Modularity of Mind

After the earthquake and tsunami occurred in Chile on February 27th 2010, the Technical University Federico Santa Maria was asked to contribute with reconstruction proposals for the commercial infrastructure destroyed in the town “San Juan Bautista”. Located 600 km (~370 mi) away from the continent, this town is not just the home of several endemic species, but is also located next to a National Protected Area and UNESCO Biosphere Reserve. Within this context, the design problem consisted on the development of a component-based strategy and prefabrication requirements, and to reduce to the minimum the implied logistics and environmental impacts of the new buildings. With a Studio of 23 final year students and the support of the Architecture Firms Association, 11 projects were developed using digital tools such as visual programming and digital fabrication. Finally, technical documentation was produced and delivered to the local and government authorities.

The concept of mass customisation is not new yet the UK construction industry has yet to grasp this opportunity to deliver greater value to its customers. The government report Rethinking Construction [Egan 1998] clearly identifies this issue:'We have repeatedly heard the claim that construction is different from manufacturing because every product is unique. We do not agree. Not only are many buildings such as houses, essentially repeat products which can be continually improved but, more importantly, the process of construction is ...

This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited them to bring them up to date (2017). The copyright page has the date of the edition and new editions will be noted there as I edit old articles or add new ones. All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds  within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality.  As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes.  If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and psychology to actually give them some control over themselves), maybe civilization would have a chance.  As things are however the leaders of society have no more grasp of things than their constituents and so collapse into anarchy is inevitable.

The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). Certainly each has much of value, but as currently implemented, they are all band aids on the cancer of selfishness and stupidity, and as handmaidens of selfish genetics lead straight to Hell on Earth.

It is critical to understand why we behave as we do and so the first section presents articles that try to describe (not explain as Wittgenstein insisted) behavior.  I start with a brief review of the logical structure of rationality, which provides some heuristics for the description of language (mind, rationality, personality) and gives some suggestions as to how this relates to the evolution of social behavior.  This centers around the two writers I have found the most important in this regard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual system (two systems of thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion.

The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell On Earth.  As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see.  We live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is the source of the universal blindness described by Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides’ Standard Social Science Model.

The next section describes the digital delusions, which confuse the language games of System 2 with the automatisms of System one, and so cannot distinguish biological machines (i.e., people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., computers).  The ‘reductionist’ claim is that one can ‘explain’ behavior at a ‘lower’ level, but what actually happens is that one does not explain human behavior but a ‘stand in’ for it.  Hence the title of Searle’s classic review of Dennett’s book (“Consciousness Explained”)— “Consciousness Explained Away”.  In most contexts ‘reduction’ of higher level emergent behavior to brain functions, biochemistry, or physics is incoherent. Even for ‘reduction’ of chemistry or physics, the path is blocked by chaos and uncertainty.  Anything can be ‘represented’ by equations, but when they ‘represent’ higher order behavior, it is not clear (and cannot be made clear) what the ‘results’ mean.  Reductionist metaphysics is a joke, but most scientists and philosophers lack the appropriate sense of humor.

Other digital delusions are that we will be saved from the pure evil (selfishness) of System 1 by computers/AI/robotics/ nanotech/genetic engineering created by System 2.  The No Free Lunch principal tells us there will be serious and possibly fatal consequences.  The adventurous may regard this principle as a higher order emergent expression of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Hi-tech enthusiasts hugely underestimate the problems resulting from unrestrained motherhood, and of course it is neither profitable nor politically correct (and now with third world supremacism dominant, not even possible) to be honest about it.

The last section describes The One Big Happy Family Delusion , i.e., that we are selected for cooperation with everyone, and that the euphonious ideals of Democracy, Diversity and Equality  will lead us into utopia, if we just manage things correctly (the possibility of politics).  Again, the No Free Lunch Principle ought to warn us it cannot be true, and we see throughout history and all over the contemporary world, that without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation that embraces it. In addition, the monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we cooperate in selling our descendant’s heritage for temporary comforts, greatly exacerbating the problems.

