Finals

Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests
Freedom of the Press

IN RE Emil (Emiliano) P. JURADO Ex Rel.:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT)
Facts: Jurado, a journalist who writes in a
newspaper of general circulation, the Manila
Standard. He describes himself as a columnist,
who incidentally happens to be a lawyer,, had
been writing about alleged improperties and
irregularities in the judiciary over several
months (from about October, 1992 to March,
1993). Other journalists had also been making
reports or comments on the same subject. At the
same time, anonymous communications were
being extensively circulated, by hand and
through the mail, about alleged venality and
corruption in the courts. And all these were
being repeatedly and insistently adverted to by
certain sectors of society. Events Directly
Giving Rise to the Proceeding at Bar.
The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by
the decision promulgated by this Court on
August 27, 1992, in the so-called controversial
case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI), G.R. No, 94374. In that decision the
Court was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4,
in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice
Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the
majority.
In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374,

the Philippine Daily Inquirer and one or two
other newspapers published, on January 28,
1993, a report of the purported affidavit of a Mr.
David Miles Yerkes, an alleged expert in
linguistics. This gentleman, it appears, had been
commissioned by one of the parties in the case,
Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), to
examine and analyze the decision of Justice
Gutierrez in relation to a few of his prior
ponencias and the writings of one of the lawyers
of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay, to ascertain if the
decision had been written, in whole or in part,
by the latter. Yerkes proffered the conclusion
that the Gutierrez decision looks, reads and
sounds like the writing of the PLDTs counsel,
Thus, he speaks of the Magnificent Seven, by
merely referring to undisclosed regional trial
court judges in Makati; the Magnificent
Seven in the Supreme Court, as some
undesignated justices who supposedly vote as
one; the Dirty Dozen, as unidentified trial
judges in Makati and three other cities. He
adverts to an anonymous group of justices and
judges for whom a bank allegedly hosted a
party; and six unnamed justices of this Court
who reportedly spent a prepaid vacation in
Hong Kong with their families.
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order
Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate
Reports of Corruption in the Judiciary, to
investigate the said reports of corruption in the
judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received
from the public utility, denying the allegations

in Jurados column. The Supreme Court then
issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt
with in the letter and affidavit of the public
utility company be docketed and acted upon as
an official Court proceeding for the
determination of whether or not the allegations
made by Jurado are true.
HELD: Jurados actuations, in the context in
which they were done, demonstrate gross
irresponsibility, and indifference to factual
accuracy and the injury that he might cause to
the name and reputation of those of whom he
wrote. They constitute contempt of court,
directly tending as they do to degrade or abase
the administration of justice and the judges
engaged in that function. By doing them, he has
placed himself beyond the circle of reputable,
decent and responsible journalists who live by
their Code or the Golden Rule and who strive
at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility
of their calling.
Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate,
may further the fruitful exercise of the right of
free speech, it does not follow that the lie,
knowingly and deliberately published about a
public official, should enjoy a like immunity.
The knowingly false statement and the false
statement made with reckless disregard of the
truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the
norm for the proper exercise of any right,
1
constitutional or otherwise, viz.: ARTICLE 19.

Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. The provision is
reflective of the universally accepted precept of
abuse of rights, one of the most dominant
principles which must be deemed always
implied in any system of law.
Requirement to exercise bona fide care in
ascertaining the truth of the statements when
publishing statements which are clearly
defamatory to identifiable judges or other public
officials.
Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded
as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms
of conduct which embody more stringent
standards of honesty, integrity, and competence
than are commonly required from private
persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or
accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot
reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any
right to private honor and reputation. For to so
rule will be to discourage all save those who
feel no need to maintain their self-respect from
becoming judges. The public interest involved
in freedom of speech and the individual interest
of judges (and for that matter, all other public
officials) in the maintenance of private honor
and reputation need to be accommodated one to
the other. And the point of adjustment or
accommodation between these two legitimate
interests is precisely found in the norm which
requires those who, invoking freedom of

speech, publish statements which are clearly
defamatory to identifiable judges or other public
officials to exercise bona fide care in
ascertaining the truth of the statements they
publish. The norm does not require that a
journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or
publishes. But the norm does prohibit the
reckless disregard of private reputation by
publishing or circulating defamatory statements
without any bona fide effort to ascertain the
truth thereof.
Freedom of Assembly
Jose B.L. Reyes vs Ramon Bagatsing
Facts: Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of
the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought
a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the
front gate of the US embassy which is less than
two blocks apart. The permit has been denied
by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The
mayor claimed that there have been intelligence
reports that indicated that the rally would be
infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued
City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging
of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the US
embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his
intention to provide protection to the US
embassy from such lawless elements in
pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. And that under our
constitution we adhere to generally accepted

principles of international law.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede
provisions of the Constitution. Whether or
not the rallyists should be granted the permit.
HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for
the protection of foreign diplomats from any
lawless element. And indeed the Vienna
Convention is a restatement of the generally
accepted principles of international law. But the
same cannot be invoked as defense to the
primacy of the Philippine Constitution which
upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech
and peacable assembly. At the same time, the
City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor
cannot be invoked if the application thereof
would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass
the clear and present danger test. The mere
assertion that subversives may infiltrate the
ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. In
this case, no less than the police chief assured
that they have taken all the necessary steps to
ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance
cannot be applied yet because there was no
showing that indeed the rallyists are within the
500 feet radius (besides, theres also the
question of whether or not the mayor can
prohibit such rally but, as noted by the SC,
that has not been raised an an issue in this case).
2
MALABANAN V. RAMENTO
(CASE DIGEST)
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme
Student Council of respondent University. They
sought and were granted by tile school
authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00
A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982.
Pursuant to such permit, along with other
students, they held a general assembly at the
Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science
basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in
such permit, not in the basketball court as
therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At
such gathering they manifested in vehement and
vigorous language their opposition to the
proposed merger of the Institute of Animal
Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At
10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward
the Life Science Building and continued their
rally. It was outside the area covered by their
permit. They continued their demonstration,
giving utterance to language severely critical of
the University authorities and using
megaphones in the process. There was, as a
result, disturbance of the classes being held.
Also, the non-academic employees, within
hearing distance, stopped their work because of
the noise created. They were asked to explain
on the same day why they should not be held
liable for holding an illegal assembly.
Then on September 9, 1982, they were formed
through a memorandum that they were under
preventive suspension for one academic year for

their failure to explain the holding of an illegal
assembly in front of the Life Science Building.
The validity thereof was challenged by
petitioners both before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus
with damages against private respondents.
Issue: WON the suspension of the students for
1 academic year was violative of the
constitutional rights of freedom pf peaceable
assembly and free speech?
Decision: Yes. As is quite clear from the
opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, 6 the invocation
of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly
carries with it the implication that the right to
free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both
are embraced in the concept of freedom of
expression which is Identified with the liberty
to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of
public interest without censorship or
punishment and which is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the state has a right to prevent. 7
It would be most appropriate then, as was done
in the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, 21 for this
Court to lay down the principles for the
guidance of school authorities and students
alike. The rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to

discuss matters affecting their welfare or
involving public interest is not to be subjected
to previous restraint or subsequent punishment
unless there be a showing of a clear and present
danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a
right to present. As a corollary, the utmost
leeway and scope is accorded the content of the
placards displayed or utterances made. The
peaceable character of an assembly could be
lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under
the name of dissent, whatever grievances that
may be aired being susceptible to correction
through the ways of the law. If the assembly is
to be held in school premises, permit must be
sought from its school authorities, who are
devoid of the power to deny such request
arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such
permit, there may be conditions as to the time
and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of
classes or stoppage of work of the nonacademic personnel. Even if, however, there be
violations of its terms, the penalty incurred
should not be disproportionate to the offense.
Petition Granted. One week suspension had
been served.
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged
3
that they are citizens and taxpayers of the

Philippines and that their right as organizations
and individuals were violated when the rally
they participated in on October 6, 2005 was
violently dispersed by policemen implementing
Batas Pambansa No. 880.
speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the

portions of their petitions raising factual issues,
particularly those raising the issue of whether
B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to
the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6,
2005.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No.

880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and other human rights treaties
of which the Philippines is a signatory. They
argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before
one can stage a public assembly regardless of
the presence or absence of a clear and present
danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and
is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression
clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message which the
expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not
content-neutral as it does not apply to mass
actions in support of the government. The
words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or
influencing suggest the exposition of some
cause not espoused by the government. Also,
the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the
law applies to assemblies against the
government because they are being tolerated.
As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass
the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two
other petitions were ordered to be consolidated
on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral
arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive

response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880,
specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a)
violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine
Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on
the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine
Constitution provides that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. The right
to peaceably assemble and petition for redress
of grievances, together with freedom of speech,
of expression, and of the press, is a right that
enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional
protection. For this rights represent the very
basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless
and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right,
while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having equal rights,

nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of
such and other constitutional rights is termed
the sovereign police power, which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that
it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that
would use public places. The reference to
lawful cause does not make it content-based
because assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be
peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither
the words opinion, protesting, and
influencing in of grievances come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be
avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyist and is
independent of the content of the expression in
the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on
the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the rights even
under the Universal Declaration of Human
4
Rights and The International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights.
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part,

and respondents, more particularly the Secretary
of the Interior and Local Governments, are
DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or
designation of at least one suitable freedom
park or plaza in every city and municipality of
the country. After thirty (30) days from the
finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of
advance notices, no prior permit shall be
required to exercise the right to peaceably
assemble and petition in the public parks or
plaza in every city or municipality that has not
yet complied with section 15 of the law.
Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response
(CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from
or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL
and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to
REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY
OBSERVE the requirements of maximum
tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all
other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED
G.R. No. L-72119

May 29, 1987
Right to Information
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI
Facts:
The fundamental right of the people to
information on matters of public concern is
invoked in this special civil action for
mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission.
The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's
request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu
City. These government employees, Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly
represented themselves as civil service eligibles
who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the
eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano
Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and
that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to acquire the information, petitioner
prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ
of mandamus to compel the respondent
Commission to disclose said information.
The Solicitor General interposes procedural

objections to give due course to this Petition.
He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue
upon the ground that the latter does not possess
any clear legal right to be informed of the civil
service eligibilities of the government
employees concerned. He calls attention to the
alleged failure of the petitioner to show his
actual interest in securing this particular
information. He further argues that there is no
ministerial duty on the part of the Commission
to furnish the petitioner with the information he
seeks.
Issues:
a.
Whether or not the Civil Service
Commission is obliged to produce the
information regarding the eligibilities of certain
persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City?
b.
Whether or not the petitioner has a
standing to assert the right to information?
Ruling:
a. This question is first addressed to the
government agency having custody of the
desired information. However, as already
discussed, this does not give the agency
concerned any discretion to grant or deny
5
access. In case of denial of access, the

government agency has the burden of showing
that the information requested is not of public
concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the
same has been exempted by law from the
operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise
will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As
aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an
advantageous position to marshall and interpret
arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law
Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the
constitutional right, every denial of access by
the government agency concerned is subject to
review by the courts, and in the proper case,
access may be compelled by a writ of
Mandamus.
respondent has failed to cite any provision in

the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioner's right to know who are, and who are
not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial
notice of the fact that the names of those who
pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
examinations and licensure examinations for
various professions, are released to the public.
Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil
service eligibility, if actually possessed.
Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual
nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
government employees concerned claim to be
civil service eligibles, the public, through any
citizen, has a right to verify their professed
eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.
In determining whether or not a particular

information is of public concern there is no
rigid test which can be applied. "Public
concern" like "public interest" is a term that
eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a
broad spectrum of subjects which the public
may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for
the courts to determine in a case by case basis
whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being

of public concern, and in the absence of express
limitations under the law upon access to the
register of civil service eligibles for said
position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position
becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
b. In the instant, case while refusing to

confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the
as requested by the petitioner Valentin L.

Legaspi.
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission

is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the
position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny,
the civil service eligibility of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said
position in the Health Department of Cebu City,
6
VELMONTE VS BALMONTE
170 SCRA 256.
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action
for mandamus with preliminary injunction
invoke their right to information and pray that
respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners
the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDPLaban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru
the intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish
petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the
public records for the subject information On
June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet
received the reply of the Government Service
and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General
Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a
reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free
to do whatever action necessary within the
premises to pursue our desired objective in
pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as
citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS
records on behest loans given by the former
First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law

granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject
of this petition. His position is apparently based
merely on considerations of policy. The
judiciary does not settle policy issues. The
Court can only declare what the law is, and not
what the law should be. Under our system of
government, policy issues are within the
domain of the political branches of the
government, and of the people themselves as
the repository of all State power. The concerned
borrowers themselves may not succeed if they
choose to invoke their right to privacy,
considering the public offices they were holding
at the time the loans were alleged to have been
granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness,
public figures, most especially those holding
responsible positions in government, enjoy a
more limited right to privacy as compared to
ordinary individuals, their actions being subject
to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used
here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can
cover both steps leading to a contract, and
already a consummated contract, Considering
the intent of the framers of the Constitution
which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further
that government-owned and controlled
corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the
people, the Court is convinced that transactions

entered into by the GSIS, a governmentcontrolled corporation created by special
legislation are within the ambit of the people's
right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings. Although citizens are
afforded the right to information and, pursuant
thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them
a right to compel custodians of official records
to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the
like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern.
CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT
Facts:
-Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity
as taxpayer, citizen and a former government
official) initiated this original action seeking(1)
to prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and
its chairman] from privately entering into,
perfecting and/or executing any agreement with
the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the
properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos
located in the Philippines and/or abroad
including the so-called Marcos gold hoard";
and(2) to compel respondent[s] to make public
all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing
or perfected, and all documents related to or
relating to such negotiations and agreement
between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."Chavez is the same person initiated
the prosecution of the Marcoses and their
cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of
the public treasury and the systematic
subjugation of the country's economy; he says
that what impelled him to bring this action were
several news reports 2 bannered in a number
of broadsheets sometime in September 1997.
These news items referred to (1) the alleged
discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets
deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss
banks; and (2) the reported execution of a
compromise, between the government (through

PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or
share these assets.-PETITIONER DEMANDS
that respondents make public any and all
negotiations and agreements pertaining to
PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' illgotten wealth. He claims that any compromise
on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth
involves an issue of "paramount public
interest," since it has a "debilitating effect
on the country's economy" that would be
greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the
Filipino people. Hence, the people in general
have a right to know the transactions or deals
being contrived and effected by the
government.-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that
they do not deny forging a compromise
agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim,
though, that petitioner's action is premature,
because there is no showing that he has asked
the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may
not yet be compelled to make any disclosure,
since the proposed terms and conditions of the
Agreements have not become effective and
binding.-PETITIONER INVOKES
Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis
for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be

provided by law. Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above
constitutional provisions refer to completed and
operative official acts, not to those still being
considered.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court could require the
PCGG to disclose to the public the details
of any agreement, perfected or not, with
the Marcoses.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The General and Supplemental Agreement
dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and
the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby
declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary
to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG,
its officers and all government functionaries and
officials who are or may be directly ot indirectly
involved in there covery of the alleged ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are
DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms
of any proposed compromise settlement, as well
as the final agreement, relating to such
alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with
8
the discussions embodied in this Decision. No

pronouncement as to cost.
RD:The "information" and the "transactions"
referred to in the subject provisions of
the Constitution have as yet no defined scope
and extent. There are no specific laws
prescribing the exact limitations within which
the right may be exercised or the correlative
state duty may be obliged. However, the
following are some of the recognized
restrictions :
(1) national security matters and intelligence
information- there is a governmental privilege
against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters. 24 But where there is
no need to protect such state secrets, the
privilege may not be invoked to withhold
documents and other information, 25 provided
that they are examined "in strict confidence"
and given "scrupulous protection."
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions-trade
or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual
Property Code 27 and other related laws) as
well as banking transactions (pursuant to the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 28)are also
exempted from compulsory disclosure.
(3) Criminal matters- Also excluded are
classified law enforcement matters, such as
those relating to the apprehension,
the prosecution and the detention of criminals,
which courts neither may nor inquire into prior
to such arrest, detention and prosecution.

Efforts at effective law enforcement would be
seriously jeopardized by free public access to,
for example, police information regarding
rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives,
or leads on covert criminal activities.
(4) Other confidential information.
- The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits
public officials and employees from using or
divulging "confidential or classified information
officially known to them by reason of their
office and not made available to the public."
Other acknowledged limitations to information
access include diplomatic correspondence,
closed door Cabinet meetings and executive
sessions of either house of Congress, as well
as the internal deliberations of the Supreme
Court.
In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court
emphasized that the information sought must be
"matters of public concern," access to which
may be limited by law. Similarly, the state
policy of full public disclosure extends only to
"transactions involving public interest" and
may also be "subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law."- As to the meanings of the
terms "public interest" and "public concern," the
Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
elucidated: In determining whether or not a
particular information isof public concern there
is no rigid test which can be applied. Public
concern" like "public interest" is a term
that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace

a broad spectrum of subjects which the public
may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, itis for the
courts to determine on a case by case basis
whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.-As to whether or not the above cited
constitutional provisions guarantee access to
information regarding ongoing negotiations
or proposals prior to the final agreement, this
same clarification was sought and clearly
addressed by the constitutional commissioners
during their deliberations,
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions"
which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the
Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer
to the contract itself? MR. OPLE. The
"transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic
and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to
a contract, and already a consummated contract,
Mr. Presiding Officer.MR. SUAREZ. This
contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading
to the consummation of the transaction? MR.
OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards
on the national interest.
- Considering the intent of the Constitution, the
Court believes that it is incumbent upon the
PCGG and its officers, as well as other
9
government representatives, to disclose

sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten
wealth. Such information, though, must pertain
to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the
stage when common assertions are still in the
process of being formulated or are in the
"exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course,
to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of
information in general, as discussed above
such as on matters involving national security,
diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and
other classified information.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 183591
October 14 2008
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement
of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP -
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of
public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the
complete and official copies of the MA-AD and
to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD
and the holding of public consultation thereon.
They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO
enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the
legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the
people's right to information on matters of
public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state
policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and
existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371

(THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication.
The failure of the respondents to consult the
local government units or communities affected
constitutes a departure by respondents from
their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the
mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
Constitution by any branch of government is a
proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues
which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the
petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus
standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted
in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the
questioned law or the approval of the
challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even
without any other overt act . Indeed, even a
10
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the

law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the
President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x
x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the
responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet
effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave
violation of the Constitution involved in the
matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a
state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (Art 2,
Sec 28) including public consultation under RA
7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty
of officialdom to give information even if
nobody demands. The complete and effective
exercise of the right to information necessitates
that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory
nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or
limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of
paramount public concern involving public
interest in the highest order. In declaring that
the right to information contemplates steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to

the executory nature or commercial character of
the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for
continuing consultations on both national and
local levels and for a principal forum for
consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to
conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate,
among other things, that the Parties aimed to
vest in the BJE the status of an associated
state or, at any rate, a status closely
approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized
under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the
ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an associative relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies
powers that go beyond anything ever granted by
the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of

the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than
the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded
version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the
ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but
name as it meets the criteria of a state laid
down in the Montevideo Convention, namely,
a permanent population, a defined territory,
a government, and a capacity to enter into
relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD
would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it
which has betrayed itself by its use of
the concept of association runs counter to the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the
relationship between the national government
and the BJE being itself contrary to the present
Constitution, it is not surprising that many of
11
the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the

formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict
with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is
more of a state than an autonomous region. But
even assuming that it is covered by the term
autonomous region in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still
be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and
existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of
the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force
upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the
legal framework, implying an amendment of
the Constitution to accommodate the MOAAD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to
the MILF the amendment of the
Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has
authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such
presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but
simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the
proper procedure for constitutional amendments
and revision, her mere recommendation need

not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD
viewed in light of the above-discussed
standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents
authority to propose constitutional
amendments, she cannot guarantee to any
third party that the required amendments
will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could
do is submit these proposals as
recommendations either to Congress or the
people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371
(THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is
the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and
be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines
Bangsamoro people as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at
the time of conquest or colonization, and their

descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined
in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not
only Moros as traditionally understood even
by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOAAD adds that the freedom of choice of
indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this
freedom of choice consists in has not been
specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to
refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the
ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOAAD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not
form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clearcut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails,
among other things, the observance of the free
and prior informed consent of the Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive
Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise.
12
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local

Government Code of 1991 requires all national
offices to conduct consultations beforeany
project or program critical to the environment
and human ecology including those that may
call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in such locality, is implemented
therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program
that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro
people, which could pervasively and drastically
result to the diaspora or displacement of a great
number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No.
3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act
No. 8371. The furtive process by which the
MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority,
and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive
duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the
present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions but the very concept
underlying them, namely, the associative

relationship envisioned between the GRP and
the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state
and implies that the same is on its way to
independence.
Freedom of Religion
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of
Cebu G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of
Cebu
G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Facts: In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu
received complaints about teachers and pupils
belonging to the Jehovahs Witness, and
enrolled in various public and private schools,
which refused to sing the Phil. National
Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic
pledge.
Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B.
Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her
Assistant issued Division Memorandum No.
108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District
Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads
of Private Educational institutions to remove

from service, after due process, teachers and
school employees, and to deprive the students
and pupils from the benefit of public education,
if they do not participate in daily flag ceremony
and doesnt obey flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovahs Witness sect find
such memorandum to be contrary to their
religious belief and choose not to obey. Despite
a number of appropriate persuasions made by
the Cebu officials to let them obey the
directives, still they opted to follow their
conviction to their belief. As a result, an order
was issued by the district supervisor of Daan
Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990,
ordering the dropping from the list in the
school register of all Jehovahs Witness teachers
and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who opted
to follow their belief which is against the Flag
Salute Law, however, given a chance to be reaccepted if they change their mind.
Some Jehovahs Witness members appealed to
the Secretary of Education but the latter did not
answer to their letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents
filed special civil actions for Mandamus,
Certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the
respondents acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
in ordering their expulsion without prior notice
13
and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to

due process, their right to free public education
and their right to freedom of speech, religion
and worship. Petitioners prayed for the voiding
of the order of expulsion or dropping from the
rolls issued by the District Supervisor;
prohibiting and enjoining respondent from
barring them from classes; and compelling the
respondent and all persons acting for him to
admit and order their(Petitioners) re-admission I
their respective schools.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO
and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
commanding the respondents to immediately readmit the petitioners to their respective classes
until further orders.
On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a
consolidated comment to the petitions
defending the expulsion orders issued by the
respondents.
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take
part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do
not engage in external acts or behavior that
would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to
show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings.
Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior,
there is no warrant for their expulsion.

Issue: Whether or not the expulsion of the
members of Jehovahs Witness from the schools
violates right receive free education.
Held: The expulsion of the members of
Jehovahs Witness from the schools where they
are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine
citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive
free education, for it is the duty of the state to
protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education, and to make such education
accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless,
their right not to participate in the Flag
Ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt
such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at
attention during flag ceremony while their
classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge,
we do not see how such conduct may possibly
disturb the peace, or pose a grave and present
danger of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any legitimate public
interest that the state has a right and duty to
prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese
occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when
every Filipino, regardless of religious
persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the
Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese
soldier, perhaps if petitioners had lived through
that dark period of our history, they would not

quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
granted and expulsion orders are hereby
annulled and set aside.
Estrada v. Escritor
A.M.No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
Puno, J.:
Facts:
1. Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC
Branch 253 in Las Pinas City. The complainant
Estrada requested for an investigation of
respondent for living with a man not her
husband while she was still legally married and
having borne a child within this live-in
arrangement. Estrada believed that Escritor is
committing a grossly immoral act which
tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she
should not be allowed to remain
employed therein as it might appear that the
court condones her act.
2. Respondent admitted she started living with
Luciano Quilapio, Jr. more than 20 years ago
when her husband was still alive but living with
another woman. She likewise admitted having a
son with Quilapio but denies any liability for
alleged grossly immoral conduct because,
1) She is a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses
and the Watch Tower Society, 2) That the
conjugal arrangement was in conformity with
14
their religious beliefs, and 3) That the conjugal

arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of
her congregation.
3. Escritor likewise claimed that she had
executed a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness' in accordance with her religion
which allows members of the Jehovahs
witnesses who have been abandoned by their
spouses to enter into marital relations. The
Declaration thus makes the resulting union
moral and binding within the congregation all
over the world except in countries where
divorce is allowed.
Held:
Escritor was therefore held not administratively
liable for grossly immoral conduct. Escritors
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as
she has made out a case for exemption from the
law based on her fundamental right to religion.
The Court recognizes that state interests must
be upheld in order that freedomsincluding
religious freedommay be enjoyed.
In the area of religious exercise as preferred
freedom, however, man stands accountable to
an authority higher than the state, and so the
state interest sought to be upheld must be so
compelling that its violation will erode the very
fabric of the state that will also protect the
freedom. In the absence of a showing that the
state interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the Infinite.
Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines,

Inc. vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003.
Facts:
Petitioner is a non-governmental
organization that extends voluntary services to
the Filipino people, especially to Muslim
Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a
fee, halal certifications to qualified products and
food manufacturers on account of the actual
need to certify food products as halal and also
due to halal food producers' request.
Subsequently, Executive Order (EO) 46 was
issued creating the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme and designating
respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to
oversee its implementation. In this petition for
prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others,
that the subject EO violates the constitutional
provision on the separation of Church and State.
herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino

Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the
task of issuing halal certifications, the State has
in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal
food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention
of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. In
the case at bar, the Court found no compelling
justification for the government to deprive
Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of
their religious right to classify a product as
halal, even on the premise that the health of
Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected
by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to
issue halal certificates.
Issue:
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court

ruled that freedom of religion was accorded
preferred status by the framers of the
fundamental law and it has consistently
affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt,
classifying a food product as halal is a religious
function because the standards used are drawn
from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving
the OMA the exclusive power to classify food
products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the
religious freedom of Muslim organizations like
Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46

violates the constitutional provision on the
separation of Church and State.
Held:
No. In granting the petition, the
Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion
was accorded preferred status by the framers of
the fundamental law and it has consistently
affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt,
classifying a food product as halal is a religious
15
function because the standards used are drawn

from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving
the OMA the exclusive power to classify food
products as halal, Executive Order 46
encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret
for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit
for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to
itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the
State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its
own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on
halal food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention
of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. In
the case at bar, the Court found no compelling
issue halal certificates.
framework like ours, the State must minimize

its interference with the affairs of its citizens
and instead allow them to exercise reasonable
freedom of personal and religious activity. In
the case at bar, we find no compelling
issue halal certifications. The protection and
promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to
health are already provided for in existing laws
and ministered to by government agencies
charged with ensuring that food products
released in the market are fit for human
consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike
EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the
religious freedom of Muslims.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave

danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of
religious freedom. If the government fails to
show the seriousness and immediacy of the
threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. In a society with a democratic
16
Gregorio Aglipay vs Juan Ruiz

