Truth pluralism

Truth pluralism, as I understand it, is the view that there is more than one property propositions can possess that makes them true when they are lucky enough to be so. In this essay, I aim to clarify pluralism by
concentrating on three questions any pluralist theory of truth must answer:
􀁸 How do we identify the properties in virtue of which propositions
are true?
􀁸 How are those properties related to truth?
􀁸 What determines which of these properties a given proposition must
have in order to be true?
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This paper appears in N. Pedersen and Wright, Truth and Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

This paper offers a critical appraisal of moderate truth pluralism through metaphysics. The appraisal is offered in the context of the ongoing debate between strong and moderate truth pluralists. Both kinds of pluralist endorse conceptual truth monism: there is a single concept of truth, TRUTH. Moderate pluralists endorse a generic truth property to go with truth. Strong pluralists maintain that there is no such property. Both moderate pluralists and strong pluralists endorse a plurality of properties (correspondence, coherence, superassertibility, etc.) that are truth-relevant for specific domains. Moderate pluralists think of truth-relevance as grounding: within a given domain instances of the truth-relevant property of that domain ground instances of generic truth. Generic truth is a property in its own right but, if true, propositions pertaining to a given domain are true because they have the truth-grounding property of the domain. Strong pluralists think of truth-relevance as reduction: truth is not a property in its own right. Within a given domain being true simply reduces to being F, where F is the truth-reducing property of the domain. We investigate how key ideas from contemporary metaphysics bear on moderate pluralism. We support three comparative claims: (i) instances of domain-specific truth-relevant properties enjoy a greater degree of qualitative similarity than instances of generic truth, (ii) domain-specific truth-relevant properties are more natural than generic truth, and (iii) domain-specific truth-relevant properties are more fundamental than generic truth. On the basis of our considerations regarding metaphysics we offer a critical appraisal of moderate pluralism. First, we argue that, in dealing with problems and challenges, moderate pluralist responses must always make ineliminable reference to the plurality of quasi-truth properties—a constraint that moderate pluralists often violate. Second, from a metaphysical point of view the unity of truth is in a certain sense grounded by its plurality—something that moderate pluralists tend to forget. Third, moderate pluralists cannot take the connection between TRUTH, the concept, and the nature of the property of truth to be too intimate. The former betrays the richness of the latter.

Some philosophers have argued that truth is a norm of judgement.1 This thesis has been given in a variety of formulations—that true judgements are the correct ones; that it is better to judge truly than to judge falsely; and that the truth is what judges ought to pursue in enquiry. I assume that truth somehow functions as a norm of judgement for then focusing on two core questions concerning the judgement-truth norm—namely, (i) what are the normative relationships between truth and judgement? And (ii) do these relationships vary or are they constant? I argue for a pluralist picture—what I call normative alethic pluralism—according to which (i) there is more than one correct judgement-truth norm and (ii) the normative relationships between truth and judgement vary in relation to the subject matter of the judgement. By means of a comparative analysis of disagreement in three core areas of the evaluative domain—refined aesthetics, basic taste and morality—I show that there is an important variability in the normative significance that disagreement has in these areas—I call this the variability conjecture. By presenting a variation of Lynch’s scope problem for alethic monism, I argue that a monistic approach to truth’s normative function is unable to vindicate the normative variability conjecture. I then argue that normative alethic pluralism provides us with a very promising model to account for such a conjecture.

In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers’ views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words “true” and “truth” in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934), Harman (1986), Horwich (1990), Wright (1992), Beall and Restall (2006), Field (2009), Lynch (2009), and Sher (2016a).1 Whenever possible, I focus on positive rather than negative views on the issues involved, although in some cases this is not possible.