I describe versions of this delusion (i.e., that we are basically ‘friendly’ if just given a chance) as it appears in some recent books on sociology/biology/economics. I end with an essay on the great tragedy playing out in America and the world, which can be seen as a direct result of our evolved psychology manifested as the inexorable machinations of System 1.  Our psychology, eminently adaptive and eugenic on the plains of Africa from ca. 6 million years ago, when we split from chimpanzees, to ca. 50,000 years ago, when many of our ancestors left Africa (i.e., in the EEA or Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation), is now maladaptive and dysgenic and the source of our Suicidal Utopian Delusions. So, like all discussions of behavior (philosophy, psychology, sociology, biology, anthropology, politics, law, literature, history, economics, soccer strategies, business meetings, etc.), this book is about evolutionary strategies, selfish genes and inclusive fitness (kin selection).
The great mystic Osho said that the separation of God and Heaven from Earth and Humankind was the most evil idea that ever entered the Human mind.  In the 20th century an even more evil notion arose—that humans are born with rights, rather than having to earn privileges.  Thus every day the population increases by 200,000, who must be provided with resources to grow and space to live, and who soon produce another 200,000 etc.  And one almost never hears it noted that what they receive must be taken from those already alive. Their lives diminish those already here in both major obvious and countless subtle ways.  Every new baby destroys the earth from the moment of conception. There cannot be human rights without human wrongs.  It cannot be more obvious, but one will never see the streets full of protesters with banners protesting motherhood.

America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, most of it for the last century and now all of it due to 3rd world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. China will continue to overwhelm America and the world, as long as it maintains the dictatorship which limits selfishness. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies.  Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic system.  Hence my concluding essay “Suicide by Democracy”.

As a social phenomenon, is war subordinate to politics, as Carl von Clausewitz argued in the early nineteenth century, or, instead, is it the product of an instinctive ‘warrior culture’, common to all peoples and times and beyond politics, as John Keegan suggested in the late twentieth? Should we emphasize ‘essential historical elements in the search for a tem-poral continuum in warfare? In this article, we stress the relevance of the ‘perennity of war’ thesis, and the impropriety of a dichotomy between political rationality vs. instinct. The results of the clash between these two strands of thought about the origins of warfare face limitations due to the absence of a temporal ‘play of scales’, so that short-term approaches emerge as incompatible with macro-historical views. We suggest that a deep understanding of the phenomenon of warfare must consider the interaction and the feedback between processes at different time scales.

Though much attention has been given to the prefabrication of architecture, little has been devoted to the discussion of the prefabricated interior environment. The significance of the unit or module is inherent in the prefabrication of architecture, but it is equally critical in its role in the prefabrication of Interior Space. The element of the module in furniture transcends the notion of furniture as object, placing it more expansively into the realm of place-maker. The advent and purpose of modular furniture are not only interconnected with the greater concepts of prefabrication in the built environment but are also inherently interconnected with the development of the modern house. The ability to mass-produce furniture and the concept of the module as a generative place-maker transformed the role of modular furniture into that of defining space or prefabricating environments.

Peu de notions ont autant influencé les sciences cognitives pendant les deux dernières décennies que celle de la modularité. Depuis le rejet du carcan béhavioriste, qui interdisait l'hypothèse de composantes psychologiques internes responsables des comportements observés, les

Emotional Training
A practical guide to emotional management

How can we cope with our natural death anxiety and create the sense of a safe place in the changing world? How can we efficiently cope with crisis and trauma? How can we learn to create relationships and find love? How can we realize our potential and be happy? And can we do all this without approaching psychotherapy or counseling or coaching?

