Marcos vs.

Manglapus (1989)
G.R. No. 88211 | 1989-09-15

Subject: Right to travel is distinct from Right to return to one's country enjoys a different
protection; Right to Return to One's Country is not guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, but
nevertheless recognized as a generally accepted principle of international law; Presidents
residual power in the interest of national security; Exercise of President's residual power not a
political question, but subject to Judicial Review.
Facts:
Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. Corazon
Aquinos ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots
of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his
wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence a petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed in order for
the Marcoses to be issued travel documents and to enjoin President Corazons decision in not
allowing that the return of the Maroses will pose a threat to national interest and welfare.
Hence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to
issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin
the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return of the remains of Mr. Marcos
along with the members of his family. The Marcoses assert their right to return to the
Philippines and questions the power of the president under the Constitution to prohibit the
same.
Held:
Right to travel is distinct from Right to return to one's country; enjoys a different
protection
1. It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel
would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's
country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel.
2. The Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat (i) the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a
state, (ii) the right to leave a country, and (iii) the right to enter one's country as separate and
distinct rights.

Right to Return to One's Country is not guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, but
nevertheless recognized as a generally accepted principle of international law
3. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to
travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a
generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of

the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate
from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Presidents residual power in the interest of national security

4. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. More particularly,
this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. It is a
power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution.
5. The president, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which
are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with
her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what
are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution.
6. The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and
the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a
matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard
and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be
granted or denied.

Exercise of President's residual power not a political question, but subject to Judicial
Review
7. The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have
normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues
beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for
Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for
example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how
premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon
though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we
amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the
power is reserved to the people.
8. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established,
the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter
which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.
9. The question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to
the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts,
arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
10. The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not

changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to
the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic
effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to
the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced
the basis for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal,"
claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines,
and declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world."

Villavicencio vs. Lukban (1919)

G.R. No. L-14639 | 1919-03-25

Subject:
Mayor and Chief of Police Had No Authority to Deport People by Duress; Remedies of the
Aggrieved Citizens; Habeas Corpus Remedy to Inquire Manner of Involuntary Restraint
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police,
took custody of about 170 women beyond the latters consent and knowledge. Thereafter, they
were shipped to Mindanao, specifically in Davao, where they were signed as laborers. The
women were apparently inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street in
Sampaloc. They were under the assumption that they were being transported to another
police station. The haciendero from Davao, where the women were placed, had no idea that
the people sent to him were prostitutes.
The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus. The respondent moved to dismiss the case
and argued that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that it should be filed
in the City of Davao instead.
During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their consent. In
effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order
authorizing Lukban's deportation of the prostitutes.
Held:
Mayor and Chief of Police Had No Authority to Deport People by Duress
1. One can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the
Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine
Islands and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless
not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are
other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another locality.

2. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being
expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
3. The law is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by
accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority
which it gives.

Remedies of the Aggrieved Citizens

4. The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas
corpus.
5. The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup
money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it
was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before the
Supreme Court.
6. The Supreme Court held that if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find
that any public officer has violated the provision of law prohibiting public officials to banish
unlawfully citizens, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as
vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action.

Habeas Corpus Remedy to Inquire Manner of Involuntary Restraint

7. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
8. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed
them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these
women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned.

Arroyo v. De Lima
G.R. No. 199034 (2011)
[Arroyo v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 199082, et al. (2013)]
FACTS:
On August 15, 2011, COMELEC and DOJ issued a Joint Order creating a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team (Joint Panel) on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections,
specifically on electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Fact-Finding Team will gather
evidence, while the Joint Committee will conduct preliminary investigation on the basis of the
evidence gathered.
The Fact-Finding Team concluded that there was manipulation of 2007 elections.
Former President Arroyo was charged of
The Fact-Finding Team recommended, among others, that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.

