L. S.

VYGOTSKY
Mind in Society
The Development
of Higher
Psychological Processes
Edited by Michael Cole
Vera John-Steiner
Sylvia Scribner
Ellen Souberrnan
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England

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1
Tool and Symbol in
Child Development
The' primary purpose of this book is to characterize the uniquely
human aspltcts of behavior, and td offer hypotheses about the way these
traits have been formed in the course of human history and the way
they develop over an individuaFs lifetime,
This: analysis Will be conoerned with three fundamental issues: (I)
What is the rclatioll bernreen human beings and their environment,
both physical and social? (2) What new forms of activity were responsi
bfe for establishing labor as the fUndamental means of relating humans
to natllre and what ate the psychological consequences of these forms
of acth'ity? (3') What is the nature of the relationship between the use
of foots and 'the ment of speech? None of these has
been fully treated by scholars with understanding animal
and human psychology.
Karl Stumpf, a prominent Gennan psychologist in the early years of
the tW011tleth century, based his studies on a set of premises completely
different from ,those I employ here,l He compim:d the study of
children to the study of botany, and stressed the botanical character of
devefopment, whlCh he associated with maturation of the whole or
ganism,
The fact is that maturation per 5e is a secondary factor in the de
velopment of the most complex, unique forms of human behavior. The
developme11t. of thes benaviors is characterized by complicated, quah
tative transfonnatiol1s of one form of behavior into another (OF, as
Hegel would phrase it, a transfonnation of quantity into quality), The
co"nceptior'l of maturation as a passivG process cannot adequately de
scribe these complex phenomena, Nevertheless, as A. Gesell has aptly
19
20
pointed out, iu t<:l devclopment we l;l)utlll1w Lo use the
botanical analogy in our descripHon of child development (for example,
we say that ,the .e.aI,ly educahon of children place h1 \l "kinder
garten").2 Recently seveTaJ psychologists have suggested Itlhal this bo:ta:n
ieal model mu.st be abandoned.
In response to this kind of ,criticism, modem psy;cholo,gy has
ascended the ladder of science by adopting zoological modeis as the
basis for a Dew gener.a1 approach to understanding the development of
children. Once the capt,ive of botany, ch.il.d psychology is now mes
merized by zoology. The observations on which these newer models
draw come almost entirely from the animal kingdom, and answers to
questions about children are sought in experiments carried out on
animals. Both the results of experiments with animals and the proce
dures used to obtain these results are finding their way from the
animal laboratory into the nursery.
This convergence of child and animal psychology has
Significantly to the study of the biological basis of human behavior.
Many links between child and animal behaviOr, particularly in the
study of elementary psychological' processes, have been established. But
a paradox has noW emerged. "When the botanical model was fashionable,
psychologists emphasized the unique character of higher psychological
functions and the difficulty of studying them by experimental means.
But this zoological approach to the higher intellectual processes---:those
processes that are uniquely human-has led psychologists to interpret
the higher intellectual functions as a direct continuation of correspond
ing processes in animals. This of theorizi.ng is particularly apparent
in the analysis of practical intelligence in children, the most important
aspect of which concerns the child's use of tools.
PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE IN ANilMALS
AND ClIlLDREN
The work of Wolfgang Kohler is particularly significant in the study
of practical intelligence.
3
He conducted many experiments with apes
during World War I, and occasionally compared some of his observa
tions of chimpanzees' behavior with particular kinds of responses in
children. This direct analogy between practical intelligence in the child
and similar response by apes becRme the guiding principle of experi
mental work in the field.
K. Buhler's researcb also sought to establish similarities between
child and ape.
4
He studied the way in which young children grasp ob
jccts, their ahlllt)' III 1II.lll' l!ttnurs pursHing a goal, amI
manner in which lllt,y primitive tuols. TIww observ:atiollS, as well
as his experirm:nt waich a young child is asked t,o remove a ring from
a 'stick, an akin 'to Kohler's. Buhler interpreted the
manifestaliO.llS of practicall intelUgence in chliMren as being of exactly
the 's,ame type as those we are famHiar with in chimpanz,ees. Indeed,
there is a phase in the Hfe of the child that !Buhler designated the
"chimpanzee age" (p. 48).. One ten-maRth-old infant whom he studied
was able Ito pull a string to oMain a cookie that was attached to it. The
ability to remove a ring from a post by lifting it rather than trying to
pull it Sideways did not appear until the middle of the second year.
u
Although these experiments were interpreted as support for the analogy
between the child and apes, they arso led Buhler to the important dis
covery, which will. be explicated in later sections, that the beginnings
of practlca! intelligence in the child (he termed it technical thinking"),
as well as the actions of the chimpanzee, are independent of speech.
Charlotte Buhler's detailed observations of infants during their
first year of life gave further support to this conclusion.
6
She found the
first manifestations of practical intelligence took place at the very
young age of six months. However, it is not only tool use that develops
at this point in a child's history but also systematic movement and
perception, the brain and hands-in fact, the child's entire organism.
Consequently, the child's system of activity is determined at each specific
stage both by the child's degree of organic development and by his or
her degree of mastery in the use of tools.
K. BuhJer established th.e. developmentally important principle that
the beginnings of intelligent speech are preceded by technical thinking,
and technical thinking comprises the initial phase of cOgnitive develop
ment. His lead in emphasizing, the chimpanzee-like features of children's
behavior has been followed by many others. It is in extrapolating this
idea that the dangers of zoological models and analogies between human
and animal behaviors find their clea.rest expression. The pitfalls are
sligbt in research that focuses on the preverbal period' in the clrild's
development, as Buhler's did. However, he drew a questionable conclu
sion from his work with very young children when he stated, "The
achi.evements of the chimpanzee ate quite independent of language
and in the case of man, even in later life, technical thinking, or think
ing in terms of tools, is far less closely bound up with language and
concepts than other forms of thinking."7
Buhler proceoded from the assumption that the relationship be
tween practical illtolliRoncc and speech that characterizes the ten
22
month-old child remains intact throughoHl Iwr li(('tinw. This analysis
postulating the independence of intelligtlnt uctioll from runs
conh"ary to our own findings, which reveal the integration of speech
and practical thinking in the course of development.