Dr. Dror Green has researched hundreds approaches to psychotherapy, and found that they all ignore our inborn emotional skills, which enable us to attune ourselves to reality, avoid crisis, realize our potential and be happy. Emotional Training is a simple and practical way of life, based on improving our emotional skills and creating a sense of a safe place.

Emotional Training is based on a new concept of human nature

The myth of the 'mind' and the belief in the separation between body and mind have been the corner stones of Western culture for more than 2,000 years, but they remain vague. Dr. Dror Green has defined a new, revolutionary concept of human nature that regards emotions as physical responses to stimuli from reality. This concept is compatible with new researches in neuroscience and the understanding that empathy is inborn. The emotional process is not a mystical concept, as is customarily assumed, but the autopilot that navigates our lives, warns us of dangers and directs us to a safe place.

Emotional Training suggests a new understanding of our lives

Emotional Training is an efficient path to a healthy and productive life, and it also enables us to review all aspects of our lives: interpersonal relationships, professional relationships, social and political systems, thought and research, creativity and art. Emotional Training supplies us with efficient ways of coping with the challenges of the 21st century, global warming and the Internet revolution.

Dr. Dror Green is a psychotherapist, lecturer and supervisor. He is the director of the Institute of Emotional Training in Bulgaria, where he gives seminars to couples, parents, directors, etc. He has trained psychotherapists, psychiatrists, psychologists and educators. He was one of the pioneers of online psychotherapy and developed the first online clinic. He is also a musician, an illustrator and the author of about 40 books for children, adults and professionals

During the last years, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber (henceforth, M&S) have been consistently working on a novel theory of reasoning capable of overcoming the limitations of the "logicist" and "individualist" accounts that have largely dominated cognitive science and philosophy. The Enigma of Reason is the culmination of this process. In it, they offer an evolutionary perspective on reasoning that takes social interaction as the key explanatory element. Their view is articulated around three main claims: (1) Reason has evolved as an adaptation to humans' unique "hypersocial" ecological niche; (2) reason has a double role (evaluative and justificatory) which manifests especially in dialogical contexts; and (3) reason does not work alone, but as part of a complex machinery of inferential mechanisms supported by the massively modular architecture of the human mind or brain.

This is a qualitative study on the Perceptions of Parents on the Modular Distance Instruction in Baslay Elementary School, District I, Cauayan, Negros Occidental. Structured questions, interviews, and Focus Discussion Group were utilized to gather data from the respondents on their age, number of children, education, and family income, their problems and challenges on modular distance education and perceptions. Findings showed that most parents were between 36-40 years old, had three children, college-level educated, and with family income of PHP25,000 per month. Further, parents' moderate perceptions on the problems and challenges on modular distance instruction were on the impact of modular instruction on pupils' daily routine, shifting differences from face-to-face instruction, and teaching support from the schools. These three areas were supported by three sub-aspects that were discussed with parents. Finally, results show that parents' level of perception was moderate or level 3. This study proposed the Strategies Enhancement Plan to improve parents' perceptions and involvement in the modular distance learning.

As figuras ambíguas geralmente são arroladas em favor da tese de que o conteúdo da experiência perceptiva sofre influência cognitiva. Neste artigo, defenderei que as figuras ambíguas não são suficientes para evidenciar esta tese. O fenômeno das figuras ambíguas pode ser explicado por uma teoria da percepção segundo a qual o conteúdo da experiência perceptiva não sofre influência cognitiva. Ou seja, o fenômeno das figuras ambíguas isoladamente não implica esta ou aquela teoria perceptiva, muito embora seja um fenômeno que qualquer teoria da percepção tenha de acomodar. Inicialmente, apresentarei a teoria da percepção de Pylyshyn para, em seguida, usá-la na explicação do fenômeno das figuras ambíguas.  Ao defender a tese de que a percepção não sofre influência cognitiva, não me comprometo com a tese de que temos acesso privilegiado ao conteúdo dos nossos estados perceptivos.  Neste artigo, não defenderei qualquer tese a respeito de como chegamos a saber quais são os conteúdos de estados perceptivos. Defenderei apenas que, quaisquer que sejam, eles não sofrem influência cognitiva.

