People vs. Lua, 256 Scra 539: Facts
People vs. Lua, 256 Scra 539: Facts
People vs. Lua, 256 Scra 539: Facts
FACTS:
Pursuant to OPLAN SATURN, a program addressing the growing drug problem in Bagong Silang,
Caloocan City, a buy-bust operation was conducted by police operatives for the entrapment of Rolando
Lua.
On 30 March 1991, with the help of Ulysses Orlino, a police informer, who verified an illegal drug
activities in the vicin of Lua, two teams of police officers were formed, one to conduct the buy-bust operation,
and the other, to serve the search warrant on Hilario Talavera. Police Officers Constantino Guerrero, Marino
Puno, Jose Marte and Alfredo Antonio formed the buy-bust team. Guerrero was designated as poseur-
buyer. Before leaving the station Guerrero, in the presence of SPO3 Perfecto Sobejana and other
police officers, marked with X and his initials C.G. 3 P10-bills to be used in the entrapment of appellant.
Guerrero and his buy-bust team arrived at Bo. Sto. Nio at 4 oclock in the afternoon together with their
informant Ulyssess Orlino. Orlino pointed to Guerrero the appellant who was then outside the door of his
house. The team strategically positioned themselves near a neighboring house while Guerrero approached
accused-appellant Lua and said, Chekwa, pa score nga, and simultaneously handed him the 3 marked
P1O-bills. Appellant took the money and went inside his house. Shortly after, he returned with 3 small tea
bags of marijuana which he gave to Police Officer Guerrero. At this juncture, Guerrero signaled to his
companions to close in. He then grabbed appellant by the hand after introducing himself as a police officer
and arrested him. Guerrero recovered the marked money from the other hand of appellant.
When the rest of the team approached Guerrero and appellant Lua, PO Marino Puno noticed
something bulging from the waistline of appellant so he immediately frisked him. Puno lifted Lua’s shirt and
found a .38 cal. paltik in the latters possession. Guerrero who was standing beside the accused grabbed
the handgun which had two (2) live bullets and an empty shell in the cylinder. When Lua was asked where
he kept the rest of the marijuana he unhesitatingly replied that they were inside his house. Accompanied
by the police operatives, appellant went inside his house and in the presence of his wife pointed to the
police officers a soapbox containing a brick of dried marijuana. Puno showed the marijuana brick to those
around him including appellants household.
After the operation, appellant together with the pieces of evidence against him, namely, 3 marked P10-
bills with serial numbers RB886096, PF245345, QF260152; 3 tea bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams);
marijuana brick inside a soapbox (209.00 grams); and, a .38 cal. paltik with two (2) live bullets and an empty
shell, were surrendered to the team leader, SPO3 Perfecto Sobejana, and Lt. Surara who were both waiting
at the barangay hall. SPO3 Sobejana and Patrolmen Guerrero, Puno, Antonio and Marte jointly executed
a sworn statement on their operation.
HELD:
The buy-bust operation conducted by the police operatives is a form of entrapment allowed
by law. The arrest of the appellant was lawful having been caught in flagrante delicto. Consequently,
there is no need for a warrant for the seizure of the 3 tea bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams) the same
being the fruit of the crime. With respect to the body search made by Puno, the same was valid being
incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore, the .38 cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets and the empty shell
found in the cylinder are admissible in evidence.
As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant’s house, the trial court correctly ignored it
apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the
warrantless search made inside appellants house became unlawful since the police operatives were not
armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under search made incidental to a lawful arrest, the
same being limited to body search and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that
which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant
was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner
portion of his house was within his reach or control.
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roque’s
leased residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the
documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s
office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-
Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and
that the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently
describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause
has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s
witness.
HELD: The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it is not incident to the
arrest. (AGNELLO vs. U.S. supra.) In this latter case, 269 U.S. 20 at 30, it is said that the
officers have a right to make a search contemporaneously with the arrest. And if the purpose of
the officers in making their entry is not to make an arrest, but to make a search to obtain
evidence for some future arrest, then search is not incidental to arrest. BYARS vs. U.S. 273
U.S., 28 ET AL. (Papani vs, U. S. 84 F 2d 160, 163) In the instant case, petitioners were
arrested at the intersection of Mayon St. and P. Margall St. at 11:30 A.M. of August 6. 1976.
The search, on the other hand, was conducted after the arrest, that was at around 12:00 noon
of the same day. How far or how many kilometers is that place from the place where petitioner
was arrested do not appear shown by the record. But what appears undisputed is that the
search was made in a place other than the place of arrest and, not on the occasion of nor
immediately after the arrest. It cannot be said, therefore, that such a search was incidental to
the arrest of the petitioners.
October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence
Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a passenger jeepney that was
about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent described a
backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top
thereof. He found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other passengers about the
owner of the bag, but no one know.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with other passengers.
Unfortunately, he did not noticed who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few
moments later that the said bag and 3 other bags were already being carried away by two (2) women. He
caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest,
but on the women got away.
DOCTRINES:
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: The right of the People to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
1. This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the
vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
2. This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to
an extension search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
MALUM PROHIBITUM
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership
thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.
Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defence. Lack of criminal intent and good
faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charge is malum prohibitum.
164. ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 588
Facts:
Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila
to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something to another person.
After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked
him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more
marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they
found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters
where he was charged of possession of prohibited drugs.
