STUDY GUIDE

Disarmament and International Security (DISEC)

Topic A: Review of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Topic B: Controlling the use of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles

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Table of Contents
1. Introduction to the First Committee of the General Assembly: ..................................................... 1 2. A message from your directors .......................................................................................................... 2 3. Topic A: Review of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty............................................................................ 3 3.1 Introduction to the Topic ................................................................................................................ 3 3.2 The Situation so Far ....................................................................................................................... 4 3.2.1 Historical Development .......................................................................................................... 4 3.2.2. Recent Development & The Current State of Affairs ........................................................... 6 3.2.2.1. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty .............................................................. 6 3.2.2.2. Nuclear Weapon Testing ............................................................................................... 8 3.2.2.3. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) ........................ 9 3.3. What Needs to be Addressed ...................................................................................................... 10 3.4. States with Particular Interest & Bloc Positions ......................................................................... 11 3.5. Key Questions ............................................................................................................................. 13 3.6. Further Reading ........................................................................................................................... 13 4. Topic B: Controlling the use of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles ............................................... 14 4.1. Introduction to the topic .............................................................................................................. 14 4.2. The Situation so Far .................................................................................................................... 14 4.3. What needs to addressed ............................................................................................................. 15 4.3.1. Recommendations to the Security Council ......................................................................... 15 4.3.2. Controlling the Proliferation ................................................................................................ 15 4.3.3. Restricting the Employment ................................................................................................ 16 4.3.4. The Laws of War ................................................................................................................. 17 4.3.5. The Right to Self-Defense & Questions of Sovereignty ..................................................... 18 4.4. States with particular interests..................................................................................................... 18 4.5. Key Questions ............................................................................................................................. 20
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4.6. Further Reading ........................................................................................................................... 21 5. Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 22 6. A Gentle Request .............................................................................................................................. 24

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1. Introduction to the First Committee of the General Assembly:

Esteemed Delegates, Welcome to LIMUN 2013, its a pleasure to have you join us in the First Committee of the General Assembly, there where we shall enjoy constructive debate on matters of Disarmament and International Security (DISEC). When speaking of this entity, this thing called the United Nations (UN), one does not refer to a simple monolithic, single-faceted Non-Governmental Organization (NGO). Rather, one makes use of an umbrella term to denote a gigantic, intricate structure of various organs, bodies, agencies and institutions. Not for nothing is it the worlds largest and most prominent International NGO. Besides its myriad agencies like, for instance, the renowned World Bank Group , the UN is composed of six so-called principle organs, of which the General Assembly (GA) is one. The GA was established as per Chapter IV of the Charter (think of that as the UN constitution), its the one organ where all Members of the United Nation, 193 states, are equally represented. Although it possesses no authority its purpose is limited to making recommendations to member-states and the Security Council its universal representation equates it to a world parliament. As such its resolutions, though too often unheeded, command respect. The GA itself has several subsidiary organs that convene outside of plenary sessions, including six main committees. Ours is the First. Although GA1 existed long before, DISEC came into existence in 1993 upon the adoption of a GA resolution concerned with revitalizing the UN for greater efficiency. Its role is outlined in Article 11 of the Charter, it may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both. It convenes once a year to discuss issues of disarmament and security, all UN member-states are invited to attend with the power of one vote each. Resolutions pass by simple majority but those adopted by the individual committees are mere drafts for the whole GA to consider. Only full GA resolutions are official.

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2. A message from your directors

The First Committee chairs for the duration of this conference will be Sid Madan (Director), Zac Zurybida (Assistant Director) and Dal ten Hove (Assistant Director).

Sid Madan My name is Sid Madan, and I'm currently a fourth year Business Studies student at the University of Edinburgh. I'm also the President of Edinburgh Model United Nations and the Secretary General for ScotMUN 2013. Having attended many national and international conferences, I look back at LIMUN 2011 as one of the best conferences I've ever had the pleasure of attending. Getting the opportunity to chair at LIMUN 2013 is an absolute honour and I promise to make DISEC at LIMUN 2013 an exciting, scintillating and memorable experience for all delegates. We, the DISEC chairing team, have spent a good amount of time picking the best topic to be debated and eagerly await the 15 th of February 2013 to see you all!

Zac Zurybida My name is Zac, and Im in my second year studying history and war studies at Kings College London, before this I took the first year of music also at Kings. Ive been involved in MUN for about 18 months, and have been to a number of conferences, though LIMUN will be the largest conference Ive chaired at. Studying war studies, these topics are of particular interest to me, so Im eager to hear all your contributions. Ive no doubt well have great debating, and Im looking forward to getting to know you all!