Truth pluralism is the view that there are different ways of being true. The most prominent form of truth pluralism ties the plurality of truth to domains. Thus, propositions about riverbanks might be true because they correspond with reality whereas propositions about the law might be true because they cohere with the body of law. Recently, truth pluralism has attracted considerable attention in the literature. Authors with pluralist sympathies have taken on the positive task of spelling out the different aspects of pluralism in greater detail. As a result, different versions of the view have emerged. Strong pluralists give up on the idea of truth-as-such. They deny that there is a single truth property applicable across all truth-apt domains of discourse. Truth is many, not one. Moderate pluralists, on the other hand, hold on to the idea of truth-as-such. The property is generic or applies across all truth-apt discourse. However, propositions belonging to different domains may possess this generic truth property in virtue of having distinct properties such as correspondence or coherence. Truth is both one and many. This paper has two aims. The first aim is to present and develop a version of strong truth pluralism. This task has been somewhat neglected in the literature, one major reason being that strong pluralism is widely regarded as a non-starter due to a battery of seemingly devastating objections leveled against it. Among these objections the problem of mixed compounds is regarded as being particularly pressing—and difficult—for the strong pluralist to deal with. The second aim of the paper is to give a strongly pluralist response to the problem of mixed compounds.

Note:
This paper has now been split into two: "On moderate pluralism about truth and logic" and "On the normative variability of truth and logic".

Abstract:
According to moderate truth pluralism, truth is both One and Many. There is a single truth property that applies across all truth-apt domains of discourse, but instances of this property are grounded in different ways. Propositions concerning medium-sized dry goods might be true in virtue of corresponding with reality while propositions pertaining to the law might be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law. In recent work Michael Lynch has suggested that a commitment to moderate truth pluralism supports logical pluralism. Lynch's intended form of logical pluralism is significantly different from the kind of logical pluralism that has received considerable attention due to the work of Jc Beall and Greg Restall. This paper has four objectives. The first objective is to present Lynch's argument from moderate truth pluralism to logical pluralism and to explain the difference between Lynch's intended form of logical pluralism and Beall and Restall's logical pluralism. The second objective is to give a general argument to the effect that there can be no path from moderate truth pluralism to logical pluralism. Moderate truth pluralists should be monists about logic. This point is argued on the assumption that logic is topic neutral. This is an assumption that Lynch takes on board. The third objective is constructive in nature. I offer an account of what moderate truth pluralists should say about logic. I suggest that, just like moderate truth pluralists are committed to a distinction between truth proper and 'quasi-truth', they should endorse a distinction between logic proper and 'quasi-logic'. Quasi-truth is truth-like in the sense that instances of quasi-truth ground instances of truth. Quasi-logic is logic-like in the sense that it concerns arguments that are necessarily truth-preserving. However, while logic proper concerns argument types all of whose instances are necessarily truth-preserving, quasi-logic concerns argument types whose instances are necessarily truth-preserving for some domains. I suggest that moderate truth pluralists should be monists about truth proper and logic proper but pluralists about quasi-truth and quasi-logic. Fourth, I discuss the normativity of logic and quasi-logic. I suggest that truth and logic are (at least) normative in the sense of underwriting instrumental rationality and discuss how this plays out in a framework that combines logic and quasi-logic. I suggest that there is no difference in the source of normativity of logic and quasi-logic. They are both normative in the sense of being instruments to achieving truth, the goal of cognition. Word count (including abstract): 8,591 2

Introductory remark Pascal Engel is an inspiration. For those of us who have toiled in the rough fields of the truth literature, his work is celebrated for, among other things, having established the question of the value of truth as central to the question of the nature of truth. Engel's work here as elsewhere combines thoroughness and technical sophistication with an extraordinary grasp of how and why the details matter for not only philosophy in general but for our intellectual lives. As such, he remains the very model of what a good philosopher should be. I am honored to contribute to this symposium.

In this paper, we offer a brief, critical survey of contemporary work on truth. We begin by reflecting on the distinction between substantivist and deflationary truth theories. We then turn to three new kinds of truth theory—Kevin Scharp's replacement theory, John MacFarlane's relativism, and the alethic pluralism pioneered by Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright. We argue that despite their considerable differences, these theories exhibit a common 'pluralizing tendency' with respect to truth. In the final section, we look at the underinvestigated interface between metaphysical and formal truth theories, pointing to several promising questions that arise here.