Issue:
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense . . . “
Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagrante as a result
of a buy bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the
illegal trade of drugs within the area. The police officer saw petitioner handling over something to an
alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His
arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bag of marijuana seized were admissible in
evidence, being fruits of the crime.
Facts An undercover officer attempted to buy alcohol, during Prohibition, from Carroll. That transaction
was never completed. Months later, the same officer recognized Carroll and his vehicle as it was
traveling along a Michigan highway. The officer pursued Carroll, pulled him over, and conducted a
warrantless search of his vehicle. Inside, officers found sixty-nine quarts of whiskey. The United States
convicted Carroll of violating the Volstead Act and the Eighteenth Amendment. Carroll appealed, citing
the warrantless search of the automobile as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Ruling The court upheld warrantless searches of automobiles when probable cause existed for such a
search – i.e. reasonable belief that the automobile to be searched contains evidence of a crime. The
court noted the differences between automobiles and fixed structures such as buildings. Automobiles
are mobile by nature and can be hidden or moved out of the jurisdiction before a warrant could be
procured. As such there are times when requiring a warrant to search a vehicle may be impracticable. As
applied in this case, the court affirmed Carroll’s conviction, holding that the officer had probable cause
to search his vehicle
166. PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING, 190 SCRA 122
FACTS:
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group of the CIS received a tip from one of its informers about an
organized group engaged in importation of illegal drugs and smuggling of contraband items. To infiltrate
the crime syndicate, they recruited confidential men and “deep penetration agents” under OPLAN
SHARON 887. One such agent was Reynaldo Tia (the dicharged/accused). As an agent, he submitted
regular reports of undercover activities of suspected syndicates. CAPTAIN PALMERA, head of oplan
sharon 887, in turned informed the Dangerous Drugs Board of Tia’s activities.
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat by another agent named George. Lim wanted a
male travelling companion for his business trips abroad. Tia offered his services and was hired by Lim.
Later, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (alias of accused/appellant Lo Ho Wing), the later turning out to be
Tia’s intended companion.
Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left for Hongkong on October 4, 1987. Tia telephoned Capt. Palmera that
they would return to the Philippines on October 6. From Hongkong, the two proceeded to Guangzhou in
mainland China. There, appeallant Lo Ho Wing bought six (6) cans of tea.Tia saw these 6 bags when they
were opened for examination. That evening, they went to Lo Ho Wing’s room and he saw two other
men with him. One was fixing the tea bags, while the other was burning a substance on a piece of
aluminum foil using a lighter. Appellant Lo Ho Wing joined the second man and sniffed the smoke
emitted by the burning substance. When Tia asked Lo Ho Wing what cargo they would bring to Manila,
the latter replied that they would be bringing Chinese drugs.
The next day en route to Manila, customs examiners inspected the bags containing the tin cans of tea.
Since the bags were not closely examined, appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia were cleared. In Manila, They
were met by Lim Cheng Huat. Appelant Lo Ho Wing and Tia boarded a taxi from the airport and loaded
their luggage in the taxi’s compartment. Lim Cheng Huat followed them in another taxi.
Meamwhile, a team composed by Capt. Palmera positioned themselves in strategic areas around the
airport. The CIS men who first saw Lo Ho and Tia followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the CIS car
overtook the taxi ridden by Lo Ho Wing and Tia , forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. The CIS team
asked the taxi driver to open the baggage compartment. The CIS team asked permission to search their
luggage.
A tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment. Sgt. Cayabyab of the CIS pried the lid open and
pressed it in the middle to pull out the contents. Crystalline white powder resmbling crushed alum came
out. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three travelling bags opened
for inspection. All the bags threshed out a total of six tin cans. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS
headquarters for questioning. Meanwhile, the second taxi carrying Lim Cheng Huat sped in attempt to
escape. However, they were later captured.
Samples from the bag tested positive for metamphetamine. The three suspects were indicted for
violating Art. III, sec.15 of the Dangerous Drug Act. Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng Huat were
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25,000 each. Reynaldo Tia was discharged as
a state witness. The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of government agents since the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties were in their favor.
ISSUES:
Ruling:
The search and seizure supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. As set forth in Manipon, Jr.
v. Sandiganbayan, there are at least 3 well-recognized exceptions, namely: (a) a search incidental to an
arrest, (b) a search of a moving vehicle, and (c) seizure of evidence in plain view. In the case at bar,
there is a clear showing that the search in question, having been made in a moving vehicle, does not
need a valid warrant to effect search.
A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought.
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command
(NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet ordered his men to set up
a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent
reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC
Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and
that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a
bulge on Malmstedt- a Swedish national on his waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused
waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it
was that was bulging on his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when
accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he
alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the
bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented
his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy
contained also hashish.
Issue:
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the
search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing
provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be
searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to
Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a
search warrant.
FACTS: On 1 April 1990, Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID), acting on information that a
huge pile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of Mustang Lumber,
conducted a surveillance at Mustang lumberyard. The team saw a truck loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber coming out of the lumberyard. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and
transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at DENR
compound. On 3 April 1990, RTC Valenzuela issued a search warrant. On same day, the team seized
from the lumberyard narra shorts, trimmings and slabs, narra lumber, and various species of lumber and
shorts. On 4 April 1990, team returned to lumberyard and placed under administrative seizure (owner
retains physical possession of seized articles, only an inventory is taken) the remaining lumber because
Mustang Lumber failed to produce required documents upon demand. Upon recommendation of SAID
Chief Robles, DENR Sec Factoran suspended Mustang Lumber’s permit and confiscated in favor of the
gov’t the seized articles. Mustang Lumber filed for a TRO against Factoran and Robles, and questioned
the validity of the April 1 and 4 seizure. RTC held that the warrantless seizure on April 1 is valid as it
comes within the exceptions where warrantless seizure is justified (search of a moving vehicle), and
April 4 seizure was also valid pursuant to the search warrant issued on April 3. CA affirmed. Mustang
lumber filed a petition for review on certiorari.