Dal ten Hove Like Zac I attend Kings College London, where I study international politics & economics. I was raised in France but went to an international school in Amsterdam for the later part of my primary education. There, in 9th grade (year 10), I joined the MUN club and have been an avid practicer of the activity ever since, both as delegate and chair at conferences in England and the Netherlands. Ive particularly enjoyed MUN for it has helped me develop cosmopolitan values which I now hold dearly. It thus has much to convey and hopefully if you, Sid, Zac & I do our jobs well youll learn something valuable from LIMUN.

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3. Topic A: Review of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 3.1 Introduction to the Topic

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a multilateral treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons. By banning nuclear explosions, the treaty seeks to prevent the harmful effects of radioactive fall-out on society and the environment. The treaty also intends to prevent new countries from acquiring and testing nuclear weapons technology and discourage the production of new types of nuclear weapons. The CTBT puts international norms against testing into binding international law and represents a critical move toward nuclear disarmament. The treaty was opened for signature in September 1996, and has been signed by 183 states and ratified by 157. The treaty cannot enter into force until it is ratified by 44 specific states, eight of which have yet to do so: China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, Iran, Egypt and the United States of America. The nuclear test ban issue has been the first item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament since 1978 with good reason. The CTBT makes it very difficult for countries to develop nuclear bombs, or for countries that already have them, to make more powerful bombs. It also prevents the huge damage caused by radioactivity from nuclear explosions to life on Earth.

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3.2 The Situation so Far

3.2.1 Historical Development

The history of nuclear testing began early on the morning of 16 July 1945 at a desert test site in Alamogordo, New Mexico when the United States exploded its first atomic bomb. Designated as the Trinity Site, this initial test was the culmination of years of scientific research under the banner of the so-called Manhattan Project. The Soviet Union was soon to follow in 1949, the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960, and China in 1964. In the five decades between that fateful day in 1945 and the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, over 2,000 nuclear tests were carried out all over the world: The United States conducted 1,032 tests between 1945 and 1992. The Soviet Union carried out 715 tests between 1949 and 1990. The United Kingdom carried out 45 tests between 1952 and 1991. France carried out 210 tests between 1960 and 1996. China carried out 45 tests between 1964 and 1996.

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By the mid-1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union started conducting high-yield thermonuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere. The radioactive fallout from these tests gave rise to increasing international criticism, leading to the first victory for test-ban advocates: the Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) signed in 1963 banned nuclear testing in outer space, the atmosphere and under water, but not underground, and was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. However, France and China did not sign and conducted atmospheric tests until 1974 and 1980 respectively. While the PTBT reduced radioactive fallout, nuclear weapons testing not only continued - albeit underground - but also increased greatly in numbers. Another important milestone was reached in 1968 with the adoption of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), which laid the foundation of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing was discussed, but not agreed upon. Many attempts were made during the Cold War to negotiate a comprehensive test ban, but it was only in the 1990s that the Treaty became a reality. In 1994, the United Nations disarmament body, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, began formal negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which lasted until 1996. 183 countries have signed the Treaty, of which 157 have also ratified it (as of February 2012), including three of the nuclear weapon States: France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom. The last Annex 2 State to ratify the Treaty was Indonesia on 6 February 2012. These "Annex 2 states" are states that participated in the CTBTs negotiations between 1994 and 1996 and possessed nuclear power reactors or research reactors at that time. These States are also members of the Conference on Disarmament. After the CTBT was opened for signature in September 1996, about half a dozen nuclear tests have been conducted: India conducted two tests in 1998 (India had also conducted one so-called peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974.) Pakistan conducted two tests in 1998. The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea announced that it had conducted a nuclear test in 2006 and again in 2009.

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3.2.2. Recent Development & The Current State of Affairs

