Salafism

Most research on jihadi groups examines their violent radicalisation.
Insurgents that politicise in civil wars and become more pragmatic
without renouncing violence are less understood. This article
defines jihadi groups’ politicisation as the development of realistic
tactical and strategic objectives, durable alliances with other actors
including foreign states and non-state armed groups, and normal­
isation of their interactions with the population. This article argues
that politicisation is not merely the outcome of armed groups’
independent ideological revisions. Politicisation results from
a combination of several factors that restrain jihadi insurgents in
civil wars. In Syria, the empirical analysis of Ahrar al-Sham demon­
strates that the group was restrained by (1) its decentralised orga­
nisational structures and (2) interactions with other actors including
other insurgents, the population, and foreign states. This article is
based on extensive field research conducted in Syria and Turkey
with Syrian insurgents across the spectrum.

This essay addresses discursive practices in the literature on Islam in Central Asia and highlights a recent shift from Wahhabism to Salafism as the main 'non-traditional' movement perceived to pose a threat. This shift is the result of a postimperial understanding of religious dynamics as well as the standardisation of global security discourses. Relying on a survey of academic journals and Central Asian media that demonstrates a recent sharp increase in the use of 'Salafism' rather than 'Wahhabism', the essay questions hierarchies of knowledge production and offers solutions to avoid the pitfalls of theoretical instrumentalisation in Central Asian scholarship.

Terms usurped and capitalised upon by Al-Qaeda and other similar terrorist and extremist organisations have a special place in Islamic culture and a particular resonance with Muslim populations. The aforementioned terrorist groups normally utilise these terms in order to further their objectives and gain, first, the support of larger audiences and, ultimately, legitimacy for their actions. At the same time, Western policy makers,
security agencies and, crucially, the media have also used and regurgitated the same terminology in an uncritical fashion. This article explains the semantic nuances behind
terms like “Islamic”, “Islamist”, “fundamentalist”, “Salafi”, “Wahhabi” and “jihadi terrorism”, and the potential that such use has for the alienation of moderate segments of the Muslim creed and the obstacles it raises for intercultural counter-radicalisation
efforts. The article then suggests the adoption of a more-nuanced term by Western circles – one that is equally embedded in Islamic culture and its value system and one that
is not as negligent or power-related as the ones that are currently used.

This article examines the “Islamic State” (IS) phenomenon that has shaken the Middle East since the summer of 2014 as well as its large-scale security implications. To this end the article provides a brief historical background on IS, explores and defines its organizational character, as well as identifies and evaluates the different kinds of security threats posed by IS at the regional and global levels. The argument is that IS is not a typical case of a terrorist organization. It is rather a fusion of a state, an insurgency, and a terrorist organization that could be best described as a “quasi-state.” Further, the security threats posed by IS are categorized into conventional and asymmetrical (or nonconventional) ones. The former regard the regional level, while the latter can even have global repercussions. The article concludes with an assessment of IS's most important security threats and highlights the importance of dealing with its extremist ideology and the conditions that fuel it.

As a non-state actor that claims its own territory, the “Islamic State” utilizes a spectrum of very different kinds of coercion and violence. Considering the group's aspirations to govern the territories controlled by it, any clear distinction between uses of force and coercion that states typically claim as their legitimate right, and implement terrorist non-state violence, tends to blur right before our analytically-focused eyes. This contribution discusses how the group challenges the distinction between “terror from above” and “terrorism from below” as well as the meaning of the dual character of Daesh's belief system between the ideological and the religious for Daesh's repertoire of violence.

This article challenges the dominant organization-centered focus of the study of Islamic movements, and argues for a turn towards social practice. To do so, it traces the rise and spread of Egypt's leading Salafi movement, Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya (e. 1926) and its role in popularizing a series of distinct practices between 1940 and 1990. Based on the full run of this movement's magazine, al-Hadi al-Nabawi (the Prophetic Guide, 1936-66) and al-Tawhid (Monolatry, 1973-93), the article explores the conditions in which practices such as praying in shoes and bareheaded, gender segregation and the cultivation of a fist-length beard were both politically viable and strategically advantageous. In doing so, it not only casts light on the trajectory of this movement, but also shows how and why the articulation and performance of distinct social practices are central to how Islamic movements shape society.

