SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 169391 : October 10, 2012

GO, and Minor EMERSON CHESTER KIM B. GO, Petitioners, v. COLEGIO DE

SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, REV. FR. EDWIN LAO, REV. FR. JOSE RHOMMEL
HERNANDEZ, ALBERT ROSARDA and MA. TERESA SURATOS, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the

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Decision2 dated May 27, 2005 and the resolution3 dated August 18, 2005 of the
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Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80349. The CA decision reversed and
set aside the decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC') of
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Caloocan City, Branch 131, awarding civil damages to the petitioners. The CA
resolution denied the petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration.

The petitioners claim that respondents Colegio de San Juan de Letran (Letran),
Rev. Fr. Edwin Lao, Rev. Fr. Jose Rhommel Hernandez, Mr. Albert Rosarda and
Ma. Teresa Suratos should be held liable for moral, exemplary, and actual
damages for unlawfully dismissing petitioner Emerson Chester Kim B. Go (Kim)
from the rolls of the high school department of Letran. The respondents claim
that they lawfully suspended Kim for violating the schools rule against fraternity
membership.

Factual Background

In October 2001, Mr. George Isleta, the Head of Letrans Auxiliary Services
Department, received information that certain fraternities were recruiting new
members among Letrans high school students. He also received a list of the
students allegedly involved. School authorities started an investigation, including
the conduct of medical examinations on the students whose names were on the
list. On November 20, 2002, Dr. Emmanuel Asuncion, the school physician,
reported that six (6) students bore injuries, probable signs of blunt trauma of
more than two weeks, on the posterior portions of their thighs.5 Mr. Rosarda,
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the Assistant Prefect for Discipline, conferred with the students and asked for
their explanations in writing.

Four (4) students, namely: Raphael Jay Fulgencio, Nicolai Lacson, Carlos Parilla,
and Isaac Gumba, admitted that they were neophytes of the Tau Gamma
Fraternity and were present in a hazing rite held on October 3, 2001 in the house
of one Dulce in Tondo, Manila. They also identified the senior members of the
fraternity present at their hazing. These included Kim, then a fourth year high
school student.
In the meantime, Gerardo Manipon, Letrans security officer, prepared an incident
report6 that the Tau Gamma Fraternity had violated its covenant with Letran by
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recruiting members from its high school department. Manipol had spoken to one
of the fraternity neophytes and obtained a list of eighteen (18) members of the
fraternity currently enrolled at the high school department. Kims name was also
in the list.

At the Parents-Teachers Conference held on November 23, 2001, Mr. Rosarda

informed Kims mother, petitioner Mrs. Angelita Go (Mrs. Go), that students had
positively identified Kim as a fraternity member. Mrs. Go expressed disbelief as
her son was supposedly under his parents constant supervision.

Mr. Rosarda thereafter spoke to Kim and asked him to explain his side. Kim
responded through a written statement dated December 19, 2001; he denied
that he was a fraternity member. He stated that at that time, he was at Dulces
house to pick up a gift, and did not attend the hazing of Rafael, Nicolai, Carlos,
and Isaac.

On the same day, Mr. Rosarda requested Kims parents (by notice) to attend a
conference on January 8, 2002 to address the issue of Kims fraternity
membership.7 Both Mrs. Go and petitioner Mr. Eugene Go (Mr. Go) did not
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attend the conference.

In time, the respondents found that twenty-nine (29) of their students, including
Kim, were fraternity members. The respondents found substantial basis in the
neophytes statements that Kim was a senior fraternity member. Based on their
disciplinary rules, the Father Prefect for Discipline (respondent Rev. Fr. Jose
Rhommel Hernandez) recommended the fraternity members dismissal from the
high school department rolls; incidentally, this sanction was stated in a January
10, 2002 letter to Mr. and Mrs. Go.8 After a meeting with the Rectors
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Council,9 however, respondent Fr. Edwin Lao, Father Rector and President of
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Letran, rejected the recommendation to allow the fourth year students to

graduate from Letran. Students who were not in their fourth year were allowed
to finish the current school year but were barred from subsequent enrollment in
Letran.