3.2.2.1. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty bans nuclear explosions by everyone, everywhere: on the Earth's surface, in the atmosphere, underwater and underground. The CTBT comprises a preamble, 17 articles, two annexes and a Protocol with two annexes. The preamble outlines the significance of the Treaty as an important nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament measure. Article I stipulates the basic obligations of the Treaty. It prohibits States Parties from carrying out any nuclear explosion. It also prohibits any encouragement of or participation in the carrying out of any nuclear explosion. Article II provides for the establishment of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna to ensure the Treaty's implementation as well as providing a forum for consultation and cooperation. Article III focuses on national implementation measures. Article IV elaborates on the global verification regime to monitor compliance with Treaty provisions. The regime is to comprise a global network of monitoring stations (the International Monitoring System), an International Data Centre in Vienna, a consultation and clarification process, On-site Inspections, and confidence-building measures. Article V outlines measures to redress a situation which contravenes the CTBT provisions and to ensure compliance with the Treaty. Article VI deals with the settlement of disputes that may arise concerning the application or the interpretation of the Treaty. Article VII is concerned with amendments to the Treaty. Article VIII stipulates when a review of the Treaty will take place after its entry into force. Article IX states that the Treaty is of unlimited duration. Article X deals with the status of the Protocol and the annexes. Article XI is concerned with signature of the Treaty. Article XII deals with ratification of the Treaty. Article XIII is about accession to the Treaty. Article XIV is about the Treaty's entry into force. This will take place 180 days after the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty have all ratified.
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Article XV specifies that the Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. Article XVI refers to the Depositary of the Treaty. Article XVII deals with the authenticity of Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish Treaty texts. As can be seen above, the CTBT itself includes a Protocol in three parts: Part I detailing the

International Monitoring System (IMS); Part II on On-Site Inspections (OSI); and Part III on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). There are also two Annexes to the Protocol: Annex 1 detailing the location of various Treaty monitoring assets associated with the IMS; and Annex 2 detailing the parameters for screening events. The Treaty provides for measures to redress a violation of the Treaty and to ensure compliance, including sanctions, and for settlement of disputes. Also, each Member State has the right to withdraw from the CTBT if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme national interests of the Member State.

The CTBT's extensive verification regime includes: an International Monitoring System, an International Data Centre, on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures. The International Monitoring System will be composed of four global monitoring regimes; 1) seismological, with 50 primary stations and 120 auxiliary stations; 2) radionuclide, with 80 stations monitoring particulates and 40 stations (to be extended to 80 in the future) monitoring noble gases; 3) hydro-acoustic,
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(monitoring for sound waves caused by a nuclear explosion in the ocean), with 11 stations; and 4) infrasound (monitoring for very low frequency sound waves in the atmosphere which could be caused by a nuclear explosion), with 60 stations. The International Data Centre, to be accessible to all States Parties, will receive, collect, process, analyse, report on, and archive data from International Monitoring System facilities. When North Korea tested in 2006 and 2009, the Member States received information about the location, magnitude, time and depth of the tests within two hours - and before the actual test had been announced by North Korea. On-site inspections, to determine whether a suspected nuclear explosion detected by the monitoring stations actually occurred, can have three phases: 1) over-flight/visual observation, photography, radioactivity measurement, environmental sampling, and passive seismic monitoring for aftershocks; 2) active seismic surveys, to locate underground anomalies, plus magnetic and gravitational field mapping, ground-penetrating radar surveys and electrical conductivity measurements; and 3) drilling to obtain radioactive samples. A large on-site inspection exercise was carried out in September 2008 in Kazakhstan and the next one is planned for 2014 in Jordan. The CTBT is frequently associated with another key element in the process of nuclear disarmament: a ban on the production of fissile material for anything other than verified peaceful use. Such a ban would impose a quantitative limit on the amount of nuclear material available for weapons use. That objective is the basis for an initiative at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to negotiate a treaty banning further production of fissile material for weapons purposes the draft Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Taken together, the CTBT and the FMCT are integral components of the nuclear control regime and provide the foundation for eventual nuclear disarmament. The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty.

3.2.2.2. Nuclear Weapon Testing The purpose of nuclear testing for military purposes is multifaceted. From a technical point of view, nuclear testing provides information on how well nuclear weapons work, how they behave under various conditions and how adjacent structures react to nuclear explosions. However, there is also the political aspect: that is, the importance of making a political statement of national, scientific and military pre-eminence.

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3.2.2.3. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Article II of the CTBT establishes the CTBTO, which ensures treaty implementation and provides states-parties with a forum for consultation and cooperation. It is an interim organization tasked with building up the verification regime of the CTBT in preparation for the Treaty's entry into force as well as promoting the Treaty's universality. The organization consists of a Conference of the States Parties, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat, with over 260 staff from over 70 countries. The organization, which is located in Vienna, is structurally independent from, but operating in collaboration with, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The CTBTO is financed mainly through assessed contributions by Member States and is headed by the Executive Secretary, Tibor Tth from Hungary. As of January 2011, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission has 79% of the IMS network installed. More than 250 stations are already transmitting data to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna via satellite-based global communications infrastructure. Procedures for on-site inspections and CBMs will be developed over time.