HELD: Yes. The search and seizures made on April 1, 3, 4 were all valid. (1) April 1 search was conducted
on a moving vehicle, which could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant. (2) The search on
April 4 was a continuation of the search on April 3 done under and by virtue of the search warrant
issued on 3 April 1990 by Exec Judge Osorio. Under ROC Rule 126 Sec 9, a search warrant has a lifetime
of 10 days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose
cannot be accomplished in 1 day, the same may be continued the following day or days until completed,
provided it is still within the 10-day period.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is denied. CA did not commit any reversible error in affirming RTC judgment.
Search and seizure done was valid.
Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes
169. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857
FACTS:
November 4, 1966 – having received information the day before that a certain shipment of misdeclared
and undervalued personal effects would be released from the customs zone of the port of Manila,
Alagao and aduly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs conducted surveillance of two trucks
allegedly carrying the goods. When the trucks left the customs zone, elements of the counter-
intelligence unit intercepted them in Ermita. The trucks and the nine bales of goods they carried were
seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation those claiming ownership showed the
policemen a “Statement of Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501” issued by the
Bureau of Customs in the name of one Bienvenido Naguit.
Mago filed with the CFI of Manila a Petition for Mandamus with restraining order or preliminary
injunction, alleging that she was the owner of the goods seized, which were purchased from Sta. Monica
Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga. She hired the trucks owned by Lanopa (who filed with her) to bring
the goods to her residence in Sampaloc, Manila. She complained that the goods were seized without a
warrant, and that they were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code
even if they were misdeclared and undervalued because she had bought them without knowing they
had been imported illegally. They asked that the police not open the bales, the goods be returned, and
for moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Whether a police officer could seize imported goods without a search warrant?
HELD: Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure
without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require
said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section
2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse,
store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or
aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said
cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be
entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." It is our
considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws.
In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their
own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which
or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced
into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or
beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had
probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same,
and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture.
170. Pedro Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16
FACTS:
Respondent Ricardo Santos brought into this country Mercury automobile, model 1957.
Petitioner Pedro Pacis, acting Collector of Customs, on July 22, 1964 received from the
Administrator, General Affairs Administration of the Department of National Defense, a letter to
the effect that the Land Transportation Commission reported that such automobile was a “hot
car.” By virtue thereof, petitioner, through his subordinates, looked into the records of his office.
Thus he did ascertain that although the amount of P311.00 was already paid for customs duty,
the amount collectible on said car should be P2,500.00, more or less. Based on such
discrepancy, on July 22, 1964, he instituted seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of
seizure and detention. On the strength thereof, the automobile was taken while it was parked on
Economia Street, Manila, and was then brought to the General Affairs Administration
compound.
Then on August 26, 1964, respondent Ricardo Santos, through counsel, wrote to the petitioner
asking that such warrant of seizure and detention issued against his car be withdrawn or
dissolved and the car released on his contention that the issuance of the warrant was
unauthorized. Petitioner denied the request for the release of the car and adverting that the
petitioner had, under the law, authority to issue such warrant of seizure and detention. As a
result, respondent on September 15, 1964 filed a criminal complaint for usurpation of judicial
functions with the City Fiscal of Manila.
ISSUE:
May petitioner effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a component court.?
RULING:
The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code
to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a
dwelling house and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced
into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said
cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said “dwelling house may
be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the
peace … .”. In this case the subject car was seized in a parking lot, not a dwelling house.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 15417 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Palawan in Criminal Case No.
10429 convicting petitioners of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substance penalized under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975.
The following facts were established by the prosecution: In September 1992, the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan received reports of illegal
fishing operations in the coastal waters of the city. In response to these reports, the city mayor
organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the police in the detection and apprehension of violators of
the laws on fishing.
On September 30, 1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, the Task Force Bantay Dagat reported to
the PNP Maritime Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by muro ami within the
shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and
members of the Task Force Bantay Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr., immediately proceeded to the
area and found several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B
Robinson within the seven-kilometer shoreline of the city.They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected
the boat with the acquiescence of the boat captain, Silverio Gargar. In the course of their inspection, the
police saw two foreigners in the captains deck. SPO3 Enriquez examined their passports and found them
to be mere photocopies. The police also discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted
fish weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat.[2] They checked the license of the boat
and its fishermen and found them to be in order. Nonetheless, SPO3 Enriquez brought the boat captain,
the crew and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further investigation.