64 Phil. 201 Political Law Appropriation
Religious Sect Religious Freedom
FACTS: The 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress organized by the Roman Catholic
Church took place sometime in 1936. In
commemoration thereof. then Director of Posts,
Juan Ruiz, initiated the production of certain
stamps the design of which would have in their
center a chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat
as border design. Eventually, the stamps were
produced and some were sold pursuant to Act
No. 4052, which provides for appropriation.
Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine
Independent Church, assailed the production
and sale of such stamps. Aglipay contends that
the funding of said stamps commemorative to a
particular religious event is in violation of Sec
13, Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution
which prohibits the appropriation or usage of
public money for the use or benefit of any
church or denomination.
money to a religious event. Act No. 4052

appropriated the sum of P60, 000.00 for the cost
of plates and printing of postage stamps with
new designs and other expenses incident
thereto, and merely authorizes the Director of
Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, to dispose
of the amount appropriated in the manner
indicated and as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government. The fact that
the fund is being used for such is only
incidental to the function of Director of Posts
and under his discretion.
On religious freedom
The Supreme Court noted however that the
elevating influence of religion is recognized
here as elsewhere. Evidence would be our
preamble where we implored the aid of divine
providence to establish an ideal government. If
should also be further noted that religious
freedom as a constitutional mandate is not an
inhibition of profound reverence to religion.
The petitioners are assailing the

constitutionality of RH Law on the following
grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of
the unborn.
2. The RH Law violates the right to health
and the right to protection against
hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to
religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional
provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal
protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free
speech.
7. The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in
violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of
privacy of ones family protected by the
Constitution
Imbong vs Ochoa
ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the
said stamps violate the Constitution.
HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in
violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was
emphasized on the stamps was not the religious
event itself but rather the City of Manila as
being the seat of such event. Act No. 4052 on
the other hand did not appropriate any public
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are
questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may

exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule
17
Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive
Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free
speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and
autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic
freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review over the controversy.
1. Actual Case or Controversy
2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule
Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with
the rule that the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there

must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or
controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,
lest the decision of the court would amount to
an advisory opinion. It must concern a real,
tangible and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and
the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a
result of the challenged action. He must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a

result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also
known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one
that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also
all other rights in the First Amendment. These
include religious freedom, freedom of the press,
and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental
right to religious freedom, freedom of the press
and peaceful assembly are but component rights
of the right to ones freedom of expression, as
they are modes which ones thoughts are
externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is
defined as a personal and substantial interest in
a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans
on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for
non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overreaching
18
significance to society, or of paramount public

interest.
One Subject-One Title: The one title-one
subject rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include
the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested
are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical
construction of the rule so as not to cripple or
impede legislation. The one subject/one title
rule expresses the principle that the title of a
law must not be so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to
its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in
the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the
act.
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox
view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords
no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed. Modern view: Under this
view, the court in passing upon the question of

constitutionality does not annul or repeal the
statute if it finds it in conflict with the
Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it
and determines the rights of the parties just as if
such statute had no existence. But certain legal
effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1)
The Legislature must be willing to retain the
valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence
of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The
valid portion can stand independently as law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
1. Majority of the Members of the Court
believe that the question of when life
begins is a scientific and medical issue
that should not be decided, at this stage,
without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual
Members could express their own views
on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in
statutory construction), the traditional meaning
of conception according to reputable
dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life

begins at fertilization. Medical sources also
support the view that conception begins at
fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended
for (a) conception to refer to the moment of
fertilization and (b) the protection of the
unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they
did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional; only those that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited.
Contraceptives that actually prevent the union
of the male sperm and female ovum, and those
that similarly take action before fertilization
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for
protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure
prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret
this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this
intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using
the word or in defining abortifacient (Section
4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also those
that induce abortion and induce the destruction
of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH
Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already
has life and that the State has a bounded duty to
protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused
their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term primarily.
19
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that

primarily induce abortion or the destruction of
a fetus inside the mothers womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec.
3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives that may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section
12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same
reason, the definition of contraceptives under
the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term
primarily, must be struck down.
2. The RH Law does not intend to do away
with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in
place, the Court believes adequate
safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
contraceptives are made available to the
public. In fulfilling its mandate under
Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must
keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729:
the contraceptives it will procure shall
be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the
actual distribution of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will be done
following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the
RH Law is to be considered mandatory only
after these devices and materials have been
tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA.
Congress cannot determine that contraceptives

are safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or
not the use of contraceptives or
participation in support of modern RH
measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong
according to ones dogma or belief.
However, the Court has the authority to
determine whether or not the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon the
policies of any one religion. To allow religious
sects to dictate policy or restrict other
groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of
the Constitution or the Establishment Clause.
This would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion, and thus, establishes a state
religion. Thus, the State can enhance its
population control program through the RH
Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use
is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which
permits RH procedures even with only
the consent of the spouse undergoing the
provision (disregarding spousal
content), intrudes into martial privacy
and autonomy and goes against the
constitutional safeguards for the family
as the basic social institution.
Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the

Constitution mandates the State to
defend: (a) the right of spouses to found
a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands
of responsible parenthood and (b) the
right of families or family associations
to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and
programs that affect them. The RH Law
cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the
institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases
where a minor undergoing a procedure is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage
(Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which states: The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government. In addition, the
portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the
case of minors, the written consent of parents or
legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercising parental authority or next-of-kin
shall be required only in elective surgical
procedures is invalid as it denies the right of
parental authority in cases where what is
involved is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as
opposed to procedures) about family planning
20
services. Parents are not deprived of parental

guidance and control over their minor child in
this situation and may assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information
received. In addition, an exception may be
made in life-threatening procedures.
5. The Court declined to rule on the
constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH
Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and DevelopmentAppropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might
raise their objection to their participation
in the RH education program, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual
case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature
because the Department of Education has not
yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places
more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of
the term primary. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that of the
State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law
and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and
duties of the parents in the moral development
of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community
associations, school officials, and other interest
groups in developing the mandatory RH

program, it could very well be said that the
program will be in line with the religious beliefs
of the petitioners.
6. The RH Law does not violate the due
process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not
vague.
The definition of private health care service
provider must be seen in relation to Section
4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public
health service provider. The private health
care institution cited under Section 7 should be
seen as synonymous to private health care
service provider.
The terms service and methods are also
broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by
religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning
methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the
RH Law) as well as from giving RH
information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect
information. Used together in relation to
Section 23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and
knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill
motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as
to the nature and effect of programs and
services on reproductive health.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given

priority in the governments RH
program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant
to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which states that the State
shall prioritize the needs of the
underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled,
women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to
paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the
poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of
the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized
couples who are suffering from fertility issues
and desire to have children. In addition, the RH
Law does not prescribe the number of children a
couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have
children. The RH Law only seeks to provide
priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions
from the mandatory RH education program
under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect
to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive
health education
8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the
RH Law for private and nongovernment health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro
21
bonoRH services does not amount to

involuntary servitude, for two reasons.
First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest
that it is both the power and a duty of
the State to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only
encourages private and non-government
RH service providers to render pro
bono Besides the PhilHealth
accreditation, no penalty is imposed
should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt
from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do
not allow them to render RH service, pro
bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that
an actual case or controversy exists and
that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH
Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a

right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the
case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for
vague violations thereof, particularly public
health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at
least, be heard on the matter now.
2. In this jurisdiction, the application of
doctrines originating from the U.S. has
been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While the Court has
withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues, it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not
only regulating free speech, but also
those involving religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights. The
underlying reason for this modification
is simple. For unlike its counterpart in
the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the

Government. Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing
petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to
determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there exist
no actual case or controversy, would diminish
this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has
been transgressed, to the detriment of the
Filipino people.
3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH
Law may not be assailed through an asapplied challenge, still, the Court has
time and again acted liberally on the
locus standi requirement. It has accorded
certain individuals standing to sue, not
otherwise directly injured or with
material interest affected by a
Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental
importance is invoked. The rule on locus
standi is, after all, a procedural
22
technicality which the Court has, on

more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional
plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in
the public interest, albeit they may not
have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other
government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as
a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case
warrants that the Court set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the
petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues
raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well being of
this nation, specially the youth; hence, their
proper and just determination is an imperative
need. This is in accordance with the wellentrenched principle that rules of procedure are
not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed.
4. Most of the petitions are praying for
injunctive reliefs and so the Court would
just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it
has original jurisdiction. Where the case
has far-reaching implications and prays
for injunctive reliefs, the Court may

consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one
subject/one bill rule. In this case, a
textual analysis of the various provisions
of the law shows that both reproductive
health and responsible parenthood
are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the
first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State
recognizes and guarantees the human rights of
all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to
health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right
to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between
reproductive health and responsible
parenthood which bears to the attainment of
the goal of achieving sustainable human
development as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to
the contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354

as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
facility which is conveniently accessible; and b)
allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health
regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit
the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures.
23
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding

5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which
is conveniently accessible regardless of his or
her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive
health programs or shall do any act that hinders
the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n
in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as
they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the
RH-IRR, which added the qualifier primarily
in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void
for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law
and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
Liberty of Abode; Right to Travel

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL.,
petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.,
respondents.
Villacicencio Vs Lukban
Facts : One hundred and seventy women were
isolated from society, and then at night, without
their consent and without any opportunity to
consult with friends or to defend their rights,
were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the
feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the
case is shown by the mere fact that the presence
of the police and the constabulary was deemed
necessary and that these officers of the law
chose the shades of night to cloak their secret
and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact
impossible to refute and practically admitted by
the respondents.
ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to
deport women with ill repute.
HELD : Law defines power. No official, no
matter how high, is above the law. Lukban
committed a grave abuse of discretion by
deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile
against their will. There is no law expressly
authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is

a law punishing public officials, not expressly
authorized by law or regulation, who compels
any person to change his residence
Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens
of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as
stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other
citizen. Thei rchoice of profession should not be
a cause for discrimination. It may make some,
like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not
authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to
isolate themselves from the rest of the human
race. These women have been deprived of their
liberty by being exiled to Davao without even
being given the opportunity to collect their
belongings or, worse, without even consenting
to being transported to Mindanao. For this,
Lukban etal must be severely punished
SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)
PARTIES:
petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
respondent: Republic of the Philippines
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition
for the change of his first name Rommel
Jacinto to Mely and his sex from male to
female in his birth certificate in the RTC of
Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex
reassignment. He alleged that he is a male
24
transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks

and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court
ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is
consonance with the principle of justice and
equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging
that there is no law allowing change of name by
reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON change in name and sex in birth
certificate are allowed by reason of sex
reassignment.
HELD:
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a
right. It may be allowed in cases where the
name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or
difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is
habitually used; or if the change will avoid
confusion. The petitioners basis of the change
of his name is that he intends his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into thru surgery. The
Court says that his true name does not prejudice
him at all, and no law allows the change of
entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the
ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied
the petition.
Marcos v Manglapus
GR No. 88211 September 15, 1989
CORTES, J:
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested
in the President of the Philippines.
FACTS:
(1) This is a petition for prohibition and
mandamus to order respondents to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the Presidents decision to
bar their return to the Philippines. This is in
response to Marcoss wish to return to the
Philippines to die. The petitioners case is
founded on the following provisions in the Bill
of Rights:
Section 1.No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.
And other contentions including:

President is without power to impair
the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so "within the limits
prescribed by law." Nor may the President
impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so.
the right to travel may be impaired by any
authority or agency of the government, there
must be legislation to that effect.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to
freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a
State shall, within that territory, have the right
to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be
subject to any restrictions except those which
are provided by law, are necessary to protect
national security, public order (order public),
25
public health or morals or the rights and

freedoms of others, and are consistent with the
other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the
right to enter his own country.
(2) The respondents contend primacy of the
right of the State to national security over
individual rights, citing Article II
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is
to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend
the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military, or
civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order,
the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of
the blessings of democracy.
and the decision of other countries to ban
deposed dictators like Cuba (Fulgencio Batista),
etc.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not, in the exercise of the
powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines
(2) Whether or not the President acted

arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when she determined that the return of the
Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and
decided to bar their return.
HELD:
Petition dismissed. President did not act with
abuse of discretion in determining the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the
present time since it poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare.
RATIO:
(1) Even from afar, the Marcoses had the
capacity to stir trouble to the fanaticism and
blind loyalty of their followers.
(2) Essentially, the right involved is the right to
return to one's country, a totally distinct right
under international law, independent from
although related to the right to travel.
(3) "what the presidency is at any particular
moment depends in important measure on who
is
President." (Corwin) Corollarily, the powers of
the President cannot be said to be limited only
to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever
power inherent in the government that is neither

legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
(4) The Constitution declares among the
guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the
Government is to serve and protect the people"
and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,
the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of
the blessings of democracy." The power
involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare
of the people. It is founded on the duty of the
President, as steward of the people.
(5) Protection of the people is the essence of the
duty of government. The preservation of the
State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is
an obligation in the highest order. The
President, sworn to preserve and defend the
Constitution and to see the faithful execution
the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.
PASEI v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
FACTS: Phil association of Service Exporters,
Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female of overseas
employment. It challenges the constitutional
validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE
entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary
Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
26
Domestic and Household Workers. It claims

that such order is a discrimination against males
and females. The Order does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills, and that it is in
violation of the right to travel, it also being an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power.
Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation
in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor
General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the
validity of the challenged guidelines involving
the police power of the State and informed the
court that the respondent have lifted the
deployment ban in some states where there
exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines
and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection
of the Filipino workers.
exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled

in general terms to underscore its allcomprehensive embrace.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory
reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department
Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," but it does not thereby make an
undue discrimination between the sexes. It is
well-settled that "equality before the law" under
the Constitution does not import a perfect
Identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions;
and (4) they apply equally to all members of the
same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification
made-the preference for female workers rests
on substantial distinctions.
ISSUE: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is

constitutional as it is an exercise of police
power.
RULING: [Police power] has been defined as
the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare." As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to
foster the common good. It is not capable of an
27
GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835;

G.R. L-27833; 18 APR 1969]
Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17,
1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of
candidates and limiting the period of election
campaign or partisan political activity was
challenged on constitutional grounds. More
precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and
free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of
association are invoked to nullify the act.
Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the
filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the
4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista
Party officialcandidate for Vice-Mayor of
Manila to which he was subsequently elected on
November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the
other hand, is a private individual,
a registered voter in the City of Manila and a
political leader of his co-petitioner. There was
the further allegation that the nomination of
acandidate and the fixing of period of election
campaign are matters of political expediency
and convenience which only political parties
can regulate or curtail by and among themselves
through self-restraint or mutual understanding
or agreement and that the regulation and
limitation of these political matters invoking the
police power, in the absence of clear and

present danger to the state, would render the
constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless
and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Taada
was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and
elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be
looked upon as a limitation on the preferred
rights of speech and press, of assembly and of
association. He did justify its enactment
however under the clear and present danger
doctrine, there being the substantive evil of
elections, whether for national or local officials,
being debased and degraded by unrestricted
campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue
concentration in politics with the loss not only
of efficiency in government but of lives as well.
The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil
Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the
U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to
give their opinions. Respondents contend that
the act was based on the police power of the
state.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880

unconstitutional.
there are two tests that may supply an

acceptable criterion for permissible restriction
on freedom of speech. These are the clear and
present danger rule and the 'dangerous
tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must
be extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high before the utterance
can be punished. The danger to be guarded
against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be
prevented. It has the advantage of establishing
according to the above decision a definite rule
in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as
to what words may be publicly established. The
"dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the
words uttered create a dangerous tendency
which the state has a right to prevent, then such
words are punishable. It is not necessary that
some definite or immediate acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is
sufficient that such acts be advocated in general
terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used
be reasonably calculated to incite persons to
acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is
sufficient if the natural tendency and probable
effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent.
Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez

28
The challenged statute could have been more

narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited
more precisely delineated to satisfy the
constitutionalrequirements as to a valid
limitation under the clear and present danger
doctrine. As the author Taada clearly
explained, such provisions were deemed by the
legislative body to be part and parcel of the
necessary and appropriate response not merely
to a clear and present danger but to the actual
existence of a grave and substantive evil of
excessive partisanship, dishonesty and
corruption as well as violence that of late has
invariably marred election campaigns and
partisan political activities in this country.
The very idea of a government, republican in
form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs and to petition for redress of
grievances. As in the case of freedom of
expression, this right is not to be limited, much
less denied, except on a showing of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent.
The prohibition of
any speeches, announcements or commentaries,
or the holding of interviews for or against the
election of any party or candidate for public

office and the prohibition of the publication or
distribution of campaign literature or materials,
against the solicitation of votes whether directly
or indirectly, or the undertaking of any
campaign literature or propaganda for or against
any candidate or party is repugnant to a
constitutional command.
considered in his prayer so that he can again

practice law.
In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 568 (AC 1928)
YES.
22JUL
RATIO:
FACTS:
Admission to the bar is a privilege burdened

with condition. Failure to abide entails loss of
such privilege. Considered in addition was the
two (2) years Atty. Edillon was barred to
practice law, and the dictum of Justice Malcolm
in Villavicencio v. Lukban that the power to
discipline, especially if amounting to
disbarment, should be exercised in a
preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. After contrition on the part of the
petitioner, the court finds reinstatement in order.
Atty. Marcial Edillon was dibarred due to nonpayment of his IBP dues, hence the petitioner
on this case. He claimed that the provisions of
Sec. 10 of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court is
unconstitutional as he is being compelled, as a
precondition in maintaining his good standing
as a lawyer, to pay and settle his dues to the
IBP. Petitioner stubbornly insisted his take and
refused to admit full competence of the court in
this matter. But after some time in realization,
his recalcitrance and defiance were gone in his
subsequent communication with the court. He
appealed that his health, advanced age, and
concern to his former clients welfare be
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Edillon should be
reinstated as member of the bar.
HELD:
SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686

(July 28, 1989)
Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the
SSS failed to act upon the unions demands
concerning the implementation of their CBA.
29
SSS filed before the court action for damages

with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction
against petitioners for staging an illegal strike.
The court issued a temporary restraining order
pending the resolution of the application for
preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners
contend that the court made reversible error in
taking cognizance on the subject matter since
the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the
National Labor Relations Commission as the
case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends
on one hand that the petitioners are covered by
the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus
have no right to strike. They are not covered by
the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may
enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the

right to strike
Whether or not the CA erred in taking
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined

on Human Rights and Social Justice provides
guarantee among workers with the right to

organize and conduct peaceful concerted
activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section
14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil
Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service
shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted
by Congress referring to Memorandum
Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service
Commission which states that prior to the
enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employees
enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions,
all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves,
walk-outs and other forms of mass action which
will result in temporary stoppage or disruption
of public service. Therefore in the absence of
any legislation allowing govt. employees to
strike they are prohibited from doing so.
original charter, having been created under R.A.

No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service
Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has

jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it
is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council
which is not granted by law authority to issue
writ of injunction in labor disputes within its
jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the
general court for the issuance of a writ of
injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the

civil service are denominated as government
employees and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an
30
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale

Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Dale
(Respondent), was an eagle scout whose
membership in the boy scouts was revoked
when the Petitioners, the Boy Scouts of
America (Petitioner), learned that he was a
homosexual.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. While individuals are
given a right to freely associate, associations are
not forced to include members whose beliefs
may affect its own ability to express the
message it wishes to convey.
Held. Reversed.
The court found that, while the Petitioners laws
and oaths do not mention sexuality, the purpose
of the organization to foster morally straight
and clean membership would be disregarded
if the Petitioner was forced to accept the
Respondent. Further, the First Amendment
Rights of the association would be violated if it
were forced, under the guise of law, to send a
message that it accepted homosexual conduct
when, on its own assertions, it did not. The
Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
Court) held that to require the Petitioner to
accept Respondent was an abridgment of the
Petitioners freedom of expression.
Facts. The Respondent, a life-long boy scout,

was an assistant scout master in New Jersey,
when the Petitioner learned of his
homosexuality and revoked his membership.
The Respondent brought suit to enjoin the
action and the New Jersey court, under its
public accommodations law, required the
Petitioner to admit the Respondent.
Dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens)

dissented, noting that by allowing the Petitioner
to revoke the Respondents membership, the
Supreme Court was allowing the organization to
prevail over the anti-discrimination laws of the
state.
Issue. This case questions whether an

organization can be compelled to accept a
member whose activities and beliefs may be
against the very nature of the organization.
Discussion. An organization cannot be

compelled to accept a member whose beliefs do
not align with the tenants upon, which the
organization stands. To do so would violate the
First Amendment constitutional rights of the
entire organization and its members, who also

align themselves with the principals on which
the organization stands.
31
Non-impairment of Contracts
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No.
101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly
represented and joined by their parents. The
first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class
suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of
the Regional Trial Court, National capital
Judicial Region against defendant (respondent)
Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs
alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests. They further asseverate that they
represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn and asserted that continued
deforestation have caused a distortion and
disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered
ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no
cause of action against him and that it raises a

political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss,
further ruling that granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts
which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari and asked the
court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order
on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of
action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a
political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the
plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to
allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which
any relief is provided by law. The Court did not
agree with this. The complaint focuses on one
fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced

and healthful ecology which is incorporated in
Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The
said right carries with it the duty to refrain from
impairing the environment and implies, among
many other things, the judicious management
and conservation of the country's forests.
Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the
DENR to be the primary government agency
responsible for the governing and supervising
the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also
substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of
the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192
and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for
policy formation, and have defined the powers
and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as
DENR's duty to protect and advance the said
right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other
who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect or respect the same gives rise
to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that
the granting of the TLA, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the full protection thereof requires that
no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
32
After careful examination of the petitioners'

complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed
violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of
the constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It
allows the Court to rule upon even on the
wisdom of the decision of the Executive and
Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid
for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment
clause.
The Court held that the Timber License
Agreement is an instrument by which the state
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. It is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause thus, the nonimpairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be
validly withdraw whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case. The
granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of nonimpairment of obligations of contract is limit by

the exercise by the police power of the State, in
the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare. In short, the non-impairment
clause must yield to the police power of the
State.
The instant petition, being impressed with
merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC
decision is SET ASIDE.
subject lot from Hermoso and built a single

storey building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a
car sales company. Ortigas & Co. filed a
petition a complaint which sought the
demolition of the constructed car sales company
to against Hermoso as it violated the terms and
conditions of the Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled
in favor of Ortigas & Co. Mathay raised the
issue to the Court of Appeals from which he
sought favorable ruling. Hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Ortigas & Co. v. CA (G.R. No. 126102.

December 4, 2000)
18AUG
FACTS:
Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel
of land located in Greenhills Subdivision, San
Juan with several restrictions in the contract of
sale that said lot be used exclusively for
residential purposes, among others, until
December 31, 2025. Later, a zoning ordinance
was issued by MMC (now MMDA)
reclassifying the area as commercial. Private
respondent (Ismael Mathay III) leased the
Whether or not the zoning ordinance may

impair contracts entered prior to its effectivity.
HELD:
Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise
of police power may be given effect over any
standing contract. Hence, petition is denied.
RATIO:
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to
regulate or govern certain activities or
transactions could be given retroactive effect
and may reasonably impair vested rights or
contracts. Police power legislation is applicable
not only to future contracts, but equally to those
33
already in existence. Non-impairment of

contracts or vested rights clauses will have to
yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by
the State of police power to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, safety,
and general welfare of the people. Moreover,
statutes in exercise of valid police power must
be read into every contract. Noteworthy,
in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, the Supreme Court already upheld
subject ordinance as a legitimate police power
measure.
Access to Courts
Acar v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-21707, March 18,
1967
All over the world, Constitutions share one
purpose: to protect and enhance the people's
interest, as a nation collectively and as persons
individually. The Philippine Constitution is no
exception. Interpretation of its provisions,
therefore, should be done with a view to
realizing this fundamental objective. Among the
provisions in our Constitution is one both,
timely and far-reaching, as it affects the people
at large and relates to social justice problems of
the day. It is Subsec. 21, Sec. I of Art. III: "Free

access to the courts shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty." It is the one
involved in this case.
Facts: A suit was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental on February 21,
1963 by ten persons for their own behalf and
that of 9,000 other farm laborers working off
and on in sugar cane plantations at the Bais
milling district, Negros Oriental, against
Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas,
Central Azucarera de Bais, Compaia Celulosa
de Filipinas, Ramon Barata, Aurelio Montinola,
Sr., and Miguel Franco. Plaintiffs sought to
recover their alleged participations or shares
amounting to the aggregate sum of
P14,031,836.74, in the sugar, molasses, bagasse
and other derivatives based on the provisions of
Republic Act 809 (The Sugar Act of 1952),
particularly Sections 1 and 9.
The benefits granted to laborers in sugar
plantations under this Act and in the Minimum
Wage Law shall not in any way be diminished
by such labor contracts known as "by the
piece," "by the volume," "by the area," or by
any other system of "pakyaw," the Secretary of
Labor being hereby authorized to issue the
necessary orders for the enforcement of this

provision."
Furthermore, plaintiffs asked thereunder as well
as by separate motion, that the aforementioned
court authorize them to sue as pauper litigants,
under Sec. 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
Acting on the petition to litigate in forma
pauperis, the Court of First Instance issued an
order on May 27, 1963, denying the same upon
the ground that the plaintiffs have regular
employment and sources of income and, thus,
can not be classified as poor or paupers.
Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of said order
but reconsideration was denied in an order
dated June 11, 1963. Assailing said two CFI
orders and asserting their alleged right not to be
denied free access to the courts by reason of
poverty, plaintiffs in said case filed herein, on
August 1, 1963, the present special civil action
orcertiorari and mandamus. Petition to litigate
as pauper in the instant case before Us was also
filed. And on August 16, 1963, We allowed
petitioners herein to litigate in this Court as
paupers and required respondent to answer.
Respondent's answer was filed on November 2,
1963. After hearing on February 10, 1964 this
case was submitted for decision.
34
Issue: whether petitioners were deprived, by the

orders in question, of free access to the courts
by reason of poverty.
Ruling: Yes
Ratio: "Free access to the courts shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty." As
applied to statutes or provisions on the right to
sue in forma pauperis, the term has a broader
meaning. It has thus been recognized that: "An
applicant for leave to sue in forma
pauperis need not be a pauper; the fact that he is
able-bodied and may earn the necessary money
is no answer to his statement that he has not
sufficient means to prosecute the action or to
secure the costs" (14 Am. Jur. 31). It suffices
that plaintiff is indigent (Ibid.), the not a public
charge. And the difference between "paupers"
and "indigent" persons is that the latter are
"persons who have no property or source of
income sufficient for their support aside from
their own labor, though self-supporting when
able to work and in employment" (Black's Law
Dictionary, p. 913, "Indigent", citing People vs.
Schoharie County, 121 NY 345, 24 NE 830). It
is therefore in this sense of being indigent that
"pauper" is taken when referring to suits in
forma pauperis. Black's Law Dictionary in fact
defines pauper, thus: "A person so poor that he

must be supported at public expense; also a
suitor who, on account of poverty, is allowed to
sue or defend without being chargeable with
costs".
As regards the fact that the supporting
certifications of indigence refer only to the ten
named plaintiffs, suffice it to reiterate that this
involves a class suit, where it is not practicable
to bring all the other 9,000 laborers before the
court. This Court finds the supporting evidence
of indigence adequate, showing in petitioners'
favor, as plaintiffs in the suit before respondent
Judge, the right not to be denied free access to
the courts by reason of poverty. Since they were
excluded from the use and enjoyment of said
right, mandamus lies to enforce it. Appeal was
unavailing, since they were not even accorded
the status of litigants, for non-payment of
docket fee; and perfecting an appeal would have
presented the same question of exemption from
legal fees, appeal bond and similar requisites.
35
Custodial Investigation
People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999)
Facts
Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy
with Maria Isip, one of his tasks was to take
care of Isips house which was under
construction adjacent to the latters residence.
The victim was a 12-year old girl who used to
frequent the residence of Isip.
On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim
was reported missing by her mother. The
following morning, the Appellant boarded a
passenger jeepney and disappeared.
The victims body was found, lifeless, at around
7:30 am that same day. She was found in the
septic tank wearing her blouse and no
underwear. The autopsy showed that the victim
was raped and was strangled to death.
Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen
found a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown
belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was
identified by the victims mother to belong to
her daughter. Also, they found a pair of blue
slippers which Isip identified as that of the
appellant. Also found in the yard, three
armslength away from the septic tank were an
underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long
pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as

appellants belongings.
The appellant was soon arrested and executed
an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated
how the crime was committed. The trial ensued
and the lower court convicted him of the crime
of Rape and was sentenced to death.
The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court
for automatic review.
Issues
1. WON the appellants extra-judicial
confession was validly taken and in
accordance with his rights under Section
12 of the Bill of Rights; and
2. WON the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution sufficient
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt
Ruling
The conviction of the appellant is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
The Court ruled that the appellants
extrajudicial confession was taken within the
ambit of the law as evinced by the records and
testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned
and explained to him his constitutionally

guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial
rights.
As to the second issue, the appellant argues that
the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution is insufficient to warrant a
conviction of his guilt. However, the Court
ruled otherwise.
The Court recalled the Rule on Evidence and
settled jurisprudence. Absence of direct proof
does not absolve the appellant because
conviction may be had with the concurrence of
the following requisites as stated in the Rules of
Court:
1.
there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court recalled the ruling in People v. De
Guia, 280 SCRA 141, all circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.
And also in People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613
citing People v. Abitona, 240 SCRA 335, that
facts and circumstances consistent with guilt
and inconsistent with innocence, constitute
36
evidence which, in weight and probative force,

may surpass even direct evidence in its effect
upon the court.
The Court agreed with the trial courts decision
in giving credence to several circumstantial
evidence, which is more than enough to prove
appellants guilt beyond the shadow of
reasonable doubt.
The Court also updated the Miranda rights with
the developments in law that provided the rights
of suspects under custodial investigation in
detail.
A person under custodial investigation should
be informed:
1. In a language known to and understood by
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other
warnings, information or communication must
be in a language known to and understood by
said person;
2. That he has a right to remain silent and that
any statement he makes may be used as
evidence against him;
3. That he has the right to be assisted at all
times and have the presence of an independent
and competent lawyer, preferably of his own
choice;
4. That if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the
services of a lawyer, one will be provided for
him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by
any person in his behalf, or may be appointed
by the court upon petition of the person arrested

or one acting in his behalf;
5. That no custodial investigation in any form
shall be conducted except in the presence of his
counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. That, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most expedient
means telephone, radio, letter or messenger
with his lawyer (either retained or appointed),
any member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him
or by any one from his immediate family or by
his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international nongovernment organization. It shall be the
responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is
accomplished;
7. That he has the right to waive any of said
rights provided it is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he
understood the same;
8. That the waiver must be done in writing AND
in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must
be warned that the waiver is void even if he
insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That he may indicate in any manner at any
time or stage of the process that he does not
wish to be questioned with warning that once he
makes such indication, the police may not
interrogate him if the same had not yet
commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if
it has already begun;
10. That his initial waiver of his right to remain

silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights
does not bar him from invoking it at any time
during the process, regardless of whether he
may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements;
11. That any statement or evidence, as the case
may be, obtained in violation of any of the
foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory,
in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
37
People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 131036, June