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3.3. What Needs to be Addressed

Firstly, any resolution on this agenda must address the issue of the CTBTs immediate enforcement by reaching mutual ground with non-signatories of the treaty and Annex 2 nations who havent ratified till date. Defining contributions required from Nations signatory to the CTBTO, in particular to assist the organisation ensure that the verification regime of the Treaty will be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty upon its entry into force, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Discuss the possibility of tabling the treaty and negotiating a new binding agreement acceptable to all member states of the UN, and especially those with nuclear-capabilities. Measures to encourage states to honour their commitments under the NPT by taking steps to speed-up the process of nuclear disarmament and enforcing tighter measures to control proliferation of nuclear technology. Further address measures to encourage states not signatory to the NPT to disarm and implement tighter controls on their nuclear arsenal with the aim to eventually disarm keeping a timeline in mind. Considering the possibility of fruitful unilateral, bilateral or multilateral negotiations between nations possessing nuclear capability which could potentially pave the way for the long-awaited enforcement of the CTBT.

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3.4. States with Particular Interest & Bloc Positions

The European Union (EU) Two of the most important elements of the EU's Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the early entry into force of the CTBT and the improvement of the capabilities and the operational performance of the CTBTO's monitoring and verification system. In pursuit of these objectives the EU provides financial support for specific projects conducted by the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO. The United States of America The United States conducted its last underground nuclear explosive test twenty years back in 1992. In 1999, the US Senate decided not to ratify the CTBT arguing that if the US ratified this treaty, it would not stop others trying to go nuclear and therefore the US should not ratify on the grounds of national security. However, experts believe that US ratification is the key, as China and India have stated they will ratify once the US does, and Pakistan would if India did. President Obama has advocated the benefits of signing the CTBT on more than one occasion in the last four years. The Peoples Republic of China China successfully tested its first nuclear weapon in October 1964. Since then, China has viewed test ban measures such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the US-Soviet Union-UK trilateral talks on nuclear test ban in the late 1970s, and the US-Soviet Union-UK Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) as measures designed by global hegemonies to lock China into a position of nuclear disadvantage while consolidating their own nuclear advantages. Experts believe that a comprehensive test ban would place greater constraints on China's nuclear program than on those of the others. Efforts such as a deeper reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the principal nuclear powers, a no-first-use commitment by all nuclear states, and the adherence to the ABM treaty by its signatories would be critical to reducing China's concerns. On 19 January 2011, during Chinese President Hu Jintao's official state visit to Washington DC, the United States and China released a joint statement declaring that "both sides support early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)" and "agreed to work together to achieve this goal."

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The Russian Federation, The Republic of France & The United Kingdom These three of the "big five" nuclear powers have shown support for the treaty by handing in their ratification to the CTBTO. The Republic of India & The Islamic Republic of Pakistan Both India and Pakistan, along with North Korea, have not signed the CTBT. The issue of Kashmir remains the cause of tensed political climate in both nations for decades now. India's argument against the CTBT was the perilous security environment in South Asia, in which India had limited options as a non-nuclear weapon state to deal with the lurking challenges from China's nuclear arsenal and Pakistan's nascent weapons program. Pakistan maintains a similar stand, emphasizing that Indias nuclear program remains a threat to their national security.

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3.5. Key Questions

Has your country ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? How does your country rate the usefulness and importance of this Treaty? Is it as essential in maintaining international peace as treaties like the NPT? Does your country believe that this issue can be negotiated with those whose pending ratification has stalled the enforcement of this Treaty? What compromises does your country think are appropriate to persuade these nations? Is there need for a new Treaty to be drafted or should the current CTBT be amended? How strong a threat to international security does your nation consider States like North Korea, India and Pakistan, who are non-signatories to this Treaty? What measures does your country deem most appropriate while engaging with nations stalling the enforcement of the CTBT?

3.6. Further Reading

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/CTBT.shtml The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treatys relevance to global security http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2488.pdf Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/CTBTBackground.pdf Project for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty http://www.projectforthectbt.org/ Department of State (United States of America) http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/ctb.html The Case for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/CTBTBrief.pdf Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization http://www.ctbto.org/

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4. Topic B: Controlling the use of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles

4.1. Introduction to the topic

The history of warfare is, evidently, a terrible bloody one, but also one of astounding technological development. Not so long ago the wars of Kings and Queens were played out by means of arrows, swords and catapults an almost darkly comedic thought for us who, nowadays, live in a world populated by fire arms, tanks, fighter jets, ballistic missiles, weaponised biological toxins, nuclear weapons and, unfortunately, much more. One such element of modern warfare is the so-called Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV), more commonly known as drone, which is, as the name suggests, an aerial vehicle that can launch missile attacks without requiring to be manned by a pilot. These UCAVs and their uses pose considerable challenges to international and human security for several reasons, hence the DISEC committee ought to discuss the possibility of international agreement on controlling their proliferation and restricting their employment. At present they are primarily used for the purpose of targeted killings the deliberate assassination of alleged enemy combatants by the United States, Israel and the United Kingdom.