Shapiro and Gerke offer an important analysis of the development
of practical thinking in children based upon experiments modeled after
Kohler's problem-solving studies with chimpanzees:'> They theorize
that children's practical thinking is similax to adult thought in certain
respects and different in others, and emphasize the dominant role of
social experience in human development. In their view, social experience
exerts its effect through imitation; when the child imitates the way
adults use tools and objects, she masters the very principle involved
in a particular activity. They suggest that repeated actions pile up, one
upon another, as in a multi-exposure photograph; the common traits
become clear and the differences become blurred. The result is a crys
talized sclleme, a definite principle of activity. The child, as she be
comes more experienced, acquires a greater number of models that
she understands. These models represent, as it were, a reBned cumula
tive design of all similar actions; at the same time, they are also a rough
blueprint for possible types of action in the future.
However, Shapiro and Gerke's notion of adaptation is too
linked to a mechanical conception of repetition. For them, social ex
perience serves only to furnish the child with motor schemas; they do
not take into account the changes occurring in the internal structure
of the child's intellectual operations. In their descliiptions of children's
problem solving, the authors are forced to note the "specific role ful
filled by speech" in the practical and adaptive efforts of the growing
child. But their description of this role is a strange one. "Speech," they
say, "replaces and compensates for rea] adaptation; it does not serve as
a bridge leading to past experience but to a purely social adaptation
wllich is achieved via the experimenter." This analysis does not allow
for the contribution speech makes to the development of a new struc
tural organization of practical activity.
Guillaume and Meyerson offer a different conclusion regarding the
role of speech in the inception of uniqnely human forms of behavior.II
From their extremely interesting experiments on tool use among apes,
they concluded that the methods used by apes to accomplish a given
task are similar in principle and coincide on certain essential points to
those used by people suffering from aphasia (that is, individuals who
are deprived of speech). Their .findings support my assumption that
:l
>,(>l'ceh plays UII ('sst>Jllinl mI. ill tlw organization of higher psychoJogical
functions.
10
These expcrimculal "x<lmplt:s hring us full circle to the beginning
I It our review of psychological theories regarding child development.
Buhler's experiments indicate that the practical activity of the young
thild prior to speech development is identical to that of the ape, and
Cuillaume and Meyerson suggest that the ape's behavior is akin to that
observed in people who are deprived of speech. Both of these lines of
work focus our attention on the importance of understanding the practi
('al activity of children at the age when they axe just beginning to speak.
My own work as well as that of my collaborators is directed at these
..ame problems. But our premises differ from those of previous investi
Io!;:ttors. Our primary concern is to describe and specify the development
nf those forms of practical intelligence that are specifically human.
RELATION BETWEEN SPtEECH AND tOOL USE:
In his classic experiments with apes Kohler demonstrated the
f utility of -attempting to develop even the most elementary sigh and
symbolic operations in animals. He concluded that tool use amon
upes is independent of symb.QI!Q activity. Further attempts to cultivate
productive speech in the ape have also produced negative results. These
showed once more that the purposive behavior of the aru
mal is independent of any speech or sign-using activity.
The study of tool use in isolatiolil from sign use is common in re
carch work on the natural history of practical intellect, and psychol
ngists who studied the development of symbolic processes in the child
have followed the same procedure. Consequently, the origin and de
velopment of speech, as well as all other sign-using activity, were treated
as independent of the organization of the child's practical activity.
Psychologists preferred to study the development of sign use as an
example of pure intellect and not as the product of the child's develop
mental history. They often attributed sign use to the child's spontaneous
discovery of the relation between signs and their meanings. As W. Stern
stated, recognition of the fact that verbal signs have meaning constitutes
"Ihe greatest discovery in the child's life."ll A numbcr of authors fix
Ihis happy "moment" at the juncturo of the child's fil"Sl and second
yoar, regarding it as the product of tho child's mental nctivity. De
tailed examination of the development of speech In<l other Corms of sign
\ISO was assumed to be unnecessary. rIlst('nd, It h(IS roul i n('! v heen as
24
'fool mlfl S11111lUI11'1 ('''Utf IJill'rl
sumed that the child's mind contains all stages of fllhm' intellectual
development; they exist in complete form, awaitillg the proper moment
to emerge.
Not only were speech and practical intelligence assumed to have
different origins, but their joint participation in common operations
was considered to be of no basic psychological importance (as in the
work of Shapiro and Gerke). Even when speech and the use of tools
were closely linked in one operation, they were still studied as separate
processes belonging to two completely different classes of phenomena.
At best, their simultaneous occurrence was considered a consequence
of accidental, external factors..
The students of practical intelligence as well as those wno study
speech development often fail to recognize the interweaving of these
two functions. Consequently, the children's adaptive behavior and sign
using activity are trea ted as parallel phenomena-a view that leads to
Piaget's concept of "egocentric" speech.J2 He did not attribute an
important role to speech ,in the organization of the child's activities,
nor did he stress its communicative functions, although he was obliged
to admit its practical importance.
Although practical intelligence and sign use can operate inde
pendently of each other in young children, the dialectical unity of these
systems in the human adult is the very essence of complex human be
havior. Our analysis accords symbolic activity a specific organizing
function that penetrates the process of tool use and produces funda
mentally new forms of behavior.
SOCIAL INTERACTION AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF PRACTICAL ACTIVITY
Based on the discussion in the previous section, and illustrated by
experimental work to be described later, the following conclusion may
be made; the most significant moment in the course of intellectual de
velopment, which gives birth to the purely human forms of practical
and abstract intelligence, occu"'$ when speech and practical actiVity.
two previously completely independent lines of development, converge.
Althougb children's use of tools during their preverbal period is com
parable to that of apes, as soon as speech and the use of signs are
incorporated into any action, the action becomes transformed and or
ganized along entirely new lines. The specifically human use of tools is
thus realized, going heyondthe more limited use of tools possible [lJ(}O!t
thc higher animals.
Prior to JOu:ilorillg bis own behavior, tlac chilcl " C ' ~ l r l " III 1111,,111 III
surroundings with the help of speech. This prOdllc'I'S IlC'W \'(1111 hili" \-\ alII
the environment in addition to the new organizntioll of IwhllVICIl If',1 II
The creation of these uniquely human forms of bohavlor 111(\1 1II'(I(IIIl'1
the intellect and become the basis of productive work: llw 1I\Il't'ilkully
human form of the use of tools.
Observations of children in an experimontal situation liilnilttr (0
that of Kohler's apes show that the children not only act in atlt'mptillg
to achieve a goal but also speak. As a rule this speech arises spontane
ously and continues almost without interruption throughout the experi
ment. It increases and is more persistent every time the situation be
comes more complicated and the goal more difficult to attain. Attempts
to block it (as the experiments of my collaborator R. E. Levina have
shown) are either futile or lead the child to "freeze up."
