Psychological Process

La atención es un proceso psicológico básico e indispensable para el procesamiento de la información de cualquier modalidad, basado en un complejo sistema neuronal que se encarga del control de la actividad mental de un organismo. El objetivo del presente artículo consiste en explicar la atención como un proceso que ayuda, facilita y participa en todos los procesos cognitivos superiores. A lo largo de la exposición se revisan los componentes y las características de la atención, así como los modelos teóricos del proceso.

Resumen
Este texto ofrece un escenario para el debate sobre el estatus de la noción de proceso psicológico a partir del enfoque de modularidad, asumida en cierta medida en la psicología contemporánea, que pone de manifiesto un compromiso con alguna variedad de arquitectura cognitiva. La modularidad fuerte ha sido un enfoque moderadamente exitoso, pero también ha conducido a una comprensión fragmentada de la mente y el comportamiento, insuficiente para fundamentar la práctica profesional en diversas áreas de la psicología. La modularidad débil, como hipótesis de trabajo y alternativa, puede ser una estrategia de investigación útil, pero también requiere la integración de los hallazgos de la investigación en psicología en un marco coherente. Se discuten las implicaciones de este debate en la enseñanza de la psicología.

Abstract
The objective of this paper is to set the stage for a discussion of the status of the idea of psychological process within psychological explanations and descriptions, indicating some of its consequences for the teaching of psychology. It is argued that contemporary psychology espouses some form of modularity, which, in turn, reveals commitments to a particular variety of cognitive architecture. The assumption of modularity has been a fruitful approach in some areas (e. g. the study of perception), but it has also led to a piecemeal understanding of mind and behavior that is simply insufficient to provide foundations for professional practice in several areas of psychology (e. g. education). Whereas assuming weak modularity as a working hypothesis might be a useful and necessary research strategy, integrating psychological research findings into a coherent framework is necessary. This idea has important consequences for the teaching of psychology.

Resumo
Este texto oferece um cenário para o debate sobre o status da noção de processo psicológico a partir do enfoque da modularidade, assumida em certa medida na psicologia contemporânea, que manifestou um compromisso com alguma variedade da arquitetura cognitiva. A modularidade forte tem sido um enfoque moderadamente exitoso, mas também tem conduzido a uma compreensão fragmentada da mente e do comportamento, insuficiente para fundamentar a prática profissional em diversas áreas da psicologia. A modularidade fraca, como hipótese de trabalho e alternativa, pode ser uma estratégia de investigação útil, mas também requer a integração das descobertas de investigação em psicologia num marco coerente. Discutem-se as implicações deste debate no ensino de psicologia.

The starting point for this paper is a critical discussion of claims of psychological reality articulated within Borg's (forth.) minimal semantics and Carpintero's (2007) character*-semantics. It has been proposed, for independent reasons, that their respective accounts can accommodate, or at least avoid the challenge from psychological evidence. I outline their respective motivations, suggesting various shortcomings in their efforts of preserving the virtues of an uncontaminated semantics in the face of psychological objection (I-II), and try to make the case that, at least for a theory of utterance comprehension, a truth-conditional pragmatic stance is far preferable. An alternative from a relevance-theoretic perspective is offered in terms of mutual adjustment between truth-conditional content and implicature(s), arguing that many " free " pragmatic processes are needed to uncover the truth-conditional content, which can then warrant the expected implicature(s) (III). I finally illustrate the difficulties their accounts have in predicting the correct order of interpretation in cases of ironic metaphor, i.e. metaphor is computed first, as part of truth-conditional content, while irony is inferentially grounded in metaphorical content (IV).