4.2. The Situation so Far

The first combative use of an unmanned air vehicle was during the First Persian Gulf War, when Iran used one against Iraqi ground forces.1 More recently, the use of UCAVs has become more widespread and commonplace as part of the USAs War on Terror to carry out targeted killings, which regardless of method employed, is a controversial tactic in terms of legality. The US first admitted to targeted killing using a UCAV in 2002, over the desert near Sana, Yemen. 2 Since then the US has also employed UCAVs as part of Operation Enduring Freedom in the Horn of Africa, but most prominently, and controversially, in Pakistan, having carried out 350 UCAV attacks between 2004 and 2012.3 The United Kingdom has also carried out UCAV attacks as part of operations in Afghanistan4 and Israel in Palestinian territories and Sudan 5.
1 2

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2008. Alston, 2010, p. 7 3 The Bureau, 2012. 4 RUSI, 2008. 5 Fulghum, 2012

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The two principal multilateral regimes that address exports of UCAVs are the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar arrangement. The MTCR, established in 1987, is a voluntary association of 34 countries that share the goal of limiting the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles and UAVs capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The Wassenaar arrangement, established in 1996, is a voluntary association of 41 countries that share the goal of limiting the spread of certain conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use items having both civilian and military applications. To date, there has been relatively little discussion of UCAVs at the UN. Discussions which have taken place have been through the Human Rights Council, and have criticized the USAs use of UCAVs to carry out targeted killings due to the resulting civilian casualties.

4.3. What needs to addressed

4.3.1. Recommendations to the Security Council

Delegates should remember that, although DISEC and the GA have no legal authority, the Security Council (SC) does at least in theory. Its resolutions are binding to all Members of the United Nations. The significance thereof is that all resolutions on the proliferation and employment of UCAVs can demand that obligatory measures be taken by the SC. It should also be kept in mind, however, that there are five Veto Powers there with drones of their own including the US and UK. They will not necessarily oppose all binding measures to control UCAVs they have reputations to maintain and images to foster but they would oppose those that challenge their military interests excessively. Thus, theoreticall y, resolutions can make any suggestions to the SC and pass through both the DISEC committee and the GA; but, if the desired outcome is to make realistic recommendations, they ought to be sensible. (That does not need to be the desired outcome, however. It may be wise to first lay out the ideals of the GA detached from pragmatism, but maybe not thats open to interpretation.)

4.3.2. Controlling the Proliferation

In 2012, the United States Government Accountability Office reported that there had been a rapid increase in the proliferation of UAVs, from 41 in 2005, to 76 by the end of 2011 (the report
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contains a full list of countries known to have acquired UAV systems).6 But it is important to remember when dealing with the matter of proliferation that only a few of these states have acquired unmanned combat aerial vehicles, i.e. a UAV capable of attack. This will need to be considered during the debate, as non-combative aerial vehicles have numerous peaceful and commercial uses, such as in search and rescue missions and in environmental conservation efforts. Due to their lower cost, UCAVs are an alternative to warplanes for weaker states, and even non-state groups, such as terrorist organizations.7 As a larger UCAV would be more easily detected, and require greater technology and expertise to operate, terrorists are likely to use only small UCAVs, not capable of carrying a large amount of explosives. However, if they were able to equip UCAVs with even a small amount of chemical or biological weapons, an attack could be potentially lethal.8 Initially Israel possessed the most advanced UCAV programe in the world, but the US has now caught up and between them they are the two main exporters of UCAV technology worldwide. All of the P5 countries are known to posses UCAVs, along with a handful of others, and worldwide many states are seeking to develop their own UAV programmes. This may result in challenges to international security for non-power-projecting states may become power-projecting states, and utilize this newly acquired power to settle disputes. However, total non-proliferation of UCAV technology is not necessarily in a states interest as, if shared with allies, it can assist states in being able to cooperate to achieve mutually beneficial goals and security objectives.

4.3.3. Restricting the Employment

Besides discussing potential constraints on the proliferation of UCAVs, DISEC ought to consider whether their use should be restricted by international agreement. On this matter memberstates may differ widely. In any case, besides those with little concern over the matter, each state will argue in favour of what they perceive as their best interest and attempt to convince others that their interests coincides. But constructing arguments based upon ones self -interest (i.e. we should do this because this is best for me) is not compelling, rather delegates will have to appeal to others factors: primarily international law and ethical considerations. In this Study Guide not all legal implications, arguments and counter-arguments, can be covered in suitable depth delegates are thus strongly encouraged to read Alstons report (see hereunder) and refer to other legal documents (see further reading).
6 7

US GAO, 2012. Dowd, 2012a. 8 US GAO, 2012.