This paper offers a discussion of metaphysical pluralism, alethic pluralism, and logical pluralism. According to the metaphysical pluralist, there are several ways of being. According to the alethic pluralist, there are several ways of being true, and according to the logical pluralist, there are several ways of being valid. Each of these three forms of pluralism will be considered on its own, but the ambition of the paper is to explore possible connections between them. My primary objective is to present and develop a positive account according to which the different forms of pluralism are intimately related. I will proceed in two steps. First, I will investigate the connection between alethic pluralism and logical pluralism. I will argue that a certain version of alethic pluralism supports logical pluralism. Second, I will connect alethic pluralism and logical pluralism to metaphysical pluralism. I will suggest that the former two are at least partly founded on the latter.

The papers in this special issue investigate a range of topics that pertain to the distinction between the concept and the property of truth. The distinction between property concepts and the properties that they pick out is a mainstay within analytic philosophy. We have learned to distinguish, for instance, between our ordinary concept simultaneous and the property simultaneity that it picks out. 1 The significance of this distinction is borne out in the theories of reference that were developed, for instance, by Putnam (1975), Kripke (1980), and Lewis (1984). If we apply any of these theories to simultaneous, they will generate the result that this concept refers to the relativized property simultaneity, even if many users of the concept take simultaneity to be absolute. 2 The concept-property distinction in truth theory: Alston's constraint Undoubtedly, then, it is important to draw the general distinction between property concepts and properties themselves. What, though, is this meant to show us about truth? Arguably, the locus classicus for thought on this topic is the work of William Alston, who observes of the concept-property distinction that "discussions of truth are led seriously astray by neglecting it." 2 Alston brings out the relevance of the distinction to theories of truth as follows 3 :

In The Metaphysics of Truth, Doug Edwards offers a sustained case against deflationism about truth and in favour of his preferred pluralist theory of truth.  Here, I take up three of the main components of that case.  The first is Edwards’ account of the distinctive metaphysical commitments of deflationism.  His views about this issue have changed over the past few years, and I detail these changes as well as a concern for the views that he develops in the book.  Second, I take up the argument that Edwards offers for thinking that deflationism is, in a certain sense, internally unstable.  I explain why this argument is inconclusive, outlining three responses to it on behalf of the deflationist.  Third, I consider Edwards’ novel argument for truth pluralism, which acts as an indirect argument against deflationism.  After sorting out some interpretive nuances related to the use of definite descriptions in this argument, I show how the deflationist can resist it.  Having responded to Edwards’ critique of deflationism, I close by briefly explaining why I take the methodology of deflationism to be especially promising, insofar as it underscores the significance of empirically-informed inquiry about truth.

We should reconcile ourselves with the fact that we are confronted, not with one concept, but with several different concepts [.] [W]e should try to make these concepts as clear as possible (by means of definition, or of an axiomatic procedure, or in some other way); to avoid further confusions, we should agree to use different terms for different concepts; and then we may proceed to a quiet and systematic study of all concepts involved, which will exhibit their main properties and mutual relations. (Tarski 1944, p. 355)

Two arguments against a pluralism of truth-predicates as advocated by Michael Lynch:

1. Pluralism cannot explain how 'mixed sentences' consisting of predicates from different areas of discourse can be true (e.g. '2 is the most beautiful prime number') - they can neither be part of two areas of discourse, since this violates the law of noncontradiction; nor can they be part of no area of discourse at all, since this would mean they are not even part of a language. But assigning them just one area of discourse would be arbitrary.

2. Alethic pluralism cannot explain how it is possible to translate a sentence from one area of discourse to another: p1 means p2 is equal to p1 is true iff p2 only if there is just one truth-predicate at play. If there are two or more truth-predicates used, the equivalence fails: 'p1 is true1 iff p2 is true2' is not a necessary truth like 'p1 means p2'. But then it would be impossible to give an explanation of one proposition in terms of a proposition from another area (like giving a naturalistic explanation of ethical terms).