20, 2001
Issue: Whether or not he was deprived of his

right under Custodial Investigation
Facts: Del Rosario was convicted of the crime

of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua.
Ruling: No.
On his appeal the accused alleged that he was

persuaded by his brother in-law Fernando
Morales as there was a threat to kill him by a
certain Zapanta, a member of a salvage team in
Olongapo. When they arrived in the police
station (station A), he found his aunt and some
people in a room where he claimed that he was
boxed by an unknown man when he sat down.
Thereafter he was brought to station B where he
was forced to sign a document, but not before
being mauled with a rattan stick and a chair.
While he was being mauled he was forced to
admit that he committed the arson. Del Rosario
further claims that he did not recall going to the
prosecutors office to file or submit his counteraffidavit, neither was he sent to the fiscals office
for preliminary investigation. Accused-appellant
claims that his arrest was violative of his
constitutional rights and that all the evidence
obtained thereat were fruits of the poisonous
tree and therefore inadmissible in any
proceeding of whatever nature and for any
purpose. He alleged that he was mauled to force
him to sign a confession.
Ratio: The Court find that his arrest was not

violative of his Constitutional rights, and that he
voluntary surrendered to police officer
Fernando Morales.
We, therefore, find that accused-appellant
surrendered to the police authorities, confessed
to the crime, volunteered the information as to
where he pawned and sold the jewelry, and
went with the Olongapo police willingly to the
Lovely Kahael Pawnshop and to the stall of the
Adrianos and to the police station in
Olongapo. He admitted that he was not even
handcuffed.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the
extrajudicial admission is not binding upon him,
let it be stressed that he was positively
identified by Florencio Gamboa, the appraiser
of Lovely Kahael Pawnshop, and by Rogelio
Adriano and his son, as the person who pawned
and sold the jewelry.
Both SPO1 Ramon Fernandez and Lt. Leonardo
Esteban told the court that the accused
voluntarily led them to the place where he

pawned and sold the jewelry so that the jewelry
could be recovered. If he was not the culprit,
how did he come to know where to lead the
policemen in order to retrieve the jewelry of
Emelita Paragua?
In addition, bare assertions of maltreatment by
the police authorities in extracting confessions
from the accused are not sufficient in view of
the standing rule enunciated in cases of People
vs. Mada-I Santalani;] People vs.
Balane; and People vs. Villanueva,that where
the defendants did not present evidence of
compulsion, or duress nor violence on their
person; where they failed to complain to the
officer who administered their oaths; where
they did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against their alleged
intimidators for maltreatment; where there
appeared to be no marks of violence on their
bodies; and where they did not have themselves
examined by a reputable physician to buttress
their claim, all these were considered by this
Court as factors indicating voluntariness.
The court a quo did not hand down a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence.
38
The accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered

to the police and admitted his guilt by way of
the waiver/confession he had
signed. Circumstantial evidence had no place in
this case.
Accused-appellant relied on alibi as a defense to
belie the accusation against him. However,
nobody was presented to corroborate his
statements as to his whereabouts on the day
when the robbery, homicide, and arson took
place, not even Rancen Anonat who was his
companion on that day and who was with him
when the crimes occurred. Already a weak
defense, alibi becomes even weaker by reason
of the failure of the defense to present any
corroboration.
In the absence of showing that the factual
findings of the trial judge were reached
arbitrarily or without sufficient basis, these
findings are to be received with respect by, and
indeed are binding on, the Supreme Court.
People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991)

Habeas Corpus Right to Bail Rebellion
Salas aka NPAs Ka Bilog was arrested and
was charged for rebellion. He was charged
together with the spouses Concepcion. Salas,
together with his co-accused later filed a
petition for the WoHC. A conference was held
thereafter to hear each partys side. It was later
agreed upon by both parties that Salas will
withdraw his petition for the WoHC and that he
will remain in custody for the continued
investigation of the case and that he will face
trial. The SC then, basing on the stipulations of
the parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus
case filed by Salas. But later on, Salas filed to
be admitted for bail and Judge Donato approved
his application for bail. Judge Donato did not
bother hearing the side of the prosecution. The
prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from
filing bail because he has waived his right to
bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas
corpus as a sign of agreement that he will be
held in custody.
HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his

right to bail when he withdrew his petition for
the issuance of the WoHC. The contention of
the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in
custody and that the same does not constitute a
waiver of his right to bail is not tenable. His
waiver to such right is justified by his act of
withdrawing his petition for WoHC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly

file for bail.
Right to Bail
39
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 11540 August 28, 1995
Facts: Petitioner was belatedly charged in an
amended information as a co-conspirator in the
crime of multiple murder in the Regional Trial
Court for the killing of members of the Bucag
family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of
which petitioner was the mayor at the time.
The trial of the base was all set to start with the
issuance of an arrest warrant for petitioners
apprehension but, before it could be served on
him, petitioner through counsel, a motion for
admission to bail with the trial court which set
the same for hearing.
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan
Capitol College General Hospital, his counsel
manifested that they were submitting custody
over the person of their client to the local
chapter president of the integrated Bar of the
Philippines and that, for purposes of said
hearing of his bail application, he considered
being in the custody of the law.
The prosecution was neither supporting nor
opposing the application for bail and that they
were submitting the same to the sound
discretion of the trail judge

Upon further inquiries from the trial court,
Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was
waiving any further presentation of evidence.
On that note and in a resolution, the trial court
admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of
P200,000.00
Issue: Whether or not the grant of bail was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion
Held: None.
As a paramount requisite, only those persons
who have either been arrested, detained, or
otherwise deprived of their freedom will ever
have occasion to seek the protective mantle
extended by the right to bail.
A person is considered to be in the custody of
the law (a) when he is arrested either by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued or by
warrantless arrest or (b) when he has
voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to
the proper authorities.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be
conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually and
physically placed under arrest. He may,
however, at that point and in the factual
ambience therefore, be considered as being

constructively and legally under custody.
Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to
physical and legal control over his person.
Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance
which attended the filing of his bail application
with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing
thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily
submitted his person to the custody of the law
and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial
court which thereafter granted bail as prayed
for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual
restraint of the arrestee or merely by his
submission to the custody of the person making
the arrest. 19 The latter mode may be
exemplified by the so-called house arrest or,
in case of military offenders, by being
confined to quarters or restricted to the
military camp area
The general rule is that prior to conviction by
the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an
accused is entitled to be released on bail as a
matter of right, the present exceptions thereto
being the instances where the accused is
charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is
strong. Under said general rule, upon proper
application for admission to bail, the court
40
having custody of the accused should, as a

matter of course, grant the same after a hearing
conducted to specifically determine the
conditions of the bail in accordance with
Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the
other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a
matter of judicial discretion on the part of the
court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing,
mandatory in nature and which should be
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court is required with the participation of both
the defense and a duly notified representative of
the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the
provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course,
the burden of proof is on the prosecution to
show that the evidence meets the required
quantum.
Rights of the Accused

People of the Philippines vs. Rodrigo Calma
G.R. No. 127126,
September 17, 1998
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Rodrigo Calma was charged
with two (2) counts of Rape on his two
daughters, namely, Annalyn and Roselyn, ages
15 years old and 11 years old respectively, and
one (1) count of Acts of Lasciviousness on his
youngest daughter, Irene, age 5 years old.
All three witnesses testified on the repeated
loathsome acts done by their own father to them
in details as examined and cross-examined by
both prosecution and defense. The testimony of
the three victims, withstood the test of crossexamination. They spontaneously, clearly and
credibly spoke of the details of their
defilement. Their testimonies were also
corroborated by the medico-legal report
conducted by Dr. Jesusa Vergara, the medicolegal officer who examined them. The defense
did not dispute the time, the place, the manner
and the frequency of the sexual abuses. Neither
did the defense show that their hymenal
lacerations were the results of other causes.
On defense, the accused-appellant denied his

daughters' accusations. He charged that Myrna
Ignacio, his common law wife and mother of
his children, coached his daughters to lie. He
claimed that he had seriously hurt her in the
past, twice by electrocution on suspicion of
infidelity. Also, seeking to help accusedappellant, his mother, Catalina Calma, and their
neighbors, testified that accused-appellant's
daughters, especially Annalyn, showed much
affection towards their father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in
convicting the accused of the crimes charged
despite failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
A reasonable doubt is not such doubt as any
man may start by questioning for the sake of a
doubt; nor a doubt suggested or surmised
without foundation in facts or testimony, for it
is possible always to question any conclusion
derived from testimony, but such questioning is
41
not what reasonable doubt is. Rather, it is that

state of the case which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the
evidence leaves the mind of the judge in that
condition that he cannot say that he feels an
abiding conviction to a moral certainly of the
truth of the charge. Absolute certainty is not
demanded by the law to convict of any criminal
charge but moral certainty is required, and this
certainty must attend every proposition of proof
requisite to constitute the offense. Absolute,
mathematical, or metaphysical certainty is not
essential, and besides, in judicial investigation,
it is wholly unattainable. Moral certainty is all
that can be required. The arguments of accusedappellant are premised on the misconception
that reasonable doubt is anything and
everything that removes a statement from the
matrix of certitude. It bears repeating that even
inconsistencies and discrepancies in the
prosecution evidence, unless treating of the
elements of the crime, would not necessarily
bring about a judgment of acquittal. In this case,
there is not even any inconsistency or
discrepancy to speak of. All things considered,
the evidence against the accused-appellant
established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
on all three (3) charges. The appeal is denied.
Death penalty is accordingly imposed.
People vs. Flores [GR 128823-24, 27

December 2002] En Banc, Carpio-Morales
(J): 14 concur
Facts: On 5 December 1996, Filipina L.
Flores, 11 years old at the time, and her younger
sister Catherine were left to the care of their
father, Pedro Flores Jr. y Flores (@ "Pesiong"),
at their family residence in Sitio Buenlag,
Barangay Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, their mother Marcelina L. Flores
having departed for Singapore to work as an
overseas contract worker. After partaking of
supper on the night of 9 December 1996, Pedro
asked Filipina to accompany him to the comfort
room situated outside their house, claiming that
he was afraid of ghosts. Albeit Filipina did not
believe him, she acquiesced because her mother
had told her to always obey her father. When
Pedro came out of the comfort room, he ordered
Filipina to remove her short pants, threatening
her with death if she disobeyed, and made her
lie down. He then removed his short pants and
brief and, against her will, he inserted his finger
and later his penis into Filipinas vagina where
she later felt hot fluid. Pedro thereafter wiped
Filipinas vagina and his hand, threatened to kill
her if she reported what he did, directed her to
put on her shorts, and they both went home. The
following morning, Filipina reported the

incident to her Inang Lorie whose full name is
Norielyn Antonio, the aunt of her mother, who
told her that if her father would sexually assault
her again, he would have him detained. 19
nights later or on 28 December 1996, as Filipina
lay asleep in their house, she was awakened
when Pedro touched her right foot. Armed with
a knife, Pedro told her not to talk and ordered
her to remove her short pants and panty. She
complied. Pedro thereupon removed his short
pants and brief and went on top of her chest
during which she tried to push him away but
failed. Pedro then inserted his finger into
Filipinas vagina for some time, wiped his
hands, and then inserted his penis for a long
time as he was sucking her breast. Filipina felt
Pedros semen drop into her private organ
where she noticed the presence of blood and a
bit of whitish substance. Pedro later wiped her
vagina with a towel. The following morning,
Filipina again reported the matter to her
grandaunt Norielyn, and to her playmate Carla
Salvador. On 31 January 1997, Filipina,
accompanied by Norielyn, a relative, and a
tricycle driver-neighbor, reported the matter to
the Philippine National Police of Urdaneta
where she gave a statement. On the same day,
she, still accompanied by Norielyn, submitted
42
herself to a medical examination at the Don

Amadeo J. Perez, Jr. Memorial General
Hospital. On 3 February 1997, complaints were
filed against Pedro. The criminal complaint in
Criminal Case U-9184 reads "The undersigned,
Filipina Flores y Lazo, 11 years old, grade three
pupil and a resident of Sitio Buenlag, Brgy
Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
under oath, hereby accuses Pedro Flores Jr. y
Flores for the crime of rape, committed as
follows: 'That on the 9th day of December
1996, in the morning at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy.
Nancamaliran West, Municipality of Urdaneta,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually
abuse the herein complaining witness Filipina
Flores y Lazo, 11 years old, all against her
will.'" The criminal complaint in Criminal Case
U- 9185, on the other hand, reads "The
undersigned, Filipina Flores y Lazo, 11 years
old, grade three pupil and a resident of Sitio
Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, under oath, hereby accuses Pedro
Flores Jr. y Flores, alias "Pesyong", committed
as follows: 'That on the 28th day of December
1996, in the evening at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy
Nancamaliran West, Municipality of Urdaneta,

Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with deliberate intent
and by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally
and feloniously sexually abuse the herein
complaining witness Filipina Flores, an 11 years
old and daughter of the herein accused with the
use of sharp pointed bladed weapon and all
against her will. '" Arraigned on 10 February
1997, Pedro pleaded not guilty to both charges.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan found Pedro guilty of
Statutory Rape and sentenced him to death in
both cases in its 7 April 1997 Joint Decision,
besides ordering him to pay Filipina the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus all the necessary
penalties and costs in each case. Hence, the
automatic review.
Issue: Whether the information violates the
constitutional right of Pedro Flores to be
informed of the nature Constitutional Law and
cause of the accusation against him.
Held: From a reading of the complaints, Pedro
Flores was denied the constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation against him. This right has the
following objectives: (1) To furnish the accused
with such a description of the charge against
him as will enable him to make the defense; (2)
To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal
for protection against further prosecution for the
same cause; (3) To inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction if one
should be had. The right cannot be waived for
reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative
that the complaint or information filed against
the accused be complete to meet its objectives.
As such, an indictment must fully state the
elements of the specific offense alleged to have
been committed. For an accused cannot be
convicted of an offense, even if duly proven,
unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the
complaint or information. The trial court found
Pedro guilty of Statutory Rape under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
RA 7659 (which restored the death penalty for
heinous crimes effective 31 December 1993).
Article 335 provides that "Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances: (1) By using
force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
43
and (3) When the woman is under twelve years

of age or is demented." The gravamen of the
crime of rape is carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse between a man and a woman under
the circumstances enumerated in the penal code.
Thus, to sustain a conviction, the complaint or
information must allege that the accused had
carnal knowledge of or sexual intercourse with
the private complainant. In the criminal
complaints herein, however, no such allegation
was made. The allegation that Pedro did
sexually abuse Filipina does not suffice.
Sexual abuse cannot be equated with carnal
knowledge or sexual intercourse. The allegation
in the criminal complaints that the accused
sexually abused the private complainant
cannot thus be read to mean that accused had
carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse with the
private complainant. The Court is not unaware
of the rule in case there is a variance between
allegation and proof as etched in Section 4 of
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which reads that "When there is
variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved, and
the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is

included in the offense proved." The present
case, however, is not one of variance between
allegation and proof. The recital of facts in the
criminal complaints simply does not properly
charge rape, sexual abuse not being an
essential element or ingredient thereof. Neither
can Pedro be convicted of acts of lasciviousness
or of any offense for that matter under our penal
laws. It is settled that what characterizes the
charge is the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. For every crime is
made up of certain acts and intent which must
be set forth in the complaint or information with
reasonable particularity of time, place, names
(plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In
other words, the complaint must contain a
specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged, the accused being presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense. Even under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (The
Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act),
Pedro cannot be held liable. The phrase
sexually abuse in the criminal complaints
does not comply with the requirement that the
complaint must contain a specific averment of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime.

Notably, the phrase sexual abuse is not used
under RA 7610 as an elemental fact but as an
altogether separate offense. Section 5 of RA
7610 enumerated the punishable acts that must
be alleged in the complaint or information to
hold an accused liable, none of which is
reflected in the present complaints charging
Pedro Flores. Thus, the informations in
Criminal Cases U-9184 and U-9185 were
declared null and void by the Supreme Court for
being violative of the constitutional right of
Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias Pesiong, for
Rape to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
People v. Murillo, 434 SCRA 342 (2004)
Facts: Freddie Murillo was convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder against
his aunt Paz Abiera and was sentenced to the
penalty of Death.
Murillo confessed that he stabbed his aunt and
dismembered her body and hid the parts inside
the septic tank and the head was placed on a red
and white striped plastic bad and was disposed
at a canal near the service road of the South
Super Highway.
44
Appellant argues: His plea of guilt was

improvident since there was no indication that
he fully understood that the qualifying
circumstances charged in the information would
result to the penalty of death. He only admitted
the killing but not the circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. There
could be no evident premeditation since he
stabbed Paz only after losing his senses. There
could also be no treachery since it cannot be
determined with certainty whether or not the
wounds inflicted on the victim were made
before or after her death. The aggravating
circumstance of outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse cannot be appreciated in this
case since it was not alleged in the Information.
Issue: Whether or not the death penalty was
violitive of his rights, considering his plea of
guilt.
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense;
reception of evidence.--- When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the

prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf.
The reason for this rule is that courts must
necessarily proceed with more care where the
possible punishment is in its severest form
death for the reason that the execution of such
sentence is irrevocable. Experience has shown
that innocent persons have at times pleaded
guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment, or upon
bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should
he admit guilt or express remorse. An accused
might be admitting his guilt before the court
and thus forfeit his life and liberty without
having fully understood the meaning,
significance and consequences of his plea. The
judge therefore has the duty to ensure that the
accused does not suffer by reason of mistaken
impressions. Requiring the trial court to take
further evidence would also aid this Court on
appellate review in evaluating the propriety or
impropriety of the plea.
Under the said rule, three things are required
from the trial court when a plea of guilty to a
capital offense is entered: (1) the court must
conduct a searching inquiry into the

voluntariness of the plea and the accuseds full
comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2)
the court must require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) the
court must ask the accused if he desires to
present evidence on his behalf and allow him to
do so if he desires.
The searching inquiry referred to here means
more than just informing cursorily the accused
that he faces jail term. The inquiry must
expound on the events that actually took place
during the arraignment, the words spoken and
the warnings given, with special attention to the
age of the accused, his educational attainment
and socio-economic status as well as the
manner of his arrest and detention, the provision
of counsel in his behalf during the custodial and
preliminary investigations, and the opportunity
of his defense counsel to confer with him.The
trial court must also explain to the accused the
essential elements of the crime he is charged
with as well as its respective penalties and civil
liabilities. The exact length of imprisonment
under the law and the certainty that he will
serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal
colony must be fully explained to the
45
accused. The court must also explain to the

accused that once convicted, he could be meted
the death penalty and that it is a single and
indivisible penalty that will be imposed
regardless of any mitigating circumstance that
may have attended the commission of the
felony. The court must also direct a series of
questions to the defense counsel to determine
whether he has conferred with the accused and
has completely explained to the latter the
meaning of a plea of guilt. This formula is
mandatory and absent any showing that it has
been followed, a searching inquiry cannot be
said to have been undertaken.
In People vs. Pastor, the Court explained that
while there is no definite and concrete rule as to
how a trial judge must conduct a searching
inquiry, the following guidelines should
nevertheless be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how
he was brought into the custody of the law; (b)
whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he
was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the
possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual

threats of physical harm coming from
malevolent quarters or simply because of the
judges intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions
as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the
meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality
profile of the accused, such as his age, socioeconomic status, and educational background,
which may serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of
guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of
imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the
law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. For not infrequently, an accused
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment
or upon bad advice or because of promises of
the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty
should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is
the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused
does not labor under these mistaken impressions
because a plea of guilty carries with it not only
the admission of authorship of the crime proper
but also of the aggravating circumstances

attending it, that increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with
which he is charged and fully explain to him the
elements of the crime which is the basis of his
indictment. Failure of the court to do so would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right to
be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and a denial of his right
to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be
in a language known and understood by the
latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the
accused in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The
accused must be required to narrate the tragedy
or reenact the crime or furnish its missing
details.
In the case at bar, records do not show that a
searching inquiry was ever conducted by the
judge when appellant entered his plea of
guilty. The Order dated July 14, 1997 simply
reads as follows:
Accused, when arraigned, with the assistance of
Atty. Dante O Garin of the Public Attorneys
46
Office, pleaded GUILTY to the crime charged

in the information.
Information is death regardless of the presence

of mitigating circumstances.
Let this case be set for hearing on July 28, 1997

at 8:30 oclock in the morning.
The failure of the defense counsel to faithfully

protect the rights of appellant also cannot go
unnoticed. Records show that defense counsel
Atty. Dante O. Garin, never cross-examined
three of the four witnesses of the prosecution,
namely Sancho Fereras, Ramon Saraos, and Dr.
Ludivino Lagat. The only prosecution witness
he cross-examined was SPO2 Nieves to whom
he asked four questions pertaining only as to
how the police came to the conclusion that the
body parts belong to Paz Abiera. Apart from
these, no other questions were ever offered.
Let subpoena be issued to all prosecution

witnesses for the next scheduled hearing.
SO ORDERED.
Clearly, the proceedings taken by the trial court
was short of being satisfactory. Appellant was
never asked about the circumstances of his
arrest and detention, not even when SPO2
Nieves himself in his testimony mentioned that
he ordered that the two brothers be brought to
Block 6 for questioning without the presence of
counsel. Where or what kind of place Block 6
is, was not even explained by the witness
neither did the court nor the defense counsel ask
the witness to clarify said point. The Court also
did not ask appellant about the circumstances of
his arraignment as well as his age and
educational attainment. He was also neither
apprised of the consequences of his plea nor
was it explained to him that the penalty
imposable for the crime attended by its
qualifying circumstances as alleged in the
There is also no record anywhere that the

defense counsel presented evidence for the
accused nor that the trial court even inform him
of his right to do so if he so desires.
For these reasons, it cannot be said that the
appellants rights were observed in the
proceedings a quo.
It is well established that the due process
requirement is part of a persons basic rights and
is not a mere formality that may be dispensed
with or performed perfunctorily. An accused
needs the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of
overzealous prosecutors, of the laws complexity

or of his own ignorance and
bewilderment. Indeed, the right to counsel
springs from the fundamental principle of due
process. The right to counsel, however, means
more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard
questions and objections. The right to counsel
means that the accused is sufficiently accorded
legal assistance extended by a counsel who
commits himself to the cause for the defense
and acts accordingly. This right necessitates an
active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case,
his bearing constantly in mind of the basic
rights of the accused, his being well-versed on
the case and his knowing the fundamental
procedures, essential laws and existing
jurisprudence. Indeed, the right of an accused to
counsel finds meaning only in the performance
by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his
client and an efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance which is not just a simple perfunctory
representation.
Atty. Garin, had the duty to defend his client
and protect his rights, no matter how guilty or
evil he perceives appellant to be. The
performance of this duty was all the more
47
imperative since the life of appellant hangs in

the balance. As a defense counsel, he should
have performed his duty with all the zeal and
vigor at his command to protect and safeguard
appellants fundamental rights.
While our jurisdiction does not subscribe to
a per se rule that once a plea of guilty is found
improvidently he is at once entitled to a remand,
the circumstances of this case warrant that a
remand to the trial court be made. To warrant a
remand of the criminal case, the Court has held
that it must be shown that as a result of such
irregularity there was inadequate representation
of facts by either the prosecution or the defense
during the trial. Where the improvident plea of
guilty was followed by an abbreviated
proceeding with practically no role at all played
by the defense, we have ruled that this
procedure was just too meager to accept as
being the standard constitutional due process at
work enough to forfeit a human life. What
justifies the remand of the criminal case to the
trial court is the unfairness or complete
miscarriage of justice in the handling of the
proceedings a quo as occasioned by the
improvident plea of guilt. In this case, apart
from the testimony of appellant, the prosecution
does not have any other evidence to hold him

liable for the crime charged.
In view of the foregoing, we find that it is
imperative to remand the case for the proper
arraignment and trial of the accused,
considering not only the accuseds improvident
plea of guilt but also his lawyers neglect in
representing his cause.
People vs. Rivera [GR 139180, 31 July 2001]
En Banc, Mendoza (J): 9 concur, 4 on official
business, 1 on leave
Facts: Sometime in March 1997, Erlanie
Rivera's younger sister, Zaira, was taken by
their parents to the Escolastica Romero
Memorial Hospital in Lubao, Pampanga.
Erlanie's mother stayed with her sister in the
hospital, but her father, Rolando Rivera, went
back home to Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga. At
around 11 p.m. of the same day, Erlanie was
awakened as Rolando started kissing her and
fondling her breasts. Erlanie tried to resist by
kicking and pushing Rolando, but her efforts
were to no avail. Rolando removed her shorts
and panty, touched her private parts, and then
had sexual intercourse with her. After he was
through with her, Rolando told complainant not
to tell anyone what had happened or he would
kill Erlanie's mother and sister. Hence, when her

mother came home the following day, Erlanie
did not tell her what had happened because she
was afraid of Rolando. On 9 April 1997,
however, Erlanie, in the presence of her mother,
told her aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and her
grandmother, Maxima Payumo, that she had
been raped by Rolando. For this reason, she was
referred to Dr. Barin for physical examination.
She also executed a sworn statement before the
police of Lubao, Pampanga. Rolando Rivera
was charged in an information filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Guagua,
Pampanga, which reads "That sometime in the
month of March 1997, in barangay Santiago,
municipality of Lubao, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
ROLANDO RIVERA, by means of violence,
threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
maliciously succeeded in having carnal
knowledge [of] his 13 year old daughter,
Erlanie D. Rivera, against the latter's will and
without her consent. Contrary to law." During
the arraignment on 30 September 1997, the
information was read to Rolando in the local
dialect (Pampango). Rolando, duly assisted by
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the
48
crime charged, whereupon trial was held. On 22

