142 Yer HS PSM 0001

Yanbu Export Refinery Project
PROJECT DESIGN BASIS 142A.5.2 Process Hazards Review Report Sour Water Stripper Document No.: 142-YER-HS-PSM-0001 Revision No.: FF Issue Date: 19 February 2008
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 1.1 1.2 2.0 2.1 2.2 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.0 5.0 6.0 TABLES: TABLE 1 PFDs Analyzed During PHR.................................................................................. 8 TABLE 2 PHR Participants ................................................................................................... 9 APPENDICES: APPENDIX A: APPENDIX B: APPENDIX C: APPENDIX D: APPENDIX E: Hazards Review Plan .............................................................................. 11 Process Flow Diagrams........................................................................... 12 YERP Plot Plans...................................................................................... 13 Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) ..................................................... 14 HAZOP Manager PHR Work Sheets ....................................................... 15 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................. 3 General........................................................................................................................ 3 Process Hazards Review ............................................................................................ 3 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 4 Scope and Overview ................................................................................................... 4 Process Description .................................................................................................... 5 METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................ 6 Introduction.................................................................................................................. 6 Process Hazards Review Procedure........................................................................... 6 Process Hazards Review Execution ........................................................................... 7 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ...................................................................................... 8 TEAM MEMBERS ....................................................................................................... 9 RESULTS.................................................................................................................. 10
General Confidential Page 2 of 15

1.0 1.1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY General The Yanbu Export Refinery Project comprises the development and installation of a new Grassroots refinery in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that will process 400,000 BPD of Arabian Heavy crude into gasoline and diesel products for export. New facilities for import of crude feed and export for products are also provided. The refinery will be located in Yanbu Industrial City on the west coast of Saudi Arabia. The entire project includes refinery process units, utilities and interconnecting piping, associated feedstock and refined product storage/logistic facilities, as well as the offsite services necessary to support the safe and efficient operation of the refinery.
1.2
Process Hazards Review A Process Hazards Review (PHR) associated with the Yanbu Export Refinery Project (YERP) Sour Water Stripper (SWS) to be located in Yanbu Industrial City, Saudi Arabia was performed at the Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) offices in Houston, Texas on 8 June 2007. The methodology used for the PHR was a Checklist" procedure. Personnel from YERP, ConocoPhillips (COP), and KBR participated in the review. The main objective of this safety review was to identify potential hazards in the process as early as possible, by means of review of the design Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs), and communicate that information to the project design team. The results from this safety review will be incorporated in to the design of the Sour Water Stripper facility and/or used in future safety reviews. One system node was reviewed during the review, and this resulted in the generation of eleven (11) action items. All of the recommendations made during the Process Hazard Review are documented on the worksheets, which are contained in Appendix E of this report.

2.0 2.1
INTRODUCTION Scope and Overview The purpose of the Process Hazards Review is to identify and communicate to the design engineers the potential hazards that should be considered in the plant design. Potential hazards may include fluids, chemicals or other substances, with special attention being given to toxic substances. Operational hazards such as start-up, offdesign operation and combinations of emergency conditions were considered. This ensures that many of the inherent hazards associated with a specific process could either be eliminated, and/or their consequences or likelihood of occurrence could be reduced. In this particular review, a Checklist" technique was performed in accordance with the guidelines published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) Procedure to identify the possible hazards that could result in a potential release to the atmosphere. In addition, the PHR was a means of developing hazard scenarios for use in the Building Siting Evaluations. Physical Systems The process systems listed below are the physical boundaries for the scope of this Process Hazard Review. This also coincides with the nodes studied. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Sour Water Degassing Drums (Phenolic Sour Water and the Non-Phenolic Sour Water) Sour Water Storage Tanks (Phenolic Sour Water and the Non-Phenolic Sour Water) Sour Water Degassing Vent Compressors (Phenolic Sour Water and the Non-Phenolic Sour Water) Sour Water Stripper (Non-Phenolic Sour Water) Sour Water Stripped Water Surge Tank (Non-Phenolic Sour Water) Two Sour Water Strippers (Phenolic Sour Water) Caustic Surge Tank
Topics of Review The Process Hazard Review addresses the following items: 1. 2. 3. Hazards of the process Applicable engineering and administrative controls Consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls

2.2
Process Description The purpose of the Sour Water Stripper is to remove H2S and NH3 from sour water produced by various refining units, to reclaim the stripped sour water so that it can be recycled to various refining units, and to recover the sulfur through the Sulfur Recovery Unit (SRU). The Sour Water Stripper (SWS) is part of the 400,000 BPSD Yanbu Export Refinery Project (YERP) and is designed to process non-phenolic sour water and phenolic sour water with separate systems. The heavy Arabian crude feed to the refinery contains nitrogen which in converted to NH3 after processing. Ammonia is highly soluble in water, therefore some ammonia will leave the process units as sour water either as wash water effluent of as condensed water when water is used to control ammonium sulfide salt concentrations. The heavy Arabian crude also contains sulfur which is converted to H2S after processing. The majority of the produced H2S is removed from the process streams by lean amine absorption, but a small portion enters the sour water along with ammonia, usually at close to equimolar amounts of H2S and NH3. The sour water has to be stripped of H2S and NH3, and the SWS acid gas sent to the SRU where sulfur is recovered as product and ammonia is converted to nitrogen and released to the atmosphere at the SRU incinerator stack. The produced sour water is segregated and classified into two types, non-phenolic and phenolic, which are processed by two dedicated SWS systems. Each SWS system consists of Sour Water reception and Sour Water stripping. Sour Water reception receives the non-phenolic and phenolic sour water from the process units, de-gases the sour water, stores the degassed water in surge tanks to even out and minimize composition fluctuations, and removes oil from the sour water. The stripper strips H2S and NH3 from sour water. Thereafter, sulfur is recovered from the SWS acid gas product and the stripped water is re-used (sent to the process units as wash/make-up water or as amine filter regeneration water) with the excess sent to the Waste Water Treatment (WWT) Unit. The SWS reception section is a 2-train design with segregated degassing drum and storage tank trains, one for the non-phenolic sour water and the other for the phenolic sour water. The Non-phenolic SW degassing drum and the phenolic Sour Water degassing drum share one liquid ring compressor. The compressor delivers the combined vent gas to the flare header recover gas absorber to remove sour gas. The SWS stripper section is a 3-train design. There is one sour water stripper for the non-phenolic sour water, and two strippers for the phenolic sour water. The nonphenolic sour water stripper is dedicated for the non-phenolic sour water only, but one of the phenolic sour water strippers, the one nearest to the non-phenolic stripper, is designed to process both phenolic and non-phenolic sour water.

3.0 3.1
METHODOLOGY Introduction The review was performed during a meeting attended by Contractor and by Company representative(s) in the Houston Operating Center, HOC for their own scope. A Checklist technique was performed in accordance with the guidelines published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE). Personnel who attended the PHR included, as appropriate, Contractor representatives from Process, Systems, Control Systems, Process Safety, Fire Protection, Environmental, Machinery, Vessel Analytical, Exchangers, Plant Services, Office of Chief Engineer, Project Engineer and Company representatives from Process Safety, Fire Protection, Environmental, Process Engineer, Project Engineer, Operations and Maintenance.
3.2
Process Hazards Review Procedure The following is a brief description of the procedure that was used for the evaluation. Checklist Review Procedure A Checklist Review is used to conduct the Process Hazards Review evaluation meetings. This procedure is a team brainstorming technique used to identify potential hazards and accidental events with a given process. The basic concept of a PHR is a multi-disciplinary team review of a process design in a series of evaluation meetings, relying on the expertise of the group members. First, specific issues related to design are addressed. PFDs are used as the basis for this portion of the review. During the review sessions, the team leader uses a checklist to pose a question to the team members. These questions are prepared ahead of the team evaluation meetings. However, the team will be encouraged to use their expertise to address whatever issues they believe necessary. The team should address each question identifying the hazard, potential consequences, engineered safeguards and possible solutions or recommendations for further study. The procedure produces qualitative results and is applied to the review of normal operations, start-ups, and shutdowns. In order to provide a logical, stepwise analytical procedure, equipment and piping shown on the PFDs will be divided into specific process systems referred to as study nodes. Checklist questions are asked pertaining to possible events occurring within that particular study node. However, potential consequence(s) both within that node as well as due to the interaction between nodes are identified. Safeguards (if any) are noted and where warranted, recommendations made to eliminate the hazard or operability problem, reduce the likelihood of the event occurring, or reduce the severity of the consequence.

3.3
Process Hazards Review Execution The following steps were used as the execution plan for performing the Sour Water Stripper PHR. This approach has proven to be an affective method of conducting PHRs without compromising the accuracy and quality of the study. Step 1: The checklist for the Process Hazards Review was provided to YERP personnel. They reviewed the checklist and responded, indicating the applicable questions. These responses were entered into the PHR worksheets in the categories of Consequences/Other Discussions and Controls. Step 2: The detailed evaluation starts with a review of the what-if questions and YERPs responses mentioned in Step 1, above. The team is given the opportunity to evaluate the event and the seriousness of the consequence, if the event did occur. After consideration of the event and consequences, safeguards and recommendations are discussed and made to correct the identified problem. Next the team is given the opportunity to consider any additional what-if questions or concerns applicable to the particular system under discussion. The study team's findings will be documented during the evaluation meeting using portable computers and Hazop Manager V. 6.0. This facilitates the development of the study report and provides timely documentation for the team members' review Step 3: The team leader prepares the final study report. The findings of the study will be used for future safety reviews during the EPC phase of the project.

4.0
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Current status design documents were required to perform the PHR. The following documents were available for reference during the Yanbu Export Refinery Project SWS PHR Process: Hazards Review Plan, 100-KBR-HS-PSM-0002 (Appendix A) Material Safety Data Sheets (Appendix D) PHR Checklist Questions Typical Sour Water Stripper Plot Plans and Overall YERP Plot Plan (Appendix C)
Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) were used at this time for this review. Copies of the PFDs and stream summaries are included in Appendix B of this report. Appendix C contains the Plot Plans and Appendix D the Stream Compositions. The drawing numbers and descriptions for these are shown in the following table. Document Number 142-YER-PE-PFD-0001 142-YER-PE-PFD-0002 142-YER-PE-PFD-0003 142-YER-PE-PFD-0004 142-YER-PE-HMB-0001 100-KBR-PE-P10-0001 142-KBR-PE-P10-0001 Title SW Stripper System Degassing Drums & Tanks Non Phenolic SW Stripper System Phenolic SW Stripper Train 1 Phenolic SW Stripper Train 2 Heat &Material Balances (sheets 1-5) Conceptual Overall Plot Plan Sour Water Stripper Plot Plan Revision F2 F2 F2 F2 F1 F2 F2
TABLE 1
PFDs Analyzed During PHR
In order to provide a logical, stepwise analytical procedure, equipment and piping shown on the PFDs were divided into specific process systems referred to as study nodes. For the PHR of the Sour Water Stripper, the unit design allowed it to be reviewed as a single node.

5.0
TEAM MEMBERS The team assembled to conduct the Process Hazards Review was comprised of individuals from YERP, Conoco Phillips (COP), and KBR with experience in production, process engineering, utilities, plant safety, and process safety. The team meetings were conducted at KBR downtown offices in Houston, Texas on 8 June 2007. The core members of the Process Hazard Review Team are listed below:
Name Abed Al Amri Frank Driskill Ashok Hati Al Keller Allison Kiger Rafael Lozano Christina Murcia Chad Patel Mike Quinlan Swati Shastri Tony Vaclavik
Company YERP KBR-Facilitator KBR COP-Sulfur Process Consultant KBR YERP KBR KBR KBR KBR-Scribe KBR
TABLE 2
PHR Participants

6.0
RESULTS Throughout the course of the Process Hazards Review, a total of eleven (11) recommendations were made to aid the project in future safety reviews and in the detailed design of the Sour Water Stripper facility. Recommendations to be evaluated during detailed design These recommendations include the need for further evaluations of process conditions and the effect on the unit. The recommendations included the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Provide closed loop type sample stations for Sour water monitoring. Verify ISBL units have adequate monitoring for water wash to limit ammonium bisulfide salts from upstream units feeding the SWS. Confirm that adequate relief protection for gas blow-by from any sour water feed source. Consider a nitrogen purge of the vapor space above the floating roof of both SW feed tanks to eliminate air in vapor space. Review project standards for vacuum protection design requirements Confirm that the gas overhead lines are heat traced and insulated to the SRU to avoid plugging. Review locations required for H2S detection monitors. Provide steam purges at inlet below pressure relief valves (PZV) to avoid plugging. Evaluate the impact of the loss of heat tracing of the overhead Acid Gas lines to the SRU with likely plugging of line (PHA issue). Review the plot location and unit layout as details are available. GLOBAL ISSUE: Consider reviewing alarm rationalization philosophy during later phase of the project.
All of the recommendations made during the Process Hazards reviews are documented on the PHR worksheets which are contained in Appendix E of this report. Also, it is expected that the FEED design team will review the Controls column of the worksheets to assure that the items assumed to be included will be considered and implemented. These will be verified by the EPC Contractors Safety Engineering during subsequent Unit Process Hazards Analyses.

APPENDIX A Hazards Review Plan

PROCESS SAFETY ENGINEERING Process Hazards Review Procedure Document No.:100-KBR-HS-PSM-0002 Revision No.: F3 Issue Date: 16 April 2007
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 2.2.4 2.2.5 Introduction.................................................................................................................. 3 Purpose and Objectives .............................................................................................. 3 Process Hazards Review Scope ................................................................................. 3 PHR Facilitator ............................................................................................................ 4 Software ...................................................................................................................... 5 PHR Methodology ....................................................................................................... 5 The Checklist Technique............................................................................................. 5 PHR Team Meetings ................................................................................................... 6 Preparation for the PHR Team Meetings .................................................................... 6 PHR Study Documents ............................................................................................... 7 Review Team .............................................................................................................. 7 Introduction to the Review........................................................................................... 8 Conduct of the Review Node by Node ..................................................................... 8
APPENDIX A - EXAMPLE PHR WORKSHEET ........................................................................... 9 APPENDIX A - EXAMPLE PHR ACTION ITEM & RESPONSE SHEET .................................... 10 APPENDIX B PHR CHECKLIST................................................................................................. 11 APPENDIX C SAMPLE REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................... 15
General /Business Confidential Page 2 of 15

1.0 1.1
INTRODUCTION Purpose and Objectives The purpose of this document is to define the procedures and requirements for performing the Process Hazards Reviews (PHRs) of the various process units and certain utility systems (see Section 1.2 below) below for the FEED phase of the Yanbu Export Refinery Project (YERP). The purpose of the PHRs is to identify and communicate to the design engineers the potential hazards that should be considered in the plant design. Potential hazards may include fluids, chemicals or other substances, with special attention being given to flammable, toxic and environmentally sensitive substances. Operational hazards such as start-up, off-design operation and combinations of emergency conditions are considered. Certain human factor elements will also be considered as contributing factors to a potentially hazardous situation. This will ensure that many of the inherent hazards associated with a specific process can either be eliminated, and/or their consequences or likelihood of occurrence be reduced so their associated hazard level can be managed. In addition, the PHR study will be a means of developing hazard scenarios for use in a Building Siting Evaluation and Consequence Analysis for dispersion, fire radiation and explosion effects that will provide input data for the development of the Project facilities overall and unit plot plans. The summary objectives of the PHR are:

To identify HES hazards and the ways they might be realized (termed top events) To identify inherently safer hazard management strategies To provide the opportunity that the facility hazards can be managed To recommend actions to manage these hazards
1.2
Process Hazards Review Scope The scope of the PHR study will include the following plant units and systems: 1. Crude Distillation Unit (Unit 110) 2. Sat Gas Plant (Unit 115 3. Distillate Hydrotreater (Unit 111) 4. Hydrocracker (Unit 112) 5. Delayed Coker Unit (Unit 113) 6. Naptha Hydrotreater (Unit 116) 7. Isomerization Unit (Unit 117)

8. Continuous Catalytic Reformer (Unit 118) 9. Benzene Extraction Unit (Unit 119) 10. Mercaptan Removal Unit (Unit 114) 11. Mercaptan Removal Sat Gas (Unit 121) 12. Hydrogen Generation Unit (Unit 120) 13. Amine Regeneration Unit (Unit 140) 14. Sulfur Recovery Unit (Unit 141) 15. Sour Water Stripper (Unit 142) 16. Flare System (Unit 144) 17. Fuel Gas System (Unit 149) 18. Coke Transport and Storage 19. Sulfur Pelletizer and Loading Additional plant systems may be added to the scope of the PHRs as deemed necessary by the YERP team. The types of hazards that will be applicable to the PHRs are hazards of the process fluids, chemicals, catalysts, equipment, hazards of the environment and hazards that are generated by human factors. The consequence categories that will be considered are health, personnel injury, the environment and asset loss. Many of the Process Units of the Project will employ licensed process technologies and that the hazards of these processes and risk mitigating strategies have been identified by the Licensors. It cases were the identification of these hazards and risk mitigating strategies are available, they will be included as part of the scope of the Project PHRs. Hazards associated with construction and maintenance activities will be performed separately from the process hazards review, however, the hazards of an operating facility to construction and maintenance personnel in adjacent areas will be considered during the PHRs. These hazards identified during the PHRs will be considered in a consequence analysis that will be used in siting buildings used during construction, commissioning and startup. 1.3 PHR Facilitator The PHRs will be chaired by a facilitator with expertise in the process hazards analysis methodology of using checklists. The PHR facilitator will be provided by KBR and will be subject to the approval of YERP. Prior to the first PHR team meetings, the facilitator will prepare the review by setting up the PHR worksheets prior to the PHR team meeting. He will ensure that full-size masters of the review PFDs are prominently displayed in the meeting room and that all necessary documents are issued and available prior to the review. The PHR facilitator will then

conduct the review and follow-up the report writing and issuance. Appendix C of this procedure contains a sample PHR report table of contents. 1.4 Software The PHR study will be recorded using HAZOP Manager V.6.0 by Lihou Technical and Software Services. This software is integrated recording, reporting, and analysis systems for the management of process hazard analysis studies including process hazards reviews and studies. The program provides all traditional functions for documenting the PHR Team review utilizing the checklist methodology of analysis. It features the ability to customize the selection of checklist items, causes, consequences, safeguards and actions for the individual processes and section of the process (node) being reviewed. The software has the capabilities of exporting the PHR Worksheets and Action Item Sheets directly to MS Word documents and Action Tracking Registers to MS Excel spreadsheets. An example of the PHR worksheets and action item sheets produced by the software is provided in Appendix A of this procedure. 2.0 PHR METHODOLOGY The review is performed during team meetings to be attended by YERP and KBR representative(s). A Checklist technique will be performed in accordance with Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 2nd Ed. (1992) pp. 54-56; 99-103 published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE). . The checklist is based on KBRs Process Engineering departments safety checklist. The PHR team as appropriate may add additional checklist items. The checklists are designed to cover many process systems and cases, therefore; only those checklist items applicable to the process system under study shall be addressed and entered into the Software. A copy of the checklists to be used is included as Appendix B of this procedure. 2.1 The Checklist Technique Nodes Determination The first step in the PHR study procedure is to select the locations, called nodes where the potential hazards of the process will be examined. Normally, the limits of a node are determined based on a single process or plant system or where the process functions or operating conditions changes significantly. The nodes are numbered for recording purposes, and the numbers are shown on the flow sheets. The numbers correspond to the node numbers listed on the header of each PHR worksheet and action/response sheet. These nodes are entered into the PHR recording software. Checklist Analysis

