(U) Cryptologic Almanac 50 Anniversary Series (U) The Berlin Tunnel

DOCID: 3962345
(U)Cryptologic Almanac 50
th
Anniversary Series
(U)The Berlin Tunnel
Part II: The Rivals
SYNOPSIS: In the early 1950s, a CIA scientist discovered a flaw in a Soviet
tele rinter s stem that rendered its enc ted traffic ..exp
the CIA worked.
from We-s-t-to-E-a-s-t-B-e-rl-in-a-n-d-t-ap
into a telephone hub that served Soviet forces in Germany and much of Eastern Europe.
However, out of institutional rivalry over control of U.S. communications intelligence
(COMINT), the CIA decided against notifying the National Security Agency -- this was
wiretapping, not COMINT, they rationalized.
NOW, ON WITH THE STORY: Intercept operations from the tunnel began
on May 10, 1955. Listening in was conducted around the clock.
(b)(1)
From the very beginning, the operation produced enormous amounts of intercept.
The taps went into three cables, containing 172 circuits, with each circuit carrying 18
communications channels. The voice material was relayed to a bank of 150 tape recorders
located in the "warehouse." Tapes of recorded telephone conversations were sent to
London, where a group of White Russian emigres transcribed and translated them. Tapes

(b)(3)-P.L.86-36
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
CIA security regulations prohibited access to the REGAL material by non-CIA
personnel. In fact, CIA did not inform NSA about the tunnel activity until a month after it
became operationa1.1 I
\\
he opinions expressed in this article are
hose of the author( s) and do not @'pproved for Release by NSA on 02-29-2012, FOIA Case # 5256j)
epresentthe offi ci al opi ni on of
SA/CSS.
DOCID: 3962345 (b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L.86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
On April 21, after several days of heavy rainfall, electrical shorts disrupted critical
Soviet communications in Germany. Soviet signal troops and East German technicians
began digging to uncover the cable; while probing for the line, they discovered the tap
chamber. Soon, the eavesdroppers heard East German telephone operators refusing to
place outgoing calls, because it was "against orders." The tunnel was entered shortly
thereafter, and operations ceased.
A very great number of reports were issued based on the telephone and teleprinte.. r
traffic. Reports identified previously unknown Soviet military units in Germany, and
confirmed other order of battle, training, and equipment data which had previously been
uncertain. Many reports dealt with the day-to-day activities of both Soviet and East
German military and government units. In a sidelight, the intercepts revealed Soviet
interest in the ELINT warehouse from which the tunnel extended.
(U) In 1961, five years after the tunnel operation had been exposed, an Eastern European
defector revealed that George Blake, an officer in Britain's SIS, was a Soviet spy. Blake
pleaded guilty to charges of espionage, and was sentenced to 42 years in prison. He told
investigators he had given the Soviets every important document he had seen since 1953.
Blake had been involved in discussions about the tunnel operation from the very start.
U.S. and British intelligence authorities now faced a difficult question. If the
Soviets knew about the tunnel from the beginning, why had they allowed it to continue?
Had they passed deceptive data?
("F.&I7'SQ.. As it turned out, while George Blake knew about the tunnel and the fact that it
was tapping telephone lines, he apparently had not been informed of the flaw on Soviet
teleprinters that allowed analysts to exploit encrypted messages. Apparently, based on
Blake's incomplete knowledge, the Soviets instituted better telephone security procedures,
but did not alter their teleprinter communication habits. Thus, plaintext telephone
conversations yielded only routine -- but sometimes still interesting -- information while
decryption of teleprinter traffic produced high-quality intelligence.
(U/IreOO) Although some in the intelligence community continued to doubt the value of
(b)(1)
86-36
. . .
the tunnel
ever undertaken. "
DOClD: 3962345
(U/7P'6YQlAnd the other side? Reportedly, technicians from the USSR expressed
admiration for the technology involved. Soon, the Soviets and the East German
government turned the tunnel into a tourist attraction, a way to denounce "imperialist"
intervention into their affairs. This stopped, however, as it backfired and as the public
began to admire the daring and sophistication of Western intelligence.
Rivalry continued between NSA and CIA over control of American COMINT,
especially as CIA expanded its active program. General Canine was bitter about having
been bypassed on the project, and it affected his relations with Allen Dulles for the rest of
his tenure. His successor, General John Samford, was more of a diplomat, however, and
achieved at least a truce with the CIA. In 1977, a rational division of effort was achieved
by memorandum between the two agencies -- widely known as lithe Peace Treaty" -- that
delineated each agency's role and responsibility more clearly.
A. Hatch, Director, Center for Cryptologic History, 972-2893s, dahatch@nsa]
Almanac 50
th
Anniversary Series
Content Owner: Feedback
Web POC: Feedback
Last Modified: by nsr
Last Reviewed: February 28, 2003
Next Review: 365 days
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it)! ( :!, __ '1l, < 1':: < J,:t.,t'"
DERIVED FROM: NSAlCSS JI.o\ONUAI.. 12.3-2.
DATED: 2.4 FtB 1998
DEa.ASSI fY ON: Xl

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