Mr. Rosarda conveyed to Mrs. Go and Kim, in their conference on January 15,
2002, the decision to suspend Kim from January 16, 2002 to February 18,
2002.10 Incidentally, Mr. Go did not attend this conference.11
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On even date, Mrs. Go submitted a request for the deferment of Kims suspension
to January 21, 200212 so that he could take a previously scheduled
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examination.13 The request was granted.14 ςrνll ςrν ll

On January 22, 2002, the respondents conferred with the parents of the
sanctioned fourth year students to discuss the extension classes the students
would take (as arranged by the respondents) as make-up for classes missed
during their suspension. These extension classes would enable the students to
meet all academic requirements for graduation from high school by the summer
of 2002. The respondents also proposed that the students and their parents sign
a pro-forma agreement to signify their conformity with their suspension. Mr. and
Mrs. Go refused to sign.15 They also refused to accept the respondents finding
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that Kim was a fraternity member. They likewise insisted that due process had
not been observed.

On January 28, 2002, the petitioners filed a complaint16for damages before the
RTC of Caloocan City claiming that the respondents17 had unlawfully dismissed ςrν ll

Kim.18 Mr. and Mrs. Go also sought compensation for the "business opportunity
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losses" they suffered while personally attending to Kims disciplinary case.

The Ruling of the RTC

Mrs. Go19 and Mr. Go20 testified for the petitioners at the trial. Mr.
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Rosarda,21 Fr. Hernandez,22 and Fr. Lao23 testified for the respondents.
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The RTC24 held that the respondents had failed to observe "the basic
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requirement of due process" and that their evidence was "utterly insufficient" to
prove that Kim was a fraternity member.25 It also declared that Letran had no ςrνll

authority to dismiss students for their fraternity membership. Accordingly, it

awarded the petitioners moral and exemplary damages. The trial court also held
that Mr. Go was entitled to actual damages after finding that he had neglected
his manufacturing business when he personally attended to his sons disciplinary
case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of
plaintiffs-spouses Eugene C. Go and Angelita B. Go, together with their minor
son Emerson Chester Kim B. Go, as against defendants Colegio De San Juan De
Letran, Fr. Edwin Lao, Fr. Jose Rhommel Hernandez, Albert Rosarda and Ma.
Teresa Suratos, and they are hereby ordered the following:

1. To pay plaintiff Eugene C. Go the amount of P 2,854,000.00 as actual

damages;

2. To pay each plaintiff, Eugene C. Go and Angelita B. Go, the amount

of P 2,000,000.00 for each defendant, or a total amount of P 20,000,000.00 as
moral damages; and P 1,000,000.00 for each defendant, or a total amount
of P 10,000,000.00 as exemplary damages, or a grand total of P 30,000,000.00,
to be paid solidarily by all liable defendants, plus prevailing legal interest thereon
from the date of filing until the same is fully paid;

3. To pay plaintiffs 20% of the total amount awarded, as attorneys fees, to be

paid solidarily by all liable defendants; and

4. The cost of suit.26 ςrνl l

The Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. It held, among
others, that the petitioners were not denied due process as the petitioners had
been given ample opportunity to be heard in Kims disciplinary case. The CA also
found that there was no bad faith, malice, fraud, nor any improper and willful
motive or conduct on the part of the respondents to justify the award of
damages. Accordingly, it dismissed the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. C-
19938 for lack of merit.

The petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the CA denied
the motion for lack of merit;27 hence, the present petition for review
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on certiorari.

The Issue

Based on the petitions assigned errors,28 the issue for our resolution is whether
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the CA had erred in setting aside the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-
19938.

The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition and affirm the CA decision.