Levina posed practical problems for four- and ve-year-old children
such as obtaining a piece of candy from a cupboard. The candy was
placed out of reach so the child could not obtain it directly. As the child
got more and more involved in trying to obtain the candy, "egocentric"
speech began to manifest itself as part of her active striving. At first
this speech consisted of a description and analysis of the situation, 'but
it gradually took on a "planful" character, reflecting possible paths to
solution of the problem. Finally, it was included as part of t'he solution.
For example, a four"and-a-nalf-year-old girl was asked to get cLmdy
from a cupboard with a stool and a stick as possible tools. Levina's
description reads as follows: (Stands on a stool, quietly looking, feeling
along a shelf with stick) "On the stool." (Glances at experimenter. Puts
stick in other band.) "Is that reany toe candy?" (Hesitates,) "l can get it
from that other stool, stand and get it." (Gets second stool.) "No, that
doesn't get it. I could use the stick." (Takes stick, knocks at the candy.)
"It will move now." (Knocks candy.) "It moved, I couldn't get it with
the stool, but the, but the stick worked."13
In such circumstances it seems both natural and necessary for
children to speak while they act; in our research we have found that
speech not only accompanies practical activity but also plays a specific
Iole in carrying it out. Our experiments demonstrate two important
facts:
(1) A child's speech is as important as the role of action in attaining
the goal. Children not only speak about what they nrc doing; their
speech and action are part of one and tlte same complr;;c lJ!lychological
function, dlrcctrd towl.\rd tho solution of tho problCln I1t hand.
(2) TIlt' 1111)1(' (;Oll1plex Lho actioll {klllflll<kd hy Ill(' silnntion and
2
the Jess direet its the greater the impOllullcl' playl'!l fly
in the operation as a whole. Sometimes speech bCf.:ollwS of such vital
importance that, if not permitted to use it, young childretl CiUlTlot ac
complish the given task.
These observations lead me to the conclusion that children solve
practical tasks with the Mlp of tMir speech, as well as tMir eyes and
hands. This unity of perception, speech, and action, which ultimately
produces intemalization of the visual field, constitutes the central sub
ject matter for any analysis of the origin of uniquely human forms of
behavior.
To develop the first of these two points, we must ask: What is it that.
really disttnguishes the actions of the speaking child from the actions
of an ape when solving practical problems?
The first thing that strikes the experimenter is the incomparably
greater freedom of children's operations, their greater independence
from the stmcture of the concrete, visual situation. 'Children, with the
aid of speech, create greater possibilities than apes can accomplish
thrOUgh action. 9.ne important manifestation of thiS Hexibility
is !hat _is the direct line goal.
Instead, he engages in a number of preliminary acts, using what we
speak of a;instru-me'ntal, or (indirect), fj) The
'of solving'a task the child is able to incJude stimuli that do not lie within
the immediate visual field. Using words (one class of such stimuli) to
create a specific plan, the child achieves a much broader range of
activity, applying as tools Dot only those objects thaLlie near at hand,
but searching for anlipreparin.g .stlch as be inthe
sOlution of the task, anaplanning future lL9,tions. -
-second, the practical operations of a child who can speak become
much less impulsive and spontaneous than those of the ape. The ape
typically makes a series of uncontrolled attempts to solve the given
problem. In contrast, the child who uses speech divides the activity into
two consecutive parts. She plans how to solve the problem through
speech and then carries out the prepared solution through overt ac
tivity. Direct manipulation is replaced by a complex psychological
process through which inner motivation and intentions, postponed in
time, Stimulate their own development and realization. This new kind
of psychological structure is absent in apeS, even in r'i.ldimentary forms.
Finall'y, it is decisively important that speecn not only facilitates the
child's effective manipulation of objects but also controls the chilas own
behaVior. Thus, with the help of speech children, unl.ilfe apes, acquire
the capacity to be both the subjects and objects of their own behavior.
of the of children en
gaged in val'iol1s iH'livlli('s slIch as that illustrated by Levina produced
the second fal:t ()f great importance demonstrated by our experiments:
the relative amount of egocentric speech, as measured by Piaget's meth
ods, increases ill relation to the difficulty of the child's task.
H
On the
basis of these experiments my collaborators and I developed the
hypothesis that children's egocentric speech should be regarded as
the transitional form between external and internal speech. Functionally,
egocentric speech is the basis for inner speech, while in its external
form it is embedded in 'communicative speech.
One way to increase the production of egocentric speech is to
complicate a task in such a way that the child cannot make direct use Qf
tools for its solution. When faced with such a challenge, the children's
emotiomil use of language increases as well as their efforts to achieve a
less automatic, more intelligent solution. They search verbally for a
new plan, and their utterances reveal the close connection between ego
centric and socialized speech. This is seen woen the experimenter
leaves the room or fails to answer the children's appeals for help. Upon
being deprived of the opportunity to engage in social' speech, children
immediately switch over to egocentric speech.
'While lthe interrelationship of these two functions of language is
apparent in this setting, it is important to remember that egocennic
speech is linked to children's social speech by many transitional forms.
The first significant illustration of the link between these two language
functions occurs when children find that they are unable to solve a prob
lem by themselves. They then tum to an adult, and verbally describe the
method that they cannot carry out by themselves. The greatest change
iD)1 children's capacity to use language as a problem-solving tool takes
place somewhat later in their development, when SOcialized speech
(which has previously been used to address an adult) is turned inward.
Instead of appealing to the adult, children appeal to themselve:s; lan
guage thus takes on an intrapersonal function in addition to its inter
personal use. When children develop a method of behavior for guid
ing themselves that had previously been used in relation to another
person, when they organize their own activities according to a social
fonn of behavior, they succeed in applying a social attitude to them
selves. The history of the process of the internalization of social speech
1S also the history of the socialization of children's practical intellect.
The relation between speech and action is a dynamic one in the
cOurse of children's development. The structural relation can shift even
an experimont. Tho crucial change occurs as follow:;: At an
IJ
28
early stage speech ar:companies the child's actJow, nllel I'dlccts the
vicissitudes of problem solving in a disrupted and ehaolic fonn. At
a later stage speech mOVes more and more toward tbc starting point of
the process, so lthat it comes t,o precede action. It functions then as an
aid to a plan that has been conceived but not yet realized in behavior.
