime,
uninhabited place, ignominy and reiteracion. (Expediente, p. 27.)
The accused entered a plea of "not guilty" and after trial the court rendered
the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape, penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 4111, and the commission of the offense having
been attended by three aggravating without any mitigating circumstance,
hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, to indemnify
the offended party in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), and to
pay the costs. In view of the fact that the offended party is a married woman,
aside from the fact that she has not become pregnant as a result of the
commission of the rape, the Court makes no pronouncement as to
acknowledgment and support of offspring. (Id., p. 64.)
The factual version of the prosecution is summarized in the People's brief as
follows:
The complaining witness, Eutropia A. Agno, a married woman and a resident
of Barrio Malinao, Gingoog City, was a classroom teacher of the Malinao
Elementary School (pp. 2, 3, tsn., Feb. 22, 1973).

In the afternoon of January 23, 1971, Eutropia went to the public market in
Gingoog City to buy foodstuffs for her family and thereafter, she proceeded to
the store of her mother to fetch her five-year old daughter Nilsonita (p. 4, tsn.,
Id.). On their way home, Eutropia and Nilsonita boarded a passenger jeepney
and while inside the vehicle she (Eutropia) noticed that the other passengers
were Rudy Gonzales, a grade I pupil of the Malinao Elementary School, the
appellant, Rafael Saylan, and a couple whom she did not know (pp, 5, 6, tsn.,
Id.). The jeepney went only as far as Malinas citrus farm because the road to
Barrio Malinao was not passable by vehicles (p. 5, tsn., Id.). It was almost 6:30
o'clock in the evening when the jeepney arrived at the Malinas citrus farm and
so all the passengers alighted and had to walk all the way to Barrio Malinao
which was about three and a half kilometers away (p. 5, tsn., Id.). After
walking some distance and upon reaching a junction, the couple separated
from the group and took the road leading to their house while Eutropia's group
took the opposite road (p. 9, tsn., Id.).lwphl@it The appellant, however,
joined the group of Eutropia and when they reached the place where the road
was plain, appellant who was then walking side by side with Eutropia suddenly
pulled out a dagger about eight inches long and pointing it at the latter said,
"Do not shout, Nang, I will kill you!" (pp. 11, 12, tsn., Id.). At this juncture,
appellant placed his right arm around the neck of Eutropia with the dagger
pointed at her left breast (p. 12, tsn., Id.), after which he dragged Eutropia at
some distance. When they reached the junction of the trail for men and a trail
for carabaos, he ordered everybody to stop and told the children (Nilsonita
and Rudy Gonzales) to stay behind and threatened to kill them if they
persisted in following them (pp. 17, 18, tsn., Id.). Thereafter, appellant again
dragged Eutropia by her hand and brought her towards a creek near a
coconut tree which was about five meters away from where Nilsonita and
Rudy Gonzales were (pp. 14, 15, 16, tsn., Id.).lwphl@it The appellant then
ordered Eutropia to remove her panty which she refused at first, but appellant
threatened to kill her, so she removed her panty after which appellant ordered
her to lie down (pp. 18, 19, tsn., Id.). Subsequently, appellant placed himself
on top of the victim and inserted his penis into her vagina and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her by moving his buttocks up and down (pp.
20,21, tsn., Id.).
After the first sexual act, appellant ordered Eutropia to standup which the
latter helplessly and grudgingly followed (p. 23, tsn., Id.). Appellant again
inserted his penis into her vagina and then performed a push and puli
movement (pp. 23, 24, 25, tsn., Id.). Not satisfied with the second intercourse,
appellant ordered Eutropia to lie down again preparatory to a third intercourse
(p. 26, tsn., Id.). Appellant again performed the sexual act with her (pp. 26,
27, tsn., Id.).

After the third intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to stand up and then he
bent her body downwards with her hands and knees resting on the ground (p.
28, tsn., Id.). When the latter was already in this position, appellant then
placed himself behind her, inserted his penis into her vagina and executed a
push and puli movement in the dog's way of sexual intercourse (pp. 27, 28,
tsn., Id.)
After performing this uncommon way of sexual intercourse, appellant ordered
Eutropia to he down again which the latter reluctantly obeyed because
appellant's dagger was always pointed at her and thereafter he had carnal
knowledge of her for the fifth time (pp. 29, 30, tsn., Id.).
After the fifth intercourse, and after satisfying his sexual lust, appellant asked
Eutropia if she will tell her husband what he did to her and the latter
answered, "I will not tell" (p. 31, tsn., Id.). But she only said this so that
appellant would let her go home (p. 33, tsn., Id.).
Afterwards, Eutropia and appellant returned to the place where the children
were left and upon arriving thereat, they found Nilsonita (Eutropia's daughter)
asleep with Rudy seated dozing beside her (pp. 32, 33, tsn., Id.). Nilsonita who
was sleeping was carried by the appellant and then they all proceeded to
Malinao (pp. 33, 34, tsn., Id.).
After walking some distance, Eutropia saw the house of her friend "Ben" and
upon approaching the said house, she shouted, "Ben, Ben, please give me hot
water" (p. 34, tsn., Id.). Upon hearing her voice, Ben, who was still awake at
the time, opened the door of his house and allowed Eutropia to come up (p.
34, tsn., Id.). Eutropia immediately went upstairs and went straight to the
room of Ben as she was feeling very bad (p. 34, tsn., Id.). Appellant, who was
then carrying Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales, were also allowed to go upstairs
(p. 35, tsn., Id.). Meanwhile, Eutropia requested Ben to fetch her husband (p.
35, tsn., Id.).
When Eutropia woke up between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock that evening, her
husband was already there (p. 36, tsn., Id.). She then asked him whether the
appellant was stin around, and in reply, he told her that appellant had already
left (p. 37, tsn., Id.). Eutropia then told her husband that she was raped by the
appellant (p. 37, tsn., Id.). Upon learning of the dastardly act committed by
the appellant, he advised his wife to submit herself to a medical examination
(p. 37, tsn., Id.).
The following morning, the offended party was brought to the office of the City
Health Department of Gingoog City where she was examined by Dr. Ireneo O.

Pascual who after conducting a thorough physical examination, issued a

medical certificate with the following findings, to wit:
(1) Multiparous.
(2) Presence of viscid whitish secretions at vaginal fornix
(3) Microscopic examination of secretions reveals epithelial cells, but no
spermatozoa Identified.
(pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Feb. 24, 1973; Exh. "A").
Rudy Gonzales, a grade I pupil of the Malinao Elementary School and one of
the witnesses for the prosecution, testified that he met Mrs. Eutropia Agno in
the afternoon of January 23, 1972 at the public market of Gingoog City buying
foodstuffs for her family (pp. 2, 3, tsn., Feb. 26, 1973). On their way back to
Barrio Malinao, they boarded a passenger jeepney and while he was inside the
vehicle, he noticed that the other passengers aside from Mrs. Agno, her
daughter, and himself were the appellant and a couple whose names he did
not know ( p. 4, tsn., Id.). The jeepney, however, could only travel up to the
Marinas Citrus farm and so they had to walk all the way to Barrio Malinao (p.
4, tsn., Id.) After was some distance and upon reaching a trail for carabaos,
the appellant suddenly pulled a dagger and placed his arms around the neck
of Mrs. Agno and then dragged her towards the carabao trail (pp. 4, 5, tsn.,
Id.). Meanwhile, he and Nilsonita were left behind and they fell asleep because
it took a long time for the appellant and Mrs. Agno to come back for them (p.
5, tsn., Id.). When Mrs. Agno and the appellant returned, he was already
awake while Nilsonita was still asleep and so appellant had to carry her in
going home to Man (p. 6, tsn., Id.).lwphl@it After was some distance, Mrs.
Agno saw the house of Mang Ben and because she was feeling bad, they all
went to the house of Mang Ben where Mrs. Agno spent the night (p. 7, tsn.,
Id.). Afterwards, he and the appellant left the house of Mang Ben and then
they proceeded to his house at Malinao where both of them slept (pp. 7, 21,
tsn., Id.). (At pp. 2-8.)
The accused did not deny having had sexual intercourse with Mrs. Agno; in
fact he admitted that he copulated with her for three successive times in the
early evening of January 23, 1972, but he claimed that it was with her
consent. Accordingly, he now claims that:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE HAD
BEEN COMMITTED AGAINST THE WILL AND CONSENT OF THE COMPLAINANT.

II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

HAD ACCOMPANIED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE. (Brief, p. 5.)
The appeal must fail for the reasons stated hereunder.
This is a typical rape case. Only the participants could directly testify on the
alleged sexual abuse and the accused alleges consent on the part of the
complainant. The question of credibility arises and under the circumstances
We have to rely heavily on the determination made by the trial judge who
observed the demeanor of the witnesses while before Us is only the cold
transcript of what they said.
We accept the conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court that the
complainant was in fact raped by the appellant. There is no fact or
circumstance in the record which will justify a different action.
The claim of the appellant that the sexual intercourse was mutually agreed is
utterly incredible. If it were true that Mrs. Agno consented to have coitus with
the appellant, her conduct thereafter defies understanding because it is
contrary to reason and it has not been shown that Mrs. Agno, a school
teacher, was bereft of common sense. For if it was true that the sexual act
was indeed mutually desired and performed why did she complain not only to
her husband but also to the authorities? An affair such as that claimed by the
appellant is carried out in a discreet manier. On the other hand, the version of
the complainant has indicia of credibility. For her version bared her shame to a
small community and her exposure was necessary only because she had to
reveal the truth. No, We simply cannot believe the appellant's version.
We have said above that the findings and conclusions of the trial court are
entitled to great respect. In finding the appellant guilty, this is what the court
a quo said in part:
The testimony of the accused is incredible. When he told his love to the
offended party for the first time, they were only two in the latter's house. He
had more time with her then. She refuse him because she is married. He tried
for the second time. He was again refused because she is married. It is
unthinkable and highly improbable that on the evening of January 23, 1972,
after only three minutes, the offended party would rush to accept his love and
go to the extent of thanking him for his considering her daughter as his own,
unless she was coerced, threatened, forced and intimidated.
It is highly improbable for a school teacher with several children to exchange
her husband only 40 years old and with a good means of livelihood for one
whom she does not know and whom she has observed as doing nothing

except to play basketball. It is subversive of the traits, character and nature of

Filipino women to say that the offended party, a school teacher and a girl
scout accepted the love of a man who is good for nothing and surrendered her
whole body and virtue to him after an accidental courtship of only three
minutes. The offended party is an unsophisticated and conservative woman,
fixing her hair the old fashion way. She does not apply make-up on her face,
and her dress is up to her knees. This makes the pretensions of the accused
all the more incredible. (Expediente, p. 59.)
The complaint alleges the following aggravating circumstances: abuse of
superior strength, nocturnity, despoblado, ignominy, and reiteracion.
The trial court disregarded superiority because it "is inherent in the crime of
rape or is absorbed in the element of force." It also did not consider nocturnity
"there being no evidence that the accused purposely sought it to facilitate the
commission of this rape." (Id, p. 63.)
Despoblado was present according to the trial court because: "The accused
dragged the offended party, at the point of a dagger, to the carabao trail,
about 10 meters from the junction, but 40 to 50 meters below to better attain
his purpose without interference, and to better secure himself from detection
and punishment (U.S. vs. Vitug, 17 Phil. 1). Even the junction where the two
children were left is already 400 meters from the nearest house. While there
maybe occasional passersby, this does not destroy its being an uninhabited
place. (People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 87)." (Id, p. 62.) We hold that the trial court
for the reasons stated correctly held that the crime was committed in an
uninhabited place.
The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not
only the missionary position, i.e. male supenor female inferior, but also "The
same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there
was no ignominy because "The studies of many experts in the matter have
shown that this 'position' is not novel and has repeatedly and often been
resorted to by couples in the act of copulation. (Brief, p. 24.) This may well be
if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.
The trial court also held that "there is no reiteracion because one of the
offenses, namely Robbery in Band, for which the accused has been penal was
committed after the commission of this rape case, and the penalty imposed
on the other offense of Frustrated Homicide, is lighter than the penalty for
rape." (Id, P. 63.)
Although not alleged in the complaint, the trial court stated that the offense
was aggravated by disregard of rank because it was a fact knowm to the

appellant that Mrs. Agno was a school teacher. The appellant claims that this
circumstance cannot be assigned to him because there was no deliberate
intent to offend or insult the rank of Mrs. Agno. The Solicitor General agrees
with the appellant for the same reason.
The judgment of the trial court is in accordance with the facts and the law but
it cannot be affirmed completely because of the lack of the necessary number
of votes.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is modified in the sense that the
appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death and
the indemnity to be paid to the offended party is increased to P20,000.00.
Costs against the appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. MELQUIADES
FERNANDEZ alias "Moding", and FEDERICO CONRADO, defendantsappellants.
PADILLA, J.:
Before the Court is Federico Conrado's appeal from the decision * of the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan, Branch I, in Criminal
Case No. L-2593 entitled, "The People of the Philippines vs. Melquiades
Fernandez, alias 'Moding' and Federico Conrado" convicting him and the other
accused of the crime of rape and sentencing them each to suffer inter alia two
(2) death penalties.
The criminal complaint dated 2 June 1982 filed before the trial court, reads as
follows:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1982, at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, at barangay Taloy, municipality of Malasiqui, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with the undersigned offended party Rebecca M. Soriano, a virgin and 15
years old, by means of force and intimidation and against the will of the latter.
1
Assisted by counsel, the accused Fernandez and Conrado, uncle and nephew
respectively, pleaded not guilty on arraignment 2 and underwent trial.
Teofilo Malong employed Rebecca Soriano as a househelper since September
1981. Residing in Teofilo's house were his wife and daughters Amelita and Ma.

Theresa. Rebecca Soriano testified that on 13 January 1982 at about 2:00

o'clock in the afternoon, and after she had just finished taking a bath and still
naked, the two (2) accused, both in short pants, surreptitiously entered the
bathroom. To prevent her from making an outcry, a piece of cloth was tightly
tied around her neck, after which she was forcibly laid down. Conrado held her
hands behind her while Fernandez sexually abused her. She declared that,
immediately after Fernandez had raped her, Conrado in turn went on top of
her and likewise succeeded in having sexual congress with her against her
will. She added that, thereafter, Fernandez got a handful of mud near the
bathroom and placed it on her vagina. Thereupon, she ran to the upper floor
of the house to report the tragic incident to Amelita Malong. 3
During the trial, Amelita Malong declared that in that afternoon of 13 January
1982, she was combing her hair in her room when she saw the approaching
Rebecca, naked with smeared mud on her lower private part and a piece of
cloth around her neck. She testified that after she was told by Rebecca about
the incident, they reported the same to her father, Teofilo, who was in his
store. She also declared that she knew both the accused because Fernandez
used to spray their mango trees while Conrado sold to them a dog sometime
in November 1981. 4
Teofilo Malong likewise testified for the prosecution. He stated that upon being
informed that his housemaid Rebecca was raped by the accused, he and his
family, together with Rebecca, proceeded to the office of the INP Police
Station of Malasiqui to report the crime and had Rebecca physically examined
by Dr. Wilfredo Claudio of the San Carlos General Hospital in that same
afternoon. He further said that the following day, or on 14 January 1982, he,
Amelita and Rebecca gave their written statements to the police. 5
Submitted as evidence for the prosecution was the "Medico-Legal Certificate"
issued by Dr. Claudio, indicating his findings of "hymenal lacerations at 6, 10,
3 o'clock positions and one dead sperm cell seen on a slide examined." 6
In defense, the two (2) accused denied any involvement in the offense, both
claiming they were nowhere at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
More particularly, Fernandez claimed he was in his house at Taloy, Malasiqui
weaving baskets when the incident happened. He admitted having been
formerly employed by Teofilo for about two (2) years to spray his mango trees
and stated that during the period he was hired as such, he lived alone in a
small hut constructed under a mango tree. 7 Conrado, on the other hand,
alleged that when the crime was committed, he was at Malimpuec, Malasiqui
as he was hired to spray the mango trees of a certain Mr. Overo Bo.

Malimpuec is his hometown but he admitted that he used to go to Bo. Taloy,

prior to the incident, as his parents-in-law lived there. 8
In the trial court's decision holding that the guilt of both accused had been
established beyond shadow of any doubt, the following observations and
conclusions are made:
As already stated, the defense of both accused is alibi, which is not even
corroborated by a single defense witness. It is well-settled rule that alibi is the
weakest defense that can be resorted to by an accused, as it is easy to
concoct or fabricate. . . .
. . . the alibi of both accused can not prevail over their positive identification
by the prosecution witnesses (especially by complainant victim of rape,
Rebecca Soriano) as the perpetrators of the crime charged, they having
testified in a clear, straightforward, positive, truthful, and convincing manner,
with no motive to fabricate this serious charge of rape or falsify the truth. The
alibi of both accused can not also be given credence or weight, considering
that at the time of the rape, accused Melquiades Fernandez was in his house
at Bo. Taloy, which is just 150 meters away from the house of the Malongs,
where Rebecca Soriano was raped; and accused Federico Conrado was at Bo.
Malimpuec, which is only 9 kms. away from Bo. Taloy, where Rebecca was
raped that afternoon of January 13, 1982. The evidence disclose that said
distance of 9 kms. can be negotiated in only about 30 minutes by motorized
vehicle, on good road connecting the 2 barrios.
xxx xxx xxx
The clear, positive, straightforward, and convincing testimony of rape victim
Rebecca Soriano, as well as her immediate reporting of the incident to the
police authorities, just 30 minutes or so after she was raped that afternoon of
January 13, 1982 and her giving of a sworn statement (Exh. A) on January 14,
1982 just the day after she was raped) which was corroborated by the
statements on the same date (January 14, 1982) by prosecution witnesses
Amelita Malong and Teofilo Malong, more than convinces and satisfies this
Court that the came charged was, in truth and fact, perpetrated by both
accused. 9
Hence, the judgment of conviction, now the object of this appeal, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds each of the accused MELQUIADES FERNANDEZ,
alias "Moding" and FEDERICO CONRADO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two crimes of rape, aggravated by cruelty or ignominy, and, pursuant to law,

hereby sentences each of them to suffer two (2) penalties of death, to

indemnify the aggrieved party, Rebecca M. Soriano, in the amount of
P12,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. 10
In an effort to reduce the imposed penalty of death to reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment), without disproving the charges against them, the two (2)
accused assigned the following errors:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR
TWO (2) CRIMES OF RAPE.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE
RAPE WAS ATTENDED BY THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF CRUELTY OR
IGNOMINY.
3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING EACH OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS TO SUFFER TWO (2) PENALTIES OF DEATH. 11
In the light, however, of the 1987 Constitution, specifically, Section 19(1),
Article III thereof, under which a death penalty already imposed is reduced to
reclusion perpetua, Fernandez withdrew his appeal. 12 The lone appellant
therefore is Conrado who insists on his appeal, notwithstanding the advice of
his counsel de officio to discontinue the appeal allegedly on the ground that
"it has become moot and academic." 13
This Court nonetheless proceeded to consider accused-appellant's arguments
for the sake of verifying the correctness of the sentence imposed. We find no
merit in the appeal.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court is accused of violating the rule against duplicity of offenses in
that, the accused were convicted for two (2) crimes of rape even when under
the criminal complaint against them, there is only one (1) crime of rape
alleged. The rule invoked in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which
states that there should be only one (1) offense charged in a criminal
complaint or information, the purpose of which is to afford the defendant a
necessary knowledge of the charge so that he may not be confused in his
defense. But it is likewise the rule that if ever duplicity of offenses is
committed, the same constitutes a ground for a motion to quash the
complaint; and failure of the accused to interpose the objection constitutes
waiver. 14 Conrado, after he had been convicted by the court a quo, can no
longer assail its judgment by raising this issue. Neither can he claim, as he

now does, that he was denied the information that he was to be tried for two
(2) separate crimes of rape. The acts complained of, as constituting the
offenses, were stated in the 2 June 1982 complaint in ordinary and concise
language that any person of common intelligence would be able to
understand and thereby know what acts he was to defend himself against.
The imposition on each of the accused of the penalty corresponding to two (2)
crimes of rape is proper, because of the existence of conspiracy. As clearly
found by the trial court:
Both accused have, obviously, conspired and confederated to commit the
crime, considering that they entered the bathroom where Rebecca was,
together and at the same time. Accused Fernandez then tied her with a piece
of cloth tightly around her neck, while accused Conrado held her hands
placing them behind her body, to prevent her from struggling or resisting.
Then after accused Fernandez had raped Rebecca, accused Conrado raped
her. Both accused, thereafter, fled from the scene of the crime together and at
the same time. All these circumstances show beyond shadow of any doubt
conspiracy on the part of both accused, which renders each of them liable for
two (2) crimes of rape, . . . 15
In a long line of decided cases, it has been held by this Court that in multiple
rape, each defendant is responsible not only for the rape personally
committed by him, but also for the rape committed by the others, because
each of them (accused) cooperated in the commission of the rape perpetrated
by the others, by acts without which it would not have been accomplished. 16
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
ignominy because of the greater perversity displayed by the offenders. The
testimony of the examining physician that he did not find mud on the victim's
private organ, does not necessarily belie the latter's asseveration that the
accused "plastered" (in the words of the lower court) mud on her private part.
It is worthwhile mentioning that the victim was examined and treated by Dr.
Claudio at 3:55 p.m. or about almost two (2) hours after the rape was
committed. 17 Given this circumstance, the absence of mud in the victim's
private part when she was examined by the physician, may be attributed to
the possibility that the mud washed or fell off even before the victim left the
house for her physical examination. Moreover, Rebecca's testimony was
corroborated by that of Amelita Malong who swore that she saw mud smeared
on Rebecca's private part when she (Amelita) saw Rebecca right after the
incident. It is also difficult to conceive why the offended party, young as she
was, and with a chaste reputation, would go to the extent of fabricating this

portion of her testimony notwithstanding the consequent humiliation on her

person and disgrace on her womanhood. We cannot but agree with the trial
court's finding that the offense was aggravated by ignominy. We are of the
opinion, however that the word "cruelty" used in the dispositive portion of the
judgment, to describe an alternative aggravating circumstance, is
unnecessary. The act of "plastering" mud on the victim's vagina right after she
was raped, is adequately and properly described as "ignominy" rather than
"cruelty or ignominy."
Third Assignment of Error
Lastly, the original death sentence was correctly imposed pursuant to the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, namely, Article 335 which states that
when the crime of rape is committed by two (2) or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death, and Article 63, which provides that when
the penalty prescribed is composed of two (2) indivisible penalties (as in this
case) and the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.
However, since the original death penalties imposed by the trial court are no
longer imposable under the present Constitution and are reduced to reclusion
perpetua, the sentence on appellant Federico Conrado has to be reduced to
two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua. 18 But the indemnity he has to pay to
the victim must be increased to P20,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment, as above modified, is AFFIRMED. With
costs against the accused-appellant Federico Conrado.
BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING, CO., INC. and ROBERT HERMOSA,
petitioners, vs. THE HON. JUDGE PEDRO SON, Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, 7th Judicial District and MANOLITO
TUACAO, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 27 September 1985, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed before
Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, then presided over by Judge
Valeriano Tomol, Jr., an information charging petitioner Robert Hermosa with
the crime of qualified theft, upon a complaint filed by petitioner Bogo-Medellin
Milling Company, Inc. ("Bogo-Medellin"), in Criminal Case No. CBU-6172. Bail
in the amount of P12,000.00 was recommended. At the same time, several
other persons including private respondent Manolito Tuacao were charged in
a separate information for simple theft, in Criminal Case No. CBU-6173. The

acts involved in both informations related to the theft of the same item, a
large rubber tire.
Five (5) months later, on 11 February 1986, private respondent Manolito
Tuacao was dropped from the information for simple theft in Criminal Case
No. CBU-6173, and instead was charged as co-accused of petitioner Hermosa
in the case for qualified theft (Criminal Case No. CBU-6172). The amended
information in CBU-6172 read as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of June, 1984, at around 7:00 o'clock in the
morning, more or less, in the Municipality of Medellin, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being then employees of the Bogo-Medellin Company,
Incorporated, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with Nonillo
Dela Cruz, Enrique Caballete, and Melecio Pilones, the latter three (3) accused
having been charged in a separate information for theft, with deliberate intent
to gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner, and with grave
abuse of confidence, did then an there wilfully, and unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away one (1) tire marked goodyear with a dimension of
1000 x 20 and sold the same in the amount of Four Thousand Seven Hundred
Eighteen (P4,718.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice
of the Bogo-Medellin Company, Incorporated in the amount aforestated.
Contrary to law. 1
After arraignment of the two (2) accused, but before the prosecution could
commence presenting its evidence, petitioner Bogo-Medellin filed on 14 April
1986 a manifestation informing the trial court of petitioner Hermosa's desire
and willingness to act as state witness and to testify against his co-accused,
private respondent Tuacao who, Hermosa claimed, was the most guilty.
Bogo-Medellin then prayed for the discharge of petitioner Hermosa from the
information in Criminal Case No. CBU-6172.
The application for discharge was opposed by co-accused Tuacao upon the
argument that the requirements of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court had not
been satisfied. More specifically, respondent Tuacao asserted that petitioner
Hermosa, judging from the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation, was the most guilty of the several persons accused of stealing
the rubber tire.
Initially, Judge Tomol denied the application of petitioner Bogo-Medellin for
discharge of Hermosa. On Bogo-Medellin's motion for reconsideration,
however, Judge Tomol issued an order reversing himself and discharging
petitioner Hermosa from the information for qualified theft. On 2 December