Preliminarily, we note that the disciplinary sanction the respondents imposed on

Kim was actually a suspension and not a "dismissal" as the petitioners insist in
their complaint. We agree with the CA that the petitioners were well aware of
this fact, as Mrs. Gos letter specifically requested that Kims suspension be
deferred. That this request was granted and that Kim was allowed to take the
examination further support the conclusion that Kim had not been dismissed.

Further, the RTCs statement that Letran, a private school, possesses no

authority to impose a dismissal, or any disciplinary action for that matter, on
students who violate its policy against fraternity membership must be corrected.
The RTC reasoned out that Order No. 20, series of 1991, of the then Department
of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991),29 which the
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respondents cite as legal basis for Letrans policy, only covered public high
schools and not private high schools such as Letran.

We disagree with the RTCs reasoning because it is a restrictive interpretation of

DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991. True, the fourth paragraph of the order states:

4. EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER, FRATERNITIES AND SORORITIES

ARE PROHIBITED IN PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS. PENALTY
FOR NON-COMPLIANCE IS EXPULSION OF PUPILS/STUDENTS.

This paragraph seems to limit the scope of the orders prohibition to public
elementary and secondary schools. However, in ascertaining the meaning of
DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991, the entire order must be taken as a whole.30 It ς rν ll
should be read, not in isolated parts, but with reference to every other part and
every word and phrase in connection with its context.31 ςrνl l

Even a cursory perusal of the rest of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991 reveals the
education departments clear intent to apply the prohibition against fraternity
membership for all elementary and high school students, regardless of their
school of enrollment.

The orders title, "Prohibition of Fraternities and Sororities in Elementary and

Secondary Schools," serves to clarify whatever ambiguity may arise from its
fourth paragraph.32 It is a straightforward title. It directs the prohibition to
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elementary and secondary schools in general, and does not distinguish between
private and public schools. We also look at the orders second paragraph,
whereby the department faults an earlier regulation, Department Order No. 6,
series of 1954, for failing to ban fraternities and sororities in public
and private secondary schools. With the second paragraph, it is clear that the
education department sought to remedy the earlier orders failing by way of
DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991.

Finally, we note that the order is addressed to the heads of private schools,
colleges, and universities, and not just to the public school authorities.

For this Court to sustain the RTCs restrictive interpretation and accordingly limit
the prohibition in DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991 to students enrolled in public
schools would be to impede the very purpose of the order.33 In United Harbor
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Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Association of International Shipping

Lines, Inc., where the Court construed an executive order,34 we also stated that
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statutes are to be given such construction as would advance the object, suppress
the mischief, and secure the benefits the statute intended. There is no reason
why this principle cannot apply to the construction of DECS Order No. 20, s.
1991.

Incidentally, the penalty for non-compliance with DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991,
is expulsion, a severe form of disciplinary penalty consisting of excluding a
student from admission to any public or private school in the country. It requires
the approval of the education secretary before it can be imposed.35 In contrast, ςrνl l

the penalty prescribed by the rules of Letran for fraternity membership among
their high school students is dismissal, which is limited to the exclusion of an
erring student from the rolls of the school.

Even assuming arguendo that the education department had not issued such
prohibition, private schools still have the authority to promulgate and enforce a
similar prohibition pursuant to their right to establish disciplinary rules and
regulations.36 This right has been recognized in the Manual of Regulations for
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Private Schools, which has the character of law.37 Section 78 of the 1992 Manual
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of Regulations of Regulations for Private Schools, in particular and with relevance

to this case, provides:
Section 78. Authority to Promulgate Disciplinary Rules. Every private school shall
have the right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules and regulations it may
deem necessary and consistent with the provisions of this Manual for the
maintenance of good school discipline and class attendance. Such rules and
regulations shall be effective as of promulgation and notification to students in
an appropriate school issuance or publication.