At the city harbor, members of the Maritime Command were ordered by SPO3 Enriquez to
guard the F/B Robinson. The boat captain and the two foreigners were again interrogated at the PNP
Maritime Command office. Thereafter, an Inspection/Apprehension Report was prepared and the boat,
its crew and fishermen were charged with the following violations:
1. Conducting fishing operations within Puerto Princesa coastal waters without mayors permit;
The following day, October 1, 1992, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat captain to get random
samples of fish from the fish cage of F/B Robinson for laboratory examination. As instructed, the boat
engineer, petitioner Ernesto Andaya, delivered to the Maritime Office four (4) live lapu-lapu fish inside a
plastic shopping bag filled with water. SPO3 Enriquez received the fish and in the presence of the boat
engineer and captain, placed them inside a large transparent plastic bag without water. He sealed the
plastic with heat from a lighter.[4]
The specimens were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) sub-office in the city
for examination to determine the method of catching the same for record or evidentiary
purposes.[5] They were received at the NBI office at 8:00 in the evening of the same day. The receiving
clerk, Edna Capicio, noted that the fish were dead and she placed the plastic bag with the fish inside the
office freezer to preserve them. Two days later, on October 3, 1992, the chief of the NBI sub-office,
Onos Mangotara, certified the specimens for laboratory examination at the NBI Head Office
in Manila. The fish samples were to be personally transported by Edna Capicio who was then scheduled
to leave for Manila for her board examination in Criminology.[6] On October 4, 1992, Ms. Capicio, in the
presence of her chief, took the plastic with the specimens from the freezer and placed them inside two
shopping bags and sealed them with masking tape. She proceeded to her ship where she placed the
specimens in the ships freezer.
Capicio arrived in Manila the following day, October 5, 1992and immediately brought the
specimens to the NBI Head Office.On October 7, 1992, NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia Rosaldes conducted
two tests on the fish samples and found that they contained sodium cyanide.
In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City filed the complaint
at bar against the owner and operator of the F/B Robinson, the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc.,
represented by herein petitioner Richard Hizon, the boat captain, Silverio Gargar, the boat engineer,
Ernesto Andaya, two other crew members, the two Hongkong nationals and 28 fishermen of the said
boat.
Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. As defense, they claimed that
they are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to
engage in fishing. They alleged that they catch fish by the hook and line method and that they had used
this method for one month and a half in the waters of CuyoIsland.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MERE POSITIVE RESULTS TO THE TEST FOR THE PRESENCE OF SODIUM
CYANIDE IN THE FISH SPECIMEN, ALBEIT ILLEGALLY SEIZED ON THE OCCASION OF A WARRANTLESS
SEARCH AND ARREST, IS ADMISSIBLE AND SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE PETITIONERS CONVICTION OF THE
CRIME OF ILLEGAL FISHING.
Ruling:
Our constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of persons without a judicial
warrant. As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Some of these are: (1) a
search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving motor
vehicle; and (4) search in violation of customs laws.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws
have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted
on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this reality,
judicial authorities have not required a search warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and
seizure can be constitutionally effected.
The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery
laws. These vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting
ships of the Philippine Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery
laws.
We thus hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of
having engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were
properly admitted by the trial court. Moreover, petitioners failed to raise the issue during trial and
hence, waived their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said search and
seizure.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in
the area where the timber or forest products are found.
Que denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber
from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa and Elpidio Sabal. The PLTP
authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged
that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by the PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they
were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services. He also objected to the
admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as evidence against him. He contended that they were fruits of an
illegal search and seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also
ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellant is guilty for violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277.
Whether the constitutional rights of accused against unlawful searches and seizures were violated.
HELD:
1.Yes. The accused was given permit by the DENR to transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs
only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck
bearing plate number PAD-548 which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn
lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the outside. The lumber were placed
in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs which were placed on the top, sides and rear of
the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much aware that he
needed documents to possess and transport the lumber but could not secure one and, therefore,
concealed the lumber by placing the same in such a manner that they could not be seen by police
authorities by merely looking at the cargo.
Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes
an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
2. Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the
aforementioned right shall, among others, be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions.
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving
vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility
of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches
of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
The police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellant’s truck. The foregoing
circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive
search of appellants truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were
lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Abe Valdez was found guilty of Violating Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. SPO3 Marcelo Tipay
received a tip from unnamed informer about the presence of marijuana plantation in Nueva Vizcaya.
Alejandro Parungao, chief of police formed a team with Marcelo Tipay and gave them specific instructions
to uproot the marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator. The police went uphill and found the hut and saw 7
five-foot flowering marijuana plants in two rows. Valdez did not deny. The police them uprooted 7
marijuana plants which weighed 1.090 kilograms for analysis.
ISSUE:
Whether the search was illegal
HELD:
The court held the validity of the seizure because no search was made by the police team. The
marijuana plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew 5 feet tall it was visible from
afar. The seized marijuana plants were in plain view and it is treated as a warrantless search under the plain
view doctrine.
It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to the plantation site merely
to make a verification. When they found the said plants, it was too much to expect them to apply for a
search warrant. In view of the remoteness of the plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and
forth) and the dangers lurking in the area if they stayed overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate the
said plants upon discovery without any search warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot was not
legally occupied by the accused and there was no fence which evinced the occupant's desire to keep
trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect, hence, no search warrant was required
174. MICLAT, JR. VS. PEOPLE, GR No. 176077, August 31, 2011 ]
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of
the (CA, which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of (RTC), convicting Miclat of Violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Abraham C. Miclat, Jr. was charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165,
Upon arraignment, Miclat, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Inspector Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa
, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, NPD-
CLO, and PO3 Rodrigo Antonio of the Caloocan Police Station Drug Enforcement Unit. The
testimony of the police investigator, PO3 Fernando Moran, was dispensed with after petitioners
counsel admitted the facts offered for stipulation by the prosecution.