1986, on the initial scheduled date of hearing of the qualified theft case,
petitioner Hermosa failed to appear before the trial court. The hearing was
accordingly rescheduled, first to 20 January 1987 and later to 3 March 1987.
By the latter date, respondent Judge Pedro C. Son had become Presiding Judge
of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. On the 3 March 1987
hearing, counsel for private respondent Tuacao manifested to the court that
he would be moving for reconsideration of the order of Judge Tomol
discharging petitioner Hermosa from the qualified theft information. BogoMedellin opposed the motion for reconsideration upon the ground that
reinstatement of Hermosa as co-accused in Criminal Case No. CBU-6172
would place him in double jeopardy, considering that the order of Judge Tomol
discharging Hermosa had resulted in his acquittal of the crime of qualified
theft.
On 18 March 1987, respondent Judge Son issued an order reinstating
petitioner Hermosa as co-accused in the case for qualified theft. The
dispositive portion of this order read as follows:
In view of all the foregoing, and considering the new provisions in the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the order of August 6, 1986 is hereby
reconsidered, and Robert Hermosa is ordered reinstated as accused in the
case at bar. Let a warrant issue for his arrest with bond fixed as P12,000.00.
In the meantime, cancel the hearing on April 2, 1987, but the hearing on May
19, 1987, as previously set, shall proceed.
SO ORDERED. 2
Bogo-Medellin moved for reconsideration of the order of reinstatement,
without success. 3
The sole issue raised in the instant Petition for Certiorari is whether or not the
order of former Judge Tomol dated 6 August 1986 discharging petitioner
Hermosa as accused in Criminal Case No. CBU-6172 had amounted to his
acquittal of the crime charged. An affirmative answer to this question would
lead to the conclusion that the order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Son dated
18 March 1987 reinstating him as one of the accused in Criminal Case No.
CBU-6172 amounted to subjecting private respondent Tuacao to a second
jeopardy for the same criminal offense.
Under Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the following are the
requisites for the defense of double jeopardy:

1. There must be a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient

in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
2. Filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
3. After the accused had been arraigned and pleaded to the charge;
4. Than the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent;
5. The second offense charged is the same as the first offense charged, or for
an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof; or
6. The second offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
first offense charged.
Bogo-Medellin and Hermosa argue that the order of Judge Tomol of 6 August
1986 discharging Hermosa from the information for qualified theft had the
effect of acquitting Hermosa of that offense.
Upon the other hand, it is contended by respondent Tuacao that the
requisites under Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court were not properly
complied with. Those requisites for the discharge of an accused from an
information in order that he may become a witness for the prosecution, are
the following:
(1) Two or more persons are charged with commission of a certain offense;
(2) The application for discharge is filed before the defense has offered its
evidence;
(3) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose
discharge is requested;
(4) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed;
(5) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(6) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(7) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude. 4

In the case at bar, it does appear that not all of the above requisites had been
complied with when petitioner Hermosa was discharged from the qualified
theft information. There appeared no absolute necessity for Hermosa's
testimony in order to sustain the information against Tuacao, since there
were other witnesses whose testimonies should be sufficient to prove the
charge. Thus, during the preliminary investigation, Nonillo dela Cruz, one of
the accused in the information for simple theft, testified that it was Hermosa
who had driven the truck carrying the alleged stolen tire out of the premises
of petitioner Bogo-Medellin, 5 and that after the tire had been sold to a certain
Soledad Divinagracia, he (de la Cruz) received from Tuacao P100.00 and
P200.00 from Hermosa. It, therefore, appears that Hermosa's testimony would
merely serve to corroborate and strengthen the testimony of Nonillo dela Cruz
and to furnish additional details of the events constituting the offense
charged. It may also be noted that during the preliminary investigation,
petitioner Hermosa had admitted that it was he who had driven the truck
carrying the stolen tire, and that it was he who had brought the same to the
vulcanizing shop of Gerry Matuya which shop was under the management of
Nonillo dela Cruz. Moreover, since petitioner Hermosa had also testified that
respondent Tuacao and he (Hermosa) had planned the commission of the
crime, 6 Hermosa appeared to be at least as guilty, if not more so, than
respondent Tuacao.
Notwithstanding, however, the apparent failure to comply with all of the
above listed requisites for the discharge of one of several accused to be a
witness for the prosecution, the discharge of petitioner Hermosa must be
considered as valid for present purposes, that is, for determination of whether
a second and prohibited jeopardy would attach upon reinstatement of
Hermosa as a co-accused in the qualified theft information. The general rule is
that the discharge of an accused in order that he may turn state witness, is
expressly left to the discretion of the trial court. 7 The effect of the discharge
of a defendant is specified in Section 10 of Rule 119 in the following manner:
Sec. 10. Discharge of Accused Operates as Acquittal. The order indicated in
the preceding section, shall amount to an acquittal of the accused discharged
and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the
accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with
his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge.
Respondent Judge Pedro C. Son did read Section 10 of Rule 119 and reached
the following construction thereof:
On the claim of the private prosecutor that the discharge of Robert Hermosa
on the basis of the questioned order operated as an acquittal and therefore

would constitute double jeopardy if he is reinstated as accused, it needs only

to state that under Section 10 of Rule 119, the discharge which amounts to an
acquittal and therefore a bar to a future prosecution for the same offense,
applies only if and after the discharged accused shall have actually testified
for the state or his failure to testify is attributable to the prosecution. Thus,
where Hermosa has not yet testified, the principle of double does not yet
apply. For even if he is not reinstated as accused and he fails or refuses, for
some reason, to testify against his co-accused, then his discharge does not
operate as an acquittal and therefore not a bar to future prosecution o f the
same offense. 8 (Emphasis supplied)
We read Section 10 differently. We consider Section 10 to mean that once the
discharge of an accused from the information is effected, the legal
consequence of acquittal follows and persists unless the accused so
discharged fails or refuses to testify against his co-defendant, in which case
the defense of double jeopardy is withdrawn from him and becomes
unavailable to him. Until it is shown that the discharged accused has in fact
failed or refused to testify against his co-defendant, subsequent proof showing
that any or all of the conditions listed in section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court had not been actually fulfilled, would not affect the legal consequence
of the discharge, i.e., would not wipe away the resulting acquittal. Using an
analogy drawn from the civil law, the failure or refusal of the discharged
accused to testify against his co-accused constitutes a resolutory condition
that results in lifting of the defense of double jeopardy. The actual testimony
of the discharged accused against his co-accused is not, contrary to what
respondent Judge Son believed, a condition precedent to the availability of the
double jeopardy defense.
This Court has held several times in the past that any witting or unwitting
error of the prosecution in asking for the discharge of an accused and of the
trial court in granting the petition for discharge, so long as no question of
jurisdiction is involved, would not deprive the discharged accused of the
acquittal that is specified in Section 10 of Rule 119 and of the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy. 9 It is also relevant to note that the
improper or mistaken discharge of an accused like petitioner Hermosa would
not affect his competency as a witness or render inadmissible his testimony.
10
In the case at bar, there is no evidence of record to show that petitioner
Hermosa failed or refused to testify against his co-accused, i.e., that he
reneged on his covenant with the prosecution. 11 All the record shows is that
petitioner Hermosa failed to attend two (2) scheduled hearings, which does
not necessarily show that he had violated his undertaking to testify against
his co-accused "in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis

for his discharge." Indeed, respondent Judge Son had noted in his 18 March
1987 Order that Hermosa had yet to testify. In his second order postponing
the hearing of 19 May 1987 to 7 July 1987, respondent Judge Son stated that
the absence of petitioner Hermosa could have been due to the fact that the
warrant for his arrest had not been properly served on him as ordered by the
trial court in its order of 18 March 1987 reinstating him as co-accused an the
qualified theft information. There is thus on record no sufficient basis to
withhold the benefits of Section 10 of Rule 119 from petitioner Hermosa. We
conclude that, petitioner Hermosa having been acquitted of the charge of
qualified theft, could not be subsequently reinstated as a co-accused in the
same information without a prohibited second jeopardy arising under the
circumstances, absent satisfactory proof that he had refused or failed to
testify against his co-accused.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE, and
the Orders of respondent Judge Pedro C. Son dated 18 March 1987 and 3 July
1987 are hereby SET ASIDE and the Order of Judge Valeriano Tomol dated 6
August 1986 is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ, concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CASTANITO GANO
Y SAGUYONG a.k.a JERRY PEREZ, ALLAN PEREZ, ALLAN SAGUYONG
and JERRY GANO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
With blood and gore akin to the butchery of swine in slaughterhouses
Castanito Gano mercilessly hacked his three (3) victims and robbed them of
their few earthly possessions. But, as may be gleaned from the theories of the
parties, the core issue now before us is whether the three (3) killings should
be appreciated as separate aggravating circumstances to warrant the
imposition of the penalty of death.
This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Mateo, Rizal, convicting CASTANITO GANO Y SAGUYONG of the crime of
robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of each of the three (3)
victims the amount of P50,000.00 or a total of P150,000.00, and to pay the
costs.1wphi1.nt

Upon arraignment, the accused Castanito Gano made a qualified admission by

admitting the killing of the three (3) victims but denying the charge of
robbery. Considering that what is charged is a complex crime with a single
penalty imposed under Art. 294 of The Revised Penal Code, the accused with
the assistance of his counsel entered a plea of not guilty.
On 27 December 1994 ALBERTO MARBELLA bade farewell to his wife Conchita
and daughter Angelica who were staying with his parents-in-law in Guinayang,
San Mateo, Rizal, before boarding a bus for Polangui, Albay. Three (3) days
later, or on 30 December 1994, he learned from his sister Araceli Marbella
through a long distance telephone call that his wife and parents-in-law
Ponciano Salen and Anicia Salen were brutally murdered. When he learned
about the distressing news, he wasted no time in returning to Manila on 1
January 1995. Accompanied by his sister Araceli, Alberto immediately went to
the San Mateo Police Station where a certain Major Santos told him that the
cadaver of the victims had already been brought to Camp Crame for autopsy.
Upon advice of Major Santos, he and Araceli went to the Santiago Funeral
Parlor which was in charge of the funeral arrangements but were informed
that the victims' bodies would be lying in state at the residence of the Salens,
his parents-in-law, in Guinayang, San Mateo, Rizal.
From the police investigator and kibitzers Alberto learned that Castanito Gano
a.k.a. Allan Perez, a former employee of Alberto's father-in-law in the latters
bakery, was tagged as the culprit in the "massacre" of his family. He also
discovered upon inspection of his household, particularly the drawers where
their valuables were kept, that several items were missing, particularly, (a)
about P30,000.00 in different denominations representing their revolving
capital in their sari-sari store; (b) two (2) pieces of gold bracelets valued at
about P2,000.00 owned by his wife Conchita and daughter Angelica; and, (c)
two (2) wristwatches also owned by Conchita. According to Alberto, Angelica
told him she saw the accused grab the money from her mother. Alberto
identified the articles recovered from the accused Castanito Gano upon the
latter's apprehension by the authorities. They included (a) a Mickey Mouse
watch marked Exh. "A;" (b) a Citizen gold watch marked Exh. "B;" (c)
Conchita's leather wallet marked Exh. "C;" and, (d) an envelop containing
peso bills amounting to P1,590.00, marked Exh. "D."
Senior Inspector Ernesto Garcia testified that at around 7:00 oclock in the
morning of 31 December 1994 his office received a report of a "massacre" at
the Salen residence in Gen. Luna St., Guinayang, San Mateo, Rizal. Forthwith,
he together with two (2) other police officers proceeded to the crime scene.
There they found on the ground floor the prostrate body of Ponciano Salen.
Before he could make any further investigation, Garcia was informed by a

relative of the victim of the identity of the suspect. This prompted him and his
companions to proceed to the domestic airport for the possible arrest of the
accused.
At the airport, the group coordinated with the Philippine Airlines (PAL)
ticketing office to verify whether a certain passenger using the name
Castanito Gano a.k.a. Allan Gano or Jerry Perez or several other known aliases
of the suspect was booked on a flight for Agusan del Sur. As the process of
verification was taking much of their time, they decided to leave for the North
Harbor which was also a possible escape route of the accused. Along the way
they would call up the PAL ticketing office every now and then for the result of
the verification, while also keeping the San Mateo police updated on the
progress of their pursuit operation. A lucky break came when the PAL ticketing
office called them and confirmed the presence of one Jerry Perez on board the
plane bound for Butuan City.
Since there was no direct flight from Manila to Butuan City, Sr. Inspector
Garcia together with SPO1 Juanito Justo and SPO1 Joselito Guillermo boarded a
plane for Cebu and from there took a connecting flight to Butuan City. When
they alighted at the airport they were met by a certain Sgt. Matty who
informed them that he and his men had already arrested the suspect. Senior
Inspector
Garcia and his companions then proceeded to the Western Police District of
Butuan City where they found Castanito Gano being detained. SPO2 Domingo
Martin Lucero, the police officer who actually arrested the accused at the
airport, informed Sr. Inspector Garcia and his group about the items found in
the possession of the accused, which consisted of two (2) wristwatches and
some cash. At the trial Sr. Inspector Garcia disclosed that on their way back to
Manila the accused confessed to him his responsibility for the triple killing and
the robbery.
Marlyn Candido, live-in partner of the accused, affirmed the contents of her
affidavit regarding particularly her positive identification of the bloodstained
garments worn by the accused on 30 December 1994. She likewise confirmed
that her live-in partner was using the aliases of Jerry Perez, Allan Perez, 1
Allan Saguyong and Jerry Gano.
Eduardo Zulueta, a relative of the victims, explained that he was with the
responding policemen at the initial investigation conducted at the scene of
the crime when they found the mangled bodies of the three (3) victims soaked
in their own blood. The lifeless body of Ponciano Salen (Exh. "Y," "Y-1," "Z" and
"Z-1") was found at the dirty kitchen while that of Anicia Salen (Exh. "W," "W1" and "T") was inside a room on the second floor. Outside the other room in

the same floor was the body of Conchita Marbella (Exh. "S," "S-1," "X" and "X1"). Eduardo first learned about the identity of the suspect when he and the
police investigators were told by Angelica, daughter of Conchita, that
Castanito perpetrated the carnage. Eduardo recalled that at around 8:00 in
the morning of 31 December, the day following the incident, he noticed
Angelica standing alone in the terrace of their house. This made him wonder
why the bakery was not yet open although it was already late in the day. He
also noticed bloodstains on the dress of Angelica (Exh. "GG" and "GG-1")
which she said came from the body of her mother Conchita.
SPO2 Richard Salvador testified on the recovery of the stolen items from the
person of the accused. Salvador explained that the stolen articles were
recovered from the accused Castanito Gano when the latter was apprehended
in Butuan City by the team of PO Martin Lucero who turned them over to SPO1
Juanito Justo. SPO2 Salvadors investigation at the scene of the crime showed
that the cabinet where the asported items, specifically the wristwatches,
jewelry, wallet and cash were supposedly kept, showed signs of having been
forcibly opened. He learned later from the victims relatives that the stolen
goods were taken from the cabinet. According to witness Salvador, the
accused Castanito Gano admitted the killings before many people, including
members of the press, and other police officers when he arrived at the San
Mateo Police Station. 2
Angelica Marbella, four (4) years old, the only living witness to the killing of
her mother and grandparents, categorically stated that the accused, known to
her as Allan, perpetrated the gruesome killings. She likewise pointed to the
accused as the one who stole the money from the drawer of her mother, her
Mickey Mouse watch and other valuables. She also identified her set of
bloodstained garments presented in evidence and explained that the
bloodstains came from her "Mommy."
On cross-examination, Angelica reiterated her earlier testimony that the
accused Allan was the author of the crime and that she was certain about it
because she saw the whole incident. Although she mentioned earlier that the
accused struck her relatives with a piece of wood she readily identified a bolo
as the object used by the culprit in killing her mother and grandparents.
Accused Castanito Gano, testifying as his only witness for himself, narrated
that he was arrested at the Butuan airport by a team led by one SPO2 Lucero.
He claimed that he was not only searched without any warrant by the
arresting police officers but the search itself yielded nothing except a wad of
bank notes which he claimed to be his remaining cash after buying his plane
ticket. He averred that the money he had left was part of his salary and his
winnings from jueteng. He recalled that at the Manila Domestic Terminal he

was asked questions by several people, including members of the media,

regarding the charges against him and he answered them without a lawyer
assisting him.
Castanito denied having robbed the victims of their valuables and insisted
that he saw the alleged stolen items for the first time only during the trial. He
belied the claim by the prosecution that he forcibly opened the lockers or
drawers of the victims to steal; in fact, the drawers were still intact and in
good condition when he left the Salen residence. He expressed remorse for
having killed the victims when he said, "I am sorry now, but at the time I did
not know how I felt," and then again in response to the question on whether
he was admitting the crime, he said, "Inamin ko yoon pagpatay parang hindi
ko ano ang pangyayaring iyon, parang pansandalian na lang, parang wala ako
sa sarili ko noon, parang sunod-sunuran na lang ako sa ginawa ko sa mga
araw na iyon pero, parang hindi ko matandaan kung ano ang nangyari sa sarili
ko noon nagawa ko yoon ganoon."
SPO Domingo Lucero testified on rebuttal that when they were informed by
Col. Maralit as to the presence of the suspect using the name Jerry Perez on
board one of the planes bound for Butuan, he dispatched a team to Bacasi
Butuan airport to arrest the suspect. Coordinating with the PAL manager who
forthwith confirmed their information, the arresting officers boarded the plane
that had just landed and accosted a passenger who when asked identified
himself as Jerry Perez. The group then invited the suspect to the office of the
Airport Manager. When asked why he was being brought to the office, the
suspect replied that he knew the reason for his detention and thereafter
admitted that he was responsible for the death of the Salen family. When SPO
Lucero asked the suspect to open his bag, he (SPO Lucero) saw among the
clothes a white envelope containing cash in different denominations. His
search of the person of the suspect also yielded a leather wallet with the
brand name Grand Royale, and a plastic purse which contained a Citizen
watch. The suspect was also found to be wearing a Mickey Mouse wristwatch.
According to SPO Lucero, after he made a receipt of the recovered items, he
turned them over to Police Inspector Ernesto Garcia of the San Mateo police
force.
Accused Castanito Gano clarified on sur-rebuttal that contrary to the
declarations of SPO Lucero, he did not voluntarily offer the contents of his bag
but were in fact taken by the apprehending officers. He was not sure whether
the alleged stolen items were found in his bag but one thing he was certain of,
the arresting officers did not find anything when they searched his body.
Giving full credence to the testimony of minor Angelica Marbella, the trial
court convicted the accused of the crime of robbery with homicide. In

imposing the death penalty on the accused, the trial court appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of "admitting the crime" as well as two (2)
aggravating circumstances based on the number of victims killed. 3
In this automatic review, the accused staunchly rejects his conviction for
robbery with homicide and insists that the prosecution failed to prove that he
committed robbery. In other words, he claims that he should only be convicted
of homicide, and not robbery with homicide, the latter being a more serious
offense.
The accused draws attention to his testimony where he categorically declared
that the only item recovered from him by the police officers was the
remainder of his salary and what he won from jueteng, and that he saw the
alleged stolen valuables for the first time during the trial. Moreover, he
contends that the allegation of SPO2 Lucero that he (accused) voluntarily
surrendered the stolen items is contrary to normal human behavior. 4
From the evidence, accused Castanito Gano is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as charged.
Angelica, in her innocence and guileless narration of the incident of 30
December 1994, ineluctably showed that the accused not only mercilessly
slaughtered the victims but also took their personal belongings, particularly
her Mickey Mouse watch for no other purpose than gain. Her testimony leaves
no doubt as to this fact Fiscal Capellan:
Q: Madam witness, do you know the person depicted in this picture?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who is he?
A: Alan, sir.
Q: Do you know Alan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know him? I will just withdraw that question. Is he good?
A: No, sir.

Q: Why Madam Witness?

Fiscal Capellan: At any rate, her answer was no. May we go to another point?
Q: Is he the one who killed your mother?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about your grandparents?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And Madam Witness, is he also the one who took the money from the
drawer of your mother?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And were you able to witness that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what else did Alan get if any?
A: Mickey Mouse, ring, earrings, sir.
Q: Who owns the Mickey Mouse?
A: That is mine, sir.
May we make it of record that she pointed to herself when we propounded
that question.
Q: Madam Witness, I am showing to (you) a Mickey Mouse, kindly go over the
same and tell this Honorable Court if this is the same Mickey Mouse that you
are (sic) referring to earlier which was owned by you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At this point, may we make it on record that the child instinctively got the
watch from the Court personnel demonstrating that she is familiar and that
she is the owner of the said watch. The said watch was earlier marked as
Exhibit A.

Q: Madam Witness, where were you when the accused killed your mother and
also your grandparents?
A: I was in our house, sir.
Q: And where were you also when the accused got the items?
We will go to another point. Were you also inside the house when Alan, the
accused in this case got the cash and other jewelry?
A: Yes, sir. 5
We are of the opinion however that with the exception of the Mickey Mouse
watch, the other items, i.e., cash, wallet, Citizen watch and bracelets
recovered from the accused, have not been established to be the fruits of the
crime since the ownership of the same or the fact that they were stolen by
him has not been satisfactorily established. This notwithstanding, the charge
of robbery must be sustained as the taking by the accused of Angelicas
Mickey Mouse watch was sufficiently proved.
Accused Castanito Gano killed three (3) persons by reason or on the occasion
of the robbery. The question that needs to be resolved is whether the
multiplicity of homicides could be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance. For sometime, this ticklish issue has been the subject of
conflicting views by this Court when it held in some cases that the additional
rapes/homicides 6 committed on the occasion of robbery would not increase
the penalty, while in other cases it ruled that the multiplicity of rapes/
homicides committed could be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. 7
But in People v. Regala 8 this Court spoke with finality on the matter It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or
homicide/s should be considered as aggravating circumstance. The
enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the
same Code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is specific
paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances.
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide
on the occasion of the robbery) would result in an anomalous situation
where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one rape
would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes. However, the
remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of
the offender and no person should be brought within its terms if he is not
clearly made so by the statute.

