Scarborough Shoal

South China Sea is a strategic location in terms of political, economic, and military aspects thus a stir of disputes on its water causes ripples of negative effects on its surroundings. One of the contested areas of dispute between the Philippines and China is the Scarborough Shoal which is also called as Panatag Shoal or Bajo de Masinloc by the Philippines and Huangyan Island by China. As states clamor for power and sovereignty over the South China Sea, one overlooked sector, the Filipino fishermen, who are all but powerless in a sea of international disputes among states, is directly suffering the negative consequences of the disputes and is given little attention. This paper determines and analyzes the implications of the South China Sea disputes in the individual lives of fishermen (micro) and how the local government units (meso) and national government (macro) of the Philippines responded to the disputes.

The Philippine islands are at the focal point of momentum sea debate in the South China Sea (SCS). The Philippines has had maritime disputes with various nations, including the US. Presently, policy consideration is centered around power question between the Philippines and China on the Scarborough. China's affirmation of the South China Sea in its 2009 recording with the UNCLCS and its current activities to avoid Philippine anglers from the waters around Scarborough Shoal encouraged the Philippines to seek for assistance from the international arbitration tribunal. The paper will identify the privileges of the Philippines to submerged elements as a feature of its continental shelf by examining the brief historical standpoints of the Philippine archipelago and the late activities by the Philippines to adjust its archipelagic cases to UNCLOS.

Leading scholars of international relations argued that the West Philippine Sea dispute (South China Sea) was a tinderbox waiting to happen. Many analysts fear that the dispute could lead to a direct military conflict if tensions remain at the Panatag shoal. Recently, public interest in the disputed island resurfaced when China, the Philippines and Vietnam traded accusations of repeated incursions. The disputed triangle chain of reefs have caused deep diplomatic divide between the six claimant nations. The tension that was once mutual is now visual and magnified by the sporadic show of deception and