(Abalos) be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to

manipulate the election results in North and South Cotabato; that GMA and Abalos be subjected
to another preliminary investigation for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao; [7]
and, that Mike Arroyo be subjected to further investigation. [8] The case was docketed as DOJComelec Case No. 001-2011.
Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Pimentel filed a Complaint-Affidavit [9] for Electoral
Sabotage against petitioners and twelve others, and several John Does and Jane Does. The case was
docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 002-2011.
On October 24, 2011, the Joint Committee issued two subpoenas against petitioners in DOJ-Comelec
Case Nos. 001-2011 and 002-2011. [10] On November 3, 2011, petitioners, through counsel, appeared
before the Joint Committee [11] and respondents therein were ordered to submit their Counter-Affidavits
by November 14, 2011. [12]
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
assailing the creation of the Joint Panel. [13] The petitions were eventually consolidated.
On November 14, 2011, Mike Arroyo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings [14] before the Joint
Committee, in view of the pendency of his petition before the Court. On the same day, GMA filed before
the Joint Committee an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam [15] to require Senator Pimentel to furnish her
with documents referred to in his complaint-affidavit and for the production of election documents as
basis for the charge of electoral sabotage. GMA prayed that she be allowed to file her counter-affidavit
within ten (10) days from receipt of the requested documents. [16] Petitioner Abalos, for his part, filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings (Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam), [17] in view of the pendency of his
petition brought before the Court.

The TRO for enforcing the TRO and Watchlist issued by DOJ was granted by the Supreme
Court because the hearing (Oral Arguments) on the DOJ circular must first be conducted before
its enforcement.
Carpio Dissent:
I vote to defer action on petitioners prayer for a temporary restraining order until after the
Government files its Comment and after oral arguments are heard on the matter. This should
take not more than five working days, which is brief enough so as not to prejudice petitioners in
any way. While the right to travel is a constitutional right that may be impaired only in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law, there are
recognized exceptions other than those created by law. Foremost is the restriction on the right to
travel of persons charged of crimes before the courts. Another is the restriction on persons
subpoenaed or ordered arrested by the Senate or House of Representatives pursuant to their
power of legislative inquiry.
In the present case, petitioners are already undergoing preliminary investigation in several
criminal cases, and charges may be filed before the courts while petitioners are abroad. In
fairness to the Government which is tasked with the prosecution of crimes, this Court must hear
first the Government in oral argument before deciding on the temporary restraining order which
if issued could frustrate the Governments right to prosecute. The Government must be heard on
how the charges against petitioners could proceed while petitioners are abroad.

Chavez vs PCGG (1998)

G.R. No. 130716 | 1998-12-09

Subject:
Right to Information on Matters of Public Concern; Compromise on criminal liability
Facts:
Reports came out of the discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various
Swiss bank accounts and the reported execution of a compromise, between the government
(through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets
Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official initiated this action to
enjoin respondents PCGG and its chairman from executing any agreement with the heirs of the
late
President
Marcos.
Petioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, likewise seeks to compel
PCGG to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all

documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and
the
Marcos
heirs.
Held:
Locus Standi
1. Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest
are the people themselves.
2. When the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and
because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of
the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action.
(Taada v. Tuvera)

Jurisdiction of the Court

3. PCGG argues that petitioner should have properly sought relief before the Sandiganbayan,
particularly in Civil Case No. 0141, in which the enforcement of the Compromise Agreements
is pending resolution.
4. However, this petition is not confined to the Agreements that have already been drawn, but
likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking towards any settlement on the alleged
Marcos loot. The core issue boils down to the precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of the
twin constitutional provisions on "public transactions." This broad and prospective relief sought
by the instant petition brings it out of the realm of Civil Case No. 0141.

Right to Information on Matters of Public Concern

5. The relevant provisions under the Constitution provide:
"Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as
may
be
provided
by
law."
"Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest."
6. The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the
Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing
the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may
be
obliged.
Limitations on the right to information
7. The following are some of the recognized restrictions
(1) national security matters and intelligence information

--covers state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
matters
--where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be
invoked to withhold documents and other information, provided that they are
examined
"in
strict
confidence"
and
given
"scrupulous
protection."
--information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties
and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of
national interest.
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions
-- trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other
related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act) [For purposes of confidentiality and trust reposed on banks: dahil
kung hindi, wala ng magdedeposit sabi ni Sen. Miriam. Magkakaroon ng bank-run.
Bank-runi-dedeposit nila ung pera nila sa iba. For security purposes.]
(3) criminal matters
-- covers classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the
apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts may not
inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution
(4) other confidential information
-- The Ethical Standards Act prohibits public officials and employees from using or
divulging "confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason
of their office and not made available to the public."
(5) diplomatic correspondence,
(6) closed door Cabinet meetings
(7) executive sessions of either house of Congress
(8) the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court
Scope of Right to Information (Matters of Public Concern and Transactions Involving
Public Interest)
8. The information sought must be "matters of public concern," access to which may be
limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure extends only to
"transactions involving public interest" and may also be "subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law." (citing Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.)
9. In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid
test which can be applied. 'Public concern' like 'public interest' is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine
on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates

to or affects the public. (citing Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission)