During the PHR team meetings, potential process hazards are identified for each node by applying the checklists items appropriate for the node under consideration. The results of the discussions about the applicable checklist item are recorded into the PHR worksheet in the column labeled Consequences and Other Discussion and the column labeled Controls (Barriers and Recovery). Barriers represent preventative controls and Recovery represent mitigating control such as fire protection. Potential Consequence Identification The first topic addressed when examining a particular hazard is the potential consequence(s) of that hazard for that node. An example of a consequence could be loss of containment could result in a fire and/or explosion. This enables the team to concentrate on hazards that could cause unsafe conditions. When a potential hazard that could cause unsafe conditions arises, all consequences are discussed and listed in the PHR software. If there is no or only an insignificant consequence resulting from that hazard, that potential hazard is usually not fully discussed and recorded accordingly. The team proceeds in this manner until no additional consequences are identified for the hazard under consideration. Controls (Safeguards) Review Once the consequences are evaluated and documented, the team focuses on the identification of existing safeguards and control of the hazard. These existing safeguards are recorded in the PHR worksheet in the column labeled Controls (Barrier and Recovery). Recommendations Following the discussion of the potential consequences of the hazards and hazard controls the team should consider recommendations where the controls are not perceived as been adequate for the stated consequences. The actions could involve the addition of or change in equipment, instrumentation, and control, or changes in process design parameters. Recommendation should be made for consequence modeling to assure adequate layout and spacing between hazard sources, energy sources and normally non-hazardous areas and occupied buildings. In some cases, further study is needed to evaluate the question, and a recommendation for outside study is noted. 2.2 2.2.1 PHR Team Meetings Preparation for the PHR Team Meetings The Process Safety Engineering Work Group Lead with the assistance of the Plant Units Project Engineering will be responsible for organizing and setting up the PHR Team meetings. Prior to the PHR team meeting, the facilitator identifies with the support of the KBR Process and Safety Engineers: a. The flammable and the toxic materials involved in the processes,

b. The equipment and lines handling these flammable and toxic materials, c. Intended inventories or these flammable and toxic materials and, d. The passive and active mitigation systems applicable to the processes. The equipment or lines identified in step a) and b) are then highlighted on the process flow sheets as system nodes. The locations of the equipment as well as potential ignition sources are identified on the overall plot plan. The study facilitator will consult with KBR Process Engineering for selection of the appropriate checklist items to be input into the PHR software prior to team meeting. Additionally, responses to the checklist questions will be pre-entered into the PHR worksheet for consideration by the PHR team. The PHR team may add to or delete the selected checklist items during the team meetings or revise the pre-entered responses as required. 2.2.2 PHR Study Documents Documents required for this review are: Process Flow Sheets showing normal process operating pressures and temperatures (one full size set and a reduced set for each team member) Stream Summary Process Descriptions Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) Overall Plot Plan (preliminary), Material Selection Diagrams (MSDs) (if available), Estimation of maximum inventory of hazardous fluids in major tanks and vessels Reports from previous process safety/hazards reviews (if available) Preliminary listing of nodes for this study.
2.2.3
Review Team The following list shows the typical PHR review team: PHR Chairman (Leader & Facilitator) PHR Scribe (provided by KBR) KBR Process Engineer KBR Control Systems Engineer KBR Plant Services Engineer

2.2.4
KBR Office of Chief Engineer Representative Process Licensor Representatives (as applicable) YERP Client Representative(s), to include Process, Operations, Control Systems and HS Engineer
Introduction to the Review The PHR facilitator will present a description of the PHR procedure and the goals of the review. Next the facilitator will review the nodes list with the review team with the opportunity to add/delete nodes as required. The KBR Process Engineer will present a process overview of the section of the plant (i.e. inlet section, liquefaction section, etc.) to be analyzed for each study node and as required by the PHR team members. He will use the PFDs and process descriptions
2.2.5
Conduct of the Review Node by Node The PHR study is carried out node by node by scrolling through the worksheets already entered into the PHR software. Checklist items that have been added to the checklist may be applied to existing nodes as determined by the review team. Top events, consequences, controls, risk evaluation and recommendations for mitigation are recorded for each new hazard scenario. (See Section 2.1 above, The Checklist Technique for more details.) Potential explosion, fire and toxic hazards are identified during the PHR study for subsequent Building Siting Evaluation (API 752) and Consequence Analysis study purposes. Corresponding credible explosion, fire and toxic case-events are defined for worst-case evaluation.

APPENDIX A EXAMPLE PHR WORKSHEET

NODE: 1.0 DATE REVIEWED: Wednesday, February 07, 2007
ITEM: CDU Cold Preht, Hot Preht, Desalter and Preflash [Process Strms, Cats and Chems] DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS 110-KBR-PE-PFD-0001, 110-KBR-PE-PFD-0002, 110-KBR-PE-PFD-0003, 110-KBR-PE-PFD-0004 PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM 1 Have the components in the feed(s), products (including combustion products), intermediates and wastes been identified? 2 Have any potentially lethal and toxic substances been identified? Can they be formed insitu? CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION All components identified. No unusual components for a refinery feed. CONTROLS (BARRIER & RECOVERY) RECOMMENDATIONS
Hydrogen sulfide in crude feed. Potential exposure to personnel due to a leak at preheat exchangers
None identified
Provide H2S detection for the Crude/Vacuum Units Model a leak from the hot and cold preheat exchangers.

APPENDIX A (CONT.) EXAMPLE PHR ACTION ITEM & RESPONSE SHEET

ACTION ON: . ACTION NO: 1 MEETING DATES: Wednesday, February 07, 2007 RESPOND BY: A.S.A.P
DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS: 110-KBR-PE-PFD-0001, 110-KBR-PE-PFD-0002, 110-KBR-PE-PFD-0003, 110-KBR-PE-PFD-0004 ITEM: (Hazop Node 1.0)
CDU Cold Preht, Hot Preht, Desalter and Preflash [Process Strms, Cats and Chems] PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM: Have any potentially lethal and toxic substances been identified? Can they be formed insitu? CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION: Hydrogen sulfide in crude feed. Potential exposure to personnel due to a leak at preheat exchangers CONTROLS (BARRIER & RECOVERY): None identified RECOMMENDATIONS: [1] Provide H2S detection for the Crude/Vacuum Units [2] Model a leak from the hot and cold preheat exchangers. RESPONSE TO REFERENCE [1]: (Action 1) DATED: YOUR REFERENCE BELOW: [1]
SIGNED: ENTER YOUR RESPONSE IN THE BOX ABOVE, THEN SIGN AND RETURN TO: NOTES (for use of Hazop Secretary only)

APPENDIX B PHR CHECKLIST

PROCESS STREAMS, CHEMICALS AND CATALYSTS 1 Have the components in the feed(s), products (including combustion products), intermediates and wastes been identified? 2 Have any potentially lethal and toxic substances been identified? Can they be formed insitu? 3 Does the process involve chemicals that are highly flammable and/or prone to form vapor clouds? 4 Does the process contain any chemicals that are highly corrosive? 5 Have feed impurity components and any reaction byproducts formed that may build up in the process and create a hazard been identified (e.g., sulfur, olefins, diolefins, aromatics, solids, heavy metals such as mercury, vanadium) 6 Does the process contain any flammable dust hazards? 7 What foreign materials can contaminate the process and create hazards 8 Are there any hazardous chemicals used for startup? 9 Have hazardous reaction or decomposition products that may be formed been identified (due to buildup or blockage in equipment/lines, etc.)? Can catalysts/chemicals decompose into hazardous products? 10 Can chemical compounds that are pyrophoric, auto-ignite, are unstable or sensitive to impact, shock or extreme temperatures or pressures exist, e.g. precipitate out of the solutions, form if the solution dries, accumulate in storage? 11 Have the physical properties needed for safe design been obtained? 12 Have important impurities been identified for the intermediate and product streams? 13 Have the compounds present been cross-checked for reactive potential if combined? PROCESS DESIGN PARAMETERS AND OPERATING CONDITIONS 1 Are there any extreme design conditions: a) High or low temperature? b) High or low pressure? c) Depressurization temperatures? d) Maximum or minimum flows? e) Maximum or minimum duties? 2 Are transient conditions identified? 3 What process variables could or do approach limiting conditions for a hazard? 4 Are there any special design considerations associated with the handling and storage of any of the process materials? 5 Are potential polymerization reactions identified? 6 Are potential decomposition reactions identified? 7 Are potentially explosive dusts stored or processed in closed systems? 8 Have any relevant alternative operating conditions been identified? Can a system operate at two or more extremely different operating conditions? 9 Can combustible or explosive mixtures of process fluids or dust occur within equipment because of normal or abnormal process conditions, including air leakage into the system and/or release and accumulation of dissolved or chemically bound oxygen? 10 Can equipment and piping be exposed to vacuum? General /Business Confidential Page 11 of 15

PROCESS SAFETY ENGINEERING Process Hazards Review Procedure Document No.:100-KBR-HS-PSM-0002 Revision No.: F3 Issue Date: 16 April 2007 11 12 13 14 15 Can equipment and piping be exposed to cyclical operating conditions? Can undesirable or runaway reactions take place? Is equipment operating at extremely different operating conditions connected via piping? Is potential coking identified where it is not desirable? Will unwanted hazardous reactions or decompositions occur because of a mechanical failure or loss of utility (e.g., pump trip, loss of agitation such as agitator trip or loss of impeller blade(s), material overcharges, solvent undercharges, overheating, overcooling, unwanted precipitations, failure of upstream and/or downstream equipment, etc?) Have any special disposal considerations and hazards been highlighted? For example, organic streams, aqueous streams, by-products, sewered materials, vent gases from towers in case of power failures or other upset conditions. Are there any ambient condition changes that must be accounted for in order to assure a safe design? Can freezing of process streams create a hazard? Have layout considerations that may be necessary to assure a safe plant design been identified and documented? Have necessary data on quantity/rate of heat/gas evolution and gas composition from reaction or decomposition of materials been identified and issued (e.g., hot spots caused by external fire, runaway reaction, etc.)? Will unwanted hazardous reactions or decompositions occur because of missing ingredients (e.g., loss of one or more feeds) or mis-proportioned reactants or catalysts? What happens if the process streams or chemicals contact air and/or moisture? What is the potential for external fires that may create hazardous internal process conditions?
16
17 18 19
20
21 22
EQUIPMENT OF THE PROCESS 1 Are fragile or brittle materials of construction used in hazardous service? 2 Can a line or connection to the bottom of a process vessel fail? 3 Can corrosion perforation in piping or a vessel or a loss of a vessel connection result in a major leak? 4 Can failure of a packing or seal cause a major release of hazardous fluids 5 Can failure of a vessel or piping component result in a major leak? 6 Can internal leaks cause a hazard due to mixing of chemicals, unexpected pressures or uncontrolled temperatures 7 Can mechanical impact or brittle failure of equipment cause a hazardous situation? 8 Can open fired equipment be exposed to a flammable release? 9 Can piping or equipment be exposed to excess thermal stresses? 10 Can piping or equipment be exposed to excess vibration? 11 Can piping, hoses or other piping components become inadvertently disconnected? 12 Can the process conditions or fluids cause embrittlement of materials of construction? 13 Does rotating equipment operate at extremely high speeds? 14 Is equipment or lines likely to plug including inlets to pressure relief devices? 15 Is exotic metallurgy (special alloys) employed in the process? 16 What hazards are produced by agitator failures? 17 Have equipment items and bypasses needed for safe startup / shutdown / maintenance been included? 18 In heat-integrated units, are provisions specified to maintain temperature control when flow through one or more pathways stops? General /Business Confidential Page 12 of 15

PROCESS SAFETY ENGINEERING Process Hazards Review Procedure Document No.:100-KBR-HS-PSM-0002 Revision No.: F3 Issue Date: 16 April 2007 19 20 21 22 Are special blanketing systems required? Will static electricity within equipment create a hazardous condition? Have any Client safety aspects been identified and referenced (e.g., Process Safety Manuals, recommended practices, etc.)? Is special equipment required (and specified) for disposal of spent catalysts?
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENACE 1 Are blanketing systems required? What hazards can occur as a result of loss purging, blanketing or inerting? How certain is the quality of the gas supply? 2 Are provisions required (and specified) for disposal of spent catalysts? 3 Can air be drawn into process equipment containing flammable or pyrophoric fluids? 4 Can failure of a reaction kill or dumping/depressuring system cause a hazard? 5 Can hazardous reaction develop as a result of gradual or sudden stopping of flow? 6 Can hazardous reactions develop as a result of equipment failure? 7 Can loss of liquid seals create a hazardous condition? 8 Can reverse flow create a hazardous condition? 9 Could a hazardous situation result from drain or vent valves positioned incorrectly? 10 Does maintenance of a system require frequent shutdowns or equipment removal from the process? 11 Does the use of heavy equipment (cranes, cherry pickers, fork trucks) pose a hazard to equipment that is in operation? 12 Have any special disposal considerations and hazards been highlighted? For example, organic streams, aqueous streams, by products, sewered materials, vent gases from towers in case of power failures or other upset conditions. 13 Is it expected that the process will require removal and/or replacement of equipment while the process is in operation? 14 Is the process such that testing of safety systems and/or devices will be difficult to do? 15 What happens if a process vessel is overfilled? 16 What happens if the wrong raw materials are introduced into the process? 17 What happens if there is inadvertent mixing of chemicals in the process? 18 What happens if too much, too little or none of a chemical is added to the process? 19 What hazards result from the loss of utilities (electricity, steam, water, instrument air, etc.)? 20 What potential process hazards are introduced by routine maintenance procedures? 21 What would happen if a slug of water entered into the vessel? 22 What would happen if process material escapes in water draw off? CHEMICAL INVENTORIES AND STORAGE 1 Are large inventories of flammable or toxic materials stored inside of buildings? 2 Are large volumes of flammable liquid stored in or adjacent to process areas? 3 Can a line or connection to the bottom of a tank fail? What happens if a seal to a pump or valve in a line from the bottom of a tank fails? 4 Is the safe storage of hazardous chemical inventory dependant on performance of instrumentation and controls? 5 What happens if a storage tank is overfilled? 6 Are flammable or toxic materials stored above their atmospheric boiling points? OTHER ITEMS 1 Can external/natural forces pose a hazard to this node (lightening, sandstorm, sabotage, earth movement, grass fire, high winds, etc.)? General /Business Confidential Page 13 of 15

PROCESS SAFETY ENGINEERING Process Hazards Review Procedure Document No.:100-KBR-HS-PSM-0002 Revision No.: F3 Issue Date: 16 April 2007 2 3 4 5 6 Can time or domino effects exacerbate any hazardous situation? What hazards does traffic (road, water) cause to the process? What hazards does adjacent equipment or Units pose to the equipment in this node (e.g. blast overpressure, heat from fires, impacts from flying debris, etc.)? What is the potential for external fires that may create hazardous internal conditions? Will leaking fluids (e.g., failure of heat exchanger tube(s) or heating/cooling coil in vessel) cause potentially toxic or flammable emissions in a normally non-hazardous unprotected area (e.g., at the cooling tower)? Have layout considerations that may be necessary to assure a safe plant design been identified and documented?

