A.M. No.

RTJ-09-2197 April 13, 2011

[Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 08-3026-RTJ]

ANTONINO MONTICALBO, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE CRESCENTE F. MARAYA, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte,
Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a verified Complaint dated September 24, 2008
filed by complainant Antonino Monticalbo charging respondent Judge Crescente F.
Maraya, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte, with gross
ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and grave abuse of authority thru false
representation.1

Complainant Monticalbo is one of the defendants in a civil case for collection of a

sum of money filed by Fatima Credit Cooperative against him and his wife before the
6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calubian-San Isidro, Leyte (MCTC).2

The case was dismissed by the said court in its February 1, 2008 Order on the
ground that the representative of Fatima Credit Cooperative had no authority to
prosecute the case.3 The MCTC, however, did not rule on the counterclaim of
complainant Monticalbo for attorney�s fees and litigation expenses. For said
reason, he filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the
court.4

Aggrieved, complainant elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Calubian, Leyte (RTC), where his appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. CN-89.5 He
then filed a motion for extension of time to file a memorandum on appeal, which was
granted by respondent judge in his Order dated June 25, 2008.6

In his August 26, 2008 Order, respondent judge dismissed the appeal for having been
filed out of time. He stated that:

Under the rules on Summary Procedure which was applied to govern the proceedings of
this case, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Being a
prohibited pleading, it will not suspend the period of appeal. (Jaravata vs. CA
G.R. No. 85467, April 25, 1990, 3rd Division). Since the appealed Order was
received by counsel for the defendants-appellants on February 13, 2008, the notice
of appeal, not a motion for reconsideration, should have been filed within a period
of 15 days which lapsed on February 29, 2008. As the Notice of Appeal was filed on
March 31, 2008, the appeal was, therefore, filed out of time and the appealed Order
has become final and executory. The lapse of the appeal period deprives the courts
of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment (Delgado vs. Republic, 164 SCRA 347).7

Complainant Monticalbo imputes the following errors on the part of respondent

judge: (1) respondent erred in ruling that Civil Case No. CN-89 is covered by the
Rules on Summary Procedure, considering that the total claim of the plaintiff in
the said case exceeded ?10,000.00; (2) respondent, motivated by bad faith and
corruption, cited the non-existent case of Jaravata v. Court of Appeals in his
questioned Order; and (3) respondent accepted bribes in the form of food from
plaintiff cooperative in Civil Case No. CN-89, through Margarito Costelo, Jr., then
Sheriff of the trial court presided over by respondent judge, and Chairman of the
Board and President of the said cooperative.8 Complainant further avers that he
personally witnessed the respondent judge enjoying a drinking spree with Costelo
and his other male staff members in a nipa hut annexed to the building of the trial
court during office hours in the afternoons of July 9, 2008, August 6, 2008 and
September 10, 2008.9

In his Comment and Manifestations dated December 29, 2008, respondent judge refutes
all the accusations hurled by complainant against him. He explains that he decided
to dismiss complainant�s appeal because it was filed out of time under the Rules on
Summary Procedure. This decision was made in the exercise of the appellate
jurisdiction of the MCTC and of his sound discretion.10 Secondly, he argues that
complainant�s accusation of bad faith and corruption is baseless and that the
complaint was filed upon the urging of Atty. Alexander Lacaba, his counsel, in an
attempt to get even with him (respondent judge) for having lost the appeal in the
case.11 Lastly, respondent denies having participated in any drinking spree with
his staff members or Costelo, who has been prohibited by his doctor from drinking
alcoholic beverages. He claims that he only eats his meals in the nipa hut because
he has to refrain from eating in public eateries for security reasons.12

The administrative complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and

referred to the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City Station, for
raffle among the justices thereat for investigation, report and recommendation.13

On April 13, 2010, Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon issued his Report and
Recommendation, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

In sum, it is recommended that respondent Judge be ABSOLVED from the charge of

grave misconduct and corruption. However, the citation of a non-existent case by
the respondent Judge in his assailed order of dismissal is tantamount to a
misrepresentation and therefore reflect poorly on his esteemed position as a public
officer in a court of justice, it is therefore recommended that he be ADMONISHED
AND STRICTLY WARNED that a repetition thereof will be more severely dealt with.14

The Court agrees with the findings of the Investigating Justice.