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4.3.4. The Laws of War

In his 2010 report to the Human Rights Council, UN special rapporteur Phillip Alston defines targeted killing as the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator9. Alston points out that the practice conflicts with International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Under circumstances of armed conflict, which the perpetrators of strikes claim the War on Terror to be, targets must be combatants or at least engage in the hostilities , killing must be military necessity i.e. non-lethal force should be considered and/or attempted , harm to civilians ought to be minimized, and punitive attacks on civilians are strictly forbidden10. What concerns the US, compelling evidence suggests that it disregards these principles (except the last). First, US intelligence distinguishes between so-called personality and signature strikes the former involves targeting individuals whose identities are known, and the latter individuals who, due to their behaviour, are believed to be terrorist militants11. Under Obama, the number of signature strikes has risen steeply12. The inherent problem thereof is that there is a lack of certainty as to whether the targets are combatants. Reportedly, some in the Obama administration joke that when the CIA sees three guys doing jumping jacks, they think it is a terrorist training camp. 13 For instance, in Afghanistan, a strike was directed at three men in 2002. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) believed one of them was bin Laden, which was incorrect. Reports since have suggested that the three individuals were local civilians collecting scrap metal.14 Second, the fact that the US has engaged in a deliberate policy of (targeted) killing suggests that no efforts, or at least not adequate effort, is made to capture first. Third, the US abides by a very questionable interpretation of what constitutes a civilian. Reportedly, anonymous government officials have revealed that, for the purpose of tracking civilian casualties, the government presumes that all military-age males killed in drone strikes are combatants. 15 It is much more difficult to obtain evidence on the actions of the Israeli government and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF); though it is publicly known that there is a policy of targeted killing and that numerous civilians are killed by UCAV attacks16. Here a call for greater disclosure regarding their methodologies would be appropriate.
9

Altston, 2010, p. 3 Altston, 2010, p. 10 11 Stamford Law School & NYU School of Law, 2012, p. 12-3 12 Stamford Law School & NYU School of Law, 2012, p. 12-3 13 Stamford Law School & NYU School of Law, 2012, p. 13 14 Stamford Law School & NYU School of Law, 2012, p. 10 15 Stamford Law School & NYU School of Law, 2012, p. 7 16 Alston, 2010, p. 6-7
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Such a request may also be made to the United Kingdom which, although it publishes weekly reports on the actions of the Royal Air Force, remains very vague about who it targets 17. For instance, it claims that 8 strikes have been directed at insurgents committing hostile acts 18 which is far too vague.

4.3.5. The Right to Self-Defense & Questions of Sovereignty

Article 2 clause 4 of the UN Charter states that all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state19. This is the basis for the law of sovereignty: states may not interfere in the affairs, nor challenge the territorial integrity, of other states. As Pakistan argues continually20, the US, through its UCAV attacks on Pakistani territory, violates its sovereignty for Pakistan does not consent to them. The same can be said about Yemeni sovereignty21, Afghani sovereignty22, and the other states subject to drone attacks. However, Article 51 of the UN Charter allows intervention in another states affairs if such act is performed for the purpose of self-defense. A key argument offered by the perpetrators of targeted killings by UCAVs inside the territory of other states is that it is consistent with the right to self-defense. The latter may be exercised if the targeted state is responsible for armed attacks against the targeter i.e. war or if the targeted is unable or unwilling to obstruct such attacks, from non-state actors, against the targeter23. Evidently, the governments of Pakistan and the like are not waging war against the United States and such; the more important argument lies in the supposed inability of those states to combat terrorist groups inside their territory. Perhaps it may thus be wiser, and more lawful, for the perpetrators to cooperate with those states to relieve them from their inability (instead of striking them).

4.4. States with particular interests

The United States of America

17 18

RAF, n.d. Drone Wars UK, n.d. 19 United Nations, n.d. 20 Parvez, 2012 21 al-Mamari, 2012 22 News Agencies, 2012 23 Alston, 2012, p. 12

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Drone strikes form a key part of the US governments approach to counterterrorism24. Reportedly the US has been involved in targeting killings by drone attacks in Pakistan, Iraq, Lybia, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and the Philippines25 using Predator and Reaper drones. Collateral damage reports vary widely; according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism civilian casualties in Pakistan alone range from 475 to 88526. Nonetheless the US government argues that its policy is lawful for it coincides with the US right to self-defense and assures that civilian casualties are low.