This case is singular in its barbarity and nauseating in the manner with which
the accused, bolo in hand, butchered his preys. Notwithstanding the
viciousness with which he perpetrated the offense, we are constrained to
apply the principle laid down in People v. Regala, and accordingly, the two (2)
other killings contrary to the ruling of the trial court, should not be
appreciated as aggravating circumstances.
Incidentally, we also examined the possibility of appreciating dwelling as a
generic aggravating circumstance, but the attempt was again thwarted by a
recent amendment to Secs. 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which took effect 1 December 2000 Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state
the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in the terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
Pursuant to the aforequoted amended provisions, the Rules now require that
the information or complaint allege not only the qualifying but the
aggravating circumstances as well, otherwise, the same cannot be properly
appreciated. Guided by the consecrated rule that when a penal statute,
substantive and remedial or procedural, is favorable to the accused, the
courts shall give it a retroactive application and so we must in this case as the
Information does not allege dwelling as an aggravating circumstance.
With respect to the mitigating circumstance, we note that the trial court
considered the admission by the accused of the killings as a mitigating
circumstance, presumably referring to voluntary confession as provided under
Art. 14 of The Revised Penal Code, notwithstanding his denial of the charge of
robbery. In effect, therefore, the accused was merely confessing to the crime
of homicide but not to robbery with homicide, a considerably graver offense.
But we note that for voluntary confession to be appreciated as an extenuating
circumstance, the same must not only be made unconditionally but the

accused must admit to the offense charged, i.e., robbery with homicide in the
present case, and not to either robbery or homicide only. Hence, if the
voluntary confession is conditional or qualified, it is not mitigating.
Any person found guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of person shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
when by reason or on the occasion of robbery the crime of homicide shall
have been committed. 9 For reasons earlier discussed, the trial court erred in
appreciating the two (2) killings as aggravating circumstances and the
voluntary confession as a mitigating circumstance. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, Art. 63 of The Revised Penal Code
dictates that the lesser penalty, or only reclusion perpetua, be imposed. We
affirm the award of P50,000.00 or a total of P150,000.00 for the three (3)
homicides as death indemnity. In consonance with Art. 2219, par. (1), in
relation to Art. 2206, of the Civil Code, an award of P50,000.00 to the legal
heirs of each of the three (3) victims for moral damages would be reasonable.
10
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal,
finding accused CASTANITO GANO Y SAGUYONG, a.k.a Jerry Perez, Allan Perez,
Allan Saguyong and Jerry Gano guilty of Robbery with Homicide is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the penalty therefor is lowered to reclusion
perpetua, and the FURTHER MODIFICATION that the accused is ordered to pay
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages, or
P100,000.00 to the legal heirs of each of the three (3) victims Conchita
Marbella,
Ponciano
Salen
and
Anicia
Salen,
or
a
total
of
P300,000.00.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84714. October 5, 1990.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JANUARIO DELA
CRUZ y HURADO, accused-appellant.
Evidence; Witnesses; Credibility is the sole province of the trial court.The
issue hangs on credibility of witnesses, and in this connection, this Court has
time and time again held that "credibility" is the sole province of the trial
court.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; While proof of the agreement need not rest on
direct evidence, the agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the
parties, disclosing a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense.On the testimony alone of Reynaldo Pascasio,
this Court is convinced that Januario dela Cruz was a co-conspirator in the

murder of Rodolfo Pamoleras, Jr., and must be held as a co-principal along

with the actual killers. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
While proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, the agreement
itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties, disclosing a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.
Pascasio's recital that dela Cruz was one of Lachingco's gang, one of whom
thrust a fatal stab wound on the deceased and threw his cadaver by the
roadside, after which dela Cruz instructed him, Pascasio, to take another
route, and that he, dela Cruz, later washed the dead's blood off the vehicle,
are an eloquent testimony of a conspiracy in the murder of Rodolfo Pamolares,
Jr.
Same; Evident Premeditation; In evident premeditation, the time intervening
between the plan to slay the victim and the actual slaying must be shown.It
is also proof of treachery, in which the malefactors, without warning and with
no risk to themselves, did away with Pamoleras. On this score, however, this
Court can not appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance,
because in evident premeditation, the time intervening between the plan to
slay the victim and the actual slaying must be shown. As to "use of motor
vehicle," the evidence indeed shows that dela Cruz, et al. had deliberately
availed themselves of a tricycle in order to consummate their dastardly act
and to use it as cover to facilitate it. [People vs. Dela Cruz, 190 SCRA
328(1990)]
SARMIENTO, J.:
The accused contests the decision of the Regional Trial Court, 1 finding him
guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua plus actual
damages.
The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following:
On August 3, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Reynaldo Pascasio, a
tricycle driver, was on his motorized tricycle parked infront of the "Big Foot"
Bar located at East Dirita, San Antonio, Zambales, near the crossroad of the
National Highway and the road leading to the U.S. Naval Communication
Station at San Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales. While there, accused Januario
dela Cruz, who crossed the road, approached him and told him "Maykadtoy ta
adda ibelleng" which in English is "Come here, we shall throw something".
Responding, he went with the accused Januario dela Cruz infront of the gate of
the Guerrero Compound where the latter's companions were. From where
Reynaldo Pascasio was parked infront of the "Big Foot" Bar, the accused
companions were about eight (8) meters away across the street. Then, three

(3) male persons, as well as accused Januario dela Cruz boarded the tricycle.
The three (3) companion's of Januario dela Cruz rode inside the sidecar of the
tricycle, while accused Januario dela Cruz rode in tandem with Reynaldo
Pascasio on the motorcycle of the tricycle. Of his four (4) passengers only
accused Januario dela Cruz was known to Reynaldo Pascasio, having known
him for the past three (3) years. After boarding the tricycle the persons inside
the sidecar told Reynaldo Pascasio to bring them to the terminal at Olongapo
City. However he was later told to proceed to San Narciso Zambales (p. 21,
t.s.n., November 17, 1987). While on the way to San Narciso, Zambales, near
the Elementary School of Barangay Beddeng, San Narciso Zambales,
Reynaldo Pascasio heard the shout in the vernacular "Array" and blood
spurted from the sidecar and landed on his forearm, as well as on the steering
bar of his motorcycle (p.30, Ibid). Upon hearing this, Reynaldo Pascasio
stopped his tricycle and one of the passengers in the sidecar, who was
bloodied, was brought out from the tricycle by the other two (2) passengers in
the sidecar. Once on the ground, the two(2) passengers mauled the bloodied
passenger. Later, they threw him by the roadside. While this was going on,
accused Januario dela Cruz was standing behind Reynaldo Pascasio.
Afterwards, the accused Januario dela Cruz and the two (2) unidentified
persons boarded the tricycle and Januario dela Cruz directed Reynaldo
Pascasio to bring them to his (Januario dela Cruz') place (p. 26, Ibid), leaving
behind the bloodied person, whom the two (2) unidentified companions of
Januario dela Cruz threw away by the roadside, infront of the Beddeng
Elementary School.
In going to the house of accused Januario dela Cruz, accused Januario dela
Cruz directed Reynaldo Pascasio to pass through the alley behind the Mini
Mart, instead of passing through the checkpoint at the road leading to the U.S.
Naval Communication Station, and exited into the road going to the Base (p.
28, t.s.n., November 17, 1987). Upon arrival at the house of accused Januario
dela Cruz, the two (2) unidentified passengers alighted from the tricycle and
accused Januario dela Cruz washed away the blood from the steering bar and
inside the sidecar with water in a pail, using a rag, which be got from his
neighbor (p. 30, Ibid). And while accused Januario dela Cruz was washing the
tricycle, the two (2) persons went behind the house of accused Januario dela
Cruz where the wound of one of them was treated by them (p. 33, t.s.n.,
supra).
Later, after washing the tricycle, accused Januario dela Cruz gave Reynaldo
Pascasio the amount of P7.00 and the latter went home. Because he was
afraid, he did not report the incident to the police. However, five (5) days
later, he was arrested by the police and was investigated. He gave his
statement to the police narrating the incident that occurred in the evening of

August 3, 1987 (Exhibit "C"). And it was after his arrest that he learned from
the father of the slain man that the latter's name was Jerry Pamoleras.
The following morning at 6:00 o'clock on August 4, 1987, Barangay Captain
Ricardo Abinsay of Barangay Beddeng, San Narciso, Zambales reported to the
Station Commander of the police station of San Narciso, Zambales his
discovery of the dead body. In turn, the Station Commander, P/Lt. Manuel
Tejada, dispatched Pat. Arsenio Agawin and Pat. Salvador Wagma to the place
where the body was found. Taking the mini-bus, the two (2) peace officers
arrived at the scene infront of the Beddeng-Mabangcal Elementary School at
Barangay Beddeng, San Narciso, Zambales at about 6:30 a.m. where they
came upon P/Lt. Amado Farias viewing the dead body of a person, who was
wearing a red undershirt (sando and a white pant bloodied, and lying flat on
his stomach on the ground. Lt. Farias then gave the wallet, which he took
from the pocket of the dead person's pants, to Pat. Agawin, which contained
an I.D. with a name "Jerry Reyes" (p. 7, t.s.n., January 12, 1988). Thereafter,
the body was transported to the police station of San Narciso, Zambales. On
the same date in the morning, Dr. Jaime Braga, the Rural Health Physician of
the San Narciso Rural Health Unit performed a post-mortem examination of
the cadaver found infront of Beddeng-Mabangcal Elementary School and
found the following:
lacerated wound proximal 3rd arm posterior aspect (L)
Incised wound palmar surface (L)
Stab wound 2 cm length neck lateral (R)
Stab wound 2 cm length medical scapular (R)
Stab wound 2 cm length vertebral area posterior
Lacerated wound 3 cm knee (L)
which injuries caused the cardiorespiratory arrest, and consequently, caused
the death of said person, identified through his wallet as "Jerry Reyes" (Exhibit
"B"). Dr. Braga issued a death certificate (Exhibit "A").
In the meantime, Rodolfo Pamoleras, who last saw his son at his house in
Olongapo City on August 3, 1987 was informed by his wife that his father who
lives at Iba, Zambales, has told her that their son had been missing for three
(3) days already. But, somehow, on August 6, 1987, by a stroke of Fate,
Rodolfo Pamoleras' brother-in-law, a tricycle driver, was told by a woman
traveller from San Narciso, Zambales that a dead body was found in San

Narciso (p. 20, Ibid). Reacting to this information, he and his wife went to San
Narciso at about 7:00 p.m. on August 6, 1987 (p. 20, Ibid) and talked to the
Chief of Police (Station Commander) of the San Narciso INP. Because the
cadaver of their son was already buried, they and the police chief were able to
identify the deceased as their son, through the latter's picture they brought
(Exhibit "E-1") and the wallet, which contained an ID card showing the name
"Jerry Reyes". The deceased was using the family name of his mother,
"Reyes", because Pamoleras is long and cannot be contained in the
identification card.
Upon learning that their son was already buried, Rodolfo Pamoleras, Sr. talked
to his wife and they agreed that the body of their son should be exhumed to
determine if it was really their son's body that was buried by the police. So, on
August 7, 1987, witnessed by the policemen of San Narciso, Zambales, the
security men of the Martin Funeral Parlor, Rodolfo Pamoleras, Sr. exhumed the
body of his son, Rodolfo Pamoleras Jr. alias "Jerry R. Reyes". When the coffin
was opened, he identified the body as that of his son through the growth at
the tip of the ear, the rotten front teeth, the Red T-shirt his son was wearing
when he saw him for the last time and the shoes his son was wearing, which
belonged to him. He also identified the body in the coffin because of the
similarity of his and that of his son's facial features. Then, a photograph of the
dead body of his son inside the coffin was taken (Exhibit "E").
Because the sister of Rodolfo Pamoleras' wife was buried at Subic, Zambales,
and his wife wanted their son buried there, the remains of his son was reburied at Subic, Zambales. For the burial services, he spent P3,000.00 (Exhibit
"C") and P3,000.00 for expenses in the exhumation and for the nine (9) days
prayer which are not supported by receipts. 2
The version of the accused, on the other hand, is as follows:
On the other hand, as claimed by accused Januario dela Cruz, he knows
prosecution witness Reynaldo Pascasio and are friends (p. 8, t.s.n., April 5,
1988) and Reynaldo Pascasio drives a tricycle whose route is from the town
proper of San Antonio, Zambales to the gate of the U.S. Naval
Communications Facility at San Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales; that at about
10:00 o'clock in the evening on August 3, 1987, he was standing infront of his
cousin's store located at the intersection of the National Highway and the road
leading to the U.S. Naval Communication Facility, known locally as "crossing".
He was there because he paid his indebtedness.
While standing infront of his cousin's store at West Dirita a man, who came
from the direction of the Holiday Inn (p. 14, Ibid) approached him and offered
him a bottle of beer, he was holding, but, he refused. He then asked for his

name and the man gave his name as Doming Lachingco. Thereafter, Doming
Lachingco asked him if he knew somebody who could bring someone to San
Narciso. And he replied he knew a driver named Reynaldo Pascasio, whose
tricycle was parked across the street infront of the "Big Foot" Bar and he
called Reynaldo Pascasio, telling him he had a passenger (pp. 10-11, t.s.n.,
April 5, 1988). After calling Reynaldo Pascasio, the latter and Doming
Lachingco talked to each other. Afterwards, Reynaldo Pascasio asked him to
accompany him in bringing his passengers to San Narciso and he acceded.
When Doming Lachingco talked to him, he was alone and did not know he had
companions. But, when Doming Lachingco boarded the tricycle, two (2) others
also boarded the tricycle (p. 24, Ibid). Of the three (3) passengers, two were
tall. Doming Lachingco was the tallest, while the third passenger was the
smallest. The latter wore short pants and a red T-shirt.
On the way to San Narciso, Zambales, a commotion among passengers
ensued inside the sidecar of the tricycle. Reynaldo Pascasio, the driver, then
stopped his tricycle and the three (3) passengers, including Doming Lachingco
inside the sidecar alighted. Then, the three (3) passengers had a free-for-all
fight on the ground. He noticed that Doming Lachingco was already bloodied
but the deceased was not yet bloodied. Then, all of a sudden, he saw Doming
Lachingco holding a glittering object, swinging it towards the shortest man in
the group and the latter fell on the right side of the road just infront of the
Beddeng-Mabangcal Elementary School about four (4) meters from the
tricycle. He then told the tricycle driver, Reynaldo Pascasio, to leave the
passengers. And, the tricycle driver maneuvered his tricycle in order to leave
his passengers in the sidecar, but Doming Lachingco and his companion held
the baggage rack (parilla) of the tricycle and boarded the tricycle.
After coming from San Narciso, Reynaldo Pascasio drove the tricycle to his
(Januario dela Cruz) house at West Dirita, which is about one (1) kilometer
from the National Highway, because Reynaldo Pascasio told him, after coming
from San Narciso, that he would bring him home. And, instead of passing
through the access road leading to the U.S. Naval Communication Facility and
the checkpoint, they passed behind the Mini-Mart and exited into the road
going to the Base. Upon arrival infront of the house of accused Januario dela
Cruz, Doming Lachingco asked Januario dela Cruz if he could wash his hands
at his gate. And after Doming Lachingco and his companion had finished
washing the tricycle of Reynaldo Pascasio, they left (p. 21, t.s.n., April 5,
1988). Then, he went inside his house; that he did not voluntarily wash the
blood from the sidecar of the tricycle of Reynaldo Pascasio and he was
threatened with death by Doming Lachingco if he would report the incident.
That was why he did not report the incident (p. 12, t.s.n., April 5, 1988).

To corroborate the claim of Januario dela Cruz that he did not wash the tricycle
of Reynaldo Pascasio, Mercy de Guzman, a neighbor of accused Januario dela
Cruz at Purok 5, West Dirita San Antonio, Zambales, declared that between
10:00 and 11:00 o'clock in the evening on August 3, 1987, she was then at
the balcony of her house having some fresh air when accused Januario dela
Cruz alighted from a tricycle. After alighting therefrom, she saw him go inside
his house. 3
In returning its verdict, the lower court relied on the testimony of Reynaldo
Pascasio, who drove the tricycle in which the stabbing occurred, who narrated
in detail the tragic trip from East Dirita San Antonio, Zambales to San Narciso,
Zambales, and who implicated dela Cruz as one of the men who went on that
journey.
Dela Cruz assigns a lone error committed supposedly by the trial court, that
is, that it was mistaken in holding him liable as a co-conspirator in the killing
of Rodolfo Pamoleras, Jr.
As the trial court noted, there is no dispute as to the corpus delicti. Neither is
it questioned that Januario dela Cruz did not personally inflict any injury on
the deceased, other than the fact that at the time the latter died, he was in
the scene of the crime. What is apparent is that it was either Doming
Lachingco 4 (who has since remained at large and hence, beyond judicial
jurisdiction), or the "Doe" accused, who actually knifed the victim. The issue
then is whether or not dela Cruz may be held responsible on the theory of
conspiracy.
The issue hangs on credibility of witnesses, and in this connection, this Court
has time and time again held that "credibility" is the sole province of the trial
court. 5
Apart from that, the records themselves amply show that Januario dela Cruz
was indeed, a co-conspirator in the murder of Rodolfo Pamolares.
Reynaldo Pascasio's testimony was candid and straightforward, and more
importantly, dela Cruz has shown no improper motive on Pascasio's part that
may have led him (Pascasio) to lie on the stand.
Dela Cruz's version that he had all along been but a chance passenger in
Pascasio's tricycle and that he had merely accompanied Lachingco, et al., and
that on their way, a free-for-all had broken out leading to the fatal stabbing, is
hardly believable. First, according to him, Lachingco was a total stranger who
had merely asked him a favor (to look for a ride to San Narciso). If this were
so, there was no need to go with him on that ride. As common experience

suggests, one does not simply hang around with perfect strangers. Second, he
did nothing after Lachingco had disposed of the victim's remains (laid by the
roadside), and subsequently, after they had all gone home. His own evidence
does not indicate that he had indeed, thereafter sought to alert the authorities
about the murder he had witnessed, or at the very least, have Pascasio come
forward to acquit him. His behavior certainly does not speak his innocence.
On the testimony alone of Reynaldo Pascasio, this Court is convinced that
Januario dela Cruz was a co-conspirator in the murder of Rodolfo Pamoleras,
Jr., and must be held as a co-principal along with the actual killers. A
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 6 While proof
of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, the agreement itself may
be inferred from the conduct of the parties, disclosing a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. 7
Pascasio's recital that dela Cruz was one of Lachingco's gang, one of whom
thrust a fatal stab wound on the deceased and threw his cadaver by the
roadside, after which dela Cruz instructed him, Pascasio, to take another
route, and that he, dela Cruz, later washed the dead's blood off the vehicle,
are an eloquent testimony of a conspiracy in the murder of Rodolfo Pamolares,
Jr. It is also proof of treachery, in which the malefactors, without warning and
with no risk to themselves, did away with Pamolares. On this score, however,
this Court can not appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying
circumstance, because in evident premeditation, the time intervening
between the plan to slay the victim and the actual slaying must be shown. 8
As to "use of motor vehicle," the evidence indeed shows that dela Cruz, et al.
had deliberately availed themselves of a tricycle in order to consummate their
dastardly act and to use it as cover to facilitate it. 9
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94308. June 16, 1994.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN E. ILAOA
and ROGELIO E. ILAOA, accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites to
warrant a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence.To warrant a
conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, three requisites must
concur: (a) there must be more than one circumstance; (b) the circumstances
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and, (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A circumstantial evidence which has not been
adequately established, and which was not corroborated, cannot, by itself, be
the basis of conviction.In the case at bench, it does not require much
analysis to conclude that the circumstance relied upon to establish Rogelio
Ilaoas guilt, i.e., the alleged dragging of the deceased to his brothers
apartment, is totally inadequate for a conviction, having miserably failed to
meet the criteria. This is especially so where the veracity of such
circumstance is even open to question. While Antonio Ramos and Abdulia
Logan testified that Rogelio Ilaoa helped his brother drag the deceased to his
apartment, Eustancia Bie who claimed to have witnessed the same incident
positively testified that it was Ruben Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio who did so.
Rogelio Ilaoa was not mentioned. Not having been adequately established, in
addition to being uncorroborated, such circumstance alone cannot be the
basis of Rogelios conviction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Motive; It is a matter of judicial knowledge that
persons have been killed or assaulted for no apparent reason at all, and that
friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a crime.
We find the version of the prosecution more persuasive than the defense. The
fact that appellant quarreled with the deceased, then mauled and pulled him
to the apartment where the latter was last seen alive, in addition to borrowing
a tricycle which was found with bloodstains when returned, sufficiently point
to Ruben as the culprit responsible for the crime. The fact that the deceased
was his compadre, hence, presumably would have no motive to kill the latter,
is not enough to exculpate appellant. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that
persons have been killed or assaulted for no apparent reason at all, and that
friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a crime.
Same; Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Abuse of superior strength
cannot be considered if there was no evidence whatsoever that the accused
was physically superior to the deceased.Abuse of superior strength cannot
be considered because there was no evidence whatsoever that appellant was
physically superior to the deceased and that the former took advantage of
such superior physical strength to overcome the latters resistance to
consummate the offense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Cruelty; Number of wounds alone is not the
criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance,
neither can it be inferred from the mere fact that the victims dead body was
dismembered.The fact that Nestor de Loyolas decapitated body bearing
forty-three (43) stab wounds, twenty-four (24) of which were fatal, was found
dumped in the street is not sufficient for a finding of cruelty where there is no
showing that appellant Ruben Ilaoa, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused
Nestor de Loyola to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him

unnecessary physical and moral pain. Number of wounds alone is not the
criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance.
Neither can it be inferred from the mere fact that the victims dead body was
dismembered.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evident Premeditation; Where there is no showing
that the accused, prior to the night of the commission of the crime, resolved
to kill the victim, or proof that such killing was the result of meditation,
calculation or resolution on his part, evident premedita-tion could not be
appreciated against him.Evident premeditation cannot likewise be
considered. There is nothing in the records to show that appellant, prior to the
night in question, resolved to kill Nestor de Loyola, nor is there proof to show
that such killing was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his
part. On the contrary, the evidence tends to show that the series of
circumstances which culminated in the killing constitutes an unbroken chain
of events with no interval of time separating them for calculation and
meditation. Absent any qualifying circumstance, Ruben Ilaoa should only be
held liable for homicide. [People vs. Ilaoa, 233 SCRA 231(1994)]
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Pfc. Reynaldo P. Angeles was dispatched in the early morning of 5 November
1987 to Tinio St., Sta. Maria Phase I, Balibago, Angeles City, where the
decapitated body of a man, later identified through his voters identification
card as Nestor de Loyola, was found in a grassy portion thereof. Apart from
the decapitation, the deceased bore forty-three (43) stab wounds in the chest
as well as slight burns all over the body. The head was found some two (2)
feet away from the corpse.
Five persons, Ruben E. Ilaoa, Rogelio E. Ilaoa, Rodel E. Ilaoa, Julius Eliginio and
Edwin Tapang, were charged for the gruesome murder of Nestor de Loyola.
However, only the brothers Ruben and Rogelio stood trial since the other
accused escaped and were never apprehended.
On 15 June 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City found Ruben and
Rogelio guilty of murder with the attendant circumstances of evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and cruelty, and imposed upon
them the penalty of "life imprisonment." 1 The conviction was based on the
following circumstantial evidence:
One. The deceased Nestor de Loyola was seen at about eleven oclock in the
evening of 4 November 1987, in a drinking session with his compadre Ruben
Ilaoa together with Julius Eliginio, Edwin Tapang and a certain "Nang Kwang"
outside Rubens apartment. 2

Two. The drunken voices of Ruben and Nestor engaged in an apparent

argument were later on heard. 3 Nestor was then seen being kicked and
mauled by Ruben and his brother Rodel, Julius Eliginio and Edwin Tapang. 4
Nestor was crying all the while, "Pare, aray, aray!" Afterwards, Nestor, who
appeared drunk, was seen being "dragged" 5 into Ruben Ilaoas apartment.
Nestor was heard saying, "Pare, bakit ninyo ako ginaganito, hirap na hirap na
ako!" 6
Three.
Ruben
Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio borrowed Alex Villamils tricycle at about two oclock
the following morning allegedly for the purpose of bringing to the hospital a
neighbor who was about to give birth. Ruben was seen driving the tricycle
alone, with a sack which looked as though it contained a human body, placed
in the sidecar. The tricycle was returned an hour later to Alex who noticed
bloodstains on the floor. The latter thought that they were those of the
pregnant woman.
Four. Blood was found on Rubens shirt when he was asked to lift it during the
investigation by the police. 7 Moreover, Rubens hair near his right forehead
was found partly burned and his shoes were splattered with blood. 8 Susan
Ocampo, Rubens live-in partner, was likewise seen in the early morning of 5
November 1987 sweeping what appeared to be blood at the entrance of their
apartment. 9
In this appeal, brothers Ruben and Rogelio Ilaoa argue for their acquittal. They
contend that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court for
their conviction failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically, they assail the finding of evident premeditation, abuse of superior
strength and cruelty as totally unwarranted.
We affirm Ruben Ilaoas guilt having been satisfactorily established by the
evidence on hand, albeit circumstantial. However, we reverse the conviction
of Rogelio as we find it patently baseless.
In finding Rogelio guilty of murder, the court a quo relied solely on the
testimony that he helped his brother Ruben drag Nestor de Loyola inside
Rubens apartment where the deceased was last seen alive. Apart from such
testimony, however, there is nothing else to link Rogelio to the killing.
To warrant a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, three
requisites must concur: (a) there must be more than one circumstance; (b)
the circumstances from which the inferences are derived are proven; and, (c)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to prove the guilt of the

accused beyond reasonable doubt. 10 In the case at bench, it does not require
much analysis to conclude that the circumstance relied upon to establish
Rogelio Ilaoas guilt, i.e., the alleged dragging of the deceased to his brothers
apartment, is totally inadequate for a conviction, having miserably failed to
meet the criteria. This is especially so where the veracity of such
circumstance is even open to question. While Antonio Ramos and Abdulia
Logan testified that Rogelio Ilaoa helped his brother drag the deceased to his
apartment, Eustancia Bie who claimed to have witnessed the same incident
positively testified that it was Ruben Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio who did so. 11
Rogelio Ilaoa was not mentioned. Not having been adequately established, in
addition to being uncorroborated, such circumstance alone cannot be the
basis of Rogelios conviction.
Rubens case, however, is a totally different matter. Unlike that of his brother,
Ruben Ilaoas fate was most definitely assured by the unbroken chain of
circumstances which culminated in the discovery of Nestor de Loyolas
decapitated body in the early morning of 5 November 1987.
As found by the trial court, in the late evening of 4 November 1987, appellant
Ruben Ilaoa was engaged in a drinking session with the deceased Nestor de
Loyola together with several others. Ruben was heard arguing with Nestor. A
few moments later, Ruben mauled and kicked the deceased with the help of
their drinking companions just outside Rubens apartment. As the deceased
cried "Aray! Aray!" and "Pare, bakit nyo ako ginaganito? Hirap na hirap na
ako!" appellant dragged the deceased with the help of Julius Eliginio to the
apartment from where a mans cries were continued to be heard later. To
further seal the case against him, Ruben borrowed Alex Villamils tricycle at
two oclock in the morning of 5 November 1987 on the pretext that a neighbor
was about to give birth and had to be rushed to the hospital. However, he was
seen driving the tricycle alone with a sack placed in the sidecar. The sack
looked as if it contained a human body. 12 Then, an hour later, or at three
oclock in the morning, the tricycle was returned with bloodstains on the floor.
For his defense, appellant Ruben Ilaoa does not dispute the testimony of an
eyewitness that he was driving the tricycle at past two oclock in the morning
with the sack in the sidecar. However, he claims that the sack contained
buntot ng pusa, a local term for marijuana, not a human body, which he
delivered to a designated place in Fields Avenue as a favor to his compadre
Nestor de Loyola whom he could not refuse. Moreover, it was the vomit
discharged by his drinking companions that was being swept clean by his
girlfriend at the entrance of their apartment in the early morning of 5
November 1987, not blood as the witnesses asseverated.