Since Ramaḍān 1435 (June/July 2014), the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (dawlat al-islāmiyya, IS), the ‘State of the Caliphate’ (dawlat al-khilāfa), publishes a periodic magazine entitled Dabiq. This glossy outlet, produced and distributed by al-Ḥayāt, one of the movement’s media organizations, is widely disseminated on the Internet and forms part of IS’s advancement in the field of the media. Published in English and other European languages, it allows the movement to spread its messages to an international audience.
This article analyzes and evaluates four issues of Dabiq published in English between June and October 2014.It argues that three aspects are crucial for framing the ideological justification of the movement’s warfare and help to rally support for their state-building project: the development and establishment of images of the enemy, the notion of ‘strangeness,’ and the call for emigration. Within this framework, the magazine intertwines textual and visual accounts of the movement’s physical and virtual battlefields and mediates these to a non-Arab speaking public. Thus, Dabiq is – chronologically, technologically, and ideologically – the most recent and very well elaborated attempt of the Islamic State at winning support among the broadest public possible on a global level. The article concludes that the magazine at large and the abovementioned aspects reflect both the ideological structure of the movement and its current situation in Iraq and Syria. Utilizing derogative images of their enemies helps the Islamic State both to maintain its claim for legitimacy and to position their adherents and opponents within a dichotomous ideological framework. On this basis, it calls its followers to immigrate to the land of the two rivers and the Levant in order to support the establishment of an Islamic State and eradicate nation state borders.

Psycho-Social Negative Reflections of Salafi Understandings of Religion
Abstract
The main claim of this article is that Salafi religious understandings lead to many negative psychological and sociological (psycho-social) consequences. At the same time, these elements are not only related to Salafism and Salafi groups, but also they are generally related to the belief elements of most Muslim individuals and groups. In this context the purpose of article is to reveal the mutually affected psycho-social negative features that have emerged in the past and present and may also come to light in the future, even though there are many different features that characterize Salafi thought. In the article, research and evaluation are made through an interdisciplinary method. In this framework, basic informations and discussion topics that will provide comprehension of Salafi understandings of religion of different disciplines are discussed in relation to the research areas of the Sociology of Religion. Firstly, the characteristics and basic attitudes of Salafi religious conceptions that may have negative psycho-social consequences are described, afterwards these attitudes are listed separately and the negative effects they can cause are explained within successive effect framework by presenting cause-and-effect relationship. As a result of the research, it has been seen that the characteristics of Salafi understandings of religion that may have negative consequences are as follows: 1-Disregard of the socio-cultural anthropological approach 2-A constant understanding of faith and religion at the basic level 3-Apparent/literal approach 4-Unity in faith and actions 5-The thought that reason cannot comprehend religious issues 6-The idea that the Qur'an is not created 7-Constructing daily life through religious texts 8-Being limited to the Golden Age 9-The blessing of the language 10-Standing against history and tradition 11-Looking for the solutions to post/modern problems through past 12-Opposition to bid‘ah (innovation) 13-The only truth discourse 14-Absolutisation of religious knowledge 15-Standing against cultural construction 16-Sanctifying religious authorities 17-Mission of tabligh (reaching out) 18-‘Ummah understanding 19-Dār Al-Harb (abode of war) discourse 20-Patriarchal religious discourse 21-Traditional education methods. When these features are analyzed in detail, it is understood that these approaches have factors that may negatively affect individuals and groups in many ways. However, Salafism is approached mostly as a negative structure by considering radical/jihadist Salafi movements in researches prevent us from seeing what kind of serious negative consequences of these understandings of religion have caused in the history of Islam and today, and what kind of problems they may cause in the future. Therefore, it is an important result that these understandings of religion should be carefully examined by believers.
Keywords
Sociology of Religion, Salafi Understandings of Religion, Salafism, Salafi Groups, Fundamentalism, Psycho-Social Negative consequences