On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole witness. The testimony
of Abraham Miclat, Sr. And Ma. Concepcion Miclat, the father and sister, respectively, of the
petitioner was dispensed with after the prosecution agreed that their testimonies were corroborative
in nature.
Evidence for the Prosecution
First to testify for the prosecution was P/Insp. Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa, who, on the
witness stand, affirmed his own findings in Physical Science Report that per qualitative
examination conducted on the specimen submitted, the white crystalline substance
weighing 0.05 gram, 0.06 gram, 0.07 gram, and 0.06 gram then contained inside four (4)
separate pieces of small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets gave positive result to the
test for Methyl amphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Also, thru the testimony of PO3 Rodrigo, the prosecution further endeavored to establish
the following:
At about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, P/Insp. Jose Valencia of the
Caloocan City Police Station-SDEU called upon his subordinates after the (sic) receiving
an INFOREP Memo from Camp Crame relative to the illicit and down-right drug-trading
activities being undertaken along Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving
Abe Miclat, Wily alias Bokbok and one Mic or Jojo (Exhs. E, E-1, and (sic) E-3, and E-4).
Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a surveillance team headed by SPO4 Ernesto Palting
and is composed of five (5) more operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit, namely:
PO3 Pagsolingan, PO2 Modina, PO2 De Ocampo, and herein witness PO3 Antonio. After
a short briefing at their station, the team boarded a rented passenger jeepney and proceeded
to the target area to verify the said informant and/or memorandum.
When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring II, Caloocan City at
around 3:50 oclock that same afternoon, they were [at] once led by their informant to the
house of one Alias Abe. PO3 Antonio then positioned himself at the perimeter of the house,
while the rest of the members of the group deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small
opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance
of 1 meters, he saw Abe arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed
to be containing shabu. Slowly, said operative inched his way in by gently pushing the door
as well as the plywood covering the same. Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith
introduced himself as a police officer while Abe, on the other hand, after being informed
of such authority, voluntarily handed over to the former the four (4) pieces of small plastic
sachets the latter was earlier sorting out. PO3 Antonio immediately placed the suspect
under arrest and brought him and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance to their headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Fernando Moran
for proper disposition. The suspect was identified as Abraham Miclat y Cerbo a.k.a ABE,
19 years old, single, jobless and a resident of MaginhawaVillage, Palmera Spring II,
Bagumbong, Caloocan City.[4]
On the other hand, the [petitioner] has a different version of the incident completely
opposed to the theory of the prosecution. On the witness stand, he alleged that at about 4:00
oclock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, while he, together with his sister and father,
were at the upper level of their house watching the television soap Cindy, they suddenly
heard a commotion downstairs prompting the three (3) of them to go down. There already
inside were several male individuals in civilian clothes who introduced themselves as
raiding police operatives from the SDEU out to effect his (Abe) arrest for alleged drug
pushing. [Petitioner] and his father tried to plead his case to these officers, but to no avail.
Instead, one of the operatives even kicked [petitioner] at the back when he tried to resist
the arrest. Immediately, [petitioner] was handcuffed and together with his father, they were
boarded inside the police vehicle. That on their way to the Bagong Silang Police Station,
PO3 Pagsolingan showed to [petitioner] a small piece of plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substances allegedly recovered by the raiding police team from their house. At
around 9:00 oclock in the evening, [petitioner] was transferred to the Sangandaan
Headquarters where he was finally detained. That upon [petitioners] transfer and detention
at the said headquarters, his father was ordered to go home.[5]
On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established all the elements of
the offense charged, rendered a Decision convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article
II of RA No. 9165,
Let the 0.24 gram of shabu subject matter of this case be confiscated and forfeited in favor
of the Government and to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for
proper disposition.
Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, which appeal. On October 13, 2006,
the CA rendered a Decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC, (DISMISSED)
In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the
evidence presented by the prosecution were all admissible against him. Moreover, it was
established that he was informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. Hence, the
CA opined that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements necessary
for the conviction of the petitioner for the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE:
WHETHER PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-COVERED WINDOW IS WITHIN THE
MEANING OF PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE FOR A WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO BE
LAWFUL.
HELD:
The right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial
exceptions, namely:
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have
that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant
and may be introduced in evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully
make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view
the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. Since petitioners arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before
effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the
results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioners guilt of
the offense charged.
175. ELENITA FAJARDO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011
In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operations Group
(PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt.
Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of concerned citizens, that armed men drinking liquor at the
residence of petitioner were indiscriminately firing guns. Along with the members of the Aklan Police
Provincial Office, the elements of the PISOG proceeded to the area. Upon arrival thereat, they noticed
that several persons scampered and ran in directions. The responding team saw Valerio holding two .45
caliber pistols. He fired shots at the policemen before entering the house of petitioner.
Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the waistband of her shorts,
after which, she entered the house and locked the main door. To prevent any violent commotion, the
policemen desisted from entering petitioners house but, in order to deter Valerio from evading
apprehension, they cordoned the perimeter of the house as they waited for further instructions from
P/Supt. Mendoza. A few minutes later, petitioner went out of the house and negotiated for the pull-out
of the police troops. No agreement materialized. At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002,
Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio Nava (SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the house,
saw Valerio emerge twice on top of the house and throw something. The discarded objects landed near
the wall of petitioners house and inside the compound of a neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava, together
with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega), radio announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as
witness, recovered the discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol,
model no. M1911A1 US, with serial number (SN) 763025, and model no. M1911A1 US, with a defaced
serial number. The recovered items were then surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1 Tan), Group
Investigator, who utilized them in applying for and obtaining a search warrant. The warrant was served
on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with a barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and members of the
media, as witnesses, the police team proceeded to search petitioners house. The team found and was
able to confiscate the following:
2. Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and
Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to possess the
confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal information for violation of P.D. No.
