1. Jaime Adriano and Legaspi Towers 300 Inc vs Alberto and Lourdes Lasala G.R. No.

197842 by Red Facts: Petitioner entered into a security service contract with respondents for one year. Subsequently, respondents received a letter signed by petitioner Jaime Adriano, the building administrator, reminding them of their non-compliance with the security services agreement, which includes the failure to assign security guards with the required height and educational attainment, and the failure to provide the agreed service vehicle. The respondents, in their compliance, replaced the unqualified personnel with Adrianos recommendees and produced a car which was parked in a nearby area because of lack of space in the building. Still, respondents received another letter reiterating the same instances of non-compliance. Adriano mentioned that the differences could only be settled by requesting from petitioner various payments. A series of correspondence between the parties took place thereafter, with the petitioners constantly reiterating respondents alleged violations of the service contract. They also added another grievance nonpayment of the minimum wage. Respondents came before the LT300 Board but the latter, terminated the contract without giving respondents opportunity to explain. Respondents filed a complaint for damages alleging that LT300 and Adriano illegally terminated their services. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents. It held that the agreement could only be terminated for a valid cause; that respondents neither committed any violation nor failed to give security services to LT300; that respondents were not given their right to be heard under the fundamental principle of due process of law; and that respondents were entitled to all the benefits and considerations due them. The CA affirmed the decision hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Issues: 1. Whether or not the Supreme Court could warrant the factual reevaluation of this case 2. Whether the CA erred in holding the petitioners liable for illegal pre-termination of contract. Held: 1. No. The determination of the existence of a breach of contract is a factual matter not usually reviewable in a petition filed under Rule 45. Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court enumerated the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Court: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; October 9, 2013

(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. However, the petitioners failed to cite in their petition the presence of any of the above circumstances to warrant the factual reevaluation of this case. The SC will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the CA especially where such findings coincide with those of the RTC. 2. No. Respondents cannot be faulted for the absorption of personnel who failed to meet the minimum qualifications since the petitioners were active participants in the selection and hiring process. Respondents readily hired Adrianos recommendees even if they lacked the qualifications stated in the agreement. Also, no proofs were filed by the affected employees showing noncompliance of minimum wage and there is no evidence that the non-parking of the vehicle within the LT300 premises hampered the effective delivery of security services. The petitioners were the ones who committed the breach by their abrupt and groundless termination of the agreement. 2. Vitaliano N. Aguirre II and Fidel N. Aguirre II and Fidel N. Aguirre Vs. FQB+, Inc., Nathaniel D. Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo and Antonio De Villa. GR. No. 170770 By JC Facts: A complaint was filed by Vitaliano Aguirre against respondents for intra-corporate dispute, inspection of corporate book and records and damages. Vitaliano filed the case in Branch 24 of RTC Manila, which was a designated special commercial court. It was docketed SEC Case No. 04-111077 FQB+ was established in 1985 with the following directors and subscribers: Directors 1. Francisco Q. Bocobo 2. Fidel N. Aguirre 3. Alfredo Torres 4. Victoriano Santos 5. Victorino Santos Subscribers 1. Francisco Q. Bocobo 2. Fidel N. Aguirre 3. Alfredo Torres 4. Victoriano Santos 5. Victorino Santos January 9, 2013

6. Vitaliano N. Aguirre II 7. Alberto Galang 8. Rolando B. Bechayda Sometime in 2004, Vitaliano discovered a changed in the names of the directors and subscribers. According to the petitioner, he was not aware of any changes except for the death of Francisco Bocobo and Alfredo Torres. The General Information Sheets (GIS) stated: Directors & Subscribers 1. Nathaniel D. Bocobo 2. Priscila D. Bocobo 3. Fidel N. Aguirre 4. Victoriano Santos 5. Victorino Santos 6. Consolacion Santos Nathaniel and Priscila Bocobo, heirs of Francisco, were designated as president and secretary/treasure, respectively. The GIS was filed in the SEC by said heirs. Vitaliano questioned the truthfulness of the GIS to the "real" Board of Directors, as stated originally in the Articles of Incorporation, but was ignored. On September 27, 2004, Nathaniel appointed Antonio De Villa as the corporation's attorney-in-fact to administer the corporation's farm in the province. Antonio was stopped by Fidel and his men. Vitaliano asserted that the respondents usurped the management powers and prerogatives of the "real" Board of Directors. A hearing was for the application of Vitaliano's application for preliminary injunction, but despite notice the respondents did not appear. On October 15, the RTC granted the application based on Vitaliano's testimonial and documentary evidence, and on October 27, 2004, the RTC issued the writ after he filed an injunction bond. The respondents filed a motion for an extension of 10 days to file the pleadings warranted in response to the complaint, which they received on October 6, 2004. The trial court denied this motion for being a prohibited pleading under Section 8, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-corporate Controversies under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799. The respondents then filed a petition for Certiorari and Petition with the Court of Appeals. The certiorari petition sought for annulment of the RTC trial on the ground that the subject-matter is an agrarian dispute and the RTC had no jurisdiction, rather with the Department of Agrarian Reform. The respondents also assailed there was forum shopping since a case was pending with the DAR and improper venue because the real corporate address was different from the Articles of Incorporation. CA Ruling The CA ruled that the issuance of the preliminary injunction was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The CA held that the Vitaliano only proved a future right if he wins and an injunction is not the proper remedy to protect future, contingent or abstract rights. The CA also opined that GIS filed with the SEC is documented facts on record of the corporate officers and directors

that should outweigh Vitaliano's assertions and the RTC should have removed the respondents from their positions. The CA then also ruled that the RTC did not have jurisdiction of the case since the corporation at the time was dissolved and has lost its juridical personality. The CA also ruled that the complaint was meant to continue the business of the dissolved corporation. CA denied motion for reconsideration Issues: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in annulling the October 15, 2004 Order based on interchanged pages. 2. Whether the Complaint seeks to continue the dissolved corporations business. 3. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over an intra-corporate dispute involving a dissolved corporation. Ruling of SC 1. Ruling of CA affirmed. The CA correctly ascertained that Vitaliano was only able to prove a future right against the present rights of the respondents and the RTC should have not disturbed the status of the GIS filed with the SEC. 2. Ruling of the CA reversed The prayer of the petitioner showed that he wishes only to vindicate his right as a stockholder. Dissolution of a corporation does not moot the issues presented by the petitioner since Section 122 of the Corporation Code requires to conduct liquidation within three years from dissolution. The issue was then to determine the rightful board of the dissolved corporation. 3. Ruling of the CA reversed. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and RA 8799 gives such jurisdiction to the RTC, designated by the Supreme Court, to settle intracorporate disputes. To determine what is a intra-corporate dispute two concurring elements must be present: 1. The dispute must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations; 2. The nature of the question subject of the controversy must be such that it is intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation or the enforcement of the parties' rights and obligation under the Corporation Code and the internal regulatory rules of the corporation. Dissolution of a corporation merely prohibits the continuation of business by the corporation, not the relationship of the parties involved. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed June 29, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87293, as well as its December 16, 2005 Resolution, are ANNULLED with respect to their dismissal of SEC Case No. 04- 111077 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The said case is ordered REINSTATED before Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The rest of the assailed issuances are AFFIRMED.

