Theory of Contract Law

Private law theory plays a role (for better or worse) in the practice of law, whether that be in education or providing criticism, or contextualizing within a broader frame what private law does and why it does what it does. Yet some say that private law theory neglects history while others say that it does not fully capture history’s possibilities. In this paper, I  explore what it means to use history in theorising by exploring how analytical philosophy has engaged with history since the 1960s, suggesting three possible historical avenues of private law theory.

1.-La question de la loyauté en droit des contrats est une question qui s'impose en pratique et qui divise la doctrine depuis la fin des années 1980. Aucun texte ne prévoit en effet une quelconque exigence claire et déterminée d'une loyauté dont les contours seraient eux-mêmes clairs et déterminés, pas même l'article 1134, alinéa 3 du Code civil, dont la signification ne force pas l'évidence. Cette incertitude suscite des interprétations doctrinales multiples comme autant de propositions plus ou moins engagées proposant la « bonne » interprétation de ce texte, au point de provoquer des dizaines de travaux, colloques, thèses, articles de doctrine 1 que l'on peut résumer, a priori, en deux catégories, pas toujours nettement qualifiées, dont une l'est plus nettement, celle du « solidarisme contractuel » quoique ses détracteurs divisent ses contempteurs entre les « solidaristes sociaux » et les « solidaristes moraux », division que réfutent avec justesse Denis Mazeaud et Christophe Jamin, à l'origine de cette appellation, et les autres, favorables à une considération plus « classique », entendons moins volontariste, de la loyauté.

There is an ongoing debate in the philosophical and jurisprudential literature regarding the nature and possibility of Contract theory. On one hand, are those who argue (or assume) that there is, or should be, a single, general, universal theory of Contract Law, one applicable to all jurisdictions and all times. On the other hand, are those who assert that Contract theory should be localized to particular times and places, perhaps even with different theories for different types of agreements. This article considers one facet of this debate: evaluating the relevance of the fact that the remedies available for breach of contract can vary significantly from one jurisdiction to another. This wide variation in remedies for breach of a (contractual) promise is one central difference between promises in morality and enforceable agreements in law. The article asserts that variation of remedies strongly supports the conclusion that there is (and can be) no general, universal theory of Contract Law.

The high numbers of over-indebtedness and of evictions in Europe since the financial crisis have highlighted the need to rethink the role that mortgage credit plays for societies. This contribution examines the social function of contract law, based on the observation that contract law is a means of allocating welfare in a political economy in which the welfare state is in retreat. The claim asserted in this article is that EU law in the field of mortgages does not fulfil its social function because it is based on a formalistic understanding of contract law. In order to close the protective gap brought about by a shift in the allocation of welfare from public provision to private markets without altering the understanding of contracts, the proposal is to follow the cooperative contract model of contracts as social cooperation. This approach allows for an assessment of fairness that acknowledges the long-term character of mortgage contracts and the ensuing need to distribute market risks between both contracting parties.

Published at William and Mary Business Law Review, vol. 9, p. 373 (2018):

In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman offers a theory of contract law that is largely descriptive, but also strongly normative.  His theory presents contract law’s purpose as supporting robust markets.  This article compares and contrasts Oman’s argument about the proper understanding of contract law with one presented over eighty years earlier by Morris Cohen.  Oman’s focus is on the connection between Contract Law and markets; Cohen’s connection had been between Contract Law and the public interest.  Oman’s work brings back Cohen’s basic insight, and gives it a more concrete form, as a formidable normative theory with detailed prescriptions.

The article is devoted to the study of the structure of the normative element of the mechanism of legal regulation of social relations.
The mechanism of legal regulation of relations is considered as a system of legal means, methods and forms which regulate social relations. At the same time, under current conditions of the society development such regulation is achieved with minimal normative of the state. Scientists claim the variability of the normative element of the mechanism of legal regulation of social relations. The normative regulator is not the only way of influence on the subject’s assessment of abilities in the social environment. The abovementioned is manifested in the field of relations free of the state imperative pressure – relations, which formation is conditioned by the sphere of a person’s private life. Legal regulation of social relations in this field is achieved through the mediation of other regulators which have a common nature with the legal norm but a subjective limitation of their obligation.
Variability of the parameters making their content and essence may not always be fit into previously established normative regulators. Therefore, the legal norm may not regulate certain types of social relations. Moreover, the disposition of legal norms may not even meet the real needs of the subjects of a particular relationship. Or vice versa, a legal norm may contain only declarative principles or definitions, complicating the appropriate level of legal regulation of relations.
It is proved that legal norm is not a fundamental element of the mechanism of legal regulation of social relations, through which relations between the society members from the essential field to the real field and formation of corresponding legal relations between them are regulated. Corresponding regulatory influence is provided by other regulators of various legal nature, but of identical axiological significance.
The author argues that along with the legal norm the legal means for ensuring the mechanism of legal regulation of public relations include alter-normative regulators (agreement, practice), which represent a mutually agreed formation and further application of a corresponding normative structure to the specific model of behaviour of the participants of legal relations. Besides, over-normative (legal principles) and quasi-normative (judicial acts) regulators are distinguished along with normative and alter-normative regulators.
Since regulatory influence on public relations goes beyond the legal norm, the corresponding element of the mechanism of legal regulation requires its structural adjustment. The scientist coins a term a normative construct as set of legal concepts identical to the legal norm for description of an element of the mechanism of legal regulation of social relations

Юридичний вчинок може бути визначено як дія, що тягне за собою юридичний наслідок, незалежно від того, чи були ці дії спрямовані на наслідки що ними (в силу норм права) називаються чи ні.

Вчинки викликають правові наслідки незалежно від того усвідомлював чи не усвідомлював суб’єкт їхнє правове значення, бажав чи не бажав їх настання. Значна частина правомірних вчинків породжується матеріально-предметною діяльністю людей (виробництвом, створенням творів літератури і мистецтва, відкриттів і винаходів тощо)

Якщо вважати, що вольовою дією є дія, в якій людина свідомо прагне до досягнення цілей, то можна стверджувати, що юридичні вчинки перебувають поза волею суб’єкта і поза його свідомістю, а тому вони принципово не можуть належати до дій як юридичних фактів і не можуть бути формою правомірних дій, бо є подіями за визначенням.

Що стосується юридичних вчинків, то для розуміння їх місця в класифікації юридичних фактів необхідно дослідити їх з точки зору вольових актів.

В поділі правомірних дій на акти і вчинки юридичний критерій є додатковим, оскільки воля щодо юридичних наслідків не є визначальною обставиною в класифікації. Юридичний критерій в даному випадку є оцінюючим, за його допомогою оцінюється те чи інше діяння з точки зору права, правової дійсності.

A question of the features of fixing of legal models of right-depriving jural facts in the conditions of civil legal agreement is explored, the order of fixing of such models in the conditions of civil agreement and the order of fixing of such models in the conditions legal proposition are compared, the influence of the appearance of right-depriving jural fact to possibility of causing the proper legal consequences is analysed