Rcca Training
Rcca Training
Rcca Training
Empower more people and functions to lead and/ or more effectively contribute to root cause and corrective action (RCCA) projects
07/13/10
Simple issues can be worked and documented within a CAT project tracking spreadsheet
07/13/10
07/13/10
Construct the problem statement Form a team Implement interim containment Determine the root cause (RC)
1. 2. 3. Brainstorm Sort and Analyze RC Verification Action Plan (VAP)
5. 6. 7. 8.
Develop corrective action (CA) Validation of corrective action (Implement a permanent fix) Prevent recurrence, preventive action (PA) Project closure justification, recognize the team
This training assumes that you have some familiarity with the 8-D problem solving process and the basic problem solving tools.
07/13/10
Consider the failure mode/ modes and aircraft operating conditions (consistent?) Utilize a minimum of three relevant people (you + 2 others) to confirm it is:
Correct and focused (single problem) Short/ concise as possible Simple/ clear as possible States the problem/ effect/ fault: does not infer or declare the solution Typically includes who, what, when, where, impact = 1 or 2 sentences
1. 2. Typically employ Quality Eng, Design Eng, Mfg Eng, Tool coordinators, Operators / Mechanics, Ops Team Lead, SCM (MPN, Buyer, Matl Handler) Work hard at this, expect iterations a.) Note: a problem well stated is a problem half solved b.) Note: If you cannot say it simply, you do not understand the problem Albert Einstein c.) Einstein also said: If he had one hour to save the world he would spend 55 minutes defining the problem and only 5 minutes finding the solution.
07/13/10
3 5
First step: Record the problem statement in the ICP 6 A full written structured and trackable plan that works with the RAIL Show higher level root cause (RC), corrective action (CA), preventive action (PA) investigation and closure tasks descriptions with key indentured interdependent sub tasks Clearly reveals the critical path to closure (RAIL does not) Think Pert diagram for multi-dimensional interdependence of tasks and their sequence Note: keep asking whats the next step? Make sure all ECDs have a basis/ plan, therefore a PCD = planned completion date (or promise) PCDs are: written, scope of task analyzed, prioritized, resources committed Make sure all interdependent handoffs are clear and agreed to (dont drop the baton) Its presentation ready to brief mgmt (retains continuity of actions, 3 panel charts do not) Its a company record of project the RAIL and the VAP are placed into as attachments
07/13/10
Form 78-35140:
Communications and Interim containment are 8D steps for emerging issues (normally not applicable for CAB selected projects)
The key tasks and sub tasks required to reach closure should all be separately numbered according to their interdependent sequential flow (clearly reveals the critical path)
05/5/11
The key tasks and sub tasks required to reach closure should all be separately numbered according to their interdependent sequential flow (clearly reveals the critical path)
The ICP is the central hub for attached documents and the full project record
08/17/10 07/13/10
Form 78-35140:
Issue Title: Supplier Name & Supplier # Part # (1) Problem Statement:
Product Line: (1.1) Communications 1. 2. 3. 4. (2) Form Team 1. Notify Product Line QA Lead Notify Chief Engineer Notify PC Administrator (Larry Moores Group) Red Flag Notification Released Contact Supplier QA Manager: 2. 3. (3) Interim Containment: 1. 2. 3. Name: Phone Number Email:
Assignee
Company
PCD ECD
Status
C Montgomery
HBC
John Doe, Quality Engineer, 6-XXXX Jim Smith, Design Engineer, 6-YYYY
Determine suspect lot: Stock: WIP:
08/17/10
Approach as a Special Project thats above your day job not typically a full time assignment, Note: continuous improvement is part of everyone's job
Everyone can either lead or support these Many simple projects can be done alone but use 2 others for 3 person confirmation points
3. Interim Containment
This is not part of the True RC training class focus assumes that if the problem is a new emerging issue that containment/ remedial action are accomplished in parallel and recorded in the ICP
07/13/10
True RCCA Training Class Reference the 8-D steps: 4. Find the Root Cause
4.1 Brainstorm the potential root causes and the escape point
Assign someone to capture the thoughts (facilitator)
Recommend using a white board, at end of meeting capture with digital camera Note: the best way to have a good idea (or the correct idea) is to have a lot of ideas Everyone still takes written notes: For their personal understanding and active engagement To get started on their action items prior to RAIL update and distribution To capture anything the group dynamics may have missed Assure everything gets captured on the RAIL at the end of the groups meeting System element level block diagrams Process flow diagrams 3D illustration (from A/C Maintenance Manual (AMM), Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC)) Digital photographs Check Lessons Learned databases for problem/ solution similarity Available data and trends
07/13/10
Identify what you know (supported by data) versus opinion but capture/ record/ and explore everything.