3. Sally Yoshizaki vs Joy Training Center of Aurora, Inc. GR No. 174978 By Roman Facts: Spouses Sally and Yoshio Yoshizaki bought a parcel of land and a building thereon covered by a TCT registered and owned under the name of Joy Training Center of Aurora, Inc. It was sold to them by Spouses Johnson, who represented themselves as having authority to sell, evidenced by a board resolution and certification issued by a corporate secretary. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and a new TCT was issued in their name. Upon knowledge of the sale, the chairperson of Joy Training filed an action for the cancellation of Sales and Damages with prayer for issuance of TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against both spouses. It also impleaded Cecilia Abordo, the OIC of the Registered of Deeds in its amended complaint as additional defendant. In its complaint, it alleged that the company did not authorize the Johnsons to sell its real property. It also argued that the certification is void for it lacks material particulars and the resolution also for being void for failure to comply with the voting requirement of majority under the Corporation Code. Celia and the Spouses Johnson were in default for failure to file an Answer within the reglementary period. However, the spouses Yoshizaki filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims. They maintained that Spouses Johnson had authority to sell; that the certification and resolution were valid; that they were buyers in good faith; that there was a contract of agency between Joy Training and the Johnsons, hence, a valid contract of sale; and lastly, they questioned the jurisdiction of RTC over the case. They posited that the case is an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission. RTC took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of the spouses Yoshizaki. Aggrieved, Joy Training appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA upheld the RTC's jurisdiction over the case but reversed its ruling with respect to the sale. It gave no probative value to the certification and rendered the resolution as void for it was not approved by a majority of the board of trustees, in violation of section 25 of Corporation Code. Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case Held: Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction. The Supreme court held that, jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings before a court belong. It is conferred by law. The allegations in the complaint and the status or relationship of the parties determine which court has jurisdiction over the nature of an action. The same test applies in ascertaining whether a case involves an intracorporate controversy. July 31, 2013

In this case, Joy Training seeks to nullify the sale of real properties on the ground that there was no contract of agency between Joy Training and Spouses Johnson. The determination of the existence of a contract of agency and the validity of a contract of sale requires the application of the relevant provisions of the Civil Code. It is a well settled rule that disputes concerning the application of the Civil Code are properly cognizable by courts of general jurisdiction. No special skill requiring the SEC's technical expertise is necessary for the disposition of this case. As to other issues, the SC ruled that there was no contract of agency, the absence of which renders the contract of sale unenforceable. 4. Opinaldo vs. Ravina GR No. 196573 By RV Facts: Victorino Opinaldo was a security guard who raised a labor complaint against former employer, Narcisa Ravina. He accused Ravina of illegal dismissal and prayed for the payment of separation pay with the NLRC. After trial and hearing, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision in favor of Opinaldo. Ravina Appealed to the NLRC, but this was dismissed for lack of merit while the LAs decision was affirmed. Ravina then elevated the case to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari. The CA reversed NLRCs decision and set it aside. Opinaldo opined that that Ravinas appeal to the NLRC should have been dismissed outright since it was beyond the reglementary period, but the CA did not agree. It ruled that the issue of timeliness was rendered moot and academic when the NLRC decided to try the case on its merits rather than on a technicality. Opinaldo moved for reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE AND ANSWER: Petition was granted. WHETHER OR NOT NLRC ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF LIBERALITY IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS JURISDICTION. NLRC did not err. General Rule: The perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal. The NLRC, however, is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the application of its rules in deciding labor cases. While these rules may not be relaxed when it would render futile the very purpose for which the principle of liberality is adopted, the present circumstances warrant the NLRCs exercise of liberality. Liberality in labor cases stems from the mandate that the workingmans welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. In the present case, despite the fact that it was Opinaldo that questioned the NLRCs discretion concerning timeliness, it was in fact Opinaldo which the NLRC favored with the exercise of its jurisdiction. Opinaldo attacked that which protected him. To allow him victory would be against the welfare of labor. To charge the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion would be counterintuitive to the fact that it ruled in favor of its own LA. To 16 October 2013

render a full resolution of the case on the merits is the more palpable explanation for the liberal application of its rules. 5. Crisanta Guido-Enriquez vs Alicia Victorino G.R. No. 180427 By John Dee Facts: In February 1980, Antonia Vda. De Victorino filed with the CFI of Rizal an application for the registration of the title over the 10,603sqm lot situated in Binangonan, Rizal. The latter alleged that she is the owner in fee simple which she and her late husband, Felixberto, acquired thru purchase. Additionally, they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, adverse possession and occupation of the said land. She also presented a Tax Declaration under the name of her late husband. The Republic opposed said application alleging that the subject lot belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. Reports shows that the subject lot is a portion of a large parcel of land covered by TCT No. M-2102, registered under the name of Antonia Guido, et. Al., overlapped with another lot which was also a subject of an application for registration. On second report by the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (Administration) alleging that a case is still pending after the Republic of the Philippines appealed praying that the application for registration shall be held in abeyance until after TCT No. 23377(mother title of TCT No. M-2109) and all derivative title have been cancelled by the Court In June 1988, the Lands Management Sector informed the Administration that the Regional Director confirmed that the subject lot does not overlap any other parcel of land. The RTC-Pasig issued a decision on August 15, 1988 with finality and issued an Order for the Issuance of the Decree on November 3, 1988 directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission to implement its decision granting Antonia Victorinos application for the land registration. Meanwhile, on Nov. 21, 1991, the SC affirmed the CA in the 1988 Guido Case rendering a decision in favor of Antonio Guido, et al., with a judicial notice that prior to the reconstitution of the mother title of subject lot in favor of the Guido, certain portions of the area were in the possession of occupants who obtained certificates of title over the area possessed and others who didnt obtained the titles but through possession length of time amounts to ownership. Private respondent Alicia Victorino alleged that before Antonia Victorino died, the latter sold the subject lot in favor of the former, and as a consequence she filed a Manifestation and Motion for an Alias Order for Issuance of a Decree in the Name of the New Owner (respondent). On Nov. 19, 2002, the RTC-Pasig rendered a decision in favour of Alicia Victorino and directed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree in accordance with the adjudication of the RTC decision dated Aug. 15, 1988. On Dec. 4, 2002, Petitioner Cristina Guido-Enriquez filed a motion for CLARIFICATION whether the Aug. 15, 1988 decision ordered the September 30, 2013

segregation of the subject lot and whether the LRA has the authority to move for said segregation. A couple of motion for reconsideration were filed by the petitioner with the RTC but the same were denied. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but on Sept. 6, 2007 it was also denied. Issue: WON 1. The CA committed serious and reversible error when it dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition in CA (special civil action) and at the same time affirming the November 19, 2002 order issued by the Hon. Presiding Judge of branch 156 of RTC of Pasig City that directed Register of Deeds for Rizal, Morong Branch, to annotate on TCT No. M-2102 of the Registry of Deeds for Rizal, Morong branch, a memorandum which, in effect, deprives of law, of 10,603 sqm of their Lands. 2. The Honorable CA committed serious and reversible error that deprived the petitioner of due process when it allowed the presiding Judge who rendered the August 15, 1988 decision in in Land registration Case No. N-10371 and LRC case No. N-55139 to participate in the decision-making process that resulted in a decision that held that the proceeding in the RTC as the appropriate proceeding envisioned in the November 21, 1991 decision of the Honorable Court in Gr No. 84966 entitle Republic of the Philippines vs CA. Held: 1. NO. In her first assigned error, petitioner reiterates her argument raised before the CA that the August 15, 1988 Decision of the RTC in LRC Case No. 10371 is null and void for lack of jurisdiction as well as for denial of petitioner's right to due process. The doctrine of immutability of judgment applies. The CA had correctly ruled, the assailed August 15, 1988 decision of the RTC had already become final and executory. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down. While there are recognized exceptions to this doctrine, petitioner failed to prove that the instant case is among them. Moreover, as the CA had observed, petitioner did not raise any issue regarding the supposed nullity of the subject Decision of the RTC in her Motion for Clarification10 filed on December 4, 2002. It was only in her petition for certiorari filed with the CA that petitioner posited the argument that the said Decision is void. 2. NO. The SC does not agree that petitioner was deprived of due process when then CA Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., who is now a member of SC, was allowed to participate and vote as a member of the CA Division which rendered the presently assailed Decision, considering that he rendered the August 15, 1988 Decision of the RTC which granted Antonia Victorino's application for registration. This Court quotes, with approval, the disquisition of the CA in its October 25, 2007 Resolution, to wit: Petitioner asked if the Hon. Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Chairman of this Division, was the presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 156, who rendered the August 15, 1988 Decision.