The right to establish disciplinary rules is consistent with the mandate in the
Constitution38 for schools to teach discipline;39 in fact, schools have the duty to
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develop discipline in students.40 Corollarily, the Court has always recognized the
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right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions on students who violate

disciplinary rules.41 The penalty for violations includes dismissal or exclusion
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from re-enrollment.

We find Letrans rule prohibiting its high school students from joining fraternities
to be a reasonable regulation, not only because of the reasons stated in DECS
Order No. 20, s. 1991,42 but also because of the adult-oriented activities often
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associated with fraternities. Expectedly, most, if not all, of its high school
students are minors. Besides, Letrans penalty for violation of the rule is clearly
stated in its enrollment contracts and in the Students Handbooks43 it distributes ςrν ll

at the start of every school year.44 ςrν ll

In this case, the petitioners were notified of both rule and penalty through Kims
enrollment contract for school year 2001 to 2002.45 Notably, the penalty ςrνl l

provided for fraternity membership is "summary dismissal." We also note that

Mrs. Go signified her conformto these terms with her signature in the
contract.46 No reason, therefore, exist to justify the trial courts position that
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respondent Letran cannot lawfully dismiss violating students, such as Kim.

On the issue of due process, the petitioners insist that the question be resolved
under the guidelines for administrative due process in Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations.47 They argue that the respondents violated due process (a)
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by not conducting a formal inquiry into the charge against Kim; (b) by not giving
them any written notice of the charge; and (c) by not providing them with the
opportunity to cross-examine the neophytes who had positively identified Kim as
a senior member of their fraternity. The petitioners also fault the respondents for
not showing them the neophytes written statements, which they claim to be
unverified, unsworn, and hearsay.

These arguments deserve scant attention.

In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,48 the Court held that Guzman v. ςrν ll

National University,49 not Ang Tibay, is the authority on the procedural rights
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of students in disciplinary cases. In Guzman, we laid down the minimum

standards in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, as
follows:
It bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does
not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may
be summary; and crossexamination is not, contrary to petitioners view, an
essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must be met
to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the
students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them,
with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.50ςrνl l

These standards render the petitioners arguments totally without merit.

In De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,51 where we affirmed the

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petitioning universitys right to exclude students from the rolls of their respective
schools52 for their involvement in a fraternity mauling incident, we rejected the
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argument that there is a denial of due process when students are not allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses against them in school disciplinary proceedings. We
reject the same argument in this case.

We are likewise not moved by the petitioners argument that they were not given
the opportunity to examine the neophytes written statements and the security
officers incident report.53 These documents are admissible in school disciplinary
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proceedings, and may amount to substantial evidence to support a decision in

these proceedings. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,54 where the ςrνll

private respondents were students dismissed from their law school after
participating in hazing activities, we held:

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not
accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which
became the basis of petitioners February 14, 1991 order, they were denied
procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the
same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for
disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to
cross examination. [Emphasis ours.]55 ςrνll

Since disciplinary proceedings may be summary, the insistence that a "formal

inquiry" on the accusation against Kim should have been conducted lacks legal
basis. It has no factual basis as well. While the petitioners state that Mr. and
Mrs. Go were "never given an opportunity to assist Kim,"56 the records show ςrνll

that the respondents gave them two (2) notices, dated December 19, 2001 and
January 8, 2002, for conferences on January 8, 2002 and January 15,
2002.57 The notices clearly state: "Dear Mr./Mrs. Go, We would like to seek your
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help in correcting Kims problem on: Discipline & Conduct Offense: Membership in
Fraternity."58 Thus, the respondents had given them ample opportunity to assist
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their son in his disciplinary case.

The records also show that, without any explanation, both parents failed to
attend the January 8, 2002 conference while Mr. Go did not bother to go to the
January 15, 2002 conference. "Where a party was afforded an opportunity to
participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot [thereafter]
complain of deprivation of due process."59ςrνll

Through the notices, the respondents duly informed the petitioners in writing
that Kim had a disciplinary charge for fraternity membership. At the earlier
November 23, 2001 Parents-Teachers Conference, Mr. Rosarda also informed
Mrs. Go that the charge stemmed from the fraternity neophytes positive
identification of Kim as a member; thus the petitioners fully knew of
the nature of the evidence that stood against Kim.