We find the version of the prosecution more persuasive than the defense. The
fact that appellant quarreled with the deceased, then mauled and pulled him
to the apartment where the latter was last seen alive, in addition to borrowing
a tricycle which was found with bloodstains when returned, sufficiently point
to Ruben as the culprit responsible for the crime. The fact that the deceased
was his compadre, hence, presumably would have no motive to kill the latter,
is not enough to exculpate appellant. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that
persons have been killed or assaulted for no apparent reason at all, 13 and
that friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a
crime. 14
If we are to believe appellant Ruben, we will not be able to account for the
blood found on the floor of the tricycle after it was brought back to the owner.
Ruben himself could not explain away such testimony for he belied the excuse
that the tricycle was needed to rush a pregnant woman to the hospital, which
was the explanation he gave to Alex Villamil when he borrowed it. We cannot
even consider that the story about the blood on the tricycle was simply
concocted by Alex Villamil to incriminate Ruben because the latter was his
friend, as Ruben himself has admitted. 15 In fact he could think of no reason
for Alex Villamil to testify falsely against him. 16
Despite the foregoing, however, we hold appellant liable only for homicide,
not murder, on the ground that the qualifying circumstances alleged in the
information, namely, abuse of superior strength, cruelty and evident
premeditation, were not sufficiently proved to be appreciated against
appellant.
Abuse of superior strength cannot be considered because there was no
evidence whatsoever that appellant was physically superior to the deceased
and that the former took advantage of such superior physical strength to
overcome the latters resistance to consummate the offense. 17 The fact that
Nestor de Loyolas decapitated body bearing forty-three (43) stab wounds,
twenty-four (24) of which were fatal, 18 was found dumped in the street is not
sufficient for a finding of cruelty where there is no showing that appellant
Ruben Ilaoa, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused Nestor de Loyola to
suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and
moral pain. 19 Number of wounds alone is not the criterion for the
appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance. 20 Neither can it be
inferred from the mere fact that the victims dead body was dismembered. 21
Evident premeditation cannot likewise be considered. There is nothing in the
records to show that appellant, prior to the night in question, resolved to kill
Nestor de Loyola, nor is there proof to show that such killing was the result of
meditation, calculation or resolution on his part. On the contrary, the evidence
tends to show that the series of circumstances which culminated in the killing

constitutes an unbroken chain of events with no interval of time separating

them for calculation and meditation. Absent any qualifying circumstance,
Ruben Ilaoa should only be held liable for homicide.
The penalty prescribed for homicide in Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum shall
be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, which is fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, which is prision mayor, in any of its periods, the range of which is six
(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
In line with present jurisprudence, the civil indemnity fixed by the court a quo
for the death of Nestor de Loyola is increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the judgment finding accused RUBEN E. ILAOA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt is AFFIRMED but only for homicide, instead of murder.
Consequently, he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8)
years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum. In addition, accused-appellant
RUBEN E. ILAOA is ordered to pay the heirs of Nestor de Loyola P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and, as fixed by the court a quo, P46,765.00 as actual
damages, P10,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation, and P10,000.00 for moral damages.
Accused-appellant ROGELIO E. ILAOA, however, is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged for obvious insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 76338-39. February 26, 1990.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RE-NATO TAC-AN
Y HIPOS, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Self-Defense; Unlawful Aggression; Unlawful aggression
refers to an attack that has actually broken out or at the very least is clearly
imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or a merely threatening stance or
posture.In the second place, assuming (arguendo merely) that Francis had
indeed made those statements, such utterances cannot be regarded as the
unlawful aggression which is the first and most fundamental requirement of
self-defense. Allegedly uttered in a high school classroom by an obviously
unarmed Francis, such statements could not reasonably inspire the well

grounded and reasonable belief claimed by Renato that he was in imminent

danger of death or bodily harm. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that
has actually broken out or materialized or at the very least is clearly
imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or a merely threatening stance or
posture. Further, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, Francis was obviously
without a firearm or other weapon when Renato returned and burst into Room
15 demanding to know where Francis was and forthwith firing at him
repeatedly, without the slightest regard for the safety of his other classmates
and of the teacher. There being no unlawful aggression, there simply could
not be self-defense whether complete or incomplete, and there is accordingly
no need to refer to the other requirements of lawful self-defense. [People vs.
Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601(1990)]
Criminal Law; Aggravating Circumstances; Use of an unlicensed firearm, not
an aggravating circumstance but if same was used to destroy human life, it
may still be taken to increase the penalty to death (reclusion perpetua under
the 1987 Constitution)However, in sentencing Renato to suffer the penalty
of death for the crime of murder, the trial court did take into account as a
special aggravating circumstance the fact that the killing of Francis had
been done with the use of an unlicensed firearm. In so doing, we believe
and so hold, the trial court committed error. There is no law which renders the
use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in homicide or
murder. Under an information charging homicide or murder, the fact that the
death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the
penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to death (or reclusion
perpetua under the 1987 Constitution). The essential point is that the
unlicensed character or condition of the instrument used in destroying human
life or committing some other crime, is not included in the inventory of
aggravating circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. x x
x In contrast, under an information for unlawful possession (or manufacture,
dealing in, acquisition or disposition) of a firearm or ammunition, P.D. No.
1866 authorizes the increase of the imposable penalty for unlawful possession
or manufacture, etc. of the unlicensed firearm where such firearm was used to
destroy human life. Although the circumstance that human life was destroyed
with the use of the unlicensed firearm is not an aggravating circumstance
under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be taken into account
to increase the penalty to death (reclusion perpetua, under the 1987
Constitution) because of the explicit provisions of P.D. No. 1866. As noted
earlier, the unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition is an
offense punished under a special law and not under the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Treachery; Treachery attended the killing of the victim, considering that
it was carried out in a manner which disabled the victim to defend himself, or
retaliate against his assailant.The court also pointed out that Renato must

have known that Francis while inside Room 15 had no means of escape there
being only one (1) door and Room 15 being on the second floor of the
building. Renato in effect blocked the only exit open to Francis as he stood on
the teachers platform closest to the door and fired as Francis and Ruel sought
to dash through the door. Renatos question where is Francis? cannot
reasonably be regarded as an effort to warn Francis for he shot at Francis the
instant he sighted the latter, seated and talking to Ruel Ungab. That Renato
fired three (3) shots before hitting Francis with the fourth shot, can only be
ascribed to the indifferent marksmanship of Renato and to the fact that
Francis and the other students were scurrying from one part of the room to
the other in an effort to evade the shots fired by Renato. The cumulative
effect of the circumstances underscored by the trial court was that the attack
upon Francis had been carried out in a manner which disabled Francis from
defending himself or retaliating against Renato. Finally, the circumstance that
Renato, having been informed that Francis was still alive, re-entered Room 15
and fired again at Francis who lay on the floor and bathed with his own blood,
manifested Renatos conscious choice of means of execution which directly
and especially ensured the death of his victim without risk to himself. We are
compelled to agree with the trial court that treachery was here present and
that, therefore, the killing of Francis Ernest Escao III was murder. [People vs.
Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601(1990)]
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Teacher or professor cannot be regarded
as a public authority within the meaning of Paragraph 2 of Art. 14.Careful
reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or
professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a person
in authority, such teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes of
application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person in authority), and 151
(resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such
person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of
Article 152 does not identify specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the
application of which any person directly vested with jurisdiction, etc. is
deemed a person in authority. Because a penal statute is not to be given a
longer reach and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of
the ordinary words used by such statute, to the disadvantage of an accused,
we do not believe that a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private
school may be regarded as a public authority within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the provision the trial
court applied in the case at bar. [People vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601(1990)]
FELICIANO, J.:
Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Tagbilaran City, convicting him of qualified illegal possession of a firearm and

ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007 and of murder in Criminal Case No.
4012 and imposing upon him the penalty of death in both cases.
On 18 December 1984, appellant was charged with violation of Section 1,
paragraph (2), of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of December 1984, in the City of Tagbilaran
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, while acting under the influence of drugs and without any
license or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have ill his possession, custody and control an
unlicensed firearm, a SMITH & WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver with
Serial Number 359323 with Five (5) spent shells and Five (5) live ammunitions
and without any justifiable cause and with intent to kill, used the said firearm
and ammunitions to shoot one Francis Ernest Escano III hitting and inflicting
upon the latter the following gunshot wounds or injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS Head & Chest (through and through);
Head Entrance 1.4 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-Temporal Area; Port 1.3 x 0.3
cm.; Right Cheek. 3.5 cm. above the right external meatus;
Chest Entrance 0.3 x 1 cm. Right Infrascapular Area at the level of the
7th Intercostal Rib (Back); Exist 0.3 cm. dia; above the right nipple;
Y-shape laceration, check at the right angle of the mouth, Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2 of the
Presidential Decree No. 1866. 1
On 11 January 1985, an amended information 2 for murder was also filed
against appellant reading as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of December, 1984 in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without any justifiable cause and with intent to kill, evident
pre-meditation treachery, while acting under the influence of drugs, with
cruelty and deliberately augmenting the suffering of the victim, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot one Francis

Ernest Escano with the use of an unlicensed SMITH & WESSON Airweight
caliber .38 revolver with Serial Number 359323 hitting and inflicting upon the
latter the following gunshot wounds or injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS Head and Chest (Through & Through);
Head Entrance 14 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-temporal Area; Port l.3 x 0.3
cm., Right Cheek, 3.5 cm., above the right external meatus;
Chest Entrance 0.3 x 1 cm. right Infrascapular Area at the level of the
7th Inter-Costal Rib (back); exit 0.3 cm. dia; above the right nipple
Y-shape laceration, cheek at the angle of the mouth, Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8.
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased namely: Judge & Mrs. Francisco Rey
H. Escano, in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Section 17 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, with the qualifying
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery and acting
under the influence of dangerous drugs and cruelty.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. The two (2) criminal cases
were consolidated upon motion of the prosecution and tried jointly. On 31 July
1986, the trial court rendered a decision 3 convicting appellant under both
informations. The dispositive portion of the decision read as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, decision is hereby
rendered in Criminal Case No. 4007 finding the accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions qualified with Murder under Section 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 and hereby sentences said Renato Tac-an y
Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH. Further, decision is also rendered in
Criminal Case No. 4012 finding the same accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 and P.D. 1866.
Appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
(treachery used to qualify the crime to murder) and the special aggravating
circumstances of acting while under the influence of dangerous drugs and
with the use of an unlicensed firearm and with insult to a person in authority
and there being no mitigating circumstance to offset them, and sentences the

said Renato Tac-an y Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The accused is
likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Francis Ernest Escano
in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00); to pay actual
compensatory damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P108,310.00); to pay moral damages to Judge
Francisco Escano, Jr., the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00) and to Mrs. Lydia Escano the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P100,000.00) for the mental anguish and suffering each experienced
because of the death of Francis Ernest. All such amount shall earn legal
interest from the time this decision shall become final and executory until fully
satisfied. The accused shall also pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Immediately after promulgation of the decision, appellant signified his
intention to appeal to this Court, although the same was subject to automatic
review by this Court.
In his brief, appellant assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by
the trial court:
I. The lower court erred in believing the prosecution's version of the case
instead of according full faith and credence to the defendant's version.
II. The trial court erred in not holding that Renato Tac-an was justified in
shooting the deceased.
III. The trial court erred in not holding that in (sic) the least the defendant
acted in incomplete self-defense in shooting the deceased.
IV. The trial court erred in not holding that P.D. 1866 is inapplicable to the
defendant inasmuch as said decree was enforceable only during the existence
of the Martial Law Regime.
V. The trial court erred in not holding that the defendant was placed twice in
jeopardy for having been prosecuted for violation of P.D. 1866 despite his
being prosecuted for murder in an information which alleges that the accused
used an unlicensed firearm in killing the deceased.
VI. The trial court erred in not adjudging the defendant innocent of murder.
From the record, the facts may be collated and summarized as follows:

Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months of
age, and the deceased Francis Ernest Escano III, fifteen (15) years old, were
classmates in the third year of high school of the Divine Word College in
Tagbilaran City. They were close friends, being not only classmates but also
members of the same gang, the Bronx gang. Renato had been to the house
where Francis and his parents lived, on one or two occasions. On those
occasions, Francis' mother noticed that Renato had a handgun with him.
Francis was then advised by his mother to distance himself from Renato. 4
Francis withdrew from the Bronx gang. The relationship between Renato and
Francis turned sour. Sometime in September 1984, Renato and Francis
quarrelled with each other, on which occasion Francis bodily lifted Arnold
Romelde from the ground. Arnold was friend and companion to Renato. The
quarrel resulted in Renato and Francis being brought to the high school
principal's office. The strained relationship between the two (2) erstwhile
friends was aggravated in late November 1984 when Francis teamed that
Renato, together with other members of the Bronx gang, was looking for him,
apparently with the intention of beating him up. Further deterioration of their
relationship occurred sometime in the first week of December 1984, when
graffiti appeared on the wall of the third year high school classroom and on
the armrest of a chair in that classroom, deprecating the Bronx gang and
describing Renato as "bayot" (homosexual) 5 Renato attributed the graffiti to
Francis.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 December 1984, Renato entered
Room 15 of the high school building to attend his English III class. Renato
placed his scrapbook prepared for their Mathematics class on his chair, and
approached the teacher, Mrs. Liliosa Baluma, to raise a question. Upon
returning to his chair, he found Francis sitting there, on the scrapbook. Renato
was angered by what he saw and promptly kicked the chair on which Francis
was seated. Francis, however, explained that he had not intentionally sat
down on Renato's scrapbook. A fistfight would have ensued but some
classmates and two (2) teachers, Mrs. Baluma and Mr. Damaso Pasilbas,
intervened and prevented them from assaulting each other. After the two (2)
had quieted down and apparently shaken hands at the instance of Mrs.
Baluma, the latter resumed her English III class. Francis sat on the last row to
the extreme right of the teacher while Renato was seated on the same last
row at the extreme left of the teacher. While the English III class was still
going on, Renato slipped out of the classroom and went home to get a gun.
He was back at the classroom approximately fifteen (15) minutes later. 6
The Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas scheduled for 3:00 p.m.
had just started in Room 15 when Renato suddenly burst into the room, shut
the door and with both hands raised, holding a revolver, shouted "Where is

Francis?" Upon sighting Francis seated behind and to the light of student Ruel
Ungab, Renato fired at Francis, hitting a notebook, a geometry book and the
armrest of Ruel's chair. Francis and Ruel jumped up and with several of their
classmates rushed forward towards the teacher's platform to seek protection
from their teacher. Renato fired a second time, this time hitting the
blackboard in front of the class. Francis and the other students rushed back
towards the rear of the room. Renato walked towards the center of the
classroom and fired a third time at Francis, hitting the concrete wall of the
classroom. Francis and a number of his classmates rushed towards the door,
the only door to and from Room 15. Renato proceeded to the teacher, s
platform nearest the door and for the fourth time fired at Francis as the latter
was rushing towards the door. This time, Francis was hit on the head and he
fell on the back of Ruel and both fell to the floor. Ruel was pulled out of the
room by a friend; Francis remained sprawled on the floor bleeding profusely. 7
Renato then went out of Room 15, and paced between Rooms 14 and 15. A
teacher, Mr. Pablo Baluma, apparently unaware that it was Renato who had
gunned down Francis, approached Renato and asked him to help Francis as
the latter was still alive inside the room. Renato thereupon re-entered Room
15, closed the door behind him, saying: "So, he is still alive. Where is his
chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor,
Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once more. The bullet entered
Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest just
above the right nipple. 8
Renato then left with two (2) remaining students and locked Francis alone
inside Room 15. Renato proceeded to the ground floor and entered the faculty
room. There, he found some teachers and students and ordered them to lock
the door and close the windows, in effect holding them as hostages. He also
reloaded his gun with five (5) bullets. After some time, a team of Philippine
Constabulary troopers led by Capt. Larino Lazo arrived and surrounded the
faculty room. With a hand-held public address device, Capt. Lazo called upon
Renato to surrender himself Renato did not respond to this call. Renato's
brother approached Capt. Lazo and volunteered to persuade his brother to
give up. Renato's father who, by this time had also arrived, pleaded with
Renato to surrender himself Renato then turned over his gun to his brother
through an opening in the balustrade of the faculty room. Capt. Lazo took the
gun from Renato's brother, went to the door of the faculty room, entered and
placed Renato under arrest. 9
Meantime, as soon as Renato left Room 15, some teachers and students came
to rescue Francis but could not open the door which Renato had locked behind
him. One of the students entered the room by climbing up the second floor on
the outside and through the window and opened the door from the inside. The

teachers and students brought Francis down to the ground floor from whence
the PC soldiers rushed him to the Celestino Gallares Memorial Hospital. 10
Francis died before reaching the hospital.
Capt. Lazo brought Renato to the PC Headquarters at Camp Dagohoy,
Tagbilaran City. The officer deposited the revolver recovered from Renato
which was an Airweight Smith and Wesson .38 caliber revolver, with Serial No.
359323, as well as the five (5) live bullets removed from the said revolver,
and the five (5) empty cartridges which Renato had turned over to him.
Ballistic examination conducted by Supervising Ballistician, Artemio
Panganiban, National Bureau of Investigation, Cebu, showed that the empty
cartridge cases had been fired from the revolver recovered from Renato. 11
Appellant at the outset assails the trial court for having believed the
prosecution's version of the facts instead of the version offered by the
appellant. The trial court took into account, inter alia, the positive and direct
testimony of:
1. Mrs. Liliosa Baluma who testified as to, among other things, the events
which took place inside her English III classroom immediately before the
shooting;
2. Ruel Ungab a fifteen (15) year old classmate of Renato and Francis, who
had fallen on the floor with Francis when the latter was finally hit by Renato;
3. Damaso Pasilbas the Mathematics teacher who was holding his class
when Renato had burst into Room 15 and started firing at Francis; and
4. Napoleon Jumauan another sixteen (16) year old, classmate of Renato
and Francis who was inside the classroom when Renato had started firing at
Francis and who was only about a foot away from the head of Francis when
Renato, having re-entered Room 15, had fired at Francis as the latter was
sprawled on the floor of the classroom.
After careful examination of the record, we find no reason to disagree with the
conclusion of the trial court that Renato had indeed shot and killed Francis
under the circumstances and in the manner described by these witnesses.
1. The claim of self-defense.
Renato claimed that he was acting in self-defense, or at least in incomplete
self-defense, when he shot Francis. For a claim of self-defense to be sustained,
the claimant must show by clear and convincing evidence that the following
requisites existed:

a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;

b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel the
aggression; and
c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. 12
Testifying in his own behalf, Renato said that a few minutes before the end of
Mrs. Baluma's English III class, Francis had approached him:
(Atty. Seno, Defense Counsel)
Q: How did it happened (sic) that you had a conversation with Francis?
(Renato)
A: While the class was going on, Mrs. Baluma was writing on the blackboard.
Q: Then what happened?
A: While our teacher was writing on the blackboard Francis suddenly got near
me.
Q: And what happened when Francis approached you?
A: He said, 'So you are brave now you had a (sic) guts to fight against me.'
Q: And what else did he say?
A: He said, 'Go home, get your firearm because I will go home to get a gun.'
Q: Was that all that he told you?
A: He further said, 'You go home get your firearm, if you won't go home and
get a gun, I will go to your place and kill you including your parents, brothers
and sisters.'
Q: And after that where did Francis go?
A: Before the bell rang he went ahead. 13
(Emphasis supplied)

We note at the outset that there was no evidence before the Court, except
Renato's own testimony, that Francis had uttered the above statements
attributed to him by Renato. Although there had been about twenty-five (25)
other students, and the teacher, in the classroom at the time, no
corroborating testimony was offered by the defense. In the second place,
assuming (arguendo merely) that Francis had indeed made those statements,
such utterances cannot be regarded as the unlawful aggression which is the
first and most fundamental requirement of self-defense. Allegedly uttered in a
high school classroom by an obviously unarmed Francis, such statements
could not reasonably inspire the "well grounded and reasonable belief"
claimed by Renato that "he was in imminent danger of death or bodily harm."
14 Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or
materialized or at the very least is clearly imminent: it cannot consist in oral
threats or a merely threatening stance or posture. 15 Further as pointed out
by the Solicitor General, Francis was obviously without a firearm or other
weapon when Renato returned and burst into Room 15 demanding to know
where Francis was and forthwith firing at him repeatedly, without the slightest
regard for the safety of his other classmates and of the teacher. There being
no unlawful aggression, there simply could not be self-defense whether
complete or incomplete, 16 and there is accordingly no need to refer to the
other requirements of lawful self-defense.
2. The claim that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable.
As pointed out at the outset, appellant was charged with unlawful possession
of an unlicensed firearm, a Smith and Wesson Airweight.38 caliber revolver
with five (5) spent bullets and five (5) live ones and with having used such
firearm and ammunition to shoot to death Francis Ernest Escano III, in
violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 provides, in relevant part, that:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession
of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
penalty of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)

Appellant urges that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable to him "considering that the
reason for its [P.D. No. 1866] issuance no longer exists." He argues that P.D.
No. 1866 was enforceable only during the existence of martial law, and that
when martial law was "lifted in 1979," the reason for the "existence" of P.D.
No. 1866 faded away, with the result that the "original law on firearms, that is,
Section 2692 of the [Revised] Administrative Code, together with its premartial law amendments, came into effect again thereby replacing P.D. No.
1866." 17
There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 (which was promulgated on 29 June 1983)
which suggests that it was intended to remain in effect only for the duration of
the martial law imposed upon the country by former President Marcos. Neither
does the statute contain any provision that so prescribes its lapsing into nonenforceability upon the termination of the state or period of martial law. On
the contrary, P.D. No. 1866 by its own terms purported to "consolidate, codify
and integrate" all prior laws and decrees penalizing illegal possession and
manufacture of firearms, ammunition and explosives in order "to harmonize
their provisions as well as to update and revise certain provisions and prior
statutes "in order to more effectively deter violators of the law on firearms,
ammunitions and explosives." 18 Appellant's contention is thus without basis
in fact.
3. The claim of double jeopardy.
It is also contended by appellant that because he had already been charged
with illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007,
aggravated by the use of such unlicensed firearm to commit a homicide or
murder, he was unconstitutionally placed in jeopardy of punishment for the
second time when he was charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 with murder
"with the use of an unlicensed [firearm]," in violation of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179.
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects
one against a second or later prosecution for the same offense, and that when
the subsequent information charges another and different offense, although
arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double
jeopardy. In the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that the offense
charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute, while the offense
charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished under the
Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in
themselves are quite different one from the other, such that in principle, the
subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having
placed appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.