I. THE HEROES OF OLD At first glance, Mark Richard's recent book When Truth Gives Out appears, in the most commendable sense of the word, 'old-fashioned'. Its central thesis is that truth is sometimes the wrong standard to use when assessing the judgements we make about the world. Not all correct judgements are true, and not all incorrect ones are false. They can all be measured, but they cannot all be measured in the same way. Many of the heroes of old, ensconced in philosophical Valhalla, are no doubt blowing their trumpets in approval. The heroes did not see truth as easy to come by. Far from it. Truth, like wealth, was to be earned, the product of hard epistemological work and stern semantic discipline. Much of what we say and think did not live up to their exacting standards for truth. Morality, literature, poetry, politics, philosophy, psychology and much else besides were often judged lacking. Consequently either we were to believe that all opinions in these matters were equally mistaken, or we were to look for explanations of why we say and think what we do about such things other than the desire to know the truth. We were expressing our sentiments, or prescribing, or commending, or manipulating. But in making such judgements, we were not judging what was true or false. Such were our choices. Grim, surely, but heroic choices often are. So, like the heroes of old, Richard thinks that truth does not live everywhere. In this respect, he is aligned with such worthies as Hume, Russell, Ayer, and one or other of the Wittgensteins. But it is there that the resemblance stops. For in point of fact, Richard's way of approaching these matters is importantly new. This is an outstanding and original work of analytic philosophy, one that manages to be both deep and sensible; it rewards careful study, and defies easy categorization. In what follows, I shall illustrate the distinctiveness of Richard's approach, and the problems it consequently faces, by asking two questions about some its key elements. The first question concerns what his picture tells us about what remains when (absolute) truth gives way. The second concerns what it tells us about truth. These are hardly the only important aspects of his view-I shall be ignoring, for

The primary focus of this paper is an investigation into the alethic norms governing judgment. In particular, I am interested in the structural issue concerning the judgement-truth norms—i.e. in the question what are the normative relationships between truth and judgement in the various areas of enquiry. The traditional debate about the judgement-truth norm generally assumes a monistic conception (Normative Alethic Monism, NAM) where truth’s normative function is expressed by a single principle which is taken to apply uniformly to all judgements in the various domains of enquiry. I will argue that NAM falls prey to a variation of the scope problem originally put forward by Michael Lynch against alethic (substantivist) monism. The problem, in a nutshell, is that NAM is unable to account for an important variability in the normative significance of enquiry-related phenomena such as the occurrence of disagreement. By means of examples from different areas of discourse I will illustrate how the kind of normative reaction elicited by the presence of disagreement varies in relation to the subject matter at issue for then arguing that since NAM forces us to adopt a Procrustean normative attitude towards the occurrence of disagreement it fails to account for such a variability. In reply to this problem, I will outline a pluralistic conception of the normative role that truth plays on judgment (Normative Alethic Pluralism, NAP) which amounts to the following two theses: (plurality) there is more than one way in which truth regulates judgment; (variability) the normative function that truth plays on judgements varies in relation to the specific subject matter at issue. I will demonstrate NAP’s superiority over NAM by showing how exactly it helps in dealing with the normative version of the scope problem.

Contemporary expressivists typically deny that all true judgments must represent reality. Many instead adopt truth minimalism, according to which there is no substantive property of judgments in virtue of which they are true. In this article, I suggest that expressivists would be better suited to adopt truth pluralism, or the view that there is more than one substantive property of judgments in virtue of which judgments are true. My point is not that an expressivism that takes this form is true, but that it more readily accommodates the motivations that typically lead expressivists to their view in the first place.

In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers' views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words "true" and "truth" in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934),

Alethic bromidism and alethic functionalism share a common starting point in the view that a theory of truth ought to be compatible with our ordinary or endoxic conception of truth. Trouble is that there is no evidential support testing such compatibility. In this paper, I argue for endoxic alethic pluralism using empirical data that show a large variance in intuitive responses to cases along two axes of linguistic discourse.

The central thesis of Mark Richard's important book, When Truth Gives Out, is that truth is sometimes the wrong standard to use when assessing the judgments we make about the world. Not all correct judgments are true, and not all incorrect ones are false. In this paper, I make two chief points. The fi rst point is that Richard's relativism about truth, while powerful, is at odds with his own stated views about truth-aptness. At the root of that tension is an old problem for relativism: the umpire problem. The second point is that Richard is committed to truth pluralism.

