Relation between International Law and National law

In 1918, the states of continental Europe, beginning with the German speaking countries, started to incorporate into their new national Constitutions the Anglo-American maxim "[international law is] part of the law of the land". Formulated by William Blackstone in 1769, this principle concerns the field of customary international law. Going forward on this basis, the general rules of international law were then generally and permanently transformed into national law, notwithstanding any act enacted by state bodies (referred to as "transformation ipso jure"). International law's  transformation ipso jure into national law does not originally appear to result from a legal obligation imposed upon the state, rather this process is the product of a deliberate policy intended to show that any given state subjects itself to international law, including when it concerns domestic affairs. It merely provides a means for implementing positive international law, alongside other possible techniques available to the different national legal systems, from which this thesis articulates a typology. Therefore, the different national constitutional norms undergoing the transformation ipso jure are not superfluous. On the one hand, the transformation ipso jure consists of a general authorization for the benefit of state organs and eventually of private individuals to be able to apply international law. On the other hand, by attributing to international law a certain internal derogatory force (in German referred to as derogatische Kraft), this process opens up the possibility for international legal norms to prevail upon internal rules with which they enter into collision.

C'est à partir de 1918 que les États d'Europe continentale, à commencer par ceux de langue allemande, introduisent dans leurs nouvelles constitutions nationales la maxime d'origine anglo-américaine « [international law is] part of the law of the land », valable en matière de droit international coutumier (formulation William Blackstone, 1769). Sur un tel fondement, les règles générales du droit international se transforment désormais de manière générale et permanente en droit interne, nonobstant toute procédure effectuée par les organes étatiques (on parlera de « transformation ipso iure »). La transformation ipso iure du droit international en droit interne n'apparaît donc à l'origine aucunement comme une exigence juridique pesant sur l'État, mais résulte d'une volonté politique délibérée de montrer que l'État en question se soumet au droit international, et ce, jusque dans sa sphère domestique. Il ne s'agit donc que d'une manière, d'une technique, pour l'État de concrétiser le droit international, à côté d'autres qui restent possibles, et d'ailleurs présentes dans les différents droits positifs nationaux ; l'on en dessinera une typologie. Les différentes normes constitutionnelles nationales qui disposent de la transformation ipso iure ne s'en trouvent pas pour autant superflues : elles consistent, d'un côté, en une habilitation générale au bénéfice des organes internes, ainsi, qu'éventuellement, aux simples particuliers, d'appliquer le droit international ; de l'autre côté, elles ouvrent la possibilité pour le droit international de prévaloir sur les réglementations internes avec lesquelles il entre en collision, en lui attribuant une certaine force dérogatoire interne.

Seit 1918 haben die Staaten des europäischen Kontinents, allen voran die deutschsprachigen, in ihren nationalen Verfassungen die aus dem anglo-amerikanischen Raum stammende Maxime eingeführt, nach der Völkerrecht Teil der nationalen Rechtsordnungen ist (International law is part of the law of the land). Diese Norm, erstmals formuliert von William Blackstone (1769), gilt im Völkergewohnheitsrecht. Auf dieser Grundlage werden seither die allgemeinen Regeln des Völkerrechts generell und ständig in nationales Recht umgesetzt, und zwar unabhängig von den jeweils durch die staatlichen Organe praktizierten Verfahren. Die Übertragung ipso iure des Völkerrechts in innerstaatliches Recht ist somit ursprünglich keinesfalls eine juristische Forderung gegen den Staat, sondern sie resultiert aus dem bewussten politischen Willen deutlich zu machen, dass der betreffende Staat sich dem Völkerrecht unterwirft, und zwar bis in seine inneren Angelegenheiten hinein. Es handelt sich also nur um eine bestimmte Art und Weise, eine Technik unter anderen, die übrigens in den verschiedenen nationalen positiven Rechtsordnungen verankert sind, nach der der Staat Völkerrecht konkretisiert; diese Techniken werden wir typologisch darstellen. Die verschiedenen nationalen Verfassungsnormen, die die Umsetzung ipso iure regeln, sind trotzdem keineswegs überflüssig: Einerseits ermächtigen sie generell die innerstaatlichen Organe, manchmal jedoch auch Einzelpersonen, Völkerrecht anzuwenden. Anderseits eröffnen sie die Möglichkeit, dem Völkerrecht Vorrang gegenüber innerstaatlichen Vorschriften einzuräumen, mit denen es kollidiert, indem sie ihm eine gewisse derogatorische Kraft verleihen.