APPENDIX C SAMPLE REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section I II III IV V VI
Title Executive Summary Introduction PHR Methodology Risk Ranking Methodology Reference Documents Results
Page No. 3 4 6 8 11 12
Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F Appendix G Appendix H Appendix I Appendix J Appendix K
PHR Review Procedure PFDs UFDs Heat and Material Balances Process Description Nodes Listing Plot Plans Material Selection Diagrams PHR Study Worksheets PHR Study Team Members & Attendance Record Recommendation Action Item Sheets

APPENDIX B Process Flow Diagrams
NOTES
PFD Stream Number Simulation Stream Name Description
001
001
002
002
004
004
005
005
011
011
013
013
014
014
015
015
016
016
017
017
018
018
019
019
021
021
022
022
023
023
Rich Amine Rich Amine from Flashed Gas Rich Amine from Rich Amine to from Process Header to ARU from ARU Rich Flash Drum to Stripper Units through Rich Amine Amine Flash Lean/Rich (Train 1) Header Flash Drum Drum Train 1 to Amine (Train 1) Fuel Gas Exhcanger System (Train 1)
Reboiler Outlet to Stripper (Train 1)
Stripper Ovhd. (Train 1)
Stripper bttms Outlet to lrean/Rich Amine Exchanger (Train 1)
Reflux Drum Outlet to Regenerator Reflux Pump (Train 1)
Reflux Stream to Sour Water from Stripper (Train 1) Regenerator Reflux Pump Train 1 to Phenolic SWS
Acid Gas from Reflux Drum Train 1 to SRU
Lean Amine from Lean Amine from Lean Amine from Lean Amine Lean Amine Filter Package to Pump Train 1 to Pump Train 2 to Amine Surge Amine Surge Amine Surge Tank Tank Tank
1. Data taken from simulation run by ProMax 2.0. 2. Stream Pressures are estimated values for simulation purposes only. 3. Temperatures shown are for design purposes only. They do not represent actual operation. 4. Normal case heat & material balance is based on 5850 gpm (at 15.6 C) of lean amine flow to refinery and 1208 tpd of sulfur removed (1144 tpd by amine & 64 tpd as sour water).
Phase Stream Composition Component H2O H2S Carbon Dioxide Hydrogen Methane Ethylene Ethane Propene Propane Butene-1 i-Butane n-Butane Pentene-1 i-Pentane n-Pentane Cyclopentane Others MDEA Total Total Stream Properties Mol rate Mass Rate Temperature Pressure Molecular Weight Total Enthalpy Specific Enthalpy Vapor Phase Properties Mol Rate Mass Rate Actual Volumetric Rate Standard Vapor Rate Specific Gravity (Air=1.0) Molecular Weight Specific Enthalpy Mass Heat Capacity Actual Density Thermal Conductivity Viscosity Liquid Phase Properties Mol Rate Mass Rate Actual Volumetric Rate Standard Liquid Rate Standard Gravity Molecular Weight Specific Enthalpy Specific Heat Actual Density Thermal Conductivity Viscosity Surface Tension H2S Content
MIXED Units mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% KG-MOL/HR KG/HR C F BARG PSIG MW KCAL/KG KG-MOL/HR KG/HR M3/HR M3/HR MMSCFD
MIXED
VAPOR
LIQUID
MIXED
VAPOR
VAPOR
LIQUID
LIQUID
LIQUID
LIQUID
VAPOR
LIQUID
LIQUID
LIQUID
88.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 100.0 51,052 1,401,694 65 150 6.0 87.0 27 -4,101 -2,515 8 109 34 199 0.2 0.447 12.9 -547 0.717 3.235 0.086 0.012 51,044 1,401,585 1,366 6,016 210.8 3.2 27 -2,516 0.832 1,026 0.325 1.3 0.057 37,148
88.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 100.0 25,526 700,847 65 150 6.0 87.0 27 -2,050 -2,515 4 54 17 100 0.1 0.447 12.9 -547 0.717 3.235 0.086 0.012 25,522 700,792 683 3,008 105 3.2 27 -2,516 0.832 1,026 0.325 1.3 0.057 37,148
3.4 0.0 0.0 63.9 13.3 1.9 7.2 2.2 4.9 0.4 0.7 1.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 100.0 4 47 65 148 5.7 82.6 12 0 -607 4 47 17 96 0.1 0.405 11.7 -607 0.796 2.805 0.090 0.012
88.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 100.0 25,691 705,405 65 150 5.8 84.1 27 -2,064 -2,516
88.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 100.0 25,691 705,405 100 213 1.1 16.0 27 -2,039 -2,485 90 2,392 1,299 2,121 1.8 0.923 26.7 -1,070 0.322 1.841 0.022 0.015
91.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 100.0 28,210 739,076 128 262 1.3 18.7 26 -2,214 -2,576 3,984 72,174 56,765 94,373 79.9 0.626 18.1 -3,137 0.465 1.271 0.023 0.014 24,226 666,903 693 3,053 99.3 4.5 28 -2,515 0.954 962 0.338 0.5 0.046 1,278
63.4 36.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 100.0 2,075 49,535 108 226 1.1 15.7 24 -92 -1,590 2,075 49,535 30,954 49,156 41.6 0.825 23.9 -1,590 0.352 1.600 0.021 0.015
90.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 100.0 24,226 666,896 128 262 1.3 18.7 28 -1,951 -2,515
99.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 100.0 1,235 22,336 60 140 0.9 13.2 18 -97 -3,721
99.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 100.0 610 11,026 60 140 1.1 16.0 18 -48 -3,721
99.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 100.0 625 11,306 60 140 1.1 16.0 18 -49 -3,721
10.5 88.5 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 840 27,199 60 140 0.9 13.2 32 -10 -330 840 27,199 11,949 19,888 16.8 1.119 32.4 -330 0.259 2.276 0.017 0.014
90.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 100.0 24,226 666,896 93 199 0.1 1.5 28 -1,976 -2,548
90.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 100.0 24,230 667,006 93 199 0.1 1.5 28 -1,977 -2,548
90.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 100.0 7,467 203,798 43 109 33.3 483.1 27 -619 -2,611
KCAL/KG KCAL/KG-C KG/M3 KCAL/HR-M-C CP KG-MOL/HR KG/HR M3/HR USGPM KBPD API KCAL/KG KCAL/KG-C KG/M3 KCAL/HR-M-C CP N/M WPPM
GENERAL/BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL
THIS DOCUMENT AND THE INFORMATION HEREIN CONTAINED ARE THE CONFIDENTIAL PROPRIETARY INFORMATION OF THE YANBU EXPORT REFINERY COMPANY. ANY DISCLOSURE TO THIRD PARTIES, USE, OR REPRODUCTION WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORIZATION IS STRICTLY
216
25,691 705,405 688 3,028 106.1 3.3 27 -2,516 0.832 1,026 0.325 1.3 0.057 36,914
25,601 703,014 702 3,093 105.6 3.3 27 -2,490 0.884 1,001 0.022 0.7 0.049 36,914
514,918
24,226 666,896 693 3,053 99.3 4.5 28 -2,515 0.954 962 0.338 0.5 0.046 929
1,235 22,336 23 100 3.4 10.2 18 -3,721 1.017 981 0.547 0.4 0.065 7,826
610 11,026 11 49 1.7 10.2 18 -3,721 1.017 981 0.547 0.4 0.065 7,826
625 11,306 12 51 1.7 10.2 18 -3,721 1.017 981 0.547 0.4 0.065 7,826
931,354
24,226 666,896 671 2,956 99.3 4.5 28 -2,548 0.914 993 0.343 0.8 0.052 929
24,230 667,006 672 2,957 99.3 4.5 28 -2,548 0.914 993 0.343 0.8 0.052 929
7,467 203,798 198 874 30.3 4.5 27 -2,611 0.855 1,027 0.345 2.5 0.060 913
PROHIBITED.
F1
Rev
22MAY07
Preliminary Issue Description
MR KBR by
ASH KBR Ck
MPQ KBR Ap YERP YERP Ck Ap
Date
YANBU EXPORT REFINERY PROJECT
UNIT HEAT & MATERIAL BALANCES AMINE REGENERATION UNIT

NORMAL CASE
UNIT NAME & UNIT NUMBER JOB NUMBER SHT. No.
ARU-140
DRAWING NUMBER
J6491
140-YER-PE-HMB-0001
1 OF 3
REV F1
NOTES
024
024
025
025
026
026
027
027
028
028
029
029
051
051
052
052
053
053
062
062
064
064
065
065
071
071
073
073
074
074
Lean Amine from Lean Amine to Lean Amine to Lean Amine to Lean Amine to Lean Amine Filter Feed Refinery Units ARU Rich Amine ARU Rich Amine Flash Drum Flash Drum Transfer Pump Cooler Packed Bed Packed Bed to Lean Amine (Train 1) (Train 2) Air Cooler
Lean Amine to Amine Filter Package
Steam to Reboiler (Train 1)
Condensate from Reboiler to reboiler Condensate Pot (Train 1)
Condensate Make-up to Amine Surge Tank
Rich Amine from Flashed Gas Rich Amine from Header to ARU from ARU Rich Flash Drum to Rich Amine Amine Flash Lean/Rich Amine Flash Drum Drum Train 2 to Exhcanger (Train 2) Fuel Gas (Train 2) System
Rich Amine to Stripper (Train 2)
LIQUID Units mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% KG-MOL/HR KG/HR C F BARG PSIG MW KCAL/KG KG-MOL/HR KG/HR M3/HR M3/HR MMSCFD
LIQUID
LIQUID
LIQUID
LIQUID
LIQUID
VAPOR
LIQUID
LIQUID
MIXED
VAPOR
LIQUID
MIXED
VAPOR
VAPOR
90.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 100.0 57,161 1,560,149 86 187 36.0 522.8 27 -4,668 -2,573
90.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 100.0 49,356 1,347,140 64 147 34.0 493.1 27 -4,062 -2,593
90.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 100.0 169 4,606 64 147 34.0 493.1 27 -14 -2,593
90.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 100.0 169 4,606 64 147 34.0 493.1 27 -14 -2,593
90.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 100.0 7,467 203,798 64 147 34.0 493.1 27 -614 -2,593
90.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 100.0 7,467 203,798 43 109 33.3 483.1 27 -619 -2,611
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 4,084 73,577 150 302 3.1 45.0 18 -270 -3,153 4,084 73,577 34,026 96,756 81.9 0.622 18.0 -3,153 0.471 2.162 0.025 0.012
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 4,084 73,577 142 288 2.8 41.0 18 -314 -3,666
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 1,237 22,284 25 77 2.0 29.0 18 -98 -3,789
88.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 100.0 25,526 700,847 65 150 6.0 87.0 27 -2,050 -2,515 4 54 17 100 0.1 0.447 12.9 -547 0.717 3.235 0.086 0.012
3.4 0.0 0.0 63.9 13.3 1.9 7.2 2.2 4.9 0.4 0.7 1.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 100.0 4 47 65 148 5.7 82.6 12 0 -607 4 47 17 96 0.1 0.405 11.7 -607 0.796 2.805 0.090 0.012
88.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 100.0 25,691 705,405 65 150 5.8 84.1 27 -2,064 -2,516
88.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 100.0 25,691 705,405 100 213 1.1 16.0 27 -2,039 -2,485 90 2,392 1,299 2,121 1.8 0.923 26.7 -1,070 0.322 1.841 0.022 0.015
91.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 100.0 28,210 739,076 128 262 1.3 18.7 26 -2,214 -2,576 3,984 72,174 56,765 94,373 79.9 0.626 18.1 -3,137 0.465 1.271 0.023 0.014 24,226 666,903 693 3,053 99.3 4.5 28 -2,515 0.954 962 0.338 0.5 0.0 1,278
63.4 36.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 100.0 2,075 49,535 108 226 1.1 15.7 24 -92 -1,590 2,075 49,535 30,954 49,156 41.6 0.825 23.9 -1,590 0.352 1.600 0.021 0.015
KCAL/KG KCAL/KG-C KG/M3 KCAL/HR-M-C CP KG-MOL/HR KG/HR M3/HR USGPM KBPD API KCAL/KG KCAL/KG-C KG/M3 KCAL/HR-M-C CP N/M WPPM 57,161 1,560,149 1,562 6,877 232.3 4.5 27 -2,573 0.906 999 0.347 0.9 0.053 913 49,356 1,347,140 1,328 5,845 200.6 4.5 27 -2,593 0.880 1,015 0.347 1.4 0.057 913 169 4,606 5 20 0.7 4.5 27 -2,593 0.880 1,015 0.347 1.4 0.1 913 169 4,606 5 20 0.7 4.5 27 -2,593 0.880 1,015 0.347 1.4 0.1 913 7,467 203,798 201 884 30.3 4.5 27 -2,593 0.880 1,015 0.347 1.4 0.1 913 7,467 203,798 198 874 30.3 4.5 27 -2,611 0.855 1,027 0.345 2.5 0.1 913
THIS DOCUMENT AND THE INFORMATION HEREIN CONTAINED ARE THE CONFIDENTIAL PROPRIETARY INFORMATION OF THE YANBU EXPORT REFINERY COMPANY. ANY DISCLOSURE TO THIRD PARTIES, USE, OR REPRODUCTION WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORIZATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.
4,084 73,577 80 350 11.1 10.0 18 -3,666 1.107 925 0.590 0.2 0.0 0
1,237 22,284 22 98 3.4 10.0 18 -3,789 0.982 997 0.521 0.9 0.1 0
25,522 700,792 683 3,008 105.4 3.2 27 -2,516 0.832 1,026 0.325 1.3 0.1 37,148
216
25,691 705,405 688 3,028 106.1 3.3 27 -2,516 0.832 1,026 0.325 1.3 0.1 36,914
25,601 703,014 702 3,093 105.6 3.3 27 -2,490 0.884 1,001 0.022 0.7 0.0 36,914
F1
Rev
22MAY07
MR KBR by
ASH KBR Ck
Date
514,918

NORMAL CASE
ARU-140
DRAWING NUMBER
J6491
140-YER-PE-HMB-0001
2 OF 3
REV F1
NOTES
075
075
076
076
077
077
078
078
079
079
081
081
082
082
Reflux Stream to Sour Water from Acid Gas from Stripper (Train 2) Regenerator Reflux Drum Reflux Pump Train 2 to SRU Train 2 to Phenolic SWS
LIQUID
LIQUID
LIQUID
VAPOR
VAPOR
LIQUID
90.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 100.0 24,226 666,896 128 262 1.3 18.7 28 -1,951 -2,515
99.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 100.0 1,235 22,336 60 140 0.9 13.2 18 -97 -3,721
99.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 100.0 610 11,026 60 140 1.1 16.0 18 -48 -3,721
99.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 100.0 625 11,306 60 140 1.1 16.0 18 -49 -3,721
10.5 88.5 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 840 27,199 60 140 0.9 13.2 32 -10 -330 840 27,199 11,949 19,888 16.8 1.119 32.4 -330 0.259 2.276 0.017 0.014
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 4,084 73,577 150 302 3.1 45.0 18 -270 -3,153 4,084 73,577 34,026 96,756 81.9 0.622 18.0 -3,153 0.471 2.162 0.025 0.012
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 4,084 73,577 142 288 2.8 41.0 18 -314 -3,666
KCAL/KG KCAL/KG-C KG/M3 KCAL/HR-M-C CP KG-MOL/HR KG/HR M3/HR USGPM KBPD API KCAL/KG KCAL/KG-C KG/M3 KCAL/HR-M-C CP N/M WPPM 24,226 666,896 693 3,053 99.3 4.5 28 -2,515 0.954 962 0.338 0.5 0.0 929 1,235 22,336 23 100 3.4 10.2 18 -3,721 1.017 981 0.547 0.4 0.065 7,826 610 11,026 11 49 1.7 10.2 18 -3,721 1.017 981 0.547 0.4 0.065 7,826 625 11,306 12 51 1.7 10.2 18 -3,721 1.017 981 0.547 0.4 0.1 7,826
931,354
4,084 73,577 80 350 11.1 10.0 18 -3,666 1.107 925 0.590 0.2 0.0 0
PROHIBITED.
F1
Rev
22MAY07
MR KBR by
ASH KBR Ck
Date

NORMAL CASE
ARU-140
DRAWING NUMBER
J6491
140-YER-PE-HMB-0001
3 OF 3
REV F1
NOTES
001
001
002
002
004
004
005
005
011
011
013
013
014
014
015
015
016
016
017
017
018
018
019
019
021
021
022
022
023
023
Rich Amine Rich Amine from Flashed Gas Rich Amine from Rich Amine to from Process Header to ARU from ARU Rich Flash Drum to Stripper Units through Rich Amine Amine Flash Lean/Rich (Train 1) Header Flash Drum Drum Train 1 to Amine (Train 1) Fuel Gas Exhcanger System (Train 1)
Reflux Stream to Sour Water from Stripper (Train 1) Regenerator Reflux Pump Train 1 to Phenolic SWS
Acid Gas from Reflux Drum Train 1 to SRU
Lean Amine from Lean Amine from Lean Amine from Lean Amine Lean Amine Filter Package to Pump Train 1 to Pump Train 2 to Amine Surge Amine Surge Amine Surge Tank Tank Tank
MIXED Units mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% mol% KG-MOL/HR KG/HR C F BARG PSIG MW KCAL/KG KG-MOL/HR KG/HR M3/HR M3/HR MMSCFD
MIXED
VAPOR
LIQUID
MIXED
VAPOR
VAPOR
LIQUID
LIQUID
LIQUID
LIQUID
VAPOR
LIQUID
LIQUID
LIQUID
88.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 100.0 51,052 1,401,694 65 150 6.0 87.0 27 -4,101 -2,515 8 109 34 199 0.2 0.447 12.9 -547 0.717 3.235 0.086 0.012 51,044 1,401,585 1,366 6,016 210.8 3.2 27 -2,516 0.832 1,026 0.325 1.3 0.057 37,148
88.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 100.0 25,526 700,847 65 150 6.0 87.0 27 -2,050 -2,515 4 54 17 100 0.1 0.447 12.9 -547 0.717 3.235 0.086 0.012 25,522 700,792 683 3,008 105 3.2 27 -2,516 0.832 1,026 0.325 1.3 0.057 37,148
3.4 0.0 0.0 63.9 13.3 1.9 7.2 2.2 4.9 0.4 0.7 1.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 100.0 4 47 65 148 5.7 82.6 12 0 -607 4 47 17 96 0.1 0.405 11.7 -607 0.796 2.805 0.090 0.012
88.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 100.0 25,691 705,405 65 150 5.8 84.1 27 -2,064 -2,516
88.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 100.0 25,691 705,405 100 213 1.1 16.0 27 -2,039 -2,485 90 2,392 1,299 2,121 1.8 0.923 26.7 -1,070 0.322 1.841 0.022 0.015
91.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 100.0 28,210 739,076 128 262 1.3 18.7 26 -2,214 -2,576 3,984 72,174 56,765 94,373 79.9 0.626 18.1 -3,137 0.465 1.271 0.023 0.014 24,226 666,903 693 3,053 99.3 4.5 28 -2,515 0.954 962 0.338 0.5 0.046 1,278
63.4 36.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 100.0 2,075 49,535 108 226 1.1 15.7 24 -92 -1,590 2,075 49,535 30,954 49,156 41.6 0.825 23.9 -1,590 0.352 1.600 0.021 0.015
90.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 100.0 24,226 666,896 128 262 1.3 18.7 28 -1,951 -2,515
99.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 100.0 1,235 22,336 60 140 0.9 13.2 18 -97 -3,721
99.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 100.0 610 11,026 60 140 1.1 16.0 18 -48 -3,721
99.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 100.0 625 11,306 60 140 1.1 16.0 18 -49 -3,721
10.5 88.5 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 840 27,199 60 140 0.9 13.2 32 -10 -330 840 27,199 11,949 19,888 16.8 1.119 32.4 -330 0.259 2.276 0.017 0.014
90.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 100.0 24,226 666,896 93 199 0.1 1.5 28 -1,976 -2,548
90.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 100.0 24,230 667,006 93 199 0.1 1.5 28 -1,977 -2,548
90.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 100.0 7,467 203,798 43 109 33.3 483.1 27 -619 -2,611
KCAL/KG KCAL/KG-C KG/M3 KCAL/HR-M-C CP KG-MOL/HR KG/HR M3/HR USGPM KBPD API KCAL/KG KCAL/KG-C KG/M3 KCAL/HR-M-C CP N/M WPPM
216
25,691 705,405 688 3,028 106.1 3.3 27 -2,516 0.832 1,026 0.325 1.3 0.057 36,914
25,601 703,014 702 3,093 105.6 3.3 27 -2,490 0.884 1,001 0.022 0.7 0.049 36,914
514,918
24,226 666,896 693 3,053 99.3 4.5 28 -2,515 0.954 962 0.338 0.5 0.046 929
1,235 22,336 23 100 3.4 10.2 18 -3,721 1.017 981 0.547 0.4 0.065 7,826
610 11,026 11 49 1.7 10.2 18 -3,721 1.017 981 0.547 0.4 0.065 7,826
625 11,306 12 51 1.7 10.2 18 -3,721 1.017 981 0.547 0.4 0.065 7,826
931,354
24,226 666,896 671 2,956 99.3 4.5 28 -2,548 0.914 993 0.343 0.8 0.052 929
24,230 667,006 672 2,957 99.3 4.5 28 -2,548 0.914 993 0.343 0.8 0.052 929
7,467 203,798 198 874 30.3 4.5 27 -2,611 0.855 1,027 0.345 2.5 0.060 913
PROHIBITED.
F1
Rev
22MAY07
MR KBR by
ASH KBR Ck
Date