June 1999, the trial court rendered a decision,
finding Rolando Rivera guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as
charged. For having violated Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act 7659, with the attendant circumstances that
the victim is under 18 years of age and the
offender is the father of the victim and absent
any circumstance that could mitigate the
commission thereof, the Court sentenced
Rolando to suffer the supreme penalty of death
by lethal injection, and ordered him, in line with
established jurisprudence, to indemnify the
offended party Erlanie Rivera in the sum of
P75,000.00 as compensatory damages and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. Rolando
appealed.
Issue: Whether the right to speedy and
adequate justice of one party necessary limits
the right to competent and independent counsel
of choice of another, and whether the speedy
disposition of the case (a day after the
memorandum was filed) denies due process to
the accused.
Held: While the Constitution recognizes the
accused's right to competent and independent
counsel of his own choice, his option to secure

the services of a private counsel is not absolute.
For considering the State's and the offended
party's right to speedy and adequate justice, the
court may restrict the accused's option to retain
a private counsel if the accused insists on an
attorney he cannot afford, or if the chosen
counsel is not a member of the bar, or if the
attorney declines to represent the accused for a
valid reason. The trial court appointed Atty.
Bansil a counsel de oficio to represent Rolando
on 6 October 1998 because his regular counsel,
Atty. Anselmo Mangalindan, was absent
without any explanation. Atty. Mangalindan had
previously been granted several postponements.
As held in People v. Serzo, Jr. (274 SCRA 553,
568 [1997]), the Courts are not required to wait
indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of the
accused as they are also mandated to promote
the speedy and orderly administration of justice.
Nor should they countenance such an obvious
trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy
requires that the trial continue as scheduled,
considering that appellant was adequately
represented by counsels who were not shown to
be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable
to represent him. Atty. Bansil was present and
heard the testimony of Dr. Barin, the
prosecution witness, on that day. Dr. Barin's
testimony on direct examination was simple,

containing primarily a discussion of her
findings on the hymenal laceration sustained by
complainant. Her testimony did not require
considerable study and extraordinary
preparation on the part of defense counsel for
the purpose of cross-examination. It seems Atty.
Bansil no longer found it necessary to crossexamine Dr. Barin. Further, Rolando was not
denied due process considering the speed with
which the trial court rendered judgment against
him, which judgment was promulgated one day
after he filed his memorandum. The decision
rendered by the trial court gives a clear account
of the facts and the law on which it is based. It
discusses in full the court's findings on the
credibility of both the prosecution and defense
witnesses and its evaluation of the evidence of
both parties. As held in the analogous case of
People v. Mercado (GR. 116239, 29 November
2000.), the speed with which the trial court
disposed of the case cannot be attributed to the
injudicious performance of its function. Indeed,
a judge is not supposed to study a case only
after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed.
It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty
that a judge studies a case long before the
deadline set for the promulgation of his decision
has arrived. The one-day period between the
49
filing of accused-appellants' memorandum and

the promulgation of the decision was sufficient
time to
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE
OF THE TRIAL IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER
CASES AGAINST THE FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
PART I. DECISION (JUNE 2001)
FACTS
The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas
(KBP) sent a letter requesting the SC to allow
the live media coverage of the anticipated trial
of the plunder and other criminal cases filed
against former Pres. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan to assure the public of full
transparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history.
The petition averred that public interest should

be evident bearing in mind the right of the
public to vital information affecting the nation.
In effect, the petition seeks the re-examination
of the October 23, 1991 resolution of the SC in
a case for libel filed by then President Aquino.
The said resolution resolved to prohibit live
radio and television coverage of court
proceedings, in view order to protect the
parties right to due process, to prevent the
distraction of the participants in the proceedings
and to avoid miscarriage of justice. Video
footages of court hearings for news purposes
shall be limited and restricted.
ISSUE
Whether live radio and TV coverage of the
court proceedings should be allowed.
RULING
Petition is denied.
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the

press and the right to public information, on the
one hand, and the fundamental rights of the
accused, on the other hand, along with the
constitutional power of a court to control its
proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial
trial. When these rights race against one
another, the right of the accused must be
preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only liberty

but also the very life of the accused, it behooves
all to make absolutely certain than an accused
receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just
and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that
would come only after the presentation of
credible evidence testified to by6 unbiased
witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure,
whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are
devoid of histrionics that might detract from its
basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from
improper influence, and decreed by a judge with
an unprecedented mind, unbridled by running
emotions or passions.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant

petition involve the weighing out of the
50
Even while it may be difficult to quantify the

influence, or pressure that media can bring to
bear on them directly and through the shaping
of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that,
indeed, it does so in so many ways and in
varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious
effect that such coverage may have on the
testimony of witnesses and the decision of
judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise
be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt
or innocence to yield to it. To say that actual
prejudice should first be present would leave to
near nirvana the subtle threats to justice that a
disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the
calm and deliberate dispensation of justice can
create.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a

right that belongs to him, more than anyone
else, where his life or liberty can be held
critically in balance. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only
implies that the court doors must be open to
those who wish to come, sit in the available
seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process.
The courts recognize the constitutionally

embodied freedom of the press and the right to
public information. Nevertheless, within the
courthouse, the overriding consideration is still
the paramount right of the accused to due
process which must never be allowed to suffer
diminution in its constitutional proportions.
PART II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

(SEPT 2001)
FACTS
The Secretary of Justice filed a MR arfuing that
there is really no conflict between the right of
the people to public information and the
freedom of the press, on the one hand, and the
right of the accused to a fair trial, on the other
hand; that if there is a clash, it must be resolved
in favor of the right of the people and the press
because the people are entitled to information.
RULING: In lieu of live TC and radio

coverage of the trial, the Court resolved to
order the audio-visual recording of the trial
for documentary purposes, considering the
significance of the trial before the
Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and

the importance of preserving the records
thereof.
There are several reasons for such televised

recording. First, the hearings are of historic
significance. They are an affirmation of our
commitment to the rule that "the King is under
no man, but he is under God and the law."
Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of
vital concern to our people who have a
fundamental right to know how their
government is conducted. This right can be
enhanced by audio-visual presentation. Third,
audio-visual presentation is essential for the
education and civic training of the people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual
records of the hearings for documentary
purposes. The recordings will be useful in
preserving the essence of the proceedings in a
way that the cold print cannot quite do because
it cannot capture the sights and sounds of
events. They will be primarily for the use of
appellate courts in the event a review of the
proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the
Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes
necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of
51
stenographic notes taken during the trial can be

checked by reference to the tapes.
be published about him constitute matters of a

public character."
On the other hand, by delaying the release of

the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those
taking part in the proceedings will be playing to
the cameras and will thus be distracted from the
proper performance of their roles whether as
counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges
will be allayed. The possibility that parallel
trials before the bar of justice and the bar of
public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent,
the just determination of the cases can be
minimized. The possibility that judgment will
be rendered by the popular tribunal before the
court of justice can render its own will be
avoided.
DISPOSITION
The right of privacy of the accused is not a bar

to the production of such documentary. In Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, the Court
held that "a limited intrusion into a person's
privacy has long been regarded as permissible
where that person is a public figure and the
information sought to be elicited from him or to
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of

the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made,
for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the
following conditions: (a) the trial shall be
recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions
thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine
should not be held public under Rule 119, 21
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras
shall be installed inconspicuously inside the
courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall
be regulated consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audiovisual recordings shall be made for
documentary purposes only and shall be made
without comment except such annotations of
scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to
explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the
recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have
rendered its decision in all the cases against the
former President shall be prohibited under pain
of contempt of court and other sanctions in case
of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure
that the conditions are observed, the audiovisual recording of the proceedings shall be
made under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and
shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by
it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the
audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the
original thereof shall be deposited in the
National Museum and the Records Management
and Archives Office for preservation and
exhibition in accordance with law.
Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo

Ilusorio vs. Bildner
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year
old of age, possessed extensive property valued
at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the
Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio
Country Club. He was married with Erlinda
Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and
begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin
Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia,
Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed
and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati
every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio
Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was
52
in Baguio City. On the other hand, the

petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
restraint of liberty must be actual and effective

not merely nominal or moral.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he

stayed with her wife for about 5 months in
Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin,
alleged that during this time their mother
overdose Potenciano which caused the latters
health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda
filed with RTC petition for guardianship over
the person and property of Potenciano due to
the latters advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998,
after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead
lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In
March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition
for habeas corpus to have the custody of his
husband alleging that the respondents refused
her demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and

effective detention or deprivation of
Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance
of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years
of age and under medication does not
necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.
He still has the capacity to discern his actions.
With his full mental capacity having the right of
choice, he may not be the subject of visitation
rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he
will be deprived of his right to privacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of

habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by
which the rightful custody of a person is
withheld from the one entitled thereto. To
justify the grant for such petition, the restraint
of liberty must an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal
The case at bar does not involve the right of a

parent to visit a minor child but the right of a
wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the
husband refuses to see his wife for private
reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat
or any penalty attached to the exercise of his
right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial
authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion
of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the
sheriffs or by any other process.
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA
G.R. 158802 November 17, 2004
J. Ynares-Santiago
Lacking the requisites set by Feria, petition for

writ of habeas corpus unavailing as a collateral
attack to a final judgment.
Aileen Mendoza, 12, was raped by her
uncle, Reynaldo de Villa in her home in Pasig.
Her pregnancy prompted the filing of charges
by her parents against de Villa.
De Villa:
1. Sickness, old age of 67 rendered
me incapable of erection
2. Mendozas bear a grudge against me
3. Alibi: in hometown of San Luis, Laguna at
time of crime
RTC: de Villa guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of qualified rape, sentenced to death.
Case automatically elevated to SC for automatic
review due to penalty imposed.
SC: affirmed RTC decision, modified by
awarding moral damages. SC found date of
birth of Aileens child, Leahlyn medically
consistent with time of rape.
June de Villa, son of accused, alleged that
defense counsel only learned of DNA testing to
resolve paternity issue at time of pendency of
SC automatic review. His 2MRs of the case
praying for DNA tests to be conducted were
denied. DNA tests obtained from Billy de Villa,
53
grandson of Reynaldo, and Leahlyn showed that

de Villacould not have sired the latter.
e. June did not allege any of the three conditions

in Feria to avail of HC
June thus filed petition for writ of habeas

corpus for his father.
2. Proper remedy should have been certiorari or

appeal
Issue: WON writ of habeas corpus a proper

remedy in the instant case.
3. *On the issue of denial of de Villas effective

aid of counsel who left for the US in the middle
of appeala.SC did not find negligence
amounting to denial of constitutional right
Held: No.
Ratio of the Court.
1. On the issue of writ of habeas corpus as
proper remedy:
a. individual is illegally deprived of his freedom
of movement or placed under some form of
illegal restraint
b. however, cannot be used to directly assail
a judgment rendered by a competent court or
tribunal which, having duly acquired
jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this
jurisdiction
c. It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of
conviction due to said lack of jurisdiction
which makes it susceptible to collateral attack
through HC
d. Feria v. CA doctrine allowed HC as postconviction remedy only when there exists:
i. deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint
ii. court had no jurisdiction
iii. penalty being excessive, is voided
4. *On the issue of the relevance of the

DNA test as to de Villas guilt
a. Pregnancy not an essential element of crime
of rape
b. Results of DNA test could not conclusively
determine de Villas guilt for the crime of rape
5. *On the issue of remedy of motion for new
trial
a. Rule 121 of Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure:
SEC. 2.
Grounds for a new trial.
The court shall grant a new trial on any of
thefollowing grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused have been committed during the
trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has bee

n discovered whichthe accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered
andproduced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted would
probablychange the judgment.
b. Requisites for motion for new trial:
(a) that the evidence was discovered after
trial;
(b) that said evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even
with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching;
and
(d) that the evidence is of such weight that
that, if admitted, it would probably change
the judgment
c. Lack of knowledge of DNA testing
attributable to negligence of counsel, and the
same is binding upon de Villa
d. Other means to determine paternity
were previously available to deVilla anyway.
Dispositive. Petition for habeas corpus and
motion for new trial dismissed.
Writ of Amparo
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,
G.R. No. 180906, Oct. 7, 2008
54
Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo

Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were
suspected of being members of the New
Peoples Army, were forcibly taken from their
home, detained in various locations, and
tortured by CAFGU and military units. After
several days in captivity, the brothers Raymond
and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as
members of the armed forces led by General
Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they
were being held in place for their brother,
Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist
insurgents. While in captivity, they met
other desaperacidos (including the still-missing
University of the Philippines students Karen
Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also
suspected of being communist insurgents and
members of the NPA. After eighteen months of
restrained liberty, torture and other
dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to
escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo.
Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from

fear is or can be protected by existing laws.
Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is
not merely a textual hook in Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution. At its core is the
immunity of ones person against government

intrusion. The right to security of person is
freedom from fear, a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity and security.
To whom may the oppressed, the little ones,
the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian
sword of the State, wielded recklessly by the
military or under the guise of police power, is
directed against them? The law thus gives the
remedy of the writ of amparo, in addition to the
rights and liberties already protected by the Bill
of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning to
protect, is borne out of the long history of
Latin American and Philippine human rights
abusesoften perpetrated by the armed forces
against farmers thought to be communist
insurgents, anarchists or brigands. The writ
serves to both prevent and cure extralegal
killings, enforced disappearances, and threats
thereof, giving the powerless a powerful
remedy to ensure their rights, liberties, and
dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that
has been embodied in positive law, gives voice
to the preys of silent guns and prisoners behind
secret walls.
Lozada v. Macapagal-ArroyoG.R. No.
184379-80 April 24, 2012 Sereno, J.
Summary: Lozada was issued a subpoena by

Senate with regards to the NBN-ZTE scandal.
He did not appear during the hearing and
instead flew to London on official businesses.
Upon his return, he was escorted by several
men and was told by Sec. Atienza that Atienza
was talking to ES and Maam, whom Lozada
assumed to be ES Recto and the President.
Lozada was brought to LSGH where he was
purportedly harassed and threatened by the
police. His brother filed for a writ of amparo.
The court held that the Writ of Amparo was
properly denied by the CA because the
petitioners failed to meet the threshold of
substantial evidence and that they failed to
prove the existence of a continuing threat.
Facts: The instant Petition stems from the
alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a
transaction between the Philippine government,
represented by the National Broadband
Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation, a
Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications
equipment. Former NEDA Secretary Neri
sought the services of Lozada as an unofficial
consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal. The latter
avers that during the course of his engagement,
he discovered several anomalies in the said
transaction involving certain public officials.
55
These events impelled the Senate of the

Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct
an investigation thereon, for which it issued a
subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify
on 30 January 2008.Lozada did not appear at
the Blue Ribbon Committee. DENR Sec.
Atienza announced that Lozada was in an
official trip to London. Because of this, Senate
issued an order (1) citing Lozada in contempt;
(2) ordering his arrest and detention; (3)
directing the sergeant-at-arms to implement
such order and make a return .Lozada asked
Sec. Atienza if he can go back to the
Philippines. Upon approval, he informed his
family that he would be arriving in Manila, Feb
5 at 4 pm. In his petition, Lozada claims that
upon disembarking, several men held his arms
and took his bag. He allegedly insisted on
joining his family but realized that it would be
wiser to go with the men when he heard them
say in their handheld radio [H]wag kayong
dumaan diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga
senado.Lozada asked to go to the comfort room
and while there, called his brother, Arturo and
informed him of his situation. He observed that
there were several cars tailing their car. Sec.
Atienza called him and assured him that he was
with government people and that Sec. Atienza
would confer with ES and Maam. Lozada
surmised them to be ES Ermita and the

President. He was also told to pacify his wife,
Violeta, who was making public statements
asking for her husbands return. Along the way,
the men asked Lozada to draft an antedated
letter requesting police protection. Lozada
asked to be brought to his home in Pasig, but
was refused due to security risks. They stopped
at Outback restaurant to meet with Atty.
Antonio Bautista and Col. Mascarinas, Lozada
claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of
an affidavit. He was then brought to LSGH per
his request. He observed that policemen,
purportedly restraining his liberty and
threatening the security of his, his family and
the LS brothers, guarded the perimeter of
LSGH. On Feb 6, Col. Mascarinas supposedly
brought Lozada to the office of Atty. Bautista to
finalize and sign an affidavit. On the same day
his wife petitioned for Habeas Corpus and his
brother petitioned for a Writ of Amparo with the
Supreme Court, and prayed for the issuance of
(a) the writ of amparo; (b) a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO); and (c) Inspection and
Production Orders as regards documents related
to the authority ordering custody over Lozada,
as well as any other document that would show
responsibility for his alleged abduction. Lozada
alleged that he was made to sign a letter
requesting police protection. On 7 February

2008, Lozada decided to hold a press
conference and contact the Senate Sergeant-atArms, who served the warrant of arrest on him.
He claimed that after his press conference and
testimony in the Senate, he and his family were
since then harassed, stalked and threatened.
Respondents: Lozada had knowledge and
control of what happened from the time of his
arrival, he voluntarily entrusted himself to their
company and was never deprived of his liberty
and that since Feb 8, Lozada has been in the
custody of the Senate.
CAs decisions:
1. Habeas Corpus case moot.
2. Denied issuance of Subpoena Ad
Testificandum and Presentation of Hostile
Witnesses and Adverse Parties irrelevant to
Amparo Case, to require them to testify would
be a fishing expedition.
3. Dropped Pres. Arroyo as a respondent
because she enjoys immunity from suit as
president.
56
4. Dismissed Writ of Amparo. Petitioners

unable to prove through substantial evidence
that respondents violated
Lozadas right to life, liberty and security.
Issue:
Whether circumstances are adequately alleged
and proven by petitioner Lozada to entitle him
to the protection of the writ of amparo? NO.
Ratio:
Definition: Writ of Amparo (courts lecture)
The writ of amparo is an independent and
summary remedy that provides rapid judicial
relief to protect the peoples right to life, liberty
and security. Having been originally intended as
a response to the alarming cases of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances in the
country, it serves both preventive and curative
roles to address the said human rights
violations. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of
these offenses, and it is curative in that it
facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent
investigation and action.
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined

only to cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof.
Considering that this remedy is aimed at
addressing these serious violations of or threats
to the right to life, liberty and security, it cannot
be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds
or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased
and is no longer imminent or continuing.
Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not
to dilute the extraordinary and remedial
character of the writ, thus: The privilege of the
writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect
and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and
security of persons, free from fears and threats
that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an
extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted
in light of and in response to the prevalence of
extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought
to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest
the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted
and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of
amparo petitions for purposes less than the
desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection
and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations.
Writ of Amparo Denied
In cases where the violation of the right to life,

liberty or security has already ceased, it is
necessary for the petitioner in an amparo action
to prove the existence of a continuing threat. In
the present case, the totality of the evidence
adduced by petitioners failed to meet the
threshold of substantial evidence. Sifting
through all the evidence and allegations
presented, the crux of the case boils down to
assessing the veracity and credibility of the
parties diverging claims as to what actually
transpired on 5-6 February 2008. In this regard,
this Court is in agreement with the factual
findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada was
not illegally deprived of his liberty from the
point when he disembarked from the aircraft up
to the time he was led to the departure area of
the airport, as he voluntarily submitted himself
to the custody of respondents.
He was able to go to the mens bathroom and
call his brother
He was avoiding the people from the Office
of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, detour
appears to explain why they did not get out at
the arrival area, where [Lozada] could have
passed through immigration so that his
passport could be properly stamped.
57
No evidence on record that Lozada struggled

or made an outcry for help
He testified that nobody held, shouted, or
was hostile to him
He knew and agreed with the plan that he
would be fetched at the airport because at that
time, it was his decision
not to testify before the Senate
It must be emphasized that if Lozada had in
fact been illegally restrained, so much so that
his right to liberty and security had been
violated, the acts that manifested this restraint
had already ceased and has consequently
rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ
of amparo moot.
The supposed announcement of General
Razon over the radio that [Lozada] was in the
custody of the PNP can neither be construed
as a threat to [Lozadas] life, liberty and
security. Certainly, no person in his right mind
would make that kind of media announcement
if his intent was indeed to threaten
somebodys life, liberty and security
Presence of armed men riding in motorcycle

passing outside the LSGH premises where he
and his family are staying and by alleged
threats of armed men around him at places
where he went to. Again, these alleged threats
were not proven by any evidence at all, as
having originated from any of the respondents
Installation of the surveillance camera at the
De La Salle and at St. Scholastica as indirect
threat to his right to
life, liberty and security. He claims that these
are spy cameras. However, save for [Lozadas]
self-serving claim, he simply failed to prove
that they were installed or ordered installed by
the respondents for the purpose of threatening
his right to life, liberty and security
No evidence on record that the bomb threats
were made by the respondents or done upon
their instigation.
He did not ascertain from the Bureau of
Immigration whether his name was actually in
the official watch list of the Bureau
[Lozada] himself testified that he does not
know whether the respondents or any of the
respondents ordered the filing of these
frivolous cases against him. In any event,

said purported cases are to be determined
based on their own merits and are clearly
beyond the realm of the instant amparo
petition filed against the respondents
The failure to establish that the public
official observed extraordinary diligence in the
performance of duty does not result in the
automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo
writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from
establishing his or her claim by substantial
evidence (Yano v. Sanchez)
Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the
filing of an amparo petition should a criminal
action have, in the meanwhile, been
commenced.
Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when
the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a
petition for amparo, the petition shall be
consolidated with the criminal action where
the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the
disposition of the relief under the Rule.
In Rubrico v. Arroyo the Court interprets the
above sections as follows:
58
(1) the consolidation of the probe and factfinding aspects of the instant petition with the
investigation of the criminal complaint before
the OMB; and
(2) the incorporation in the same criminal
complaint of the allegations in this petition
bearing on the threats to the right to security.
Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of
the investigation reports to aid that body in its
own investigation and eventual resolution of
OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB
shall be given easy access to all pertinent
documents and evidence, if any, adduced
before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as
complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should
be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic
criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases
is to be fully effective.
APPLIED: if the Complaint filed before the
DOJ had already progressed into a criminal
case, then the latter action can
more adequately dispose of the allegations
made by petitioners. After all, one of the
ultimate objectives of the writ of
amparo as a curative remedy is to facilitate the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators. On the
other hand, if there is no actual criminal case

lodged before the courts, then the denial of the
Petition is without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate administrative, civil or criminal
case, if applicable, against those individuals
whom Lozada deems to have unduly restrained
his liberty.
No basis for interim reliefs since writ of amparo
denied.
In Yano v. Sanchez, this court declined to grant
the prayer for the issuance of a TPO, as well as
Inspection and Production
Orders, upon a finding that the implicated
public officials were not accountable for the
disappearance subject of that case. Analogously,
it would be incongruous to grant herein
petitioners prayer for a TPO and Inspection and
Production Orders and at the same time rule that
there no longer exists any imminent or
continuing threat to Lozadas right to life,
liberty and security. Thus, there is no basis on
which a prayer for the issuance of these interim
reliefs can be anchored.
Denial of the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum proper - for a subpoena to issue, it
must first appear that the person or documents
sought to be presented are prima facie relevant

to the issue subject of the controversy CA
correctly denied petitioners Motion for the
Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum on the
ground that the testimonies of the witnesses
sought to be presented during trial were prima
facie irrelevant to the issues of the case. The
court has repeatedly reminded the parties, in the
course of the proceedings, that the instant
Amparo Petition does not involve the
investigation of the ZTE-NBN contract.
President Arroyo was not proven to be involved
in the alleged violation of life, liberty and
security of Lozada
President Arroyos term as president has ended,
therefore she no longer enjoys immunity, but an
examination of Petitioners evidence reveals
their failure to sufficiently establish any
unlawful act or omission on her part that
violated, or threatened with violation, the right
to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Except
for the bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza
mentioned a certain Ma[a]m, whom Lozada
speculated to have referred to her, and (b) Sec.
Defensor told Lozada that
the President was hurting from all the media
frenzy, there is nothing in the records that
59
would sufficiently establish the link of former

President Arroyo to the events that transpired on
5-6 February 2010, as well as to the subsequent
threats that Lozada and his family purportedly
received.
was lodged against them for theft of electric wires

and lamps in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter,
Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the
security department of Asian Land also located in
Grand Royale Subdivision.
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of
her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of
Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of
Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the
petitioners. The trial court issued the challenged
Decision granting the petition. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by
the trial court.
Digest: Navia, et al. v. Pardico

G.R. No. 184467 : June 19, 2012
FACTS:
A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation
(Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M.
Lapore. The arrival of the vehicle awakened
Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur
Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her
house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she
saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the
vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita
where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita
could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him
that he and Ben should go with them to the
security office of Asian Land because a complaint
Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the

amparo petition. They contend that the writ of
amparo is available only in cases where the factual
and legal bases of the violation or threatened
violation of the aggrieved partys right to life,
liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that
in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to
establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on
its face as it failed to state with some degree of
specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of
the petitioners constituting a violation of or a threat
to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And
second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence
Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that
petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance.
On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which
bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent
proof that petitioners released Ben on March 31,
2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit

that the trial court erred in issuing the writ and in
holding them responsible for Bens disappearance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of
Amparo is proper?
HELD: RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: writ of amparo
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of
Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in
the country. Its purpose is to provide an
expeditious and effective relief "to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity."
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights recognizes every human
beings inherent right to life, while Article 9 thereof
ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and
security. The right to life must be protected by law
while the right to liberty and security cannot be
impaired except on grounds provided by and in
accordance with law. This overarching command
against deprivation of life, liberty and security
without due process of law is also embodied in our
fundamental law.
60
The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed

in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this Court defined
enforced disappearances. The Court in that case
applied the generally accepted principles of
international law and adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances definition of enforced
disappearances, as "the arrest, detention, abduction
or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person
outside the protection of the law."
From the statutory definition of enforced
disappearance, thus, we can derive the following
elements that constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or
any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political
organizations refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the
person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove

subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the
protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and
proof that the persons subject thereof are missing
are not enough. It must also be shown and proved
by substantial evidence that the disappearance was
carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the
intention of removing them from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put,
the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the indispensable
element of government participation.
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition,
proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is
likewise essential to establish that such
disappearance was carried out with the direct or
indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of
the government. This indispensable element of
State participation is not present in this case. The
petition does not contain any allegation of State
complicity, and none of the evidence presented
tend to show that the government or any of its

agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact,
none of its agents, officials, or employees were
impleaded or implicated in Virginia's amparo
petition whether as responsible or accountable
persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or
proof that the government or its agents had a hand
in Bens disappearance or that they failed to
exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating
his case, the Court will definitely not hold the
government or its agents either as responsible or
accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 079-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought
to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo
petition is a private individual or entity, still,
government involvement in the disappearance
remains an indispensable element. Here,
petitioners are mere security guards at Grand
Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City
and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private
entity. They do not work for the government and
nothing has been presented that would link or
connect them to some covert police, military or
governmental operation. As discussed above, to
fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in
relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must
61
be attended by some governmental involvement.