10. Official acts of public officers done in pursuit of their official functions are public in
character; hence, the records pertaining to such official acts and decisions are within the ambit
of the constitutional right of access to public records. (citing Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato)
11. The recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest. "Ill-gotten wealth," by its very nature, assumes a public character
since the assets and properties they refer to supposedly originated from the government itself.
To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people.

Access to Information on Negotiating Terms

12. It is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have
decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily
to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communicationsduring the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory"
stage.

Compromise on criminal liability

13. Any compromise relating to the civil liability arising from an offense does not automatically
terminate the criminal proceeding against or extinguish the criminal liability of the malefactor.
While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar general
sanction as regards criminal liability. The authority must be specifically conferred.
14. The power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14,
as amended by EO No. 14-A. PCGG may exercise such authority under these conditions: (1)
the person to whom criminal immunity is granted provides information or testifies in an
investigation conducted by the Commission; (2) the information or testimony pertains to the
unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused acquired or accumulated illgotten property; and (3) such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove guilt
or civil liability of such individual. From the wording of the law, the person referred to is a
witness in the proceeding, not the principal respondent, defendant or accused.

Validity of the PCGG-Marcos Compromise Agreements

15. The General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs
suffers from serious legal flaws:

(i) Criminal immunity cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants
in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending before the Sandiganbayan.
(ii) The PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by
the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution:
"No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress." Even granting that Congress enacts a law
exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on their properties, such law will definitely
not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant
of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation.

(iii) The government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos
heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts. This is a direct encroachment
on judicial powers. Once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction,
the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the
judge.
(iv) The government also waives all claims and counterclaims, "whether past, present, or
future, matured or inchoate," against the Marcoses. Under the Civil Code, an action for
future fraud may not be waived
(v) The Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the
parties shall fulfill their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the Marcoses
submit an inventory of their total assets.
(vi) The Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for determining which
assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses.
(vii) The absence of then President Ramos' approval of the principal Agreement, an
express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable.
Nevertheless, even if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be
valid.

Antolin v. Domondon
G.R. No. 165036 (2010)
Examinations have a two-fold purpose. First, they are summative; examinations are intended to
assess and record what and how much the students have learned. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, they are formative; examinations are intended to be part and parcel of the learning
process. In a perfect system, they are tools for learning. In view of the pedagogical aspect of
national examinations, the need for all parties to fully ventilate their respective positions, and
the view that government transactions can only be improved by public scrutiny, we remand these
cases to the trial court for further proceedings.
The crux of this case is whether petitioner may compel access to the Examination Documents
through mandamus. As always, our inquiry must begin with the Constitution. Section 7, Article
III provides:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Together with the guarantee of the right to information, Section 28, Article II promotes full
disclosure and transparency in government, viz:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
***
For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear, and certain legal
right to the thing demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required
act must be equally clear. One cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to re-check the
examination.
We now turn to the question of whether the petition has become moot in view of petitioner's
having passed the 1998 CPA examination. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases
to present a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical
use or value.
Petitioner's belated passing of the CPA Board Exams does not automatically mean that her
interest in the Examination Papers has become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly, the constitutional
question presented, in view of the likelihood that the issues in this case will be repeated, warrants
review.

Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people's right to
information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving
public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law". The Court has always
grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern."
In determining whether x x x a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the
interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by
case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.
On the other hand, we do realize that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination
Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it
may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration,
and checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and answers remain
confidential for a limited duration. However, the PRC is not a party to these proceedings. They have
not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the
justification for keeping the Examination Documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching
implications of this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and
in order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, we deem it best to remand these cases to the RTC for
further proceedings.

Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment (1983)

G.R. No. L-60403 | 1983-08-03
Subject: Government owned and controlled corporations and state colleges and universities
are not mandated to pay their employees 13th month pay
Facts:
Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered labor federation while the other
petitioners are its affiliate unions with members from among the employees of the following
offices, schools, or government owned or controlled corporations. The AGW together with the
Philippine Government Employees Association (PGEA) filed for a declaratory relief for the
proper application of the 13th month pay to government agencies and government owned and
controlled corporations.
According to the Unions, P.D. No. 851 requires all employers to pay the 13th-month pay to
their employees with one sole exception found in Section 2 which states that "Employers
already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this
Decree." They contended that Section 3 of Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 851 included other
types of employers such as the government and its political subdivisions not exempted by the
decree. They state that nowhere in the decree is the Minister of Labor and Employment,
authorized to exempt other types of employers from the requirement. They assailed that Sec.
3 of the Implementing rules is ultra vires and void. They state that a legislative act cannot be
amended by a rule and an administrative officer cannot change the law. Section 3 is
challenged as a substantial modification by rule of a Presidential Decree and an unlawful
exercise of legislative power.
Held:
Government owned and controlled corporations and state colleges and universities
are not mandated to pay their employees 13th month pay
1. Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 is a
correct interpretation of the decree. An analysis of the "whereases" of P.D. No. 851 shows that
the President had in mind only workers in private employment when he issued the decree.
There was no intention to cover persons working in the government service.
2. Restrictive statutes and acts which impose burdens on the public treasury or which diminish
rights and interests, no matter how broad their terms do not embrace the Sovereign, unless
the Sovereign is specifically mentioned. (See Dollar Savings Bank v. United States) The

Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, cannot be covered by a general term like "employer"
unless the language used in the law is clear and specific to that effect.
3. Under the present Constitution, govemment-owned or controlled corporations are
specifically mentioned as embraced by the civil service. (See Section 1, Article XII-B,
Constitution). Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations are now part of the
civil service. It would not be fair to allow them to engage in concerted activities to wring
higher salaries or fringe benefits from Government even as other civil service personnel such
as the hundreds of thousands of public school teachers, soldiers, policemen, health personnel,
and other government workers are denied the right to engage in similar activities.
4. To say that the words "all employers" in P.D. No. 851 includes the Government and all its
agencies, instrumentalities, and government-owned or controlled corporations would also
result in nightmarish budgetary problems. The salaries and fringe benefits of those embraced
by the civil service are fixed by law.

People vs. Ferrer

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 | 1972-12-27
Subject:
Anti-Subversion Act of 1957 not a bill of attainder; Not violative of freedom of expression;
Guidelines
to
be
observed
in
prosecuting
under
RA
No.
1700
Facts:
Two information on different instances were filed against several individuals for violating the
Anti-Subversive Act of 1957. One was against Feliciano Co for being a leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult
to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. The other
was against Nilo Tayag and five other people for being members / leaders of the New Peoples
Army (NPA) and for inciting and instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine
Government attended by aggravating circumstances of aid of armed men, craft, and fraud.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 (Republic Act No. 1700) was approved, among other
purposes, to outlaw the CPP and similar associations and membership therein. It defined the
Communist Party as an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force
and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is
a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines and further provided that
affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable.
Co and Tayag moved to quash the information against them and questioned the validity of the
Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 on several grounds. RTC Judge Simeon Ferrer, in dismissing the
information, said that R.A. 1700 is a bill of attainder as Congress usurped the powers of the
judge by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any judicial trial. It also created a
presumption of organizational guilt, which the accused can never hope to overthrow.

The government appealed by filing a special civil action for certiorari to uphold the validity of
R.A.1700.
Held:
R.A. 1700 is not a bill of attainder
1. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. It is
substitution of a legislative determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of
attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to
rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
2. In this case, the statute simply declares that the CCP as an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the government as an example. The act does not solely apply to CPP but to other
organizations having the same purpose. The acts focus is not on a particular person or group,
but on the conduct.
3. Membership to this kinds of organization, to be unlawful, must show that it was acquired to
further the goals of the organization by overt acts. The element of membership with
knowledge should be present. With this, it is required that a direct proof of the members
direct participation must be shown. The same is still subject to judicial determination and
scrutiny. It is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial
does it become a bill of attainder.

Not violative of freedom of expression

4. Whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of
membership in the CPP is weak considering national security and preservation of democracy.

Guidelines to be observed in prosecuting under RA1700

5. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition
to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be
established:
(a) In the case of Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the
organizations purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish
a domination of a foreign power. It must also be proven that the same was done knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts.
(b) In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose must be established. It
should also be shown that the membership was willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.