Self-Doubt

Materialism is the focus of much research due to its negative consequences for individuals and societies. While recent research indicates that the strength of materialistic value orientations changes with age during adulthood, little is known about the processes that cause these age-related changes. We propose that changes in materialism, as people grow older, are rooted in changes in self-uncertainty. We find evidence for this idea in two studies and across different measures of self-uncertainty. In addition, we show that the changes in materialism cannot be explained by (age-related) differences in socio-demographic variables. Finally, our results indicate that changes in self-uncertainty provide a better account for changes in materialism than age-related changes in self-esteem.

Objectives: To test the hypothesis that a decrease in confidence on a well-learned task will increase effort and performance. Design: A 2 (group: control, experimental) Â 2 (trial: practice, competition) mixed-model with repeated measures on the second factor. Method: Expert skippers' (n ¼ 28) self-confidence was reduced via a combination of task (i.e., change of rope) and competitive demands. Performance was the number of skips in a 1-min period. On-task effort was measured via the verbal reaction time to an auditory probe.

The anthropological principles of liberalism presuppose that an individual has a possessive character. It means that a person possesses only specified characteristics and attributes which define them from the outside but do not constitute their nature. The essence of what a person is remains entirely independent from specific choices.
Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between rational knowledge and affective knowledge. Explaining the structure of judgment through connaturality Thomas shows the relation between constitutive nature and human characteristics. Connaturality is achieved gradually as a result of a repetition of simple acts. This means that a person’s choices constitute human nature to some extent.
Keywords:
Individual, person, feature, disposition, habit, connaturality, inclination.

Se dire que nos croyances reflètent l'influence de facteurs arbitraires et non-pertinents  peut être dérangeant. La découverte de l'importance de tels facteurs sur la manière dont nous évaluons les données disponibles devrait-elle nous faire réduire notre confiance en ces croyances ? Quelle est la bonne réaction ? Plus généralement, lorsque nous apprenons qu’une croyance reflète l’influence de facteurs non-pertinents, de combien devrions-nous réduire la vigueur de la croyance en question ? La réponse est : cela dépend. Cela dépend si oui ou non le facteur non-pertinent risque de nous empêcher d’être en accord avec nos propres standards pour raisonner. Si c'est oui, alors le fait de se rendre compte de l'influence de ce facteur devrait réduire la vigueur des croyances influencées par ce facteur. Si c'est non, alors non. Ceci est ma thèse.

Ambivalence (as in practical conflicts, moral dilemmas, conflicting beliefs, and mixed feelings) is a central phenomenon of human life. Yet ambivalence is incompatible with entrenched philosophical conceptions of personhood, judgement, and action, and is denied or marginalised by thinkers of diverse concerns. This book takes a radical new stance, bringing the study of core philosophical issues together with that of ambivalence. The book proposes new accounts in several areas – including subjectivity, consciousness, rationality, and value – while elucidating a wide range of phenomena expressive of ambivalence, from emotional ambivalence to self-deception. The book rejects the view that ambivalence makes a person divided, showing that our tension-fraught attitudes are profoundly unitary. Ambivalence is not tantamount to confusion or to paralysis: it is always basically rational, and often creative, active, and perceptive as well. The book develops themes from Wittgenstein, Davidson, Sartre, and Freud. It engages with contemporary debates in Analytic Philosophy in addition to work ranging from Aristotle to Cultural Studies and Empirical Psychology, and considers a rich set of examples from daily life and literature.

CONSTANTINE SEDIKIDES AND MICHAEL J. STRUBE themselves, and make plans for the future. Indeed, the notion that selfevaluation is motivated goes several millennia back. Epicureanism (e.g., Epicurus, Hermarchus of Mitylene-successor to Epicurus; Polystratus-successor to Hermarchus) argued that the pursuit of pleasure is the predominant motive of human behavior. According to this view, individual actions are morally appropriate insofar as they produce pleasure, and are morally reprehensible if they generate pain. Thus the construction of the self and a supporting social network is based on the goal of increasing one's personal pleasure. For example, the most important criterion for the selection of friends and intimate others is their ability to augment one's positive outcomes. By contrast, Skepticism (e.g., Pyrrho of Elis, 365275 B.C.; Arcesilaus of Pitane, 315-241 B.c.; Aenesidemus of Cnossus-early part of the first century B.c.) declared the epistemological superiority of old knowledge to new knowledge. By viewing new information (about the self or other objects) with caution, one can avoid feelings of doubt and insecurity stemming from possible inferential pitfalls and conflicting data. Yet another philosophical school, the Socratic philosophy (e.g., Socrates, 470-399 B.c.; Euclid of Megara, 450-380 B.c.; Antisthenes of Athens, 445365 B.C.), proclaimed accurate knowledge of one's self (gnothi seauton) as the highest human virtue. According to this philosophical school, accurate self-knowledge should be sought, regardless of its positive or negative implications, and is attainable through intense self-examination. Finally, Growth philosophers (e.g., Aristotle, 384-322 B.C.; Democritus, ca. 460370 B.c.; Hippocrates, ca. 460-377 B.c.) emphasized change, growth, and improvement in both plant and animal (including human) life. According to this view, self-development is defined by attempts to improve one's skills, relationships, and well-being.

John G. Neihardt transcribed the story of Black Elk's vision. His vision was about a lot of things. And the fact that he told it to Neihardt and we can read it now means a whole lot more. You really should read the book, but the short and skinny of it is that people like the Lakota have practices and traditions that the people with the big guns and oil pipeline plans need to stop what they are doing and consider, before they go ahead trying to kill everybody on the planet by destroying the rapidly decreasing resources we all need in order to survive.