NORMAL CASE
ARU-140
DRAWING NUMBER
J6491
140-YER-PE-HMB-0001
1 OF 3
REV F1
NOTES
024
024
025
025
026
026
027
027
028
028
029
029
051
051
052
052
053
053
062
062
064
064
065
065
071
071
073
073
074
074
Lean Amine from Lean Amine to Lean Amine to Lean Amine to Lean Amine to Lean Amine Filter Feed Refinery Units ARU Rich Amine ARU Rich Amine Flash Drum Flash Drum Transfer Pump Cooler Packed Bed Packed Bed to Lean Amine (Train 1) (Train 2) Air Cooler
Lean Amine to Amine Filter Package
Condensate Make-up to Amine Surge Tank
Rich Amine from Flashed Gas Rich Amine from Header to ARU from ARU Rich Flash Drum to Rich Amine Amine Flash Lean/Rich Amine Flash Drum Drum Train 2 to Exhcanger (Train 2) Fuel Gas (Train 2) System
Rich Amine to Stripper (Train 2)
LIQUID
LIQUID
LIQUID
LIQUID
LIQUID
VAPOR
LIQUID
LIQUID
MIXED
VAPOR
LIQUID
MIXED
VAPOR
VAPOR
90.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 100.0 57,161 1,560,149 86 187 36.0 522.8 27 -4,668 -2,573
90.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 100.0 49,356 1,347,140 64 147 34.0 493.1 27 -4,062 -2,593
90.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 100.0 169 4,606 64 147 34.0 493.1 27 -14 -2,593
90.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 100.0 169 4,606 64 147 34.0 493.1 27 -14 -2,593
90.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 100.0 7,467 203,798 64 147 34.0 493.1 27 -614 -2,593
90.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 100.0 7,467 203,798 43 109 33.3 483.1 27 -619 -2,611
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 4,084 73,577 150 302 3.1 45.0 18 -270 -3,153 4,084 73,577 34,026 96,756 81.9 0.622 18.0 -3,153 0.471 2.162 0.025 0.012
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 4,084 73,577 142 288 2.8 41.0 18 -314 -3,666
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 1,237 22,284 25 77 2.0 29.0 18 -98 -3,789
88.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 100.0 25,526 700,847 65 150 6.0 87.0 27 -2,050 -2,515 4 54 17 100 0.1 0.447 12.9 -547 0.717 3.235 0.086 0.012
3.4 0.0 0.0 63.9 13.3 1.9 7.2 2.2 4.9 0.4 0.7 1.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 100.0 4 47 65 148 5.7 82.6 12 0 -607 4 47 17 96 0.1 0.405 11.7 -607 0.796 2.805 0.090 0.012
88.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 100.0 25,691 705,405 65 150 5.8 84.1 27 -2,064 -2,516
88.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 100.0 25,691 705,405 100 213 1.1 16.0 27 -2,039 -2,485 90 2,392 1,299 2,121 1.8 0.923 26.7 -1,070 0.322 1.841 0.022 0.015
91.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 100.0 28,210 739,076 128 262 1.3 18.7 26 -2,214 -2,576 3,984 72,174 56,765 94,373 79.9 0.626 18.1 -3,137 0.465 1.271 0.023 0.014 24,226 666,903 693 3,053 99.3 4.5 28 -2,515 0.954 962 0.338 0.5 0.0 1,278
63.4 36.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 100.0 2,075 49,535 108 226 1.1 15.7 24 -92 -1,590 2,075 49,535 30,954 49,156 41.6 0.825 23.9 -1,590 0.352 1.600 0.021 0.015
KCAL/KG KCAL/KG-C KG/M3 KCAL/HR-M-C CP KG-MOL/HR KG/HR M3/HR USGPM KBPD API KCAL/KG KCAL/KG-C KG/M3 KCAL/HR-M-C CP N/M WPPM 57,161 1,560,149 1,562 6,877 232.3 4.5 27 -2,573 0.906 999 0.347 0.9 0.053 913 49,356 1,347,140 1,328 5,845 200.6 4.5 27 -2,593 0.880 1,015 0.347 1.4 0.057 913 169 4,606 5 20 0.7 4.5 27 -2,593 0.880 1,015 0.347 1.4 0.1 913 169 4,606 5 20 0.7 4.5 27 -2,593 0.880 1,015 0.347 1.4 0.1 913 7,467 203,798 201 884 30.3 4.5 27 -2,593 0.880 1,015 0.347 1.4 0.1 913 7,467 203,798 198 874 30.3 4.5 27 -2,611 0.855 1,027 0.345 2.5 0.1 913
THIS DOCUMENT AND THE INFORMATION HEREIN CONTAINED ARE THE CONFIDENTIAL PROPRIETARY INFORMATION OF THE YANBU EXPORT REFINERY COMPANY. ANY DISCLOSURE TO THIRD PARTIES, USE, OR REPRODUCTION WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORIZATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.
4,084 73,577 80 350 11.1 10.0 18 -3,666 1.107 925 0.590 0.2 0.0 0
1,237 22,284 22 98 3.4 10.0 18 -3,789 0.982 997 0.521 0.9 0.1 0
25,522 700,792 683 3,008 105.4 3.2 27 -2,516 0.832 1,026 0.325 1.3 0.1 37,148
216
25,691 705,405 688 3,028 106.1 3.3 27 -2,516 0.832 1,026 0.325 1.3 0.1 36,914
25,601 703,014 702 3,093 105.6 3.3 27 -2,490 0.884 1,001 0.022 0.7 0.0 36,914
F1
Rev
22MAY07
MR KBR by
ASH KBR Ck
Date
514,918

NORMAL CASE
ARU-140
DRAWING NUMBER
J6491
140-YER-PE-HMB-0001
2 OF 3
REV F1
NOTES
075
075
076
076
077
077
078
078
079
079
081
081
082
082
Reflux Stream to Sour Water from Acid Gas from Stripper (Train 2) Regenerator Reflux Drum Reflux Pump Train 2 to SRU Train 2 to Phenolic SWS
LIQUID
LIQUID
LIQUID
VAPOR
VAPOR
LIQUID
90.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 100.0 24,226 666,896 128 262 1.3 18.7 28 -1,951 -2,515
99.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 100.0 1,235 22,336 60 140 0.9 13.2 18 -97 -3,721
99.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 100.0 610 11,026 60 140 1.1 16.0 18 -48 -3,721
99.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 100.0 625 11,306 60 140 1.1 16.0 18 -49 -3,721
10.5 88.5 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 840 27,199 60 140 0.9 13.2 32 -10 -330 840 27,199 11,949 19,888 16.8 1.119 32.4 -330 0.259 2.276 0.017 0.014
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 4,084 73,577 150 302 3.1 45.0 18 -270 -3,153 4,084 73,577 34,026 96,756 81.9 0.622 18.0 -3,153 0.471 2.162 0.025 0.012
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 4,084 73,577 142 288 2.8 41.0 18 -314 -3,666
KCAL/KG KCAL/KG-C KG/M3 KCAL/HR-M-C CP KG-MOL/HR KG/HR M3/HR USGPM KBPD API KCAL/KG KCAL/KG-C KG/M3 KCAL/HR-M-C CP N/M WPPM 24,226 666,896 693 3,053 99.3 4.5 28 -2,515 0.954 962 0.338 0.5 0.0 929 1,235 22,336 23 100 3.4 10.2 18 -3,721 1.017 981 0.547 0.4 0.065 7,826 610 11,026 11 49 1.7 10.2 18 -3,721 1.017 981 0.547 0.4 0.065 7,826 625 11,306 12 51 1.7 10.2 18 -3,721 1.017 981 0.547 0.4 0.1 7,826
931,354
4,084 73,577 80 350 11.1 10.0 18 -3,666 1.107 925 0.590 0.2 0.0 0
PROHIBITED.
F1
Rev
22MAY07
MR KBR by
ASH KBR Ck
Date

NORMAL CASE
ARU-140
DRAWING NUMBER
J6491
140-YER-PE-HMB-0001
3 OF 3
REV F1

APPENDIX C YERP Plot Plans

APPENDIX D Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS)
Material Safety Data Sheet Collection

Genium Publishing Corp.
1171 RiverFront Center Amsterdam, NY 12010 (518) 842-4111 Issue Date: 2003-02
Anhydrous Ammonia AMM1000

Temp: was 0001.html
Section 1 - Chemical Product and Company Identification
51/57
Material Name: Anhydrous Ammonia CAS Number: 7664-41-7 Chemical Formula: H3N Structural Chemical Formula: NH3 EINECS Number: 231-635-3 Synonyms: AM-FOL; AMMONIA; AMMONIA ANHYDROUS; AMMONIA GAS; AMMONIA,ANHYDROUS; AMMONIA,ANHYDROUS,LIQUEFIED; AMMONIAC; AMMONIACA; AMMONIAK; AMONIAK; ANHYDROUS AMMONIA; AQUA AMMONIA; AQUEOUS AMMONIA; LINDE AMMONIA; LIQUID AMMONIA; NITRO-SIL; R 717; SPIRIT OF HARTSHORN Derivation: Prepared by using atmospheric nitrogen and a hydrogen source at high temperatures (752 F (400 C) 11,732 F (6500 C)) and pressures (100 to 900 atm) in the presence of an iron catalyst (modified Haber reduction process). General Use: Used in the manufacture of nitric acid, explosives, hydrazine, pesticides, urea, ammonium nitrate, ammonium salts, nylon, detergents; as refrigerant, cotton defoliant, fertilizer, neutralizing agent in petroleum industry; in metal treating operations, e.g., nitriding; for hydrogenation of fats and oils; source of pure nitrogen; in rubber industry for stabilization of raw latex; catalyst to make synthetic resin; in water treatment, against tastes and odors; on citrus fruit to control fungal growth; in veterinary medicine as an antacid and respiratory stimulant.
Section 2 - Composition / Information on Ingredients

Name Anhydrous ammonia OSHA PEL 3 TWA: 50 ppm; 35 mg/m . OSHA PEL Vacated 1989 Limits 3 STEL: 35 ppm; 27 mg/m . ACGIH TLV 3 TWA: 25 ppm, 17 mg/m ; STEL: 3 35 ppm, 24 mg/m . CAS 7664-41-7 % ca 100% vol DFG (Germany) MAK 3 TWA: 20 ppm, 14 mg/m ; PEAK: 3 40 ppm, 28 mg/m ; ceiling, local irritant effects determine peak value.
NIOSH REL 3 TWA: 25 ppm, 18 mg/m ; STEL: 3 35 ppm, 27 mg/m . IDLH Level 300 ppm.
Section 3 - Hazards Identification

ChemWatch Hazard Ratings
1 3
Fire Diamond
Flammability Toxicity Body Contact Reactivity Chronic 0 Min 1 Low 2 Moderate 3 High 4 Extreme
HMIS 2 1 0
Health Flammability Reactivity
ANSI Signal Word
Danger!
Corrosive
Compressed Gas
Emergency Overview
Anhydrous ammonia is an easily liquified colorless gas with a pungent, irritating odor. It is toxic by inhalation and ingestion. Due to its extreme alkalinity, it is corrosive and causes severe burns. Exposure may result in respiratory distress and, at high levels, may be fatal. This combustible gas can form explosive mixtures with air and can violently react with many other chemicals. When heated to decomposition, anhydrous ammonia emits toxic fumes of ammonia and nitrogen oxides (NOx).
Potential Health Effects

Target Organs: Eyes, skin, respiratory system, brain Primary Entry Routes: Inhalation, ingestion, skin and/or eye contact/absorption
Copyright 2003 by Genium Publishing Corporation. Any commercial use or reproduction without the publishers permission is prohibited. Judgments as to the suitability of information herein for the purchasers purposes are necessarily the purchasers responsibility. Although reasonable care has been taken in the preparation of such information, Genium Publishing Corporation extends no warranties, makes no representations, and assumes no responsibility as to the accuracy or suitability of such information for application to the purchasers intended purpose or for consequences of its use.
2003-02
Anhydrous Ammonia
AMM1000
Acute Effects Inhalation: Dyspnea, bronchospasms, laryngitis, chest pain, excessive salivation, pink frothy sputum, urine retention, elevated blood pressure, corrosion of nose, throat and respiratory tract, fluid in the lungs (can be delayed), inflammation of and fluid accumulation in the larynx, changes in brain energy metabolism, coma, convulsions, and even death from kidney failure or spasm can result from inhalation of anhydrous ammonia. Concentrations of 25004500 ppm for 30 minutes can be fatal. Eye: Contact with liquid or exposure to high gas concentrations (> 1700 ppm) causes tearing, eyelid redness and swelling, extreme irritation, permanent corneal damage, cataract formation, glaucoma-like symptoms, temporary/permanent blindness. Skin: Contact with liquid or exposure to high gas concentrations may cause blisters, burns, and frostbite (liquid only). Percutaneous absorption may take place through damaged tissue, and lead to systemic effects. Ingestion: Nausea, vomiting, swelling of the lips, mouth and larynx and systemic effects (see Inhalation) can result. Carcinogenicity: NTP - Not listed; IARC - Not listed; OSHA - Not listed; NIOSH - Not listed; ACGIH - Not listed; EPA - Not listed; MAK - Not listed. Medical Conditions Aggravated by Long-Term Exposure: Impaired lung or liver function, corneal disease, glaucoma. Chronic Effects: Repeated inhalation may result in asthma, chronic bronchitis, dilation of and fiber formation in the bronchial tubes, headache and prolonged sleepiness. Repeated skin contact can result in dermatitis.
Section 4 - First Aid Measures

Inhalation: Remove exposed person to fresh air and support breathing as needed. Eye Contact: Do not allow victim to rub or keep eyes tightly shut. Gently lift eyelids and flush immediately and continuously with flooding amounts of water until transported to an emergency medical facility. Skin Contact: Quickly remove contaminated clothing. Rinse with flooding amounts of water for at least 15 min. Wash exposed area with soap and water. For reddened or blistered skin, consult a physician. Ingestion: Never give anything by mouth to an unconscious or convulsing person. Contact a poison control center. Unless the poison control center advises otherwise, have the conscious and alert person drink 1 to 2 glasses of water or milk. Do not induce vomiting. After first aid, get appropriate in-plant, paramedic, or community medical support. Note to Physicians: Serum ammonia levels are not clinically useful in managing exposures; instead, monitor blood gases and evaluate clinically for pulmonary edema and respiratory distress, with treatment as appropriate. Consider esophagoscopy if patient has oral or pharyngeal burns. Gastric lavage is contraindicated. For eye exposure, irrigate until conjunctival sack pH is < 8.5. If ingestion is significant, observe for signs of esophageal stricture.
Section 5 - Fire-Fighting Measures

Flash Point: Not applicable, combustible gas Burning Rate: 1 mm/min Autoignition Temperature: 1204 F (651 C) LEL: 16% v/v UEL: 25% v/v Flammability Classification: Combustible gas. Extinguishing Media: Use carbon dioxide or dry chemical to extinguish flame at gas valve. General Fire Hazards/Hazardous Combustion Products: Heating anhydrous ammonia to Fire Diamond decomposition can produce fumes of ammonia, and nitrogen oxides (NOx). Containers may explode in heat of fire. Ammonia can form explosive mixture with air, and may decompose to flammable hydrogen and nitrogen gas at temperatures greater than 840 F (450 C); reacts exothermically with acids. Contact with many incompatibles (see Sec. 10) can generate explosive products. Fire-Fighting Instructions: Do not release runoff from fire control methods to sewers or waterways. Use water spray to protect personnel shutting off gas. Remove cylinders from fire. Because fire may produce toxic thermal decomposition products, wear a selfcontained breathing apparatus (SCBA) with a full facepiece operated in pressuredemand or positive-pressure mode.
Section 6 - Accidental Release Measures

Spill/Leak Procedures: Isolate spill for 330-660 ft (100-200 m) in all directions. Fully encapsulating, vapor protective clothing should be worn for spills and leaks with no fire. Do not touch or walk through spilled material. Aerosol from leak of liquid ammonia may lower air temperature considerably. Use water spray to reduce vapors or divert vapor cloud drift, and then stop leak if possible. If possible, turn leaking containers so that gas escapes rather than liquid. Prevent entry into waterways, sewers, basements or confined areas. Do not direct water at spill or source of leak. Isolate area until gas has dispersed. Small Spills: Absorb liquid anhydrous ammonia with vermiculite, earth, sand or similar material. Large Spills: For large spills, consider downwind evacuation of at least 1000 ft (300 m). Do not release into sewers or waterways. Spills can be neutralized with dilute acid. Page 2 of 5 Copyright 2003 Genium Publishing Corporation. Any commercial use or reproduction without the publishers permission is prohibited.
2003-02
Anhydrous Ammonia
AMM1000
Regulatory Requirements: Follow applicable OSHA regulations (29 CFR 1910.120).
Section 7 - Handling and Storage

Handling Precautions: Avoid vapor inhalation, and skin and eye contact. Use only with ventilation sufficient to reduce airborne concentrations to non-hazardous levels (see Sec. 2). Wear protective gloves, goggles, and clothing (see Sec. 8). Ground and bond all containers during transfers to prevent static sparks. Use non-sparking tools to open and close containers. Liquid ammonia will attack some plastics, rubbers and coatings. Never eat, drink, or smoke in work areas. Practice good personal hygiene after using this material, especially before eating, drinking, smoking, using the toilet, or applying cosmetics. Recommended Storage Methods: Store outside, out of direct sunlight, away from drinking water wells, or in a tightly closed container in a cool, well-ventilated area, away from heat, ignition sources and incompatibles (see Sec. 10). Periodically inspect materials. Equip drums with appropriate pressure-relief devices. Do not use copper, brass, bronze or galvanized steel in contact with ammonia. Regulatory Requirements: Follow applicable OSHA regulations. Also 29 CFR 1910.101, 111 for combustible gases.
Section 8 - Exposure Controls / Personal Protection