Petitioner, thus, alleged that "there is something seriously amiss" which affects this Court's Decision, dated September 6, 2007. True, Justice Villarama, Jr. was the ponente of the August 15, 1988 decision of the RTC. Indeed, They indicated the same in the SCs decision. It is likewise true that Justices under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, are prohibited from sitting "in any case in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review." However, a careful review of the records of this case will show that although Justice Villarama, Jr. penned the August 15, 1988 RTC Decision, said Decision had already attained finality on or before November 3, 1988 and was not the subject of review in this Petition. Said August 15, 1988 decision, which is a final judgment, was merely incidental or part of the "history" of the case. Attention is invited to the fact that the issues raised by Petitioner in this case revolved only on the alleged invalidity of said Alias Decree and the annotation. It is the issuance of the Decree in the name of the Private Respondent and the annotation thereof to Petitioner's title which initiated this Petition for Certiorari, or the Orders dated November 19, 2002, dated March 6, 2003 and dated September 2, 2003. Said orders, however, were no longer penned by then Judge Villarama, Jr. but by respondent Judge Alex L. Quiroz, Justice Villarama, Jr.'s successor. Clearly, the August 15, 1988 Decision penned by then Judge Villarama, Jr. was not in issue or under review in this Petition for which a judicial officer is prohibited from participating. The fact alone that the issuances under review in this Petition, in effect, affirms the final and executory RTC decision, dated August 15,1988, does not mean that this Court acted with partiality and without the necessary prudence in rendering Our Decision, dated September 6, 2007. The courts decision was rendered after judicious review of the law, the records and the jurisprudence. Noting that Justice Villarama no longer took part in the above quoted Resolution of the CA, this Court finds nothing erroneous or irregular in the above ruling of the appellate court. 6. Royal Savings Bank vs. Fernando Asia et. Al G.R. No. 183658 By Jet Facts: Pacencia Salita and her nephew Franco Valenderia borrowed the amount of 25,000.00 from Royal Savings Bank. The latter loaned to them an additional 20,000.00. Salita executed a real estate mortgage over her property to secure payment of the amounts loaned from bank. Unfortunately, neither Salita or Valenderia were able to pay their debts. The petitioner bank instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding against the real estate mortgage. Pursuant to Act No. 3135, the mortgaged property was sold to a public auction at which the petitioner bank was the highest bidder. Both Salita and Valenderia failed to redeem the property within the time period prescribed thus a new title covering the same property issued to the petitioner-bank. Salita filed with the RTC a case for Recoveyance, annulment of title and damages against the petitioner. The trial court granted Salitas prayer for nullification of foreclosure proceedings and the reconveyance of the property under the petioner-banks name. The petitioner bank appealed to the CA, which reversed the decision of the trial court. Salita did not appeal April 10, 2013

the ruling of the CA which reversed the decision of the trial court. Salita did not appeal the ruling of the CA making it final and executory. Pursuant to Sec. 7 of Act 3135, the petitioner bank filed with the RTC an Ex-Parte Petition for the issuance of a writ of Possession. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner bank and issued the writ of possession in its favor. The respondents Asia et. al claimed to have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of owners of the land in question for 40 years. The respondents were given three days to voluntary vacate the property. To prevent the execution of the notice, the former filed an urgent motion to quash the writ of possession and writ of execution. The trial court granted the motion to quash. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration and the respondents filed an opposition to this. Claiming that it raises no factual issues, the petitioner came straight to the SC through a petition for Review under Rule 45 of Rules on Civil Procedure. Issues: 1. W/N the Regional Trial Court erred in issuing the herein assailed orders on the basis of its initial finding that respondents are third parties who are actually holding the property adversely vis-a-vis the judgment debtor. 2. W/N the pairing judge violated the hierarchy of courts when she quashed the writ of possession validly issued by the then presiding Judge of the RTC Quezon City, a co-equal body. Held: On the first issue: In the eyes of this Court, the RTC did not err in issuing the herein assailed Orders on the basis of its initial finding that respondents are third parties who are actually holding the property adversely vis-vis the judgment debtor. The RTC did not err in applying the doctrine laid down in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court,in which we ruled that the obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial, once it appears that there is a third party who is in possession of the property and is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. Explained in Philippine National Bank v. Austria that the foregoing doctrinal pronouncements are not without support in substantive law. Notably, the Civil Code protects the actual possessor of a property, to wit: Art. 433.Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. We find that it was only proper for the RTC to quash the Writ of Possession until a determination is made as to who, between petitioner and respondents, has the better right to possess the property. On the second issue: No court has the power to interfere by injunction in the issuance or enforcement of a writ of possession issued by another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to issue that writ. However, as correctly pointed out by respondents in their Comment, it was the same trial court and "not another court or co-equal court body that quashed the subject writ of possession. The pairing judge, who issued the Order quashing the Writ of Possession, issued it in her capacity as the judge of Branch 222 of Quezon City-the same

branch, albeit then under a different judge, that issued the Writ of Possession. 7. Mark Anthony Esteban (in substitution of the deceased Gabriel O. Esteban), Petitioner -versus- Spouses Rodrigo C. Marcelo and Carmen T. Marcelo, Respondents G.R. No. 197725 By Grace Facts: The late Gabriel O. Esteban, substituted by his son, petitioner Mark Anthony Esteban, had been in possession of a piece of land located at 702 Tiaga St., Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong City, since the 1950s. In the 1960s, the late Estebans sister constructed a foundry shop at the property. In the 1970s, after the foundry shop operations had proven unproductive, the respondents-spouses Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo were allowed to reside therein, for a monthly rental fee of P50.00. Since March 2001, the respondents-spouses have stopped paying the rental fee (which by that time amounted to P160.00). On October 31, 2005, the late Esteban, through a lawyer, sent the respondents-spouses a demand letter requiring them to settle their arrears and to vacate within five (5) days from receipt thereof. For failure to comply with the demand to pay and to vacate, the late Esteban instituted an unlawful detainer case against the respondents-spouses on December 6, 2005. In April 23, 2009, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ruled that there was a valid ground for ejectment; with the jurisdictional demand to vacate complied with, the respondents-spouses must vacate the property, pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 1673 of the New Civil Code, on the grounds of expiration of the lease and non-payment of monthly rentals. The MeTC likewise ordered the respondents-spouses to pay back rentals and rentals, plus legal interest until they shall have vacated the property, attorneys fees and cost of the suit. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) fully affirmed the MeTC ruling. The respondents-spouses appealed the RTCs ruling to the CA. In January 17, 2011, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. The CA ruled that from the year of dispossession in 2001 when the respondents-spouses stopped paying rent, until the filing of the complaint for ejectment in 2005, more than a year had passed; hence, the case no longer involved an accion interdictal cognizable by the MeTC, but an accion publiciana that should have been filed before the RTC. Therefore, the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case so that its decision was a nullity. Hence, the present petition. Issue: Whether or not MeTC had jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Held: The Court finds the petition meritorious. It is not the tenants mere failure to pay rents that makes the tenant's possession of the premises unlawful but the owner's demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the latter has failed to pay the rents on time and the refusal or failure to vacate July 31, 2013