""In this paper, I discuss two concerns for pluralist truth theories: a concern about a key detail of these theories and a concern about their viability. The detailed-related concern is that pluralists have relied heavily upon the notion of a domain, but it is not transparent what they take domains to be. Since the notion of a domain has been present in philosophy for some time, it is important for many theorists, not only truth pluralists, to be clear on what domains are and what work they can do.

The viability-related concern is that it's not clear how a pluralist truth theory could explain the truth-conditions of mixed atomic propositions. To address this concern, truth pluralists should recognize something to which they have not been sufficiently attentive: that some atomic propositions belong to more than one domain. But, recognizing this requires rethinking the relationships between the nature of propositions, their membership in domains, and their truth. I address these issues and propose an understanding of them that is preferable to the best existing account of them, that offered by Michael Lynch.""

Pluralism, no less than traditional inflationism and deflationism, is consistent with all four main approaches to the alethic paradoxes: the truth-value gluts (dialethism) and gaps (analethism) solutions, the hierarchical gambit (Tarskianism), and the meaninglessness strategy (positivism). The view explored in this chapter is that some variant of positivism could be a good bet—albeit not one that defends a meaningless strategy per se. Rather, I suggest an approach in which pluralists take a liar sentence (λ, hereafter) to be undecidable. That is, pluralists can decline to assert the dialethicist’s claim that λ is both true and false, and can decline to assert the analethicist’s claim that λ is neither true nor false; and they can decline to assert that λ is either true or false, and that λ is true, and that λ is false. Moreover, to so decline, pluralists need not positively assert that λ is meaningless. Rather, for pluralists, λ may be meaningful but undecidable.

A set of three overlapping answers are proposed to two initial questions (about what and how do leftists and rightists disagree with each other?)
(1) Intensional rigidity: Yes, left and right are rigid designators, but provided that these are not referring to concrete objects (individuals) but, rather, to abstract objects (properties). No, they aren’t if these must refer to individuals only.
(2) Faultless disagreement: Left- and right-wing agents are in disagreement whilst being correct with respect to discretionary, perspectival, Blackburn style expressivism (Blackburn 1984, 1993).
(3) Inferential roles: Left and right are better defined in logical terms of moral inference rules (Zangwill 1994, 2021), provided that: political concepts are thick concepts (Williams 1985); their descriptive use relies on a ‘lightweight’ truth (Wright 1993); equivocations (including the Frege-Geach Problem) are avoided by moral inferentialism (Hamblin 1987, Hallich 2014).

Truth pluralism offers the latest extension in the tradition of substantive theorizing about truth. While various forms of this thesis are available, most frameworks commit to domain reliance. According to domain reliance, various ways of being true, such as coherence and correspondence, are tied to discourse domains rather than individual sentences. From this follows that the truth of different types of sentences is accounted for by their domain membership. For example, sentences addressing ethical matters are true if they cohere and those addressing extensional states of affairs if they correspond. By tying distinct truth-grounding properties to domains rather than individual sentences, truth pluralists avoid certain issues with definitional ambiguity and indeterminacy. I argue that contrary to the ideal situation, domains fail to provide the sought-after benefits of achieving definitional unambiguity and determinacy in the standard domain reliant pluralist frameworks. The reason is that, when combined with the inherently ambiguous nature of certain truth-relevant terms of sentences, fringe cases emerge, causing some of them to count as members of multiple domains. Consequently, some sentences end up being both true and false in the standard domain reliant pluralist frameworks, thus conflicting with both standard laws of non-contradiction and identity. Finally, I argue that truth pluralists should pay closer attention to the hitherto neglected question of inherent natural language ambiguity.

This paper was inspired by criticism of pluralism and relativism about truth, offered by Pascal Engel in (Engel 2011). We discuss the main points of his talk in terms of our understanding of the later Wittgenstein. We share the essence of Engel’s absolutist thesis about truth and give it our interpretation in terms of the notion of family resemblance.