Scopul lucrarii este acela de a examina dimensiunea monistă a dreptului Uniunii Europene, precum și valențele dualiste și pluraliste încă existente la nivelul dreptului național și să anticipeze influențele pe care acestea le exercită în abordarea constituțională a Statelor Membre.

When concluding an international treaty, and even more in the subsequent transformation of it to internal law rules, states can differently understand the meaning of words and expressions, and as a consequence - the content and boundaries of obligations arising from such an international treaty. Moreover, the transformation into the domestic law, made by the states-parties to the treaty independently of each other, and furthermore, subsequent changes in the domestic law (often without a full evaluation of the consequences for international obligations) can lead to de facto and de jure (in the domestic law) different regulatory regimes.
The resulting effect of law enforcement can level out, in whole or in part, the effect of the conclusion and execution (and absolutely conscientious) of an international treaty. It turns out that in reality the participating States are able to realize a different volume of obligations. This phenomenon leads to a different understanding what is the target regulatory regime based on of the international treaty and therefore to imbalance of international obligations.
The more time we pass from the time of the conclusion of the international treaty, the less control will be exercised over the law enforcement practice of its use (and the application of national legislation into which the international treaty was transformed), the more unbalanced may be the obligations of states.
Of course, when it comes to violation by the State of an international treaty, the issue goes to the area of internationally wrongful acts with the possibility of the international responsibility of States.  However, we are talking about the imbalance, when there are no formal violations of international legal obligations, and it is simply the scope of these obligations is not clearly defined by the international treaty, and therefore is understood differently by states (immediately or after some time).
As an example of such an imbalance we can cite the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Cyprus on legal assistance in civil and criminal matters (signed in Moscow on 19.01.1984)

The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis represented an occasion to assess whether the international, European Union, and national systems provide adequate remedies for violation of socio-economic rights caused by austerity measures. Victims of these violations tried to obtain a remedy by lodging complaints before national judicial organs, the Court of Justice of the European Union, international human rights bodies (such the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association and the European Committee on Social Rights), and the European Court of Human Rights. This article addresses whether one (or more) of these venues indicted adequate remedies of violations of socio-economic rights and whether these mechanisms could have adopted a different (and more human rightsoriented) adjudicative approach with the view of enhancing the effectiveness of socio-economic rights enshrined in international treaties. The paper assumes that the adequacy of the relief depends on two elements. The first is the collective nature of socio-economic rights, which requires structural or systemic remedies rather than individual ones. The second is the need to preserve States’ economic soundness in order to allow Countries to satisfy their international obligations, namely securing a minimum essential level of socioeconomic rights and their progressive realization. Against these assumptions, remedies should benefit the victimized class as a whole, alongside avoiding major distributional or unintended consequences to the detriment of public finances. The investigation focuses on the case law and pronouncements concerning Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The paper reaches the conclusion that constitutional review of austerity measures is the most adequate and effective venue to address such sensitive matters. This is especially true where constitutional courts rely on international conventions protecting socio-economic rights as per se parameters of constitutionality or through consistent interpretation – viz. by construing the national bill of rights in line with treaty-based socio-economic rights.

The Italian Constitutional Court's judgment no. 238 of 2014 holds that Italy cannot comply with the ICJ's judgment in Germany v. Italy and therefore all domestic measures implementing it are unconstitutional. This is the most spectacular instance of open dualism this side of Medellin.