makes the withholding of possession unlawful. Such refusal violates the owners right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer. Furthermore, in cases where there were more than one demand to pay and vacate, the reckoning point of one year for filing the unlawful detainer is from the last demand as the lessor may choose to waive his cause of action and let the defaulting lessee remain in the premises. The case has been properly filed as an accion interdictal cognizable by the MeTC, or within the one-year prescriptive period counted from the date of the last demand on October 31, 2005, hence, the MeTC had proper jurisdiction over the case. Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the court grants the petition for review on certiorari. The decision of the CA was reversed and set aside and the decision of the RTC was reinstated. Cost against the respondents spouses Marcelo. 8. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ROBERT P. NARCEDA, Respondent. G.R. No. 182760 By Sonny Facts: Robert P. Narceda (respondent) married Marina on 22 July 1987. At the time of their wedding, Marina was only 17 years and 4 months old. According to respondent, Marina went to Singapore in 1994 and never returned. There was never any communication between them. He tried to look for her, but he could not find her. Years had passed since Marina left, one of their town mates in Luna, La Union came home from Singapore and told him that Marina was already living with a Singaporean husband. Consequently, respondent Narceda filed with the RTC on 16 May 2002 a Petition for a judicial declaration of the presumptive death and/or absence of Marina. On 5 May 2005 the RTC granted respondents Petition. The dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring the PRESUMPTIVE DEATH of MARINA B. NARCEDA for all legal intents and purposes of law as provided for in Rule 131, Sec. 3(w-4), Rules of Court, without prejudice to the effect of re-appearance of the absent spouse. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTCs Decision to the CA. According to petitioner, respondent Narceda failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with the diligence required by law and enough to give rise to a "wellfounded" belief that she was dead. The CA dismissed the appeal ruling that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding under the Family Code and is thus governed by Title XI. Article 247 of the Family Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in summary court proceedings shall be immediately final and executory. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA. Thus, this petition. Issues: April 10, 2013

1. WHETHER OR NOT the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction; 2. WHETHER OR NOT Respondent Narceda has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead. Held: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The 14 November 2007 Decision of the Court Appeals and its subsequent 29 April 2008 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 85704, dismissing the appeal of the Republic of the Philippines are AFFIRMED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balaoan, La Union in Special Proceeding No. 622 dated 5 May 2005 declaring the presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda is hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY. This is because the petitioner, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, availed of the wrong remedy when it filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42. As a result, the running of the period for filing a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was not tolled. Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned. As a result, petitioners contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this court. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Nevertheless, an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). HTRDC commenced a complaint with the DARAB which culminated with the cancellation of emancipation patents of the occupants of the land. On 4 November 2003, HTRDC filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages with the MTCC of Malolos against the occupants of the subject land, again including respondent spouses. The MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner, ordering occupants to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable rent, attorneys fees and costs of suit. Respondents moved to reconsider the decision, but their motion for reconsideration was denied for being a prohibited pleading. The MTCC then ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondents appealed on 15 August 2005, but their appeal was denied due course for being filed out of time, as the period to appeal had not been stayed by the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Thus, the Decision dated 25 May 2002 became final and executory. In order to prevent the enforcement of the writ of execution and demolition, respondents filed several actions in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for annulment of judgment; Special Civil Action for certiorari; and Civil Case for quieting of title. These cases, however, were dismissed by the RTC on the grounds of forum shopping and immutability of final judgment for the first two cases while Civil Case finality of judgment for the third case. The MTCC issued an Alias Writ of Execution and an Alias Special Order of Demolition on 25 October 2006, and 28 October 2006, respectively. Respondents moved to quash both writs on the ground that they had now acquired ownership over the subject property before the writs were issued, as evidenced by Emancipation Patent issued in their favor during the pendency of the case. The MTCC denied their motion on the ground that respondents acquisition of ownership is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case. Aggrieved by the MTCCs denial of their motion to quash, respondents filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari directly with the CA with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The appellate court issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and ultimately granted the petition for certiorari. The CA likewise held that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. Hence this instant petition for review before the Supreme Court. Issues: 1. Whether or not MTCC had jurisdiction over unlawful detainer case; and 2. Whether or not respondents erred in filing special civil action directly to the CA, instead of RTC. Held: The court ruled in affirmative in both issues. The CA committed reversible error in ruling that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The petition was directed to the MTCCs denial of respondents motion to quash, and not to he MTCCs Consolidated Decision of 25 May 2005, nor could it

9. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, represented by JENNIFER R. MARQUEZ vs. SPOUSES CARLOS AND ELIZABETH ABACAN G.R. No. 183858 By Joe Ann Facts: Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation (HTRDC) acquired a parcel of land located in Sumapang, Malolos City from its registered owner. Petitioner later found that the subject lot was already occupied by some individuals, including respondent-spouses Carlos and Elizabeth Abacan. HTRDC then filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondentspouses and the other occupants. The case was later on withdrawn because there is a need to verify the exact location of the property, which the occupants claimed was covered by emancipation patents April 17, 2013

be, because respondents failed to make timely appeal the said decision, as prescribed under Rule 65 on petition for certiorari. The sole issue in the present case is de facto possession of the subject property. Such issue was already passed upon the MTCC during the trial. This was conclusively settled by the MTCC in HTRDC's favor in its final and executory Decision dated 25 May 2005. Did the MTCC commit grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents motion to quash? We rule in the negative. As to procedural issue, respondents erred in filing the special civil action for certiorari directly with the CA instead of the RTC. In doing so, they violated the time-honored principle of respect for the hierarchy of courts. While the Supreme Court, the CA, and the RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari the parties to a suit are not given unbridled freedom to choose between court forums. Judicial hierarchy indicates that "petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA." Therefore, respondents petition for certiorari was dismissible outright on procedural grounds. 10. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. G.R. No. 163037 By Krissey Facts: On February 9, 1990, Judge Zeus Abrogar of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, approved the Compromise Agreement dated February 7, 1990 submitted by PLDT and respondent Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI). Thereafter, ETPI filed, respectively, a Motion for Enforcement/Execution and an Urgent Motion, alleging, among others, that PLDT violated the terms of the above Compromise Agreement. PLDT filed its Opposition with Compulsory CounterMotion asserting that it was ETPI that breached their Compromise Agreement. Both parties jointly moved for a suspension of the proceedings in order for them to amicably settle the case. Thereafter, the parties arrived in a letter-agreement. In a series of letters, ETPI advised PLDT that the former agreed to the proposals of REACH Hong Kong to have the Total Accounting Rate (TAR) for telephone service between the Philippines and Hong Kong reduced. A letter was also sent by PLDT to ETPI stating its objection to the reduction of accounting rates and that it was not consulted thereon. PLDT advised ETPI that it would be implementing a complete blocking of telephone service traffic from REACH Hong Kong carried on the ETPI-REACH circuits if the settlement rate arrangement for the telephone service between Hong Kong and the Philippines were not resolved. Despite the negotiations to amicably resolve their issues, PLDT threatened to block all calls to and from the REACH ETPI circuits unless the latter grants their demands. Thus, the latter prayed for the trial court to direct PLDT to comply with the Compromise Agreement. PLDT stated in its Opposition that the matter sought to be enjoined by ETPI was beyond the jurisdiction of RTC. Further contending that the Compromise Agreement was novated by their letter agreement. RTC ruled against PLDT and declared that it had jurisdiction on the matter sought to be enjoined by ETPI. The trial court further ordered PLDT to comply with to February 6, 2013