An interesting anal'ogy can be found in children's speech while drawing
(see also chapter 8). Young children name their draWings only after
they have completed them; they Iileed to see them before they can decide
what they are. As children get older they can decide in advance what
they are going to draw. This displacement of the naming process signifies
a change in the function of speech. Initially speech follows actions, is
provoked by and dominated by activity. At a later stage, however, when
speech is moved to the starting point of an activi.ty, a new relation be
tween word and action emerges. Now speech guides, detennines, and
dominates the course of action; the planning function of speech comes
into being in addition to the already existing function of language to
reflect the external world.U
Just as a mold gives shape to a stlbstance, words can shape an
activity into a shucture. However, that structure may be changed or
reshaped when children learn to use language in ways that allow them
to go beyond previous experiences when planning future action. In
contrast to the notion of sudden discovery popularized by Stern, we
envisage verbal, intellectual activity as a series of stages in which the
emotional and communfcative functions of speech are expanded by the
addition of the planning function. As a resultthe child acquires the abH
ity to engage in complex operations extending over time,
Unlike the ape, which Kohler tells us is "the slave of its own visual
field," children acquire an independence with respect to their concrete
surroundings; they cease to act in the immediately given and evident
space. Once children learn how to use the planning function oftheir
language effectively, their psychological field changes radically. A
view of the future is now an integral part of their approacnes to their
surroundings. In subsequent chapters, I will describe the developmental
course of some of these central psychological functions in greater debiI.
To summarize what has been said thus far in this section: The
specifically human capacity for language enables children to provide
for au.'{iliary tools in the solution of difficult tasks, to overcome impulsive
action, to plan a solution to a problem prior to its execution, and to
master their own behavior. Signs and words serve children first and
foremost as a means of social contact with other people. The cognitive
:md communicative functions of language then become the basis of a
new and fOlIll of .1<:Uvily in children, di:;1 illg\lishing them from
animals.
The I bn\'v descrihcd do not OG'Cur in a one-dimensional,
eveo fashioll. Our rese,lrch has shown that very smaIl children solve
problems using unique mixtures of processes. In contrast with adults,
who react differently to objects and to people, young children are likely
to fuse action and speech when responding to both objects and social
beings. This fusion of actiVity is analagous to syncretism in perception,
which has been described by many developmental psychologists.
The unevenness I am speaking of is seen quite clearly in a situation
where small children, when unable to solve the task before them easily,
combine direct attempts to obtain the desired end with a reliance upon
emofional speech. At times speech expresses the children's desires, while
at other times it serves as a substitute for actually achieVing the goal.
The child may attempt to solve the task through verbal formulations
and by appeals to the experimenter for help. TIlls mixture of diverse
forms of activity was at first bewildering; but further observations drew
our attention to a sequence of actions that clarify the meaning of the
children's behavior in such circumstances. For example, after oompleting
a number of intelligent and interrelated actions that should help him
solve a particular problem sllccessfully, the child suddenly, upon
meeting a difficulty, ceases all attempts and turns for help to the experi
menter. Any obstacle to the child's efforts at solving the problem may
interrupt his activity. The cMld's verbal appeal to another person is an
effort to fill the hiatus his activity has revealed. By asking a question, the
child indicates that he has, in fact, formulated a plan to solve the task
hefore him, but is unable to perform all the necessary operations.
Through repeated experiences of this type, children learn covertly
(mentally) to plan their activities. At the same time they enlist the assist
ance of another person in accordance with the requirements of the
problem posed for them. The child's ab.iJity_to c.Q.ntrol another person's
9f practical activity.
Initially this problem solving in conjunction with another person is
not differentiated with respect to the roles played by the child nnd his
helper; it is a general, syncretic whole. We have more thon 1II1C(' ob
served that in the course of solving a task, children get confused hCC'l\llS
they begin to merge the logic of what they are doing with thl'
the same problE:m as it has to be solved with the cooperatloll 01. Illlothor
person. Sometimes syncretic action manifests itself wh<lll chllel. C'II fllU HzC'
the hopelessnoss of their direct efforts to solve r\ pmhlc'lIl. III 111e.:
xamplc from Levlnn's work, children nddrcss thr olllN'h 01 111e't. '111\'11
tioll equally wi!h words and sticks, lhi' IllucJo1l1cutai :UlU
illseparable tie between speech and actioll ill thl' child's [IClivity;
unity becomes particularly clear when compared with the separation of
these processes in adults.
In stunmary, children confronted with a problem that is slightly too
complicated for them exhibit a complex variety of responses including
direct attempts at attaining the goal, the use of tools, speech wl'ected
toward the person conducting the experiment or speech that simply
accompanies the action, and direct, verbal appeal's to the object of
attention itself.
If analyzed dynamicaUy, this alloy of speech and action has a very
specific function in tbe history of the child's development; it also demon
strates the logic of its own genesis. From the very first days of the child's
development his actiVities acquire a meaning of their own in a system of
social behavior and, being directed towards a definite purpose, are re
fracted through the prism of the child's environment. The path from
object to child and from child to object passes 'through another person.
This complex human structure is the product of a developmental process
,deeply rooted in the links between individual and social history.
The Dev'elopment of
Perception and Attention
The linkage between tool use and speech affects several psycho
logical functions, in particular perception, sensory-motor operations,
and at,tention, each of which is part of a dynamic system of behavior.
Experimental-developmental research indicates that the connections
and relations among functions constitute systems that change as radically
in the course of a child's development as do the individual functions
themselves. Considering each function in tum, I will examine how
speech introduces qualitative changes in both its form and its relation to
other functions.
Kohler's work emphasized the importance of the structure of the
visual field in organizing the ape's practical behavior. The entire process
of problem solving is essentiaUy determined by perception. In this
respect Kohler had ample grounds for believing that these animals are
bound by their sensory field to a much greater exfent than adult humans.
They are incapable of modifying their sensory field by means of volun
tary effort.. Indeed, it would probably be useful to view as a general lav...
the dependence of all natural forms of perception on the structure of
the sensory field.
However, a cllild's perception, because it is human, does not deverop
as a direct continuation and further perfection of the forms of animal
perception, not even of those animals that stand nearest to humankind.
Experiments conducted to clarify this problem led us to discover some
basic laws that characterize the higher human forms of perception.
