FESTO R. GALANG, JR. vs. HON. RAMIRO R.

GERONIMO, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81; and NICASIO M. RAMOS G.R. No. 192793 February 22, 2011

attached his Answer with Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim. One of his affirmative defenses was that the electoral protest was filed out of time, since it was filed more than ten (10) days after the date of proclamation of the winning candidate. The trial court then issued the assailed Order dated June 24, 2011, finding the service of Summons on petitioner on May 28, 2010 as valid, and declaring the Answer filed on June 11, 2010, as filed out of time. The Motion to Admit Answer is DENIED for lack of merit. The Motion to Admit Answer having been denied, the preliminary conference shall proceed ex parte, as previously scheduled pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9, A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC. On July 12, 2010, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to: (1) Restore Protestee's Standing in Court; (2) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated June 24, 2010; and (3) Suspend Proceedings Pending Resolution of Falsification Case Before the Law Department of the COMELEC. However, on July 22, 2010, the trial court issued the second assailed Order denying petitioner's Omnibus Motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to issue writs of certiorari over election cases involving acts and omissions of the MTC and RTC RULING: NO In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The Court held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This was reiterated in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated that a court may issue a

FACTS:

Petitioner (Festo Galang, Jr.) won the mayoralty race on May 10, 2010 Automated Elections for the Municipality of Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon. Subsequently, private respondent Nicasio Ramos, who was also a mayoralty candidate in the same election, requested the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a manual reconciliation of the votes cast. The COMELEC granted the said request. The manual reconciliation was done on May 20, 2010 at the Sangguniang Bayan Session Hall, after which proceedings the eight winning Sangguniang BayanMembers were also proclaimed. The MBOC made erasures and corrections using correction fluid on the COCP for the Sangguniang Bayan Members to reflect the results of the manual reconciliation. As for the COCP for the previously proclaimed mayoralty and vice-mayoralty candidates, the total number of votes for each of the candidates remained the same even after the manual reconciliation; hence, only the date was erased and changed to read "May 20, 2010" to correspond with the date of the manual reconciliation. On May 27, 2010, private respondent filed an election protest case against petitioner before the RTC. The following day, the court sheriff went to petitioner's residence to serve summons with a copy of the petition. The Sheriff's Return of Summons stated that the sheriff was able to serve Summons on petitioner by leaving the same and the attached copy of the protest with a certain Gerry Rojas, who was then at petitioner's residence. On June 8, 2010, petitioner, appeared in court and requested a copy of the summons with a copy of the election protest. During the hearing on said date, respondent judge directed petitioner to file the proper pleading and, on June 11, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Answer, to which was

writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court. Section 8, Rule 14 of the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials states that: Sec. 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the COMELEC within five (5) days after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel or on the adverse party who is not represented by counsel. 8 Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner erred in invoking this Court's power to issue said extraordinary writ. BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. Nos. 172476-99 September 15, 2010

ofP10,500.00 per square meter. Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter. On 18 December 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit against petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for (1) violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 of Republic Act No. 3019 and (2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents. The case was docketed as Case No. OMB-3-98-0020. On 28 January 1999, the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and 12 information for falsification of public documents against petitioner and several other coaccused. Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration dated 12 February 1999, with a supplemental motion dated 28 May 1999, of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. In its 11 June 1999 Order, the Sandiganbayan disposed of petitioners first motion for reconsideration, thus: In a memorandum dated 22 November 2001, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from the informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA), in a memorandum dated 18 December 2001, recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject property. On 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea, the Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty. On 9 March 2006, petitioner filed a motion to set aside his arraignment pending

FACTS: The petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) from April, 5 1994 to July 27,1998. During petitioners term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City for development as housing projects. On 1 August 1997, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual vendors, executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the agreed price

resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. The Sandiganbayan ruled that petitioners second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have should be ventilated in the trial of the case. In its assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied for lack of merit petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him? RULING: NO

We remind respondent to abide by this Courts ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,where we stated that the mere filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the Sandiganbayan. Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so provides: Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. The court in which the petition [for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus] is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case BERNARDO DE LEON vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY substituted by the CITY OF PARAAQUE, RAMON ARELLANO, JR., RICARDO PENA and REYMUNDO ORPILLA G.R. No. 181970 August 3, 2010

In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment. There is grave abuse of discretion when power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction and control over a case properly filed before it. The Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case.There being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on its part, the Sandiganbayan should continue its proceedings with all deliberate dispatch.

FACTS: On [January 15, 1993], petitioner Bernardo De Leon ("De Leon") filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Makati City against respondent Public Estates Authority ("PEA"), a government-owned corporation, as well as its officers, Ramon Arellano, Jr., Ricardo Pena and Reymundo Orpilla. The suit for damages hinged on the alleged unlawful destruction of De Leons fence a nd houses constructed on Lot 5155 containing an area of 11,997 square meters, situated in San Dionisio, Paraaque, which De Leon claimed has been in the possession of his family for more than 50 years. Essentially, De Leon prayed that one, lawful possession of the land in question be awarded to him; two, PEA be ordered to pay damages for demolishing the improvements constructed on Lot 5155; and, three, an injunctive relief be issued to enjoin

PEA from committing acts which would violate his lawful and peaceful possession of the subject premises. The RTC granted De Leons prayer for injunction.

Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the resolution of PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition RULLING:

PEA sought recourse before the Supreme Court through a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for a Restraining Order, ascribing grave abuse of discretion against the court a quo for issuing injunctive relief. The Petition was later referred to this Court for proper determination and disposition, and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 30630. On 30 September 1993, the SC affirmed the decision of the RTC. PEA appealed to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Certiorari insisting that Lot 5155 was a salvage zone until it was reclaimed through government efforts in 1982. The land was previously under water on the coastline which reached nine to twenty meters deep. In 1989, PEA started constructing R-1 Toll Expressway Road for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, which project directly traversed Lot 5155. PEA argued that the documentary evidence presented by De Leon to bolster his fallacious claim of possession and ownership were procured only in 1992, thus negating his very own allegation that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in occupation since time immemorial. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 30630, and dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 93-143 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati. The aforesaid Decision became final and executory as no motion for reconsideration was filed. In due course, PEA moved for the issuance of a writ of execution praying that De Leon and persons claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate and peaceably surrender possession of Lot 5155. De Leon thereafter filed several motions to delay execution of the judgment. ISSUE:

YES Section 7,Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides the general rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of origin does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. It is true that there are instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy.The principle of judicial courtesy, however, remains to be the exception rather than the rule. As held by this Court in Go v. Abrogar, the precept of judicial courtesy should not be applied indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to maintain the relevance of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, in the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, a new paragraph is now added to Section 7, Rule 65, which provides as follows: The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.1avvphi1 While the above quoted amendment may not be applied in the instant case, as A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was made effective only on December 27, 2007, the provisions of the amendatory rule clearly underscores the urgency of proceeding with the principal case in the absence of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction.

This urgency is even more pronounced in the present case, considering that this Courts judgment in PEA v. CA, finding that De Leon does not own the subject property and is not entitled to its possession, had long become final and executory. As a consequence, the writ of execution, as well as the writ of demolition, should be issued as a matter of course, in the absence of any order restraining their issuance. In fact, the writ of demolition is merely an ancillary process to carry out the Order previously made by the RTC for the execution of this Courts decision in PEA v. CA. It is a logical consequence of the writ of execution earlier issued. Furthermore, the Order of the RTC holding in abeyance the resolution of PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition also appears to be a circumvention of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which limit the period of effectivity of restraining orders issued by the courts. In fact, the assailed Orders of the RTC have even become more potent than a TRO issued by the CA because, under the Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the CA is effective only for sixty days. In the present case, even in the absence of a TRO issued by a higher court, the RTC, in effect, directed the maintenance of the status quo by issuing its assailed Orders. Worse, the effectivity of the said Orders was made to last for an indefinite period because the resolution of PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition was made to depend upon the finality of the judgment in G.R. No. 181970. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated December 28, 2007 and March 4, 2008. ERNESTO FRANCISCO, JR. vs. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO G.R. No. 154117 October 2, 2009

Supreme Court for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure base on the ground that the Office of the Ombudsman committed serious errors of law amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding respondents as guilty of committing plunder or/are graft, and in denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner with the respondent.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not public respondent Office of the Ombudsman committed serious errors of law as well as grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Resolution and Order 2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for using the wrong mode of appeal Ruling: 1. No Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as "such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be "so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." We do not find this situation to be present in the instant case so as to merit a reversal of the questioned Resolution and Order issued by respondent Office of the Ombudsman. 2. No Although we agree with private respondents Velarde that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy for parties seeking relief

FACTS: The petitioner (Ernesto Francisco Jr.) filed criminal cases (graft and plunder) against the respondents former President Estrada and others with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the case for lack of evidence. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied. The case was raised to the

from final judgments, orders, or resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies like the Office of the Ombudsman, as has been repeatedly held by this Court, we find that the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 posited by private respondents Velarde is not proper either. This Court subsequently held that under the ruling in Fabian, "all appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure." Said remedy, therefore, is not applicable to cases involving criminal or non-administrative charges filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, which is the situation in the case before us now. As we further stated in Tirol v. Del Rosario: [An] aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In Fabian v. Desierto, the case was dismissed and remanded to the Court of Appeals. This case being criminal and not administrative in nature, however, the conclusion in Fabian is not applicable. Thus, due to the nature of this case and the allegations involving grave abuse of discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman, it should have been filed under Rule 65, and not Rule 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court had already provided this remedy in Nava v. Commission on Audit, wherein we held: The remedy availed of by petitioner is erroneous. Instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant to the provisions of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only judgments or final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court and other courts, whenever authorized by law, may be the subject of an

appeal by certiorari to this Court. It does not include resolutions of the Ombudsman on preliminary investigations in criminal cases. Petitioner's reliance on Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 is misplaced. Section 27 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. In other words, the right to appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like the case at bar. Such right is granted only from orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. An aggrieved party is not left without any recourse. Where the findings of the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.