Grave Misconduct and Bribery

In order to merit disciplinary action, it must be established that respondent�s

actions were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred or were attended by
fraud, dishonesty or corruption.15 In the absence of such proof, the decision or
order in question is presumed to have been issued in good faith by respondent
judge.16 This was emphasized in the case of Balsamo v. Judge Suan,17 where the
Court explained:

The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being
biased and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the
performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in
bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which
a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.181avvphi1

In cases where a judge is charged with bribery or grave misconduct, bias or

partiality cannot be presumed. Neither can bad faith or malice be inferred just
because the judgment or order rendered by respondent is adverse to complainant.19
What constitutes bad faith has been expounded on in the case of Sampiano v. Judge
Indar:20

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach
of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the
nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.
Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused
to do wrong or cause damage.21

Before a judge can be held liable for deliberately rendering an unjust judgment or
order, one must be able to show that such judgment or order is unjust and that it
was issued with malicious intent to cause injustice to the aggrieved party.22 Well-
established is the rule in administrative proceedings that the burden of proof
rests on the complainant, who must be able to support and prove by substantial
evidence his accusations against respondent.23 Substantial evidence, the quantum of
proof required in administrative cases, is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.24 Failure of the
complainant to substantiate his claims will lead to the dismissal of the
administrative complaint for lack of merit because, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, the presumption that a judge has regularly performed his duties will
prevail.25

In this case, complainant has nothing but mere assertions and conjectures to
buttress his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery on the part of respondent
who, if complainant is to be believed, accepted bribes of food and engaged in
drinking sprees with court employees during office hours. Contrary to complainant�s
statement, the Investigating Justice found that respondent was attending to his
cases during the dates when he allegedly had those drinking sessions.

Time and again, this Court has held that charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence.26 Complainant miserably failed to
substantiate his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery. He merely alleged
hollow suppositions to shore up his Complaint. Consequently, this Court has no
other option except to dismiss the administrative complaint for lack of merit.

Although the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that
would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people�s faith in
the judiciary, it will not hesitate to protect an innocent court employee against
any groundless accusation or administrative charge which has no basis in fact or
law.27 As succinctly put by Justice Quisumbing in the case of Francisco v. Leyva,28

This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon
employees of the Judiciary. At the same time, however, neither will we hesitate to
shield the same employees from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather
than promote the orderly administration of justice.29

Gross Ignorance of the Law

Respondent judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be
shown that he committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of
bad faith.30 In addition to this, the acts complained of must not only be contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be motivated by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.31

Complainant Monticalbo insists that respondent judge erred in ruling that his
counterclaim for attorney�s fees and litigation expenses was covered by the Rules
on Summary Procedure which provides that a motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading and will not toll the running of the period to appeal. To
support his argument, complainant points out that his claim exceeds the ?10,000.00
limit set in the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Complainant is mistaken.

A cursory reading of Section 1 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure clearly

shows that complainant�s claim is covered by the said rule which reads:

Section 1. Scope. � This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling
within their jurisdiction:

A. Civil Cases

x x x

(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the
plaintiff�s claim does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (?100,000.00) or Two
hundred thousand pesos (?200,000.00) in Metropolitan Manila, exclusive of interest
and costs.

Evidently, the complainant has been consulting old books. The rule now, as amended
by A.M. No. 02-11-09-SC, effective November 25, 2002, has placed the ceiling at ?
100,000.00. As such, the complainant has no basis in charging that respondent�s
"knowledge of law fell so short" and that he was remiss in his obligation to be
familiar with the law which "even law students these days know such x x x."32

For this reason, counsel for complainant is reminded to choose his words carefully
and refrain from hurling insults at respondent judge especially if, as in this
instance, he is obviously mistaken in his reading of the law. His use of insulting
language and unfair criticism is a violation of his duty as a lawyer to accord due
respect to the courts. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
that "a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others."

Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent judge erred in
issuing the questioned order, he cannot be held liable for his official acts, no
matter how erroneous, for as long as he acted in good faith.33 A judge is not
required to be faultless because to demand otherwise would make the judicial office
untenable for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
administration of justice can be infallible.34 As a matter of policy, a judge
cannot be subject to disciplinary action for his erroneous actions, unless it can
be shown that they were accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt motives, or
improper considerations.35

The complainant should have elevated his grievance to the higher courts. The filing
of an administrative case against the judge is not an alternative to the other
judicial remedies provided by law, neither is it complementary or supplementary to
such actions.36 With regard to this matter, the case of Flores v. Abesamis37 is
instructive:

As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or
irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be
regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence,
or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal
principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment
or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies
against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character
(i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.)
are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or
a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort
to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in
the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other
measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil,
administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial
remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality,
that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability
may be said to have opened, or closed.38

Citation of non-existent case

The Court now deals with the charge that respondent judge cited a non-existent case
� Jaravata v. Court of Appeals with case number CA G.R. No. 85467 supposedly
promulgated on April 25, 1990 � in his questioned Order.

A search of available legal resources reveals that no such decision has been
promulgated by the Supreme Court.