The first set of experiments concerned developmental stages of
picture perception in chiJdren. Similar experiments describing specific
aspects of young chUdren's perception and its dependence on higher
31
Interaction between
Learning and Dev,elopment
The pIobJems encountered in the psychological analysis of teaching
cannoE be correctly resolved or ev.en formulated withOllt addressing the
relation between learning and development in school-age children. Yet
it is the most unclear of aU the basic issues on which the application of
child de'V'elopmcnt theories to educational processes depends. Needless
to say, the lack of fheoretical clarity does not mean that the issue is
removed altogether from current research efforts into learning; not one
study can avoid this central theoretical! issue. But the relation between
learning' and development remains methodologically undear because
concrete research studies have embodied theoretically vague, critically
unevatuated, and sometimes internally contradictory postulates, prem
ises, and peculiar solutions to the problem of this fundamental relation
ship; and these, of course, I1esult in a variety of errors.
Essentially, all current conceptions of the :relation between devdop
ment and learning in children can be reduced to three major theoretical
positions.
The first centers on the assumption that processes of child develop
ment are independent of learning. Learning is considered a purely
external process that is not actively involved il1 development. It merely
utilizes the achievements of development rather than providing an
impetus for modifying its course.
In experimental investigations of the development of thinking in
school children, it bas bD assumed that processes such as deduction
and understanding, evolution of notions about the' world, interpretation
of pohysical causality, and mastery of logical fonns of thought and ab
stract logic all occur by themselves, witnout any -i.nfIuence from school
79
HfJ
learning. An example oJ such a theory is Piaget's exlrcllwly complex und
interesting theoretical principles, which also shape the ('xpcrimcntal
methodology he employs. The questions Piaget uses in the course of his
"clinical conversations" with children dearly illustrate his approach.
When a five-year-old is asked "why doesn't the sun fall?" it is assumcd
that the child has neither a ready answer for such a question nor the
general capabilities for generating one. The point of asking questions
that are so far beyond the reach of the child's intellectual skills is to
eliminate the influence of previous experience and knowledge. The
experimenter seeks to obtain the tendencies of children's thinking in
"pure" form, entirely independent of learning.1
Similarly, the classics of psychological literature, such as the works
by Binet and others, assume that development is always a prerequisite
for learning and that if a child's mental functions (intellectual operations)
have not matured to the extent that he is capable of learning a particular
subject, then no instruction will prove useful. They especially feared
premature instruction, the teaching of a subject before the child was
ready for it. All effort was concentrated on nnding the lower threshold of
learning ability, the age at which a particular kind of learning nrst
becomes possible.
Because this approach is based on the premise that learning trails
behind development, that development always outruns learning, it
precludes the notion that learning may playa role in the course of the
development or maturation of those functions activated in the course of
learning. Development or maturation is viewed as a precondition of
learning but never the result of it. To summarize this position; Learning
forms a superstructure over development, leaVing the latter essentially
unaltered.
The second major theoretical position is that learning is develop
ment. This identity is the essence of a group of theories that are quite
diverse in origin.
One such theory is based on the concept of reflex, an essentially
'old notion that has been extensively revived recently. Whether reading,
writing, or arithmetic is being considered, development is viewed as the
mastery' of conditioned reBexes; that is, the process of learning is COm
pletely and inseparably blended with the process of development. This
notion was elaborated by who reduced the learning process to
habit formation and identified the learning process with development.
Reflex theories have at least one thing in commOn with theOries
such as Piaget's: in both, development is conceived of as the elaboration
and substitution of innate responses. As James expressed it, EducatiOH,
tiT
in short, CanJlol lw lll'ltf'r than by calling it the organization
of acquired hllhib ot couduct and tendencies to behavior."2 Develop
ment itself is rL'duced primarily to the accumulation of all possible
responses. Any acquired response is considered either a more complex
form of or Ii substitute for the innate response.
But despite the similarity between the nrst and second theoretical
positions, there is a major difference in their assumptions about the
temporal relationship between learning and developmental processes.
Theorists who hold the Brst view assert that developmental cycles pre
cede learning cycles; maturation precedes learning and instruction must
lag behind mental growth. For the second group of theorists, both
processes occur simultaneously; learning and development coincide at
all points in the same way that two identical geometrical6gures coincide
when superimposed.
The third theoretical position on the relation between learning and
development attempts overcome the extremes of the other two by
simply combining them. A clear example of this approach is Koffka's
theory, in which development is based on two inherently different but
related processes, each of which influences the other.
s
On the one hand
is maturation, which depends directly on the development of the nervous
system; on the other hand is learning, which itself is also a developmental
process.
Three aspects of this theory are new. First, as we already noted, is
the combination of two seemingly opposite viewpoints, each of which
has been enoountered separately in the history of science. The very fact
that these two viewpoints can be combined into one theory indicates
that they are not opposing and nmmally exclusive but have something
essential in common. Also new is the idea that the two processes that
make up development are mutually dependent and interactive. Of
course, the nature of the interaction is left virtually unexplored in
KofFka's work, which is limited solely to very general rem.arks regarding
the relation between these two processes. It is clear that for iKoffka the
process of maturation prepares and makes poSSible a specific process of
learning. The learning process then stimulates and pushes forward the
maturation process. The third and most important new aspect of this
theory is the expanded role it ascribes to learning in child development.
This emphasis leads us directly to an old pedagogical problem, that of
formal discipline and the problem of transfer.
Pedagogical movements that have emphasized formal discipline and
urged tho tcaching of classical languages, ancient civilizations, and
mnthomnl!cq hOVil t\ssumcd that regardless of the irrelevance of these
p.articular subjects for dai.ly living, they were of tIll' vuhw for
the pupil's mental development. A variety of studies haY!' cllllcd into
question the soundness of this idea. It has beenshnwn that learning in
one area has very little influence on overall development For example,
reflex theorists Woodworth and Thorndike found that adults who, after
special exercises, had achieved considerable success in determining the
length of short lines, had made virtually no progress in their ability to
detennine the length of long lines. These same adults were successfully
trained to estimate the size of a given two-dimensional figure, but this
training ,did not make them successful in estimating the size of a series
of other two-dimensional figures of various sizes and shapes.
According to Thorndike, theoreticians in psychology and education
believe that every particular response acquisition directly enhances
overall ability in equal measure.