The State of Israel The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) pursues confirmed policies of targeted killings directed at supposed terrorists in Occupied Palestinian Territory27. Also, the Senior Military Editor of Aviation Week claims Israeli UCAVs have attacked arms convoys in Sudan 28. The means thereof include, amongst various others, UCAV attacks, and reportedly there are many civilian casualties. Israels stance on this issue is an ambiguous one. On the one hand official government policy is, in accordance with the ruling of Israels Supreme Court, that necessary precautions ought to be taken to reduce collateral damage, whilst on the other the IDF reportedly violates those pledges with no or little consequences. 29

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland The UK has also adopted a public policy of targeted killing by drone strikes, primarily in Afghanistan.30 Prime-minister Cameron declared that it ensures civilian casualties are avoided31; but as of yet the RAF reports do not disclose information about the number of civilians killed32.

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan Pakistan is subject to most drone strikes in the world33. Official Pakistani policy consists in publicly condemning the US attacks for causing the deaths of civilians and violating the states sovereignty. President Asif Ali Zardari has called upon the US to share its intelligence concerning the whereabouts of militants which it has largely refused instead of striking without warning34. Tensions between the two states have risen, and startling threats have been made from Pakistani
24 25

Stamford Law School & NYU School of Law, 2012, p. 7 Dowd, 2012b 26 The Bureau, 2012 27 Alston, 2010, p. 5-6 28 Fulghum, 2012 29 Alston, 2010, p. 5-6 30 Drone Wars UK, n.d. 31 Wood, 2012 32 RAF, n.d. 33 The Bureau, 2012 34 Press Trust of India, 2009

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army officers. Major Murad Khan reportedly stated that we will retaliate if the US continues crossborder attacks35 and another senior official said: Any object entering into our air space, including U.S. drones, will be treated as hostile and be shot down36. However, allegations have been made that Pakistani intelligence covertly works with US intelligence37.

Others Other relatively noteworthy actors include the states with drones (see the first two links in further reading), NATO, which carries out strikes as well38, Iran and Venezuela which reportedly cooperate to gain UCAV power39, and the known list of victims to drone strikes Iraq, Lybia, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, the Philippines, Sudan and Palestine.

4.5. Key Questions

1) Does your state possess, or is it in the process of acquiring, UCAV technology, and has it ever employed such technology in combat? 2) Is your state already a member of the MTCR or Wassenaar arrangement, and how may these protocols affect further non-proliferation measures? 3) Has your state expressed an opinion on the USAs and others use of UCAVs in Pakistan and other states? 4) Should UCAVs be allowed for use in targeted killings? 5) Should there perhaps be Security Council law dictating the procedures by which targeted killings are to be carried out?

35 36

PressTV, 2008 NBC News, 2011 37 Wilkinson, 2009 38 NNI, 2012 39 Dowd, 2012a

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4.6. Further Reading

http://dronewarsuk.wordpress.com/6-who-has-drones/ http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/aug/03/drone-stocks-by-country http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Unmanned_Combat_Air_Vehicles.pdf
http://www.law.columbia.edu/ipimages/Human_Rights_Institute/BackgroundNoteASILColumbia.pdf http://livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Stanford_NYU_LIVING_UNDER_DRONES.pdf

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42136.pdf For the really committed delegates (and law students), hereunder follows a list of international law agreements that pertain to this topic: The United Nations Charter The Universal Declaration of Human Rights The League of Nations Protection of Civilian Populations Against Bombing From The Air The First Hague Convention (1899) The Second Hague Convention (1907) The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

But worry not, a solid basis can be gained by simply reading Alstons report (third link in further reading). Additionally, Nils Melzer, a law researcher, examines the legal paradoxes and other implications of targeted killings in Targeted Killing in International Law.