This hallmark of State participation differentiates
an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary
case of a missing person.
Caram v. Segui, G.R. No. 193652, August 6,
2014
Facts: Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram had
an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano
Constantino III and eventually became pregnant
with the latters child without the benefit of
marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead
Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion
when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of
her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to
have the child adopted through Sun and Moon
Home for Children in Paranaque City to avoid
placing her family in a potentially embarrassing
situation for having a second illegitimate son.
On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to baby
Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical
Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered
all the Hospital and medical expenses. On August
13, 2009, Christina voluntary surrendered her son
by way of deed of Voluntary Commitment to the
DSWD.
On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart

attack and died without knowing about the birth of
his son. Thereafter, during the wake, Christina
disclosed to Marcelinos family that she and the
deceased had a son that she gave up for adoption
due to financial distress and initial embarrassment.
Marcelinos family was taken aback by the
revelation and sympathized with Christina. After
the emotional revelation, they vowed to help her
recover and raise her son. On November 27, 2009,
the DSWD, through Secretary Esperanza Cabral
issued a certificate declaring the baby Julian as
Legally available for adoption. A local matching
conference was held on January 27, 2010 and on
February 5, 2010, Julian was matched with the
spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina of the
Kaisahang Bahay Foundation.
Christina through a writ of amparo hoped and
prayed to recover her son and seeking to obtain the
childs custody.
Issue: Whether or not the writ of amparo was the
proper recourse for obtaining parental authority
and custody of the minor child.
Held: The Court rejects the petitioners
contentions and denies the petition.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of
amparois a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful actor
omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National
Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al.,31 this Court held:
[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the
intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances
or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are
"killings committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced
disappearances" are "attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction
of a person by a government official or organized
groupsor private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose
62
the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned

or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ
was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada,
Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo32 where this Court
explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of
amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, or to
threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced
disappearance," the Court in Navia v.
Pardico33 enumerated the elementsconstituting
"enforced disappearances" as the term is
statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No.
985134 to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or
any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State ora political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political
organizations refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the
person subject of the amparopetition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal isto remove

subject person from the protection of the law for
a prolonged period of time.1wphi1
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent
DSWD officers caused her "enforced separation"
from Baby Julian and that their action amounted
to an "enforced disappearance" within the context
of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position,
however, the respondent DSWD officers never
concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact,
Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May
28, 2010 Memorandum35 explicitly stating that
Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina
Spouses when she filed her petition before the
RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition
for review on certiorari that the respondent
DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the
RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of
August 5, 2010.36 There is therefore, no "enforced
disappearance" as used in the context of the
Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are
missing.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of
forcibly separating her from her child and placing
the latter up for adoption, supposedly without
complying with the necessary legal requisites to
qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates
that she is not searching for a lost child but

asserting her parental authority over the child and
contesting custody over him.37 Since it is extant
from the pleadings filed that what is involved is
the issue of child custody and the exercise of
parental rights over a child, who, for all intents
and purposes, has been legally considered a ward
of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly
applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is
a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of
a similar nature, regardless of whether the
perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a
public official or employee or a private
individual. It is envisioned basically to protect
and guarantee the right to life, liberty and
security of persons, free from fears and threats
that vitiate the quality of life.
Speedy Disposition of Cases
Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
146368, Oct. 18, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner laments that although the complaint
was filed with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas as early as
63
December 13, 1994, the informations were filed

with the Sandiganbayan only on August 1, 1997,
and the amended informations, on October 27,
1998. According to her, the delay of nearly three
years to finish the preliminary investigation
violated her constitutional rights to due process
and speedy disposition of cases.
Held:
The right to speedy disposition of cases, like the
right to speedy trial, is violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays.4 In the determination of
whether said right has been violated, particular
regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.5 The conduct
of both the prosecution and the defendant, the
length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay
are the factors to consider and balance.6 A mere
mathematical reckoning of time involved would
not be sufficient.7
In this case, the Graft Investigation Officer
released his resolution finding probable cause
against petitioner on August 16, 1995, less than
six months from the time petitioner and her coaccused submitted their counter-affidavits. On
October 30, 1995, only two and a half months

later, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had reviewed
the case and had approved the resolution.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the lapse of
only ten months from the filing of the complaint
on December 13, 1994, to the approval of the
resolution on October 30, 1995, is by no means
oppressive. "Speedy disposition of cases" is
consistent with reasonable delays. 8 The Court
takes judicial notice of the fact that the nature of
the Office of the Ombudsman encourages
individuals who clamor for efficient government
service to lodge freely their complaints against
alleged wrongdoing of government personnel.9 A
steady stream of cases reaching the Ombudsman
inevitably results.10 Naturally, disposition of those
cases would take some time. Moreover, petitioner
herself had contributed to the alleged delay when
she asked for extension of time to file her
counter-affidavit.
That the informations were filed only on August
1, 1997, also did not violate petitioners
constitutional rights. The delay was not without
valid reasons. The Special Prosecutor in charge
of preparing the informations felt a genuine need
to specify in the informations (1) the value of the
five drums of fuel petitioner received as gift in
violation of the anti-graft law and (2) the amount
of the subsistence allowance of heavy-equipment

operators that the municipality of Laoang,
Northern Samar, paid for when petitioner used
heavy equipment rented by the municipality to
develop her private property. The
recommendation to specify these two amounts
then had to undergo levels of review and was
approved by Ombudsman Desierto only on
January 29, 1996. Unfortunately, the needed
information was not in the records, so the Deputy
Special Prosecutor sought it from the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. As that
office also did not possess the needed
information, it issued an Order on June 10, 1996,
directing petitioner to supply the needed
information.
When petitioner received a copy of the Order,
however, she sought additional time to comply
with the Order. She waited for two months before
filing on August 23, 1996, a verified statement
supplying none of the information required of
her. She claimed that the five drums of fuel were
merely donated to her and that she did not know
their value. She also alleged that it was she and
her husband, and not the government, who spent
for the subsistence allowance of the heavyequipment operator in the development of her
private property. She did not object to the delay
64
in the termination of the proceedings against her,

nor did she seek at that time to expedite its
resolution.
Petitioners refusal to supply the information
prompted the handling investigator at the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas to
recommend on August 28, 1996, that the price of
the five drums of fuel be estimated instead.
Notably, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
could have filed the informations then, but
petitioner had filed with the said office a motion
for reassessment of evidence on June 25, 1996,
and a supplemental motion on August 20, 1996.
These motions, which incidentally also failed to
raise the issue of delay, effectively suspended the
filing of the informations.
Subsequently, the case had to be reassigned to
another Special Prosecutor because the original
handling prosecutor was appointed Resident
Ombudsman for the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Petitioners motion for reassessment was
resolved only on June 27, 1997. The resolution
again went up for further review.
Considering the number of times that the case
had to be reviewed, the levels of review that the
case had to undergo, and petitioners own
motions for additional time, the period that
lapsed -- roughly two years and five months

(from the time petitioner and her co-accused
submitted their counter-affidavits on March 29,
1995, to the time the informations were filed on
August 1, 1997) to terminate the proceedings
against petitioner -- could not be considered
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. They
were necessitated by exigency of the actions
taken on the case. The period to terminate the
proceedings, in our view, had not violated
petitioners constitutionally guaranteed rights to
due process and to a speedy disposition of
cases.11
Neither could the delay be said to have been
prejudicial to her considering that she herself is
guilty of delay.12The Court has held that if the
long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation was not solely the prosecutions
fault, but was also due to incidents attributable to
the accused and his counsel, the right of the
accused to speedy disposition of cases is not
violated.13 Petitioner cannot now seek the
protection of the law to benefit from what she
now considers the adverse effects of her own
conduct in this case.
WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for

Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan,
307 SCRA 149 (1999)
Facts:
On March 6, 1986, one Pedro Almendras filed
with the Office of the Tanodbayan (predecessor
of the Ombudsman) a sworn complaint[2] against
Alejandro Tapang for falsification of
complainant's "salaysay" alleging that Alejandro
Tapang made complainant sign a piece of paper
in blank on which paper a "salaysay" was later
inscribed stating that complainant had been paid
his claim in the amount of P17,594.00, which
was not true. In the said complaint, Pedro
Almendras mentioned that he sought the help of
petitioner Elpidio C. Cervantes who worked as
analyst in the office of labor arbiter Teodorico L.
Ruiz.[3]
On October 2, 1986, Alejandro Tapang submitted
to the Office of the Tanodbayan a counteraffidavit stating that the letter complaint of
Almendras was the subject of a labor case
decided by Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz; that the
letter "is full of lies and improbabilities" and
"that it is vague."[4]
On October 16, 1986, petitioner Elpidio C.
Cervantes filed with the office of the Tanodbayan
an affidavit stating that he had nothing to do with
the blank paper that Almendras signed, as
65
admitted by the latter in a confrontation in the

presence of National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) vice chairman Diego
Atienza.[5]
On May 18, 1992, more than six (6) years after
the filing of the initiatory complaint with the
Tanodbayan, Special Prosecution Officer II,
Office of the Special Prosecutor Luz L.
Quinones-Marcos filed with the Sandiganbayan,
assigned to the First Division, an Information
charging petitioner Elpidio C. Cervantes, together
with Teodorico L. Ruiz and Alejandro Tapang
with violation of Section 3 (e), Republic Act
3019, committed as follows:
That on or about June 16, 1984, or for sometime
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused Teodorico L. Ruiz, a
public officer, being then a Labor Arbiter,
National Labor Relations Commission, NCR,
Department of Labor and Elpidio Cervantes, also
a public officer, being then a Labor Analyst,
National Labor Relations Commission, NCR,
Department of Labor, in the exercise of their
official and administrative functions, conspiring,
confederating and conniving with private
respondent Alejandro Tapang, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality cause undue
injury to one Pedro Almendras by then and there
inducing Pedro Almendras to sign a blank paper,
on which a statement was later typed and
attributed as his (Almendras) statement in which
statement Almendras allegedly acknowledged

that the whole amount awarded to him by the
NLRC in a decision in NCR Case No. 10-73181 had been paid by Alejandro Tapang and
therefore, he is no longer pursuing any claim
against Tapang, thereby giving said Alejandro
Tapang unwarranted benefits and advantage to
the damage and prejudice of Pedro Almendras.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion
to quash for violation of the right to speedy
disposition of the case.
Held:
He was deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case, a right guaranteed by the
Constitution.[12] It took the Special Prosecutor
(succeeding the Tanodbayan) six (6) years from
the filing of the initiatory complaint before he
decided to file an information for the offense with
the Sandiganbayan. The letter complaint was
filed with the Tanodbayan on March 6, 1986. The
affidavit of the petitioner was filed therein on
October 16, 1986. The Special Prosecutor
resolved the case on May 18, 1992. In their
comment to the petition at bar,[13] the
Sandiganbayan and the Special Prosecutor try to
justify the inordinate delay in the resolution of
the complaint by stating that no political
motivation appears to have tainted the
prosecution of the case in apparent reference to
the case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, (footote:
159 SCRA 70, 81-82.) where the Court ruled that

the long delay (three years) in the termination of
the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan"
was violative of the Constitutional right of
speedy disposition of cases because political
motivations played a vital role in activating and
propelling the prosecutorial process in this case.
The Special Prosecutor also cited Alvizo vs.
Sandiganbayan (footnote 220 SCRA 55, 64)
alleging that, as in Alvizo, the petitioner herein
was insensitive to the implications and
contingencies thereof by not taking any step
whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the
matter.
We cannot accept the Special Prosecutors
ratiocination. It is the duty of the prosecutor to
speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by
the Constitution, regardless of whether the
petitioner did not object to the delay or that the
delay was with his acquiescence provided that it
was not due to causes directly attributable to him.
Consequently, we rule that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the
information for violation of petitioners
Constitutional right to the speedy disposition of
the case in the level of the Special Prosecutor,
Office of the Ombudsman.[14]
We deem it unnecessary to resolve the first issue
in view of the foregoing ruling.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the
petition and ANNULS the minute resolution of
the Sandiganbayan, dated December 24, 1992, in
Criminal Case No. 17673. The Court directs the
66
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case, with costs de

oficio.
The temporary restraining order heretofore issued
is made permanent.
No costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Right Against Self-incrimination
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON [175 SCRA
216; G.R. NO. 85215; 7 JUL 1989]
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of
the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio
City station. It was alleged that he was involved
in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the
PAL management notified him of an investigation
to be conducted. That investigation was
scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of
Conduct and Discipline, and the
CollectiveBargaining Agreement signed by it
with the Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.
A letter was sent by Ramosstating his willingness
to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of
the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted
that he misused proceeds oftickets also stating
that he was prevented from settling said amounts.
He proffered a compromise however this did not
ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was
charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not
guilty. Evidence by the prosecution
contained Ramos written admission and
statement, to which defendants argued that the

confession was taken without the accused being
represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did
not admit those stating that accused was not
reminded of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was
denied. Hence this appeal.
witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to

decline to appear before the court at the
time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether.
It is a right that a witness knows or should know.
He must claim it and could be waived.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge

correct in making inadmissible as evidence the
admission and statement of accused.
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to

counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these
rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987

constitution provides that the right against selfincrimination (only to witnesses other than
accused, unless what is asked is relating to a
different crime charged- not present in case at
bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be
compelled to be a witness against himself. It
prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition
of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when
the specific question, incriminatory in character,
is actually put to the witness. It cannot be
claimed at any other time. It does not give a
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in

miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused
include:
The individual may knowingly and intelligently

waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such rights and
waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at
the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.
Chavez vs. Court of Appeals
24 SCRA 663 (1968)
Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified
theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car together
with accessories). An information was filed
against the accused together with other
accused,that they conspired, with intent to gain
67
and abuse of confidence without theconsent of

owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.All the accused
plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia
(prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be thefirst
witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal
Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will
only be an ordinary witness not an state witness.
Counsel of accused answer that it will only
incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in
favor of the fiscal.
Petitioner was convicted.
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of
Chavez against self incrimination had been
violated to warrant writ of HC?
HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to
incriminate himself, in full breach of his
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be
said now that he has waived his right. He did not
volunteer to take the stand and in his own
defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;
Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case
heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky
defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own
admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his
original claim remains valid. For the privilege,
we say again, is a rampart that gives protection
even to the guilty
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is
traditionally considered as an exceptional
remedy to release a person whose liberty is
illegally restrained such as when the accuseds
constitutional rights are disregarded. Such

defect results in the absence or loss of
jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and
the consequent conviction of the accused whose
fundamental right was violated. That void
judgment of conviction may be challenged by
collateral attack, which precisely is the
function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue
even if another remedy which is less effective
may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure
by the accused to perfect his appeal before the
Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to
the writ. The writ may be granted upon a
judgment already final. For, as explained in
Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as
an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given
effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty
is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given
the nod in that case, involving a violation of
another constitutional right, in this wise:
A courts jurisdiction at the beginning of trial
may be lost in the course of the proceedings
due to failure to complete the court as the
Sixth Amendment requires by providing
Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain
Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this
constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty
is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth
Amendment is not complied with, the court no
longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment
of conviction pronounced by a court without
jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned
thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus.
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the

remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose
case presents a clear picture of disregard of a
constitutional right is absolutely proper.
Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless
otherwise expressly provided by law, to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.
VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS [41 PHIL 62;
G.R. NO. 16444; 8 SEP 1920]
Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the
crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the
petitioner to subject herself into
physicalexamination to test whether or not she
was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of
adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner
refused to such physical examination interposing
the defense that suchexamination was a violation
of her constitutional rights against selfincrimination.
Issue: Whether or Not the
physical examination was a violation of the
petitioners constitutional rights against selfincrimination.
Held: No. It is not a violation of
68
her constitutional rights. The rule that the

constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The
corollary to the proposition is that,
an ocular inspection of the body of the accused
ispermissible.
69
BELTRAN VS. SAMSON [53 PHIL 570; G.R.

NO. 32025; 23 SEPT 1929]
Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of
Falsification, refused to write a sample of his
handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge.
The petitioner in this case contended that such
order would be a violation of hisconstitutional
right against self-incrimination because
such examinationwould give the prosecution
evidence against him, which the latter should
have gotten in the first place. He also argued that
such an act will make him furnish evidence
against himself.
Issue: Whether or not the writing from the
fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose
of comparing the latter's handwriting and
determining whether he wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence against himself within the
scope and meaning of the constitutional provision
under examination.
Held: The court ordered the respondents and
those under their orders desist and abstain
absolutely and forever from compelling the
petitioner to take down dictation in his
handwriting for the purpose of submitting the
latter for comparison. Writing is something more
than moving the body, or the hands, or the
fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act,
because it requires the application of intelligence

and attention; and in the case at bar writing
means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a
means to determine whether or not he is the
falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal
clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we
believe the present case is similar to that of
producing documents or chattels in one's
possession. We say that, for the purposes of the
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce
a document, and one who is compelled to furnish
a specimen of his handwriting, for in both
cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence
against himself. It cannot be contended in the
present case that if permission to obtain a
specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not
granted, the crime would go unpunished.
Considering the circumstance that the petitioner
is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a
difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine
specimens of his handwriting. But even
supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means
complained herein, that is no reason for
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases
criminals may succeed in evading the hand of
justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This
constitutional privilege exists for the protection
of innocent persons.
Non-imprisonment for Beliefs; Involuntary

Servitude
CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR [82 PHIL 851;
NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949]
Facts: This is an action for
habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in
behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was
employed by the Far Eastern Employment
Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent
herein. An advanced payment has already been
given to Estelita by the employment agency, for
her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted
to transfer to another residence, which was
disallowed by the employment agency. Further
she was detained and her liberty was restrained.
The employment agency wanted that
the advance payment, which was applied to her
transportation expense from the province should
be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to
leave.
Issue: Whether or Not an employment
agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid
without returning the advance payment it gave?
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the
amount it may advanceto a
prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no
power to curtail her freedom of movement. The
70
fact that no physical force has been exerted to

keep her in the house of the respondent does not
make less real thedeprivation of her personal
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from
one place to another, freedom to choose ones
residence. Freedom may be lost due to external
moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear,
to erroneous belief in the existence of an
imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if
not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological
element that may curtail the mental faculty of
choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If
the actual effect of such psychological spell is to
place a person at the mercy of another, the victim
is entitled to the protection of courts of justiceas
much as the individual who is illegally deprived
of liberty by duress or physical coercion.
Excessive Fines and Cruel and Inhuman
Punishment
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Under the Eighth

Amendment, the capital punishment of a
mentally retarded convict is cruel and unusual.
Facts. Atkins Daryl (D) was sentenced to death
for shooting a patron of an automated teller
machine and for robbery, after he was found
guilty of abduction, capital murder and armed
robbery. A verdict of mildly mentally retarded
pertaining to the health of Atkins (D), was given
by a forensic psychologist. This verdict of the
psychologist was based on the interview he had
with Atkins (D) and with others who knew him,
review of school and court records of other
crimes and a standard intelligence test which
showed that Atkins (D) had a full scale IQ of 59.
Atkins (D) however appealed against the ruling
of the trial court on the ground that sentencing a
mentally retarded criminal to death was a cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.
Issue. Under the Eighth Amendment, is the
capital punishment of a mentally retarded convict
cruel and unusual?
Dissent. (Scalia, J) the decision taken in this case

as no ground in the Eighth Amendments text or
history, no ground in contemporary attitudes
towards the death penalty, relies on nothing more
than the personal preferences of the members of
todays majority and the Courts death-isdifferent jurisprudence is taken to the extreme.
So, not making use of the death penalty belongs
to the legislatures and abolishing it one small
increment at a time should not be sought by this
Court.
Held. (Stevens, J.) Yes. Under the Eighth

Amendment, the capital punishment of a
mentally retarded convict is cruel and unusual.
Mentally retarded persons should be tried and
punished when they commit crimes once they
meet the laws requirement. Mentally retarded
persons do not act with the level of moral
Discussion. the Supreme Court in Atkins

observed that the execution of mentally retarded
criminals in the states that permitted it was not
common and also noted that the practice of such
executions has become truly unusual and
developing a national consensus against it was
fair.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)

Brief Fact Summary. Atkins contention was that
the execution of a mentally retarded criminal is a
cruel and unusual punishment which contravenes
the Eighth Amendment. He made this contention
when he was sentenced to death for committing
murder. Atkins (D) had an IQ 0f 59 at the time of
his conviction.
culpability that characterizes the most serious

adult criminal conduct because of their
disabilities in the areas of reasoning, control of
impulses and judgment. Hence, the enactment of
the federal government which exempts the
mentally retarded from execution has provided a
strong evidence in which the society view the
mentally retarded offenders as less culpable than
the average criminal. The mentally retarded
persons disposition often portrays that they lack
remorse for their crimes and they are also poor
witnesses because they are not capable of
assisting their counsel. Reversed and remanded.
71
Lim vs People
G.R. No. 130038
Sep.18, 2000
INTRO
The case is an appeal from the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming in toto that of the
Regional Trial Court, Cebu City. Both courts
found petitioner Rosa Lim guilty of twice
violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and
imposing on her two one-year imprisonment for
each of the two violations and ordered her to pay
two fines, each amounting to P200,000.00.
The trial court also ordered petitioner to return to
Maria Antonia Seguan, the jewelry received or its
value with interest, to pay moral damages,
attorneys fees and costs.
FACTS
On August 25, 1990, petitioner bought various
kinds of jewelry worth P300,000.00 from Maria
Antonia Seguan. She wrote out a check with the
same amount, dated August 25, 1990, payable to
cash drawn on Metrobank and gave the check
to Seguan.
The next day, petitioner again went to Seguans
store and purchased jewelry valued at
P241,668.00. Petitioner issued another check
payable to cash dated August 16, 1990 drawn
on Metrobank in the amount of P241,668.007 and
sent the check to Seguan through a certain
Aurelia Nadera.
Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank.

The checks were returned with a notice of
dishonor. Petitioners account in the bank from
which the checks were drawn was closed.
Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan
the amounts of the two dishonored checks, but
she never did.
On June 5, 1991, an Assistant City Prosecutor of
Cebu filed with the RTC, Cebu City, Branch 23,
two informations against petitioner for violations
of BP No. 22.
After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial
court rendered a decision in the two cases
convicting petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the same was
dismissed by the CA in its October 15, 1996
Decision wherein it affirmed in toto the RTCs
Decision.
ISSUE
WON Lim violated B.P. No. 22.
HELD
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are:
(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any
check to apply for account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and
(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or dishonor for the same reason had not the

drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment.
The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or one that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment.
And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of
the check or make arrangement for its payment
within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor.
The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and
inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to
achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent
against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the
check was issued, and the terms & conditions
surrounding the issuance of the checks, are
irrelevant in determining culpability.
Under BP No. 22, one need not prove that the
check was issued in payment of an obligation, or
that there was damage.
It was ruled in United States v. Go Chico, that in
acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the
law been violated? When dealing with acts mala
prohibita it is not necessary that the appellant
should have acted with criminal intent. In many
crimes, the intention of the person who commits
the crime is entirely immaterial
This case is a perfect example of an act mala
prohibita. The first and last elements of the
offense are admittedly present. B.P. No. 22,
Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that
the second element prima facie exists when the
first and third elements of the offense are present.
If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.
72
To escape liability, she must prove that the

second element was absent. Petitioner failed to
rebut this presumption and she failed to pay the
amount of the checks or make arrangement for its
payment within 5 banking days from receipt of
notice of dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly
violated. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita
lex scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard
but so the law is written.
However, the penalty imposed on petitioner must
be modified. In Vaca v. Court of Appeals [298
SCRA 658 (1998)], it was held that in
determining the penalty to be imposed for
violation of B.P. No. 22, the philosophy
underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable
human material, and to prevent unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness with due regard to the protection of
the social order. The prison sentence imposed on
petitioners is deleted, and imposed on them only
a fine double the amount of the check issued.
Consequently, the prison sentences imposed on
petitioner are deleted. The two fines imposed for
each violation, each amounting to P200,000.00
are appropriate and sufficient. The award of
moral damages and order to pay attorneys fees
are deleted for lack of sufficient basis.
LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 180016, April 29,
2014 PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Accused Corpuz received from
complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry
with an obligation to sell the same and
remit the proceeds of the sale or to
return the same if not sold, after the
expiration of 30 days.
The period expired without Corpuz
remitting anything to Tangcoy.
When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz
promised that he will pay, but to no
avail.
Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with
abuse of confidence against Corpuz.
Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is
inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.
b. The information was defective because the
date when the jewelry should be returned and the
date when crime occurred is different from the
one testified to by Tangcoy.
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not
proved.
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for
conviction
ISSUES and RULING

Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of
document without violating the best evidence
rule (only original documents, as a general
rule, is admissible as evidence)?
Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party
failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence
at the time they were offered in evidence, such

objection shall be considered as waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility
of the said evidence at the time it was identified,
marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy.
Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his
Comment to the prosecutions formal offer of
evidence and even admitted having signed the
said receipt.
Is the date of occurrence of time material in
estafa cases with abuse of confidence?
No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of
estafa with abuse of confidence under Article
315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is
the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the
owner and that the time of occurrence is not a
material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the
occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the
Information, do not make the latter fatally
defective.
Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of
information:
1. The designation of the offense by the statute;
2. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the commission of
the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the
information indicates that the time of offense was
73
committed on or about the 5th of July 1991,

such is not fatal to the prosecutions cause
considering that Section 11 of the same Rule
requires a statement of the precise time only
when the same is a material ingredient of the
offense.
What is the form of demand required in estafa
with abuse of confidence?
Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse
of confidence are as follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property
is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion
of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended
party on the offender.
No specific type of proof is required to show that
there was demand. Demand need not even be
formal; it may be verbal. The specific word
demand need not even be used to show that it
has indeed been made upon the person charged,
since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of
the money [in this case, property], would be
tantamount to a demand.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely
verbally inquired about the money entrusted to
the accused, the query was tantamount to a

demand.
May a sole witness be considered credible?
Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in
assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives
great respect to the evaluation of the trial court
for it had the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on
the witness stand, an opportunity denied the
appellate courts, which merely rely on the
records of the case.
The assessment by the trial court is even
conclusive and binding if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence, especially
when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is
established not by the number of witnesses, but
by the quality of their testimonies, for in
determining the value and credibility of evidence,
the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.
Non-imprisonment for non-payment of debt or

poll tax
Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)
146 SCRA 323 Commercial Law Negotiable
Instruments Law Constitutionality of BP 22
This case is a consolidation of 8 cases regarding

violations of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (enacted April 3, 1979). In one
of the eight cases, Judge David Nitafan of RTC
Manila declared the law unconstitutional. Among
the arguments against the constitutionality of the
law are a.) it is violative of the constitutional
provision on non-imprisonment due to debt, and
b.) it impairs freedom of contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, BP 22 is constitutional.
The Supreme Court first discussed the history of
the law. The SC explained how the law on estafa
was not sufficient to cover all acts involving the
issuance of worthless checks; that in estafa, it
only punishes the fraudulent issuance of
worthless checks to cover prior or simultaneous
obligations but not pre-existing obligations.
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the
practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e.
checks that end up being rejected or dishonored
for payment. The practice is proscribed by the
state because of the injury it causes to public
interests.
BP 22 is not violative of the constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The
debt contemplated by the constitution are those
arising from contracts (ex contractu). No one is
going to prison for non-payment of contractual
debts.
However, non-payment of debts arising from
crimes (ex delicto) is punishable. This is
precisely why the mala prohibita crime of issuing
74
worthless checks as defined in BP 22 was enacted

by Congress. It is a valid exercise of police
power.
Due to the insufficiency of the Revised Penal
Code, BP 22 was enacted to punish the following
acts:
any person who, having sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank when he makes or
draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover
the full amount of the check if presented within a
period of ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.
And
any person who makes or draws and issues any
check on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of said check in full upon presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Congress was able to determine at that time that
the issuance of worthless checks was a huge
problem. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration
by the legislature that, as a matter of public
policy, the making and issuance of a worthless
check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by
the imposition of penal sanctions.
Checks are widely used due to the convenience it

brings in commercial transactions and confidence
is the primary basis why merchants rely on it for
their various commercial undertakings. If such
confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as
currency substitutes would be greatly diminished
or may become nil. Any practice therefore
tending to destroy that confidence should be
deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks
can only create havoc in trade circles and the
banking community. Thus, the Congress, through
their exercise of police power, declared that the
making and issuance of a worthless check is
deemed a public nuisance which can be abated by
the imposition of penal sanctions.
The Supreme Court however also explained that
(regardless of their previous explanation on ex
delicto debts) the non-payment of a debt is not
the gravamen of the violations of BP 22. The
gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the
act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under
pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because
of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.
Double Jeopardy
PEOPLE VS. RELOVA [149 SCRA 292; G.R.
NO.L-45129; 6 MAR 1987]
FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and
mandamus, People of thePhilippines seeks to set
aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon.
Relova quashing an information for theft filed
against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double
jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police
together with personnel of BatangasElectric Light
System, equipped with a search warrant issued by
a city judge of Batangas to search and examine
the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant
owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They
discovered electric wiring devices have been
installed without authority from the city
government and architecturally concealed inside
the walls of the building. Said devices are
designed purposely to lower or decrease the
readings of electric current consumption in the
plants electric meter. The case was dismissed on
the ground of prescription for the complaint was
filed nine months prior to discovery when it
should be 2months prior to discovery that the act
being a light felony and prescribed the right to
file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was
filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City
Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of
a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized
electrical installations with resulting damage and
75
prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of