Engineering Controls: Consider installation of sprinklers protection for protection against vapors. Provide general or local exhaust ventilation systems to maintain airborne concentrations as low as possible. Local exhaust ventilation is preferred because it prevents contaminant dispersion into the work area by controlling it at its source. Administrative Controls: Implement medical surveillance procedures for workers, including chest x-ray, examination of eyes, skin and respiratory tract. Personal Protective Clothing/Equipment: Wear chemically protective gloves, boots, aprons, and gauntlets of butyl rubber, Teflon, Trellchem HPS, or Responder (breakthrough time (BT) >8 hr), if possible, or alternatively, nitrile rubber (BT >4 hr), and neoprene (BT >1 hr), to prevent skin contact. Polyvinyl chloride, polyethylene, polyvinyl alcohol, Barricade and Chemrel (BT <1 hr) may degrade after contact and are not recommended. Wear splash-proof chemical safety goggles and face shield (8-inch minimum), per OSHA eye- and face-protection regulations (29 CFR 1910.133). Contact lenses are not eye protective devices. Appropriate eye protection must be worn instead of, or in conjunction with contact lenses. Respiratory Protection: Seek professional advice prior to respirator selection and use. Follow OSHA respirator regulations (29 CFR 1910.134) and, if necessary, wear a MSHA/NIOSH-approved respirator. For concentrations <= 250 ppm, use chemical cartridge respirator with green cartridge, or supplied air (SA) respirator; <= 300 ppm, SA respirator in continuous flow mode, or powered air-purifying respirator with green cartridge, or chemical cartridge respirator with full facepiece and green cartridge, or air-purifying full-facepiece respirator with chin-style front- or back-mounted green cartridge, or SCBA with full facepiece, or SA respirator with full facepiece; > IDLH, or emergency, SCBA with full facepiece operated in pressure-demand or other positive-pressure mode, or SA respirator with full facepiece operated in pressure-demand or other positive-pressure mode combined with SCBA. For escape, use air-purifying full facepiece respirator with green cartridge, or escape-type SCBA. Warning! Air-purifying respirators do not protect workers in oxygen-deficient atmospheres. If respirators are used, OSHA requires a written respiratory protection program that includes at least: medical certification, training, fit-testing, periodic environmental monitoring, maintenance, inspection, cleaning, and convenient, sanitary storage areas. Other: Separate contaminated work clothes from street clothes. Launder before reuse. Remove this material from your shoes and clean personal protective equipment. Make emergency eyewash stations, safety/quick-drench showers, and washing facilities available in work area.
Section 9 - Physical and Chemical Properties

Appearance/General Info: Colorless; strong, pungent, irritating odor. Freezing/Melting Point: -107.86 F (-77.7 C) Physical State: Gas Viscosity: 0.255 centipoise at -28.3 F (-33.5 C) Odor Threshold: 0.32 - 46.8 ppm Surface Tension: 23.4 dynes/cm at 39.4 F (4.1 C) Vapor Pressure (kPa): 7,510 mm Hg at 77 F (25 C) Ionization Potential (eV): 10.18 eV Vapor Density (Air=1): 0.59 Water Solubility: 31% at 77 F (25 C) Formula Weight: 17.03 Other Solubilities: 10% in ethanol at 77 F (25 C); Density: 0.771 g/L at 760 mm Hg (gas) 16% in methanol at 77 F (25 C); soluble in Refractive Index: 1.325 at 61.7 F (16.5 C) chloroform and ether. pH: 11.6 (1.0 N aqueous solution) Boiling Point: -28 F (-33.35 C)
Section 10 - Stability and Reactivity

Stability/Polymerization/Conditions to Avoid: Anhydrous ammonia is stable at room temperature in closed containers under normal storage and handling conditions. Hazardous polymerization cannot occur. Heat, ignition sources, contact with oxidizing agents, combustible materials and incompatibles. Page 3 of 5
Copyright 2003 Genium Publishing Corporation. Any commercial use or reproduction without the publishers permission is prohibited.
2003-02
Anhydrous Ammonia
AMM1000
Storage Incompatibilities: Include acids; strong oxidants; interhalogens; chlorine or chlorine bleach; boron halides; 1,2-dichloroethane; ethylene oxide; chloroformamidnium nitrate; oxygen + platinum; magnesium perchlorate; nitrogen trichloride; heavy metals and their compounds; chlorine azide; bromine; iodine; iodine + potassium; tellurium halides; pentaborane; silver compounds; hypochlorites; air + hydrocarbons; germanium derivatives; stibine; 1-chloro-2,4dinitrobenzene; ethanol + silver nitrate; 2-, or 4-chloronitrobenzene; acetaldehyde; acrolein; boron; chlorosilane; hexachloromelamine; sulfur; hydrazine + alkali metals; potassium ferricyanide; potassium mercuric cyanide; nitrogen dioxide; phosphorus pentoxide; tetramethylammonium amide. Hazardous Decomposition Products: Thermal oxidative decomposition of anhydrous ammonia can produce fumes of ammonia and nitrogen oxides (NOx).
Section 11 - Toxicological Information

Acute Oral Effects: Rat, oral, LD50: 350 mg/kg. Man, oral, TDLo: 15 L/kg, caused changes in structure/function of esophagus. Acute Inhalation Effects: Rat, inhalation, LC50: 2000 ppm/4 hr. Human, inhalation, TCLo: 20 ppm, caused ulcerated nasal septum, conjunctive irritation, structural/functional change in trachea. Human, inhalation, LCLo: 5000 ppm/5 min. Other Effects: 3 Rat, inhalation: 19800 mg/m /16 weeks. Multiple Dose Toxicity Effects - Rat, inhalation, 300 ppm/6 hr/5 days, intermittently, caused other changes in blood, other degenerative changes in brain and coverings. Genetic Effects - Bacteria - E. Coli, 1500 ppm/3 hr resulted in mutations (-S9). Tumorigenicity - Rat, oral, 1680 g/kg/24 weeks, continuously, resulted in gastrointestinal tumors.
See NIOSH, RTECS BO0875000, for additional data.
Section 12 - Ecological Information

Environmental Fate: Anhydrous ammonia has a very high vapor pressure and will rapidly evaporate from water and soil. In surface water, it may sorb to suspended sediments provided that conditions are oxidizing. Ammonia does not bioconcentrate. Biological nitrification (conversion to nitrate) will rapidly occur in soil and water under aerobic conditions. In the atmosphere, ammonia will rapidly combine with sulfate ion and be removed via wet deposition, though some may be oxidized to nitrogen oxides (NOx) and nitrate (NO3), contributing to rainfall acidity. Ecotoxicity: Crayfish, LC100=80 ppm/3 days; fathead minnow, TLm=8.2 ppm/96 hr; goldfish/yellow perch, LC60=2.0-2.5 ppm/1-4 day. 3 Henry's Law Constant: 0.76 atm-m /mole Octanol/Water Partition Coefficient: log Kow = -1.14
Section 13 - Disposal Considerations

Disposal: Contact your supplier or a licensed contractor for detailed recommendations. Consider dilution with water, cautious neutralization with hydrochloric acid (HCl), and discharge to sewer. Follow applicable Federal, state, and local regulations.
Section 14 - Transport Information

DOT Transportation Data (49 CFR 172.101):
Shipping Name: Ammonia, anhydrous Hazard Class: 2.3; 2.2 ID No.: UN1005 Packing Group: Label: POISON GAS, CORROSIVE MATERIAL; NONFLAMMABLE GAS
Section 15 - Regulatory Information

EPA Regulations: RCRA 40 CFR: Not listed CERCLA 40 CFR 302.4: Listed per CWA Section 311(b)(4) 100 lb (45.35 kg) SARA 40 CFR 372.65: Listed SARA EHS 40 CFR 355: Listed RQ: 100 lb TPQ: 500 lb
Page 4 of 5
2003-02
TSCA: Listed
Anhydrous Ammonia
AMM1000
Section 16 - Other Information

Disclaimer: Judgments as to the suitability of information herein for the purchasers purposes are necessarily the purchasers responsibility. Although reasonable care has been taken in the preparation of such information, Genium Publishing Corporation extends no warranties, makes no representations, and assumes no responsibility as to the accuracy or suitability of such information for application to the purchasers intended purpose or for consequences of its use.
Page 5 of 5
NFPA RATING
FLAMMABILITY
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET

Prepared
4
HEALTH
to U.S. OSHA, CMA, ANSI and Canadian WHMIS Standards

4
REACTIVITY
OTHER
PART I
What is the material and what do I need to know in an emergency? 1. PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION
CHEMICAL NAME; CLASS: PRODUCT USE: SUPPLIER/MANUFACTURER'S NAME: ADDRESS:
HYDROGEN SULFIDE - H2S Document Number: 001029

For general analytical/synthetic chemical uses. AIRGAS INC. 259 N. Radnor-Chester Road Suite 100 Radnor, PA 19087-5283 1-610-687-5253 1-800-949-7937 International: 423-479-0293 May 20, 1996 February 3, 2001
BUSINESS PHONE: EMERGENCY PHONE: DATE OF PREPARATION: REVISION DATE:
2. COMPOSITION and INFORMATION ON INGREDIENTS

CHEMICAL NAME CAS # mole % ACGIH TLV ppm Hydrogen Sulfide 7783-06-4 > 99.0% 10 STEL ppm 15 PEL ppm 20 C 10 (Vacated 1989 PEL) EXPOSURE LIMITS IN AIR OSHA STEL ppm 50 ppm (10 minute maximum peak) 15 (Vacated 1989 PEL) Maximum Impurities < 1.0% IDLH ppm 100 NIOSH REL: 10 ppm C (10 minutes) DFG-MAK: 10 ppm OTHER
None of the trace impurities in this mixture contribute significantly to the hazards associated with the product. All hazard information pertinent to this product has been provided in this Material Safety Data Sheet, per the requirements of the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) and State equivalent standards. See Section 16 for Definitions of Terms Used
NE = Not Established
C = Ceiling Limit
NOTE: All WHMIS required information is included. It is located in appropriate sections based on the ANSI Z400.1-1993 format.
HYDROGEN SULFIDE - H2S MSDS (Document # 001029) PAGE 1 OF 9
3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION EMERGENCY OVERVIEW:

Hydrogen Sulfide is a toxic, flammable gas and has a distinct rotten-egg smell. Hydrogen Sulfide is a colorless liquid which rapidly turns into a gas at standard atmospheric temperatures and pressures. Inhalation of high concentrations of this gas can result in unconsciousness, coma, and death. Contact with rapidly expanding gases, or contact with the liquid, may cause frostbite. Both the liquid and gas pose a serious fire hazard when accidentally released. The gas is heavier than air and may spread long distances. Distant ignition and flashback are possible. Flame or high temperature impinging on a localized area of the cylinder of Hydrogen Sulfide can cause the cylinder to rupture without activating the cylinders relief devices. Provide adequate fire protection during emergency response situations.
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL INFORMATION SYSTEM
SYMPTOMS OF OVEREXPOSURE BY ROUTE OF EXPOSURE: The most significant route of overexposure for Hydrogen Sulfide is by inhalation. The following paragraphs describe symptoms of exposure by route of exposure. INHALATION: Inhalation of high concentrations of Hydrogen Sulfide can cause dizziness, headache, and nausea. Exposure to higher concentrations can result in respiratory arrest, coma, or unconsciousness. Exposure for more than 30 minutes at concentrations of greater than 600 ppm have been fatal. Continuous inhalation of low concentrations may cause olfactory fatigue, so that the odor is no longer an effective warning of the presence of Hydrogen Sulfide. A summary of exposure concentrations and observed effects are as follows:
CONCENTRATION
0.3-30 ppm: 50 ppm: Slightly higher than 50 ppm: 100-150 ppm: 200-250 ppm:
HEALTH FLAMMABILITY REACTIVITY
(BLUE)
(RED)
(YELLOW)
EXPOSURE SYMPTOM
Odor is obvious and unpleasant. Eye irritation. Dryness and irritation of nose, throat. Irritation of the respiratory system. Temporary loss of smell. Headache, vomiting nausea. Prolonged exposure may lead to lung damage. Exposures of 4-8 hours can be fatal. Swifter onset of symptoms. Death occurs in 1-4 hours. Headache, excitement, staggering, stomach after brief exposure. Death occurs from 0.5 - 1 hour. Rapid onset of unconsciousness, coma, death. Immediate respiratory arrest.
PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT D
EYES RESPIRATORY HANDS BODY
300-500: 500 ppm: > 600 ppm: > 1000 ppm:
See Section 8
For routine industrial applications
See Section 8
See Section 16 for Definition of Ratings Severe exposures which do not result in death may cause long-term symptoms such as memory loss, paralysis of facial muscles, or nerve tissue damage.
SKIN and EYE CONTACT: The gas may be irritating to the skin. Inflammation and irritation of the eyes can occur at very low airborne concentration (less than 10 ppm). Exposure over several hours may result in gas eyes or sore eyes with symptoms of scratchiness, irritation, tearing and burning. Above 50 ppm, there is an intense tearing, blurring of vision, and pain when looking at light. Exposed individuals may see rings around bright lights. Most symptoms disappear when exposure ceases. However, in serious cases, the eyes can be permanently damaged. OTHER POTENTIAL HEALTH EFFECTS: Contact with liquid or rapidly expanding gases (which are released under high pressure) may cause frostbite. Symptoms of frostbite include change in skin color to white or grayish-yellow. The pain after such contact can quickly subside. HEALTH EFFECTS OR RISKS FROM EXPOSURE: An Explanation in Lay Terms. Overexposure to Hydrogen Sulfide may cause the following health effects: ACUTE: Hydrogen Sulfide is irritating to the skin and eyes. Inhalation of high concentrations of Hydrogen Sulfide can cause dizziness, headache, and nausea. Exposure to higher concentrations can result in respiratory arrest, coma, or unconsciousness, and death. Contact with liquid or rapidly expanding gases may cause frostbite. CHRONIC: Severe exposures which do not result in death may cause long-term symptoms such as memory loss, paralysis of facial muscles, or nerve tissue damage. Chronic overexposure may cause permanent eye damage. TARGET ORGANS: Respiratory system, skin, eyes, central nervous system.
PART II
What should I do if a hazardous situation occurs? 4. FIRST-AID MEASURES
RESCUERS SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO RETRIEVE VICTIMS OF EXPOSURE TO HYDROGEN SULFIDE WITHOUT ADEQUATE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT. At a minimum, SelfContained Breathing Apparatus and gloves should be worn. Under some response circumstances, Fire-Retardant Personal Protective equipment may be necessary. Adequate fire protection must be provided during rescue situations.
Remove victim(s) to fresh air as quickly as possible. Trained personnel should administer supplemental oxygen and/or cardio-pulmonary resuscitation, if necessary. Only trained personnel should administer supplemental oxygen. In case of frostbite, place the frostbitten part in warm water. DO NOT USE HOT WATER. If warm water is not available, or is impractical to use, wrap the affected parts gently in blankets. Alternatively, if the fingers or hands are frostbitten, place the affected area in the armpit. Encourage victim to gently exercise the affected part while being warmed. Seek immediate medical attention. SKIN EXPOSURE: If liquid is spilled on skin, or if irritation of the skin develops after exposure to liquid or gas, immediately begin decontamination with running water. Minimum flushing is for 15 minutes. Remove exposed or contaminated clothing, taking care not to contaminate eyes. Victim must seek immediate medical attention. EYE EXPOSURE: If liquid is splashed into eyes, or if irritation of the eye develops after exposure to liquid or gas, open victim's eyes while under gentle running water. Use sufficient force to open eyelids. Have victim "roll" eyes. Minimum flushing is for 15 minutes. Victim(s) must be taken for medical attention. Rescuers should be taken for medical attention, if necessary. Take copy of label and MSDS to physician or other health professional with victim(s).
5. FIRE-FIGHTING MEASURES
FLASH POINT: Not applicable. Hydrogen Sulfide is a flammable gas. AUTOIGNITION TEMPERATURE: 260C (500F) FLAMMABLE LIMITS (in air by volume, %): Lower (LEL): 4.0% Upper (UEL): 44.0% FIRE EXTINGUISHING MATERIALS: Extinguish Hydrogen Sulfide fires by shutting-off the source of the gas. Use water spray to cool fire-exposed containers, structures, and equipment. Other appropriate extinguishing media are dry chemical, foam, and carbon dioxide. UNUSUAL FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARDS: Hydrogen Sulfide is a
HEALTH
NFPA RATING
FLAMMABILITY
4 4 0
REACTIVITY
OTHER
flammable, toxic gas and presents an extreme hazard to firefighters. The See Section 16 for Definition of Ratings products of thermal decomposition of this material include water and sulfur dioxide. This gas is heavier than air; it can travel a long distance to a source of ignition and flash back. DANGER! Fires impinging (direct flame) on the outside surface of unprotected pressure storage vessels of Hydrogen Sulfide can be very dangerous. Direct flame exposure on the cylinder wall can cause cylinder failure. For massive fires in large areas, use unmanned hose. Explosion Sensitivity to Mechanical Impact: Not sensitive. Explosion Sensitivity to Static Discharge: Static discharge may cause Hydrogen Sulfide to ignite explosively. SPECIAL FIRE-FIGHTING PROCEDURES: Structural firefighters must wear Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus and full protective equipment. The best fire-fighting technique may be simply to let the burning gas escape from the pressurized cylinder, tank car, or pipeline. Stop the leak before extinguishing fire. If the fire is extinguished before the leak is sealed, the leaking gas could explosively re-ignite without warning and cause extensive damage, injury, or fatality. In this case, increase ventilation (in enclosed areas) to prevent flammable mixture formation. If water is not available for cooling or protection of vessel exposures, evacuate the area. Refer to the North American Emergency Response Guidebook (Guide #117) for additional information.
6. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES

SPILL AND LEAK RESPONSE: Uncontrolled releases should be responded to by trained personnel using pre-planned procedures. Proper protective equipment should be used. In case of a release, clear the affected area, protect people, and respond with trained personnel. Adequate fire protection must be provided. Minimum Personal Protective Equipment should be Level B: fire-retardant protective clothing, mechanical resistant gloves and Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus. Use only non-sparking tools and equipment. Locate and seal the source of the leaking gas. Protect personnel attempting the shut-off with water-spray. Allow the gas to dissipate. Monitor the surrounding area for levels of combustible gas, Hydrogen Sulfide, and oxygen. Combustible gas concentration must be below 10% of the LEL (LEL = 4.0%) prior to entry. A colorimetric tube is available for Hydrogen Sulfide. If a colorimetric tube is used to indicate the concentration of Hydrogen Sulfide, the reading obtained should be lower than the limits indicated in Section 2 (Composition and Information on Ingredients). The atmosphere must have at least 19.5 percent oxygen before personnel can be allowed in the area without Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA). Attempt to close the main source valve prior to entering the area. If this does not stop the release (or if it is not possible to reach the valve), allow the gas to release in place or remove it to a safe area and allow the gas to be released there. THIS IS AN EXTREMELY FLAMMABLE, TOXIC GAS. Protection of all personnel and the area must be maintained.
PART II
What should I do if a hazardous situation occurs? 7. HANDLING and STORAGE
WORK PRACTICES AND HYGIENE PRACTICES: As with all chemicals, avoid getting Hydrogen Sulfide IN YOU. Do not eat or drink while handling chemicals. Be aware of any signs of effects of exposure indicated in Section 3 (Hazard Identification); exposures to fatal concentrations of Hydrogen Sulfide could occur rapidly. Working alone with Hydrogen Sulfide should be avoided when possible. All work operations should be monitored in such a way that emergency personnel can be immediately contacted in the event of a release. STORAGE AND HANDLING PRACTICES: Cylinders should be stored in dry, well-ventilated areas away from sources of heat. Compressed gases can present significant safety hazards. Store containers away from heavily trafficked areas and emergency exits. Post No Smoking or Open Flames signs in storage or use areas. Store Hydrogen Sulfide cylinders away from incompatible materials, such as strong oxidizers, metals, and metal oxides. SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS FOR HANDLING GAS CYLINDERS: Protect cylinders against physical damage. Store in cool, dry, well-ventilated area, away from sources of heat, ignition and direct sunlight. Do not allow area where cylinders are stored to exceed 52C (125F). Use a check valve or trap in the discharge line to prevent hazardous backflow. Post No Smoking or Open Flame signs in storage and use areas. Cylinders should be stored upright and be firmly secured to prevent falling or being knocked over. Cylinders can be stored in the open, but in such cases, should be protected against extremes of weather and from the dampness of the ground to prevent rusting. Never tamper with pressure relief devices in valves and cylinders. Electrical equipment should be non-sparking or explosion proof. The following rules are applicable to situations in which cylinders are being used: Before Use: Move cylinders with a suitable hand truck. Do not drag, slide, or roll cylinders. Do not drop cylinders or permit them to strike each other. Secure cylinders firmly. Leave the valve protection cap, if provided, in-place until cylinder is ready for use. During Use: Use designated CGA fittings and other support equipment. Do not use adapters. Do not heat cylinder by any means to increase the discharge rate of the product from the cylinder. Use check valve or trap in discharge line to prevent hazardous backflow into the cylinder. Do not use oils or grease on gas-handling fittings or equipment. After Use: Close main cylinder valve. Replace valve protection cap, if provided. Mark empty cylinders EMPTY. NOTE: Use only DOT or ASME code containers. Earth-ground and bond all lines and equipment associated with Hydrogen Sulfide. Close valve after each use and when empty. Cylinders must not be recharged except by or with the consent of owner. For additional information refer to the Compressed Gas Association Pamphlet P-1, Safe Handling of Compressed Gases in Containers. Additionally, refer to CGA Bulletin SB-2 Oxygen Deficient Atmospheres and CGA Pamphlet G-12, Hydrogen Sulfide. PROTECTIVE PRACTICES DURING MAINTENANCE OF CONTAMINATED EQUIPMENT: Follow practices indicated in Section 6 (Accidental Release Measures). Make certain application equipment is locked and tagged-out safely. Purge gas handling equipment with inert gas (e.g. nitrogen) before attempting repairs.
8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS - PERSONAL PROTECTION

VENTILATION AND ENGINEERING CONTROLS: Use with adequate ventilation. Local exhaust ventilation is preferred, because it prevents Hydrogen Sulfide dispersion into the work place by eliminating it at its source. If appropriate, install automatic monitoring equipment to detect the level of Hydrogen Sulfide, the presence of potentially explosive air-gas mixtures, and oxygen. Eye wash stations/safety showers should be near areas where Hydrogen Sulfide is used or stored. RESPIRATORY PROTECTION: Maintain Hydrogen Sulfide levels below the exposure limits provided in Section 2 (Composition and Information on Ingredients) and oxygen levels above 19.5% in the workplace. Use supplied air respiratory protection during emergency response to a release of Hydrogen Sulfide. If respiratory protection is required, follow the requirements of the Federal OSHA Respiratory Protection Standard (29 CFR 1910.134), or equivalent State standards. The following NIOSH respiratory protection recommendations for Hydrogen Sulfide are provided for additional information. CONCENTRATION of HYDROGEN SULFIDE Up to 100 ppm: RESPIRATORY EQUIPMENT
Powered air-purifying respirator with cartridge(s) to protect against Hydrogen Sulfide, gas mask with canister to protect against Hydrogen Sulfide, Supplied Air Respirator (SAR), or full-facepiece Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA). Emergency or Planned Entry into Unknown Concentration or IDLH Conditions: Positive pressure, full-facepiece SCBA or positive pressure, full-facepiece SAR with an auxiliary positive pressure SCBA. Escape: Gas mask with canister to protect against Hydrogen Sulfide or escape-type SCBA The IDLH concentration for Hydrogen Sulfide is 100 ppm. EYE PROTECTION: Splash goggles or safety glasses, for protection from rapidly expanding gases and splashes of Liquid Hydrogen Sulfide. Additionally, face-shields should be worn if there is a potential for contact with liquid Hydrogen Sulfide. HAND PROTECTION: Wear mechanical resistant gloves when handling cylinders of Hydrogen Sulfide. Wear chemical resistant gloves when using this gas. Butyl rubber, chlorinated polyethylene, neoprene nitrile, and polyvinyl rubber are recommended. BODY PROTECTION: Use body protection appropriate for task. Coveralls may be appropriate if splashes from the liquefied gas are anticipated. Transfer of large quantities under pressure may require protective equipment appropriate to protect employees from splashes of liquefied product, as well as fire retardant items.
9. PHYSICAL and CHEMICAL PROPERTIES

VAPOR DENSITY: 1.406 kg/m (0.0878 lb/ft3) pH: Not applicable. SPECIFIC GRAVITY ( air = 1): 1.188 FREEZING POINT: -85.5C (-122.0F) SOLUBILITY IN WATER: Soluble. BOILING POINT @ 1 atm: -60.3C (-76.6F) EVAPORATION RATE (nBuAc = 1): Not applicable. EXPANSION RATIO: Not applicable ODOR THRESHOLD: 0.13-100 ppm. VAPOR PRESSURE (psia): 266.7 SPECIFIC VOLUME (ft3/lb): 11.2 COEFFICIENT WATER/OIL DISTRIBUTION: Not applicable. APPEARANCE AND COLOR: Colorless gas. The liquid is also colorless. The odor for both the liquid and gas is similar to that of rotten eggs. HOW TO DETECT THIS SUBSTANCE (warning properties): Continuous inhalation of low concentrations may cause olfactory fatigue, so that there are no distinct warning properties. In terms of leak detection, fittings and joints can be painted with a soap solution to detect leaks, which will be indicated by a bubble formation. Wet lead acetate paper can be used for leak detection. The paper turns black in the presence of Hydrogen Sulfide. Cadmium Chloride solutions can also be used. The solution will turn yellow upon contact with Hydrogen Sulfide.
3
10. STABILITY and REACTIVITY

STABILITY: Stable. DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS: Water, sulfur dioxide. MATERIALS WITH WHICH SUBSTANCE IS INCOMPATIBLE: Hydrogen Sulfide is not compatible with the following materials: oxidizing agents, organic peroxides, alkaline materials, metals (e.g., copper, lead), and metal oxides. Hydrogen Sulfide is corrosive to most metals, because it reacts with these substances to form metal sulfides. HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION: Will not occur. CONDITIONS TO AVOID: Contact with incompatible materials and exposure to heat, sparks and other sources of ignition Avoid exposing cylinders to extremely high temperatures, which could cause the cylinders to rupture.
PART III
How can I prevent hazardous situations from occurring? 11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION
TOXICITY DATA: The following information is for Hydrogen Sulfide.

LCLo (inhalation, human) = 600 ppm/30 minutes LDLo (inhalation, man) = 5.7 mg/kg; central nervous system, pulmonary effects LCLo (inhalation, human) = 800 ppm/5 minutes LC50 (inhalation, rat) = 444 ppm TCLo (inhalation, rat) = 20 ppm (female, 6-22 days post), reproductive effects LC50 (inhalation, mouse) = 634 ppm/1 hour LCLo (inhalation, mammal) = 800 ppm/5 minutes
SUSPECTED CANCER AGENT: Hydrogen Sulfide is not found on the following lists: FEDERAL OSHA Z LIST, NTP, IARC, CAL/OSHA, and therefore is neither considered to be nor suspected to be a cancer-causing agent by these agencies. IRRITANCY OF PRODUCT: Hydrogen Sulfide is severely irritating to the eyes, and may be mildly to severely irritating to the skin. SENSITIZATION TO THE PRODUCT: Hydrogen Sulfide is not known to cause sensitization in humans with prolonged or repeated contact. REPRODUCTIVE TOXICITY INFORMATION: Listed below is information concerning the effects of Hydrogen Sulfide and its components on the human reproductive system. Mutagenicity: No mutagenicity effects for humans have been described for Hydrogen Sulfide. Embryotoxicity: No embryotoxic effects for humans have been described for Hydrogen Sulfide. Teratogenicity: No teratogenic effects for humans have been described for Hydrogen Sulfide. Reproductive Toxicity: No reproductive toxicity effects for humans have been described for Hydrogen Sulfide. Animal reproductive data are available for Hydrogen Sulfide; these data were obtained during clinical studies on specific animal tissues exposed to this compound. A mutagen is a chemical which causes permanent changes to genetic material (DNA) such that the changes will propagate through generation lines. An embryotoxin is a chemical which causes damage to a developing embryo (i.e. within the first eight weeks of pregnancy in humans), but the damage does not propagate across generational lines. A teratogen is a chemical which causes damage to a developing fetus, but the damage does not propagate across generational lines. A reproductive toxin is any substance which interferes in any way with the reproductive process. MEDICAL CONDITIONS AGGRAVATED BY EXPOSURE: Conditions relating to the target organs may be aggravated by overexposures to Hydrogen Sulfide. See Section 3 (Hazard Identification) for information on these conditions. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PHYSICIANS: Administer oxygen, if necessary. Treat symptoms and eliminate exposure. Be observant for initial signs of pulmonary edema. BIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE INDICES (BEIs): Hydrogen Sulfide. Currently, Biological Exposure Indices (BEIs) are not applicable for
12. ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION

ENVIRONMENTAL STABILITY: This gas will be dissipated rapidly in well-ventilated areas. Additional environmental data are available for Hydrogen Sulfide as follows:
HYDROGEN SULFIDE: Water Solubility = 1 g/242 mL at 20C
EFFECT OF MATERIAL ON PLANTS or ANIMALS: Any adverse effect on animals would be related to oxygen-deficient environments, respiratory system damage, and central nervous system effects. See Section 11 (Toxicological Information) for additional information on the effects on animals. Additional information on the effects of Hydrogen Sulfide on plants are available as follows:
Continuous fumigation of plants with 300 or 3000 ppb Hydrogen Sulfide caused leaf lesions, defoliation, and reduced growth with severity of injury correlated to dose. At higher (3.25 and 5.03 ppm) Hydrogen Sulfide, significant reductions in leaf CO2 and water vapor exchanges occurred, and stomatal openings were depressed. When Hydrogen Sulfide gas was applied to 29 species of green plants for 5 hours, young, rapidly elongating tissues were more sensitive to injury than older tissues. Symptoms included scorching of young shoots and leaves, basal and marginal scorching of older leaves. Mature leaves were unaffected. Seeds exposed to Hydrogen Sulfide gas showed delay in germination.
EFFECT OF CHEMICAL ON AQUATIC LIFE: Hydrogen Sulfide is soluble in water and is toxic to terrestrial life. Therefore, all work practices should be aimed at eliminating contamination of aquatic environments with Hydrogen Sulfide. Additional information on effects of Hydrogen Sulfide on aquatic life are as follows on the next page:
12. ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION (Continued)

EFFECT OF CHEMICAL ON AQUATIC LIFE:
TLm (Asellussp) = 0.111 mg/L/96 hour TLm (Cranfgonyx sp) =1.07 mg/L/96 hour TLm (Gammarrus) = 0.84 mg/L/96 hour 3 LC50 (fly inhalation) = 380 mg/m /960 minutes 3 LC50 (fly inhalation) = 1500 mg/m /7 minutes TLm (Lepomis macrochirus, bluegill sunfish) = 0.0478 mg/L/96 hour TLm (Lepomis macrochirus, bluegill sunfish) = 0.0448 mg/L/96 hour at 21-22 EC TLm (Pimephlaes promelas, fathead minnow) = 0.0071-0.55 mg/L/96 hour TLm (Salvenilis foninalis, brook trout) = 0.0160-0.515 mg/L/96 hour at 6-12.5 EC LC50 (goldfish, Carassius auratus) = 51-95 mg/L, flow-through test, varied oxygen, 96 hours LC50 (white suckers, Catastonius commersonii) = 0.018-0.034 mg/L, 24120 hours, flow-through test LC50 (northern pike, Esox lucius) = 0.0260.159 mg/L, 96-24 hours, flow-through test LC50 (walleye, Stizostedion vitreum) = 0.0070.020 mg/L, 72-96 hours, flow-through test LC50 (bluegill, Lepomis macrochirus) = 0.0090-0.032 mg/L, 96 hours, temperatures 8-22C
13. DISPOSAL CONSIDERATIONS

PREPARING WASTES FOR DISPOSAL: Product removed from the cylinder must be disposed of in accordance with appropriate Federal, State, and local regulations. Return cylinders with residual product to Airgas. Do not dispose locally.
14. TRANSPORTATION INFORMATION

THIS MATERIAL IS HAZARDOUS AS DEFINED BY 49 CFR 172.101 BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. PROPER SHIPPING NAME: Hydrogen sulfide, liquefied HAZARD CLASS NUMBER and DESCRIPTION: 2.3 (Poison Gas) UN 1053 UN IDENTIFICATION NUMBER: PACKING GROUP: Not Applicable Poison Gas, Flammable Gas DOT LABEL(S) REQUIRED: NORTH AMERICAN EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDEBOOK NUMBER (2000): 117 SPECIAL PROVISION: Hydrogen Sulfide is poisonous by inhalation. Shipments must be properly described as inhalation hazards. ZONE B. MARINE POLLUTANT: Hydrogen Sulfide is not classified by the DOT as a Marine Pollutant (as defined by 49 CFR 172.101, Appendix B). TRANSPORT CANADA TRANSPORTATION OF DANGEROUS GOODS REGULATIONS: THIS MATERIAL IS CONSIDERED AS DANGEROUS GOODS. Use the above information for the preparation of Canadian Shipments. Note: There is an alternative shipping name spelling for Canadian shipments: Hydrogen Sulphide.
15. REGULATORY INFORMATION

U.S. SARA REPORTING REQUIREMENTS: Hydrogen Sulfide is subject to the reporting requirements of Sections 302, 304 and 313 of Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, as follows: CHEMICAL NAME Hydrogen Sulfide SARA 302 (40 CFR 355, Appendix A) YES SARA 304 (40 CFR Table 302.4) YES SARA 313 (40 CFR 372.65) YES
U.S. SARA THRESHOLD PLANNING QUANTITY: Hydrogen Sulfide = 500 lb. U.S. CERCLA REPORTABLE QUANTITY (RQ): Hydrogen Sulfide CERCLA RQ = 100 lb; Hydrogen Sulfide EHS (Extremely Hazardous Substance) RQ = 100 lb; Hydrogen Sulfide RCRA Code = U135. CANADIAN DSL/NDSL INVENTORY STATUS: Hydrogen Sulfide is on the DSL Inventory. U.S. TSCA INVENTORY STATUS: Hydrogen Sulfide is listed on the TSCA Inventory. OTHER U.S. FEDERAL REGULATIONS: Hydrogen Sulfide is subject to the reporting requirements of Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act. The Threshold Quantity for this gas is 10,000 lb. Compliance with the OSHA Process Safety Standard (29 CFR 1910.119) may be applicable to operations involving the use of Hydrogen Sulfide. Under this regulation Hydrogen Sulfide is listed in Appendix A. The Threshold Quantity of Hydrogen Sulfide under this regulation is 1500 lb.
15. REGULATORY INFORMATION (Continued)