For a long time, one of my dreams was to describe the nature of uncertainty axiomatically, and it looks like I've finally done it in my co∼eventum mechanics! Now it remains for me to explain to everyone the co∼eventum mechanics in the most approachable way. This is what I'm trying to do in this work. The co∼eventum mechanics is another name for the co∼event theory, i.e., for the theory of experience and chance which I axiomatized in 2016 [1, 2]. In my opinion, this name best reflects the co∼event-based idea of the new dual theory of uncertainty, which combines the probability theory as a theory of chance, with its dual half, the believability theory as a theory of experience. In addition, I like this new name indicates a direct connection between the co∼event theory and quantum mechanics, which is intended for the physical explanation and description of the conict between quantum observers and quantum observations [4]. Since my theory of uncertainty satises the Kolmogorov axioms of probability theory, to explain this co∼eventum mechanics I will use a way analogous to the already tested one, which explains the theory of probability as a theory of chance describing the results of a random experiment. The simplest example of a random experiment in probability theory is the " tossing a coin ". Therefore, I decided to use this the simplest random experiment itself, as well as the two its analogies: the " "flipping a coin " and the " spinning a coin " to explain the co∼eventum mechanics, which describes the results of a combined experienced random experiment. I would like to resort to the usual for the probability theory " coin-based " analogy to explain (and first of all for myself) the logic of the co∼eventum mechanics as a logic of experience and chance. Of course, this analogy one may seem strange if not crazy. But I did not come up with a better way of tying the explanations of the logic of the co∼eventum mechanics to the coin-based explanations that are commonly used in probability theory to explain at least for myself the logic of the chance through a simple visual " coin-based " model that clarifies what occurs as a result of a combined experienced random experiment in which the experience of observer faces the chance of observation. I hope this analogy can be useful not only for me in understanding the co∼eventum mechanics.

The aspects exposed here are an oversimplification of highly debated issues in the two fields. The controversies take place not only between the two frameworks, but also within them. This extremely brief presentation is meant to show only the general characters and the main premises of the two parts involved in the long standing discussion.

Semiotics (sometimes spelled “semeiotic”) is the name first given by John Locke, and later reprised by Charles S. Peirce, for the “doctrine of signs,” or the study of how some things can stand for other things to still other things. This deliberate inquiry can be contrasted with “folk semiotic” accounts, which assume that there is some intrinsic feature about, say, the human voice or a painted board that makes them capable of signifying. Such a naive assumption does not withstand serious scrutiny. From a philosophical standpoint, what makes something a sign is an involvement in a specific sort of triadic relation. This relation is found in human/nonhuman and deliberate/nondeliberate signs alike. Semiosis, the action of signs, is what permits communication, but it is wider than communication. For example, if while in an adjacent room I smell that the turkey in the oven is ready, my pet dog can smell it too, and the turkey is not trying to “tell” us anything. But if the cook in the kitchen tells me it is ready, I receive that message, while my dog hears the sounds but is none the wiser (in contemporary semiotic parlance, my dog and I couple our Umwelten via indices, but the symbols at hand generate interpretants only in my anthroposemiosis). In spite of the fact that it has a long and distinguished history (especially during the medieval period), general inquiry into signs became an organized research program only in the mid-20th century. Today, in addition to philosophers, semiotics attracts a wide range of scholars, such as ethologists, cognitive scientists, linguists, art historians, logicians, media theorists, literary critics, computer programmers, biologists, sociologists, and so on. From a methodological standpoint, then, parochialism is not an option. The scholarly literature can nevertheless be fruitfully divided into theoretical and applied strands. Not surprisingly, most philosophers drawn to semiotic questions work in the former strand. Semiotics is not to be confused with “semiology,” a (now largely defunct) project that originated in the lectures of the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and which was active in the 1960s, mainly in France. Semiotics, by contrast, is a vibrant tradition that continues to flourish worldwide. Although some persist in employing the term “semiotics” when discussing narrow studies that focus exclusively on cultural codes, such terminological misuse masks the fact that a study of signs is broader than a study of language. A sustained philosophy of signs, then, promises (as Locke initially surmised) to yield truly novel insights.