1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against them.
For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search warrant was
defective because the allegation contained in the application filed and signed by SPO1 Tan was not
based on his personal knowledge. They further asserted that the execution of the search warrant was
infirm since petitioner, who was inside the house at the time of the search, was not asked to accompany
the policemen as they explored the place, but was instead ordered to remain in the living room (sala).
No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons ,houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III,
Section 2, of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article:
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence obtained
through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under any of the following circumstances:
(1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a right to be in the
position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery
of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he
can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery
inadvertent.
Ruling:
Yes, the receivers are admissible as evidence in court. The receivers were seized in
plain view which is an exception to the rule that evidence that has been obtained
through warrantless arrest and seizure is inadmissible. Prior to the seizure, the law
enforcement officer lawfully made an intrusion and was in aposition from which he
can particularly view the area. In the course of lawful intrusion, heinadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating to the accused. The evidence was also
open to the eye and hand and its discovery was inadvertent
Facts:
Petitioner's automobile had been seen leaving the site of the robbery. The car was traced and petitioner was
arrested as he was entering it, near his home. After a cursory search of the car, the arresting officer took petitioner
to a police station. The police decided to impound the car as evidence, and a crane was called to tow it to the
precinct. It reached the precinct about an hour and a quarter after petitioner. At this moment, the windows of the
car were open and the door unlocked. It had begun to rain.
A regulation of the Metropolitan Police Department requires the officer who takes an impounded vehicle in charge
to search the vehicle thoroughly, to remove all valuables from it, and to attach to the vehicle a property tag listing
certain information about the circumstances of the impounding. Pursuant to this regulation, and without a
warrant, the arresting officer proceeded to the lot to which petitioner's car had been towed, in order to search the
vehicle, to place a property tag on it, to roll up the windows, and to lock the doors. The officer entered on the
driver's side, searched the car, and tied a property tag on the steering wheel. Stepping out of the car, he rolled up
an open window on one of the back doors. Proceeding to the front door on the passenger side, the officer opened
the door in order to secure the window and door. He then saw the registration card, which lay face up on the
metal stripping over which the door closes. The officer returned to the precinct, brought petitioner to the car, and
confronted petitioner with the registration card. Petitioner disclaimed all knowledge of the card. The officer then
seized the card and brought it into the precinct. Returning to the car, he searched the trunk, rolled up the
windows, and locked the doors.
Held: The card was subject to seizure and introducible in evidence, since it was not discovered by means of a
search in the technical sense, but was plainly visible to the officer who had a right to be in a position of viewing it.
The admissibility of evidence found as a result of a search under the police regulation is not presented by this case.
The precise and detailed findings of the District Court, accepted by the Court of Appeals, were to the effect that
the discovery of the card was not the result of a search of the car, but of a measure taken to protect the car while
it was in police custody. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant in these narrow
circumstances.
Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card, with the name of the robbery victim on it, was
plainly visible. It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence
178. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547
Facts:
The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members
in Dagupan City.They put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie, sister
of someone whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor
of Rosemarie, who stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza alias “Basilio Damaso”,
the appellant.Together with Morados, they reached the house of Damaso where they saw
Luz Tanciangco, a helper. Tanciangco then allowed the group to enter inside the house.
The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant when
the latter was absent.They requested the persons in the house to allow them to look
around. In one of the rooms, they saw subversive materials which they confiscated.They
likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation and
the persons revealed that Damaso was the lessee of the house and owned the items
confiscated. Based on this, Damaso was charged with illegal possession of firearms.
Held:
No. The Court ruled that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements
of a valid search and seizure. None of these exceptions for a warrantless search is
present in this case.
Moreover, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the person whose rights are invaded
or 2) one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
In this case, the records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz,
his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter. There was no evidence that would
establish the fact that Luz was indeed Damaso’s helper or if it was true that she was his
helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his absence. Being a
helper, she does not qualify as a person authorized to waive such right in representation
of her employer.
Thus, the search being invalid for lack of warrant, the evidence obtained thereafter
is inadmissible.
Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 by the Regional Trial Court of Manila was
appellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan, after having been found guilty of unlawfully selling “shabu,” in
violation of Section 15 of Article III in relation to Section 2(e-2), (f), (m), and (o) of Article 1 of “The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972” (R.A. 6425).
Velasco was apprehended in a buy-bust operation in the afternoon of June 28, 1991. Velasco was
caught in flagrante delicto as she was handing shabu to a designated poseur-buyer. Five more decks
were found in her pockets.
Appellant argues that the court erred in admitting the said decks of shabu as evidence against her since
those were acquired through a warrantless arrest. Hence, its inadmissibility. Secondly, appellant
questions the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case given the quantity allegedly obtained in her possession.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the decks of shabu are inadmissible as evidence for having been acquired through a
warrantless arrest.
2.) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
1.) Yes. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that an arrest when done
lawfully either by a peace officer or any private person may be done if the person to be arrested is
actually committing, has committed or attempting to commit an offense.
Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto thus her denial and defense of frame-up cannot be justified
under the said provision. Moreover, appellant failed to establish that the members of the buy-bust team
are policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous caprice when they entrapped her.
2.) Yes. The enforcement of R.A. 7659, which amended the penalty provided for in R.A. 6425, agrees
with the appellants argument that under the foregoing directive, since the amount of shabu involved in
the instant case is only 0.8020 gram, the proper imposable component penalty is prision correccional to
be applied in its medium period, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Applying
the indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum shall be taken from the medium of prision correccional,
which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor, the range of
which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.”
R.A. 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The said act vested these courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years. However, R.A. 7691 shows that
retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from
an express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as having retroactive application to criminal
cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity. RTC’s jurisdiction to proceed
to the final determination of the cause is not affected by the new legislation.
At the time that the case against appellant was filed, the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the
offense charged in as much as Section 39 of R.A 6425. In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over
the case of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425 before
amendment) when the information was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the
action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior
courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in nature
Read also:
180. PEOPLE VS. Leangsiri 252 SCRA 213
Suchinda Leangsiri was arrested in the NAIA in the act of bringing into the country approximately
more than * kilo of heroin. In his arrest, he informed the arresting officers that the heroin is meant to
deliver to three other people in Las Palmas Hotel in Manila. Immediately, the NARCOM formed a
group for a follow up operation in the said Hotel. In the accused’s cooperation, he was allowed to
check in to Room 504, where the others will meet him to give the drugs. Around 10 pm, Amidu two
other co-appellants entered Room 504 and Leagsiri gave them the drugs, before the appellants leave
the room, the NARCOM officers barged in and arrested the appellants. Amidu, told the officers that
he is staying in Rm 413 and that the two others are in royal Palm Hotel. The officers then went to the
room of Amidu, searching for evidence and subsequently confiscated a telephone address bearing
the name of Leangsiri, other possessions and documents of Amidu were also confiscated. In the case
of the two other, the police confiscated a suit case and masking tape and empty transparent bag,
allegedly will be use in transporting the drugs. The appellants were charged and was convicted in
conspiring to transport heroin violative of RA 6425. Hence this petition, alleging that the search is
illegal being conducted not in the direct premises of the arrest.
Issue:
Whether the articles sought in the other room and hotel, outside the direct premises of the
arrest admissible as evidence?
Held:
No. those article are inadmissible as evidence as it was obtained not in plan view nor within
the direct premises of the arrest. The plain view doctrin applies to OBJECTS OF THE PLAIN VIEW OF
AN OFFICER WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO BE IN THE POSITION TO HAVE THAT VIEW ARE SUBJECT TO
SEIZURE AND MAYBE PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE. Thus, what can be admitted are evidences seized
within the direct premise where the accused has an immediate control which should only be Rm. 509.
In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper
bearing Leangsiri's name was obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel,
and found tucked within the pages of appellant Amidu's telephone and address book. Clearly, the
warrantless search is illegal and the piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name cannot be admitted as
evidence against appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however, exculpate
appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecution's case against appellants. The remaining
evidence still established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
A Valid waiver of right in Sec 2 art III, elements
(1) The right to be waived is existing
(2) The person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive
(3) He or she has actual intention to relinquish the right.
Facts:
After the gruesome killing of Patronicia Caburao, the investigating police went to the residence of the
accused-appellant, Baula et al. In the process of questioning the appellants, the police saw bloodstained
bolo, short pants, polo shirts and was subsequently confiscated without search warrant and directed to
the NBI for forensic exams. The exam resulted that the bloods found in the confiscated articles bears the
same blood type “O” as that of the victim. Thus, the accused were arrested, charged and was convicted
in the crime of murder by the RTC Lingayen and sentenced to suffer RP. Hence this appeal for review on
the decision of the lower court in the ground that the articles sought (bloodstained bolo, shirt and short
pants) cannot be admitted as evidence against the accused since it was seized without a valid search and
seizure warrant.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search conducted was valid under a consented search
Held: No. The articles are unlawfully searched and seized. A search incidental to a valid arrest is
one of the statutory exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search and seizure shall
be effected without a valid warrant. In this instance, the arrest should be lawful before search
and seizure by the arresting officer would be conducted. A warrantless arrest may be effected
by the arresting officer when in his presence the person arrested is have committed,
committing or attempting to commit the crime. It cannot be reversed; otherwise, it would
unlawful and unconstitutional and the seized article would be inadmissible evidence.
In the case at bar, Accused-appellants were not being arrested at the time that the subject articles were
allegedly taken from them but were just being questioned by the police officers conducting the
investigation about the death of Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating officers had no personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed the crime. Being in no position to effect a
warrantless arrest, the police officers were thus likewise barred from effecting a warrantless search and
seizure. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the
evidence yielded by that search. The Court finds it less than credible the stance of the prosecution that
the polo shirt and short pants have been voluntarily given. An alleged consent to a warrantless search
and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This
presumption, by itself, cannot prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and
zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself
abhors.
Thus, the bloodstained polo, bolo and shorts are inadmissible as evidence.
Facts: On April 12, 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP, acting
upon a directive issued by Metrodicom Commander Col. Franco Calida, raided the house of
herein petitioners in Davao City on information that the said residence was being used as a safe
house of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did
not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant.
The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet conducted the search pursuant to the
authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. They recovered a.45 cal. handgun with a
magazine, a bag etc.