Compromise Agreement, specifically Sections 3 and 11 of the same agreement which served as basis for the judgment. Not discouraged by the unfavorable rulings of the trial court, PLDT filed with the court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under rule 65 seeking to declare null and void the trial courts orders which were allegedly issued without jurisdiction and with clear, grave abuse of discretion. The petition was granted declaring the orders null and void. ETPI duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration also with the CA and was able to overturn the decision. PLDT moved for the reconsideration of the amended decision but it was also denied. Hence, the party filed an instant petition, setting forth the following issues: Issues: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC-MAKATI CEASED TO HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF CIVIL CASE NO. 17694 IN VIEW OF THE NOVATION OF THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BY THE LETTER-AGREEMENT, WHICH PROVIDED FOR ARBITRATION AS THE MEANS FOR SETTLING DISPUTES BETWEEN PLDT AND ETPI THAT COULD NOT BE SETTLED AMICABLY; 2. WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS NOVATION OF THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BY THE LETTER-AGREEMENT; 3. WHETHER OR NOT BY VIRTUE OF R.A. NO. 7925 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS, IT IS THE NTC WHICH HAS PRIMARY AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER SETTLEMENT OF ACCESS CHARGES AND REVENUE SHARING AFFECTING TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES; 4. AGREEMENT CAN STILL BE ENFORCED BY MERE MOTION AFTER THE LAPSE OF FIVE (5) YEARS FROM THE TIME IT BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY; 5. WHETHER OR NOT ETPI WAS ESTOPPED FROM INVOKING THE JURISDICTION OF THE RTC-MAKATI; 6. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC-MAKATI CEASED TO HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF CIVIL CASE NO. 17694 BECAUSE BY ITS OWN TERMS THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT EXPIRED ON 28 NOVEMBER 2003; 7. WHETHER OR NOT PLDTS PETITION IS MOOT; Held: After a thorough review of the facts and issues of the instant petition, the Court finds that, indeed, PLDTS claim is already moot. The Compromise Agreement, by its own terms, was effective only until 28 November 2003.The conditions for the termination of the Compromise Agreement were complied with. As a result of the expiration of the Compromise Agreement, there is nothing for the RTC-Makati to enforce and/or act upon. The court citing the case of Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Court emphatically stated that: It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

Applying the pronouncement, there was no justiciable controversy anymore in the instant petition in view of the expiration of the Compromise Agreement sought to be enforced. Clearly, any decision of this Court on the present petition, whether it be an affirmance or a reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, would be equivalent in effect to an affirmance or an invalidation of the challenged Orders of the RTC. There is nothing more for the RTC to enforce and/or act upon. As such, any discussion on the matter would be a mere surplusage. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED for being moot and academic 11. LORNA CASTIGADOR VS. DANILO M. NICOLAS G.R. No. 184023 By Edgar Facts: Petitioner was the previous registered owner of a 522-square meter property in Tagaytay. In 2004, the City Treasurer of Tagaytay sold the property at public auction for non-payment of real estate taxes. According to petitioner, she did not receive any notice of assessment, notice of delinquency, warrant of levy and notice of public auction. Respondent Danilo M. Nicolas was thereafter declared the highest bidder. The certificate of sale issued to respondent was then annotated at the back of petitioners title. Petitioner further alleged that she was not given a notice of the auction sale or registration of the certificate of sale. In 2006, respondent sought the issuance of a new title due to petitioners failure to redeem the property. Petitioner, again, alleged that she did not receive a copy of the petition or any subsequent notices as her address indicated therein was wrong. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City rendered on May 31, 2006 its decision granting respondents petition6 and ordering the issuance of TCT in respondents name. Petitioner filed the petition for annulment of judgment with the CA on July 17, 2007. On July 31, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed Resolution dismissing the petition on the grounds that: (1) the petition is defective for failure to comply with Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; and (2) there is no allegation in the petition that it is based on extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, in violation of Rule 47, Section 2 of the Rules. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The CA simply stated that the arguments posed by the petitioner in support of the grounds citedfor the allowance of the petition are bereft of merit, as they do not constituteextrinsic fraud to annul the questioned decision. Issue: WON the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the petition. Held; Under Section 5, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, it is incumbent that when a court finds no substantial merit in a petition for annulment of judgment, it may dismiss the petition outright but the specific reasons for such dismissal shall be clearly set out. March 4, 2013

On the assumption that the CAs dismissal was based on a procedural defect, the Court finds a reversible error committed by the CA on this score. The petition filed with the CA contained the following allegations, among others: (1) the auction sale of the land is null and void for lack of actual and personal notice to herein petitioner; (2) the RTC did not comply with the procedure prescribed in Section 71, Presidential Decree No. 1529 and (3) petitioner was not afforded due process when she was not notified of the proceedings instituted by respondent for the cancellation of her title. The petition need not categorically state the exact words extrinsic fraud; rather, the allegations in the petition should be so crafted to easily point out the ground on which it was based. The allegations in the petition filed with the CA sufficiently identify the ground upon which the petition was based extrinsic fraud. Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. On the assumption, on the other hand, that the CAs disposition of the petition was based on its substantial merits, the Court still finds a reversible error committed by the CA. The grounds relied upon by the petitioner in support of its prayer for the annulment of judgment is lack of notice, from the assessment of the property for real estate tax purposes up to the time the title over the property passed on to respondent. These are serious charges and could very well affect the validity of the issuance of the new title to respondent. The Court is not in the proper position to determine the veracity and validity of petitioner's allegations as these entail a factual assessment of the records. Moreover, records show that the proceedings before the CA did not even reach the comment stage as the petition was summarily dismissed. 12. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON S. CAGUIOA, Presiding Judge, Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Olongapo City, META TRANS TRADING INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, and HUNDRED YOUNG SUBIC INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents. G.R. No. 174385 By Pure Facts: In March 2005, fourteen lower court petitioners (LCPs), importers and traders operating in the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone (SSEFZ), filed before respondent Judge Caguioa a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary mandatory injunction seeking to stop the implementation of Sec 6 of RA 9334. Said law amended Sec 131 of the National Internal Revenue Code which now provides that imported tobacco and alchohol products shall be subject to applicable taxes even if they are destined for tax and duty-free shops. In 1992, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) granted tax exemptions to said LCPs as they engaged in the import and export of general merchandise including alcohol and tobacco products. When February 20, 2013