Selefî Din Anlayışlarının Psiko-Sosyal Olumsuz Yansımaları
Öz
Bu makalenin temel iddiası, Selefî din anlayışlarının psikolojik ve sosyolojik (psiko-sosyal) açıdan birçok olumsuz sonuca yol açtığı, aynı zamanda bu unsurların sadece Selefîlik ve Selefî gruplarla ilgisi olmadığı, dolayısıyla genel olarak çoğu Müslüman birey ve grubun inanç ögeleriyle ilişkili olduğudur. Bu kapsamda makalenin amacı, Selefî düşünceyi karakterize eden birçok farklı özellik olsa da onun din anlayışlarına yönelik geçmiş dönemde ve günümüzde ortaya çıkmış, aynı zamanda gelecekte de gün yüzüne çıkabilecek karşılıklı olarak birbirini etkileyen psiko-sosyal olumsuz özellikleri açığa çıkarmaktır. Makalede interdisiplinler bir yöntem üzerinden araştırma ve değerlendirme yapılmaktadır. Bu çerçevede farklı disiplinlere ait Selefî din anlayışlarının anlaşılmasını sağlayacak temel bilgiler ve tartışma konuları Din Sosyolojisi’nin araştırma alanlarıyla ilişkili bir biçimde ele alınmaktadır. İlk olarak Selefî din anlayışlarının psiko-sosyal açıdan olumsuz sonuçlar doğurabilecek özellikleri ve temel tutumları betimlenmiş, daha sonra bu tutumlar ayrı maddeler hâlinde sıralanarak onların yol açabileceği olumsuz etkiler zincirleme etki çerçevesinde neden-sonuç ilişkisi sunularak açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Araştırma neticesinde Selefî din anlayışlarının olumsuz sonuçlar doğurabilecek özelliklerinin şunlar olduğu görülmüştür: 1-Sosyo-kültürel antropolojik yaklaşımın dikkate alınmaması 2-Temel seviyede sabit bir iman ve din anlayışı 3-Zâhirî/literal yaklaşım 4-İman-amel bütünlüğü 5-Aklın dinî konuları kavrayamayacağı 6-Kur’an’ın mahlûk olmaması 7-Dinî metinler üzerinden hayatı inşa etme 8-Asr-ı saâdet dönemiyle sınırlı kalma 9-Dilin kutsanması 10-Tarih ve geleneğe karşı duruş 11-Post/modern sorunlara geçmiş üzerinden çözüm arama 12-Bid’at karşıtlığı 13-Tek hakikatçi söylem 14-Dinî bilginin mutlaklaştırılması 15-Kültürel inşaya karşı duruş 16-Dinî otoriteleri kutsallaştırma 17-Tebliğ misyonu 18-Ümmetçilik anlayışı 19-Dârülharp söylemi 20-Ataerkil dinî söylem 21-Geleneksel eğitim yöntemleri. Bu özellikler ayrıntılı bir şekilde analiz edildiğinde söz konusu yaklaşımların kişi ve grupları birçok yönden olumsuz etkileyebilecek unsurlara sahip olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Fakat araştırmalarda çoğunlukla radikal/cihatçı Selefî hareketler dikkate alınarak Selefîliğin olumsuz bir yapılanma olarak ele alınması, söz konusu din anlayışlarının İslâm tarihi içerisinde ve günümüzde ne tür ciddi olumsuz sonuçlara yol açtığını ve gelecekte de ne tür sorunları ortaya çıkarabileceğini görmemize engel olmaktadır. Bundan dolayı bu din anlayışlarının inananlar tarafından dikkatle incelenmesi gerekliliği önemli bir sonuç olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Din Sosyolojisi, Selefî Din Anlayışları, Selefîlik, Selefî Gruplar, Fundamentalizm, Psiko-Sosyal Olumsuz Etkiler

This research analyses the comparative institutionalization of the strategies of three major components of the Egyptian Islamist social movement family: the jihadis, the Muslim Brotherhood and the salafis. It uses historical institutionalism to amend rational choice paradigms and to investigate the constraints and opportunities posed by these actors' past trajectories on their subsequent strategic choices. This article argues that 1981 and 2011 were two critical junctures that have shaped these actors' ideational and organizational construction through path-dependent causal mechanisms regulating their mobilization and socialization processes. It contends that these mechanisms have shaped these groups' evolution and mediated the institutionalization of their strategies.

In contrast to the allegedly puritan, ‘intolerant’ Islam practiced in the Middle East, Islam in Malaysia has always been portrayed especially in Western media as rather moderate. Given the fact that Islam in Malaysia has taken a conservative turn since the 1980s, such assertions are increasingly problematic. This paper attempts to explain the Islamic conservative turn in Malaysia and identify its social and political implications. It seeks to highlight how this conservative turn will impact Malaysian society and politics. An important impact that will be discussed in the paper is the emergence of neo-Sufi and neo-Salafi movements. The paper will end by examining the future trajectory of Islam in the country.

This article investigates the adoption of Salafi jihadism by young Egyptians and its repercussions on their mobilization in the Syrian jihad after 2011. This research demonstrates that Salafi jihadis mostly were raised in religious families and argues that the post-9/11 US-led wars triggered the exploration of an alternative to non-jihadi Salafism. This exploration was facilitated by: (1) the inability of mainstream Salafism to face the post-9/11 challenge; (2) the absence of local militant groups; (3) the availability of an alternative literature on the Internet; and (4) the shared religious creed of jihadi and mainstream Salafism. This research contends that online socialization created an internally diverse Salafi jihadi milieu that regulated these youths’ mobilization in the Syrian jihad after 2011.

The Muslim jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) is famous for polemic against Islamic philosophy, theology and rationalizing mysticism, but his positive theological contribution has not been well understood. This comprehensive study of Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicy helps to rectify this lack. Exposition and analysis of Ibn Taymiyya’s writings on God’s justice and wise purpose, divine determination and human agency, the problem of evil, and juristic method in theological doctrine show that he articulates a theodicy of optimism in which God in His essence perpetually wills the best possible world from eternity. This sets Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicy apart from Ash'ari divine voluntarism, the free-will theodicy of the Mu'tazilis, and the essentially timeless God of other optimists like Ibn Sina and Ibn 'Arabi.