P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed
a motion to quash on the ground of double
jeopardy. The Assistant fiscals claim is that it is
not double jeopardy because the first offense
charged against the accused was
unauthorized installation ofelectrical
devices without the approval and necessary
authority from the City Government which was
punishable by an ordinance, where in the case
was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense
which is theft of electricity which is punishable
by the Revised Penal Code making it a different
crime charged against the 1st complaint against
Mr.Opulencia.
Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia
can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the
second offense charged against him by the
assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft
of electricity punishable by a statute against the
Revised Penal Code.
Held: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double
jeopardy as defense for the second offense
because as tediously explained in the case of Yap
vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or
kinds of double jeopardy. The first would be that
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense and the second
sentence states that If an act is punishable by a
law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal

shall bar to another prosecution for the same act.
In the case at bar, it was very evident that the
charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on
the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy
wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. It further explains
that even if the offensescharged are not the same,
owing that the first charge constitutes a violation
of an ordinance and the second charge was a
violation against the revised penal code, the fact
that the two charges sprung from one and the
same act of conviction or acquittal under either
the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution
under the other thus making it against the logic of
double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was
acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd
complaint against him coming from the same
identity as that of the 1st offense charged against
Mr.Opulencia.
People vs Dela Torre
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to
please read the original & full text of the case
cited. Xie xie!
People vs Dela Torre
G.R. No. 137953-58
April 11, 2002
Facts:
(3) children with his common-law wife Melinda

Torre, namely: M1, M2 and M3. Melinda left her
family when M1 was about seven (7) years old
bringing with her M3. The victim lived with her
father and brother M2 in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
In January of 1997, Felita Sobrevilla, teacher of
M1, noticed sudden changes in her behavior and
when confronted, the latter admitted that she was
sexually abused by her father. Her head teacher
informed her Aunt Elpidia Balindo about the
sexual abuses. They referred the case to the
DSWD who took her under its custody.
M1 testified that her father committed sexual
abuses on her on the following dates: September
30, 1996, October 10, 1996, October 18, 1996,
November 01, 1996, November 12, 1996 and
December 23, 1996.
A medical examination conducted by Dr.
Milagrina Mayor, Rural Health Physician of Sta.
Cruz, Zambales, on Mary Rose revealed that her
hymen was broken with healed lacerations at the
3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 nine oclock positions. The
girl also suffered from urinary tract infection.
Issues:
(a) Whether appellee should be penalized with
reclusion perpetua in each of the four indictments
for rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty
of death as mandated by R.A. No. 7659?
Appellee WILFREDO DELA TORRE had three

76
(b) Whether an increase in the penalty imposed

by the lower court will violate the right of the
accused against double jeopardy.
Held: The RTC ruled that "it was duly
established that accused Wilfredo committed acts
of lasciviousness against M1 on 30 September
1996 and 10 October 1996, and had carnal
knowledge [of] M1 on 18 October 1996, 01
November 1996, 12 November 1996 and 23
December 1996." Further, the trial court added
that the moral ascendancy of appellee over the
victim was equivalent to intimidation. It did not
give any probative value to his uncorroborated
and unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi.
However, the court refused to impose the
supreme penalty of death on appellee. It
maintained that there were circumstances that
mitigated the gravity of the offenses.
The prosecution asks this Court to modify the
RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty
of death on the accused. It argues that it has
proven that the victim is the daughter of the
accused, and that she was below eighteen (18)
years old when the rapes took place. As a
consequence, the trial court should have imposed
the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of RA
7659.
Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a
judgment or final order, unless the accused will

be placed in double jeopardy. This provision is
substantially the same as that provided by the
1985 Rules.
In several cases, this Court has already
definitively ruled on this issue. Recently, in
People v. Leones, it unmistakably declared that
"[w]hile it is true that this Court is the Court of
last resort, there are allegations of error
committed by a lower court which we ought not
to look into to uphold the right of the accused.
Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution
seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the
accused for this runs afoul of the right of the
accused against double jeopardy."
demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused

its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of
its very power to dispense justice. On the other
hand, if the petition, regardless of its
nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary
review of the findings of the court a quo, the
constitutional right against double jeopardy
would be violated. Such recourse is tantamount
to converting the petition for certiorari into an
appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the
Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence on double jeopardy."
The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in

jurisprudence. The doctrine has several avowed
purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from
using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a
multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also
serves the additional purpose of precluding the
State, following an acquittal, from successively
retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a
conviction. And finally, it prevents the State,
following conviction, from retrying the defendant
again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.
"While certiorari may be used to correct an
abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such
extraordinary proceeding must clearly
77
Ex Post Facto Law Bill of Attainder

In Re: Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429
(1970)
FACTS: Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a
recognized nonstock, non-profit corporation
contests validity of RA # 6132 Sec. 8 saying it
violates due process rights of association,
freedom of expression and is an ex post facto law
ISSUES:
1. WON it violates three rights?
No. Its set up to prevent prostitution of electoral
process and equal protection of laws.
2. Whether or not it is an ex post facto law?
Held: No. Ex post facto law defined:
a. makes criminal an act done before law was
passed and punishes act innocent when done.
b. aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it
was
c. inflicts greater punishment than the law
prescribed when committed
d. alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes
conviction upon less or different tests
e. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
only in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of
right which when done was lawful
Petition denied. Constitutional act.
Constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal

laws. Penalty in law imposed to acts committed
after approval of law.
PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382;
NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC 1972]
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the
Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or
the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of
attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of
subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano
Co for being an officer/leader of
the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt
and insult to public officers, subversion by a band
and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo
Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of
the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and
overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended
by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed
Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of
opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers
of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any
forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It
created a presumption of organizational guilt by
being members of the CPP regardless of
voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved
20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and
similar associations
penalizing membership therein, and for other

purposes. It defined the Communist Party being
although apolitical party is in fact an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not
only by force and violence but also by deceit,
subversion and other illegal means. It declares
that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the
security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided
that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal
acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states
that due investigation by a designated prosecutor
by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing
of information in court. Section 6 provides for
penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7
provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts
penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8
allows the renunciation of membership to the
CCP through writing under oath. Section 9
declares the constitutionality of the statute and its
valid exercise under freedom if thought,
assembly and association.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/
ex post facto law.
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of
expression.
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the
78
Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.
its unlawful acts.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It

punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
substitution of judicial determination to a
legislative determination of guilt. In order for a
statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the
following requisites must be present: 1.) The
statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is
applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A
bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto
law.)
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in

nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after
approval of the act. The members of the
subversive organizations before the passing of
this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability
by renouncing membership in accordance with
Section 8. The statute applies the principle of
mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes
having been made.
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the

CPP as an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for purposes of
example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act
applies not only to the CPP but also to other
organizations having the same purpose and their
successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not
person.
Membership to this organizations, to be
UNLAWFUL, it must be shown
thatmembership was acquired with the intent to
further the goals of the organization by overt acts.
This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with
KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the
required proof of a members direct participation.
Why
is membership punished. Membership renders aid
and encouragement to the
organization. Membership makes himself party to
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized

conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine
Government should not be the basis of guilt. This
declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act.
The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL
justifies the limitation to the exercise of
Freedom of Expression and Association in this
matter. Before the enactment of the statute and
statements in the preamble, careful investigations
by the Congress were done. The court further
stresses that whatever interest in freedom of
speech and association is excluded in the
prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak
considering NATIONAL SECURITY and
PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in
the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to
proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion,
the following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it

must be proven that the organization purpose is to
overthrow the present Government of the
Philippines and establish a domination of a
FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and
knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its
subversive purpose.Membership is willfully and
knowingly done by overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the
crimes of the accused under the Act.
The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of
the TRIAL COURT.
Academic Freedom
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v CA 348
SCRA 265 December 15, 2000
Facts: The members of the editorial board of the
Miriam College Foundations school paper were
subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College
Discipline Committee after letters of complaint
were filed before the Board following the
publication of the school paper that contains
obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents.
Prior to the disciplinary sanction to
the defendants they were required to submit a
written statement to answer
the complaints against them to the Discipline
Committee but the defendants, instead of doing
so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to
79
the DECS which they alleged to have the

jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with
the investigation ex parte the Committee found
the defendants guilty and imposed upon them
disciplinary sanctions. Defendantsfiled before the
court for prohibition with preliminary injunction
on said decision of the Committee questioning
the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over
the defendants.
Issue: WON the Discipline Board of Miriam
College has jurisdiction over the defendants.
Held: The court resolved the issue before it by
looking through the power of DECS and the
Disciplinary Committee in imposing sanctions
upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV
of the Constitution guarantees all institutions
of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right
of the school or college to decide for itself, its
aims and objectives, and how best to attain them
free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls
for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution
the right to discipline its students and inculcate
upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The
right of students to free speech in school is not
always absolute. The court upheld the right of
students for the freedom of expressionbut it does
not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on
the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of
the of the Campus Journalism Act provides that
the school cannot suspend or expel a student

solely on the basis of the articles they write
EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts
class work of involve substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others. Therefore the
court ruled that the power of the school to
investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend
or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the
enforcement of rules and regulations and the
maintenance of a safe and orderly educational
environment conducive to learning. That power,
like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent
part of the academic freedom of institutions
of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution.
The court held that Miriam College has the
authority to hear and decide the cases filed
against respondent students.
Morales v. U.P. Board of Regents, 446 SCRA
227 (2004)
Facts:
In the school year 1997-1998, petitioner Nadine
Rosario M. Morales transferred from the UP
Manila campus, where she was taking up Speech
Pathology, to UP Diliman and enrolled in the
European Languages undergraduate program
under the College of Arts and Letters. Said
program has three curricula, namely, Plan A, Plan
B, and Plan C. Upon the petitioners transfer, she
chose the Plan A curriculum and elected French
as her major and German as her minor. Under the
Plan A curriculum, the student is required to
complete 141 units worth of subjects in the

University, 27 of which should be electives in his
or her minor field of study.
During the first semester of school year 19971998, the petitioner enrolled in the subjects
German 10 and German 11 where she obtained
the grades of 1.0 in both subjects. At the start of
the second semester, however, the petitioner
changed her language minor from German to
Spanish, while maintaining French as her major.
By the end of the first semester of school year
1999-2000, the petitioner was included in the list
of candidates for graduation with probable
honors issued by the College of Arts and Letters
of UP Diliman. The inclusion of the petitioner in
the said list was based on the computation made
by the College of Arts and Letters of the
petitioners General Weighted Average (GWA)
inclusive of her grades of 1.0 in German 10 and
11. According to the colleges computation, the
petitioner had a GWA of 1.725, clearly above the
minimum weighted average grade[6]for
conferment of cum laude honors.[7] Petitioner
obtained an average of 1.708 for her remaining
subjects in her final semester in the University,
bringing her GWA to 1.729, which is definitely
higher than the 1.75 average grade required
for cum laude honors.
During the assessment for graduation though, the
petitioner was not granted cum laude honors
because her grades of 1.0 in the subjects German
10 and 11, which she took when her minor was
still German, were excluded in the computation
80
of her GWA, thus bringing her GWA to 1.760,

which is lower than the minimum weighted
average grade required for the conferment of cum
laude honors.
Prof. Edwin Thaddeus L. Bautista, Chair of the
Department of European Languages, explained
that a student following the Plan A curriculum is
required to major in one European language other
than Spanish, and minor in another or any of the
disciplines allowed under the curriculum. In
petitioners case, her major is French and her
minor is Spanish, thus, German does not fit into
her curriculum. Furthermore, the Plan A
curriculum does not allow for free electives.
Electives under said curriculum must be major
language electives, which, in the case of
petitioner, must have been taken from French
courses in either literature or translation. German
10 and 11, being basic language courses, do not
fall under electives as contemplated in the Plan A
curriculum.
Maintaining that the colleges manner of
computing her grades was erroneous, the
petitioner wrote Dr. Ofelia Silapan, College
Secretary of the College of Arts and Letters, on
06 April 2000, requesting that her German
language subjects (i.e., German 10 and 11) be
included in the computation of her GWA, it
appearing that such had been done in connection
with the inclusion of her name in the list of those
graduating with probable honors. Said letter was
followed-up by another letter signed by
petitioners father, and addressed to Dr. Elena L.
Samonte, University Registrar, on 08 April 2000,

explaining why petitioners German 10 and 11
grades should be included in the computation of
her GWA.
These letters were taken up on a no-name basis
during the 68th meeting of the University Council
on 10 April 2000 upon the University Registrars
endorsement. After deliberating on the matter, the
University Council, by a vote of 207 in favor and
4 against, affirmed the recommendation of the
European Languages Department and the College
of Arts and Letters of not awarding the cum
laude honors to the petitioner.
In view of the adverse decision of the University
Council, the petitioner, together with her parents,
wrote UP President Francisco A. Nemenzo, on 18
April 2000, asking that the merits of petitioners
case be reviewed and, if deemed appropriate, the
same be elevated to the UP Board of Regents in
order to correct the error in the computation of
the petitioners GWA.
At the 1142nd meeting of the Board of Regents
held on 26 May 2000, petitioners appeal was thus
discussed, and it was resolved that said appeal be
returned to the University Council for further
consideration, with full disclosure of who is
involved in the matter.
Petitioners case was then again considered by the
University Council during its 69th meeting held
on 21 June 2000. After much deliberation, the
University Council, by a vote of 99 for, 12
against, and 6 abstentions, resolved to reaffirm its
earlier decision of 10 April 2000 denying the

award of cum laude honors to petitioner.
Upon the denial of the appeal, petitioners parents,
on petitioners behalf and for themselves,
submitted a Notice of Appeal dated 27 June 2000
to the Board of Regents through President
Nemenzo and, subsequently, an Appeal
Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum
dated 24 and 30 August 2000, respectively. The
appeal was taken up during the 1144thmeeting of
the Board of Regents held on 31 August 2000.
After a thorough discussion on the proper
interpretation and application of Article 410 of
the UP Code, the Board of Regents, by a vote of
9 against 2, elected to deny the appeal. Petitioners
parents thereafter filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was also denied.
Assailing the decision of the UP Board of
Regents as erroneous, petitioner, on 21 March
2001, brought a petition
for certiorari and mandamus before the RTC,
which resolved the case in her favor under Order
of 05 September 2002. According to the said
Order, the UP Board of Regents gravely abused
its discretion in the improper application of its
academic discretion in interpreting Article 410 of
the UP Code. The lower court, hence, required
the respondent UP Board of Regents to recompute petitioners grades by including her
grades in German 10 and 11 and to confer upon
petitioner cum laude honors. The respondent filed
a Motion for Reconsideration on 07 October
2002, which was subsequently denied by the
81
lower court. Upon said denial, the respondent

appealed the RTCs Order to the Court of Appeals
by filing a Notice of Appeal dated 14 February
2003.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the
appeal on 24 April 2003, advancing that the
Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the appeal, inasmuch as it raised
only questions of law. Said argument was
reiterated in petitioners Memorandum, together
with the position that the lower court was correct
to find that respondent had gravely abused its
discretion in arbitrarily excluding petitioners
grades in German 10 and 11 from the
computation of her GWA.
The respondent, for its part, contended that the
lower court failed to take into consideration the
interpretation of the pertinent provision of the UP
Code arrived at by the University Council during
its deliberations. It instead, substituted its own
interpretation in violation of the academic
freedom of UP as an institution of higher
learning.
Issue: whether only questions of law are
involved in the case
Held:
We agree with petitioner that respondents appeal
to the appellate court raises only questions of law.
There is a question of law when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value
of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the

correct application of law and jurisprudence on
the matter.[11] On the other hand, there is a
question of fact when the doubt or controversy
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
When there is no dispute as to fact, the question
of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom
is correct is a question of law.[12]
Contrary to what the Court of Appeals postulates,
the resolution of the issues presented by
respondent UP Board of Regents does not
necessitate an incursion of the facts attending the
case. Whether the lower court erred in finding
that respondent gravely abused its discretion in
interpreting and applying the provisions of the
UP Code on the case of petitioner is a question of
law, the determination of which calls for the
analysis of the proper application of law and
jurisprudence. While the Court of Appeals is
correct in saying that in order to resolve the
issues raised by the parties, the court must
consider all the facts and evidence presented in
the case, it does not, however, rule on the truth or
falsity of such facts, based on the evidence and
matters on record. It must be stressed that the
facts were admitted by both parties. Therefore,
any conclusion based on these facts would not
involve a calibration of the probative value of
such pieces of evidence, but would be limited to
an inquiry of whether the law was properly
applied given the state of facts of the case.
It is thus evident that the controversy centered on,
and the doubt arose with respect to, the correct
interpretation and application of Rule 410 of the

UP Code in relation to petitioners situation and
not as to any fact or evidence advanced by the
parties. And since the appeal brought by
respondent UP Board of Regents before the Court
of Appeals raises only questions of law, the
proper mode of appeal is by way of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45.[13] Therefore, the
appellate court did not have jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and to resolve respondents appeal.
The above conclusion, however, will not deter
this Court from proceeding with the judicial
determination of the basic legal issues herein. We
must bear in mind that procedural rules are
intended to ensure the proper administration of
law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not
to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for
they are adopted to help secure, not override,
substantial justice.[14] A deviation from its rigid
enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its
prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of
justice is the core reason for the existence of
courts.[15] Noting that this case involves the
exercise of a fundamental right - academic
freedom no less - of the State University, and that
the petitioner has, in any event, raised before us
the legal question of whether the RTC correctly
required respondent to confer cum laude honors
on the petitioner because of respondents alleged
grave abuse of discretion, for pragmatic reasons
and consideration of justice and equity, the Court
must go on to resolve the second assignment of
error.
82
Therefore, it was error on the part of the lower

court to rule that respondents discretion has been
gravely abused, thus justifying the substitution of
judicial discretion in the interpretation of Article
410 of the UP Code. The decision of the lower
court in substituting its own interpretation of the
Universitys internal rules for that of the
respondent UP Board of Regents, is an intrusion
into the constitutionally protected right of the
University to academic freedom.
Sec. 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution
provides that [a]cademic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
Academic freedom accords an institution of
higher learning the right to decide for itself its
aims and objectives and how best to attain them.
This constitutional provision is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion.[39]Certainly, the wide sphere of autonomy
given to universities in the exercise of academic
freedom extends to the right to confer academic
honors. Thus, exercise of academic freedom
grants the University the exclusive discretion to
determine to whom among its graduates it shall
confer academic recognition, based on its
established standards. And the courts may not
interfere with such exercise of discretion unless
there is a clear showing that the University has
arbitrarily and capriciously exercised its
judgment. Unlike the UP Board of Regents that
has the competence and expertise in granting
honors to graduating students of the University,
courts do not have the competence to constitute

themselves as an Honors Committee and
substitute their judgment for that of the
University officials.
Therefore, for failure to establish that the
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
in not conferring cum laude honors to petitioner,
the lower court erred in mandating that
petitioners grades be re-computed including her
marks in German 10 and 11 and to confer upon
petitioner academic honors.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the UP Board of Regents on 31
August 2000 denying the appeal of the petitioner
is AFFIRMED. The Order of the Regional Trial
Court dated 05 September 2002 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, 68 SCRA
277 (1976)
Facts:
Petitioner alleged: "3. That in summer, 1975,
Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies
leading to an M.A. in Theology; 4. That on May
30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the
same course for the first semester, 1975-76,
Respondent told her about the letter he had
written her, informing her of the faculty's
decision to bar her from re-admission in their
school; 5. That the reasons stated in said letter,
dated May 19, 1975 ... do not constitute valid
legal ground for expulsion, for they neither

present any violation of any of the school's
regulation, nor are they indicative of gross
misconduct; 6. That from June 25, 1975,
Petitioner spent much time and effort in said
school for the purpose of arriving at a
compromise that would not duly inconvenience
the professors and still allow her to enjoy the
benefits of the kind of instruction that the school
has to offer, but all in vain; she was in fact told
by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that
the compromises she was offering were
unacceptable, their decision was final, and that it
were better for her to seek for admission at the
UST Graduate School; 7 Petitioner then
subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to
the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate
studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was
informed that she could enroll at the UST
Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have
to fulfill their requirements for Baccalaureate in
Philosophy in order to have her degree later in
Theology which would entail about four to
five years more of studies whereas in the
Loyola School of Studies to which she is being
unlawfully refused readmission, it would entail
only about two years more; 8. That Petitioner,
considering that time was of the essence in her
case, and not wanting to be deprived of an
opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary for
her life's work, enrolled as a special student at
said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she
would not thereby be credited with any academic
83
units for the subject she would take; 9. That

Petitioner could have recourse neither to the
President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being
with the First Couple's entourage now in Red
China, nor with the Secretary of Education, since
this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11,
1975 is the last day for registration; ... " 2 She
prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of
allowing her to enroll in the current semester. She
made it more specific in a pleading she called
Amended Petition so that she would be allowed
cross-enrollment even beyond the June 11, 1975
deadline for registration and that whatever units
may be accredited to her in the UST
Ecclesiastical Faculties be likewise recognized by
respondent. Her petition included the letter of
respondent Father Lambino which started on a
happy note that she was given the grade of B+
and B in two theology subjects, but ended in a
manner far from satisfactory for her, as shown by
this portion thereof: "Now, you will have to
forgive me for going into a matter which is not
too pleasant. The faculty had a meeting after the
summer session and several members are
strongly opposed to having you back with us at
Loyola School of Theology. In the spirit of
honesty may I report this to you as their reason:
They felt that your frequent questions and
difficulties were not always pertinent and had the
effect of slowing down the progress of the class;
they felt you could have tried to give the
presentation a chance and exerted more effort to
understand the point made before immediately
thinking of difficulties and problems. The way

things are, I would say that the advisability of
your completing a program (with all the course
work and thesis writing) with us is very
questionable. That you have the requisite
intellectual ability is not to be doubted. But it
would seem to be in your best interests to work
with a faculty that is more compatible with your
orientation. I regret to have to make this report,
but I am only thinking of your welfare."
Held:
This Court, in a resolution of June 23, 1975,
required comment on the part of respondent
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology. 4 As submitted on behalf of Father
Lambino, it set forth the following: "Respondent
is the Chairman of the Faculty Admission
Committee of the Loyola School of Theology,
which is a religious seminary situated in Loyola
Heights, Quezon City; In collaboration with the
Ateneo de Manila University, the Loyola School
of Theology allows some lay students to attend
its classes and/or take courses in said Loyola
School of Theology but the degree, if any, to be
obtained from such courses is granted by the
Ateneo de Manila University and not by the
Loyola School of Theology; For the reason above
given, lay students admitted to the Loyola School
of Theology to take up courses for credit therein
have to be officially admitted by the Assistant
Dean of the Graduate School of the Ateneo de
Manila University in order for them to be
considered as admitted to a degree program;

Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was admitted
by respondent to take some courses for credit but
said admission was not an admission to a degree
program because only the Assistant Dean of the
Ateneo de Manila Graduate School can make
such admission; That in the case of petitioner, no
acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo
de Manila Graduate School was given, so that she
was not accepted to a degree program but was
merely allowed to take some courses for credit
during the summer of 1975; Furthermore,
petitioner was not charged a single centavo by the
Loyola School of Theology and/or the Ateneo de
Manila University in connection with the courses
she took in the summer of 1975, as she was
allowed to take it free of charge; That respondent
Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J., and/or the Loyola
School of Theology thru its Faculty Admission
Committee, necessarily has discretion as to
whether to admit and/or to continue admitting in
the said school any particular student,
considering not only academic or intellectual
standards but also other considerations such as
personality traits and character orientation in
relation with other students as well as considering
the nature of Loyola School of Theology as a
seminary. The Petition for Mandamus therefore
does not lie, as there is no duty, much less a clear
duty, on the part of respondent to admit the
petitioner therein in the current year to take up
further courses in the Loyola School of
Theology." 5It was likewise alleged in the
84
aforesaid comment that as set forth in the letter of

May 19, 1975, the decision not to allow
petitioner to take up further courses in said
seminary "is not arbitrary, as it is based on
reasonable grounds, ... ." 6 Then reference was
made to the availability of non-judicial remedies
which petitioner could have pursued. 7 The prayer
was for the dismissal of the petition for lack of
merit. Petitioner sought permission to reply and it
was granted. Thereafter, she had a detailed recital
of why under the circumstances she is entitled to
relief from the courts. In a resolution of August 8,
1975, this Court considered the comment of
respondent as answer and required the parties to
file their respective memoranda. That they did,
and the petition was deemed submitted for
decision. As was made clear at the outset, we do
not see merit in it. It must therefore be dismissed.
1. In respondent's memorandum, it was made
clear why a petition for mandamus is not the
proper remedy. Thus: "Petitioner cannot compel
by mandamus, the respondent to admit her into
further studies in the Loyola School of Theology.
For respondent has no clear duty to so admit the
petitioner. The Loyola School of Theology is a
seminary for the priesthood. Petitioner is
admittedly and obviously not studying for the
priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman.
And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that she
is qualified to study for the priesthood, there is
still no duty on the part of respondent to admit
her to said studies, since the school has clearly
the discretion to turn down even qualified
applicants due to limitations of space, facilities,

professors and optimum classroom size and
component considerations." 8 No authorities were
cited, respondent apparently being of the view
that the law has not reached the stage where the
matter of admission to an institution of higher
learning rests on the sole and uncontrolled
discretion of the applicant. There are standards
that must be met. There are policies to be
pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence.
In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student
in the position of petitioner possesses is a
privilege rather than a right. She cannot therefore
satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a
mandamus proceeding. Such being the case, there
is no duty imposed on the Loyola School of
Theology. In a rather comprehensive
memorandum of petitioner, who unfortunately
did not have counsel, an attempt was made to
dispute the contention of respondent. There was a
labored effort to sustain her stand, but it was not
sufficiently persuasive. It is understandable why.
It was the skill of a lay person rather than a
practitioner that was evident. While she pressed
her points with vigor, she was unable to
demonstrate the existence of the clear legal right
that must exist to justify the grant of this writ.
2. Nor is this all. There is, as previously noted,
the recognition in the Constitution of institutions
of higher learning enjoying academic freedom. It
is more often identified with the right of a faculty
member to pursue his studies in his particular
specialty and thereafter to make known or
publish the result of his endeavors without fear

that retribution would be visited on him in the
event that his conclusions are found distasteful or
objectionable to the powers that be, whether in
the political, economic, or academic
establishments. For the sociologist, Robert
McIver it is "a right claimed by the accredited
educator, as teacher and as investigator, to
interpret his findings and to communicate his
conclusions without being subjected to any
interference, molestation, or penalization because
these conclusions are unacceptable to some
constituted authority within or beyond the
institution." 9 As for the educator and
philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his version:
"What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the
freedom of professionally qualified persons to
inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as
they see it in the field of their competence. It is
subject to no control or authority except the
control or authority of the rational methods by
which truths or conclusions are sought and
established in these disciplines." 10
3. That is only one aspect though. Such a view
does not comprehend fully the scope of academic
freedom recognized by the Constitution. For it is
to be noted that the reference is to the
"institutions of higher learning" as the recipients
of this boon. It would follow then that the school
or college itself is possessed of such a right. It
decides for itself its aims and objectives and how
best to attain them. It is free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the
85
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.