The petitioners nevertheless argue that the respondents defectively observed the
written notice rule because they had requested, and received, Kims written
explanation at a time when the respondents had not yet issued the written notice
of the accusation against him. The records indicate that while Kims denial and
the first notice were both dated December 19, 2001, Kim had not yet received
the notice at the time he made the requested written explanation.

We see no merit in this argument as the petitioners apparently hew to an

erroneous view of administrative due process. Jurisprudence has clarified that
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict
judicial sense.60 The very nature of due process negates any concept of
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inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable

situation.61 Thus, we are hard pressed to believe that Kims denial of his
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fraternity membership before formal notice was given worked against his interest
in the disciplinary case. What matters for due process purpose is notice of what
is to be explained, not the form in which the notice is given.

The raison detre of the written notice rule is to inform the student of the
disciplinary charge against him and to enable him to suitably prepare a defense.
The records show that as early as November 23, 2001, it was already made plain
to the petitioners that the subject matter of the case against Kim was his alleged
fraternity membership. Thus, by the time Mr. Rosarda spoke to Kim and asked
for his written explanation in December 2001, Kim has had enough time to
prepare his response to this plain charge. We also note that the information in
the notice the respondents subsequently sent is no different from the information
that they had earlier conveyed, albeit orally, to the petitioners: the simple
unadorned statement that Kim stood accused of fraternity membership. Given
these circumstances, we are not convinced that Kims right to explain his side as
exercised in his written denial had been violated or diminished. The essence of
due process, it bears repeating, is simply the opportunity to be heard.62
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And Kim had been heard. His written explanation was received, indeed even
solicited, by the respondents. Thus, he cannot claim that he was denied the right
to adduce evidence in his behalf. In fact, the petitioners were given further
opportunity to produce additional evidence with the January 8, 2002 conference
that they did not attend. We are also satisfied that the respondents had
considered all the pieces of evidence and found these to be substantial. We note
especially that the petitioners never imputed any motive on Kims co-students
that would justify the claim that they uttered falsehood against him.

In Licup v. San Carlos University,63 the Court held that when a student commits ςrνll

a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard,

he forfeits his contractual right, and the court should not review the discretion of
university authorities.64 In San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals, et
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al.,65 we held that only when there is marked arbitrariness should the court
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interfere with the academic judgment of the school faculty and the proper
authorities.66 In this case, we find that the respondents observed due process in
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Kims disciplinary case, consistent with our pronouncements in Guzman. No

reason exists why the above principles in these cited cases cannot apply to this
case. The respondents decision that Kim had violated a disciplinary rule and
should be sanctioned must be respected.

As a final point, the CA correctly held that there were no further bases to hold
the respondents liable for moral or exemplary damages. Our study of the records
confirms that the respondents did not act with bad faith, malice, fraud, or
improper or willful motive or conduct in disciplining Kim. Moreover, we find no
basis for the award of actual damages. The petitioners claim, and the RTC
agreed,67 that the respondents are liable for the business opportunity losses the
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petitioners incurred after their clients had cancelled their purchases in their
plastic-manufacturing business. To prove the claim, Mr. Go testified that he
neglected his business affairs because he had his attention on Kim's unlawful
dismissal, and that his clients had subsequently cancelled their purchase orders
when he could not confirm them.68 His testimony on the reason for the clients' ςrν ll

cancellation, however, is obviously hearsay and remains speculative. The

respondents' liability for actual damages cannot be based on speculation.

For these reasons, we find no reversible error Ill the assailed ('A decision, and
accordingly, DENY the present petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM the decision dated May

271 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80349.