Is there ‘a Salafi community’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and is it a threat to moderate and tolerant Islam in Bosnia? This article intends to critically question the category of Salafism and explore the broader phenomenon of Islamic militancy in the religious and political context of postwar Bosnia. The aim is to depart from a securitizing framework by avoiding defining it in ideological terms and by choosing to look at Salafism as a relational and social phenomenon. The argument starts with a revision of the problem and of the terms used to describe it and proceeds by proposing a genealogy of the various militant Islamic groups and an analysis of Salafi relations to the religious establishment.

In any contest for power, the multiple actors involved employ various strategies to convey their messages to national and international audiences. The contest for control over the state between the Iraqi government forces and Jihadist groups after 2003 has seen the latter deploy both rhetoric and particular forms of visualization to persuade their audience of the need to establish an ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq and beyond. This article evaluates the extent to which al-Qāʿida in Iraq (AQI) and its successor the ‘Islamic State of Iraq’ (ISI) have tried to appeal to supporters by employing specific rhetorical and visual signs. It analyzes the group’s utopian prospects – a vision that is reinforced through rhetoric and images that play on emotions and inspire the adherents of the ‘Islamic State’.

This article aims to explain the ideas and the significance of Dr. Bilal Philips, a prominent 'Salafi'preacher, a major proponent of Neo-Traditional Salafism, and how his writings and activities can aid us in understanding the dynamics regarding the nature of Salafism in the West as a discursive tradition with deep roots in the Islamic intellectual history, as well as an element of global Salafi movements. As such, the article focuses primarily on identifying and analyzing Philips' ideas on what constitutes a proper approach to interpreting the Qur'¯ an and Sunna in the light of the Islamic legal and exegetical tradition. After discussing the reasons why the ideas of Philips are significant for understanding Salafism in the West, the article focuses on his views on the conceptual relationship between sunna and had¯ ıth, the broader hermeneutic characterization of the main four Sunni schools of thought (madh¯ ahib), and issues pertaining to the correct methodology of Qur'¯ anic exegesis (tafs¯ ır). The article also discusses the internal factionalism and the contentedness of the category of Salafism among western Salafis by examining one critique levelled at Philips by his fellow Salafis residing in the West, with the view of not only understanding and situating the views of Philips more accurately but also to provide an avenue to understand the internal Salafi dynamics in the West in particular.

This article examines recent developments of Salafism in Côte d’Ivoire by exploring how the movement has evolved over the last 25 years through its main national associations and leaders. Although the situation with regard to terrorism has changed in this country since the attack in Grand-Bassam on 13 March 2016, the intent of this article is to move beyond a reductive focus on security and counterterrorism by painting a more-nuanced portrait of one local manifestation of a global movement often reduced to violence and conflict. Far from becoming radicalized and despite increasing levels of activism, the country’s Salafi elites and main national associations have demonstrated civic engagement and opposition to terrorism. They also increased their participation in the socioeconomic arena as well as their willingness to act as a key intermediary between the Muslim community and the country’s political leadership.

The essay deals with the bitter polemics between Neo-Ahl al-Ḥadīth and Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, a well-known legal scholar in the contemporary Muslim Sunni world. In addition to analyzing the substantial claims made by one party against the other one, the essay focuses on the rhetorical devices used by both parties. It analyzes these devices in light of theories of Pragmatics in the field of discourse analysis, with special attention to the distinction between a " discussion " and an " argument. " My main finding is that Qaraḍāwī's critics seek to ruin his public " face " because, in their view " modernist-reformist " religious figures like Qaraḍāwī are agents of Western-oriented secularization, camouflaged by a pseudo-orthodox juristic dress.

The renowned Syrian ʿālim Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan Al-Buti was one of the world's leading scholarly representatives of Sunni Islam in contemporary times. The written debates that occurred between the Damascene ʿulamā', al-Buti, and the iconic Salafi scholar and h  adīth scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani constitute one of the most important and comprehensive intra-Muslim debates in the twentieth century, having helped to define a clear schism between the neotraditionalist position and its presumed opposite: Salafism. This article suggests that the rhetoric of anti-Salafism needs to be studied further to better understand contemporary currents in modern Islamic intellectual history. The adversarial rift that crystallised in the thriving Shāmī scholarly milieu of the 1980s and 90s informed the existence of a distinct neo-traditionalist school both in the West and many parts of the Muslim world for the latter part of twentieth century and to this day. At the intersection of political competition, textual methodology and competing visions of heresy and history, Islamic neo-traditionalism represents a key contestant in the battle for religious authority in contemporary Islam under the secular nation-state. Between championing a constructed concept of a 'tradition' for modern times and those who seek to return to a pristine 'true Islam', a deadlock is inevitable.