Hay una disputa clásica desde la filosofía hasta la psicología actual si la mente funciona como un sistema unitario para realizar los diferentes procesos cognitivos, o si por el contrario, es un conjunto de sistemas especializados para realizar cada uno de los procesos cognitivos. La posición que defiende un sistema unitario recibe el nombre de holísmo y es defendida por los conexionistas, mientras que la posición que defiende sistemas especializados recibe el nombre de modularidad. Este ensayo busca defender la posición modular que sostiene que la mente es un conjunto de sistemas especializados o módulos con especificidad de dominio.

I FINALLY LEARNED HOW TO SAY THIS PROPERLY.

WE, THE HUMAN PUPPETS, ARE MICRO-CONTROLLED BY THE HIVE MIND MOVIE CONCOCTED BY OUR PURE CONSCIOUSNESSES VIA DREAMS IN DARKNESS. 

IT’S LIKE KIDS RIDING SLEDS, WE, AS PURE CONSCIOUSNESSES, SET THE MOVIE IN MOTION, WE THEN JUMP ON AND GO FOR THE RIDE – YOU CAN SEE THE SHADOW SELF WITH YOUR OWN EYES IN HERE:

“Perceptual Learning” refers, roughly, to long-lasting changes in perception that result from practice or experience (see E.J. Gibson 1963). William James, for instance, writes about how a person can become able to differentiate by taste between the upper and lower half of a bottle for a particular kind of wine (1890: 509). Assuming that the change in the person’s perception lasts, is genuinely perceptual (rather than, say, a learned inference), and is based on prior experience, James’ case is a case of perceptual learning.

This entry has three parts. The first part lays out the definition of perceptual learning as long-term changes in perception that result from practice or experience, and then distinguishes perceptual learning from several contrast classes. The second part specifies different varieties of perceptual learning. The third part details cases of perceptual learning in the philosophical literature and says why they are philosophically significant.

Contrary to many language teachers' assumption, the Natural Approach is an effective language teaching method which can also be used in unnatural classroom settings. The underlying theory of the method, with its practical implications, is discussed in the light of the results of research conducted in Turkish High Schools.
Ellidokuzoğlu, H. (2014) How to apply the Natural Approach in an unnatural setting. Military Review (Stratiotiki Epitheorisi-Στρατιωτική Επιθεώρηση) pp.88-97. This article was selected by Turkish Military Academy and sent to Greek Military for pubication as part of the measures taken to reinforce friendship and cooperation between Turkish and Greek Armed Forces in 2014. (available at http://army.gr/sites/default/files/mag_20140101.pdf) The original (Greek) version of the article is attached to the end of this document.

Evolutionary Psychology (EP) is an emerging integrative approach to the study of Human Nature, founded upon evolutionary biological theory and cognitive science. This article evaluates the theoretical foundations and implications of EP from a Scientist-Practitioner perspective. EP is contrasted with its antecedent, human sociobiology, and theoretical differences are discussed. Cosmides & Tooby’s EP is described; including EP’s model of mind, the need for a computational theory and how this is provided by functional adaptationism, the strategic modelling of the past needed to make evolutionary inferences, and the role of present ontogenetic environment on the development and function of adaptations. The adaptationist approach to Human Nature is controversial; therefore the scientific validity of this approach is evaluated; the critique is not found convincing. The perceived paradox of EP’s focus compared with behavioral genetics and comparative psychology is resolved. The compatibility between learning psychology and EP is addressed. Finally EP’s implications for the mainstream academic fields of psychology - cognitive, social, developmental, and personality psychology - and to the practice of clinical psychology - Evolutionary Psychopathology - are considered. EP is a growing, influential and promising field of study, and potentially a unifying theory of psychology.

