Sacmar Vs Carpio
Sacmar Vs Carpio
Sacmar Vs Carpio
: FACTS: In the case filed by complainant Sacmar against Zoren Legaspi in the MTC of Pasig City, the latter was convicted for grave threats and was sentenced to arresto mayorand and to pay complainant moral damages of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Upon appeal by Legaspi, RTC Judge Reyes-Carpio (herein respondent) modified the decision, finding the accused guilty only of Other Light Threats under Article 265 of the RPC, reducing the penalty to arresto menor and to pay moral damages of ten thousand pesos (P10,000). Complainant claims that respondent judge wittingly afforded unwarranted benefits to the accused which caused undue injury to her as private complainant in the case. She likewise avers that respondent judge exhibited manifest partiality towards the accused when she disregarded the evidence on record in modifying the decision of the MTC by downgrading the conviction of Legaspi from Grave Threats to Other Light Threats thereby reducing the criminal and civil liabilities of Legaspi.
Respondent vehemently denied all the charges, claiming that she rendered her decision in good faith, without malice, and without any conscious and deliberate intent to favor a movie actor whom she does not even know.
In her Reply, complainant pointed out that respondent judge, in her Comment, failed to explain why she unilaterally downgraded the conviction of accused Legaspi. In effect, respondent judge has impliedly admitted the charges against her when she failed to specifically challenge these charges. Complainant assailed the claim of respondent judge that the downgrading of the offense was rendered in good faith and without malice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Judge rendered an unjust judgment pursuant to Art. 204, RPC and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
As a rule, the acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial functions are not subject to disciplinary power unless they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.