Costs against the petitioners. ςrαl αωl ιb rα r

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

1 ςrν ll Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp.3-37.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and concurred in by
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Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Monina Arevalo-

Zenarosa; Id. At 40-51.

3
ςrν ll Id. At 53-55.

4
ςrν ll In Civil Case No. C-19938, dated August 18, 2003; id. At 81-93.

5 ςrν ll RTC Records, p. 540.

6
ςrν ll Id. at 545.

7
ςrν ll Id. at 548.

8 ςrν ll Id. at 502.

9 ςrν ll TSN dated June 30, 2003, p. 657.

10 Id. at 658.
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11
ςrν ll TSN dated May 19, 2003, p. 399.

12
ςrν ll TSN dated June 17, 2003, p. 542.

13 ςrν ll RTC Records, p. 503.

14
ςrν ll TSN dated June 17, 2003, p. 507; and TSN dated June 30, 2003, p. 663.

15
ςrν ll RTC Records, p. 552.

16
ςrν ll RTC Records, p. 7.

17
ςrν ll Including Letran High School Principal Ma. Teresa Suratos.

18
ςrν ll RTC Records, p. 15.

19
ςrν ll TSN dated January 31, 2003.

20
ςrν ll TSN dated February 5, 2003 and March 31, 2003.

21
ςrν ll TSN dated May 19, 2003.

22 ςrν ll TSN dated June 17, 2003.

23
ςrν ll TSN dated June 30, 2003.

24
ςrν ll Judge Antonio J. Fineza, presiding.
25
ςrνllRollo, pp. 90-91.

26
ςrν ll Id. at 93.

27
ςrν ll Id. at 55.

28
ςrν ll Rollo, p. 19. The present petition assigned the following errors:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED

ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT HELD
THAT I DUE PROCESS ATTENDED THE SANCTION IMPOSED BY RESPONDENTS
ON PETITIONER KIM JUST BECAUSE THEY REQUIRED HIM TO EXPLAIN IN
WRITING (WITHOUT ANY WRITTEN CHARGE INFORMING HIM OF THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM) HIS MEMBERSIP [sic] IN
FRATERNITY, WHICH HE DID BY DENYING IT, ALTHOUGH THE SANCTION IS
BASED MERELY ON CONFIDENTIAL, UNDISCLOSED, UNVERIFIED OR UNSWORN
STATEMENTS OF HIS CO-STUDENTS AND, WORSE, ON CONFIDENTIAL,
UNDISCLOSED, UNVERIFIED AND DOUBLE HERESAY [sic] REPORT OF
RESPONDENT SCHOOLS DETACHMENT COMMANDER.

II WHEN IT CLEARED RESPONDENTS OF ANY LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES.

29 ςrν ll DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991 reads:

PROHIBITION OF FRATERNITIES AND SORORITIES IN ELEMENTARY AND

SECONDARY SCHOOLS

To: Bureau Directors

Regional Directors
School Superintendents
Presidents, State Colleges and Universities
Heads of Private Schools, Colleges and Universities
Vocational School Superintendents/Administrators

1. Recent events call attention to unfortunate incidents resulting from initiation

rites (hazing) conducted in fraternities and sororities. In some cases, problems
like drug addiction, vandalism, absenteeism, rumble and other behavior
problems in elementary and secondary schools were found to be linked to the
presence of and/or the active membership of some pupils/students in such
organizations.

2. Although Department Order No. 6, s. 1954 prohibits hazing in schools and

imposes sanctions for violations, it does not ban fraternities/sororities in public
and private secondary schools.
3. Considering that enrolments in elementary and secondary schools are
relatively small and students come from the immediate communities served, the
presence of fraternities/sororities which serve as socializing agents among
pupil/student-peers is not deemed necessary. On the other hand, interest clubs
and co-curricular organizations like the Drama Club, Math Club, Junior Police
organization and others perform that same function and in addition develop
pupil/student potentials.