4
Teachers believed and acted on the
basis of the theory that the mind is a complex of abilities-powers of
observation, attention, memory, thinking, and so forth-and that any
improvement in any specific ability results in a general improvement in
all abilities. According to this theory, if the student increased the atten
tion he paid to Latin grammar, he would increase his abilities to focus
attention on any task. The words "'accuracy," "'quick-Wittedness," "ability
to reason," "memory," "'power of observation," "attention," "concentra
tion," and so forth are said to denote actual fundamental capabilities
that vary in accordance with the material with which they operate; these
basic abilities are substantially modified by studying particular subjects,
and they retain these modifications when they turn to other areas. There
fore, if someone learns to do any single thing well, he will also be able
to do other entirely unrelated things well as a result of some secret
connection. It is assumed that mental capab.iIities function indepen
dently of the material with which they operate, and tllat the development
of one ability entaus the development of others.
Thorndike himself opposed this point of view. TIrrough a variety of
studies he showed that particular forms of activity, such as spelling,
are dependent on the mastery of specific skills and material necessary for
the performance of that particular task. The development of one particu
lar capabHity se1dom means the development of others. Thorndike
argued that specialization of abilities is even greater than superficial
observation may indicate. For example, if, out of a hundred individuals
we choose ten who display the ability to detect spelling errors or to
measure lengths, it is unlikely that these ten will display better abilities
regarding, for example, the estimation of the weight of objects. In the
same way, SPC('Ollll<1l1Cl'urucy in :llkling I11l1nhers are entirely unrelated
to nnd in able to think op antonyms.
This l'I.Jlillarl.:h shows that the mind is not a complex network of
ge1lraZ capabilities such as observation, attention, memory, judgment,
and so forth, but a set of specific capabilities, each of which is, to some
extent, independent of the others and is developed independently.
Learning is more than the acquisition of the ability to think; it is th.e
acquisition of many specialized abilities for thinking about a variety of
things. Learning does not alter our overall ability to focus attention but
rather develops variOUS abilities to focus attention on a variety of things.
Acoording to this view, special training affects overall development only
when its elements, material, and processes are similar across specific
domains; habit governs us. This leads to the conclusion that because
each activLty depends on the material with which it operates, the
development of consdousness is the development of a set of particular,
independent capabilities or of a set of particular habits. Improvement
of one Eunction of consciousness or one aspect of its activity can affect
the development of another only to the extent that there are elements
common to both functions or activities.
Developmental theorists such as Koffka and the Gestalt School-who
hold! to the third theoretical position outlined earlier-oppose Thorn
dike's point of view. They assert that the influence of learning is never
specific. From their study of structural principles, they argue tbat the
learning process can never be reduced simply to th.e formation of skills
but embodies an intellectual order that makes it possible to transfer
general principles discovered in solving one task to a variety of other
tasks. From this of ",iew, the child, wbile leaming a particular
operation, acquires the ability to cIeate structures of a certain type,
regardless of the diverse materials with which she is working and regard
legs of the particular ,elements [I.wolved. Thus, Koffka does not conceive
of learning as limited to a process of habit and skill acquisition. The
relationship he posits between learning and development is not that of
an identity but of a more complex relationship. According to Thorndike,
learning and development coincide at all points, but for Koffka, develop
ment is always a larger set than learning. Schematically, the relationship
between the two processes could be depicted by two concentric circles,
the smaller symbolizing the learning process and the larger the develop
mental process evoked by learning.
Once a child has learned to perronn an operation, he thus assimilates
some structural principle whose sphere of application is other than just
85

the operations of the type 00 whose basis the principle was llssimilated
Consequelltly, in one step il} I'eaming, a child makes two steps in
development, that is, learning and development do not coincide. This
concept is the essential aspect of the third group of theories We have
discussed.
ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT:
A NEW APPROACH
Although we reject all three theoretical positions discussed above,
analyzing them leads \is to a more adequate view of the relation between
leaming and development. The question to be framed in arriving at a
solution to this problem is complex. It consists of two separate issues:
first, the general relation between learning and development; and
second, the specific featmes of this relationship when children reach
school age.,
That children's learning begins long before they attend school is
the starting pOint of this discussion. Any learning a child encounters in
school always has a previous history. For example, children begin to
study arithmetic in school, but long beforeoand they have had some
experience with have had to deal with operations of
division, addition, subtraction, and ,determination of size. Consequently,
children have their own preschool arithmetic, which only myopic
psychologists coul'd ignore.
It goes without saying that learning as it occurs in the preschool
years differs markedly from school learning, which i.s concemed with the
assimilation of the fundamentals of scientific knowledge. But even when,
in the period of her first questions, a child asSimilates the names of
objects in her environment, she is lea,rning. Indeed, can it be doubted
that children learn speech from adults; or that, through asking questions
and giving anSWers, children acquire a variety of ]nfonnation; or that,
through imitating adults and through being instructed about how to
act, children develop an entire repository of skills? and devel
opment are interrelated from the child's very first day of life.
koffb, attempting to clarify the laws of child learning and their
relation to mental development, concentrates his attention on the sim
plest learning processes, those that Occur in the preschool years. His error
is that, while s'eeing a similarity between preschool and school learning,
he fails to discern the difference-he does not See the specilically new
elements that school learning introduces. He and others assume that
the difference between preschool and school learning consists of non
,"U'rIIl'UCIII t/tlm'.'j'" 1.I'IJ"1I11
systemat-i(: learning in lIlIC case and systematic learning in the other.
But "systematicness" is Dot the only issue; there is also the fact that
school leanling introduces something fundamentally new into the child's
development. In order to elaborate the dimensions of school learning, we
will describe ,a new and exceptionally important concept without which
the, issue cannot be resolved: the zone of proximal development.
A well known and empirically established fact is that learning
should be matched in some manner with the child's developmental level.
For example, it has been established that the teaching of reading, writ
ing, and arithmetic should be initiated at a specific age level. Only
recently, however, has attention been directed to the fact that we cannot
limit ourselves merely to detennining developmental levels if we wish to
discover the-actual relations of the developmental process to learning
capabilities. We must determine at least two developmental levels.
The first level can be called the actual developmental level, that is,
the level of development of a child's mental functions that has been
established as a result of certain already completed developmental
cycles. When we determine a child's mental age by using tests, we are
almost always dealing with the actual developmental level. In studies
of children's mental development it is generally assumed that only those
things that: ohildren can do on their own are indicative of mental abilities.