U.S. STATE REGULATORY INFORMATION: Hydrogen Sulfide is covered under specific State regulations, as denoted below:
Alaska - Designated Toxic and Hazardous Substances: Hydrogen Sulfide. California - Permissible Exposure Limits for Chemical Contaminants: Hydrogen Sulfide. Florida - Substance List: Hydrogen Sulfide. Illinois - Toxic Substance List: Hydrogen Sulfide. Kansas - Section 302/313 List: Hydrogen Sulfide. Massachusetts - Substance List: Hydrogen Sulfide. Michigan - Critical Materials Register: Hydrogen Sulfide. Minnesota - List of Hazardous Substances: Hydrogen Sulfide. Missouri - Employer Information/Toxic Substance List: Hydrogen Sulfide. New Jersey - Right to Know Hazardous Substance List: Hydrogen Sulfide. North Dakota - List of Hazardous Chemicals, Reportable Quantities: Hydrogen Sulfide. Pennsylvania - Hazardous Substance List: Hydrogen Sulfide. Rhode Island - Hazardous Substance List: Hydrogen Sulfide. Texas - Hazardous Substance List: Hydrogen Sulfide. West Virginia - Hazardous Substance List: Hydrogen Sulfide. Wisconsin - Toxic and Hazardous Substances: Hydrogen Sulfide.
CALIFORNIA SAFE DRINKING WATER AND TOXIC ENFORCEMENT ACT (PROPOSITION 65): Hydrogen Sulfide is not on the California Proposition 65 lists. LABELING: DANGER: POISONOUS, FLAMMABLE LIQUID AND GAS UNDER PRESSURE. MAY BE FATAL IF INHALED. CAN FORM EXPLOSIVE MIXTURES WITH AIR. MAY CAUSE RESPIRATORY TRACT AND CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM DAMAGE. CAN CAUSE EYE IRRITATION. GAS DEADENS SENSE OF SMELL. SYMPTOMS MAY BE DELAYED. ROTTEN EGGS. Do not breath gas. Do not depend on odor to detect presence of gas. Store and use with adequate ventilation, and use in closed systems. Keep away from heat, flames, and sparks. Avoid contact with eyes. Cylinder temperature should not exceed 52C (125F). Close valve after each use and when empty. Use in accordance with the Material Safety Data Sheet.
ODOR:
POISON CALL A PHYSICIAN
FIRST AID:
IF INHALED, remove to fresh air. If not breathing, give artificial respiration. If breathing is difficult, give oxygen. Call a physician, even if no symptoms are present. Keep under medical observation. Symptoms may be delayed. IN CASE OF CONTACT, immediately flush eyes or skin with water for at least 15 minutes while removing contaminated clothing and shoes. Call a physician. DO NOT REMOVE THIS PRODUCT LABEL.
CANADIAN WHMIS SYMBOLS:
Class A: Compressed Gas Class B1: Flammable Gas Class D1A: Toxic Material/Immediate and Serious Effects Class D2B: Other Toxic Effects
16. OTHER INFORMATION PREPARED BY: Airgas - SAFECOR
The information contained herein is based on data considered accurate. However, no warranty is expressed or implied regarding the accuracy of these data or the results to be obtained from the use thereof. AIRGAS, Inc. assumes no responsibility for injury to the vendee or third persons proximately caused by the material if reasonable safety procedures are not adhered to as stipulated in the data sheet. Additionally, AIRGAS, Inc. assumes no responsibility for injury to vendee or third persons proximately caused by abnormal use of the material even if reasonable safety procedures are followed. Furthermore, vendee assumes the risk in his use of the material.
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
A large number of abbreviations and acronyms appear on a MSDS. Some of these which are commonly used include the following:
CAS #: This is the Chemical Abstract Service Number which uniquely identifies each constituent. It is used for computer-related searching. EXPOSURE LIMITS IN AIR: ACGIH - American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, a professional association which establishes exposure limits. TLV Threshold Limit Value - an airborne concentration of a substance which represents conditions under which it is generally believed that nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed without adverse effect. The duration must be considered, including the 8-hour Time Weighted Average (TWA), the 15-minute Short Term Exposure Limit, and the instantaneous Ceiling Level (C). Skin absorption effects must also be considered. OSHA - U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. PEL Permissible Exposure Limit - This exposure value means exactly the same as a TLV, except that it is enforceable by OSHA. The OSHA Permissible Exposure Limits are based in the 1989 PELs and the June, 1993 Air Contaminants Rule (Federal Register: 58: 35338-35351 and 58: 40191). Both the current PELs and the vacated PELs are indicated. The phrase, Vacated 1989 PEL, is placed next to the PEL which was vacated by Court Order. IDLH - Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health - This level represents a concentration from which one can escape within 30-minutes without suffering escape-preventing or permanent injury. The DFG - MAK is the Republic of Germanys Maximum Exposure Level, similar to the U.S. PEL. NIOSH is the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, which is the research arm of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). NIOSH issues exposure guidelines called Recommended Exposure Levels (RELs). When no exposure guidelines are established, an entry of NE is made for reference. HAZARD RATINGS: HAZARDOUS MATERIALS IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM: Health Hazard: 0 (minimal acute or chronic exposure hazard); 1 (slight acute or chronic exposure hazard); 2 (moderate acute or significant chronic exposure hazard); 3 (severe acute exposure hazard; onetime overexposure can result in permanent injury and may be fatal); 4 (extreme acute exposure hazard; onetime overexposure can be fatal). Flammability Hazard: 0 (minimal hazard); 1 (materials that require substantial pre-heating before burning); 2 (combustible liquid or solids; liquids with a flash point of 38-93C [100200F]); 3 (Class IB and IC flammable liquids with flash points below 38C [100F]); 4 (Class IA flammable liquids with flash points below 23C [73F] and boiling points below 38C [100F]. Reactivity Hazard: 0 (normally stable); 1 (material that can become unstable at elevated temperatures or which can react slightly with water); 2 (materials that are unstable but do not detonate or which can react violently with water); 3 (materials that can detonate when initiated or which can react explosively with water); 4 (materials that can detonate at normal temperatures or pressures). NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION: Health Hazard: 0 (material that on exposure under fire conditions would offer no hazard beyond that of ordinary combustible materials); 1 (materials that on exposure under fire conditions could cause irritation or minor residual injury); 2 (materials that on intense or continued exposure under fire conditions could cause temporary incapacitation or possible residual injury); 3 (materials that can on short exposure could cause serious temporary or residual injury); 4 (materials that under very short exposure causes death or major residual injury). NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (Continued): Flammability Hazard and Reactivity Hazard: Refer to definitions for Hazardous Materials Identification System. FLAMMABILITY LIMITS IN AIR: Much of the information related to fire and explosion is derived from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Flash Point - Minimum temperature at which a liquid gives off sufficient vapors to form an ignitable mixture with air. Autoignition Temperature: The minimum temperature required to initiate combustion in air with no other source of ignition. LEL the lowest percent of vapor in air, by volume, that will explode or ignite in the presence of an ignition source. UEL - the highest percent of vapor in air, by volume, that will explode or ignite in the presence of an ignition source. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION: Possible health hazards as derived from human data, animal studies, or from the results of studies with similar compounds are presented. Definitions of some terms used in this section are: LD50 - Lethal Dose (solids & liquids) which kills 50% of the exposed animals; LC50 - Lethal Concentration (gases) which kills 50% of the exposed animals; ppm concentration expressed in parts of material per million parts of air or water; mg/m3 concentration expressed in weight of substance per volume of air; mg/kg quantity of material, by weight, administered to a test subject, based on their body weight in kg. Data from several sources are used to evaluate the cancer-causing potential of the material. The sources are: IARC - the International Agency for Research on Cancer; NTP - the National Toxicology Program, RTECS - the Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances, OSHA and CAL/OSHA. IARC and NTP rate chemicals on a scale of decreasing potential to cause human cancer with rankings from 1 to 4. Subrankings (2A, 2B, etc.) are also used. Other measures of toxicity include TDLo, the lowest dose to cause a symptom and TCLo the lowest concentration to cause a symptom; TDo, LDLo, and LDo, or TC, TCo, LCLo, and LCo, the lowest dose (or concentration) to cause lethal or toxic effects. BEI - Biological Exposure Indices, represent the levels of determinants which are most likely to be observed in specimens collected from a healthy worker who has been exposed to chemicals to the same extent as a worker with inhalation exposure to the TLV. Ecological Information: EC is the effect concentration in water. REGULATORY INFORMATION: This section explains the impact of various laws and regulations on the material. EPA is the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. WHMIS is the Canadian Workplace Hazardous Materials Information System. DOT and TC are the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Transport Canada, respectively. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA); the Canadian Domestic/Non-Domestic Substances List (DSL/NDSL); the U.S. Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA); Marine Pollutant status according to the DOT; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund); and various state regulations.
METHYLDIETHANOLAMINE
Material Safety Data Sheet
ATOFINA Chemicals, Inc. 1 PRODUCT AND COMPANY IDENTIFICATION Organic Chemicals ATOFINA Chemicals, Inc. 2000 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 Information Telephone Numbers Customer Service Product Name Product Synonym(s) Chemical Family Chemical Formula Chemical Name EPA Reg Num Product Use EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS: Chemtrec: (800) 424-9300 (24hrs) or (703) 527-3887 Medical: Rocky Mountain Poison Control Center (303) 623-5716 (24Hrs) Phone Number 1-800-628-4453 METHYLDIETHANOLAMINE MDEA Alkyl Alkanolamine CH3N(C2H4OH)2 Ethanol, 2,2-(Methylimino) bisAvailable Hrs 8:30 to 5:30 EST
2 COMPOSITION / INFORMATION ON INGREDIENTS Ingredient Name Methyldiethanolamine Water CAS RegistryNumber 105-59-9 7732-18-5 Typical Wt. % 99 0.3 OSHA Y N
The substance(s) marked with a "Y" in the OSHA column, are identified as hazardous chemicals according to the criteria of the OSHA Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) This material is classified as hazardous under Federal OSHA regulation. The components of this product are all on the TSCA inventory list. 3 HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION Emergency Overview Pale straw liquid with amine odor WARNING! CAUSES EYE IRRITATION.
Potential Health Effects Skin contact and inhalation are expected to be the primary routes of occupational exposure to this material. Based on single exposure animal tests, it is considered to be severely irritating to the eyes, though practically non-irritating to skin.
Product Code: 002146
Revision: 2
Issued: 16 JUN 2000
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ATOFINA Chemicals, Inc.
FIRST AID MEASURES
IF IN EYES, immediately flush with plenty of water for at least 15 minutes. Get medical attention. IN CASE OF CONTACT, flush the area with plenty of water. Remove material from clothing. Wash clothing before reuse. IF SWALLOWED, induce vomiting as directed by medical personnel. Get medical attention. NEVER GIVE ANYTHING BY MOUTH TO AN UNCONSCIOUS PERSON. IF INHALED, remove to fresh air.
FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES
Fire and Explosive Properties Auto-Ignition Temperature Flash Point Flammable Limits- Upper Lower Extinguishing Media
770 F (410 C) 240 F 8.8 1.4
Flash Point Method
PMCC
Use water spray, carbon dioxide, foam or dry chemical. Fire Fighting Instructions Use water spray. A solid stream of water can cause frothing and spattering. Fire fighters and others who may be exposed to products of combustion should wear full fire fighting turn out gear (full Bunker Gear) and selfcontained breathing apparatus (pressure demand NIOSH approved or equivalent). Fire fighting equipment should be thoroughly decontaminated after use. Fire and Explosion Hazards When burned, the following hazardous products of combustion can occur: Carbon dioxide Carbon monoxide Nitrogen oxides
6 ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES In Case of Spill or Leak Isolate hazard area and deny entry to unnecessary or unprotected personnel. Contain spilled liquid with sand or earth. Clean up spill immediately, observing precautions in the Personal Protection section of MSDS. Avoid runoff into storm sewers and ditches which lead to waterways.
7 HANDLING AND STORAGE
Revision: 2
Issued: 16 JUN 2000
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7 HANDLING AND STORAGE Handling Avoid contact with eyes. Wash thoroughly after handling. Emptied container retains vapor and product residue. Observe all labeled safeguards until container is cleaned, reconditioned or destroyed. Storage This material is not hazardous under normal storage conditions; however, material should be stored in closed containers, in a secure area to prevent container damage and subsequent spillage.
8 EXPOSURE CONTROLS / PERSONAL PROTECTION Engineering Controls Investigate engineering techniques to reduce exposures. Provide ventilation if necessary to minimize exposure. Dilution ventilation is acceptable, but local mechanical exhaust ventilation preferred, if practical, at sources of air contamination such as open process equipment. Eye / Face Protection Where there is potential for eye contact, wear chemical goggles and have eye flushing equipment immediately available. Skin Protection Minimize skin contamination by following good industrial hygiene practice. Wearing rubber gloves is recommended. Wash hands and contaminated skin thoroughly after handling. Respiratory Protection Where airborne exposure is likely, use NIOSH approved respiratory protection equipment appropriate to the material and/or its components. If exposures cannot be kept at a minimum with engineering controls, consult respirator manufacturer to determine appropriate type equipment for a given application. Observe respirator use limitations specified by NIOSH or the manufacturer. For emergency and other conditions where there may be a potential for significant exposure, use an approved full face positive-pressure, self-contained breathing apparatus or positive-pressure airline with auxiliary self-contained air supply. Respiratory protection programs must comply with 29 CFR 1910.134.
Airborne Exposure Guidelines for Ingredients The components of this product have no established Airborne Exposure Guidelines
-Only those components with exposure limits are printed in this section. -Skin contact limits designated with a "Y" above have skin contact effect. Air sampling alone is insufficient to accurately quantitate exposure. Measures to prevent significant cutaneous absorption may be required. -ACGIH Sensitizer designator with a value of "Y" above means that exposure to this material may cause allergic reactions.
Revision: 2
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9 PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES Appearance/Odor pH Specific Gravity Vapor Pressure Vapor Density Melting Point Freezing Point Boiling Point Solubility In Water Evaporation Rate Percent Volatile Molecular Weight Pale straw liquid with amine odor NE 1.04 @ 20 C <0.01 mmHg @ 20 C 4 NA -21 C (-5.8 F) 240-255 C (464-491 F ) Complete NE 100 119.2
10 STABILITY AND REACTIVITY Stability This material is chemically stable under normal and anticipated storage and handling conditions. Hazardous Polymerization Does not occur. Incompatibility Avoid contact with strong acids, strong alkalis, and strong oxidizers. Hazardous Decomposition Products None known.
11 TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION Toxicological Information Data on this material and/or its components are summarized below. Single exposure (acute) studies indicate: Oral - Slightly Toxic to Rats (LD50 4,780 mg/kg) Dermal - Practically Non-toxic to Rabbits (LD50 6,300 mg/kg) Inhalation - Exposure of rats to a saturated vapor (concentration unreported) at ambient temperature for 8 hours produced no deaths Eye Irritation - Severely Irritating to Rabbits (59/110) Skin Irritation - Practically Non-irritating to Rabbits (4-hr exposure, 0.2/8.0) No skin allergy was observed in guinea pigs following repeated skin exposure. No genetic changes were observed in standard tests using bacteria and animals.
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12 ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION Ecotoxicological Information No data are available. Chemical Fate Information No data are available.
13 DISPOSAL CONSIDERATIONS Waste Disposal Incineration is the recommended method for disposal observing all local, state and federal regulations.
14 TRANSPORT INFORMATION DOT Name DOT Technical Name DOT Hazard Class UN Number DOT Packing Group RQ Not Regulated by DOT
PG
15 REGULATORY INFORMATION Hazard Categories Under Criteria of SARA Title IIII Rules (40 CFR Part 370) Immediate (Acute) Health Y Delayed (Chronic) Health N Fire Reactive Sudden Release of Pressure N N N
The components of this product are all on the TSCA inventory list. International Inventory Memo
All ingredients of this product are listed on the following international inventories:
Australia (AICS) Canada (DSL) Europe (EINECS) Japan (ENCS) Korea (ECL) Philippines (PICCS) Ingredient Related Regulatory Information: SARA Reportable Quantities Water Methyldiethanolamine Chemical Weapons Convention
CERCLA RQ NE NE
SARA TPQ
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Issued: 16 JUN 2000
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Chemical Weapons Convention Methyldiethanolamine 16 OTHER INFORMATION
Revision Information Revision Date Supercedes Revision Dated 16 JUN 2000 14-APR-1999 Revision Number 2
Revision Summary The manufacturer has changed its name from Elf Atochem North America, Inc. to ATOFINA Chemicals, Inc. Key NE= Not Established
NA= Not Applicable
(R) = Registered Trademark
ATOFINA Chemicals, Inc. believes that the information and recommendations contained herein (including data and statements) are accurate as of the date hereof. NO WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE, WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, OR ANY OTHER WARRANTY, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, IS MADE CONCERNING THE INFORMATION PROVIDED HEREIN. The information provided herein relates only to the specific product designated and may not be valid where such product is used in combination with any other materials or in any process. Further, since the conditions and methods of use are beyond the control of ATOFINA Chemicals, ATOFINA Chemicals expressly disclaims any and all liability as to any results obtained or arising from any use of the product or reliance on such information.
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APPENDIX E HAZOP Manager PHR Work Sheets
KBR
Project No: 6491 NODE: 1.1
Client: YERP Project: Yanbu Exp Ref Proj - ARU PHR DATE REVIEWED: 8 June, 2007
ITEM: ARU: A. PROCESS STREAMS, CHEMICALS AND CATALYSTS DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS 140-YER-PE-PFD-0001; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0002; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0003; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0004 140-YER-PE-HMB-001 sheets 1 thru 3 TEAM MEMBERS: Frank (Facilitator); Swati Shastri (Scribe); Chad Patel (Office of the Chief Engr); Steve Lehrer (Process Safety); Ashok Hati (); PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM 1 A.1 Have the components in the feed(s), products (including combustion products), intermediates and wastes been identified? 2 A.2 Have any potentially lethal and toxic substances been identified? Can they be formed insitu? CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION Yes, minor, Ammonia, hydrocarbons, H2, and BTX. Significant H2S in gas product and MDEA amine (liquid). Additionally water and water vapor. Yes, high content of H2S in Acid Gas to SRU. Potentially lethal if Acid Gas release. CONTROLS (BARRIER & RECOVERY) None identified RECOMMENDATIONS No Action
Materials of construction Area gas detection (H2S). Personnel H2S monitors. Standard refinery procedures.
Provide closed loop sample stations for rich and lean amine and acid gas product.
ACTION NO: 1 ASSIGNED TO: Process Systems - Malcolm Ditto 3 A.4 Does the process contain Sour water, wet H2S stream, Materials of construction any chemicals that are highly rich amine, high temperature corrosive? lean amine and caustic. Area gas detection (H2S). Personnel monitors. Standard refinery procedures. Maximum rich amine loading limits. Maximum heat stable salt anion content. Velocity limits in pipes and vessels. Standard maintenance and inspection procedures ACTION NO: 2 ASSIGNED TO: EPC Contractor Consider corrosion monitoring program (condition monitoring)
Data File: YERP ARU 140 PHR jun9.hdf
KBR
Project No: 6491
Client: YERP Project: Yanbu Exp Ref Proj - ARU PHR DATE REVIEWED: 8 June, 2007 RECOMMENDATIONS No Action