4. Effective upon receipt of this order, fraternities and sororities are prohibited in
public elementary and secondary schools. Penalty for non-compliance is
expulsion of pupils/students.

5. Wide dissemination of and strict compliance with this Order is enjoined.

(Sgd.) ISIDRO D. CARI

[emphasis ours]

30 ςrν ll See Judge Leynes v. Commission on Audit, 463 Phil. 557, 573 (2003).

31See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc., 205 SCRA 184,
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188.

32
See Government of the P.I. v. Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634, 636
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(1915).

33 Paragraphs 1 and 2, DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991. We also note that the intent
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of the DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991 has been further clarified by the Department
of Education itself in a 2006 issuance titled "REITERATING THE PROHIBITION OF
THE PRACTICE OF HAZING AND THE OPERATION OF FRATERNITIES IN
SORORITIES IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS." Department of
Education Order No. 7, s. 2006 explicitly states, and we quote: "DECS Order No.
20, s. 1991, meanwhile, prohibits the operation of fraternities in public and
private elementary and secondary schools."

34
G.R. No. 133763, November 13, 2002, 391 SCRA 522, 533. See
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also Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc. v. United Harbor Pilots

Association of the Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 172029, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA
284, 294.

35
ςrν ll Section 77, 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.

36
Tan v. Court of Appeals, 276 Phil. 227 (1991).
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37
Espiritu Santo Parochial School v. NLRC, 258 Phil. 600 (1989).
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38
ςrν ll CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Section 3(2).
39
Jenosa v. Delariarte, G.R. No. 172138, September 8, 2010, 630 SCRA 295,
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302.

40
See Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431, 456
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(2000).

41
Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business Administration, 244 Phil. 8, 23 (1988),
ςrν ll

citing Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of Appeals, No. L-56180, October 16,
1986, 145 SCRA 100; and Licup v. University of San Carlos (USC), 258-A Phil.
417, 424.

42
ςrν ll Supra note 29.

43
ςrν ll RTC Records, pp. 536 -537.

44 ςrν ll TSN dated May 19, 2003, p. 348.

45
ςrν ll RTC Records, pp. 538-539.

46
ςrν ll TSN dated May 19, 2003, p. 350.

47
ςrν ll 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

48 ςrν ll G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993, 222 SCRA 644, 656.

49
ςrν ll 226 Phil. 596 (1986).

50
ςrν ll Id. at 603-604.

51 ςrν ll G.R. No. 127980, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 22, 52-53.

52 The students were enrolled at the De La Salle University and the College of
ςrν ll

Saint Benilde.

53
These documents were later formally offered in Civil Case No. C-19938 as
ςrν ll

Exhibits "7," "8," "9," "10," and "11" RTC Records, pp. 541-546.

54
ςrν ll Supra note 48.

55
ςrν ll Id. at 657-658.

56
ςrν ll RTC Records, p. 15.

57
ςrν ll TSN dated January 31, 2003, Record, pp. 116, 118, 123.

58 ςrν ll Records, pp. 548-549.

59
ςrνllDe La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 51, at 51.

60
Gatus v. Quality House, Inc., G.R. No. 156766, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 177,
ςrν ll

190.

61Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, G.R. No. 152048, April
ςrν ll

7, 2009, 584 SCRA 110, 123.

62Gatus v. Quality House, Inc., supra note 59, at 190, citing Phil. Airlines, Inc. v.
ςrν ll

National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 87353, July 3, 1991, 198 SCRA.
748; see also Audion Electric Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 106648, June 19, 1999, 308 SCRA 341.

63
ςrν ll Supra note 41.

64 ςrν ll Ibid.

65
ςrν ll 274 Phil. 414 (1991).

66
Id. at 424, citing Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
ςrν ll

Theology, No. L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277, 289.

67 ςrν ll See the RH' Decision, p. 92.

68
ςrν ll TSN dated February 5. 2003, pp. 242 to 243.