CONSTANTINE SEDIKIDES AND MICHAEL J. STRUBE themselves, and make plans for the future. Indeed, the notion that selfevaluation is motivated goes several millennia back. Epicureanism (e.g., Epicurus, Hermarchus of Mitylene-successor to Epicurus; Polystratus-successor to Hermarchus) argued that the pursuit of pleasure is the predominant motive of human behavior. According to this view, individual actions are morally appropriate insofar as they produce pleasure, and are morally reprehensible if they generate pain. Thus the construction of the self and a supporting social network is based on the goal of increasing one's personal pleasure. For example, the most important criterion for the selection of friends and intimate others is their ability to augment one's positive outcomes. By contrast, Skepticism (e.g., Pyrrho of Elis, 365275 B.C.; Arcesilaus of Pitane, 315-241 B.c.; Aenesidemus of Cnossus-early part of the first century B.c.) declared the epistemological superiority of old knowledge to new knowledge. By viewing new information (about the self or other objects) with caution, one can avoid feelings of doubt and insecurity stemming from possible inferential pitfalls and conflicting data. Yet another philosophical school, the Socratic philosophy (e.g., Socrates, 470-399 B.c.; Euclid of Megara, 450-380 B.c.; Antisthenes of Athens, 445365 B.C.), proclaimed accurate knowledge of one's self (gnothi seauton) as the highest human virtue. According to this philosophical school, accurate self-knowledge should be sought, regardless of its positive or negative implications, and is attainable through intense self-examination. Finally, Growth philosophers (e.g., Aristotle, 384-322 B.C.; Democritus, ca. 460370 B.c.; Hippocrates, ca. 460-377 B.c.) emphasized change, growth, and improvement in both plant and animal (including human) life. According to this view, self-development is defined by attempts to improve one's skills, relationships, and well-being.

In early July 2015, I worked together with my co-moderators at the Sociolinguistic Events Calendar (http://www.baal.org.uk/slxevents.html) on an online survey to determine, once and for all, what’s hot and what’s not in the world of sociolinguistic conferences. On 9 July 2015, I released the survey to a number of sociolinguistic mailing lists. A week later on 16 July, after a healthy 100 responses, I cast my eyes over the results and wrote it all into a report for everyone to savour, to digest, and to use as a Conference Planning Bible. The survey is still live. You can take it here: https://goo.gl/MSMCgH. You can also check the latest results https://goo.gl/NchF58. The first 100 responses had some definite trends, so here’s my report... (Note: not all questions were mandatory so, despite 100 responses, the % doesn’t always equal the number.)

This paper aims at understanding the condition of the skeptic as skeptical. Using the mechanism of cognition argued by Aquinas, which explains how cognitions are connected with dispositions and affections, it tries to unlock the skeptic’s disposition to doubt as something willed. Culling insights from Wittgenstein, this essay points to certainty as a necessity for the person who wishes to live without the constant apprehension of doubt and pervasive suspicion of others. It concludes with an analysis of the skeptic’s need for trust as a willingness to open oneself dynamically in self-giving and submission to others, requiring that one give up self-sufficiency.

This paper argues that there is a conflict between two theses held by John McDowell, namely i) the claim that we are under a standing obligation to revise our beliefs if reflection demands it; and ii) the view that veridical experience is a mode of direct access to the world. Since (i) puts no bounds on what would constitute reasonable doubt, it invites skeptical concerns which overthrow (ii). Conversely, since (ii) says that there are some experiences which we are entitled to trust, it undermines the prescriptive scope of (i). Drawing on C. S. Peirce’s distinction between genuine and contrived doubt, I maintain that critical revisions of beliefs should be triggered only by unwanted disruptions of habits, thereby restoring unity between McDowell’s two theses.

Regulatory focus theory [Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention: Regulatory focus as a motivational principle. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 30, pp. 1–46). New York: Academic Press.] argues that concerns with growth and nurturance (i.e., a promotion focus) and concerns with safety and security (i.e., a prevention focus) produce different motives and perception. The current studies test whether regulatory focus also affects individuals’ strivings for self-evaluation. Specifically, we argue that a promotion or a prevention focus directs the self-evaluation process to self-esteem or self-certainty, respectively. Two studies supported this prediction by demonstrating that regulatory focus affects the strength of self-evaluation goals and individuals’ reactions to goal failure. In Study 1, we found that a promotion focus led to a stronger self-esteem goal (as measured by greater accessibility of esteem-related words), whereas a prevention focus led to a stronger self-certainty goal (as measured by greater accessibility of certainty-related words). In Study 2, a promotion failure led to lower self-esteem than a prevention failure, but a prevention failure led to lower self-certainty than a promotion failure. This research suggests an unrecognized role of nurturance and safety concerns in understanding the self-evaluation process.

The impact on self-esteem of activating self-doubt was investigated in three studies. Individuals with enduring high selfdoubt were expected to be more threatened by an experimental induction of self-doubt (modeled on the ease of retrieval paradigm) than individuals low in enduring self-doubt, and their self-esteem was predicted to decline. The predictions were supported when self-esteem was measured postexperimentally (Experiment 1) and when it was measured both pre- and post-experimentally (Experiment 2). There was no comparable loss in self-esteem for individuals low in self-doubt. A third experiment explored the phenomenology of low-self-doubt individuals and replicated the finding that their level of self-esteem was unaffected by the induction designed to produce doubt.