COS: Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions
in Furtherance of Rebellion)
Issues: Assuming the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1866 the respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion in admitting in evidence certain articles which were clearly inadmissible
for being violative of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Held: Yes. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of t
he 1987Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a
valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search
incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view
(People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No.88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]). None of these
exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners
is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers.
While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because he did
not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself
recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but
rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed
granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel
soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to
procure a search warrant but did not. Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms
is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se.
Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be
summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence,
the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were
confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be
used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal
possession of firearms.(Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that
there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita while there is no need of criminal
intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or
voluntariness there is no crime.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against the petitioners
for illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED.
Facts: Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained from the justice of the
peace of Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house
or store of the petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac, for “certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and
other papers relating to her activities as usurer.” The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit
given by the said Almeda.
On the same date, the said Mariano G. Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine
Constabulary, went to the office of the petitioner in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search
warrant to the petitioner’s bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without the presence of the petitioner
who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof
The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury
Board and thereafter were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed six
separate criminal cases against the herein petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.
While the Solicitor-General admits that, in the light of decisions of this court, the search warrant
was illegally issued, he maintains the waiver may be either express or implied. No express waiver
has been made in the case before us. It is urged, however, that there has been a waiver by
implication.
The legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal
cases and the devolution of the documents demanded. The respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s
motion for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of
the petitioner.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. It may be admitted that waiver may be the result of a failure to object within a reasonable time
to a search and seizure illegally made. However, the petitioner, on several occasions, and prior to
the filing of criminal actions against her, had demanded verbally, through counsel, the return by
the Anti-Usuary Board of the properties seized.
It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear, first, that the
right exists; secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of
the existence of such right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.
It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. She could
not have objected because she was sick and was not present when the warrant was served upon
Alfredo Salas.
Of course, the petitioner came to know later of the seizure of some of her papers and documents.
But this was precisely the reason why she sent her attorneys to the office of the Anti-Usuary Board
to demand the return of the documents seized. In any event, the failure on the part of the petitioner
and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied
waiver of constitutional right.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1964, the petitioner and Reparations Commission entered into a conditional
contract, subject to the condition that the title to and ownership of the vessel shall remain with the
Commission until full payment. Later on, petitioner entered into a contract with one Tomas
Velasco, authorizing the latter to supervise and manage the M/V JOLO LEMA. The vessel
however was apprehended, searched and then seized by the Collector of Customs. A Seizure
Identification proceeding was instituted against said vessel for smuggling into the Philippines
1,408 sacks of Indonesian copra and 86 sacks of Indonesian coffee beans, in violation of Section
2530 (a) and (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. This appeal taken by Lopez
directly to the Supreme Court, upon the ground that only questions of law would be taken up
therein. The seizure was therefore declared lawful by the Court of Tax Appeals, and its decision
was affirmed by us.
The only question remaining is about the search of the hotel room, the petition alleged
that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September 19, 1966, when the vessel was searched,
a combined team of Constabulary and Regional Anti-Smuggling Center operatives headed by
NBI agent Earl Reynolds raided the hotel room then being rented by petitioner Tomas Velasco
without any search warrant and in the absence at the time of such petitioner Tomas Velasco or
the presence of any other person, except one Teofila Ibañez, a mere manicurist of Davao City by
occupation and "forcibly opened luggages and boxes from which only several documents and
papers were found, then seized, confiscated and took away the same."
ISSUE:
Whether in this instance there was consent on the part of the person who was the
occupant of the hotel room then rented by petitioner Velasco.
RULING:
Respondents, as previously noted, contend that there was such consent. They so alleged
in their answer. Their memorandum would stress it further in these words: "Here the wife of
petitioner Tomas Velasco, upon being informed of the purpose of the search by the officers,
invited them to enter and search the hotel room and even voluntarily gave the documents and
things requested by said officers. This fact could be gleaned from the following records of the two
seizure cases involving the vessel M/V Jolo Lema and its cargo of Indonesian copra and coffee.
There was a person inside who from all indications was ready to accede to their request.
Even common courtesy alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to why
she was there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can readily be concluded that there was
consent sufficient in law to dispense with the need for a search warrant. The petition cannot,
therefore, prevail.
The group of Lt. Quijardo was sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Dagupan City. They
put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie, sister of someone whom they earlier
arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie, who stated that she worked
with Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso, the appellant. Together with Morados, they reached the
house of Damaso where they saw Luz Tanciangco, a helper. Tanciangco then allowed the group to enter
inside the house. The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant
when the latter was absent. They requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. In
one of the rooms, they saw subversive material (M14 Rifle on top of a table )which they confiscated.
They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation and the
persons revealed that Damaso was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated.Based on
this, Damaso was charged with illegal possession of firearms.
Issue:
Resolution:
The Court ruled that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and
seizure. None of these exceptions for a warrantless search is present in this case. Moreover, the
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one, cannot be
waived by anyone except 1) the person whose rights are invaded or 2) one who is expressly authorized
to do so in his or her behalf. In this case, the records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time
Luz, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter. There was no evidence that would establish the
fact that Luz was indeed Damaso’s helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that Damaso had
given her authority to open his house in his absence. Being a helper, she does not qualify as a person
authorized to waive such right in representation of her employer. Thus, the search being invalid for lack
of warrant, the evidence obtained thereafter is inadmissible.
Note: Seizure of the gun cannot be justified under the “plain view” doctrine because they were looking
for evidence at that time and something was done before they saw it. It was not inadvertently found.