07/13/10
Fault, Problem
Testing
Quality
Sys Ops
Fault Trees (essentially a vertically oriented fishbone diagram) Example fault tree elements / realms / branches:
07/13/10
1.2.1.1 Short circuit 1.1.2 FOE 1.2.1.1.1. Aircraft harness 1.1.3 Damaged parts 1.2.1.2 Transient load during switching 1.2.1.3 Close/ release timing 1.2.1.3.1 Commands to relays 1.2.1.3.2 Relay operation
provides clear sub level identification numbering for VAP Can be constructed in Excel
1.2.1.4 Two power sources linked 1.2.2 Magnetized 1.2.3 Over voltage 1.2.4 External heat
07/13/10
Design/Product FMEA: built from a top level system schematic (what box talks to what other box/ components in the system?) and/ or a detail part or assy level drawings
What design characteristics/functions could lead to a particular failure mode?
Design FMEA
Identifier Design Characteristic Item/Design Function/ Requirements Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of Failure S e v Potential Cause(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure O c c Current Design/Process Controls D e t R P N Comments / Notes Recommended Actions Responsibility & Target Completion Date Actions Taken
1.1.2
Dimensional
Oversize
75
2.2.3
Surface Plating
Sealing Surface
Leakage
Dimensional Inspection
320
Process FMEA
Identifier Process Characteristic Item/Process Function/ Requirements Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of Failure S e v Potential Cause(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure Non-homogenius material composition Poor inventory mgmt (FIFO) O c c Current Design/Process Controls Comments / Notes Recommended Actions Actions Taken
3.2.1
Elongation
15
4.2.2
Seal storage
Shelf life
15
08/24/10
07/13/10
Probability of Failure
Remote: Failure is unlikely.
Occurrence
Never happened before Happens rarely and may cause FM / effect rarely
Low: Relatively Few Failures 1 in 15,000 1 in 2,000 1 in 400 1 in 80 1 in 20 High: Repeated Failures 1 in 8 1 in 3 > = 1 in 2 Very High: Failure is almost inevitable Moderate: Occasional Failures Happens sometimes and may cause FM / effect rarely Happens every time and may cause FM / effect rarely Happens rarely and may cause FM / effect sometimes Happens sometimes and may cause FM / effect sometimes Happens every time and may cause FM / effect sometimes Happens rarely and will cause FM / effect every time Happens sometimes and will cause FM / effect every time Happens every time and will cause FM / effect every time
07/13/10
07/13/10
1.2.1.1 Short circuit 1.1.2 FOE 1.2.1.1.1. Aircraft harness 1.1.3 Damaged parts 1.2.1.2 Transient load during switching 1.2.1.3 Close/ release timing 1.2.1.3.1 Commands to relays 1.2.1.3.2 Relay operation
1.2.1.4 Two power sources linked 1.2.2 Magnetized 1.2.3 Over voltage 1.2.4 External heat
07/13/10
Root Cause Verification Action Plan: "Generator main contacts remain closed"
Fault Tree Locator Number Fault Tree Element Fault Tree Subelement Fault Tree Subelement Fault Tree Subelement Fault Tree Subelement RPN
Assigned to:
ECD A = Active
= Complete
Results
Potential RC Conclusion
1.0 Physical problems 1.1 1.1.1 1.1.2 1.1.3 Physically stuck Damaged return spring FOE Damaged parts
Leads to
No
1.2 1.2.1 1.2.1.1 1.2.1.1.1 1.2.1.2 1.2.1.3 1.2.1.3.1 1.2.1.3.2 1.2.1.4 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.2.4
Contacts welded closed Overcurrent Short circuit Aircraft harness Transient load during switching Close/ release timing Commands to relays Relay operation Two power sources linked Magnitesed Over voltage External heat Yes Maybe
(A new sheet typically started for each major fault tree element)
08/24/10
Assigned to:
ECD
Results
Potential RC Conclusion
No
08/24/10
Validation = after CA implementation, checking that the action is achieving its goal and without adding a new problem (proof that the change has worked)
Note: nothing is particularly hard if you divide it into small jobs
A minimum of three relevant people to commit they concur the True RC is correct, comprehensive in terms of multiple levels of contributing causes, and the escape point is clear
Reference them in the ICP for future info (willingly held accountable) Should also include the champion
07/13/10
A minimum of three relevant people to commit they concur the CA plan is correct and comprehensive in terms of appropriate action assigned to all levels of contributing cause
Reference them in the ICP for future info (willingly held accountable) Should also include the champion
07/13/10