We give children a battery of tests or a variety of tasks of varying
degrees of difficulty, and we judge the extent of their mental develop
ment on the basis of how they solve them and at what level of difficulty.
On the other hand, if we offer leading questions or show how the problem
is to be solved and the child then solves it, or if the teacher initiates
tne solution and the child completes it or solves it in collaboration with
other children-in sJhort, if the child barely misses an independent
solution of the problem-the solution is not regax'ded as indicative of his
mental development. This "truth" was famtliar and reinforced by com
mon sense. Over a decade even the profoundest thinkers never ques
tioned the assumption; they never entertained the notion that what
children can do with the assistance of others might be in some sense
even more indicative of tlleir mental development than what tIley can
,do alone.
Let us take a simple example. Suppose I investigate two children
upon entrance iato school, both of whom are ten years old chronologi
c,tlly and eight years old in terms of mental development Can I say that
they are the same age mentally? Of course. What does this mean? It
means that th('y cnn independently deal with tasks up to the degree of
difficulty thn\ Iw('n standardized fOF the eight-year-old level. U ]
stop <It this point, people would imagine that the IiUh1i('(}I1l'1I1 course of
mental development and of school learning for these uhildren will b
the same, because it depends on their intellect. Of course, there may be
other factors, for example, if one child was sick for half a year while
the other was never absent from school; but generally speaking, the fate
of these children should be the same. Now imagine that il do not
terminate my study at this point, but only begin it. These children seem
to be capable of handling problems up to an eight-year-old's level, but
not beyond that. Suppose that I show them various ways of dealing with
the problem. Different expel'imenters might employ different modes 0
demonstration in different cases: some might run through an entire dem
onstration and ask the children to repeat it, others might initiate the
solution and ask the child to finish it, or offer leading questions. In short,
in some way or another I propose that the children solve the problem
with my assistance. Under these circumstances it turns out that the first
child can deal with problems up to a twelve-year-old's level, the second
up to a nine-year-old's. Now, are these children mentally the same?
When it was first shown that the capability of children with equal
levels of mental development to learn under a teacher's guidance
varied to a high degree, it became apparent that those children were not
mentally the same age and that the subsequent course of their learning
would obviously be different. This difference between twelve and eight,
or between nine and eight, is 'what we call develop
rrumt. It is the distance hetween the actual developrnentallevel as de
te.rmined by 1.ndeperulent problem solving ;;nd ,tbe-level of
development as determined through problem solVing 'tlruler adult
guidance or in collahoration, with mQ!L.capable peers.
If we naively ask what the actual developmental level is, or, to put it
more simply, what more independent problem solving reveals, the most
common answer would be that a child's actual developmental level
defines functions that have already matured, that is, the end products of
development. If a child can do such-and-such independently, it means
that the functions for suchand.such have matured in her. 'What, then,
is defined by the z{)ne of proximal as detennlned through
problems that children cannot solve independently but only with
sistance? The zone of proximal development defines those functions that
have not yet matured but are in the process of maturation, functions that
will mature tomorrow but are currently in an embryonic state. These
functions could be termed the "buds" or "flowers'" of development
rather than the "fruits" of development. The actual developmental level
characterizes mental development retrospectively, while the zone of
1.,-"
proximal ucv(llopull'lIt l'llllrncterizes mental development prospectively.
The zone uf proximal development furnishes psychologists and
educators with LI tool through which the internal course of development
can be understood. By using this method we can take account of not
only the cycles and maturation processes that have already been com
pleted but also those processes that are currently in a state of fonnation,
that are j ust: to mature and develop. Thus, the zone of proximal
development permits us to delineate the child's immediate future and his
dynamic developmental state, allowing not only for what already has
been achieved developmentally but also for what is in the COID'Se of
maturing. The two children in our example displayed the same mental
age from the viewpoint of developmental cycles already completed, hut
the developmental dynamics of the two were entirely different. The
state of a child's mental development can be determined only by clarify
ing its two levels: the actual developmental level and the zone of
proXimal development.
I will discuss one study of preschool children to demonstrate that
what is.0 the zone o(proximal today_"",ill be the
dev-el0l'mental level tomorrow-that is, what a child can do with as- . ____
sistance today Slle wHl be able to do by herself tomorrow.
The American researcher Dorothea McCarthy showed that among
children between the ages of three and five there are two groups of
functions: those the children already possess, and those they can perform
under guidance, in groups, and in collaboration with one another but
which they have not mastered independently. McCarthy's study dem
ot!.strated that this second group of functions is at the actual develop
mental level of five-to-seven-year-olds. What her subjects could do only
under guidance, in collaboration, and in groups at the age of three-to-five
yearS they could do independently when they reached the age of five-to
seven Thus, if we were to determine only mental age--that is,
oIlly functions that have matured-we would have but a summary of
completed development, while if we determine the maturing functions,
we can predict what will happen to these children between five and
seven, provided the saITle developmental conditions are maintaiued. The
zone of proximal development can become a powerful concept in devel
opmental research, one that can markedly enhance the ,effectiveness
and utility of the application of diagnostics of mental development to
educational problems.
A full understanding of the concept of the zone of prOXimal
development mllst result in reevaluation of the role of imitation in learn
in!!. An UllShl\kl\blo tenet of classical psychology is that only the inde

pendent activity of children, not their lrlJitativo llcllvlly. Indicates their
Jevel of mental development. This view is expressed in all current
testing systems. In evaluating mental development, consideration is
given to only those solutions to test problems which thp. child reaches
without the assistance of others, Without demonstrations, and without
leading questions. Imitation and learning are thought of as purely
mechanical processes. But recently psychologists have shown that a
person can imitate only that which is within her developmental level.
For example, if a child is having difficulty with a problem in arithmetic
and the teacher solves it on the blackboard, the child may grasp the
solution in an instant. But if the teacher were to solve a problem in
higher mathematics, the child would not be able to understand the
solution no matter how many times she imitated it.
Animal psychologists, and in particular Kohler, have dealt with this
question of imitation quite welL6 Kohler's experiments sought to deter
mine whether primates are capable of graphic thought. The principal
question was whether primates solved problems independently or
whether they merely imitated solutions they had seen perfonned earlier,
for example, watching othe'r animals or humans use sticks and other
tools and then imitating them. Kohler's special experiments, designed
to determine what primates could imitate, reveal that primates can use
imitation to solve only those problems that are of the same degree of
difficulty as those they can solve alone. However, Kohler failed to take
account of an 'important fact, namely, that primates cannot be t,aught (in
the human sense of the word) through imitation, nor can their intellect
be developed, because fhey have nO ZONe of proximal development. A
primate can learn a great deal through training by using its mechanical
and :mental skills, but it cannot be made more intelligent, that is, it
cannot be taught to solve a var.iety of more advanced problems inde
pendently. For' this reason animals are incapable of learning in the
human sense of the tenni human learning preS1,lpposes a specific social
nature and a process by which children grow into the intellectual life of
those around them.