It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly
extending to the choice of students. This
constitutional provision is not to be construed in
a niggardly manner or in a gradging fashion. That
would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its
intent. Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the
University of the Philippines, in his Philippine
Political Law, is similarly of the view that it
"definitely grants the right of academic freedom
to the university as an institution as distinguished
from the academic freedom of a university
professor." 11 He cited the following from Dr.
Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of
Dijon, France, President of the conference of
rectors and vice-chancellors of European
universities: " "It is a well-established fact, and
yet one which sometimes tends to be obscured in
discussions of the problems of freedom, that the
collective liberty of an organization is by no
means the same thing as the freedom of the
individual members within it; in fact, the two
kinds of freedom are not even necessarily
connected. In considering the problems of
academic freedom one must distinguish,
therefore, between the autonomy of the
university, as a corporate body, and the freedom
of the individual university teacher." " 12 Also:
"To clarify further the distinction between the
freedom of the university and that of the
individual scholar, he says: "The personal aspect
of freedom consists in the right of each university
teacher recognized and effectively guaranteed
by society to seek and express the truth as he

personally sees it, both in his academic work and
in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status
of the individual university teacher is at least as
important, in considering academic freedom, as
the status of the institutions to which they belong
and through which they disseminate their
learning."' 13 He likewise quoted from the
President of the Queen's University in Belfast, Sir
Eric Ashby: "'The internal conditions for
academic freedom in a university are that the
academic staff should have de facto control of the
following functions: (i) the admission and
examination of students; (ii) the curricula for
courses of study; (iii) the appointment and tenure
of office of academic staff; and (iv) the allocation
of income among the different categories of
expenditure. It would be a poor prospect for
academic freedom if universities had to rely on
the literal interpretation of their constitutions in
order to acquire for their academic members
control of these four functions, for in one
constitution or another most of these functions
are laid on the shoulders of the law governing
body .'" 14 Justice Frankfurter, with his extensive
background in legal education as a former
Professor of the Harvard Law School, referred to
what he called the business of a university and
the four essential freedoms in the following
language: "It is the business of a university to
provide that atmosphere which is most conducive
to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
atmosphere in which there prevail "the four
essential freedoms" of a university to

determine for itself on academic grounds who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to
study." 15 Thus is reinforced the conclusion
reached by us that mandamus does not lie in this
case.
4. It is not an easy matter then to disregard the
views of persons knowledgeable in the field, to
whom cannot be imputed lack of awareness of
the need to respect freedom of thought on the part
of students and scholars. Moreover, it could
amount to minimizing the full respect that must
be accorded the academic freedom expressly
granted by the Constitution "to institutions of
higher learning." It is equally difficult to yield
conformity to the approach taken that colleges
and universities should be looked upon as public
utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to
admit or reject. Education, especially higher
education, belongs to a different, and certainly
higher, category.
5. It only remains to be added that the futility that
marked the persistence of petitioner to continue
her studies in the Loyola School of Theology is
the result solely of a legal appraisal of the
situation before us. The decision is not to be
construed as in any way reflecting on the
scholastic standing of petitioner. There was on
the part of respondent due acknowledgment of
her intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons
explained in the letter of Father Lambino, it was
deemed best, considering the interest of the
86
school as well as of the other students and her

own welfare, that she continue her graduate work
elsewhere. There was nothing arbitrary in such
appraisal of the circumstances deemed relevant.
It could be that on more mature reflection, even
petitioner would realize that her transfer to some
other institution would redound to the benefit of
all concerned. At any rate, as indicated earlier,
only the legal aspect of the controversy was
touched upon in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack
of merit.
De La Salle University v. CA, G.R. No. 127980,
Dec. 19, 2007
Facts:
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto
Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle
University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde
(CSB)1 Joint Discipline Board because of their
involvement in an offensive action causing
injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other
student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. This
is the backdrop of the controversy before Us
pitting private respondents' right to education visa-vis the University's right to academic freedom.
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court are the following: (1) Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 1996

dismissing DLSU's petition for certiorariagainst
respondent Judge and private respondents
Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes,
Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of the CA dated October 15,
1996 denying the motion for reconsideration;3 (3)
Order dated January 7, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting private
respondent Aguilar's motion to reiterate writ of
preliminary injunction;4 and (4) Resolution No.
181-96 dated May 14, 1996 of the Commission
on Higher Education (CHED) exonerating private
respondent Aguilar and lowering the penalties for
the other private respondents from expulsion to
exclusion.5
Factual Antecedents
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the
DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, two violent
incidents on March 29, 1995 involving private
respondents occurred:
x x x From the testimonies of the complaining
witnesses, it appears that one week prior to
March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his
dinner alone in Manang's Restaurant near La
Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing
and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored
the comments of the two. When he arrived at his
boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his
two other brods while watching television. These
two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner
at Manang's. Then, the three, together with four
other persons went back to Manang's and
confronted the two who were still in the
restaurant. By admission of respondent

Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a
member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There
was no rumble or physical violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted
between the two heads of the fraternity through
the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau
Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology.
"Kailanganng apology" in the words of
respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made.
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity went to the tambayan of the Domino
Lux Fraternity in the campus. Among them were
respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Papio.
They were looking for a person whose
description matched James Yap. According to
them, this person supposedly "nambastos ng
brod." As they could not find Mr. Yap, one of
them remarked "Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na
lang."
Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.
Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m.,
Mr. James Yap went out of the campus using the
Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft
Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue,
he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten
guys were running towards him. He panicked. He
did not know what to do. Then, respondent
Bungubung punched him in the head with
something heavy in his hands
"parang knuckles." Respondents Reverente and
Lee were behind Yap, punching him.
Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in
87
front of him, were also punching him. As he was

lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked
him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the
group of attackers left.
Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members
of the group who attacked him. With respect to
respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said "hindi ko nakita
ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya."
What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also
running with the group.
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus.
At this point, Mr. Dennis Pascual was at the
Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual accompanied Yap
to the university clinic; reported the incident to
the Discipline Office; and informed his fraternity
brods at their tambayan. According to Mr.
Pascual, their head of the Domino Lux Fraternity
said: "Walang gagalaw. Uwian na lang."
Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a
ride with Dennis Pascual, saw him under the
clock in Miguel Building. However, they did not
proceed directly for home. With a certain
Michael Perez, they went towards the direction of
Dagonoy Street because Mr. Pascual was
supposed to pick up a book for his friend from
another friend who lives somewhere in the area.
As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before
they could pass the Kolehiyo ng Malate
Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw several guys
inside the restaurant. He said not to mind them
and just keep on walking. However, the group got
out of the restaurant, among them respondents
Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr. Cano told Mr.
Lee: "Ayaw namin ng gulo." But, respondent Lee

hit Mr. Cano without provocation. Respondent
Reverente kicked Mr. Pascual and respondent
Lee also hit Mr. Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez
managed to run from the mauling and they were
chased by respondent Lee and two others.
Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent
Reverente first kicked him, Mr. Pascual was
ganged-upon by the rest. He was able to run, but
the group was able to catch up with him. His shirt
was torn and he was hit at the back of his head
with a lead pipe. Respondent Lee who was
chasing Cano and Perez, then returned to Mr.
Pascual.
Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and
Lee, as among those who hit him. Although Mr.
Pascual did not see respondent Valdes hit him, he
identified respondent Valdez (sic) as also one of
the members of the group.
In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr.
Pascual. He was almost near the corner of Leon
Guinto and Estrada; while respondent Pascual
who managed to run was stopped at the end of
Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. Respondent Valdes
shouted: "Mga putang-ina niyo." Respondent
Reverente hit Mr. Pascual for the last time.
Apparently being satisfied with their handiwork,
the group left. The victims, Cano, Perez and
Pascual proceeded to a friend's house and waited
for almost two hours, or at around 8:00 in the
evening before they returned to the campus to
have their wounds treated. Apparently, there were
three cars roaming the vicinity.6
The mauling incidents were a result of a

fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner
James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano,
and Michael Perez, are members of the "Domino
Lux Fraternity," while the alleged assailants,
private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto
Valdes, Jr. are members of "Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity," a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap
lodged a complaint7 with the Discipline Board of
DLSU charging private respondents with "direct
assault." Similar complaints8 were also filed by
Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin
Lee and private respondents Valdes and
Reverente. Thus, cases entitled "De La Salle
University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin
Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul
Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R.
Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee
(EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (ABMGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (ABMGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline
Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent
separate notices to private respondents Aguilar,
Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente
informing them of the complaints and requiring
them to answer. Private respondents filed their
respective answers.9
As it appeared that students from DLSU and
CSB10 were involved in the mauling incidents, a
joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board11 was formed
88
to investigate the incidents. Thus, petitioner

Board Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent notices of
hearing12 to private respondents on April 12,
1995. Said notices uniformly stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded
Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and
deliberate the charge against you for violation of
CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written
complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and
Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the
Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at
the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses
to give testimony and present evidence in your
behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when
you give your testimony or those of your
witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further
directed to provide the Board, through the
Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as
well as the sworn statement of their proposed
testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or
your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the
sworn statement of their proposed testimony will
be considered a waiver on your part to present
evidence and as an admission of the principal act
complained of.
For your strict compliance.13
During the proceedings before the Board on April
19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed
the common defense of alibi, summarized by the
DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board as follows:
First, in the case of respondent Bungubung,

March 29, 1995 was one of the few instances
when he was picked-up by a driver, a certain
Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time, respondent
Bungubung goes home alone sans driver. But on
this particular date, respondent Bungubung said
that his dad asked his permission to use the car
and thus, his dad instructed this driver Carillo to
pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is not a family driver,
but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the
Philippine Ports Authority where the elder
Bungubung is also employed.
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of
respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that he
arrived at La Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up
respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the Roxas Blvd.
route towards respondent's house in BF
Paraaque (on a Wednesday in Baclaran); and
arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent
Bungubung was dropped-off in his house, and
taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at
the South Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine
Ports Authority is located at the South Harbor.14
xxxx
Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was
with his friends at McDonald's Taft just before
6:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he left
McDonald at 5:50 p.m. together to get some
medicine at the university clinic for his throat
irritation. He said that he was at the clinic at 5:52
p.m. and went back to McDonald, all within a
span of 3 or even 4 minutes.
Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the

girlfriend of respondent Valdes, a certain Jorgette
Aquino, attempted to corroborate Valdez' alibi.15
xxxx
Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the
Board that he was at his home at 5:00 p.m. of
March 29, 1995. He said that he was given the
responsibility to be the paymaster of the
construction workers who were doing some
works in the apartment of his parents. Although
he had classes in the evening, the workers
according to him would wait for him sometimes
up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his classes.
The workers get paid everyday.
Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit,
unsigned by the workers listed there, supposedly
attesting to the fact that he paid the workers at the
date and time in question.16
xxxx
Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore]
that [he] left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp Crame
for a meeting with some of the officers that we
were preparing."17
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline
Board issued a Resolution18 finding private
respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme
penalty of automatic expulsion,19 pursuant to
CHED Order No. 4.20 The dispositive part of the
resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the
Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (ABBSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG
(AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE
89
(EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V.

REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of
having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby
orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO
(AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of
the charge.
SO ORDERED.21
Private respondents separately moved for
reconsideration22 before the Office of the Senior
Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU.
The motions were all denied in a LetterResolution23 dated June 1, 1995.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed
with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a
petition for certiorariand injunction under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil
Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to respondent
Judge of Branch 36. The petition essentially
sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of
the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the
June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of
the Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent
Judge issued a TRO24 directing DLSU, its
subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other
persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and
desist from implementing Resolution dated May
3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995
and to immediately desist from barring the
enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of

school year (SY) 1995.
Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed
an ex parte motion to amend his petition to
correct an allegation in paragraph 3.2125 of his
original petition. Respondent Judge amended the
TRO26 to conform to the correction made in the
amended petition.27
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to
furnish it with copies of the case records of
Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121,28 in view of
the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
(MRPS).
On the other hand, private respondents
Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes,
filed petitions-in-intervention29 in Civil Case No.
95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued
corresponding temporary restraining orders to
compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private
respondents.
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion
to dismiss30 in behalf of all petitioners, except
James Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a
supplemental motion to dismiss31 the petitions-inintervention.
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued
an Order32 denying petitioners' (respondents
there) motion to dismiss and its supplement, and
granted private respondents' (petitioners there)
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The
pertinent part of the Order reads:
For this purpose, respondent, its agents,

representatives or any and all other persons
acting for and in its behalf is/are restrained and
enjoined from
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution
dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic
expulsion of petitioner and the petitioners-inintervention from the De La Salle University and
the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995, affirming
the Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered
at respondent De La Salle University and to
immediately allow them to enroll and complete
their respective courses/degrees until their
graduation thereat in accordance with the
standards set by the latter.
WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for
is granted. Respondent, its agents,
representatives, or any and all persons acting for
and its behalf are hereby restrained and enjoyed
from:
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution
dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic
expulsion of petitioner and petitioners-inintervention and the Letter-Resolution dated June
1, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered
at respondent (De La Salle University) and to
forthwith allow all said petitioner and petitionersin-intervention to enroll and complete their
90
respective courses/degrees until their graduation

thereat.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take
effect upon petitioner and petitioners-inintervention posting an injunctive bond in the
amount of P15,000.00 executed in favor of
respondent to the effect that petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention will pay to respondent
all damages that the latter may suffer by reason
of the injunction if the Court will finally decide
that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are
not entitled thereto.
The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto
is denied for lack of merit. Respondents are
directed to file their Answer to the Petition not
later than fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
SO ORDERED.33
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar
was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when
he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for
the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on
September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with
respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite
petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of
court.34Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be
compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance
with respondent Judge's Order dated September
20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent
Judge issued35 a writ of preliminary injunction,
the relevant portion of which reads:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned
of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA that until further orders, you the said
DE LA SALLE University as well as your

subordinates, agents, representatives, employees
and any other person assisting or acting for or on
your behalf, to immediately desist from
implementing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995
ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner
and the intervenors in DLSU, and the letterresolution dated June 1, 1995 affirming the said
Resolution of May 3, 1995 and to immediately
desist from barring the enrolment of petitioner
and intervenors in the courses offered at DLSU
and to allow them to enroll and complete their
degree courses until their graduation from said
school.36
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with
the CA a petition for certiorari37 (CA-G.R. SP No.
38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement
of respondent Judge's September 20, 1995 Order
and writ of preliminary injunction dated
September 25, 1995.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners'
prayer for preliminary injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its
questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily
disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all
private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to
be reinstated, while other private respondents
were to be excluded.38 The Resolution states:
RESOLUTION 181-96
RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT
AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF
THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED

ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR.,
ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE
BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.
RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE
COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO
IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE
REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND
THE LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR.
JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R.
VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR.
RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM
EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.39
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU
again prevented private respondent Aguilar from
enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting
his lawyer to write several demand letters40 to
petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal of
petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent
Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26,
1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco
requesting that private respondent Aguilar be
allowed to continue attending his classes pending
the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of
Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner
Quebengco refused to do so, prompting CHED to
promulgate an Order dated September 23, 1996
which states:
Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr.
Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La Salle
University (DLSU) to comply with CHED
Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of Alvin
91
Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to

reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the urgent
request as meritorious, there being no other plain
and speedy remedy available, considering the set
deadline for enrollment this current
TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent further
prejudice to his rights as a student of the
institution, DLSU, through the proper school
authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin
Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the
Commission's Resolution of the instant Motion
for Reconsideration filed by DLSU.
SO ORDERED.41
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner
DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still
refused to allow private respondent Aguilar to
enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar's counsel
wrote another demand letter to petitioner
DLSU.42
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent
Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96,
filed a motion to dismiss43 in the CA, arguing that
CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA
case moot and academic.
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned
resolution granting the motion to dismiss of
private respondent Aguilar, disposing thus:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of
herein petition is hereby directed.
SO ORDERED.44
On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its
resolution denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, as follows:
It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No.

181-96 is immediately executory in character, the
pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration
notwithstanding.
After considering the Opposition and for lack of
merit, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
denied.
SO ORDERED.45
On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested
transfer of case records to the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the
CHED.46 Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS,
not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion
cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the case
records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to
the DECS.
On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal
of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction, private respondent
Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of
preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995
before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.47
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued
its questioned order granting private
respondent Aguilar's urgent motion to
reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent
portion of the order reads:
In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's
urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary
injunction is hereby granted, and respondents'
motion to dismiss is denied.
The writ of preliminary injunction dated

September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force and
effect.
Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served
personally by the Court's sheriff upon the
respondents at petitioners' expense.
SO ORDERED.48
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was
allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner
DLSU, subject to the continued effectivity of the
writ of preliminary injunction dated September
25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case No.
95-74122.
On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the
instant petition.
On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as prayed
for by the urgent motion for the issuance of a
TRO50 dated June 4, 1998 of petitioners, and
enjoined respondent Judge from implementing
the writ of preliminary injunction dated
September 25, 1995 issued in Civil Case No. 9574122, effective immediately and until further
orders from this Court.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar
filed his manifestation51 stating that he has long
completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He
finished and passed all his enrolled subjects for
the second trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated
in his transcript of records52 issued by DLSU.
However, despite having completed all the
academic requirements for his course, DLSU has
not issued a certificate of completion/graduation
in his favor.
92
Issues
We are tasked to resolve the following issues:
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which
has legal authority to review decisions of
institutions of higher learning that impose
disciplinary action on their students found
violating disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its
rights in expelling private respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due
process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to
academic freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven
by substantial evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU
on private respondents is proportionate to their
misdeed.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of
petitioners53 that while CHED Resolution No.
181-96 disapproved the expulsion of other
private respondents, it nonetheless authorized
their exclusion from petitioner DLSU. However,
because of the dismissal of the CA case,
petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle
of having two different directives from the
CHED and the respondent Judge CHED
ordering the exclusion of private respondents
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the
Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to
enroll and complete their degree courses until
their graduation.
This is the reason We opt to decide the whole

case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities,
in order to settle the substantial issues involved.
This Court has the power to take cognizance of
the petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and
the nature and importance of the issues raised
warrant the immediate exercise of Our
jurisdiction.54 This is in consonance with our case
law now accorded near-religious reverence that
rules of procedure are but tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when
its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, this Court has the
duty to suspend their operation.55
I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the
power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.
Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may
kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at pagrepaso
sa mga desisyong pandisiplina ng mga
institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral.
Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to
review student expulsion cases, even those
involving students in secondary and tertiary
levels, is vested in the DECS not in the CHED. In
support of their stance, petitioners cite Sections
4,56 15(2) & (3),57 54,58 57(3)59 and 7060 of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as
the "Education Act of 1982."
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS'
power of supervision/review over expulsion cases
involving institutions of higher learning. They

say that unlike B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722
makes no reference to the right and duty of
learning institutions to develop moral character
and instill discipline among its students. The
clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of
the CHED was academic, i.e., the formulation,
recommendation, setting, and development of
academic plans, programs and standards for
institutions of higher learning. The enumeration
of CHED's powers and functions under Section 8
does not include supervisory/review powers in
student disciplinary cases. The reference in
Section 3 to CHED's "coverage" of institutions of
higher education is limited to the powers and
functions specified in Section 8. The Bureau of
Higher Education, which the CHED has replaced
and whose functions and responsibilities it has
taken over, never had any authority over student
disciplinary cases.
We cannot agree.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No.
7722, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the
Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating
Funds Thereof and for other purposes."
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way
for the creation of the CHED, provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher
Education. In pursuance of the abovementioned
policies, the Commission on Higher Education is
hereby created, hereinafter referred to as
Commission.
93
The Commission shall be independent and

separate from the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the
office of the President for administrative
purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public
and private institutions of higher education as
well as degree-granting programs in all post
secondary educational institutions, public and
private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are
enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They
include the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission.
The Commission shall have the following
powers and functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and
exercise such other powers and functions as may
be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose
and objectives of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be
necessary for its effective operations and for the
continued enhancement of growth or
development of higher education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of
petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to
the CHED the DECS' power of
supervision/review over expulsion cases
involving institutions of higher learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing.
They make no reservations of powers to the
DECS insofar as institutions of higher learning
are concerned. They show that the authority and
supervision over all public and private

institutions of higher education, as well as
degree-granting programs in all post-secondary
educational institutions, public and private,
belong to the CHED, not the DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has
authority to decide disciplinary cases involving
students on the tertiary level would render
nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is
"both public and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree granting programs in
all post secondary educational institutions, public
and private." That would be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is
a private educational institution which offers
tertiary degree programs. Hence, it is under the
CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not
only the protection, fostering and promotion of
the right of all citizens to affordable quality
education at all levels and the taking of
appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be
accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned
with ensuring and protecting academic freedom
and with promoting its exercise and observance
for the continued intellectual growth of students,
the advancement of learning and research, the
development of responsible and effective
leadership, the education of high-level and
middle-level professionals, and the enrichment of
our historical and cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress
passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware
that disciplinary cases involving students on the

tertiary level would continue to arise in the
future, which would call for the invocation and
exercise of institutions of higher learning of their
right to academic freedom.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its
bare claim that the Bureau of Higher Education,
which CHED replaced, never had authority over
student disciplinary cases. In fact, the
responsibilities of other government entities
having functions similar to those of the
CHED were transferred to the CHED.62
Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of
review in student discipline cases should
therefore be read in conjunction with the
provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear
in stating that "[j]urisdiction over DECSsupervised or chartered state-supported postsecondary degree-granting vocational and
tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the
Commission [On Higher Education]." This
provision does not limit or distinguish that what
is being transferred to the CHED is merely the
formulation, recommendation, setting and
development of academic plans, programs and
standards for institutions of higher learning, as
what petitioners would have us believe as the
only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where
the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit
grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily
94
includes the transfer to the CHED of any

jurisdiction which the DECS might have
possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other
law or rule for that matter.
IIa. Private respondents were accorded due
process of law.
Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng
tamang proseso ng batas.
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1
of the Constitution embodies a system of rights
based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in
the traditions and feelings of our people as to be
deemed fundamental to a civilized society as
conceived by our entire history.64 The
constitutional behest that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law is solemn and inflexible.65
In administrative cases, such as investigations of
students found violating school discipline,
"[t]here are withal minimum standards which
must be met before to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process and these are: that (1) the
students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them and with the assistance if counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the
right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the
case."66
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to

participate in the proceedings but failed to do so,
he cannot complain of deprivation of due
process.67 Notice and hearing is the bulwark of
administrative due process, the right to which is
among the primary rights that must be respected
even in administrative proceedings.68 The essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.69So long as the
party is given the opportunity to advocate her
cause or defend her interest in due course, it
cannot be said that there was denial of due
process.70
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and
in all instances, essential to due process it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective
sides of the controversy and to present supporting
evidence on which a fair decision can be
based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean
presentation of testimonial evidence in court
one may also be heard through pleadings and
where the opportunity to be heard through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.72
Private respondents were duly informed in
writing of the charges against them by the DLSUCSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner
Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer
the charges against them as they, in fact,
submitted their respective answers. They were

also informed of the evidence presented against
them as they attended all the hearings before the
Board. Moreover, private respondents were given
the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and
they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered
all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all
the parties before rendering its resolution in
Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were
denied due process when they were not allowed
to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This
argument was already rejected in Guzman v.
National University73where this Court held that
"x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
requires observance of procedural due process.
And it bears stressing that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts
of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross examination is
not, x x x an essential part thereof."
IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of
higher learning, possesses academic freedom
which includes determination of who to admit
for study.
Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng
mas mataas na pag-aaral, ay nagtataglay ng
kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang
karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution
guaranties all institutions of higher learning
95
academic freedom. This institutional academic

freedom includes the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public interest calls for some
restraint.74 According to present jurisprudence,
academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to
determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what
may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who
may be admitted to study.75
It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an
interest in teaching the student discipline, a
necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field
of learning. By instilling discipline, the school
teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to
discipline the student likewise finds basis in the
freedom "what to teach."76 Indeed, while it is
categorically stated under the Education Act of
1982 that students have a right "to freely choose
their field of study, subject to existing curricula
and to continue their course therein up to
graduation,"77 such right is subject to the
established academic and disciplinary standards
laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner
DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its
academic freedom, which includes its free choice
of students for admission to its school.
IIc. The guilt of private respondents
Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was
proven by substantial evidence.
Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na

sina Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay
napatunayan ng ebidensiyang substansyal.
As has been stated earlier, private respondents
interposed the common defense of alibi.
However, in order that alibi may succeed as a
defense, "the accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence (a) his presence at another
place at the time of the perpetration of the offense
and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence
at the scene of the crime."78
On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not
be successfully invoked where the identity of the
assailant has been established by
witnesses.79 Positive identification of accused
where categorical and consistent, without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the
alibi and denial of appellants whose testimonies
are not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.80 Well-settled is the rule that denial and
alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the
positive testimonies of the offended parties.81
Courts reject alibi when there are credible
eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively
identify the accused.82Alibi is an inherently weak
defense and courts must receive it with caution
because one can easily fabricate an
alibi.83 Jurisprudence holds that denial, like alibi,
is inherently weak and crumbles in light of
positive declarations of truthful witnesses who
testified on affirmative matters that accused were
at the scene of the crime and were the victim's
assailants. As between categorical testimonies

that ring of truth on one hand and a bare denial
on the other, the former must prevail.84 Alibi is
the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to
fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for
this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive
identification of accused by the witnesses.85
The required proof in administrative cases, such
as in student discipline cases, is neither proof
beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of
evidence but only substantial evidence.
According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations,86 it means "such reasonable evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of
private respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and
Reverente.1awphi1They were unable to show
convincingly that they were not at the scene of
the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was
impossible for them to have been there.
Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their
positive identification by the victims.
We hark back to this Court's pronouncement
affirming the expulsion of several students found
guilty of hazing:
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the
immediate reinstatement of respondent students
who have been investigated and found guilty by
the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner
university's disciplinary rules and standards will
certainly undermine the authority of the
96
administration of the school. This we would be

most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair
petitioner university's academic freedom which
has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the
present 1987 Constitution.87
Certainly, private respondents Bungubung,
Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to claim
a venerable institution as their own, for they may
foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the
students currently enrolled, as well as those who
come after them.88 It must be borne in mind that
universities are established, not merely to
develop the intellect and skills of the studentry,
but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes;
nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of
the total man.89
As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We
are inclined to give credence to his alibi that he
was at Camp Crame in Quezon City at the time
of the incident in question on March 29, 1995.
This claim was amply corroborated by the
certification that he submitted before the DLSUCSB Joint Discipline Board, to wit:
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm
by way of this Certification that sometime on
March 29, 1995, at about and between 4:30 P.M.
and 5:30 P.M., we were together with Alvin A.
Aguilar, at Kiangan Hall, inside Camp Crame,
Quezon City, meeting in connection with an
affair of our class known as Class 7, Batch 89 of
the Philippine Constabulary discussing on the

proposed sponsorship of TAU GAMMA PHI
from said Batch '89 affair.
That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30
P.M. that evening and Alvin Aguilar had asked
our permission to leave and we saw him leave
Camp Crame, in his car with the driver.
April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.90
The said certification was duly signed by PO3
Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-Organized Crime CIC,
NCR), PO3 Alejandro D. Deluviar (ODITRM,
Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2 Severino C.
Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City), and
PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto (Supply Center,
PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi assumes
significance or strength when it is amply
corroborated by credible and disinterested
witnesses.91 It is true that alibi is a weak defense
which an accused can easily fabricate to escape
criminal liability. But where the prosecution
evidence is weak, and betrays lack of credibility
as to the identification of defendant, alibi
assumes commensurate strength. This is but
consistent with the presumption of innocence in
favor of accused.92
Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for
there are times when accused has no other
possible defense for what could really be the
truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time,
and such defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of
justice in his favor.93
III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU

on private respondents is disproportionate to
their misdeed.
Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU
sa private respondents ay hindi angkop sa
kanilang pagkakasala.
It is true that schools have the power to instill
discipline in their students as subsumed in their
academic freedom and that "the establishment of
rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline,
may be regarded as vital, not merely to the
smooth and efficient operation of the institution,
but to its very survival."94 This power, however,
does not give them the untrammeled discretion to
impose a penalty which is not commensurate
with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of
proportionality between the offense committed
and the sanction imposed is not followed, an
element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give
rise to a due process question.95
We agree with respondent CHED that under the
circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the acts
committed by private respondents Bungubung,
Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two
mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds
and the victims did not suffer any serious injury.
Disciplinary measures especially where they
involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut
significantly into the future of a student. They
attach to him for life and become a mortgage of
his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases.
97
Officials of colleges and universities must be

anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that,
appropriately construed, a disciplinary action
should be treated as an educational tool rather
than a punitive measure.96
Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of
exclusion97 only, not expulsion,98 imposed on
them by the CHED. As such, pursuant to Section
77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may
exclude or drop the names of the said private
respondents from its rolls for being undesirable,
and transfer credentials immediately issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions
dated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996,
and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36,
Order dated January 7, 1997
areANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while
CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996
is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate
of completion/graduation in favor of private
respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may
exclude or drop the names of private respondents
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its
rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately
issued.
SO ORDERED.
Commission on Human Rights
Cario v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and

a class day, some 800 public school teacher,
among them the 8 herein private respondents who
were members of the Manila Public School
Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass
concerted actions to dramatize and highlight
their plight resulting from the alleged failure of
the public authorities to act upon grievances that
had time and again been brought to the latters
attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by
the Secretary of Education. They complained to
CHR.
ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate
alleged human rights violations
RULING: No.
The Commission evidently intends to itself
adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the
character of finality and definiteness, the same
issues which have been passed upon and decided
by the Secretary of Education and subject to
appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as
aforementioned, declared that the teachers
affected may take appeals to the CSC on said
matter, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the CHR
has the power under the constitution to do so;
whether or not, like a court of justice or even a

quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and
decide, or dear and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged human rights
violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares that the CHR to have no such
power, and it was not meant by the fundamental
law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency
in this country, or duplicate much less take over
the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function,
to repeat, the Commission does not have.
98
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power

to investigate, cannot and not try and resolve
on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved
in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it
has announced it means to do; and cannot do so
even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in
question, initiated and conducted by the DECS,
their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed.
99
Simon vs. Comm. on Human Rights G.R. No.