Conflict and polemic between Sunni Muslims and Shiites have a long history. In the contemporary era, this polemic has been accentuated by the conflictual situation in the Middle East, and it is also colouring the minority Muslim situation. This article is concerned with Islamic interpretations related to ‘othering’, taking as its main focus an analysis of publications on a Swedish Sunni website, ‘Maktabah Dâr-ul-Hadîth’, which has clear Salafi leanings. Reports show that Shiites currently feel threatened by Salafis in minority contexts and the material cited in this article ‘others’ Shiite Islam and Shiites (amongst others), creating a stereotypical image that may have the potential to influence sectarian violence in real life. Several of the texts on the website deal with theological issues concerning the alleged false beliefs of Shiites. However, the article does not focus on theological creed but rather on manhaj, the programme for action, that is, the behaviour towards Shiites that is recommended in various situations, such as at work, in greeting Shiites or being invited to a Shiite wedding, thus affecting everyday situations. The analysis looks into what kind of ‘othering’ is promoted and what effect this othering might have if put into practice.

Followers of Muhammad b. ’Abd al-Wahhab, often considered to be Islam’s Martin Luther, shaped the political and religious identity of the Saudi state while also enabling the significant worldwide expansion of Salafist Islam. Studies of the movement he inspired, however, have often been limited by scholars’ insufficient access to key sources within Saudi Arabia. Nabil Mouline was granted rare interviews and admittance to important Saudi archives in preparation for this groundbreaking book, the first in-depth study of the Wahhabi religious movement from its founding to the modern day. Gleaning information from both written and oral sources and employing a multidisciplinary approach that combines history, sociology, and Islamic studies, Mouline presents a new reading of this movement that transcends the usual resort to polemics.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw a rapid depletion of Islamic society, government, theology and culture. This caused a great disconnect with the long theological and historical traditions of the Islamic faith. Many Muslim scholars and theologians were highly influenced by the decline of the Muslim world and deeply troubled by it (Kuru 2007, 568–578). Moreover, in a context of oppression, many adopted novel responses and reformulated their theologies with emphasis on rejection, reformation and revolution of Islam from its established traditions and institutions (Kerr 1966). The result of such thought was Islamic movements were mostly Islamist in their outlook and approach with a political agenda. This chapter argues the modernist influence and its shift away from the Islamic tradition paved the path for the re-emergence of the neo-Kharijite sect in Islam. A good exception to this was the Kurdish scholar Said Nursi’s (1877-1960) revivalist work, the Risale-i Nur, which retained the rich theological, historical and cultural traditions of Islam and called for a social activism rooted in non-violence as well as an apolitical attitude. This chapter critically examines the Risale-i Nur and discusses the historical context within which Said Nursi worked. It describes the theological arguments and methodology that refuted the prevailing discourses of his contemporaries, particularly the emerging Salafism and neo-Kharijite. It does so to distinguish Nursi’s theology based apolitical non-violent activism from theological arguments that endorse activism rooted in political Islam. A comparative analysis of these theological arguments in light of their historical contexts provides a good framework to analyse contemporary Islamic movements and their political and civic responses to the world, ranging from non-violence to social and political activism and finally to violent extremism.

The study focuses particularly on Egypt because this country is central to the elaboration of Islamic political thought. In fact, the conditions for that phenomenon called āl-Nahḍa, translated as rebirth/renaissance, were born in Egypt, in which were born the first authors who would then lead to political Islam, a theme then developed in this research. In fact, the greatest of the first Salafist thinkers, Muhammad 'Abdū, was the bearer of a neo-Mutalizilite and progressive thought, a message which has been betrayed by his disciple Rashīd Riḍā and even more by a follower of Riḍā: the famous Hasan āl Bannā who gave life to the Brotherhood of the Muslim Brotherhood, the first group of political Islam. And although the Muslim Brotherhood tended to choose a peaceful line - although we will see that Sayyd Quṭb who will be the maitre a penser of global jihadism will emerge from the Brotherhood - a red thread connects them to today's jihadist organizations: the call to Caliphate and shari'ah in a vision of an all-inclusive Islam. Sayyd Sayyd Quṭb then goes on to embody the ideological link between the Muslim Brotherhood and jihādism with his concept of jahiliyya, and therefore of takfīr. The evolution of jihadist groups will then follow other paths that are explored here, passing from the Egyptian āl Jamā'a āl Islāmiyya and āl Takfīr wal Hijra  to the formation of āl Qā’eda up to ISIS, which seems to gather many of the previous elements as in a sort of matryoshka. On the other hand, however, a new generation of Muslim thinkers requires reform, often clinging to the neo-Mutalizilite inheritance and in particular to the scholar, imam of Āl-Azhar, refined thinker who played such an important role, Muhammad 'Abdū. A new ijtihād, an interpretative effort is required, the āl maqāsid āl shari'ah, the higher purposes of the shari'ah and the discussion of a new relationship between the Korān and hadīth, in favor of the Korān, are among the most important and convincing themes used by these neo-reformists.