Children can imitate a variety of actions that go well beyond the
limits of their own capabilities. Using imitation, children are capable
of doing much more in collective activity or under the guidance of
adults. This fact, which seems to be of little significance in itself, is of
fundamental importance in that it demands a radical alteration of the
entire doctrine concenling the relation between learning and develop
ment in children. One direct consequence is a change in conclusions that
may be drawn from diagnostic tests of development.
R
Formerly, it wns hclievl..o that by using tests, we determine the
mental developml.'lJt level with which education should reckon and
whose limits it should not exceed. This procedure oriented learning
loward yesterday's development, toward developmental stages already
completed. The error of this view was discovered earlier in practice
than in theory. It is demonstrated most clearly in the teaching of
mentally retarded children. Studies have established that mentally
retarded children are not very capable of abstract thinking. From this
the pedagogy of the special school drew the seemingly correct con
clusion that all teaching of such children should be based on the
use of concrete, look-and-do methods. And yet a considerable amount
of experience with thi.s method resulted in profound disillusionment.
It turned out 'that a teaching system based solely on concreteness
one that eliminated from teaching everything associated with abstract
thinking-not only failed to help retarded children overcome their
innate handicaps but also reinforced their handicaps by accustoming
children exclusively to concrete thinking and thus suppressing the
rudiments of any abstract thought that such children still have. Pre
cisely because retarded child..ren, when left to themselves, will never
achieve well-elaborated forms of abstract thought, the school should
make every effort to push them in that direction and to develop in
them what is intrinsically lacking in their own development. In the
current practices of special schools for retarded children, we can ob
serve a beneficial shift away from this concept of concreteness, one that
restores look-and-do methods to their proper role. Concreteness is now
seen as necessary alfd unavoidable only as a stepping stone for develop
ing abstract thinking-as a means, not as an end in itself.
SjmilarIy, in normal children, learning which is oriented toward de
velopmental levels that have already been reached is ineffective from
the viewpoint of a chiM's overall development. lit does not aim for
a new stage of the developmental process but rather lags behind this
process. Thus, the notion of a zone of proximal development enables us
to propound a new formula, namely that the only "good learning" is
that which is in advance of development.
The acquisition of language can provide a paradigm for the entire
problem of the relation between learning and development. Language
arises initiaJly as a means of communication between the chil'd and the
people in his environment. Only subsequently, upon conversion to
internal speech, docs it come to organize the child's thought, that is,
become an fnlemnl menta) function. Piaget and others have shown
that rcasoninll: il. 1I chlldren's group as an argument intonded
III
1m
to provG one's OWll point of view before it occurs as an illtel'llal activity
whose distinctive feature is that the child begins to perceive and check
the basis of his thoughts. Such observations prompted Piaget to con
clude that communication produces the need for checking and con6rm
ing thoughts, a process that is characteristic of adult thought.
7
In the
same way that internal speech and refl..ective thought arise from the
'interactions between the child and persons in her environment, these
interactions provide the source of development of a child's voluntary
behavior. Piaget has shown that cooperation prOvides the basis for the
development of a child's moral judgment. Earlier research established
that a child nrst becomes able to subordinate her behavior to rules in
group play and only later does voluntary self-regulation of behavior
arise as an internal function.
These individual examples illustrate a general developmental law
for the higher mental functions that we feel can be applied in its en
tirety to children's learning processes. We propose that an essential
feature of learning is that it creates the zone of proXimal development;
that is, learning awakens a variety of internal developmental processes
that are able to operate only when the child is interacting with people
in his environment and in cooperation with his peers. Once these pro
cesses are internalized, they become part of the child's independent
developmental achievement.
From this point of view, learning is not devePopment; however,
properly organized learning results in mental development and sets in
motion a variety of developmentaf processes that would be impossible
apart from learning. Thus. learning is a necessary and universal aspect
of the process of developing culturally organized, specifically human,
psychological functions.
To swnmarize, the most essential feature of our hypothesis is the
notion that developmental processes do not coincide with learning
processes. Rather, the developmental process lags behind the learning
process; this sequence then results in zones of proximal development.
Our analysis alters the traditional view that at the moment a child
assimilates the meaning of a word, or masters an operation such as
addition or written language, her developmental processes are basically
completed. In fact, they have only just begun at that moment. The
major of analyzing the educational process in this manner
is to show that the initial mastery of, for example, the four arithmetic
operations provides the basis for the subsequent development of a
variety of highly complex internal processes in children's thinking.
Our hypothesis establishes the unity but not the identity of learning
processes nnd illlc'llI.d proc<.!sses. [t presupposes tha'1. the
one is converted illll! Ihe other. it becomes an important con
cern of psychological research to show how external knowledge and
ubilities in children become internalized.
Any investigation explores some sphere of reality. An aim of the
psychological analysis of development is to describe the internal rela
tions of the intellectual processes awakened by school learning. In this
respect, such analysis will be directed inward and is analogous to the
use of x-rays. If successful, it should reveal to the teacher how develop
mental processes stimulated by the course of schoolleaming are carried
through inside the head of each individual child. The revelation of this
internal, subterranean developmental network of school subjects is a task
of primary importance for and educational ana]ysis.
A second essential feature of our hypothesis is the notion that,
although learning is directly related to the course of child development,
the two are never accomplished in equal measure or in parallel. De
velopment in children never follows schoollcami!ng the way a shadow
follows the object that casts it. In actuality, there are highly complex
dynamic relations between developmental and learning processes that
canoot be encompassed by an unchanging hypothetical formulation.
Each school suhject has its own specific relation to the course of
child development, a relation that varies as the child goes from oDe
stage to another. This leads us directly to a reexamination of the prob
lem of fannal discipline, thalt is, to the significance of each particular
subject from the viewpoint of overall mental development. Clearly, the
problem cannot be solved by using anyone formula; extensive and
highly diverse concrete research based on the concept of the zone of
proximal development is necessary to resolve the issue.