Keywords: Evolutionary Psychology - Human Nature - Modular Mind - Human Sociobiology - Adaptationism - Scientist-Practitioner - Evolutionary Psychopathology

A response to Jonathan Kramnick's "Against Literary Darwinism." From opening paragraphs:

Evolutionary criticism argues that evolution has shaped human minds
to be partially reshapable, not least by our species-wide predisposition to
culture, to art in general, and to literature in particular. Evocritics show
how the fact that human minds owe their structure to evolutionary pressures
makes a difference to literature—to features of human minds and
behaviors that literature deploys, represents, appeals to, engages, and
modifies.
At least, that’s how I understand what we do. Jonathan Kramnick understands “literary Darwinists” differently: as committed to (1) a narrow and controversial evolutionary psychology, whose controversial nature we
ignore; (2) an untenable modular view of the mind, whose modules were
shaped in the Pleistocene and have not changed since; (3) the adaptive
value of a modular “literary competence”; and beyond that (4) a purely
thematic approach to literature incapable of attending to form, variation,
or history. I do not recognize our work in his version.

A MONUMENTAL DISCOVERY  - HIVE MIND EXISTS!!!!

BY DR BRUCE LIPTON & GREGG BRADEN - THE BIGGEST EVER DISCOVERY BECAUSE IT NEVER HAPPENED BEFORE, IF EUPHORIA HAD EVER BEEN INSTALLED WE’D KNOW!!
→ THE BEGINNING OF FREEDOM IS LEARNING AND ADMITTING THAT WE ARE MICRO-CONTROLLED PUPPETS. IN HERE IS HOW THAT IS EASILY ACCOMPLISHED.

IT IS WITHOUT DOUBT THAT HUMANS ARE PUPPETS OF A HIVE MIND (OUR COLLECTIVE SUBCONSCIOUSES).  SINCE MATTER DOES NOT EXIST – EVERYTHING IS COMPOSED OF CONSCIOUSNESS THAT IS CHANGEABLE AND HAS BEEN IMAGINEERED INTO THIS SKID MARK = IDIOTSVILLE!!!

EXCUSE ME – WHY? 

SAD ANSWER:  ENTERTAINMENT VIA SEPARATION

Mirror neuron research has come a long way since the early 90’s, and many theorists are now stressing the heterogeneity and complexity of the sensorimotor properties of fronto-parietal circuits. However, core aspects of the initial ‘mirror mechanism’ theory, i.e. the idea of a symmetric encapsulated mirroring function translating sensory action perceptions into motor formats, still appears to be shaping much of the debate. This article challenges the empirical plausibility of the sensorimotor segregation implicit in the original mirror metaphor. It is proposed instead that the teleological organization found in the broader fronto-parietal circuits might be inherently sensorimotor. Thus the idea of an independent ‘purely perceptual’ goal understanding process is questioned. Further, it is hypothesized that the often asymmetric, heterogeneous and contextually modulated mirror and canonical neurons support a function of multisensory mapping and tracking of the perceiving agents affordance space. Such a shift in the interpretative framework offers a different theoretical handle on how sensorimotor processes might ground various aspects of intentional action choice and social cognition. Mirror neurons would under the proposed “social affordance model” be seen as dynamic parts of larger circuits, which support tracking of currently shared and competing action possibilities. These circuits support action selection processes—but also our understanding of the options and action potentials that we and perhaps others have in the affordance space. In terms of social cognition ‘mirror’ circuits might thus help us understand not only the intentional actions others are actually performing—but also what they could have done, did not do and might do shortly.