The Arab Spring has reshaped the Islamist landscape in the Middle East drastically. After decades of repression and exclusion, Islamist parties have taken power in Egypt, Tunis, and Morocco. However, the startling rise of Salafism (Salafiyya) remains the most visible feature of the new Islamist scene in the region. After decades of eschewing politics for theological and political reasons, Salafi movements and groups have rushed into electoral politics enthusiastically. They became keen to form political parties, contest elections, and vie for power. In Egypt, the Salafi parties fared well in the post-revolution parliamentary elections and are a key player in drafting Egypt's new constitution. This article explores the rise of Salafism after Mubarak and examines its effects on the democratic transition in Egypt. It investigates the ideological and theological stance of Salafi movements and parties on politics and democracy in particular. The argument put forward is that the extraordinary political openness in Egypt after the revolution has pushed Salafis into everyday politics. Subsequently, Salafis have become more inclined to adopt a pragmatic and practical discourse. Based on field research, this article provides a thematic analysis of Egyptian Salafism and assesses its political future.

Based on extensive research conducted in the Arabian Peninsula, this book offers an original approach to Salafism taking into account the internal dynamics of the Yemeni branch of the movement as well as its relationship to its complex and evolving context. Laurent Bonnefoy focuses on the allegedly apolitical Salafi doctrine but most importantly references the everyday practices of its followers.

Over the last decade or so Salafism has become one of the West’s new political bogey-men. Many regard the movement as the antechamber of violent groups such as al-Qaeda, and as the by-product of a centralized foreign-policy platform shaped by so-called Saudi interests. Based on extensive research conducted throughout Yemen between 2001 and 2009, and particularly in the southern province of Yâfi‘, this book offers an original approach to Salafism and draws a necessary counter-narrative that takes into account the dynamics of the Salafi movement as well as its relationship to its evolving environment, either local, regional and international.

Having studied over a hundred recorded sermons and conferences and dozens of books, and carried out interviews with numerous clerics, intellectuals and activists, Laurent Bonnefoy focuses on the allegedly apolitical Salafi doctrine promoted by the renowned Yemeni Salafi figure, Muqbil al-Wadi'i, who died in 2001. Building on IR theory and political sociology, he references the everyday practices of al-Wadi'i's dedicated followers, their rivalries as well as their own evolving trajectories. He demonstrates that, rather than resulting from specifically planned policies, Yemeni Salafism has, since the early 1980s, evolved through a series of spontaneous, grassroots mechanisms, many of which are shaped by transnational flows, that embed this movement in the complex Yemeni context.

Following the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions, Salafi parties have been established in Egypt and Tunisia. They tend to have ultra-conservative views on social and gender issues, but have denounced the use of violence. The al-Nour party in Egypt and the Reform Front in Tunisia have advocated the implementation of Sharia by democratic means. They have chosen to campaign through the parliament and within the constitution. However, their participation in the political system of post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia is a puzzle given Salafism's rejection of democracy. The article will utilise framing theory to understand why electoral Salafis have endorsed democratic practices to gain support and survive politically. It will first explain the content of the democracy master frame. Then the article will describe the political transformation of Salafism in Egypt and Tunisia. Finally, it will analyse how Salafis have adopted the democracy master frame to achieve their political goals.

published in MER221 (/mer/mer221) Since the early 1980s, commentators have argued that Islam is suffering a crisis of identity, as the crumbling of Islamic civilization in the modern age has left Muslims with a profound sense of alienation and injury. Challenges confronting Muslim nations --failures of development projects, entrenched authoritarian regimes and the inability to respond effectively to Israeli belligerence --have induced deep-seated frustration and anger that, in turn, contributed to the rise of fundamentalist movements, or as most commentators have preferred to say, political Islam. But most commentators have been caught off guard by the ferocity of the acts of mass murder recently committed in New York and Washington. The basic cruelty and moral depravity of these attacks came as a shock not only to non-Muslims, but to Muslims as well.

This article analyses Russian elements in the texts of Said Buriatskii (1982–2010), who in the late 2000s was one of the main ideologists and symbols of the internationalist Islamist resistance in the North Caucasus. Trying to explain the importance and validity of jihad, Buriatskii referred to the concepts of the famous Soviet historian and anthropologist Lev Gumilev and brought Islamic radicalism closer to a Russian-speaking audience by using Gumilev’s terminology. Indeed, he found some appreciation among Russian radical journalists, and even among oppositionists from a background close to the Russian Orthodox Church. This article therefore argues that, in spite of his Islamic rhetoric, Buriatskii can also be understood as aspiring to achieve the status of a Russian public intellectual, particularly as a representative of a broader movement that emphasizes values such as sincerity and passion.