We note that the information in Criminal Case No. 4007 after charging
appellant with unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition,
went on to state that said firearm and ammunition had been used to shoot to
death Francis Ernest Escao III. We note also that the amended information in
Criminal Case No. 4012 after charging appellant with the unlawful killing of
Francis Ernest Escao III, stated that the killing had been done with the use of
an unlicensed firearm. We believe these additional allegations in the two (2)
informations did not have the effect of charging appellant with having
committed the same offense more than once.
However, in sentencing Renato to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of
murder, the trial court did take into account as a "special aggravating
circumstance" the fact that the killing of Francis had been done "with the use
of an unlicensed firearm." In so doing, we believe and so hold, the trial court
committed error. There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed
firearm as an aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an
information charging homicide or murder, the fact that the death weapon was
an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the penalty for the second
offense of homicide or murder to death (or reclusion perpetua under the 1987
Constitution). The essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition
of the instrument used in destroying human life or committing some other
crime, is not included in the inventory of aggravating circumstances set out in
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. 19
In contrast, under an information for unlawful possession (or manufacture,
dealing in, acquisition or disposition) of a firearm or ammunition, P.D. No.
1866 authorizes the increase of the imposable penalty for unlawful possession
or manufacture, etc. of the unlicensed firearm where such firearm was used to
destroy human life. Although the circumstance that human life was destroyed
with the use of the unlicensed firearm is not an aggravating circumstance
under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be taken into account
to increase the penalty to death (reclusion perpetua, under the 1987
Constitution) because of the explicit provisions of P.D. No. 1866. As noted
earlier, the unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition is an
offense punished under a special law and not under the Revised Penal Code.
4. The claim that there was no treachery.
Appellant contends that there was no treachery present because before any
shot was fired, Renato had shouted "where is Francis?" Appellant in effect
suggests his opening statement was a warning to Francis and that the first
three (3) shots he had fired at Francis were merely warning shots. Moreover,
building upon his own testimony about the alleged threat that Francis had

uttered before he (Renato) left his English III class to go home and get a gun,
appellant argues that Francis must have anticipated his return and thus had
sufficient time to prepare for the coming of the appellant. 20 Appellant's
contention, while ingenious, must be rejected. The trial court made a finding
of treachery taking explicit account of the following factors:
1. Room 15 of the Divine Word College High School Department Tagbilaran
City, is situated in the second floor of the building. It is a corner room and it
has only one (1) door which is the only means of entry and exit;
2. At the time of the attack, the deceased was seated on his chair inside his
classroom and was writing on the armrest of his chair and also talking to Ruel
Ungab and while their teacher, Mr. Damaso Pasilbas was checking the
attendance. The deceased was not aware of any impending assault neither
did he have any means to defend himself;
3. The accused used an airweight Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver in
shooting to death the defenseless and helpless Francis Ernest Escao;
4. The attack was so sudden and so unexpected. the accused consciously
conceived that mode of attack;
5. The accused fired at Francis again and again and did not give him a chance
to defend himself. After the deceased was hit on the head and fell to the floor
while he was already sprawled and completely defenseless the accused fired
at him again and the deceased was hit on the chest;
6. The deceased was not armed. He was totally defenseless. He was
absolutely not aware of any coming attack. 21
The Court also pointed out that Renato must have known that Francis while
inside Room 15 had no means of escape there being only one (1) door and
Room 15 being on the second floor of the building. Renato in effect blocked
the only exit open to Francis as he stood on the teacher's platform closest to
the door and fired as Francis and Ruel sought to dash through the door.
Renato's question "where is Francis?" cannot reasonably be regarded as an
effort to warn Francis for he shot at Francis the instant he sighted the latter,
seated and talking to Ruel Ungab. That Renato fired three (3) shots before
hitting Francis with the fourth shot, can only be ascribed to the indifferent
markmanship of Renato and to the fact that Francis and the other students
were scurrying from one part of the room to the other in an effort to evade the
shots fired by Renato. The cumulative effect of the circumstances underscored
by the trial court was that the attack upon Francis had been carried out in a
manner which disabled Francis from defending himself or retaliating against

Renato. Finally, the circumstance that Renato, having been informed that
Francis was still alive, re-entered Room 15 and fired again at Francis who lay
on the floor and bathed with his own blood, manifested Renato's conscious
choice of means of execution which directly and especially ensured the death
of his victim without risk to himself. 22 We are compelled to agree with the
trial court that treachery was here present and that, therefore, the killing of
Francis Ernest Escao III was murder.
5. The claim that there was no evident premeditation.
The trial court also found the presence of evident premeditation and
appreciated the same as a generic aggravating circumstance. Here, it is the
urging of the appellant that the requisites of evident premeditation had not
been sufficiently shown. In order that evident premeditation may be taken
into account, there must be proof of (a) the time when the offender formed his
intent to commit the crime; (b) an action manifestly indicating that the
offender had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (c) of the
passage of a sufficient interval of time between the determination of the
offender to commit the crime and the actual execution thereof, to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. 23 The defense pointed out that
barely fifteen (15) minutes had elapsed from the time Renato left his English
III class and the time he returned with a gun. While there was testimony to the
fact that before that fatal day of 14 December 1984, anger and resentment
had welled up between Francis and Renato, there was no evidence adequately
showing when Renato had formed the intention and determination to take the
life of Francis. Accordingly, we must discard evident premeditation as an
aggravating circumstance.
6. The claim that the killing was not done under the influence of a dangerous
drug.
Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179 which was promulgated on 2 March 1982 provides
as follows:
SEC. 17. The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, when a
crime is committed by an offender who is under the influence of dangerous
drugs, such state shall be considered as a qualifying aggravating
circumstance in the definition of a crime and the application of the penalty
provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court found that Francis was killed by Renato while the later was
under the influence of a dangerous drug, specifically marijuana, and took that
into account as a "special aggravating circumstance". No medical evidence
had been submitted by the prosecution to show that Renato had smoked

marijuana before gunning down Francis. Fourteen (14) days had elapsed after
December 14, 1984 before Renato was medically examined for possible traces
of marijuana; the results of the examination were negative. Defense witness
Dr. Rogelio Ascona testified that in order to have a medically valid basis for
determining the presence of marijuana in the human system, the patient must
be examined within twenty-four (24) hours from the time he is supposed to
have smoked marijuana. 24 The prosecution had presented Orlando Balaba, a
student at the Divine Word College, High School Department, who testified
that he found Renato and one Jaime Racho inside the men's room of the High
School Department sucking smoke from a hand-rolled thing that look like a
cigarette, that he had asked Renato what that was and that Renato had
replied damo (marijuana). 25 While the testimony of Orlando Balaba was
corroborated by two (2) other prosecution witnesses, we believe that Orlando
Balaba's testimony was incompetent to show that what Renato and Jaime
Racho were smoking inside the men's room was indeed marijuana. It was
pointed out by apellant that Orlando Balaba had never smoked nor smelled
marijuana.
In the absence of medical evidence, the Court took into account certain
detailed factors as circumstantial evidence supporting the testimony of
Orlando Balaba. These circumstances were:
The circumstance of place where the killing was committed, the circumstance
of the manner of the attack, the circumstance of holding hostage some
teachers and students inside the faculty room, the circumstance of terrifying
an entire school, the circumstance that sitting on a scrapbook is too
insignificant as to arouse passion strong enough to motivate a killing, are
circumstantial evidences that gave the court no room for doubt that
prosecution witnesses Orlando Balaba, Benjamin Amper and Allan de la Serna
truthfully told the court that they saw the accused smoking marijuana inside
the comfort room at 1:45 in the afternoon of December 14, 1984. ... . 26
The above circumstances pointed to by the trial court may be indicative of
passionate anger on the part of Renato; we do not believe that they
necessarily show that Renato had smoked marijuana before entering his
English III class. In the absence of competent medical or other direct evidence
of ingestion of a dangerous drug, courts may be wary and critical of indirect
evidence, considering the severe consequences for the accused of a finding
that he had acted while under the influence of a prohibited drug. The Court
considers that the evidence presented on this point was simply inadequate to
support the ruling of the trial court that Renato had shot and killed Francis
while under the influence of a prohibited drug.
7. The claim that appellant had voluntarily surrendered.

Appellant contends that he had voluntarily surrendered and that the trial court
should have considered that mitigating circumstance in his favor. The trial
court did not, and we consider that it correctly refused to do so. Firstly, Renato
surrendered his gun, not himself, 27 by handing over the weapon through the
balustrade of the faculty room. Secondly, he surrendered the gun to his
brother, who was not in any case a person in authority nor an agent of a
person in authority. 28 Thirdly, Renato did not surrender himself he was
arrested by Capt. Lazo. The fact that he did not resist arrest, did not constitute
voluntary surrender. 29 Finally, if it be assumed that Renato had surrendered
himself, such surrender cannot be regarded as voluntary and spontaneous.
Renato was holed up in the faculty room, in effect holding some teachers and
students as hostages. The faculty room was surrounded by Philippine
Constabulary soldiers and there was no escape open to him. He was not
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
8. Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to
the public authorities.
The trial court held that the shooting to death of Francis had been done "in
contempt of or with insult to the public authorities:
Under Republic Act 1978, as amended, a teacher of a public or private school
is considered a person in authority. The fact that Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, the
teacher in mathematics, was already checking the attendance did not deter
the accused from pursuing his evil act, The accused ignored his teacher's
presence and pleas. Not yet satisfied with the crime and terror he had done to
Francis and the entire school, the accused entered the faculty room and held
hostage the teachers and students who were inside that room. To the court,
this act of the accused was an insult to his teachers and to the school, an act
of callus disregard of other's feelings and safety and completely
reprehensible. 30
We believe the trial court erred in so finding the presence of a generic
aggravating circumstance. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 1978 and Presidential Decree No. 299, provides as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. Who shall
be deemed as such. In applying the provisions of the preceding and other
articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as
an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation,
board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain
and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.

A person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by

competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the
protection and security of life and property, such as a barrio councilman,
barrio policeman and barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid
of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers,
professors and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the
actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by P.D. No.
299, September 19, 1973 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).
Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a
teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be
a "person in authority," such teacher or professor is so deemed only for
purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person in
authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or
the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast, the
first paragraph of Article 152 does not identify specific articles of the Revised
Penal Code for the application of which any person "directly vested with
jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute is
not to be given a longer reach and broader scope than is called for by the
ordinary meaning of the ordinary words used by such statute, to the
disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a teacher or professor of
a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a "public authority"
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, 31
the provision the trial court applied in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 31 July 1986 is hereby
MODIFIED in the following manner and to the following extent only:
1. In Criminal Case No. 4007, appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua;
2. In Criminal Case No. 4012 (a) the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and of having acted with contempt of or insult to the public
authorities shall be DELETED and not taken into account; and (b) the special
aggravating circumstances of acting while under the influence of dangerous
drugs and with the use of an unlicensed firearm shall similarly be DELETED
and not taken into account. There being no generic aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances present, the appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua shall be served successively in

accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. As so
modified, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PHILIP C. TAN,
JR., accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse
without consent.The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse
without consent. The medical certificate showed lacerations in complainants
private parts indicating there was sexual intercourse. Likewise, the convincing
testimony of complainant indicates that she was forced by appellant to submit
to his deplorable lust. In consummating this innate desire, he employed force
and intimidation by boxing and hitting complainant on her stomach and legs.
Weakened by the physical blows and with a knife pointed at her, she became
helpless. Appellant eventually succeeded in performing his maniacal desires
which was repeated six more times. On two occasions, she became
unconscious after eating and drinking the bitter food and milk forced upon
her by appellant. When she regained consciousness she found herself naked
and with white slippery fluid going out of her vagina. Appellant even told
her that he had just finished doing it again.
FRANCISCO, J.:
Before us is another tragic desecration of human dignity committed no less
upon a child on the verge of womanhood, perpetrated by her very own
stepfather and inflicted thru seven (7) abominable non-consensual acts of sex
called rape.
Based on complaints filed by 16-year old complainant Annabelle Degay
assisted by her mother Filomena Tan, wife of appellant Philip Tan, Jr., the latter
was charged in fifteen (15) separate informations for raping complainant,
appellant's own stepdaughter. 1 These informations contained identical
language except as to the dates of the rape incidents as well as the means
employed by appellant. Ten (10) of these informations used the phrase "by
the use of the knife." The rest used the phrase "while she was then in a state
of unconsciousness as she was soundly sleeping." Said informations read as
follows:
That on or about (the dates) at Lubas, Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-

named accused, being the stepfather and even adopter of the herein
complainant and offended party, (by means of force, violence, intimidation,
and by the use of a knife or while she was then in a state of unconsciousness
as she was soundly sleeping,) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded
in having carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse with said complainant and
offended party Annabelle Degay y Salioan against her will.
That, in the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstance of
relationship is present, the accused being the stepfather and adopter of the
offended party. Also, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime is present as
the accused committed this offense during the night to facilitate its
accomplishment. 2 (Emphasis ours)
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Benguet convicted appellant of seven (7) counts of rape
committed on the nights of July 12, 13, 25, 28, 29 and August 7 and 11 of
1989 upon the person of complainant. The dispositive portion of the judgment
of conviction states:
WHEREFORE, the accused Philip C. Tan, Jr. is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape on seven (7) counts under Criminal
Cases Nos. 89-CR-0724, -0725, -0730, -0732, -0733, -0734, and
-0738, as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
and taking into account the attendance of two aggravating circumstances, the
said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum allowable penalty of
seven (7) successive imprisonments of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify
the complainant, Annabelle Degay in the amount of P100,000.00; and to pay
costs; however, said accused is hereby found not guilty of the crimes charged
in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-CR-0726,
-0727, -0728, -0729, -0731, -0735, -0736, and -0737 for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED. 3
Appellant directly appeals his conviction to this Court arguing that the trial
court erred in giving credence to the testimony of prosecution witnesses and
in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 7 counts of rape.
The factual milieu of the 15 charges as stated in the respective briefs of both
appellant and appellee which are materially and substantially patterned from
the factual findings of the trial court, ably supports the conclusion that
appellant's conviction is indeed based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. We
quote with approval the "Counterstatement of Facts" from the SolicitorGeneral's Brief, 4 the same being supported by evidence on the record:

Annabelle Degay, the daughter of Felomina Tan by another man, was three (3)
years old when Felomina married on July 12, 1976 appellant Philip Tan, a
widower with four children by his first wife (October 23, 1989, tsn, pp. 4). The
appellant, whom Annabelle considered as her real father, was a carpenter by
profession and Felomina, a weaver at Narda's Handicraft in La Trinidad,
Benguet, with working hours that consisted of two shifts that alternated every
two weeks: one shift from 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight, and the other from
7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. (Ibid., tsn, pp. 8-10).
Annabelle was a sixteen year-old high school student at the San Jose High
School in Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet, at the time of the rape incidents
(Ibid., tsn. p. 11).
Around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 12, 1989, Annabelle was at home in
Lubas, km. 5, La Trinidad, Benguet, together with her stepsisters Jennifer (21
years old), Annalyn (14) her half-sister Emily (daughter of appellant and
Annabelle's mother) and appellant, Philip Tan, Jr. The mother of Annabelle,
Felomina, was then on a night shift duty. After dinner, Annabelle and her
stepsister Jennifer, upon appellant's orders, massaged him as they usually did
every night, for about an hour and a half; appellant was lying down, wearing
only his briefs, and in this position, they would see his penis and he would let
his feet touch Annabelle's and Jennifer's private parts (Ibid., tsn, pp. 10-13).
After they had massaged all parts of appellant's body, Annabelle and Jennifer
were ordered by appellant to go to sleep (Ibid., tsn, p. 15).
Annabelle, Jennifer, Annalyn and Emily all occupied one of the three rooms in
the house. Jennifer and Emily slept on the bed, while Annabelle and Annalyn
slept on the floor (Ibid., tsn, p. 15). On that particular night the lights in the
house were out as the main switch was shut off from the master's bedroom
occupied by the appellant (Ibid., tsn, p. 17). After about thirty minutes,
Annabelle noticed the appellant enter their room (Ibid., p. 18). He slowly went
near his stepdaughter Annabelle and embraced her, uttering, "It is cold."
While uttering this, he forced Annabelle to take off her blanket (Ibid.).
Wondering what her stepfather was trying to do and what his intentions were,
Annabelle tried to fight back by struggling and kicking him; he was then in a
straddling position. But he slapped her, pointed a kitchen knife on her right
side, and boxed her thigh when she continued resisting (Ibid., pp. 19-22). It
was at this point that Annabelle shouted at her stepsisters Jennifer and
Annalyn to wake and help her. But no help was forthcoming from her
stepsisters, however, because Jennifer, though awake (as she could easily be
awakened), pretended to be asleep (Ibid., tsn, p. 22).
Annabelle continued struggling when appellant finally boxed her in the
stomach, causing her to lose consciousness (Ibid., tsn, pp. 23-26). Annabelle

started to fight back again, struggling until such time when appellant stood up
and left the room (Ibid., tsn, p. 20). Annabelle, in tears, followed her
stepfather, and in her anger, attempted to hit him. When she asked him why
he did the bestial act to her, appellant replied, "Ay-ayam ngarud" (It's just a
game) (Ibid., tsn, p. 27).
Annabelle immediately took a bath in the bathroom and as she washed
herself, she noticed blood and white slippery fluid flowing out from her vagina
(Ibid., tsn. p. 30). When she came out of the comfort room, she saw the
appellant looking at her and smiling. Scared, Annabelle ran to her room (Ibid.,
tsn, p. 31). She then changed her panty and clothes and cried (Ibid., tsn, pp.
31-32). Thereafter, she fell asleep.
Annabelle woke up at 5:30 in the morning the following day, July 13, 1989,
and started to cook rice. About fifteen (15) minutes later, appellant also woke
up and went to her, warning that he would kill her and her mother should she
tell the latter what happened between them (Ibid., tsn, p. 33). This scared
Annabelle to no end because she knew that appellant was capable of
maltreating her and her mother (Ibid.). Her stepsisters, too, when they woke
up, acted as if nothing had happened the previous night (Ibid., tsn, p. 34). It
was her mother, Felomina (who had returned at 2:00 o'clock on the morning
from her night shift duty) who woke up and inquired why she had been crying
the whole night and why there were lumps on her head. Annabelle did not say
anything. Because of her silence, Felomina presumed that this was caused by
appellant's having made unpleasant remarks at Annabelle again, or maybe
had scolded or physically hurt her (January 23, 1990, tsn, p. 6).
Annabelle did not go to school that day because her body was in pain, and
she could not concentrate anyway (October 24, 1989, tsn, p. 38).
In the evening of July 13, 1989, Felomina again worked on the night shift at
the Narda's when after dinner, appellant called Jeniffer and Annabelle to
massage him. After having massaged him for about an hour, Annabelle and
Jennifer proceeded to study their lessons while awaiting the arrival of
Felomina. Appellant, however, ordered them to go to sleep (October 24, 1989,
tsn, pp. 38-39).
Around 10:00 o'clock, appellant opened the door of their room. Annabelle
vainly tried to push the trunk of the door but appellant was able to get in.
When she tried to awaken Annalyn who was sleeping beside her, appellant
pushed her face to the floor (Ibid., tsn, p. 40). He then held Annabelle's hand
and told her that they already did it before anyway (Ibid.). All of a sudden,
appellant got hold of her hair and pushed her face to the floor (p. 40).
Appellant then knelt down, rode on her back and bumped her head several

times on the floor (Ibid., tsn, p. 40). Annabelle tried to face him so she could
fight back but appellant pulled her legs straight such that she fell on her back
(Ibid., tsn, p. 41). Finally, to keep her still, appellant boxed Annabelle's
stomach, which rendered her unconscious (Ibid., p. 42). When she regained
consciousness, Annabelle found herself naked and again, white slippery fluid
was flowing out of her vagina. By then, appellant was no longer inside the
room (Ibid., tsn, p. 42).
Later that night, Annabelle opened the door for her mother who arrived from
work. Felomina had noticed that her daughter had been crying, but when she
inquired as to the reason why, Annabelle, who had borne in mind her
stepfather's threats, just keep silent. Thereafter, Annabelle went to the
comfort room to wash (Ibid., tsn, pp. 43-44).
In the evening of July 15, 1989 appellant drank liquor with his friends in the
house (Ibid., p. 49). When his friends left, they ate supper and thereafter,
Annabelle and Annalyn massaged him (Ibid., tsn, p. 5'0). Afterwards, when
they went to study, appellant ordered them to go to sleep. Not long
thereafter, appellant entered their room. Annabelle attempted to block the
door but appellant was able to enter by force (Ibid., tsn, pp.
50-51). At this juncture, Annabelle screamed which prompted Jennifer to
inquire from her "Daddy" what he was doing. At this point, Annabelle
embraced Annalyn but appellant pulled her and slapped her face. Then he left
(Ibid., tsn, p. 51).
In the evening of July 25, 1989, when Felomina worked on the night shift from
4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight, appellant entered Annabelle's room and boxed
her several times until she felt weak. Then, he removed her pants, t-shirt and
panty, and pushed her to the floor. He then removed his underwear and
started mashing her breasts and kissing her. She could only struggle and push
and kick him, but to no avail. Appellant was able to successfully insert his
penis into her vagina. After having performed this bestial act on his
stepdaughter, appellant proceeded to his own room. Annabelle noticed that
while slippery fluid again flowed from her vagina (Ibid., tsn, pp. 56-60).
On July 28, 1989, after he was massaged, appellant ordered Annalyn to buy
milk. When she returned, appellant ordered her and Emily to go to sleep (Ibid.,
tsn, pp. 60-62). Thereafter, appellant prepared milk for himself, Jennifer and
Annabelle. Annabelle noticed however, that the glass of milk that was
prepared for her tasted bitter such that she requested Jennifer to exchange
her milk with hers. She was prevented from doing so by the appellant,
however. Thus, she pretended to drink the milk since she intended to throw it
away later. When she tried to do so, however, appellant scolded her and
threatened that if she threw it, something III would happen to her (Ibid., tsn, p.