Resumen
Este texto ofrece un escenario para el debate sobre el estatus de la noción de proceso psicológico a partir del enfoque de modularidad, asumida en cierta medida en la psicología contemporánea, que pone de manifiesto un compromiso con alguna variedad de arquitectura cognitiva. La modularidad fuerte ha sido un enfoque moderadamente exitoso, pero también ha conducido a una comprensión fragmentada de la mente y el comportamiento, insuficiente para fundamentar la práctica profesional en diversas áreas de la psicología. La modularidad débil, como hipótesis de trabajo y alternativa, puede ser una estrategia de investigación útil, pero también requiere la integración de los hallazgos de la investigación en psicología en un marco coherente. Se discuten las implicaciones de este debate en la enseñanza de la psicología.

Abstract
The objective of this paper is to set the stage for a discussion of the status of the idea of psychological process within psychological explanations and descriptions, indicating some of its consequences for the teaching of psychology. It is argued that contemporary psychology espouses some form of modularity, which, in turn, reveals commitments to a particular variety of cognitive architecture. The assumption of modularity has been a fruitful approach in some areas (e. g. the study of perception), but it has also led to a piecemeal understanding of mind and behavior that is simply insufficient to provide foundations for professional practice in several areas of psychology (e. g. education). Whereas assuming weak modularity as a working hypothesis might be a useful and necessary research strategy, integrating psychological research findings into a coherent framework is necessary. This idea has important consequences for the teaching of psychology.

Resumo
Este texto oferece um cenário para o debate sobre o status da noção de processo psicológico a partir do enfoque da modularidade, assumida em certa medida na psicologia contemporânea, que manifestou um compromisso com alguma variedade da arquitetura cognitiva. A modularidade forte tem sido um enfoque moderadamente exitoso, mas também tem conduzido a uma compreensão fragmentada da mente e do comportamento, insuficiente para fundamentar a prática profissional em diversas áreas da psicologia. A modularidade fraca, como hipótese de trabalho e alternativa, pode ser uma estratégia de investigação útil, mas também requer a integração das descobertas de investigação em psicologia num marco coerente. Discutem-se as implicações deste debate no ensino de psicologia.

William of Ockham frequently mentions a distinction between two modes of cognition: in se and in alio. The aim of this chapter is to show that this distinction raises some important problems for his philosophy of mind and more broadly for his nominalism. The main issue is the possibility of an externalist theory of mental contents. For, Ockham affirms that no material substance is cognized in se. But if only accidents are cognized in se does this mean that material substances are necessarily cognized in alio? How could this “something else” lead us to the cognition of something we have never experienced? The difficulty here is how we should understand his view concerning the acquisition of simple substance concepts like “man” or “horse.” On the one hand it seems that we have no direct acquaintance with substances. On the other hand, he says that these concepts, equivalent to simple natural kind terms in the mind, directly refer to singular substances thanks to external relations of causality and likeness, on which their signification is based. This chapter suggests that the evolution of Ockham’s theory of concepts during his career is probably the key for our understanding of this crucial distinction.

Coletânea de traduções de verbetes da SEP na área de Filosofia da Cognição organizada por Eros Carvalho (UFRGS). A obra contém os seguintes verbetes: "Ciência cognitiva", "A teoria computacional da mente", "Teorias teleológicas do conteúdo mental", "Modularidade da Mente", "Cognição Corporificada", "Emoção", e "Cognição Animal".

I argue that semantics is the study of the proprietary database of a centrally inaccessible and informationally encapsulated input–output system. Its role is to encode and decode partial and defeasible evidence of what speakers are saying. Since information about nonlinguistic context is therefore outside the purview of semantic processing, a sentence’s semantic value is not its content but a partial and defeasible constraint on what it can be used to say. I show how to translate this thesis into a detailed compositional-semantic theory based on the influential framework of Heim and Kratzer. This approach situates semantics within an independently motivated account of human cognitive architecture and reveals the semantics–pragmatics interface to be grounded in the underlying interface between modular and central systems.