Besides, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, "CA G.R." And, it
cannot be considered a CA case because the respondent is the "Court of Appeals."
This undoubtedly runs counter to the standard of competence and integrity expected
of those occupying respondent�s judicial position. A judge must be "the embodiment
of competence, integrity and independence."39 The Code of Judicial Conduct also
demands that he "be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence."40

While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment without proof that it
was made with a deliberate intent to cause an injustice, still he is required to
observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official
duties.41 As such, he should always strive to live up to the strict standards of
competence, integrity and diligence in public service necessary for one in his
position.42 The case of Lacanilao v. Judge Rosete appropriately states that: "A
judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a
manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. Integrity, in a
judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity."43

It is important to note that respondent did not offer any explanation for the
incorrect citation of the said case in his Comment to the complaint against him. He
should be admonished for his failure to address this issue, especially as it
pertains to the proper execution of his office.

Nonetheless, considering that this is the first time that respondent has been
reported to have committed such carelessness, the Court will accord him leniency.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for Grave Misconduct and Corruption is hereby DISMISSED.
For citing a non-existent case, however, respondent judge is ADMONISHED to observe
due care in the performance of his functions and duties and WARNED that a
repetition thereof would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 1-5.

2 Id. at 9-11.

3 Id.

4 Id. at. 2.

5 Id. at 12.

6 Id. at 15.

7 Id. at 16.

8 Id. at 3.

9 Id.

10 Id. at 22.

11 Id. at 23.

12 Id.

13 Id. at 38.

14 Id. at 45.

15 Ang v. Judge Asis, 424 Phil. 105, 115 (2002).

16 Planas v. Reyes, 492 Phil. 288, 300 (2005), citing Osorio v. Judge Dizon, et al,
469 Phil. 819 (2004).

17 458 Phil. 11 (2003).

18 Id. at 23, citing Abdula v. Guiani, 382 Phil. 757 (2000); Rallos v. Gako, Jr.,
385 Phil. 4 (2000).); Calleja v. Santelices, 384 Phil. 595 (2000); Guillermo v.
Reyes, Jr., 310 Phil. 176 (1995).

19 Salcedo v. Bollozos, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 27, 44.

20 A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 597.

21 Id. at 613, citing Planas v. Judge Reyes, 492 Phil. 288 (2005).

22 Supra note 15 at 116, citing Naval v. Panday, 341 Phil. 656 (1997).

23 Planas v. Judge Reyes, 492 Phil. 288, 301 (2005), citing Ong v. Judge Rosete,
484 Phil. 102 (2004).
24 Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, A.M. No. P-10-2788, January 18,
2011.

25 Ever Emporium, Inc. v. Judge Maceda, 483 Phil. 323, 339 (2004), citing Atty. Rex
J.M.A. Fernandez v. Court of Appeals Associate Justices Eubolo G. Verzola, Martin
S. Villarama, Jr., and Mario L. Guari�a III, 480 Phil. 1 (2004); Leonides T. Cortes
v. Sandiganbayan Justices Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada
and Rodolfo G. Palattao, 467 Phil. 155 (2004).

26 De Jesus v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 171491, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 341, 350,
citing Manalabe v. Cabie, A.M. No. P-05-1984, July 6, 2007, 526 SCRA 582, 589;
Adajar v. Develos, 512 Phil. 9(2005); Ong v. Rosete, 484 Phil. 102 (2004); Datuin,
Jr. v. Soriano, 439 Phil. 592(2002).

27 Sarmiento v. Salamat, 416 Phil. 684, 694 (2001), citing Re: Report on the
Judicial Audit, RTC Br. 117, Pasay City, 353 Phil. 190 (1998).

28 Francisco v. Leyva, 364 Phil. 1, 4 (1999).

29 Id.

30 Ora v. Judge Almajar, 509 Phil. 595, 601 (2005), citing Joaquin v. Madrid, 482
Phil. 795 (2004).

31 Ocampo v. Bibat-Palamos, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1655, March 6, 2007, 517 SCRA 480 487.

32 Rollo, pp. 3 and 28.

33 Supra note 18, citing Casta�os v. Esca�o, Jr., 251 SCRA 174 (1995).

34 Tan v. Judge Adre, 490 Phil. 555, 562 (2005), citing Villanueva-Fabella v. Lee,
464 Phil. 548 (2004).

35 Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, 395 Phil. 352, 365 (2000), citing Guerrero v.
Villamor, 296 SCRA 88 (1998).

36 Salcedo v. Bollozos, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 27, 42 citing
Bello v. Diaz, 459 Phil. 214 (2003).

37 341 Phil. 299 (1997).

38 Id. at 312.

39 Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1, Rule 1.01.

40 Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, Rule 3.01.

41 Dipatuan v. Judge Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 48,
56.

42 Lacanilao v. Judge Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1702, April 8, 2008, 550 SCRA 542,
553.

43 Id. at 552, citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Barron, 358 Phil. 12
(1998) and Capuno v. Jaramillo, A.M. No. RTJ-98-944, July 20, 1994, 234 SCRA 212,
232.