62). Because of the threat, she was forced to drink the milk; she fell asleep
soon thereafter (Ibid., tsn, p. 63). When she woke up, she realized that
appellant had sexual intercourse with her for she found herself naked and
noticed that her vagina was slippery again (Ibid., tsn, pp. 63-64). She
immediately stood up to wash herself in the bathroom. When she returned to
her bedroom she could not sleep anymore (Ibid., tsn, p. 64). The following
day, much as she wanted to finally tell her mother (who again asked her why
she had bruises on her face and head) what had happened to her, she never
attempted to do so for she did not know how (October 24, 1989, tsn, pp. 6566).
In the evening of July 29, 1989, the appellant and his friends had a drinking
spree inside their house (Ibid., tsn, pp. 68-69). When his friends left, appellant
entered the room which Annabelle was sharing with her stepsisters (Ibid., tsn,
p. 69). She tried in vain to stop the appellant from coming inside by pushing
the door against him (Ibid.). When he was able to enter, appellant
immediately embraced her tightly such that her efforts to kick him were to no
avail. Irritated by her struggles, appellant hit Annabelle's head and boxed the
right side of her stomach, causing her to lose consciousness (Ibid., tsn, p. 69).
When she regained consciousness, she was already naked and her pants and
panty were at the floor near her feet. White slippery fluid was also flowing
from her vagina (Ibid., tsn, pp. 69-70; October 30, 1989, p. 3).
On August 7, 1989, Felomina again worked on night duty. When supper was
prepared, appellant volunteered to cook the shrimps which he had bought
earlier. The viand was bitter but appellant forced Annabelle to eat it (Oct. 30,
1989, tsn, pp. 4-5). Thereafter, they were ordered to immediately to go to
sleep (Ibid., tsn, p. 5). Instead of going to sleep, Annabelle went to the toilet
to wash her clothes. Appellant, however, knocked at the door and ordered her
to go to sleep (Ibid., tsn, p. 5). Annabelle complied since she also became
sleepy, but instead of sleeping at her usual space on the floor, she slept on
top of the trunk near the place where their clothes were hanged (Ibid., tsn, pp.
5-6). Later, appellant entered the room but not finding her on the floor, he
switched on the light. Appellant got mad when he saw Annabelle sleeping on
top of the trunk and demanded why she had to sleep there (Ibid., tsn, p. 7). As
she meekly stood up, appellant immediately embraced Annabelle (Ibid.). She
struggled to resist his advances but appellant pushed her head to the floor,
causing her to lose consciousness. Appellant, thus, succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of her (Ibid., tsn, pp. 7-9).
Again, on August 11, at 9:30 p.m. appellant entered Annabelle's room while
she and her stepsisters were sleeping. She woke up when appellant had
removed her blanket and was embracing her. She kicked him, but he boxed
her many times and hit her head on the floor, causing her to lose

consciousness. When she recovered, she saw him about to stand up. He then
told her that he was already through with his bestial act. Then she realized
that she was already naked, and white slippery fluid was also coming out from
her vagina (Ibid., tsn, pp. 16-17).
She woke up at 5:00 o'clock the following morning (August 12, 1989) and then
proceeded to the bathroom to wash. After eating breakfast, she again went
inside the bathroom and while inside, her mother knocked at the door, asking
why she had been crying. Finally, this time, gathering enough courage, she
told her mother everything that appellant had been doing to her. They both
cried and embraced each other. Then her mother instructed her to collect all
her clothes so that they could look for a place where they could stay. When
they could not find a place at kms. 5 and 6, Annabelle volunteered to stay
with her Manang Grace at Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City (October 30, 1990,
tsn, pp. 17-18).
Felomina went on leave of absence from her work on the evening of August
12, 1989 and went home. Before the arrival of her husband, she slept in the
room of their children, at the floor which used to be occupied by Annabelle.
Around 3:20 in the morning, appellant entered the room and held her legs,
thinking that it was Annabelle whom he was holding. Appellant was surprised
when it was Felomina who suddenly rose. Appellant exclaimed "Why are you
here? where is Annabelle?" Felomina retorted that he should stop raping her
daughter (January 23, 1990, tsn, pp. 12-14).
Having confirmed that her husband had really raped her daughter, Felomina
sought the help of the barangay captain in the morning of August 13, 1989.
The barangay captain advised her, however, to report the matter to the
municipal hall since it involved a serious case (Ibid., tsn, p. 16). But ashamed
of what her husband had done, Felomina hesitated on reporting the matter to
the police. Finally, on August 21, 1989, the cry for justice for her defiled
daughter prevailed over whatever love she had left for her rapist of a
husband; she and Annabelle reported to the police the rape incidents (Ibid.,
tsn, pp. 16-17).
On August 21, 1989, Annabelle Degay was brought by her mother and other
relatives to the Benguet General Hospital for physical examination. Dr. Susan
Chungalao who conducted the medical examination prepared the MedicoLegal Certificate (Exhibit "A"), indicating the following findings upon internal
examination:
nulliparous
Vagina admits 2 fingers with slight difficulty
hymen with old healed lacerations at 5 o'clock, 7 o'clock

and 12 o'clock positions

cervix firm and close
uterus small
no bleeding at time of examination (Exhibit "A").
Dr. Chungalao also confirmed that Annabelle could have been raped several
times (Ibid.). [Note: "Sic" was not inserted in order not to clutter the narration,
(Emphasis ours)].
For his defense, appellant denied the charges of rape. He also contended that
it was impossible for him to commit the salacious acts given the circumstance
and place where the crimes were committed. He argued that the room was
small (2 meters and 32 cm by 2 meters and 32 cm) 5 and that complainant's
stepsisters Jennifer (21) and Annalyn (14) 6 as well as complainant's halfsister Emily (12) 7 who were all sleeping in the same room could have been
easily awakened when complainant allegedly shouted at the top of her voice
and vigorously struggled against appellant's advances, had the same been
true.
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse without consent.
The medical certificate showed lacerations in complainant's private parts
indicating there was sexual intercourse. Likewise, the convincing testimony of
complainant indicates that she was forced by appellant to submit to his
deplorable lust. In consummating this innate desire, he employed force and
intimidation by boxing and hitting complainant on her stomach and legs.
Weakened by the physical blows and with a knife pointed at her, she became
helpless. Appellant eventually succeeded in performing his maniacal desires
which was repeated six more times. On two occasions, she became
unconscious after eating and drinking the "bitter" food and milk forced upon
her by appellant. When she regained consciousness she found herself naked
and with "white slippery fluid going out of her vagina." Appellant even told her
that he had just finished doing "it" again.
The pattern of complainant's behavior, after the sexual assault is indicative of
her resistance to appellant's monstrous acts. On one occasion, she washed
clothes at the late hour of the evening just to resist the effect of the bitter
food, aware that once she loses consciousness, appellant will try to rape her
again. She even slept on top of the trunk, which is not the usual place where
she sleeps to prevent appellant from finding her. Upon discovering this,
appellant got angry and was not able to satisfy his lust on that night.
Appellant's contention that the room was small cannot exculpate him from his
barbaric acts. There is also no merit in his assertion that complainant's sisters,
who were sleeping beside her would have been awakened by complainant's

shouting and struggling while being ravished. It is "not impossible nor

incredible for the members of the complainant's family to be in deep slumber
and not be awakened" 8 while the brutish sexual assault on her was being
committed. Lust is no respecter of time and place. 9 Several times, the Court
has held that rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate, in parks along the roadsides, in school premises, in a house
where there are other occupants. 10 in the same room where other members
of the family are also sleeping, 11 and even in places which to many, would
appear unlikely and high risk venues for its commission. 12 Besides, there is
no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. 13
Moreover, the passive behavior of complainant's sisters during those dark
nights is not difficult to comprehend if we are to consider appellant's
character and treatment of his family. Nestor Tan testifying for his father,
confirmed complainant's and her mother's testimony that appellant is very
strict and "nauuyong" (cranky), 14 that appellant maltreats his family, that he
throws things at them and that he slaps them. 15 Worse, appellant even
requires the
21-year old Jennifer and the 16-year old complainant to massage his whole
body for almost an hour every night while he was scantily clad only in his
briefs where his daughters would see his penis. 16 Not satisfied with that,
appellant "would even try to let his feet touched (sic)" her daughters'
(including complainant's) private parts." 17 As aptly observed by the trial
court:
. . . From these acts and behavior of the accused Philip Tan towards the
members of his family, including herein private complainant and her mother,
the accused had established moral and physical dominance over each
member of the family, such that none would dare stand up against him, much
less the herein complainant who, from her demeanor in Court, appeared to be
a very timid, very shy, and very frightened young woman whose voice, while
testifying, often could hardly be heard. . . . Also, the regular whole-body
massages performed on the almost naked accused by complainant and
Jennifer Tan has had the effect of brainwashing and conditioning the minds of
his children that there was nothing morally wrong with the practice, that it
was part of the discipline that the accused imposed on them and that it was
part of the duties that the members of the family, particularly Annabelle the
complainant, to the accused Philip Tan, their lord and master who gives them
food, shelter and clothing. More, with respect to complainant Annabelle
Degay, whose status of being a bastard without any father was constantly
being hammered in her head by the accused, and who had been made to
understand that she is taken in the house of the accused under the latter's full
support and protection, she must have been reduced in her mind to the status
of one no better than a slave for the accused to treat and dispose of as

nothing but a chattel. On the part of her step-sisters, this attitude of the
accused, must have convinced them that Annabelle is a second-class sister.
They are convinced that what their father was doing to her was an acceptable
act of imposing authority on and exacting recompense on Annabelle for being
taken in as member of the family.
. . . It is not unbelievable that these three (3) young natural daughters of the
accused would just accept the situation and the actuation of their father
during the nights of the repeated commission of rape as part of their father's
exacting discipline on the illegitimate bastard, Annabelle Degay, much as they
may have viewed the almost daily ritual of naked body massage as part of the
discipline imposed upon them by the accused and as a way or repaying him
for his support and protection. . . . 18 (emphasis ours).
Appellant also assails complainant's credibility by pointing out: that the latter,
in her sworn statement 19 as well as during the preliminary investigation said
that she was raped 15 times whereas her testimony in court revealed only
seven (7) instances of sexual intercourse; that she failed to immediately
report the incidents to her mother or to the authorities; and that she was only
concocting the rape charges as a form of revenge against the "strictness" of
appellant.
The imputed inconsistency in the dates when the separate acts of rape were
committed was thoroughly explained by complainant during crossexamination:
Atty. Reyes: I invite your attention to No. 5. How many times did he rape you
and your answer is about 15 times in the month of July whenever my mother
worked at Narda's, is that correct?
A: They asked me how many times my mother worked during nighttime, they
see the record and that is what they placed there.
Court: What record did they see?
A: The attendance of my mother, sir.
Q: You mean the record of Narda's where she worked, the policemen verified
the dates when your mother was supposed to be at Narda's working, is that
what you mean?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: I invite your attention to question no. 6. How about in the month of August,
how many times did your stepfather raped you and your answer is, my
stepfather. . . from August 7 to 11, 1989, is your statement correct?
A: They asked the date when I left the house and I said August 11 and they
verified the record of my mother and they found out that she worked in the
evening from August 7 to August 11.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So, this Exhibit "C" now, what you told to the police is not true?
A: Some are not true.
Q: So, some are not true?
A: Only the dates are not true.
xxx xxx xxx
Court: Let us see now, what is the basis of the Police authorities in basing the
frequency of the alleged rape?
A: On the attendance record of my mother at Narda's. Sir, they asked when
Philip Tan raped me and I said, during the times that mother was working at
night. 20 (emphasis ours).
Thus, it was the police investigator, not the complainant, who concluded that
the latter was raped 15 times, based on her statement that the same
occurred whenever her mother goes to work on a night shift. Complainant was
not therefore inconsistent. In any case, variances between affidavit and court
testimony do not by themselves affect credibility. 21
Assuming arguendo that there was really an inconsistency, the same pertains
only to a minor and trivial detail 22 not touching on the why's and wherefore's
of the crime 23 which strengthened rather than diminished complainant's
credibility 24 as they erased suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. 25 As the
Court said in People v. Barranco, 26 "ang isang saksi na ang pahayag ay may
kaunting pagkakamali ang karaniwang nagsasabi ng katotohanan." Besides,
errorless testimony cannot be expected of a rape victim 27 for she may not be
able to remember and recount every ugly detail of the harrowing experience
and appalling outrage, especially so since she might in fact be trying not to
remember them, 28 as they are painful to recall. 29

The failure of complainant to reveal to her mother appellant's deprave acts is

not indicative of fabricated charges. As held in one case: 30
Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against their
rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain rather than reveal their
shame to the world or risk rapist's making good their threats to kill or hurt
their victims. 31
Complainant is in the same situation. Her shame and genuine fear of what
appellant might do to her mother, 32 aware of appellant's capacity to hurt
them, had temporarily sealed her lips. Her silence was impelled by both fear
for her life and shame for the degradation that had befallen her. It is not
uncommon for a young girl at a tender age of 16 years to be intimidated into
silence and conceal for sometime the violation of her honor, even by the
mildest threat against her life. 33 Rape victims do not always immediately go
to the rooftop and denounce their assailants. Silence is not an odd behavior of
a rape victim. 34 As explained in some studies, 35 this "natural reticence or
aversion of the victims to reveal the humiliation attaching to the crime," is a
"stigma they will have to bear indefinitely thereafter." The fear of these young
victims of reprisals upon them or their families easily cows them into
submission and silence. 36 Worse, in incestuous rapes, that fear which
compels non-revelation is further reinforced by the moral ascendancy of the
rapist over his ravished relative. 37 Appellant as complainant's stepfather,
whom she even called "Daddy", had assumed parental authority over her
during her formative years. Clearly he exerts strong moral influence and
ascendancy over complainant. 38
There is also no merit in appellant's argument that complainant's credibility is
questionable she was allegedly motivated by revenge in concocting the rapes.
As recently held in People v. Acabo 39 and as consistently ruled by the Court,
when the issue boils down to the credibility of witness, settled is the rule that
the trial court's assessments thereon are accorded with great respect unless it
overlooked or misapplied some facts which would have affected the result of
the case. 40 The trial court, giving full faith and credence to complainant's
testimony found the latter to be "very timid, very shy and very frightened
young woman whose voice, while testifying, often could (sic) hardly be heard".
41 It even observed that she is "unsophisticated, submissive, subservient, and
cowed young woman who obviously is (sic) suffering from extreme inferiority
complex and lack of self-esteem". 42 Undoubtedly, no cogent reason was
shown that would justify departure from the lower court's assessments and
findings. 43 The rationale for this is the trial court's unique position of having
observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness'
deportment on the stand and manner of testifying during trial, which is denied
to the appellate court. 44

It is highly unlikely that complainant, a "16-year old high school student of a

religious school, presumably a virgin, an innocent and unsophisticated Igorota
native" 45 unexposed to the ways of the world, would concoct a reprehensible
story of defloration, no less than against her stepfather, allow an examination
of her private parts and then subject herself to the rigors, trouble,
inconvenience, ridicule and scandal of a public trial, where she has to bare her
harrowing and traumatic experience, and be subjected to harassment,
embarrassment and humiliation during cross-examination, unless she was in
fact raped and deeply motivated by her sincere desire to do so solely to seek
justice and obtain redress for the unforgivable and wicked acts committed
upon her. 46 At the risk of being tautological, this Court has repeatedly ruled
that no young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was ravished
unless that is the truth for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. 47
Complainant's tender age, further lends to her credibility. 48 Thus:
Apparent from the Court's decisions in rape cases with the offended parties
being young and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, . . . is
(the) considerable receptivity on the part of this Tribunal to lend credence to
their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative
vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which such a grueling
experience as a court trial, where they are called upon to lay bare what
perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy, did expose them to. This is not to say
that an uncritical acceptance should be the rule. It is only to emphasize that
skepticism should be kept under control. 49
A victim who cries rape almost always says all that has to be said. 50 The
"avalanche of intimate revelations from a daughter to a mother", the latter
"torn between her love and loyalty for her husband and love for her own
daughter" 51 was impelled to test the truth of complainant's revelations. She
(complainant's mother) did not report to her night work. Instead, she lay on
the very same spot where complainant sleeps at night. At 3:20 a.m., what
would have been another nightmare began. 52 Appellant entered the room.
Despite the darkness, he reached the spot where complainant sleeps with
familiar ease, thinking that the latter was there. Instead, appellant was
surprised to find his wife who confronted him. The latter, of course, denied the
accusation. And when charged before the court, he prefaced such denial with
the assertion that he treated the victim as his own child 53 and that he was
even giving her financial and material support. 54
Suffice it to say that such arguments are clearly non-requitur, and that denial
is inherently a weak defense which cannot prevail over positive

identifications. 55 Moreover, affirmative testimony, like that of complainant's,

is stronger than a negative one. 56
The rape charges against appellant were committed with the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime 57 which as found by the trial court and as proven
by the prosecution, appellant chose in order to facilitate the accomplishment
of his criminal design. Also attendant is the aggravating circumstance of
relationship between stepdaughter and stepfather. 58
The penalty for each act of rape through the use of a deadly weapon (knife),
59 is reclusion perpetua, notwithstanding the attendance of any mitigating or
other aggravating circumstance. 60 As appropriately put in the vernacular by
our distinguished colleague, Madame Justice Flerida Ruth Romero:
Ang pagwasak sa puri ng isang nagdadalaga na walang kamalaymalay sa
kamunduhan ay gawa ng isang halimaw na nararapat lamang na patawan ng
kaukulang kaparusahan ng mga hukuman ng ating lipunan. 61 (emphasis
ours.)
Although we uphold appellant's convictions, we take exception to the
monetary award. The case at bar involves the "rape committed on a very
young girl who has been further denied thereby of her right to grow up and
discover the wonders of womanhood in the normal way. . . . (U)ncompromising
judicial sanctions should stem the growing tide of paraphilia 62 that seeks the
youth for its victims, leaving inevitable traumatic and psychological scars on
their young and innocent lives." 63 Thus, contrary to what appellant thought,
rape is not a mere "ay-ayam ngarud" 64 (a game) where victims are left
helpless and eternally scarred. Conformably, the P100,000.00 awarded by the
trial court to complainant, should be raised to P350,000.00 as per recent
rulings awarding P50,000.00 65 for each 66 crime of rape.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the decision of Branch 8 of
the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, in Criminal Cases 89-CR-0724,
89-CR-0725, 89-CR-0730, 89-CR-0732, 89-CR-0733, 89-CR-0734, and 89-CR0738 finding appellant Philip Tan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape in
seven (7) counts attended by two (2) aggravating circumstances and
sentencing him to suffer seven (7) reclusion perpetuas is AFFIRMED subject to
the modification that appellant shall pay complainant an indemnity of
P350,000.00 (P50,000.00 for each count of rape) and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff appellee vs. ROQUE CABRESOS,
accused-appellant.

Roque Cabresos was charged with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial
Court ("RTC"), Branch 26 of Medina, Misamis Oriental, in an information which
alleged:
That on or about 29th day of June 1988 at about 2:00 early dawn, more or
less, at Sitio Upper Anoling, Barangay Kabulakan, Municipality of Balingoan,
Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation
and with the use of a knife, have sexual intercourse with the offended party,
Editha Pesidas, against her will and without her consent.
The crime was committed with the attendance of aggravating circumstance of
abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness as accused was
accommodated to live with the complainant's family.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 335, paragraph 1, in relation to Article
14, paragraph 4, all of the Revised Penal Code. 1
At arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, he was found guilty
and sentenced in a decision rendered in November 19, 1992. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds Roque Cabresos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with the use of deadly weapon
as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code with
aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence, obvious ungratefulness,
blood relationship and with the use of deadly weapon; and, thereby sentences
him to suffer an imprisonment under reclusion perpetua or thirty (30) years
imprisonment, with full credit of the entire period of his detention from
February 17, 1989 to the present or finality of this judgment. Accused Roque
C. Cabresos is hereby declared as the father of the child Anthea Q. Pesidas
and he is ordered to recognize and support said child in accordance with the
provisions of the Family Code.
Accused Roque Cabresos is likewise ordered to pay Editha Pesidas the sum of
P30,000.00 by way of moral damages and P20,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages and to pay the costs. 2
Roque Cabresos appeals from his conviction assigning the following as errors
allegedly committed by the trial court:
I

The trial court gravely erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witness which is highly incredible, inconsistent and unreliable.
II
The trial court gravely erred in not giving credence to the defense interposed
by accused-appellant.
III
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 3
The trial court found that the evidence of the prosecution showed the relevant
facts to be the following:
Complainant Editha Pesidas testified that she is 18 years old (at the time she
testified), but she was 16 years old when she was raped by accused. She is
single, housekeeper and a resident of Kabulakan, Balingoan, Misamis Oriental
and has studied up to second year high school. She personally knows the
accused Roque Cabresos whom she considers as her uncle because he is a
cousin of her mother. She identified the accused in the courtroom by touching
his shoulder.
Editha Pesidas declared that last June 28, and June 29, 1988, her mother and
father were in Talisayan District Hospital. She was left in the house together
with her brother and sister, who are 12 and 10 years old respectively. She
slept alone in her room, while her brother and sister slept in the adjoining
room. Roque Cabresos lived with them and in that particular night of June 29,
1988, Roque Cabresos slept in the sala. Then, at dawn, which was 2:00 o'clock
in the morning, more or less, already June 29, 1988, she was awakened by
accused Roque Cabresos who pointed a sharp pointed knife to her neck,
squeezed her mouth and boxed her abdomen that she lost her strength.
There and then, Roque Cabresos took off her panty by tearing it. Then,
accused placed himself on top of her and made a push and pull movement
(kiyo-kiyo). Accused inserted his penis to her vagina that she felt severe pain
which lasted about half an hour. The left hand of accused was holding the
knife and was always pointing to her neck. She struggled, but accused is
bigger and stronger that she lost her strength. Ultimately, accused succeeded
in raping her. Something sticky came out from his penis; thereafter, Roque
Cabresos threatened her; that, she would be killed if she would tell her

parents. He uttered this threat about five (5) times. Then, Roque Cabresos left
her room and returned to sleep in the sala.
After three days from the commission of the crime, her parents returned home
from the hospital. She did not tell them about what happened because Roque
Cabresos threatened to kill her.
Complainant testified that at the time accused raped her, she was fertile. In
the succeeding months, she did not have monthly menstruation. When her
pregnancy was noticeable, her parents inquired about it, and she told them
the truth. She told also her grandfather Eufrocino Quejada some time last
February 1989. She was accompanied to the house of a midwife for
examination. Thereafter, accompanied by her parents and grandfather, they
went to the police station of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, and there, her
affidavit was taken on February 14, 1989 which she subscribed on the
following day before the prosecutor. 4
Appellant Cabresos' version of the facts was summarized by the trial court as
follows:
On June 28, 1988 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused appellant was at
the house of Mr. Trapal in Upper Lapinig, Balingoan, Misamis Oriental together
with his companions, namely: Anastacio Cabresos alias "Baloloy", Eddie
Aragon, Rene Magallon, Dobby Magallon and Oloy Cabresos drinking one
pocket size of Tanduay rhum. While they were drinking, they were conversing
about their works, especially the gathering of coconuts. After staying there for
an hour, they proceeded to the municipal building of Balingoan, Misamis
Oriental. In the said store, they again drank one pocket size of Tanduay rhum.
From the store of Beboy Pebular, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the
same day, they went to the house of Alding Itom. At Alding Itom's house, they
butchered a dog, cooked the meat and ate the same as their sumsuman. After
eating, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day they proceeded
to the house of his uncle Anastacio Cabresos. When they were already at the
house of his uncle, they once more drank another one pocket size of Tanduay
rhum. The accused went to sleep at around 11:30 o'clock in the evening of the
same date at the latter's house and woke up at about 5:00 o'clock in the
morning of the following day. That was June 29, 1988. 5
We are once again faced with the task of deciding who as between two (2)
persons is worthy of belief and who is not. Private complainant Editha Pesidas
claims that she was raped by the accused. The accused denies the accusation
and interposes the defense of alibi contending that he could not have
committed the rape because he was somewhere else at the time the alleged
rape occurred. In support of his claim, Cabresos presented witnesses who

vouched that he was with them on the night and hour in question, carousing
on cheap rum and on dog-meat with great abandon.
After much consideration and upon careful examination of the record, we find
no reason to overturn the findings of the trial court.
The issue to be resolved is, of course, whether or not the prosecution was able
to establish from the testimony of the complainant the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
We answer in the affirmative.
The question is essentially one of credibility and it is a well-settled rule
reiterated in a long and still growing line of cases, that appellate courts will
generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the latter are
in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless it is convincingly shown that the trial court had plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. 6
In his appeal, appellant highlights certain points in complainant's testimony
which he contends constitute inconsistencies or improbabilities which weaken
the force of her accusation. However, going over those same points we come
to a different conclusion.
On the night of the rape, the victim's parents were not at home. They were at
a hospital in Talisayan where the victim's mother had to be brought 7 and
they returned from the hospital only three (3) days later. 8 Complainant
positively identified the accused as her assailant. There was a kerosene vigil
lamp in the altar which illuminated her bedroom. 9 Moreover, as found by the
trial court, she was familiar (with) the persona of the accused being a relative
who resided in their house. 10
Complainant was only able to cry out for help once because the accused
threatened her with a knife which he pointed at her neck; 11 he also squeezed
her mouth and boxed her stomach, as a result of which her strength and
vitality fled her. 12
The fact that her young brother (12 years of age) and sister (10 years old)
who were sleeping in an adjoining room did not hear her outcry does not
necessarily mean that the rape never occurred.