RA 9334 was passed, SBMA issued a memorandum requiring said importers and traders to pay duties and taxes on their importations of tobacco and alcohol products before they can be cleared and released in the Freeport. Because of this, the LCPs filed a petition for declaratory relief with a prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a TRO to stop petititioner Republic of the Philippies (acting through SBMA) from enforcing said memorandum. On May 4, 2005, and May 11, 2005, respectively, respondent judge granted the LCPs application and issued the preliminary injunction despite the Republics opposition. The Republic filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as GR. No. 168584, to annul the respondent judges order and writ issued pursuant to this order. The Republic also filed a motion in the RTC asking Judge Caguioa to suspend the proceedings pending the resolution of GR No. 168584. Subsequently, private respondents Meta Trans Trading and Hundred Young Subic International, filed before the respondent judge motions for leave to intervene and to admit complaints-inintervention and to extend to them the benefits of the May 4, 2005 order as well as the writ of preliminary injunction issued on May 11, 2005. The respondent judge, whilst not acting on the Republics motion to suspend the procedings, granted their motions as he found them similarly situated with the LCPs. Republic filed for a motion for reconsideration (MR) but Judge Caguioa denied both MR and petition to suspend proceedings. Hence this petitions. According to petitioner, the respondent judge acted in partiality and with grave abuse of discretion and that it was denied its right to due process when the motions and complaints-in-intervention were granted ex parte without giving prior notice of hearing nor any copy of the said motions. The respondents pointed out the procedural defects in the Republics petition 1) it was filed out of time, saying that the 60 -day period within which to file is counted from the notice of denial, 2) the petition did not comply with the rules on filing and service, 4) the Republic failed to serve their counsel a copy of the petition, and 4) it did not observe the hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition. Issues: I. Are there procedural defects in the Republics Petition? II. Did Respondent Judge act with grave abuse of discretion? Held: The Court found that petition was filed within the reglementary period. According to Section 4, Rule 65 the 60- day period within which to file the petition for certiorari is counted from the Republics receipt of the order denying the latters motion for reconsideration. The present petition complied with the rules on proof of filing and service of the petition. Attached to the petition in compliance with Sections 12 and 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court are the registry receipts and the affidavit of the person who filed and served the petition by registered mail. Secondly, while the principle of hierarchy of courts does indeed require that recourses should be made to the lower courts before they are made to the higher courts this principle is not an absolute rule and admits of exceptions under well-defined circumstances. Such as 1) when dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy; 2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice;

3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or 4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified our immediate and direct handling of the case. The court also found that the respondent judge violated and continues to violate its right to due process by allowing the private respondents and several others to intervene in the case sans notice to the Republic; by extending to them the benefit of the original injunction; and by continuing to suspend the Republics right to collect excise taxes from the private respondents and from the lower court petitioners, thus adversely affecting the governments revenues. Such a situation constitute special and compelling circumstances calling for our direct and immediate attention. Lastly, under our rules of procedure,19 service of the petition on a party, when that party is represented by a counsel of record, is a patent nullity and is not binding upon the party wrongfully served. This rule, however, is a procedural standard that may admit of exceptions when faced with compelling reasons of substantive justice manifest in the petition and in the surrounding circumstances of the case. Procedural rules can bow to substantive considerations through a liberal construction aimed at promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. The respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion warranting the issuance of the corrective writ ofcertiorari. Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution or grossly disregards the law or existing jurisprudence. The term refers to such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, as when the act amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law. The respondent judge so acted so that the orders he issued should be declared void and of no effect.

13. Editha Padlan vs Elenita Dinglasan and Felicimo Dinglasan GR No. 180321 By Ace Facts: Elenita Dinglasan is the registered owner of a lot. While riding the jeepney with her mother Lilia, the latter had a conversation with one Maura Passion and believed her to be a real estate agent. Lilia then borrowed the owners copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura. After that, Maura was able to subdivide the lots and through falsified deeds of sale with forged signatures of Elenita and her husband was able to sell the lots to one Lorna Ong. Lorna eventually sold the lot to herein petitioner Editha Padlan for P4000. Upon discovery, the spouses Dinglasan demanded that Editha surrender possession of said lot but she refused. As a consequence, they filed a case for Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title before the RTC of Balanga, Bataan. Editha filed a motion to dismiss the case arguing that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because the summons was not validly served upon her but only by means of substituted service through her mother. The RTC declared her in default upon motion of the respondents, thus trial ensued. RTC RULING: March 20 2013

The RTC found Editha to be a buyer in good faith and the case was dismissed. CA RULING: CA reversed and set aside RTCs findings. The court found that Editha was a purchaser in bad faith; the fact that the subject lot was sold to her for only P4000 should have put her on guard. Thus, the title issued to her was fraudulent and therefore null and void. Petitioner then filed for a motion for reconsideration arguing that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as her person. This was denied. Hence, the petition. Petition: 1. Petitioner posits that the court (RTC) lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, considering that from the complaint, it can be inferred that the value of the property was only P4,000.00, which was the amount alleged by respondents that the property was sold to petitioner by Lorna. Issue: W/N the Honorable Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case Held: NO. The SC cited Sec. 33(3) of BP 129, as amended by RA 7691 which provides for the Jurisdiction of the first level courts: (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs. x x x and Sec. 19(2), which provides for the jurisdiction of the RTC: xxx (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) The SC ruled that from the Complaint by the Respondents, the action was that which involves title to real property, thus falling within the coverage of the above-mentioned provision. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs (herein respondents) is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore all proceedings therefrom are null and void. 14. Darma Maslag vs Elizabeth Monzon, William Geston, and Registry of Deeds of Benguet GR. No. 174908 June 17, 2013 By Nica

Facts: In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of original certificate of title against respondents. The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court. After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over petitioners property. Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action. The presiding judge declared that it will take cognizance of the case pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which provides for appeal from orders dismissing the case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. RTC thereafter reversed the decision of the MTC, prompting the petitioner to file a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the respondents contention that the proper remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. Issue: W/N petitioners ordinary appeal is the proper remedy Held: No. The CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject property. Since the assessed value of the disputed property is only P12,400, MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. In fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the proceedings that originated from the MTC. It was a judgment issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it is not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. Neither would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case. The present court looks at what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC, and not into what type of jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised. Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case is a question that already involves the merits of the appeal, but the court obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was improper to begin with. Wherefore, Petition for Review is denied for lack of merit. The Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.

15. Optima Realty Corporation vs Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars Inc G. R. No. 183035 January 9,2013 By Joe Facts: Optima Corporation,a company engaged in leasing commercial spaces and buildings to its tenants, entered into a Contract of Lease with Hertz Phil Exclusive Cars Inc. over an office unit and a parking slot in the Optima Building fortwo years and five months, startingfrom October 1, 2003 up to February 28, 2006. During the lease period, Hertz alleged that it experienced a 50% drop in monthly sales and a significant decrease in its personnels productivity due to the renovations made in the building. It then requested a 50% discount on its rent for four months in 2005.Optima granted the request;however, respondent still failed to pay. Petitioner then wrote another letter to Hertzon December 8, 2005, reminding the latter that the contract could be renewed subject to a new negotiation and upon written notice by the lessee to the lessor at least 90 days prior to the termination of the lease period. Since noletter was received from Hertz within the 90-day period, Optima informed it that the lease would expire on February 282006 and would not be renewed. In its answer, Hertz wrote a letter on December 21, 2005 advising Optima of the formers desire to negotiate and extend the lease. However,petitioner no longer entertained the notice. Optima therebyordered Hertz to surrender and vacate the leased premises.Respondent, however, refused to vacate the leased premises which resulted to Optima filing a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in the MeTC against Hertz. The MeTC rendered a decisionin favor of Optima. The RTC affirmed its decision. CA reversed RTCs decision because of the MeTCs failure to acquire jurisdictiondue to improper service of summons, hence, this appeal. Issues: 1. WON the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the respondent Hertz; 2. WON the unlawful detainer case is barred by litis pendentia; 3. WON the ejectment of Hertz and the award of damages,attorneys fees and costs were proper. Held:

In the case, jurisdiction over the person of Hertz was acquired by reason of the latters voluntary appearance in court. As a rule, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. The filing of motions to admit answer is considered voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. It was stated that in spite of the defective serviceof Summons, the defendant opted to file the Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court. From this statement,it can be concluded that respondent had a voluntary appearance in court. Furthermore, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz did notraise the defense of improper service of summons. 2. The instant ejectment case is not barred by litis pendentia. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following elements: a. Identity of parties b. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for c. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases In the case,rights asserted and the relief prayed for are different. Hence, pendency of Complaint for Specific Performance is not a bar to the institution of the present case for ejectment. 3. The eviction of respondent and award of damages, attorneys fees and costs were proper. Respondent failed to pay rental arrearages and utility bills to Optima and the Contract of Lease expired without any request from Hertz for a renegotiation thereof at least 90 days prior to its expiration. 16. Planters Development Bank of the Philippines v. Lopez Spouses G.R NO.186332. By PJ Facts: Planters Development Bank filed a petition for review to challenge the July 30,2007 amended decision and the February 5,2009 resolution of the Court of Appeals. The said judgment ordered the respondent Lopez spouses to pay the loan interest at 12 % per annum computed from the finality of this decision until full payment of the amount of 3.5 million pesos, minus the proceeds of the auction sale of the foreclosed mortgage property. The respondents as a defense, reiterate the Court of Appeals arguments. They also assert that the amended decision has already become final and executory due to Planters Bank filing of a motion for reconsideration on August 22,2007. Issue: October 13,2013

Petition is granted and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the appellate court were reversed. 1. The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the respondent Hertz. In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired either by serviceofsummons or by the defendants voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals amended decision is final and executory. Held: The Court of Appeals amended decision is not yet final and executory. Section 13 Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by an affidavit of the person mailing the facts showing compliance with Section 7 ,Rule 13 of the rules of court. However, the presentation

of an affidavit and a registry receipt is not indispensable in proving service by registered mail. Other competent evidence, such as the certifications from the Philippine Post Office may establish the fact and date of actual service. Such certifications are direct and primary pieces of evidence of completion of service. Planters Banks motion for reconsideration dated August 22,2007 was filed on time. The Manila Central Post Offices certification states that the amended decision was only dispatched from Manila Central Post Office to the Makati Central Post Office on August 2,2007. On the other hand, the Makati Central Post Offices certification provides that Planters bank actual receipt of the decision was on August 7,2007 and not on August 2,2007.

witnesses and whatever documentary exhibits presented by the plaintiff and that the claim is distinct and separate, also added that the action made against Asian bank is anchored on the claim that its acquisition of the subject properties was tainted with bad faith because of its actual or constructive knowledge. And that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the claim of bad faith even if it is merely incidental to the main action and that the court can grant separate trial. Asian Bank moved a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution, but denied. Hence, Metrobank being the successor in interest of Asian Bank commenced their special civil action for certiorari. Issue: W/N 1.the Republic was entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank. 2.the only issue as regards asian bank was whether there was evidence that the asian bank acquired the properties in bad faith. 3.The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the issue of asian banks alleged bad faith in acquiring the properties.

17. Metropolitan bank and trust company as successor in interest of asian bank corporation Vs Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval,Hon Francisco H. Villaruz Jr. and Hon. Rodolfo A. Ponferada G.R. No. 169677 By Irish Facts: Ferb.18,2013

Held: Two parcels of commercial land was among the subject property in an action brought by the Republic in a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, accounting and damages against Andres v. Genito,jr.,Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda r. Marcos and other defendant. To recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their nominees dummies and agents the said complaint was filled in the Sandiganbayan. The subject properties, the two parcels of commercial land, was under possession of the Asian Bank who also claimed ownership through registration and writ of possession. Hence, the Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint in order to implead Asian Bank as an additional defendant, and when they where about to terminate the presentation of evidence against the original defendants, it moved to hold a separate trial against Asian Bank. Asian bank sought the deferment of any action on the motion until it was first given the opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and documentary evidence the republic had already presented against the original defendants ,and contended that it would be deprived of its day in court if a separate trial were to be held against it without having been sufficiently approved about the evidence Republic had adduced before it was brought in as an additional defendant. The Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian Bank was proper because its cause of action against it was entirely distinct and independent form its cause of action against the original defendant, and that the issue raised was whether the Bank had actual constructive knowledge at the time of the issuance of the TCTs for the properties In its name that such were the subject of the complaint in civil case, and so it would justify forfeiture of the said properties if judgment would be in favor of the Republic. The Asian Bank replied that the issue concerning its actual or constructive knowledge was intimately related to the issue dealing on the character of the properties as the ill-gotten wealth of the original defendant, thus it had a right to confront the evidence presented by the republic as to the character of the properties; and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction, being a special court and it could only determine the issue whether or not the properties were illegally acquired by the original defendants. The Sandiganbayan grant the motion for separate trial reasoning that the bank was merely seeking the opportunity to confront the 1&2. The petition for certiorari is partly meritorious. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting the motion for separate trial, but was correct in upholding its jurisdiction over republics claim against Asian Bank. The rule on separate trial in civil action is found in sec.2 rule 31 of the rules of court.the trial court has discretion to determine if a separate trial if any claim,cross claim,counterclaim,or third party complaints or of any separate issues should be held,provided that the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering separate trial against Asian Bank on the ground that the issue was distinct and separate, it veered away from the general rule of having all the issues in every case tried at one time, forgot the dictum that a single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the court. Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issue will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issue will give a fair trial to all parties. The disadvantages that a separate trial would cause to Metrobank would far outweigh any good or benefit that the republic would seemingly stand to gain from the separate trials. 3. Republics allegation in its amended complaint in civil case that Asian Bank acted in bad faith for ignoring the sequestration of the properties as ill-gotten wealth has made the cause of action against Asian Bank incidental or necessarily connected to the cause of the action against the original defendant. Consequently, Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over the claim against Asian Bank. The court rule in presidential commission on good government vs. Sandiganbayan, that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction and exclusive not only over principal causes of action involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth, but also over all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme court.

Wherefore, the court partially grants the petition for certiorari. The Court declares that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over the amended complaint against Asian Bank corporation/Metrobank and trust company. 18. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. TOMAS CUENCA, MARCELINA CUENCA, MILAGROS CUENCA, BRAMIE T. TAYACTAC, and MANUEL D. MARANON, JR., Respondent. G.R. No. 173297 By Coy Facts: When Civil Case No. 98-023 for collection of sum of money and damages was filed by Manuel Maranon against respondents Tomas Cuenca and Bramie Tayactac, a writ of preliminary attachment was ordered by the RTC against respondents. As required, Maranon posted a SICI Bond No. 68427 JCL (4) No. 02370 for P 1 million. Enforcing the writ of preliminary attachment, the Sheriff levied upon equipment, supplies, materials and other personal properties belonging to Arc. Cuisine, Inc. found in the leased corporate officecum-commissary or kitchen of the corporation. Upon, the courts approval, the properties were deposited for safekeeping at the warehouse of Maranon. Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the writ of Attachment were filed by Cuenca and Tayactac, on the ground that RTC lacked jurisdiction. As an intra-corporate matter, it is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. RTC denied both motions, as well as the motion for reconsideration later filed by the respondents asserting that a case for collection of sum of money is within its jurisdiction. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, it dismissed the Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 98-023, for lack of jurisdiction. The CA also remanded the matter to the RTC for hearing and resolution of claims for damages resulting from the enforcement of the writ of preliminary attachment sustained by the Cuencas and Tayactac. The RTC held Maranon and SICI jointly and solidarily liable for damages to Cuenca and Tayactac and ordered them to pay the following: 1. P 1,000,000 representing the amount of the bond; 2. P 100,000 for moral damages; 3. P 50,000 for exemplary damages; 4. P 100,000 for attorneys fees; 5. To pay the cost of suit. Only SICI appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC finding no reversible error; CA later on denied the motion for reconsideration filed by SICI. Hence this appeal by petition for review on Certiorari filed by SICI. Issues: WON the lower courts erred in ruling the liability of SICI: March 6, 2013