100150 January 05, 1994
Facts :
Petitioner Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR
from further hearing and investigating
"demolition case" on vendors of North EDSA.
Constitutional
Issue :
Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and
decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a
fine for contempt.
Ruling :
Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution
empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari
stores and carenderia cannot fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights".
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere
in man by virtue of his humanity and are the
same in all parts of the world.
Human rights include civil rights (right to life,
liberty and property; freedom of speech, of the
press, of religion, academic freedom; rights of
the accused to due process of law), political
rights (right to elect public officials, to be elected
to public office, and to form political
associations and engage in politics), social rights
(right to education, employment and social
services.
Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the
individual person from the sheer fact of his
humanity...Because they are inherent, human

rights are not granted by the State but can only
be recognized and protected by it.
Human rights includes all the civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights defined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Human rights are rights that pertain to man
simply because he is human. They are part of his
natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.
CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every
citizen and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government.
POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of the government.
Civil Liability for Violation of Rights
Lim vs. Ponce De Leon Case Digest August 29,
1975
TOPIC: ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE/
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
FACTS:Taha sold to a certain Alberto
Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN
RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962
Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan
alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took
away the motor launch from him.
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being
informed that the motor launch was in Balabac,
Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of
Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment
commander-in Balabac to impound and take

custody of the motor launch.
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon
reiterated his request to the Provincial
Commander to impound the motor launch,
explaining that its subsequent sale to a third
party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot
prevent the court from taking custody of the
same. 2 So, on July 6, 1962 upon order of the
Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee
Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of
Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN
RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim
and impounded it.
Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha filed a case
against Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and
Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962
Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin
Lim without a search warrant and then and there
took away the hull of the motor launch without
his consent; that he effected the seizure upon
order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully
well that his office was not vested with authority
to order the seizure of a private property; that
said motor launch was purchased by Delfin Lim
from Jikil Taha in consideration of Three
Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) of which has been given to
Jikil Taha as advance payment; that as a
consequence of the unlawful seizure of the motor
launch, its sale did not materialize; and that since
July 6, 1962, the said motor launch had been
moored at the Balabac Bay, Palawan and because
100
of exposure to the elements it had become

worthless and beyond repair.
In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the
material allegations of the complaint and
as affirmative defenses alleged that the motor
launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha
to Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was
sometime in April 1962, forcibly taken with
violence upon persons and with intent to gain by
Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya without the
latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise
to the filing of a criminal charge of robbery
against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in
his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to seize and
impound the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL", for
being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that
Orlando Maddela merely obeyed the orders of his
superior officer to impound said launch. By way
of counterclaim, defendants-appellees alleged
that because of the malicious and groundless
filing of the complaint by plaintiffs-appellants,
they were constrained to engage the services of
lawyers, each of them paying P500.00 as
attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral
damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each and
actual damages in the amount of P500.00 each.
They also prayed that each of them awarded
exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000.00.
ISSUES/HELD:
whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce
de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the
motor launch in question without a warrant of
search and seizure even if the same was

admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime.
ANSWER: NEGATIVE. the power to issue a
search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate
and in no other officer and no search and seizure
can be made without a proper warrant
whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly
liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages
allegedly suffered by them granting that the
seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.
ANSWER. AFFIRMATIVE. To be liable under
Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough
that there was a violation of the constitutional
rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that
defendants should have acted with malice or bad
faith. Except for Madella who was merely acting
under orders.
RATIO DICIDENDI:
since in the present case defendants-appellees
seized the motor launch without a warrant, they
have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffsappellants against unreasonable search and
seizure.
Under the old Constitution 7 the power to issue a
search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate
and in no other officer and no search and seizure
can be made without a proper warrant. At the
time the act complained of was committed, there
was no law or rule that recognized the authority
of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant. In
his vain attempt to justify the seizure of the motor
launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce
de Leon invoked the provisions of Republic Act
No. 732, which amended Sections 1674 and 1687

of the Revised Administrative Code. But there is
nothing in said law which confers upon the
provincial fiscal; the authority to issue warrants,
much less to order without warrant the seizure of
a personal property even if it is the corpus
delicti of a crime. True, Republic Act No. 732 has
broadened the power of provincial fiscals to
conduct preliminary investigations, but said law
did not divest the judge or magistrate of its power
to determine, before issuing the corresponding
warrant, whether or not probable cause exists
therefor. 8
We are not prepared to sustain his defense of
good faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the
New Civil Code it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of the
plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants
should have acted with malice or bad faith.
But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot
be held accountable because he impounded the
motor launch upon the order of his superior
officer. While a subordinate officer may be held
liable for executing unlawful orders of his
superior officer, there are certain circumstances
which would warrant Maddela's exculpation from
liability. The records show that after Fiscal Ponce
de Leon made his first request to the Provincial
Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela was
reluctant to impound the motor launch despite
repeated orders from his superior officer. 21 It was
only after he was furnished a copy of the reply of
Fiscal Ponce de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the
101
letter of the Provincial Commander, justifying the

necessity of the seizure of the motor launch on
the ground that the subsequent sale of the launch
to Delfin Lim could not prevent the court from
taking custody of the same, 22 that he impounded
the motor launch on July 6, 1962. With said letter
coming from the legal officer of the province,
Maddela was led to believe that there was a legal
basis and authority to impound the launch. Then
came the order of his superior officer to explain
for the delay in the seizure of the motor
launch. 23 Faced with a possible disciplinary
action from his Commander, Maddela was left
with no alternative but to seize the vessel. In the
light of the above circumstances. We are not
disposed to hold Maddela answerable for
damages.
Aberca vs. Ver Case Digest L-69866 April 15,
1988
FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and
seizures and other violations of the rights
and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence
units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered
by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive
strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)
underground houses in view of increasing reports
about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro
Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that
complying with said order, elements of the
TFM raided several places, employing in most

cases defectively issued judicial search warrants;
that during these raids, certain members of the
raiding party confiscated a number of purely
personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that
plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants
issued by the courts; that for some period after
their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives
and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in
violation of their rights to silence and counsel;
that military men who interrogated them
employed threats, tortures and other forms of
violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish
them; that all violations of plaintiffs
constitutional rights were part of a concerted and
deliberate plan to forcibly extract information
and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and
to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans
being previously known to and sanctioned
by defendants.
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs'
complaint, the respondents postulate the view
that as public officers they are covered by the
mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done
in the performance of official duties or function
ISSUE:whether the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for
damages for illegal searches conducted by
military personnel and other violations of rights
and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If
such action for damages may be maintained, who
can be held liable for such violations: only the
military personnel directly involved and/or their

superiors as well.
RATIO DICIDENDI:
SC: We find respondents' invocation of the
doctrine of state immunity from suit totally
misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents
actually involved acts done by officers in the
performance of official duties written the ambit
of their powers.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely
responding to their duty, as they claim, "to
prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in
accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of
President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial
law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of
such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes
against alleged communist terrorist underground
houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket
license or a roving commission untramelled by
any constitutional restraint, to disregard or
transgress upon the rights and liberties of the
individual citizen enshrined in and protected by
the Constitution. The Constitution remains the
supreme law of the land to which all officials,
high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience
and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any
public officer or employee or any private
individual liable in damages for violating the
Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein, does not exempt the
102
respondents from responsibility. Only judges are

excluded from liability under the said article,
provided their acts or omissions do not constitute
a violation of the Penal Code or other penal
statute.
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners'
contention that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners' right and cause of action for damages
for illegal arrest and detention and other
violations of their constitutional rights. The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise
illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is
merely the right of the individual to seek release
from detention through the writ of habeas corpus
as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for
damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of
alleged physical violence" which constituted
delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as
actionable the act of violating or in any manner
impeding or impairing any of the constitutional
rights and liberties enumerated therein, among
others
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts
showing with abundant clarity and details, how
plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties
mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were
violated and impaired by defendants. The
complaint speaks of, among others, searches
made without search warrants or based on
irregularly issued or substantially defective
warrants; seizures and confiscation, without
proper receipts, of cash and personal effects

belonging to plaintiffs and other items of
property which were not subversive and illegal
nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and
detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under
irregular, improper and illegal circumstances;
detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed
places of 'safehouses" where they were kept
incommunicado and subjected to physical and
psychological torture and other inhuman,
degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of
extracting incriminatory statements. The
complaint contains a detailed recital
of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative
of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those
shown to have participated "directly" should be
held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code
encompasses within the ambit of its provisions
those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible
for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether
direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the
complaint. It is well established in our law and
jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of
action must be based on what appears on the face
of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency
of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in
the complaint, and no others, should be
considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to
dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint.
MHP Garments v. CA, 236 SCRA 227 (1994)

Facts:
On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments,
Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and
distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies,
badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum
Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the
authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken
the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of
scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." 1
Sometime in October 1983, petitioner
corporation received information that private
respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol
Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling
Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any
authority. Petitioner de Guzman, an employee of
petitioner corporation, was tasked to undertake
the necessary surveillance and to make a report to
the Philippine Constabulary (PC).
On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M.,
petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M.
Peafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men of
the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village,
Diliman, Quezon City went to the stores of
respondents at the Marikina Public Market.
Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl
scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at
respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a
commotion and embarrassed private respondents.
Receipts were issued for the seized items. The
103
items were then turned over by Captain Peafiel

to petitioner corporation for safekeeping.
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was
then filed against private respondents. 2 During
its pendency, petitioner de Guzman exacted from
private respondent Lugatiman the sum of THREE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,100.00) in order to be dropped from the
complaint. On December 6, 1983, after a
preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the
private respondents. On February 6, 1984, he also
ordered the return of the seized items. The seized
items were not immediately returned despite
demands. 3 Private respondents had to go
personally to petitioners' place of business to
recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized
items were returned. The other items returned
were of inferior quality.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiffs and against defendants,
ordering the latter jointly and severally
The decision was appealed to the respondent
court. On January 18, 1989, its Fifth
Division, 5 affirmed the Decision with
modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION; and, as
modified, the dispositive portion thereof now
reads as follows
Issue: Whether or not the CA committed an

erred in their decision
Held:
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects
our people from unreasonable search and seizure.
It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
This provision protects not only those who
appear to be innocent but also those who appear
to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. 6 In the case
at bench, the seizure was made without any
warrant. Under the Rules of Court, 7 a warrantless
search can only be undertaken under the
following circumstance:
Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
We hold that the evidence did not justify the
warrantless search and seizure of private
respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation

received information that private respondents
were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and
paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date
and time are not established in the evidence
adduced by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman
then made a surveillance of the stores of private
respondents. They reported to the Philippine
Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid
was made on the stores of private respondents
and the supposed illicit goods were seized. The
progression of time between the receipt of the
information and the raid of the stores of private
respondents shows there was sufficient time for
petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a
judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time,
they did not apply for a warrant and seized the
goods of private respondents. In doing so, they
took the risk of a suit for damages in case the
seizure would be proved to violate the right of
private respondents against unreasonable search
and seizure. In the case at bench, the search and
seizure were clearly illegal. There was no
probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause for
a search has been defined as "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched." 8 These facts and
circumstances were not in any way shown by the
petitioners to justify their warrantless search and
seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation,
104
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their

complaint for unfair competition and later
ordered the return of the seized goods.
Petitioners would deflect their liability with the
argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary
that conducted the raid and their participation
was only to report the alleged illegal activity of
private respondents.
While undoubtedly, the members of the PC
raiding team should have been included in the
complaint for violation of the private
respondents' constitutional rights, still, the
omission will not exculpate petitioners.
Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful
seizure justifies the award of exemplary
damages. 21 It will also serve as a stern reminder
to all and sundry that the constitutional protection
against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile
reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all
encompassing protection extends against
intrusions directly done both by government and
indirectly by private entities.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We
impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from
January 9, 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (P2,000.00) for the unreturned twenty-six
(26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE
PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX
PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon
finality of this Decision until the payment
thereof. 22 Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Citizenship
G.R. No. 161434
March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX
B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
G.R. No. 161634
March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ
G. R. No. 161824
March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes
disqualification in the presidential elections for
having allegedly misrepresented material facts in
his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming
that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his
parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed
the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino
Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the
Comelec, contending that only the Supreme
Court may resolve the basic issue on the case
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had

jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse
of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino
citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on
questions regarding qualification of a candidate
for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in
connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines which the Supreme Court may take
cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President
or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of
discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the
prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth,
provided that among the citizens of the
Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens
of the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his
grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters
death certificate was identified as a Filipino
Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age
105
of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In

the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos
place of residence upon his death in 1954 was
presumed to be the place of residence prior his
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that
the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being
so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to
his son, Allan---respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as
Allans son to Bessie, though an American
citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of
paternal filiation as evidenced by the
respondents birth certificate. The 1935
Constitution on citizenship did not make a
distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of
the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous
marriage and the allegation that respondent was
born only before the assailed marriage had no
bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the
established paternal filiation evidenced by the
public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty
of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section
78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Republic of the Philippines v Chule Y Lim

Facts:
Constitutional Law Citizenship Electing
Filipino Citizenship
In 1999, Chuley Lim filed a petition for
correction of entries in her birth certificate with
the regional trial court of Lanao del Norte. Her
maiden name was Chuley Yu and thats how it
appears in all her official records except that in
her birth certificate where it appears as Chuley
Yo. She said that it was misspelled. The
Republic of the Philippines through the local city
prosecutor raised the issue of citizenship because
it appears that Lims birth certificate shows that
she is a Filipino. The prosecutor contends that
Lims father was a Chinese; that she acquired her
fathers citizenship pursuant to the 1935
Constitution in place when she was born; that she
never elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority (she is already 47
years old at that time); that since she is a Chinese,
her birth certificate should be amended to reflect
that she is a Chinese citizen. Lim contends that
she is an illegitimate child hence she is a Filipino.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim is a Chinese citizen.
HELD: No. The provision which provides the
election of Filipino citizenship applies only to
legitimate children. In the case at bar, Lims
mother was a Filipino. Lims mother never
married the Chinese father of Lim hence Lim did
not acquire the Chinese citizenship of her father.
What she acquired is the Filipino citizenship of
her mother. Therefore, she is a natural born
Filipino and she does not need to perform any act

to confer on her all the rights and privileges
attached to Philippine citizenship.
Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727 (1996)
Facts:
174 SCRA 245 Law on Public Officers
Citizenship of a Public Officer
In 1988, Juan Frivaldo won as governor of
Sorsogon. Salvador Estuye, President of the
League of Municipalities of Sorsogon, filed with
the COMELEC a petition for annulment of
Frivaldos election and proclamation because
apparently, Frivaldo, in 1983, was naturalized as
an American. In his defense, Frivaldo said that he
was forced to be naturalized because the then
President Marcos was after him; but that
participating in the Philippine elections, he has
effectively lost his American citizenship pursuant
to American laws. He also assailed the petition as
he claimed that it is in the nature of a quo
warranto which is already filed out of time, the
same not being filed ten days after his
proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo can validly
serve as a governor.
HELD: No. He has not regained Filipino
citizenship. As far as Philippine law is concerned,
he is not a Filipino. He lost his citizenship when
he declared allegiance to the United States. Even
if he did lose his US citizenship, that did not
restore his being a Filipino because he did not
106
undergo naturalization or repatriation

proceedings. Neither did his participation in the
1988 elections restore his Philippine citizenship.
At best, he is a stateless person. He cannot serve
as governor when he owes allegiance to a foreign
state. The fact that he was elected by the people
of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country.
The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will
of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is
lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in
the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his
total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at
issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that no person shall be a Member of
the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted
in the US Marine Corps and without the consent

of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath
of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he
lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63
[(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other,
rendering service to or accepting commission in
the armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss
of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in
connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630
[(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or
Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of
the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was
elected as the Representative of the 2nd District
of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over
petitioner Bengson who was then running for
reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo
Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the HOR since he is not a naturalborn citizen as required under Article VI, section
6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the
petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the

duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship
may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes
by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces
in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United
States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On
the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship,
107
he will be restored to his former status as a

natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces
of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship
by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and registering the same with
Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides
or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance
to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is
deemed to have recovered his original status as a
natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to
recover, or return to, his original status before he
lost his Philippine citizenship.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009 ]
GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA,
PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND GUSTAVO S.
TAMBUNTING, RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Tambunting ran for a public local office which
was opposed by Cordora. The latter alleged that
Tambunting was not eligible to run for local
public office because Tambunting lacked the
requiredcitizenship and residency requirements.
In lieu with this, Cordora seeks to prosecute
Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful
statements in his certificates of candidacy.
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that
he did not make any misrepresentation in his
certificates of candidacy. Tambunting further
denied that he was naturalized as an American
citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by
the US government after Tambunting's father
petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition
for Relative) merely confirmed
Tambunting's citizenship which he acquired at
birth. Tambunting's possession of an American
passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a
Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of
allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or
the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act
of 2003.Tambunting further stated that he has
resided in the Philippines since birth. Tambunting
has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the
Filipino language, and has been educated in
Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that
proof of his loyalty and devotion to the
Philippines was shown by his service as
councilor of Paraaque.
The COMELEC En Banc was convinced and

affirmed the findings and the resolution of the
COMELEC Law Department that Cordora failed
to support his accusation against Tambunting by
sufficient and convincing evidence.
Issues:
1.
WON the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on its ruling.
2.
WON Tambunting was qualified to hold a
local public office.
Held:
1.
There was no grave abuse of discretion in
the COMELEC En Banc's ruling that there is no
sufficient and convincing evidence to support a
finding of probable cause to hold Tambunting for
trial for violation of Section 74 in relation to
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Probable cause constitutes those facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed. Determining
probable cause is an intellectual activity premised
on the prior physical presentation or submission
of documentary or testimonial proofs either
confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations
in the complaint.
2.
Tambunting possesses dual citizenship.
Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was
108
no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo

the naturalization process to acquire
Americancitizenship. The process involved in
INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the
Americancitizenship which Tambunting acquired
at birth. Clearly, Tambunting possessed
dual citizenship prior to the filing of his
certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections.
The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did
not disqualify him from running for public office.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in
a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states.
Suffice it to say, that the twin requirements in
R.A. No. 9225 (Oath of Allegiance and an
execution of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship) do not apply to Tambunting for the
reason that he is natural-born Filipino. The twin
requirements apply only when a Filipino who
becomes a naturalized citizen of another country
is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by
swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an

oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a
naturalized citizen's foreign citizenship.
David v. Agbay
[G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015]
TOPIC: Retroactivity of laws
PONENTE: VILLARAMA, JR., J.
FACTS: (chronological order)
1. In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian
citizen by naturalization. Upon their
retirement, petitioner and his wife
returned to the Philippines. Sometime in
2000, they purchased a lot along the
beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental
Mindor. However, in the year 2004, they
came to know that the portion where
they built their house is public land and
part of the salvage zone.
2. On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a
Miscellaneous Lease
Application (MLA) over the subject
land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) at the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
in Socorro. In the said application,
petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen.
3. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay
opposed the application on the ground
that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is

disqualified to own land. She also filed a
criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents under Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code against the
petitioner.
4. Meanwhile, on October 11, 2007, while
petitioners MLA was pending,
petitioner re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship under the provisions of R.A.
9225 as evidenced by Identification
Certificate No. 266-10-07 issued by the
Consulate General of the Philippines
(Toronto).
5. In his defense, petitioner averred that at
the time he filed his application, he had
intended to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship and that he had been assured
by a CENRO officer that he could
declare himself as a Filipino. He further
alleged that he bought the property from
the Agbays who misrepresented to him
that the subject property was titled land
and they have the right and authority to
convey the same. The dispute had in fact
led to the institution of civil and
criminal suits between him and private
respondents family.
6. On January 8, 2008, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor issued its
Resolution finding probable cause to
indict petitioner for violation of Article
172 of the RPC and recommending the
109
filing of the corresponding information

in court. Petitioner challenged the said
resolution in a petition for review he
filed before the Department of Justice
(DOJ).
7. On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an
order rejecting petitioners MLA. It
ruled that petitioners subsequent reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
did not cure the defect in his MLA
which was void ab initio.
8. Petitioner argued that once a naturalborn Filipino citizen who had been
naturalized in another country reacquires his citizenship under R.A.
9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus
deemed not to have been lost on account
of said naturalization.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner may be
indicted for falsification for representing
himself as a Filipino in his Public Land
Application despite his subsequent reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. 9225
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, was
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of

said law read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby
declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions
of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the
Republic.nRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid
oath. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that
Filipinos who have become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship, such is qualified by the
phrase under the conditions of this Act. Section
3 lays down such conditions for two categories of
natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and
second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are

those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country
who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers
those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is
required for both categories of natural-born
Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign
country, but the terminology used is different,
re-acquired for the first group, and retain
for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between
those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens before (first group) and after
(second group) the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Although the heading of Section 3 is
Retention of Philippine Citizenship, the
authors of the law intentionally employed the
terms re-acquire and retain to describe
the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also
evident from the title of the law using both reacquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a
foreign country, they shall be deemed to have
re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which
was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which
110
naturalization in a foreign country is one of

the ways by which Philippine citizenship may
be lost.
In the case of those who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall
retain Philippine citizenship despite having
acquired foreign citizenship provided they
took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
That the law distinguishes between reacquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenship was made clear in the discussion of
the Bicameral Conference Committee,
wherein the following was explained:
The reacquisition will apply to those who lost
their Philippine citizenship by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63The second aspect is
the retention of Philippine citizenship applying
to future instances eacquired for those who
previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue
of Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for
those in the future.
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as
a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of
R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of
natural-born Filipinos under the first
paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign
country.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in

the MLA, a public document, that he is a
Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing
law at the time he was naturalized as
Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign
country was among those ways by which a
natural-born citizen loses his Philippine
citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later,
the falsification was already a consummated
act, the said law having no retroactive effect
insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in
finding probable cause for falsification of
public document under Article 172, paragraph
1.
Suffrage
Akbayan v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147066, March
26, 2001
Facts:
Political Law Election Laws Right of
Suffrage Extension of Voters Registration
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth,
together with other youth movements sought the
extension of the registration of voters for the May
2001 elections. The voters registration has
already ended on December 27, 2000.
AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21
be allowed a special 2-day registration. The

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied
the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued
COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion
for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth
alleged that there are about 4 million youth who
were not able to register and are now
disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8
of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no
registration shall be conducted 120 days before
the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however
counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act
8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its
residual and stand-by powers, can reset the
periods of pre-election acts including voters
registration if the original period is not observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC
exercised grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the extension of the voters registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its
right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of
Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters
registration shall be conducted within 120 days
before the regular election. The right of suffrage
is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like
voters registration which is not a mere statutory
requirement. The State, in the exercise of its
inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voters
registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election,
to the incidental yet generally important end, that
even pre-election activities could be performed
111
by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic

and orderly manner one which is not indifferent
and so far removed from the pressing order of the
day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA
8189s provision is explicit as to the prohibition.
Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that
cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day
special registration, COMELEC has shown in its
pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially
create a setback in the other pre-election matters
because the additional voters from the special
two day registration will have to be screened,
entered into the book of voters, have to be
inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered
into the computerized voters list; and then they
will have to reprint the voters information sheet
for the update and distribute it by that time, the
May 14, 2001 elections would have been
overshot because of the lengthy processes after
the special registration. In short, it will cost more
inconvenience than good. Further still, the
allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is
not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youths
pleading was attached any actual complaint from
an individual youth voter about any
inconvenience arising from the fact that the
voters registration has ended on December 27,
2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in
their pleading that they are asking an extension
because they failed to register on time for some
reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The
law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber

on their rights.
Kabataan Party-list vs. COMELEC Case
DIgest (G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009)
voters registration; and that the October 31, 2009

deadline was impelled by operational and
pragmatic considerations, citing Akbayan-Youth
v. COMELEC.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
In the instant case, the petitioners, Kabataan
Party-List, seeks to extend the voters registration
for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections
from October 31, 2009, as fixed by COMELEC
Resolution No. 8514, to January 9, 2010 which is
the day before the 120-day prohibitive period
starting on January 10, 2010.
The petitioners anchor its ground on the
provision of Section 8 of R.A. 8189 which reads:
"The personal filing of application of registration
of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of
the Election Officer during regular office hours.
No registration shall, however, be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty
(120) days before a regular election and ninety
(90) days before a special election."
On the other hand, COMELEC maintains that the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code
confer upon it the power to promulgate rules and
regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and
honest elections; that Section 29 of R.A. 6646
and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 authorize it to fix
other dates for pre-election acts which include
Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority

to fix the voter's registration beyond the
prohibitive period set forth by R.A. 8189.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
It held that the right of every Filipino to choose
its leaders and participate to the fullest extent in
every national or local election is so zealously
guarded by Article V of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court explained that Section 8 of R.A. 8189
decrees that voters be allowed to register daily
during office hours, except during the
period starting 120 days before a regular election
and 90 days before a special election. The Court
is bound to respect the determination of Congress
that the 120 day or 90 day period, as the case
may be, was enough to make the necessary
preparations with respect to the coming elections
and COMELEC's rule making power should be
exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.
112
R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with

the mandate of continuing voter's registration
under R.A. 8189. R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 both
grant COMELEC the power to fix other period
for pre-election activities only if the same cannot
be reasonable held within the period provided by
law. However, this grant of power, is for the
purpose of enabling the people to exercise the
right of suffrage -- the common underlying policy
under R.A. 8189, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436.
In the case at bar, the Court did not find any

ground to hold that continuing voter's registration
cannot be reasonably held within the period
provided by R.A. 8189.
With regard to the Court's ruling in AkbayanYouth v. COMELEC, The court explained that if
the petitioners had only filed their petition, and
sought extension, before the 120 day prohibitive
period, the prayer would have been granted

pursuant to the mandate of R.A. 8189.
As a result, the petition was granted and the
COMELEC resolution fixing voters registration
for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections
on October 31, 2009 was declared null and void.
113

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Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

Freedom of the Press

In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374,

from the public utility, denying the allegations

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constitutional or otherwise, viz.: ARTICLE 19.

requires those who, invoking freedom of

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preventive suspension for one academic year for

institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to

Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

that they are citizens and taxpayers of the

speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No.

Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive

equal enjoyment of others having equal rights,

Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

Rights and The International Covenant on Civil

Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part,

G.R. No. L-72119

The Solicitor General interposes procedural

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access. In case of denial of access, the

respondent has failed to cite any provision in

In determining whether or not a particular

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being

b. In the instant, case while refusing to

as requested by the petitioner Valentin L.

WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission

Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law

people, the Court is convinced that transactions

Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

compromise, between the government (through

citizen, subject to such limitations as may be

Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

the discussions embodied in this Decision. No

to such arrest, detention and prosecution.

that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace

Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

government representatives, to disclose

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS

MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in

domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371

Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

singular violation of the Constitution and/or the

contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to

government. It also implies the recognition of

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the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the

and revision, her mere recommendation need

the time of conquest or colonization, and their

Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local

underlying them, namely, the associative

of Private Educational institutions to remove

Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to