Appellant stresses the fact that after the alleged rape, the complainant
testified that she continued going to school and not once did she report the
incident to her parents or the police although she passed by the police station
everyday on her way to school. 13 Furthermore, the complainant did not
report the outrage on her person to a relative of hers who is a policewoman.
14
We have previously held in earlier cases that delay in prosecuting the rape is
not an indication of fabricated charges. 15 In at least one case, we observed
that "if the complainant did not become pregnant, she probably would never
have revealed that she was raped by her uncle. Many victims of rape never
complain or file criminal charges against their rapists. They prefer to bear the
ignominy and pain rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the
rapists' making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims." 16 This in fact
was what happened here where the victim reported the incident to her
parents only eight (8) months after she had been raped when her pregnancy
became noticeable. Similarly, in the case of People v. Soterol, 17 where the
appellant had contended that complainant's 6-month delay in filing the
complaint and her silence after the alleged rape render her charge incredible,
we ruled that the complainant's failure to report the rape incident earlier had
been fully and satisfactorily explained. There, the complainant testified that
she did not report the incident immediately because she believed her uncle's
threat to kill her.
Editha's inaction for eight (8) months was sufficiently explained by her in open
court. Thus:
(Direct Examination of Editha Pesidas)
Q: And when your father arrived in your house, did he know about the
incident?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why?
A: I did not say anything because I was afraid of the warning of Roque
Cabresos.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What was the warning or threat of the accused during the incident?
A: He said that if I tell my parents he would kill me.

Q: How many times did he utter these words?

A: Five times. 18
xxx xxx xxx
(Cross-examination of Editha Pesidas)
Q: When Roque Cabresos left your house, and your parents (were) already
there, of course, your fear no longer existed because your parents were
already there?
A: I was still afraid of him.
xxx xxx xxx
A: I was still afraid for he might come back. 19
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did it not occur to your mind to tell your parents that you were already
pregnant?
A: No, because of fear and shame.
Q: Did it not occur to your mind that your parents would eventually discover
you were pregnant and it was better to tell them earlier so that if there is a
person answerable for that they would run after him?
A: No, because of my fear.
Q: Did it not occur to your mind that your fear of being discovered will be
useless because eventually your parents will discover it?
A: No, because of my fear and shame.
Q: Did it not occur to your mind your shame will be useless because
eventually your parents will know of your pregnancy?
A: No.
Q: Why?

A: Because of my fear. 20
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
While a mature woman would probably have acted differently, we are unable
to conclude that Editha's continued fear of her violator and her failure to
inform her parents of the rape meant that it had not occurred at all.
Appellant Cabresos also assails the findings of the trial court concerning the
delayed delivery of the child as not supported by evidence. The trial court
found that the complainant Editha Pesidas "gave birth within 300 days or 10
months allowable in medical science from conception or fertilization,
implantation, gestation and to birth of the child," 21 as a result of the sexual
assault inflicted upon her by appellant. The trial court said on this point:
. . . this court has taken note of the testimony of Editha Pesidas; that the
onset of her monthly menstruation was June 9, 1988 and ended after five
days. So, it must be June 14, 1988. Medical science has shown that from the
first day of menstruation, the first ten days thereafter is considered a safe
period, meaning the woman is not fertile. This corresponds to June 10 to 19,
1988. Then, the period from the 11th day to 20th day from the first day of
menstruation is fertility period where the ovum in matured and any time may
be fertilized by a sperm. In the case of Editha Pesidas, [the] fertility period
corresponds from June 20 to June 29, 1988, that is why, Editha Pesidas said
that from the day she was raped, she did not have any monthly menstruation
thereafter, except a little blood spotting on July 20, 1988.
Medical science has taught us the basics of fertilization, conception, gestation
and delivery of a child. First, the basics: a baby is formed when the sperm cell
from the man meets (or fertilizes) the woman's egg or ovum. An ovum, which
is released by the woman's ovary only once in about 28 days, has a maximum
life of 24 to 72 hours (3 days only). The sperm cell, on the other hand, may
live for up to 6 days under very hospitable conditions, but usually lives for
only about 24 hours. When the ovum is not fertilized, it dies, and the absence
of fertilization is normally indicated by the arrival of menstruation. On the
other hand when the ovum is fertilized, it attaches itself on the inner wall of
the womb. This is sometimes known as implantation of fertilized ovum. The
inner wall does not shed off, so menstruation does not occur during the entire
period of pregnancy.
Somewhere in July 20, 1988 is the attachment of the fertilized ovum in the
womb of Editha Pesidas. It is the date of the implantation of said fertilized

ovum. That is why on said date, she had little blood spotting which is not
considered as menstruation. Counting therefrom, the birth of Anthea Q.
Pesidas on May 1, 1988, the child's coming to this world was within the 300
days or ten months, allowable in medical science from conception or
fertilization, plantation, gestation, and to birth of the child. 22
In computing the duration of pregnancy, "we should note that time is
computed from the date of three different occurrences in the life of the
mother: one is the first day of the last menstrual period, one is the time of
intercourse, and one is the time of the fertilization of the ovum . . . . . " 23 We
find that the trial judge's computation in this case of the duration of
complainant's pregnancy counted from the time of the fertilization of the
ovum, is medically accepted and recognized.
Moreover, from complainant's testimony, the uncontroverted fact is that the
complainant gave birth to a baby girl 307 days or 10 months after the date of
her alleged rape. While the ordinary period of gestation is approximately 9
calendar months or 280 days, calculated from the first day of the last
menstrual period, 24 there is nevertheless an abundance of medical
authorities recording exceptions to this general rule. 25 In fact, it has been
held that length of pregnancy varies from 220 to 330 days from date of fruitful
coitus. 26 Thus, the 280-day rule is not a hard and fast one. 27
On the other hand, as against the complainant's positive identification, the
accused-appellant offers the defense of alibi. However, we have many times
held that alibi is a weak defense and cannot prevail over the complainant's
positive and clear identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime. 28 Moreover, the defense of alibi in this case must be rejected because
aside from a clear and positive identification made by the complainant, the
possibility of the accused having gone to the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission was not at all remote. Note the following statements of
defense witnesses:
(Cross-examination of Rene Magallon)
Q: And this place of Balodoy to Kabulakan, Balingoan, Misamis Oriental is how
many kilometers, according to your own estimate?
A: Three kilometers.
Q: And ordinarily hiking we can negotiate three kilometers in less than one
hour?
A: Yes, sir. 29

xxx xxx xxx

(Cross-examination of Anastacio Cabresos)
Q: A healthy person like the accused can reach Barangay Kabulakan which is
three kilometers only one hour because he is healthy?
A: Of course, if he is healthy.
Q: Or maybe less than an hour?
A: Depending upon his speed in walking. 30
xxx xxx xxx
(Cross-examination of accused Roque Cabresos)
Q: Anastacio Cabresos alias Baludo is living in what place?
A: At Upper Lapinig.
Q: What is the distance from Upper Lapinig to Kabulakan, particularly the
place of Pesidas?
A: Three kilometer, more or less.
Q: By ordinary hiking you can negotiate three kilometers with an hour hike?
A: It depends how you walk.
Q: But natural walking?
A: More than an hour, more or less. 31
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You mean, by ordinary hike, you can negotiate one kilometer by one hour?
A: Less than (an) hour.
Q: Even in thirty minutes?
A: Yes sir. 32

xxx xxx xxx

The settled rule is that, for alibi to be given credence, "an accused must not
only prove satisfactorily that he was at another place at the time the crime
happened; but more importantly, that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission." 33
Of equal significance is the fact that the accused had the opportunity to
commit the crime considering that none of his witnesses actually saw him at
the hour in question because they were all already asleep at that time.
(Direct Examination of Rene Magallon)
Q: What time did Roque Cabresos go to sleep on June 29, 1988?
A: 1:20 in the morning
Q: About you, what time did you go to sleep?
A: 2:00 o'clock. 34
xxx xxx xxx
(Cross-examination of Anastacio Cabresos)
Q: So that at 9:00 o'clock you were already lying down and at 10:00 o'clock
you were already sound asleep?
A: About that hour.
Q: And you woke up the next morning at about 4:40?
A: 4:30 dawn.
Q: And the accused who was sleeping in your house was not sleeping with you
in the same room that night?
A: He slept in another room.
Q: So that you cannot determine if Roque Cabresos was still in his room
because you could not see him?

A: My house has three rooms and the room where they were sleeping I could
pass by it.
Q: But you had no time to pass by the room where they were sleeping
because you were sleeping at that time?
A: I woke up at 4:30.
Q: It was only at 4:30 when you passed by the room where the accused (was)
sleeping?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At 12:00 midnight you did not wake up?
A: No, sir
Q: You did not wake up at 1:00 o'clock?
A: I woke up to urinate in my bedpan.
Q: At 2:00 o'clock did you wake up?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was only 4:30 when you woke up again?
A: Yes, sir. 35
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Although we affirm the findings of the lower court with regard to the guilt of
the accused and its appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of use of a
deadly weapon, 36 abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness, 37 we
must take exception to its appreciation of blood relationship as an
aggravating circumstance in this case. We have held in earlier cases 38 that
the relationship between uncle and niece is not covered by any of the
relationships mentioned in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless,
the penalty imposed by the trial court need not be disturbed considering the
presence of other aggravating circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding appellant Roque Cabresos
guilty of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and declaring him as
the father of the child Anthea Q. Pesidas, ordering him to recognize and
support said child, is hereby AFFIRMED. The award to the complainant of civil
indemnity in the total amount of P50,000.00 (P30,000.00 as moral damages
and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages) is likewise AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LAROY
BUENAFLOR y TUAZON alias "Larry," defendant-appellant.
Same; Intoxication is an alternative circumstance.The ordinary rule is that
intoxication may be considered either as aggravating or as mitigating,
depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime.
Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if the intoxication is not
habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; upon
the other hand, when intoxication is habitual or intentional, it is considered as
an aggravating circumstance. The person pleading intoxication must present
proof that he had taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the
commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of blurring his
reason; and at the same time, he must prove that not only was intoxication
not habitual but also that his imbibing the alcoholic drink was not intended to
fortify his resolve to commit the crime. [People vs. Buenaflor, 211 SCRA
492(1992)]
FELICIANO, J.:
Laroy Buenaflor, who was charged with and convicted of rape and sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the offended
party in the sum of P30,000.00 and the costs of suit, is before the Court on
appeal.
The complaint filed by the offended party, Isabella Federis, against appellant
Buenaflor reads as follows:
That on or about August 19, 1989, in the City of Naga, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force, threats and intimidation, commit sexual intercourse against one Isabella
Federis y Cedron, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law. 1

The appellant having entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment, the case
proceeded to trial. On 10 May 1990, judgment was rendered by the trial court
with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Laroy Buenaflor y Tuazon, alias "Larry,"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under Article 335,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused is further ordered to
indemnify the offended party, Isabella Federis, the sum of P30,000.00 and to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 2
The facts constituting the offense were summarized by the trial court in its
decision in the following manner:
As the evidence of the prosecution stands, we find from the clear and positive
testimony of the complainant that she is 21 years old, single, a student at the
University of Nueva Caceres in Naga City, with residence at Lourdes Young,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening of August
19, 1989, she was on her way home to her boarding house in Peafrancia
Avenue, Naga City, together with her boardmate Imelda Barcebal, coming
from the Bichara Theater, and they had to walk in returning to their boarding
house; that when they reached the Naga City Post Office along Peafrancia
Avenue, the accused coming from behind them and armed with a knife put his
left arm on her shoulder and with his right hand poked a knife on the right
side of her body and told her not to move because she might be killed; that
she called for Imelda Barcebal but the latter kept on running away and left her
alone. The accused then transferred the position of the knife from the right
side of her body to the right side of her neck. She tried to shout but the
accused pressed harder the knife on her neck and dragged her to a darker
portion of the Mabini Interior and she noticed that the accused had no more
pants and brief and then pushed her down and laid on top of her and tried to
remove her t-shirt (Exhibit D), and [told] her not to shout because he was
going to kill her. The accused was also able to remove her pants (Exhibit E)
and panty (Exhibit F) and, thereafter, inserted his penis on her vagina for
which she felt pain and the accused started kissing her on her lips and other
parts of her body. That she kept on crying and the accused threatened to kill
her.
From the testimony of the complainant it has been further sufficiently
established that, when she was able to regain her strength she told the
accused that wherever he will go she will go with him, but requested the
accused that she first be allowed to go home to got her clothes and money, to

which the accused agreed. The accused then accompanied the complainant
on the way to her boarding house, but when they reached the Mary Anne
Snackhouse which was just in front of the boarding house, the complainant
told the accused to wait for her in that place. She then proceeded to her
boarding house and upon reaching the same she was met by Aurora Ozaeta,
Imelda Barcebal and the rest of her co-boarders. She then related to them the
incident that happened to her and further told them that the man who raped
her was waiting for her in front of the Mary Anne Snackhouse and described to
them the person of the accused and the clothes he was wearing. Her
boardmate, Aurora Ozaeta, called up the police station giving said information
given by the complainant identifying the person of the accused and where he
could be found. That after a while policemen arrived informing them that they
were able to apprehend the person reported to have raped the complainant.
The policemen showed to her a knife (Exhibit B) which the complainant
identified as the one used by the accused in poking at her. The policemen
went back to their police headquarters. After a while her parents arrived and
they all went to the police headquarters. Aurora Ozaeta and Imelda Barcebal
followed to the police headquarters. That at the police headquarters the
policemen showed to the complainant the person apprehended and the
complainant readily identified him as the person who raped her. 3
Before this Court, the sole error assigned by the appellant is that:
[t]he trial court erred in not considering the mitigating circumstances of
imbecility and drunkenness in convicting the accused/appellant of the crime
charged. 4
Appellant did not seriously try to deny that he had sexual intercourse with
Isabella Federis on the night of 19 August 1989. He, however, denied having
sexually assaulted Isabella; he claimed that Isabella did not physically resist
the act of penile penetration and had in effect given her consent to it.
Appellant Buenaflor testified in substance that he was in Naga City
Subdivision on 19 August 1989, in the house of one Badong for whom he
worked. He later declared that he was staying in his sister's house in
Canaman, Camarines Sur. On the night of 19 August 1989, he saw a movie at
the Robertson Cinema; he left the cinema at 12:00 midnight and proceeded to
the public plaza where he allegedly had been staying for fifteen (15) days. On
cross-examination, he declared that while at the plaza, he saw two (2) women
talking. He approached them, poked a knife at one of them (Isabella Federis)
and led her away to a dark alley. There they performed the sexual act,
appellant stated, without Isabella offering any resistance and even embracing
appellant in the course of copulation. Appellant also testified that he was a
"little bit drunk" during that time. 5

The trial court found that appellant Buenaflor had indeed forced himself on
Isabella, that he had explicitly admitted "poking a knife" at Isabella and that
the testimony of Isabella that she had been forced down upon or near a
garbage heap in the dark alley of Mabini Interior and there ravished against
her will, was forthright and candid and worthy of belief. Appellant having
presented no basis for rejecting and overturning the above finding of coercion
and intimidation, that finding must stand.
The principal submission of appellant was in fact that his criminal liability, if
any, should at least have been mitigated in view of his impaired mental
faculties. Appellant apparently does not seek completely to avoid criminal
liability on the ground of imbecility as an exempting circumstance. The
pleadings filed by appellant merely tended to show erratic behavior and lack
of coherence on his part in the course of trial, said to be symptomatic of a
diseased mind, which behavior, although not indicating complete deprivation
of intelligence and freedom of will, we are urged to take as basis for mitigation
of liability.
During the pretrial conference, counsel for appellant stated that his client was
suffering from mental disease. The pretrial conference was thereupon reset to
a later date and the trial court ordered appellant examined by a physician to
ascertain appellant's mental condition. Appellant Buenaflor was examined by
Dr. Imelda Escuadra, a medical specialist at the Don Susano Rodriguez
Regional Mental Hospital. The report prepared by Dr. Escuadra set forth the
following information:
Brief Background History:
The patient is the fifth among eight siblings. He was born on February 14,
1968 by normal spontaneous delivery, assisted by hilot at home. At age three
months, he started to have convulsions, up to age three years old. As a
consequence, he had poor scholastic standing, repeating Grade I several
times and stopped at Grade II. He was observed to be childish with poor
speech development and behaved as "uto-uto."
Patient was accused of raping a girl last August 20, 1989. He was ordered to
submit himself for neuropsychiatric evaluation.
Mental Status Examination:
An adult male, with handcuffs, wearing clean printed polo shirt and faded
maong pants. He had pockmarks on his face due to pimple scars. He looked
serious, with faraway gaze and at times downcast eyes.

He claimed he was Larry Buenaflor, a resident of San Jose, Camarines Sur. He

recognized his companions: his mother and police escort. He claimed he
finished Grade III. Initially, he denied knowing the number of children in their
family, later, he said there are four boys and five girls. He also claimed he did
not know his age.
He admitted he had a case in court rape; mentioned a girl named Annabel
Frias as the victim, a resident of Peafrancia Street, Naga City. He narrated
that he brought her home from Naga City. With him that time was Ruel
Villegas. He said he loved the girl and has been courting her giving several
dates when his love [was] accepted. He also said he raped the girl once but it
was Ruel who did it first. He cannot give the details of the incident of the
crime.
He spoke coherently and relevantly but not spontaneous in character. He
denied not [sic] knowing some facts as his age, the number of children of the
family and he was not sure of the dates he gave. As he spoke, he sighed
deeply.
He complained of impaired sleep and impaired appetite. He had impaired
memory as evidenced by his inability to recall important facts like number of
children in the family.
During the second interview he was more relaxed, responded spontaneously
and claimed he had good sleep and appetite. No hallucinations were elicited.
In his third interview, he looked depressed, complaining of insomnia.
During the last interview, he was also depressed and complained of poor
sleep.
Physical Examinations:
Essentially normal findings.
Psychological Testing:
Subject weighted a score of 37 with an IQ equivalent to 63 indicating mild
mental deficiency level of intellectual functioning. His judgment and
comprehension are poor. Projectivewise, depressive reaction is prominently
established. Poor reality testing function is elicited. Diagnosis:
1. Mental retardation

2. Reactive depression
3. No psychosis.
Remarks and Recommendations:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, the patient is
suffering from Mental Retardation and Reactive Depression. However, he is
not psychotic.
A person with mental retardation has below normal intelligence as evidenced
by the intelligence quotient tests. He has poor memory, poor judgment and
poor grasp of general information. He is trainable up to the primary grades
only. According to the "Synopsis of Psychiatry" by Kaplan a patient with
mental retardation "has concurrent deficits or impairment in adaptive
functioning, i.e., a person's effectiveness in meeting the standards expected
for his or her age by his or her cultural group in area such as social skills and
responsibility, communicates daily living skills, personal indulgence and selfsufficiency." (sic) Therefore, he is capable of undergoing judicial trial with
much difficulty. 6
Article 12 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 12. Circumstances which Exempt from Criminal Liability. The following
are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval.
xxx xxx xxx
Imbecility, like insanity, is a defense which pertains to the mental condition of
a person. Our case law projects the same standards in respect of both insanity
and imbecility, that is, that the insanity or imbecility must constitute complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act, or total deprivation
of freedom of the will. 7 The above quoted medical evidence that was
admitted into the record in the case at bar does not show complete
deprivation (nor even substantial deprivation) of intelligence on the part of
appellant Buenaflor and he, accordingly, cannot be deemed exempted from
criminal liability for the rape of Isabella Federis. His behavior on the night he
raped Isabella showed that he was quite conscious of his acts and aware of
the moral quality thereof.

At the same time, we believe, however, that the medical evidence of record
does show that appellant Buenaflor's mental faculties were to some extent
retarded or impaired in their development, which impairment or retardation
reflects a diminished level of responsibility for his criminal acts. Article 13 (9)
of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 13. Mitigating
circumstances:

Circumstances.

The

following

are

mitigating

xxx xxx xxx

(9) Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will
power of the offender without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of
his acts.
xxx xxx xxx
We think that the mitigating circumstance contemplated in Article 13 (9) of
the Revised Penal Code was present in the case at bar.
Appellant, in addition, claimed intoxication as a mitigating circumstance. As
earlier noted, he had declared on cross-examination that he was a "little bit
drunk" at the time be committed the act complained of. On that basis alone,
appellant asserts he should be credited with a mitigating circumstance.
The ordinary rule is that intoxication may be considered either as aggravating
or as mitigating, depending upon the circumstances attending the
commission of the crime. Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty,
if the intoxication is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the
contemplated crime; upon the other hand, when intoxication is habitual or
intentional, it is considered as an aggravating circumstance. 8 The person
pleading intoxication must present proof that he had taken a quantity of
alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to produce
the effect of blurring his reason; 9 and at the same time, he must prove that
not only was intoxication not habitual 10 but also that his imbibing the
alcoholic drink was not intended to fortify his resolve to commit the crime. 11
The record here does not show that appellant had taken an alcoholic beverage
prior to raping Isabella Federis. The testimony of appellant himself on direct
examination did not establish such drinking as a fact. The sole basis of
appellant's claim to the alternative circumstance of intoxication is his own
remark during cross-examination that he was a "little bit drunk" when he
inflicted himself sexually upon Isabella Federis. We do not believe that

appellant's own remark sufficiently established his asserted state of

intoxication.
At any rate, the appreciation of a mitigating circumstance in favor of appellant
Buenaflor would not have the effect of reducing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed upon him by the trial court. Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code prescribes that "in all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, [such penalty) shall be applied by the courts regardless of
any mitigating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
deed." Reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty. 12
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated 10 May 1990 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.
S0 ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO LIMACO, defendant-appellant.
Menandro Quiogue for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Jose G. Bautista for
appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal to suspend the decision of conviction for the crime of triple
murder sentencing the accused-appellant Ricardo Limaco to "life
imprisonment at hard labor, without hope of any pardon or reprieve
whatsoever, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Severa Envelino, Sofia
Envelino and Matrina Amores in the sum of P6,000 each (People vs. Amansec,
G.R. No. L-927, March 11, 1948)*, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs."
After a review of the record of the case, we find the following facts to have
been fully established. On June 30, 1948, Liberato Envelino, his wife and son
left their house in Sitio Bunlas, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, to work on
their clearing or kaingin several kilometers away. In the house were left his
three daughters Inacia, Severa, and Sofia, all surnamed Envelino and a
niece Martina Amores, aged 15, 14, 5 and 3 respectively. According to the
eldest daughter, Inacia, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, appellant Ricardo
Limaco came to the house and found the four girls in the kitchen. He asked
her sister Severa to sell him a pig which he wanted to butcher. Severa told
him that he better wait for her parents because she would not dare sell the

animal in their absence and without their consent. Visibly disappointed and
resenting her refusal to sell, he addressed Severa thus: "If you do not want to,
it is better that you will be hacked because you are selfish." Almost
simultaneously, he drew his bolo, Exhibit A, locally known as "talibong", from
its sheath, Exhibit A-1 and attacked Severa with it, inflicting on her seven
wounds, two of which were mortal; Sofia and Martina rushed to Severa and
embraced her, but Ricardo in his fury also boloed them, inflicting on each four
wounds, two of which were mortal. The three girls died on the spot.
In the meantime, Inacia who witnessed the horrible slaughter drew back in
terror, and fearing that her turn would come next, jumped down from the
kitchen through an opening in the wall and hid herself in the bushes. After an
hour and thinking that the accused had left, she ventured into the house and
found the dead bodies of her two sisters and niece, sprawled on the very spot
in the kitchen where she last saw them, covered with wounds. Later, in the
evening her parents and brother arrived and she related the gory details.
The authorities in Kabankalan were finally notified and the chief of police and
one policeman and the president of the Sanitary Division went to the place
and made the corresponding investigation. The accused was arrested by two
policemen in his home in sitio Nabhang, municipality of Ayungon, and
according to the policemen he admitted to them having killed the three girls,
even surrendering the bolo, Exhibit A, with which he boloed them, with its
corresponding scabbard, Exhibit A-1.
During this detention in the municipal jail in Kabankalan, he made a written
statement, Exhibit B, with its corresponding translation (Exhibit B-1) which
was sworn to and subscribed by him before Justice of the Peace Garaygay on
July 10, 1948. In this affidavit, the appellant states that early in the morning of
June 30, 1948, he and his father Rufo Limaco and his step-mother went to sitio
Carul-an, Ayungon, to make some purchases at the market there; that at
about 8 o'clock that same morning, his father and stepmother returned to
their home in sitio Nabhang but he remained and went to the cockpit; that in
the afternoon he started for his home but passed by the house of Liberato
Envelino in sitio Bunlas in order to ask him to catch a carabao of his father for
he (defendant) intended to pasture it around his house to get rid of the tall
grass growing there; that Liberato was employed by his father Rufo Limaco as
a herder or caretaker of their carabaos; that upon reaching the house of
Liberato he found the four girls already mentioned and inquired for Liberato,
saying that he wanted him to catch one of his father's carabaos but that
instead of giving a civil answer, Severa answered in anger. We quote a
pertinent portion of Exhibit B-1:

"Why, what is the meaning of asking where my father is; you are not giving us
food for dinner or supper." I answered, "Not of course, but I have something to
do with your father, to have him catch one of our carabaos." Then she
answered me again saying, "Catch the carabao, none of your business to
order us to catch your carabao, I will throw you with this piece of wood." Later
on while we were exchanging hot words, she threw me with a piece of wood,
but I parried it with my hand.
Q. After Severa Envelino had thrown you with a piece of wood, what did you
do? A. Because I got mad at her for the pain I felt in my hand, I forgot
everything and pulled out my "talibong" I had with me that time, and hacked
Severa Envelino unconsciously, and later, I happened to include the two
children who were her sister and niece, mentioned above, because they were
hugging Severa Envelino at the time I was stabbing her and as a result of that
three of them died inside the house in sitio Bunlas, Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental, on that time and date.
Q. After killing the three of them, what did you do then? A. I went home
immediately to Nabhang, Oriental Negros where my father live and I did not
tell anybody in the house what happened to me; and they came to know the
incident on Monday of July 5, 1948 when I was arrested by the policemen from
Kabankalan.
Q. Where were the wounds in the bodies of Severa Envelino and the children
whom you killed? A. I do not know, I was not able to find out where,
because I kept on hacking them and when all of them were dead I went down
the house.
Q. Who were the persons present there at the time you killed Severa Envelino
and the other children? A. There was no other person present, only the four
of them, whom I have mentioned above. I was not able to stab Inacia
Envelino, their elder sister because at the time I was hacking her sister she
jumped out of the kitchen and hid among the bushes..
Q. Where is your "talibong" which you used in killing Severa Envelino and the
two children? A. It was now in the possession of the Chief of Police of
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, because it was taken by the policemen from
our house when they arrested me on July 4, 1948.
In a confidential report prepared by the Chief of Police of Kabankalan for the
Provincial Commander of Occidental Negros, dated July 15, 1948 (Exhibit H),
the chief of police stated that appellant Ricardo Limaco admitted to him that
he had killed Severa, Sofia and Martina on June 30, 1948, and practically
repeated the details about the killing and the reason therefor as contained in

the affidavit (Exhibit B-1). The chief of police also states in his report that he
had examined appellant's father, Rufo Limaco, who told him that when
Ricardo came home that day, June 30, 1948, he brought with him the meat of
a rooster killed in the cockpit but was surprised to see blood smeared on his
clothes and on the handle of his bolo or "talibong", and when he asked him
about the blood stains Ricardo informed him that in cutting up the rooster
while it was still alive it struggled and its blood spurted on him and stained his
shirt and his bolo.
We are fully satisfied that the appellant killed the three girls in the manner
already described at the beginning of this decision. We are not impressed by
the claim of the accused that he was ill-treated by the police in order to obtain
from him his written statement, Exhibit B, and that he signed the same before
the justice of the peace without knowing its contents. The alleged illtreatment was denied by the police, and the justice of the peace on the
witness stand told the court that he saw no marks of ill-treatment or torture
on the body of the accused who signed the statement after the contents had
been fully explained to him. But even without this affidavit, Exhibit B, we find
the testimony of Inacia Envelino to be straightforward and sincere and
sufficient on which to base the conviction of the appellant.
At the trial, the appellant interposed the defense of alibi claiming that he
could not have committed the crime in the sitio of Bunlas in the afternoon of
June 30, 1948, because he never left his house in his barrio of Nabhang from
the morning of that day until the day following. In this he was corroborated by
his friend Ciriaco Batollo and his father Rufo Limaco. After analyzing the
evidence for the accused on this point, and citing several authorities, the
lower court rejected this defense, stating that Batollo was an interested
witness "due to the bond of friendship existing between himself on one hand
and the accused and his father on the other, or that he was a paid or
fabricated witness who manufactured untold lies before the court." As to the
father Rufo Limaco, the trial court said that his testimony of trial supporting
his son's defense of alibi is belied by his testimony given at the preliminary
investigation and by his affidavit, Exhibit I. We agree to the trial court's
rejection of this defense of alibi. As a matter of fact, appellant's counsel
abandoned this defense of alibi in his brief. Neither does he deny that the
appellant is the author of the killing. He merely asks that the sentence be
suspended and that his client be committed to the Psychopathic Hospital for
mental observation.
In our opinion, and considering was has transpired between the commission of
the crime and the end of the trial, there is no reason for granting this request.
In other words, there is no reason to believe that the appellant is now insane
or did not have the use of his reason at the time he committed the crime.

There is no evidence that in all his life he ever had attacks of insanity, lunacy,
or epilepsy that should have deprived him of reason and discernment, even
momentarily. On the contrary, he seems to be normal in every respect. We
quote from the decision of the trial judge who had the opportunity to serve
him on the witness stand:
The Court had seen the defendant testify on his own behalf; if had observed
his stern look from his pair of cold terrifying eyes. Cold and dry in his
demeanor and answering in counsel's questions intelligently, the defendant
impressed the Court as a man who was not insane at the time when he
mercilessly hacked to death his three young victims, but was simply a plain
blood-thirsty looking man in his early twenties.
The trial court found the accused guilty of murder. That is correct. Attacking
three weak and defenseless girls, two of them only five and three years old,
suddenly and with a deadly weapon like a bolo, against which unexpected
assault they could not defend themselves, clearly constitutes treachery which
qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of murder. The trial court
further found present the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength, disregard of respect due to sex and age, and that the crime was
committed in the dwelling of the victims. The finding of the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling is also correct; not so however, with abuse of
superior strength and disregard of respect due to sex and age. Said two
circumstances may be regarded as included in that of treachery. On this point
the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil., 548, citing
Viada, says the following:
. . . The aggravating circumstance of disregard to sex cannot be considered
because it has neither been proved nor admitted by the defendant that in
committing the crime he had intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim.
Viada, in his commentaries on the Penal Code, Volume I, page 329, says:
"Question III. In the murder of a girl of 14 years, qualified as such by
treachery, is it proper to consider the aggravating circumstance of disregard
of respect due the offended party on account of her age?" The Supreme Court
has resolved the same in the negative, saying: "Considering that the trial
court did not err in not considering against the accused the 20th aggravating
circumstance of article 10, because nothing appears in the judgement from
which it may be presumed that in the commission of the crime, the accused
deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex or age of the offended party,
but only to execute his evil purpose in a treacherous manner, taking
advantage of the weakness of her sex and the tenderness of her age in order
to perpetrate the same without risk to his person, etc." (Decision of June 25,
1878, published in the Gazette of August 25th.) Neither may the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength be taken into account just because

of the fact that the defendant is a man and the deceased a woman, inasmuch
as this circumstance is inherent in the crime committed and his moreover
absorbed by he treachery which, in this case, qualifies the crime as murder.
There therefore remains only one aggravating circumstance, namely, that of
dwelling.
We notice that the trial court imposed only one penalty for the three murders.
In this, the trial court erred. There should be a penalty for each of the three
separate crimes caused by separate acts or blows committed and inflicted by
the appellant.
The trial judge severely condemns the act committed by the appellant, calling
it hideous and gruesome, committed, in the opinion of the court, either by an
insane or by a blood-thirsty criminal, and regards the defendant as plain
blood-thirsty, unfit to live in normal and peaceful society, and goes on to say
that if said defendant had three lives, he could legally be deprived of each
and every one of them, and that the trial court could send him to the electric
chair without any compunction of conscience. But strange to say, the trial
judge states, and we quote:
But a quick death would seem to be too sweet a medicine for him. He does
not deserve it. He should be put to death slowly but surely and, in the opinion
of the court, life imprisonment at hard labor, without hope whatsoever of any
pardon or reprieve, is just the right punishment for him.
Further, the trial judge indulges in unfavorable comments on the death
penalty.
We always respect the private opinions of trial judges tho highly debatable
and even if they happen not to harmonize with ours on the subject. But when
such private opinions not only form part of their decision but constitute a
decisive factor in arriving at a conclusion and determination of a case or he
penalty imposed, resulting in an illegality and reversible error, then we are
constrained to state our opinion, not only to correct the error but for the
guidance of the courts. We have no quarrel with the trial judge or with anyone
else, layman or jurist as to the wisdom or folly of the death penalty. Today
there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme
penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as
that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law
provides for is imposition in certain cases, it is a duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. It is a well
settled rule that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or
morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of the

Legislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or
vetoes them. The only function of he judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if
not in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them. And for the guidance
of the members of the judiciary we feel it incumbent upon us to state while
they as citizens or as judges may regard a certain law as harsh, unwise or
morally wrong, and may recommend to the authority or department
concerned, its amendment, modification or repeal, still, as long as said law is
in force, they must apply it effect as decreed by the law-making body.
The crime committed in this case is truly shocking. Three innocent girls, two
of tender age, apparently without any provocation, were butchered and
hacked to death. While some members of this Court are for imposing the
extreme penalty, others believe that the appellant is entitled to a mitigating
circumstance, either that he, a relatively ignorant man interpreted the refusal
of one of the victims to sell a pig as an affront and thereby became
obfuscated and lost his head, or that he lacks education and instruction for
the reason that he did not finish even the first grade in elementary school. In
that case, this mitigating circumstance will compensate the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, thereby resulting in the imposition of the penalty in
its medium degree. For lack of sufficient votes, the penalty will be reclusion
perpetua. But this penalty is for each of three murders, it being understood
that the maximum period of imprisonment will not exceed forty years. With
this modification, the decision appealed from, is hereby affirmed with costs.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes and Jugo, JJ.,
concur.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DANTE
BARTULAY Accused-Appellant.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
Subject of this appeal is the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49,
Puerto Princesa City, in Criminal Case No. 3042 entitled "People vs. Dante
Bartulay" convicting appellant Dante Bartulay of the crime of robbery with
homicide under an amended information which reads:
"The undersigned accuses ROSALIO LAGUARDIA alias "ROLLY", DANTE
BARTULAY alias "TOTOY", BALTAZAR BERAN alias "BOY BUNGAL", as principals,
and RAYMUNDO BARTULAY alias "MANDING", as accessory, of the crime of
"ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM WITH ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE,"
committed as follows:

'That on or about the 6th day of September, 1979, and for sometime prior
thereto, in Puerto Princesa City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Rosalio Laguardia, Dante Bartulay and Baltazar
Beran, conspiring and confederating together and mutually, helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their
possession, custody and control the following firearm(s), to wit: One (1) .380
cal., automatic pistol and One (1) 22 cal. revolver with Serial No. 64618,
without having the necessary license and/or permit from the proper
authorities; that while in possession of aforedescribed firearms at the
aforementioned place and date, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain
and without the consent and against the will of the owners, by means of force,
violence and intimidation and with the use of aforementioned firearms and
motor vehicle, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away from one MIGUEL 'MIKE' CHUA the amount of P50,000.00
cash, more or less, and P37,000.00 in checks, more or less and a panel truck
worth P100,000.00 in the total value of P187,000.00 more or less, belonging
to said MIGUEL 'MIKE' CHUA and the FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, to
the damage and prejudice of the latters (sic) in the aforesaid amount; that on
the occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take said
amount and panel truck the said accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy,
with treachery, evident premeditation, taking advantage of nighttime, with
the use of a motor vehicle and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one MIGUEL 'MIKE' CHUA,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal gunshot wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death; that accused Raymundo Bartulay,
having full knowledge of the commission of the aforementioned robbery with
homicide and without having participated therein either as principal or
accomplice, take part subsequent to its commission by then and there
profiting himself and/or assisting the abovenamed principal accused to profit
by the effects of the crime and also by concealing and hiding the cash money
and checks taken from said Miguel 'Mike' Chua in order to prevent its
discovery by the authorities.'
"CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, treachery, use of a motor vehicle and nighttime." (pp. 1-2,
Original Records)
Since appellant evaded arrest, his co-conspirators Rosalio Laguardia and
Baltazar Beran, were convicted ahead of him and are now serving sentence at
the National Penitentiary Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. On April 28, 1985,
appellant was arrested at Agno St., Tatalon, Quezon City by elements of the
Manila Police Force (pp. 6-7; 293, Ibid).

At the arraignment, appellant with the assistance of Attys. Gregorio Austria

and Ma. Buen Consejo, pleaded GUILTY to the crime of robbery; NOT GUILTY to
homicide; hence, a conditional plea of NOT GUILTY was entered into the
records (p. 28, Ibid).
The facts as gleaned from the records are as follows:
Benjamin Caca, driver of Fortune Tobacco Corporation and principal witness
for the prosecution, testified that: On September 6, 1979, at about 10:00 in
the evening, the victim, Miguel `Mike' Chua, salesman of the Fortune Tobacco
Corporation, was driving a panel truck, together with him, helper Edgardo
Aniar and friend Frank Morante, passing along kilometer 36 southroad, a
zigzag road inside the Iwahig Penal Colony, on their way to Puerto Princesa
City. The group had come from Brooke's Point, Palawan where they delivered
cigarettes and collected payments for previous sales amounting to more or
less P100,000.00. At a distance of five (5) meters, from the approaching truck,
appellant Dante Bartulay and Baltazar Beran, co-accused, motioned to Mike
Chua to stop. When the truck stopped at the middle of the road, co-accused
Beran approached the victim at the pretext of borrowing a screw driver. The
victim told Beran to wait as he will park the truck on the side of the road. At
this point, appellant and Beran pulled out their guns and announced a holdup.
They ordered the four persons to alight from the truck. Beran directed him,
Edgardo Aniar and Frank Morante to stay at the right side of the road some
five (5) meters away from the truck while appellant separately led the victim
about two meters away from them on the same side of the road. The four of
them were ordered to lie down facing the ground. Appellant with one foot,
stepped on the shoulder of the victim while pointing a gun at him. Beran then
divested him and Frank Morante of their watches and wallets while appellant
took Chua's watch and wallet. Appellant asked the victim where his collection
was. The latter told appellant that the money is placed at the back of the
driver's seat. Appellant then ordered Beran to get the money. The latter did
and gave the money contained in a paper bag to appellant. Thereafter, Beran
demanded the keys of the truck from the victim, who gave them to appellant,
who in turn gave them to Beran. Beran then ordered the companions of the
victim to go inside the panel truck. Some twenty five (25) seconds after they
were locked up inside the truck, two successive shots were fired. The truck
then started to move and while in motion, he opened the secret exit door of
the panel and was able to jump out, rolling on the ground until he reached the
canal. He was able to hitch a ride up to Narra, Palawan where he reported the
incident to the police authorities (Hearing of Sept. 13, 1985; T.S.N., pp. 5-20).
The next day, September 7, 1979, the cadaver of Miguel Chua was examined
by Dr. Rufino Ynzon, the City Health Officer of Puerto Princesa City. His
findings were contained in a necropsy report as follows::-cralaw

"POSTMORTEM-FINDINGS
"1. Wound, gunshot, (entrance) roughly circular hole, 8-9 mm. in diameter,
surrounded by a contuso-abraded collar, located at the occipital region, 3
inches above from the occipital protroberance.
"2. (a) Wound, gunshot (exit) hole which is irregular in shape, about 1 inch
long, located at the left frontal bone, 2 1/2 inches above left superior orbital
ridge.
(b) Wound, gunshot (exit) hole which is irregular in shape, about 3/4 inch,
long, 1 1/2 inches above wound of exit-(a).
"3. Wound, punctured-lacerated, about 1/3 inch in diameter, located at the left
inferior orbital ridge.
"4. Contusion with hematoma, located at the left superior orbital portion.
"5. Contusion with hematoma, located at the right superior orbital portion.
"6. Abrasions, located at the left arm, medial third, anterior portion.
"7. Abrasions, located at the left elbow, posterior portion.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
HEMORRHAGE, MASSIVE, INTRA-EXTRA CRANIAL, SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT
WOUND." (Exhibit "B", Folder of Exhibits).
Appellant took the PAL second flight in Puerto Princesa to Manila in the
morning of September 7, 1979 (T.S.N., p. 127; Hearing of July 21, 1986; Ibid.,
p. 198, Hearing of October 30, 1987).
M/Sgt. Eugenio Enriquez, head of the Intelligence and Operations of the
Palawan Constabulary Command, stated that the police authorities were able
to investigate Anthony Pediapco who informed them of the presence of one
"Boy Bungal" at the scene of the crime as he even borrowed some tools from
him that night. After ascertaining that "Boy Bungal" was Baltazar Beran, police
authorities traced his whereabouts and arrested him on September 8, 1979.
Recovered from him was P4,500.00 which he admitted was part of his share
from the booty (Exhibits "F" and "F-1", "G" and "G-1" and "H" and "H-1" Folder
of Exhibits). Beran executed a confession before the police authorities on the
day he was arrested (Exhibits "P" and "Q", Ibid.) and another statement on
September 9, 1979 (Exhibit "Q", Ibid). Based on said confessions, the police

authorities were able to recover from the roof of the kitchen of one Rosalio
Laguardia, the revolver he used during the holdup, the motorcycle owned by
Laguardia, which was used as a getaway vehicle, and some part of the share
of appellant from the loot entrusted by him to his brother Raymundo Bartulay
who, upon investigation by the police, voluntarily informed them of the place
where it was hidden (Exhibits "I"-"N", Ibid.; T.S.N., pp. 55-76, Hearing of Sept.
24, 1985; Ibid., pp. 86-98, Hearing of Feb. 14, 1985).chanrobles virtual law
library
At the trial, appellant admitted that he and Beran only agreed to stage a
holdup. He portrayed himself as the one who guarded the companions of
Miguel Chua and that he was instructed by Beran to get the money from
behind the driver's seat. He stated that upon finding the bag containing the
money, he heard two successive shots; he even resented why Baltazar Beran
had to kill Miguel Chua as they merely planned to rob him; he was responsible
in saving the lives of the three passengers by pleading to Baltazar Beran to
spare them (T.S.N., pp. 178, 184, Hearing of Oct. 29, 1987).
On March 8, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of
the crime of robbery with homicide, the dispositive portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, the Court find (sic) and so founds (sic) Dante Bartulay guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide defined and
penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as principal by
direct participation, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all accessories provided for by law, to indemnify the heirs of
Miguel Chua the amount of Seven Hundred Twenty Thousand (P720,000.00)
Pesos for the expected earnings, Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos for moral
damages and Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos for exemplary damages and
to pay the costs." (p. 55, Rollo).
In seeking the reversal of his conviction, appellant claims that the trial court
erred: (1) in its findings that he was the one who shot Miguel Chua; (2) in
finding him guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide despite lack
of evidence; and (3) in failing to appreciate that he endeavored and in fact
was successful in preventing Baltazar Beran from killing the three companions
of Miguel Chua. Appellant admits participation in the commission of robbery
but vehemently and specifically denies any participation in the killing of
Miguel Chua (pp. 63-64, Rollo).
The evidence indubitably shows that appellant and co-accused Beran agreed
to commit robbery at Km. 36, Zigzag Road, Iwahig Penal Colony, Puerto
Princesa City, two (2) weeks prior to the incident. On September 6, 1979, both
appellant and Beran succeeded in robbing Miguel Chua of P87,000.00 and the

victim was shot to death 25 seconds subsequent to his three companions'

entry into the van. There was no eyewitness to the killing of the said victim.
Neither was there a showing that appellant endeavored to prevent the killing
of Chua. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when two or more
persons avow to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it (People v. Taaca, G.R. No. 35652, September 29, 1989).
Appellant tries to exculpate himself of criminal liability by pointing to coaccused Beran as the one who fired the shots and killed Chua. When the
conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery was conclusively shown by the
concerted acts of the accused and homicide was committed as a consequence
thereof, all those who participated are liable as principals in the robbery with
homicide, although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it
appears that they attempted to prevent the killing. The question as to who
actually robbed or who actually killed is of no moment since all of them would
be held accountable for the crime of robbery with homicide (People v.
Salvador, G.R. No. 77964, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 574 [1988]). (Emphasis
supplied).:- nad
Moreover, the following actuations of appellant after the shots were fired
clearly show that he is a co-conspirator: (a) immediately after the firing of the
shots, he followed the truck driven by Baltazar Beran in the motorcycle; (b)
when they reached Montible, Baltazar Beran abandoned the truck, rode in the
motorcycle with appellant and proceeded to the house of appellant's brother
in Puerto Princesa City where they divided the loot (T.S.N., pp. 184, 196-199,
Hearing of Oct. 30, 1987). Where conspiracy has been established, a showing
as to who inflicted the fatal blow is not required. (People v. Alvarez, G.R. No.
70446, January 31, 1989, 169 SCRA 730).
Finally, appellant admitted that when he heard the news that he was being
hunted by police authorities in connection with the crime, he immediately
bought a plane ticket at the PAL office in Puerto Princesa City and took the
second flight to Manila in the morning of September 7, 1979. His sudden
departure is indicative of guilt. The guilty flee when no man pursueth but the
innocent are as bold as a lion (People v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 72883, December
20, 1989).
As correctly found by the trial court, the use of motor vehicle by the appellant
and his co-conspirator aggravated the commission of the offense since the
vehicle was used to facilitate their escape from the scene of the crime.
The penalty of robbery with homicide prescribed in Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since only one aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the greater penalty

that is death shall be applied pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, this penalty cannot be imposed presently in view of the 1987
Constitution. Hence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed
by the trial court upon the appellant.
The trial court correctly convicted accused of robbery with homicide only
despite the fact that the amended information charged all the four accused
namely, Rosalio Laguardia, Dante Bartulay and Baltazar Beran of the crime of
illegal possession of firearm with robbery with homicide. The information
alleges that the four accused by conspiring and confederating together,
unlawfully have in their possession one .380 cal. automatic pistol and one 22
cal. revolver with Serial No. 64618 without the necessary license or permit
from the proper authorities and that while in the possession of said firearms,
the four accused, by conspiring together, committed robbery with homicide.
The information herein is violative of Section 13 Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure which states that a complaint or information must charge
but one offense except in certain cases. The four accused are charged with
two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and robbery with
homicide. When each one of two offenses committed is punishable by two
different laws, they cannot be charged in one information as a complex crime
but must be regarded as two separate and distinct offenses, each one to be
the subject of separate informations. When duplicity of offenses exists in an
information the accused must present his objection by filing a motion to
quash the information on the ground of duplicity of offenses. If the accused
fails to object and goes to trial under the information which contains a
description of more than one offense, the general rule is he thereby waives
the objection and may be found guilty of and should be sentenced for, as
many offenses as are charged in the information and proved during trial
(People v. Medina 59 Phil. 134; People v. Miana 50 Phil. 771). This rule
however shall apply only if the accused is formally arraigned and required to
plead on all the offenses as are charged in the information. Otherwise, the
accused cannot be convicted of the offenses with respect to which he was not
properly arraigned.
In the case at bar, the accused was not formally arraigned as to the offense of
illegal possession of firearm. The information wrongly complexed the robbery
with homicide with the special offense of illegal possession of firearm. In
effect, the accused is charged with two distinct offenses. He should therefore
be arraigned and required to plead to the two offenses. Records show that
during the arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty to robbery and not guilty
to homicide. Hence, the trial court entered a conditional plea of not guilty for
him to the offense of robbery with homicide, without requiring the accused to
enter his plea to the illegal possession of firearms (p. 28, Records). And in the

rendition of judgment, the trial court convicted him only of robbery with
homicide as there was no proper arraignment of the accused concerning the
other offense. In one case, this Court held that where the defendant is
charged with three separate offenses, and he pleaded guilty to the two
offenses without pleading to the third offense charged, the court cannot
render judgment of conviction on the third offense without requiring him to
plead (US v. Sobrevias 35 Phil. 32). This is based on the principle that a
defendant is legally placed on trial only when issue upon the information
which charges such an offense has been joined after arraignment by his plea
of not guilty thereto (People v. Ylagan 58 Phil. 851).
We shall sustain the monetary award, consisting of loss of earnings, made by
the trial court in favor of the heirs of the victim as this matter was not raised
in issue in this appeal. Further, this Court grants the amount of P50,000.00 as
death indemnity to be paid by the appellant to the heirs of the victim, in
accordance with the new policy of this Court laid down in the Resolution of
this Court en banc dated August 30, 1990 and in People v. Daniel Sison, G.R.
86455, September 14, 1990, in addition to the moral and exemplary damages
awarded by the trial court.:-cralaw
ACCORDINGLY, except for the above mentioned modification, the decision
appealed from convicting the accused appellant of the crime of robbery with
homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
all the accessories provided for by law is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.