1. to pay respondent Cuenca et al who are not the owners of the properties; thus are not the proper parties to claim any damages arising from their attachment; 2. when the purported damages were due to the negligence of the sheriff of the Trial Court and his failure to comply with the rules of court pertaining to the attachment of properties; 3. for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and cost of suit, since its guaranty is limited only to P 1,000,000. Held: Petition for review was found meritorious. Even if it was not raised in the CA, the supreme court found merit in the issue that respondents Cuenca et al are not proper parties to file action; the Court asserts that, actual legal interest of the parties in the subject litigation is a matter of substance that has jurisdictional impact, even on appeal before this Court; There is no question that a litigation should be disallowed immediately if it involves a person without any interest at stakeSection 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. The purpose of the rule are as follows: 1. To prevent prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the case; 2. To require that actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3. To avoid multiplicity of suits; and 4. To discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy The properties attached belong to Arc Cuisine, Inc. and not of the Cuencas et al; and even if the latter stands to benefit in the successful prosecution of the case as stockholder, employee or otherwise, it is not controlling in identifying the real parties in interest to the litigation. The Cuencas et al could bring the action in behalf of Arc. Cuisine Inc., but such should be brought in the name of the corporation. In the present case, they presented the claim in their own names. In view of the outcome reached in the first issue, the Court deems it unnecessary to give any extensive consideration in the remaining issues.

19. Leticia Diona vs Romeo Balangue, Sonny Balangue, Reynaldo Balangue and Esteban Balangue, Jr G.R. No. I73559 By Joebert Facts: A violation of the partys right to due process may be declared void ab initio. This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari which assails the Resolution of the CA which granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment.

Respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from Petitioner payable in six months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202square meter property located in Marulas, Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). When the debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint with the RTC. Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny Balangue (Sonny) with the assistance of Atty. Arthur C. Coroza of the Public Attorneys Office; they filed a Motion to Extend Period to Answer. Despite the requested extension, they failed to file any responsive Pleadings. Thus, upon motion of the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed petitioner to present her evidence ex parte. In a Decision, the RTC granted petitioners Complaint that the Respondents shall pay the unpaid principal amount of P45,000.00 plus interest of 5% per month, Attorneys Fees plus cost of suit and if the respondents fail to satisfy the aforesaid obligation, an order of foreclosure shall be issued for the sale at public auction of the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title and the improvements thereon. Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60%per annum) until full payment. Resultantly, their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest from March 2, 1991 to May 22, 2001 ballooned from P124,400.00 to P652,000.00. In an Order dated May 7, 2002, the RTC granted respondents motion and accordingly modified the interest rate awarded from 5% monthly to 12%per annum. Then on August 2, 2002, respondents filed a Motion for Leave To Deposit/Consign Judgment Obligation in the total amount of P126,650.00. Displeased with the RTCs May 7, 2002 Order, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest but at the same time pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing the rate of interest to 12%per annum. Respondents filed with the same court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale with Damages. They contended that the portion of the RTC Decision granting petitioner 5% monthly interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and of their right to due process. According to respondents, the loan did not carry any interest as it was the verbal agreement of the parties that in lieu thereof petitioners family can continue occupying respondents residential building for free until said loan is fully paid. The CA concluded that the awarded rate of interest is void for being in excess of the relief sought in the Complaint. Thus, respondents motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and its previous resolution is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner sought reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its June 26, 2006 Resolution. Issues: I. THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A SUBSTITUTE OR ALTERNATIVE REMEDY OF A LOST APPEAL. II. THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR AND MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW AND THE FACTS WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID DECISION HAS BECOME FINAL AND ALREADY

EXECUTED CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT. Held: The SC agreed with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. An exception to the final judgment rule. A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the partys own neglect in promptly availing of the same. The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final should be laid to rest. While under Section 2, Rule 4733 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. It provides: Extent of relief to be awarded. A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages. Petition is hereby DENIED. 20. Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, Bonifacia Mercado, Damian Mercado and Emmanuel Mercado Bascug (petitioners) VS Spouses Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina (respondents) GR. No. 173987 By RJ Facts: The petitioners claim to be the owners of a 338 sq. meter parcel of land now owned by the respondents located in Poblacion, Maasin, Southern Leyte being the heirs of the original owners (late spouses) Santiago and Sofronia Mercado. Sometime in 1996, the respondents alleged that they have purchased the said land from Josefa Mercado, who bought it from Genivera Mercado Kavanaugh, who bought it from Escolastico Mercado who also bought it from Santiago Mercado (the original owner). The petitioners claim that all these contracts and transactions never happened and they asked the court to nullify the Transfer Certificate of Title and award them actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attys fees. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction because the petitioners failed to state the assessed value of the property and that the action is barred by prescription, and that the case holds no sufficient cause of action

because respondents are deemed to be in good faith because petitioners did not allege bad faith in their case.

21. SPOUSES DACUDAO vs GONZALES By Cybill

The RTC denied the motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, the case was brought to CA via certiorari assailing the orders of RTC. The CA has denied the case and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Petitioners have filed an Amended Complaint in the RTC to include the assessed value of the property. The respondents, on the other hand filed a motion to dismiss amended complaint due to prescription, laches, indefeasibility of title and lack of cause of action. The RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Respondents filed an action for certiorari before the CA assailing the latest ruling or the RTC. The CA GRANTED the petition and set aside the ruling of the RTC and enjoined it from the proceedings. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but such was denied. This is why the petitioners brought the case before the Supreme Court via PETITION for REVIEW on CERTIORARI. Issues: 1. Procedurally, WON CA erred in giving due course to respondents motion to dismiss the AMENDED COMPLAINT. [the petitioners claim that this is not right because the motion was filed beyond the period allowed by the Rules of Court] 2. Substantively, WON CA erred in ordering RTC to dismiss the case and enjoin it from the proceeding on the ground of indefeasibility of title, prescription/laches. [here the petitioners claim that the ground of indefeasibility of title in the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents is not an authorized ground under Rule 16 of the ROC] Held: 1. There is no dispute in the issue of timeliness. The issue in the amended complaint (re: the assessed value) cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because such was not raised in their comment when they filed the petition for certiorari. They only mentioned it in their motion for reconsideration. it is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. The court also said that the respondents have the right to file a motion to dismiss amended complaint because it is deemed that the original complaint is withdrawn and replaced by the amended one. 2. The court ruled that the case lacked sufficient cause of action because petitioners failed to alleged bad faith of the respondents. There was a mention of fraud in the course of the transactions but the petitioners did not allege that those were committed by respondents. Also, since this land is covered by the Torrens System, the respondents are not really compelled to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. When they got the title, it was a clean title (allegations of fraud pertained to an earlier purchase). They are considered innocent purchaser for value (again because there was no allegation to the contrary). Petition for review on certiorari is denied.

Facts: Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City. On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Issues: 1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus directly to the Court? 2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182? 3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violate petitioners constitutionally guaranteed rights? Held: 1. Dismissed. Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition. We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warrant, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse. Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, x x x x. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasijudicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

2. The Secretary of Justice did not act arbitrarily or oppressively against petitioners. DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of its validity. DO No 182 did not deprive petitioners in any degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong done against them by the Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners and others like them expedite the prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all those responsible for the wrong through the creation of the special panel of state prosecutors and prosecution attorneys in order to conduct a nationwide and comprehensive preliminary investigation and prosecution of the cases. 3. No. The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, the Secretary of Justice took into account the relative distance between Cagayan de Oro, where many complainants against the Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where the preliminary investigations would be conducted by the special panel. He also took into account that the cases had already been filed in the City Prosecutors Office of Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued DO No. 182. Given the considerable number of complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was fully justified in excluding the cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO No. 182. The classification taken into consideration by the Secretary of Justice was really valid.