(Labor) Genesis vs. Ummgt Digest and Taroy

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GENESIS vs. UMMGT & TAROY Juan Taroy was hired on February 2, 1992 by Genesis Transport as a driver.

By 2002, Taroy was, after due notice and hearing, terminated from employment after an accident having been driving recklessly. Taroy thus filed for illegal dismissal claiming that he was singled out for termination because of his union activities, other drivers who had met accidents not having been dismissed. He further alleged that in 1997, petitioner had been deducing from his weekly earnings an amount ranging from P1690-900 (representing toll fees) without his consent, thereby violating LC 113. Deductions were also taken from the bus conductors earnings to thus result to double deduction (Labor Union filed a case too claiming that there was no due process in dismissal). On petitioners part, Genesis counter claimed that despite repeated warnings and disciplining, Taroy had committed several violations which included poor driving skills, tardiness, gambling inside the premises, use of shabu, smoking while driving, insubordination and reckless driving. In support of its claim that Taroy was afforded due process, Genesis Transport cited his preventive suspension, and the investigation held which resulted in the finding that the accident was not due to faulty breaks (as Taroy claimed) but due to his reckless driving. LA: Genesis has discharged the burden of proof in proving that Taroy was indeed reckless and that former was offered due process. UMMGT case was dismissed as well finding that there was due process. On the claim for service incentive leave pay LA ruled that Taroy was not entitled thereto since he was a field personnel paid on commission basis. With respect to Taroys claim for refund, however, LA ruled in his favor finding that though tollgate fees are claimed to form part of overhead expense, why were not expenses for fuel and maintenance also charged to overhead expenses? LA thus concluded that tollgate fees are

deducted from the gross revenues and not from the salaries of drivers and conductors, but certainly the deduction thereof diminishes the take home pay of the employees. Both parties appealed, petitioner as to the finding that Taroy was underpaid. Taroy as for the failure to go over the issue of his preventive suspension. NLRC: Affirmed (underpayment) with Modification, brushing aside the illegal suspension issue having been brought up for the first time on appeal but found that he had not been afforded due process. SC: Petitioners aver that cases of similar import involving also the respondent union have been decided with finality in their favor by the NLRC, thereby invoking res judicata to be applied. SC finds however that absent any ruling that the decisions had become final, said doctrine cannot be applied. Neither may the Court take judicial notice of petitioners claim that the deduction of tollgate fees from the gross earnings of drivers is an accepted and long- standing practice. Judicial Notices would be applied under the following requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non- existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge. LABOR ISSUES: Lower Courts correctly held that the withholding of those amounts reduced the amount from which Taroys 9% commission would be computed. Not to mention the fact that without Taroys written consent or authorization, the deduction is considered illegal.

DP: Rules require is that the employer act on the suspended workers status of employment within the 30-day period by concluding the investigation. It is only when the suspension exceeds 30 days that the employer must reinstate the employee. In the present case, petitioner company had until May 20, 2002. It did by terminating him through a notice dated May 10, 2002, hence, the 30-day requirement was not violated.

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