NODE: 1.1 (continued) ITEM: ARU: A. PROCESS STREAMS, CHEMICALS AND CATALYSTS PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION
CONTROLS (BARRIER & RECOVERY) Purged (reflux purge) Ion exchange bed for heat stable salts Maintenance procedures Filtration for FeS Nitrogen blanket on tanks Heat stable salt removal
Ammonium bisulfide. 4 A.5 Have feed impurity components and any reaction by products formed that may Heat stable salts in amine. build up in the process and create a hazard been FeS (possibly pyrophoric). identified (e.g., sulfur, olefins,diolefins, aromatics, solids, heavy metals such as mercury, vanadium)? 5 A.7 What foreign materials can contaminate the process and create hazards 6 A.8 Are there any hazardous chemicals used for startup? Oxygen ingress
No Action
Caustic wash (~ 2-5 wt%) of the equipment
Startup and maintenance procedures
No action No action
7 A.9 Have hazardous reaction No significant consequences or decomposition products identified by the team. that may be formed been identified (due to buildup or blockage in equipment/lines, etc.)? Can catalysts/chemicals decompose into hazardous products? 8 A.10 Can chemical compounds that are pyrophoric, auto-ignite, are unstable or sensitive to impact, shock or extreme temperatures or pressures exist, e.g. precipitate out of the solutions, form if the solution dries, accumulate in storage? 9 A.11 Have the physical properties needed for safe design been obtained? 1 A.12 Have important 0 impurities been identified for the intermediate and product streams? 1 A.13 Have the compounds 1 present been cross checked for reactive potential if combined? FeS may be pyrophorric when vessel is opened for maintenance. Maintenance and shutdown procedures
No Action
Yes
No Action
Yes
No action
Yes
No action
KBR
ITEM: ARU: B. PROCESS DESIGN PARAMETERS AND OPERATING CONDITIONS DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS 140-YER-PE-PFD-0001; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0002; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0003; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0004 140-YER-PE-HMB-001 sheets 1 thru 3 PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM 1 B.1 Are there any extreme 2 design conditions: High or low temperature? High or low pressure? Depressurization temperatures? Maximum or minimum flows? Maximum or minimum duties? CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION None for high or low temperature Increased pressure from source (blow by) CONTROLS (BARRIER & RECOVERY) PZV sized to handle case. RECOMMENDATIONS Confirm that adequate relief protection for gas blow-by from any rich amine feed source.
Material of construction and design guidelines for maximum liquid or two-phase Possible design velocity limits flow velocity for liquid and vapor streams. None for maximum or minimum duties
ACTION NO: 3 ASSIGNED TO: Process Systems - Malcolm Ditto 1 B.3 What process variables 3 could or do approach limiting conditions for a hazard? 1 B.4 Are there any special 4 design considerations associated with the handling and storage of any of the process materials? 1 B.8 Have any relevant 5 alternative operating conditions been identified? Can a system operate at two or more extremely different operating conditions? No significant consequences identified by the team Amine storage tank N2 purged to avoid heat stable salt formation. No action
No Action
No significant consequences identified by the team
No action
No significant consequences 1 B.9 Can combustible or 6 explosive mixtures of process identified by the team fluids or dust occur within equipment because of normal or abnormal process conditions, including air leakage into the system and/or release and accumulation of dissolved or chemically bound oxygen?
No action
KBR
Project No: 6491
Client: YERP Project: Yanbu Exp Ref Proj - ARU PHR DATE REVIEWED: 8 June, 2007 RECOMMENDATIONS Review project standards for vacuum protection design requirements
NODE: 1.2 (continued) ITEM: ARU: B. PROCESS DESIGN PARAMETERS AND OPERATING CONDITIONS PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM 1 B.10 Can equipment and 7 piping be exposed to vacuum? CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION
CONTROLS (BARRIER & RECOVERY)
Because of water vapor in Vessels designed to per gas and steam use in stripper project standard for vacuum. vacuum condition is feasible.
ACTION NO: 4 ASSIGNED TO: Process Systems - Malcolm Ditto 1 B.12 Can undesirable or 8 runaway reactions take place? 1 B.13 Is equipment operating 9 at extremely different operating conditions connected via piping? No significant consequences identified by the team No significant consequences identified by the team No Action
No Action
No significant consequences 2 B.15 Will unwanted 0 hazardous reactions or identified by the team decompositions occur because of a mechanical failure or loss of utility (e.g., pump trip, loss of agitation such as agitator trip or loss of impeller blade(s), material overcharges, solvent undercharges, overheating, overcooling, unwanted precipitations, failure of upstream and/or downstream equipment, etc?) 2 B.16 Have any special 1 disposal considerations and hazards been highlighted? For example, organic streams, aqueous streams, by products, sewered materials, vent gases from towers in case of power failures or other upset conditions. Iron sulfide, HC, heat stable salt disposal from Amine Filtration package. Iron sulfide sludge from maintenance - cleaning. Waste water treatment system Maintenance procedures Project environmental assessment (waste disposal study) Filter media disposed by vendor
No action
[1] Confirm means for proper disposal of iron sulfide, HC, heat stable salts [2] Confirm that vendor is responsible for filter media disposal
ACTION NO: 5 ASSIGNED TO: Process Systems - Malcolm Ditto REF: [1] ACTION NO: 6 ASSIGNED TO: EPC Contractor REF: [2]
KBR
Project No: 6491
Client: YERP Project: Yanbu Exp Ref Proj - ARU PHR DATE REVIEWED: 8 June, 2007 RECOMMENDATIONS No action
NODE: 1.2 (continued) ITEM: ARU: B. PROCESS DESIGN PARAMETERS AND OPERATING CONDITIONS PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM 2 B.17 Are there any ambient 2 condition changes which must be accounted for in order to assure a safe design? Can freezing of process streams create a hazard? CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION None identified
CONTROLS (BARRIER & RECOVERY)
Major concern is the release 2 B.18 Have layout 3 considerations which may be of acid gas at 90%+ H2S. necessary to assure a safe plant design been identified and documented?
ARU is near the SRU minimizing the length of line. Typical layout for Amine Regeneration equipment. Standard engineering procedures. Plot plan review.
No Action
2 B.19 Have necessary data on No significant consequences 4 quantity/rate of heat/gas identified by the team evolution and gas composition from reaction or decomposition of materials been identified and issued (e.g., hot spots caused by external fire, runaway reaction, etc.)? 2 B.20 Will unwanted 5 hazardous reactions or decompositions occur because of missing ingredients (e.g., loss of one or more feeds) or misproportioned reactants or catalysts? No significant consequences identified by the team
No action
No action
No new issues identified by 2 B.21 What happens if the 6 process streams or chemicals the team. contact air and/or moisture? 2 B.22 What is the potential for No significant consequences 7 external fires that may create identified by the team hazardous internal process conditions? 2 B.2 Are transient conditions 8 identified? No significant hazards identified by the team
Amine storage tank is N2 purged.
No action
No action
No action
KBR
ITEM: ARU: C. EQUIPMENT OF THE PROCESS DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS 140-YER-PE-PFD-0001; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0002; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0003; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0004 140-YER-PE-HMB-001 sheets 1 thru 3 PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM 2 C.1 Are fragile or brittle 9 materials of construction used in hazardous service? CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION Wet H2S may lead to vessel wall cracks CONTROLS (BARRIER & RECOVERY) RECOMMENDATIONS
All carbon steel (HIC No Action resistant) vessels and piping welds will be post-weld stress relieved. Use of stainless steel in vessel lining and piping
3 C.2 Can a line or connection 0 to the bottom of a process vessel fail?
Corrosion or erosion if Design velocity constraints. conditions exist, possible loss of containment and presence Appropriate metallurgy. of H2S. Corrosion monitoring. Heat stable salt are controlled Standard operating, maintenance, inspection and emergency procedures Follow project standards for isolation and mitigation. PWHT of carbon steel Rich amine loading control. H2S area monitors
No Action
KBR
Project No: 6491
Client: YERP Project: Yanbu Exp Ref Proj - ARU PHR DATE REVIEWED: 8 June, 2007 CONTROLS (BARRIER & RECOVERY) RECOMMENDATIONS No Action
NODE: 1.3 (continued) ITEM: ARU: C. EQUIPMENT OF THE PROCESS PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM 3 C.3 Can corrosion perforation 1 in piping or a vessel or a loss of a vessel connection result in a major leak? CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION
Corrosion or erosion if Design velocity constraints. conditions exist, possible loss of containment and presence Appropriate metallurgy. of H2S. Corrosion monitoring. Heat stable salt are controlled Standard operating, maintenance, inspection and emergency procedures Follow project standards for isolation and mitigation. PWHT of carbon steel Rich amine loading control. H2S area monitors
3 C.4 Can failure of a packing Possible release of H2S 2 or seal cause a major release of hazardous fluids
Double seal on pumps. Appropriate metallurgy. Corrosion monitoring. H2S area monitors
Review locations required for H2S detection monitors.
ACTION NO: 7 ASSIGNED TO: Safety Engineering - Peter Pilgrim 3 C.5 Can failure of a vessel or No new issues identified by 3 piping component result in a the team. major leak? 3 C.6 Can internal leaks cause 4 a hazard due to mixing of chemicals, unexpected pressures or uncontrolled temperatures Feed to bottoms exchanger leak would be a small leak No significant consequences identified by the team Plant procedures for critical lifts. No action
No action
Dropped object on Acid Gas 3 C.7 Can mechanical impact 5 or brittle failure of equipment line to SRU could be cause a hazardous situation? dangerous if line is opened. 3 C.9 Can piping or equipment 6 be exposed to excess thermal stresses? No significant consequences identified by the team
No Action
No action
KBR
Project No: 6491
Client: YERP Project: Yanbu Exp Ref Proj - ARU PHR DATE REVIEWED: 8 June, 2007 CONTROLS (BARRIER & RECOVERY) RECOMMENDATIONS No action
NODE: 1.3 (continued) ITEM: ARU: C. EQUIPMENT OF THE PROCESS PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM 3 C.10 Can piping or 7 equipment be exposed to excess vibration? 3 C.11 Can piping, hoses or 8 other piping components become inadvertently disconnected? 3 C.12 Can the process 9 conditions or fluids cause embrittlement of materials of construction? 4 C.14 Is equipment or lines 0 likely to plug including inlets to pressure relief devices? 4 C.15 Is exotic metallurgy 1 (special alloys) employed in the process? 4 C.17 Have equipment items 2 and bypasses needed for safe startup / shutdown / maintenance been included? 4 C.19 Are special blanketing 3 systems required? 4 C.20 Will static electricity 4 within equipment create a hazardous condition? 4 C.21 Have any Client safety 5 aspects been identified and referenced (e.g., Process Safety Manuals, recommended practices, etc.)? CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION No significant consequences identified by the team No significant consequences identified by the team
No action
No significant consequences identified by the team
No action
None identified
No action
No
No action
Not identified on PFDs.
Will be reviewed at PID No action reviews, per project standard procedures No action No action
No new issues identified by the teams Not expected.
Yes
No Action
KBR
ITEM: ARU: D. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS 140-YER-PE-PFD-0001; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0002; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0003; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0004 140-YER-PE-HMB-001 sheets 1 thru 3 PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM 4 D.1 Are blanketing systems 6 required? What hazards can occur as a result of loss purging, blanketing or inerting? How certain is the quality of the gas supply? 4 D.3 Can air be drawn into 7 process equipment containing flammable or pyrophoric fluids? CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION No new issues identified by the team CONTROLS (BARRIER & RECOVERY) RECOMMENDATIONS No action
No new issues identified by the team
No action
4 D.5 Can hazardous reaction Not applicable 8 develop as a result of gradual or sudden stopping of flow? 4 D.6 Can hazardous reactions No new issues identified by 9 develop as a result of the team equipment failure? 5 D.7 Can loss of liquid seals 0 create a hazardous condition? Not applicable
No action
No action
No action
5 D.8 Can reverse flow create a None identified. 1 hazardous condition? 5 D.9 Could a hazardous 2 situation result from drain or vent valves positioned incorrectly? 5 D.10 Does maintenance of a 3 system require frequent shutdowns or equipment removal from the process? Potential for exposure to H2S. Standard operating and maintenance procedures H2S area monitors No significant consequences identified by the team
No action No Action
No Action
5 D.11 Does the use of heavy No new issues identified by 4 equipment (cranes, cherry the team pickers, fork trucks) pose a hazard to equipment that is in operation?
No Action
KBR
Project No: 6491
NODE: 1.4 (continued) ITEM: ARU: D. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM 5 D.12 Have any special 5 disposal considerations and hazards been highlighted? For example, organic streams, aqueous streams, by products, sewered materials, vent gases from towers in case of power failures or other upset conditions. 5 D.13 Is it expected that the 6 process will require removal and/or replacement of equipment while the process is in operation? CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION No new issues identified by the team
No new issues identified by the team
No Action
5 D.14 Is the process such that None expected. 7 testing of safety systems and/or devices will be difficult to do? 5 D.15 What happens if a 8 process vessel is overfilled? Overfilling of reflux drum, Spare pump, on autostart carryover to KO drum at the SRU, leading consequently to Control system and SRU plant shutdown. instrumentation. No issues identified by the team
No Action
No Action
5 D.16 What happens if the 9 wrong raw materials are introduced into the process?
No Action
6 D.17 What happens if there is No issues identified by the 0 inadvertent mixing of team chemicals in the process? 6 D.18 What happens if too 1 much, too little or none of a chemical is added to the process? 6 D.19 What hazards result 2 from the loss of utilities (electricity, steam, water, instrument air, etc.)? 6 D.20 What potential process 3 hazards are introduced by routine maintenance procedures? Low amine concentration Material selection leads to high acid gas loading causing excessive corrosion Sampling and monitoring rate procedures
No Action
No Action
Plant will go into safe Total electricity and No Action shutdown mode operational instrument air failure leads to upset only shutdown in safe mode. No safety concerns identified by the team None identified No Action
KBR
Project No: 6491
NODE: 1.4 (continued) ITEM: ARU: D. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION
6 D.21 What would happen if a No issues identified by the 4 slug of water entered into the team vessel?
NODE: 1.5 ITEM: ARU: E. CHEMICAL INVENTORIES AND STORAGE
DATE REVIEWED: 8 June, 2007
DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS 140-YER-PE-PFD-0001; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0002; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0003; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0004 140-YER-PE-HMB-001 sheets 1 thru 3 PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM 6 E.1 Are large inventories of 5 flammable or toxic materials stored inside of buildings? 6 E.3 Can a line or connection 6 to the bottom of a tank fail? What happens if a seal to a pump or valve in a line from the bottom of a tank fails? CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION No issues identified by the team Spilling of fresh amine of the fresh amine storage tank Leak of amine from tank Tank area contained No Action Instrumentation control (minimum isolation requirements) CONTROLS (BARRIER & RECOVERY) RECOMMENDATIONS No Action
No Action
None identified 6 E.4 Is the safe storage of 7 hazardous chemical inventory dependant on performance of instrumentation and controls? 6 E.5 What happens if a 8 storage tank is overfilled? No new issues identified by the team
No Action
KBR
ITEM: ARU: F. OTHER ITEMS DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS 140-YER-PE-PFD-0001; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0002; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0003; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0004 140-YER-PE-HMB-001 sheets 1 thru 3 PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM 6 F.1 Can external/natural 9 forces pose a hazard to this node (lightening, sandstorm, sabotage, earth movement, grass fire, high winds, etc.)? 7 F.2 Can time or domino 0 effects exacerbate any hazardous situation? CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION GLOBAL: Possible damage to the plant and personnel injury - team not able to specify. Cyber security of control system is necessary to avoid sabotage Unidentified leak (minor leaks) CONTROLS (BARRIER & RECOVERY) GLOBAL: Design considerations follow client recommendations and standard and local requirements for external/natural forces. Area H2S monitors Operating, maintenance and emergency procedures No Action RECOMMENDATIONS No Action
No Action
7 F.3 What hazards does traffic No new issues identified by 1 (road, water) cause to the the team process? Hydrocracker is adjacent - No 7 F.4 What hazards does 2 adjacent equipment or Units credible cause identified pose to the equipment in this node (e.g. blast overpressure, heat from fires, impacts from flying debris, etc.)? No credible cause identified 7 F.5 What is the potential for 3 external fires that may create hazardous internal conditions? Amine/H2S leaking into 7 F.6 Will leaking fluids (e.g., 4 failure of heat exchanger cooling water system tube(s) or heating/cooling coil in vessel) cause potentially toxic or flammable emissions in a normally non-hazardous unprotected area (e.g., at the cooling tower)? In progress 7 F.7 Have layout 5 considerations which may be necessary to assure a safe plant design been identified and documented? Cooling water is closed loop Sampling and monitoring program
No Action
No Action
No Action
Piping design and requirement will follow Project and industry standards.
Review the plot location and unit layout during consequence analysis and PHAs
ACTION NO: 8 ASSIGNED TO: Safety Engineering - Steve Lehrer
KBR
ITEM: ARU: G. INHERENTLY SAFER DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS 140-YER-PE-PFD-0001; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0002; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0003; 140-YER-PE-PFD-0004 140-YER-PE-HMB-001 sheets 1 thru 3 PROCESS HAZARDS CHECKLIST ITEM 7 G.1 Minimize 6 7 G.2 Substitute 7 CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER DISCUSSION Minimize manual labor for cleaning Amine Filters Tertiary Amine (MDEA) chosen to provide lower flows and lower energy required. Controlling rich amine loading and heat stable salt content Design considerations to minimize corrosion. Inherently safer design - Rich amine local ISBL flash drum. 7 G.4 Limit effects 9 8 G.5 Simplify/Design for error 0 tolerance No findings identified by the team Steam system simplification to minimize operator error No Action No Action CONTROLS (BARRIER & RECOVERY) Automated filter back flush RECOMMENDATIONS No Action No Action
7 G.3 Moderate 8
No Action

142 Yer HS PSM 0001

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

General Confidential Page 2 of 15

Yanbu Export Refinery Project

General Confidential Page 3 of 15

Yanbu Export Refinery Project

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PFDs Analyzed During PHR

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

APPENDIX A Hazards Review Plan

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General /Business Confidential Page 2 of 15

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

APPENDIX A EXAMPLE PHR WORKSHEET

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

APPENDIX A (CONT.) EXAMPLE PHR ACTION ITEM & RESPONSE SHEET

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

APPENDIX B PHR CHECKLIST

Yanbu Export Refinery Project

Yanbu Export Refinery Project

Yanbu Export Refinery Project

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

APPENDIX C SAMPLE REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

APPENDIX B Process Flow Diagrams

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PFD Stream Number Simulation Stream Name Description

Reboiler Outlet to Stripper (Train 1)

Stripper Ovhd. (Train 1)

Stripper bttms Outlet to lrean/Rich Amine Exchanger (Train 1)

Reflux Drum Outlet to Regenerator Reflux Pump (Train 1)

Acid Gas from Reflux Drum Train 1 to SRU