The Salafi movement presents itself as a moral guardian of Muslims in a world that, according to many, is filled with moral crisis, temptations and anti-Islam tendencies. Salafis claim that it is essential to return to the community of the pious forefathers seen as the most outstanding community of all times with the highest absolute moral standard. In this article I will show how individual participants engage with this idea of a moral community of believers yet remain vulnerable to the ambiguities and ruptures inherent in everyday life and within the Salafi movement. By exploring how Salafis passionately try to search for the ‘correct’ knowledge and strive to maintain a unity between knowledge, conviction and behavior, and the role of friendships therein, I argue that Salafism does not remain separate from the troubles of everyday but that these issues enter into and exist in Salafi thought and practice, not by being resolved but by being transformed into personal struggles. These ambiguities and ruptures may cause problems but also provide an incentive for Salafis to continuously work at the self-improvement of one’s piety, authenticity, and sisterhood and brotherhood.

Little has been written about the political party of the LeT, the Milli Muslim League, and what has been written has been misleading. Some authors have suggested that the MML reflects Pakistan’s sincere desire to defang its nastiest militant group by shunting its stalwarts and cadres into a useful political role, whereby it can counter the army’s civilian enemies within Pakistan. Below, I argue that Pakistan’s move is much more profound than a quest to find an alternative to demilitarizing the LeT/JuD or even manipulating electoral outcomes. I contend that the formation of the MML is part of a more serious effort to use the pro-state organization against the myriad militant groups tearing the state apart, while also investing in another political alternative to the current political parties that will pay dividends over the longer time horizon. Based upon available information about the MML, its ties to the JuD and its mentorship by Pakistan’s security organizations, I reject the claim that the MML’s formation signals a new effort on the part of the Pakistani state to redirect JuD’s external militarism towards a new domesticated political role, and thus serves as a state-directed “de-radicalization” or “demobilization” effort to mainstream Islamist militants. I argue, instead, that the MML will be a complement to JuD’s efforts to stabilize Pakistan internally and enhance LeT’s external activities in the service of the deep state.

Jugendarbeit agiert im Allgemeinen nach ihrem methodologischen Selbstverständnis und Bildungsauftrag nicht unter dem Vorzeichen von Prävention. Dort aber, wo Jugendliche mit menschenfeindlichen Orientierungs- und Handlungsmustern durch Angebote der Jugendarbeit erreicht werden, kann dies auch unter präventiven Gesichtspunkten einer beziehungsorientierten und zielgruppenspezifischen „Förderung positiver Lebensverhältnisse“ geschehen. Die akzeptierende Jugendarbeit mit Jugendlichen in rechtsextremen Jugendcliquen ist diesen Weg gegangen. Dieser Ansatz wird auf die Jugendarbeit mit Jugendlichen, die sich in Hinwendungsprozessen zum sog. Salafismus befinden, übertragen.

Turkey has been absent from the growing literature on the phenomenon of transnational Salafism. A tendency among Middle East specialists to focus on Arab regions and in Turkey on the Islamist movement and its long struggle with the Kemalist establishment has perpetuated the notion of Turkey as a category apart. This article argues that, on the contrary, Salafism is a fringe strand of Turkish Islam that began to evolve in the context of the state's effort in the 1980s to recalibrate religion as a complement to nationalism. Salafism became a topic of discussion in media and scholarly writing in Turkish religious studies faculties, while self-styled Salafi preachers trained in Saudi Arabia found a niche through publishing houses. These publishers facilitated the translation into Turkish of Arabic texts by important Saudi religious scholars in an effort to change the discursive landscape of Islam in Turkey. I show that contra assumptions of a rich Sufi tradition acting as a block against modern Salafi ideas, Salafism managed to gain a foothold in Turkey, facilitated in part by the republic's experience of secular materialism.

In contemporary academic literature, the word “Salafī” has a variety of meanings. Most importantly, Western academic literature of the 20th and 21st centuries applies the word to (1) an Islamic reform movement founded by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d. 1897) and Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849–1905) in the last decades of the 19th century and (2) to contemporary Sunni reform movements that criticize manifestations of Sunni Islam which are based on Sufism, Ashʿarism, and traditional madhhab-affiliations to the Shāfiʿī, Ḥanafī, and Mālikī schools. In a 2010-article Henri Lauzière argued that the use of the word “Salafī” to describe these two movements is an equivocation based on a mistake. While the movement of contemporary Salafīs may be rightfully called by that name, al-Afghānī and ʿAbduh never used the term. Only Western scholars of the 1920s and 30s, most importantly Louis Massignon (1883–1962), called this latter movement “salafī”. This paper reevaluates the evidence presented by Lauzière and argues that Massignon did not make a mistake. The paper describes analytically both reform movements and draws the conclusion that there is a historic continuity that justifies calling them both “salafī”. The paper draws an analogy from the use of the word “socialist” in European political history, which first applied to a wider movement of the late 19th century before its use was contested and narrowed down in the course of the 20th.