The philosophical and democratic case for a citizens' super-jury to represent and defend future people Rupert Read "[Society is] a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born."-Edmund Burke. "We act as we do because we can get away with it: future generations do not vote; they have no political or financial power; they cannot challenge our decisions".-World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987. "We may come to think that vox populi is vox dei, but not until it is the group voice, not until it is found by some more intimate process than listening to the shout of the crowd or counting the votes in the ballot-box".-Mary Parker Follett. "The irony of the matter is that the future generations do not have a vote. In effect, we hold their proxy."-Charles J. Hitch, Regarding the environment. 7 My suggestion in this paper is that the great applied work for philosophers et al at this time is to think a change to our socio-political institutions that might enable us to rise to the challenge we face: that might enable us collectively to think the future. To think and will and bring about a sustainable/survivable future. This way will have, I argue, to be and to be perceived to be democratic; in the era of the Arab Spring (on which, see the previous issue of JIRR), authoritarian 'solutions' are simply no longer viable, even if they were to be desirable (which they are not). It will also have to have enough teeth, enough force, to do what is necessary to turn around this supertanker, this carbon-driven society that we live in. A society in which the economic interests of rich individuals and corporations (and countries) is tending to tyrannise over the needs of the bulk of humanity-present and future. This is the challenge we face. I answer it here by offering a radical vision: of a 'super-jury' of strong guardians for the future, powerfully inserted at the apex of each and every parliamentary democracy, and into our system of international governance (such as it isand, hopefully, to be strengthened in the process). In response to this challenge, I will begin by (in the remainder of the present section) laying out briefly in an informal manner how I arrived at my argument to follow (and thus summarise my proposal). I will then detail that argument, in sections 1 thru 7 of the paper. This, I have tended to find, is the most effective way of introducing and making comprehensible the radical proposal that I am making. The simplest way of making plausible the challenge that we face is to point out that we have to find some way of addressing chronic short-termism in our culture and institutions. i The electoral cycle, let alone the news cycle, quarterly reports: these all incline us to incredibly short time-horizons. The idea in the present paper is proposed to counterbalance those pressures for short-termism. This problem of short-termism is particularly harsh so far as it applies to electoral democracy. Only people who are alive vote. Even markets do, at least in a rudimentary way, include a reckoning for future people: for example, the desire of future people for oil is already being registered, today, in (somewhat!) 'rational expectations' about future oil prices. Thus economic decisions being taken right now make at least some basic inclusion of the needs of future people. But votes don't, unless future people are fortunate enough that voters explicitly choose for them to, in a way that makes the effort to foresee those needs. And that begins to lead into another way in which one can think about the basis for the proposal that I will make, that's equally important: and that's in the concept of democracy itself (See section 1, below). One of the main things I want to do is to get philosophers and IR theorists and citizens to reflect on what we mean by democracy. What is democracy? For me, the obvious place to start with that question is etymology; and 'democracy' means, or is supposed to mean, 'the rule of the people'. So: the question we ought to ask ourselves is, "Do the people rule in Britain [or the U.S., or wherever, reader, you are living] today?" And to ask that question is to answer it-of course they don't. In Britain, where I live, and allegedly the 'mother' of all modern parliamentary democracies, we need a reformed electoral system, a thoroughly reformed Upper House, economic democracy, localisation, participatory democracy; these are the kind of changes that would be needed to make a country like Britain worthy of the name 'democratic'. But there's a problem that remains, even after all of those reforms have perhaps been made in 9 So, that's the essence of my proposal: a super-jury, faithfully sworn to uphold the basic needs of future people; with access to the very best expert advice (including from philosophers, legal theorists, international relations experts…); able to exercise a proxy veto on the future's behalf over legislation. And these people should be selected like a jury, by 'sortition'…which was exactly the main democratic mechanism in Athens, which is well-known as the 'birthplace of democracy'. There's no particular reason why 'democracy' has to mean election; democracy can mean random selection, sortition. It did in Athens; it could do again here and now; it still animates our democratic system through the jury system. You could call these new guardians 'philosopher-kings'… But the philosophical inspiration for my proposal is actually less Plato than Habermas (as I detail in section 3, below). The super-jurors wouldn't of course have to be philosophers; they would form a non-elite, democratic institution. Giving a powerful voice to the voiceless (unborn future generations). Actually bringing us a step nearer to a more ideal situation in which the speech of all can as it were be heard, and matter, at last…I will now seek to make good and fill out the summary-overview just offered. Democracy: What does it mean? Democracy means: the people rule… Do the people rule at present? To ask the question is to answer it: No… So, for example, to change this, one might have a polity such as Britain's, ii that has a House of Commons (which should be elected by proportional representation (PR)), and an Upper House (that should probably be elected by PR if the Commons is not or alternatively selected Athenian-style by a Goodwin-style lot, iii and served by experts to assist in its deliberation). Such electoral reform, together with campaign finance reform (public funding of elections), massively-egalitarian redistributive legislation, and serious media reform to break the power of media oligarchs, should be enough to take us some way in the direction of democracy. Furthermore, serious decentralisation is essential-what Colin Hines calls 'localisation'-and this can and should result in far more participatory democracy. But: there is a problem that still remains, even in the much-improved reformed democracy that would eventuate. The problem is this: The people who would rule, even in this improved democratically-reformed future, are only the people (in fact, the adult, registered-to-vote, not extremely-infirm etc. people) who are alive now. But surely 'the people' iv ought to be thought of in a far more temporally extended manner. Does a people only exist as a momentary 'time-slice'; or even one generation at a time? Surely not. A people, a nation-state, a society, a continent such as Europe, the global citizenry: each of these is something extended over time. Extending into (or rather from) the past, and extends indefinitely into the future. (Of course, over time a people changes, radically: the Romans of the 4 th century C.E. don't have a great deal in common with the 'Romans' of today. But this point too will turn out to my eventual advantage: for over time, a people tends gradually to become more and more dispersed into the entire future of the human race. A people, to protect its descendants, needs to protect the entire human future; needs, that is, to protect the ecosystems etc of the Earth…) To some extent this is an intractable problem that we simply have to come to terms with: our power over the future. We cannot wish this away. We cannot wish away the asymmetry 12 We need then to think about the legitimation of a democratic principle for how to represent, voice and empower future generations (whether by means of 'guardianship' or in any other way). First, then, let me move to introduce into this conversation the leading living philosopher of legitimation and of democracy, Jurgen Habermas. One's starting-point here, in thinking about legitimation, ought to be the fundamental principle of every democratic government: all power is based upon the people. This is a simple, clear concept of how a state is legitimate. Every citizen of a nation is to be treated as a citizen and thus able to have their own voice. This form of government ensures a ground for a just procedure of governing, entailing the (re-)distribution of power and authority. The justice of the procedure is based upon the fact that every member, in the exercise of her own will, is in a position to equally-contribute towards the decision process which involves her fate. In the United Kingdom this contribution is (allegedly) ensured via representatives on different levels of government who are voted in in a just way. So far the situation is set and clear, but there are implications that are hidden and must be revealed. The legitimate representative authority of an official decision is ensured by basing the power on the people (and, where appropriate, by deciding via justly appointed representatives). Again we need to ask: What does 'the people' mean? (And here we are rehearsing in a more 'abstract' way the considerations that occupied us at the very opening of the paper, in Sections 0 & 1.) In a democratic system the concept of 'the people' is used...

Since becoming president in March 2013 Xi Jinping often refers to the ‘Chinese Dream’ in his first address to the nation as head of state on 17 March 2013 as having three broad prerequisites for bringing about the "renaissance of the Chinese nation", that is, "following the "Chinese road", "developing the China spirit" and "concentrating and crystallizing China's strength".  These notions fall alongside President Xi’s focus on building public trust,  which signal a continuation of a more populist and nationalistic China. Indeed, the announcement of the Chinese Communist Party’s Leading Small Group on the Protection of Maritime Interests headed by President Xi at the end of 2012 illustrates the importance the new president places on Chinese maritime interests and a coordinated policy-making process. This development signals increased policy emphasis on its maritime borders in the South and East China Sea by the new leadership, with significant implications for regional security and international relations.
While this will be popular with the domestic public, it will not calm international fears that China has abandoned its ‘peaceful rise’ in favour of more aggressive behaviour in the international system. This is a significant foreign policy challenge for the Xi leadership. With the United States’ refocus on the Asia-Pacific region, China will need to regain the confidence of its neighbours if it is to successfully compete with the United States for regional influence. However, what are the opportunities and constraints behind these policy developments? Are there fundamental changes to the structure of Chinese foreign policy decision-making? Do the answers to these questions signal a change in direction for Chinese foreign policy in the South China Sea under Xi Jinping?