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5. Bibliography
al-Mamari, I. (2012, October 3). US UAV angers Yemenis. Retrieved from http://www.yemenfox.net/news_details.php?sid=4426 Ambassador Robinson, Foster,J and Scheber,T. (2012). The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Questions and Challenges. Available: http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/2012/11/the-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-questionsand-challenges Alson, P. (2010, May 28). Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary executions . Retrieved from Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights website: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf Bergen, P. (2012, September 19). Drone is Obama's weapon of choice. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.co.uk/2012/09/05/opinion/bergen-obama-drone/index.html The Bureau. (2012, January 11). Obama 2012 Pakistan strikes. Retrieved from The Bureau of Investigative Journalism website: http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/01/11/obama-2012-strikes/ Chang, W. (2001). China and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Negotiations. Available: http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal1/china3.pdf. Last accessed Nov 2012 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Available: http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-ctbt/ Congressional Research Service. (2012, January). U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems (Research Report) (Congressional Research Service, Author). Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42136.pdf Dowd, A. W. (2012a, August 7). [Editorial]. Retrieved from The American Interest Online website: http://www.theamerican-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1301 Dowd, A. W. (2012, November 6). U.S. Should Show Restraint on Drone Strikes. Retrieved from Looking Back and Thinking Ahead website: http://67.199.60.145/Articles.aspx?ArticleId=750 Drone Wars UK. (n.d.). UK Drone Strikes. Retrieved from http://dronewarsuk.wordpress.com/uk-drone-strike-list/ Fulghum, D. A. (2012, July 27). New Israeli Command Extends Reach With UAVs. Retrieved from Aviation Week Online website: http://www.aviationweek.com/ Article/PrintArticle.aspx?id=/article-xml/ asd_07_27_2012_p02-01480779.xml&p=1&printView=true Hafemeister, D. (n.d.). The Case for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Available: http://www.fas.org/faspir/pir0297.htm#Testban Jabri, P. (2012, June 19). Pakistan urges US to respect its sovereignty. Retrieved from Business Recorder website: http://www.brecorder.com/top-news/1-front-top-news/62943-pakistan-urges-us-to-respect-its-sovereignty.html Kimball, D. (2012). Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at a Glance. Available: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/testban-treaty-at-a-glance Mackby, J. (2012). Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Available: http://csis.org/publication/comprehensivenuclear-test-ban-treaty-0 NBC News. (2011, December 10). Pakistan says U.S. drones in its air space will be shot down. Retrieved from http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/12/10/9352886-pakistan-says-us-drones-in-its-air-space-will-be-shot-down News Agencies. (2012, October 5). Lavrov: US Drone Attacks Violation of Afghan Sovereignty (Moqawama.org, Ed.). Retrieved from http://www.english.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=21168&cid=274

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NNI. (2012, August 18). NATO drone strike kills up to 50 militants in eastern Afghanistan: police. Retrieved from http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/international/18-Aug-2012/nato-drone-strikekills-up-to-50-militants-in-eastern-afghanistan-police Physicians for Social Responsibility. (n.d.). Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Available: http://www.psr.org/nuclearweapons/comprehensive-test-ban-treaty.html Press Trust of India. (2009, February). Share intelligence, stop drone attacks: Zardari to US. Retrieved from http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20090082266 PressTV. (2008, September 8). Pakistan threatens to retaliate against US. Retrieved from http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/68818.html RAF. (n.d.). RAF Operational Update. Retrieved from http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafoperationalupdate/opsupdate/ RUSI, 2008, Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Unmanned_Combat_Air_Vehicles.pdf) Shah, A. (2000). The US and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Available: http://www.globalissues.org/article/70/the-us-and-the-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty. Last accessed Nov 2012 Stamford Law School, & NYU School of Law. (2012, September). Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan. Retrieved from http://livingunderdrones.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/Stanford_NYU_LIVING_UNDER_DRONES.pdf United Nations. (n.d.). CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml US GAO, 2012, Nonproliferation. (http://dronewarsuk.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/us-gao-_-noproliferation-ofuavs.pdf) Vinod Kumar. (2009). India and the CTBT: The debate in New Delhi. Available: http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/india-and-the-ctbt-the-debate-new-delhi The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2008, Irans Asymmetric Naval Warfare, Policy Focus #87. (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus87.pdf) Wilkinson, I. (2009, April 3). Pakistan 'helps US drone attacks'. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/5101196/Pakistan-helps-US-drone-attacks.html Wood, C. (2012, September 21). British PM Cameron: We expect drone strikes to avoid civilian casualties. Retrieved from The Bureau of Investigative Journalism website: http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/09/21/british-pmcameron-we-expect-drone-strikes-to-avoid-civilian-casualties/ (2007). Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Available: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/l33234_en.htm. (2008). Barack Obama to encourage India and Pakistan to sign Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Available: http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakistan-strategic-forces/14580-barack-obama-encourage-india-pakistan-signcomprehensive-test-ban-treaty.html (2012). No Going Back: 20 Years Since the Last U.S. Nuclear Test. Available: http://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/No-Going-Back-20-Years-Since-the-Last-US-Nuclear-Test%20

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6. A Gentle Request
The DISEC chairing staff wishes you the best of luck while preparing for LIMUN 2013. Do consider, however, that to attain a state of being well-prepared it is not necessary to print this study guide. Thus please do not unless truly necessary. If you do:

Print double-sided Print with 2 pages on one side And do not print useless parts like the bibliography

Thank you!

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