The Salafi ulama (religious scholars) in Malaysia have seen their
religious and political influence amplified over the last five years. Operating within a newly formed organization, the Pertubuhan IlmuwanMalaysia (ILMU) and the newly augmented United Malays National
Organization’s (UMNO) young ulama wing, Salafi scholars play a key role in providing Islamic legitimacy to the government and defending it against the opposition Islamist party, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). The decision by Salafi scholars to support the Malaysian government is striking given their hardline views on the implementation of Islamic laws and their opposition to democracy. This paper seeks to understand the reasons for the Salafi ulama’s support for UMNO. It argues that the Salafi ulama’s involvement in UMNO is due to a convergence of interest between the two groups and as part of a strategy by the Salafi ulama to expand their influence at both the state and societal levels. The paper examines the religious-political positions of the Salafi ulama on issues such as the Islamic state, the implementation of Islamic laws and democratic political system, and argues that they are opposed to the current state of religious affairs and the political structure of the Malaysian state. Nevertheless, the
ulama are working within UMNO to change the political system. For  UMNO leaders, the Salafi ulama form an important group that could defend the party against religious attacks from PAS and provide the party with greater religious credence.

Salafis do not view Shias very favourably. In general, this has to do with their ideological objections to Shias' beliefs and, perhaps secondarily, the political conflicts with Shia powers like Iran, Syria and the Lebanese Hizballah (Haykel, 2010; Steinberg, 2009). Given the fact that Jordan has virtually no Shias, the kingdom may differ from other countries in that the sectarian issue is less urgent there. Yet Jordanian Salafis also use sectarianism to vilify other Sunnis in a competition for their own regime's favour. This article shows that Jordanian Salafis contribute to the sectarianization of the kingdom with their own anti-Shiism by relying on a discourse in which anti-Shia ideological and political arguments and intra-Sunni polemics are inextricably mixed. It first deals with the Jordanian regime's stance on Shias and its relationship with Salafis. The article then analyses what some prominent Jordanian Salafi scholars have said about Shias and how they have used this to curry favour with the regime, at the expense of other Sunnis. The Jordanian context The regime's view of Shias Views of Shias in Jordan were strongly influenced by the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Yet negative perceptions of Shias held by King Husayn (r. 1953-1999), who ruled Jordan at the time, seem to have emanated more from his opposition to the new Iranian regime than from anti-Shia feelings. In order to keep out Iranian influence, Jordan began promoting a 'moderate' and 'official' Islam (Robbins & Rubin, 2013). This was the reason several Islamic institutes were founded, including the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, established in 1980. This institute aims to bring together all Muslimsincluding Shiasand has also been used to counter the discourse of militant groups like al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State (IS) with a 'moderate' message, a campaign that especially King 'Abdallah II (r. 1999-) has been in the forefront of (Minzili, 2007).

The article examines the complexity of Tunisian Salafism in the context of the Tunisian transition to democracy. Building on primary sources and original field work, the article highlights the theoretical and practical divergences that affect the Salafist camp in Tunisia in its struggle to continue a revolutionary project for a sector of disenfranchised youth unwilling to support a process of renewal of political institutions that they perceive as contributing their marginalization. In addition, the article explores the ways in which, paradoxically, the emergence and public presence of Salafism can contribute to the strengthening of democratic debate in the country.

Saudi Arabia has begun to pursue an active and ambitious foreign policy in recent years, especially under the rule of the Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman. The main parameters of this new era may be stated as: an increasing dependence on the US; the further demonisation of Iran and its regional allies; greater efforts to normalise political relations with Israel; the establishment of closer cooperation with the UAE and Egypt; and the promoting of Madkhali Salafism in the Middle East. Riyadh's emergence as a new power centre significantly relies on regional and international power politics. In this respect, the geopolitical dimension of Middle Eastern politics plays a crucial role in examining the Saudi position. This article aims to explain Riyadh's recent foreign policy moves within the context of the Barakah Circle Theory as a non-Western geopolitical framework.

After conquering large swaths of Syria and Iraq, the IS undertook an aggressive sectarian campaign in which they not only enacted horrific violence against the Shia people, but also damaged or destroyed several key Shia mosques and shrines. Drawing on Social Movement Theory (SMT), this article analyzes the response by various Shia nonstate actors—militia leaders, religious clergymen, populist preachers, and seminal poets. It argues that they used the IS threat to Shia holy sites to develop and deploy a mobilization frame that has come to be referred to as the “shrine protection narrative.” The article also documents the manifold consequences of the shrine protection narrative: it underpinned a mass recruitment drive that saw tens of thousands enlist; it legitimized foreign Shia militias to enter the conflicts in both Syria and Iraq; it justified the formation of entirely new militias who declared the centrality of shrine protection to their mandate; and it mobilized them to enact political violence. In doing so, this article extends existing studies of SMT to demonstrate that “sacred spaces”—and particularly the need to protect religious sites from specific threats—can serve as a powerful mobilization frame towards political violence.