Ever since he hit his first deliberate, 'mind-controlled' home run at 12 years old, Barry's interest in conscious creation and the principles behind manifestation (how sustained consecutive thought & feeling creates your reality) has taken center stage in his life. Now, at 36 and living in Virginia Beach, Barry has come to terms with his Life's mission:

In this paper, I present an informational approach to the nature of personal identity. In ‘‘Plato and the problem of the chariot’’, I use Plato’s famous metaphor of the chariot to introduce a specific problem regarding the nature of the self as an informational multiagent system: what keeps the self together as a whole and coherent unity? In ‘‘Egology and its two branches’’ and ‘‘Egology as synchronic individualisation’’, I outline two branches of the theory of the self: one concerning the individualisation of the self as an entity, the other concerning the identification of such entity. I argue that both presuppose an informational approach, defend the view that the individualisation of the self is logically prior to its identification, and suggest that such individualisation can be provided in informational terms. Hence, in ‘‘A reconciling hypothesis: the three membranes model’’, I offer an informational individualisation of the self, based on a tripartite model, which can help to solve the problem of the chariot. Once this model of the self is outlined, in ‘‘ICTs as technologies of the self’’ I use it to show how ICTs may be interpreted as technologies of the self. In ‘‘The logic of realisation’’, I introduce the concept of ‘‘realization’’ (Aristotle’s anagnorisis) and support the rather Spinozian view according to which, from the perspective of informational structural realism, selves are the final stage in the development of informational structures. The final ‘‘Conclusion: from the egology to the ecology of the self’’ briefly concludes the article with a reference to the purposeful shaping of the self, in a shift from egology to ecology.

Whereas efficient and effective practical implementation of mass customization in goods industries is a well-researched topic, a deeper understanding of service mass customization is still missing. Particularly service specific challenges have been hitherto unaddressed. These characteristics affect the requirements towards the service design as well as the appropriate education of service employees. One key challenge for service mass customization is to translate information about consumer preferences gained through market research into a format that can be easily used for service modularization decisions and customer-contact personnel training. As solution to this "translation problem" we propose "personas" as a tool for transferring complex market research data into narrative descriptions of archetype customers. Such archetypes convey customization needs in a way that makes it easy for decision makers and employees to understand and to communicate effectively with each other. Along with the concept we introduce a structured approach for developing and using personas in service mass customization projects and provide managerial implications as well as an outlook for further research.

By analyzing various versions of the Modularity of Mind (MoM) Thesis, originally proposed by Jerry Fodor (1983), I discuss considerable advantages offered by the segmented and domain-specific architecture of the mind in comparison to more holistic images of cognition often presumed in socio-psychological theories of perception and learning. At the same time, I propose to retrieve the considerable explanatory power of the modularity theories from the assumption of the innateness of the modular cognitive functions and the image of one-way information processing. I argue that the relative encapsulation and selective domain-specificity of cognitive modules can be better understood within the framework of what I call an "ecological perspective on the architecture and evolution of the human mind," the perspective of which Vygotsky-Luria'с conception of activity is exemplary. The results are going to be appealing to the theorists and other students of human cognition who are trying to breach the gap between rationalism and empiricism as well as nativism and embedded/ situated cognition.

Largely aided by the findings of the so-called ‘mirror neurons’ the attention to motor activity in action observation has exploded over the last two decades. The idea that we internally ‘mirror’ an observed action by covertly reproducing a version of it has lead to a new strand of implicit simulation theories of action understanding. The basic idea of this sort of simulation theory is that perception of others actions automatically activate our own covert action representations, and then that we can use this shared action representation to understand various aspects of the observed action and possibly infer the goal and/or intentions of the observed agent or maybe predict upcoming actions. There is some disagreement among researchers and theorists as to the function of motor ‘simulation’. It is debated whether it serves as the basis for low-level ‘mind-reading’, i.e. ascription of intentions and various mental states to others (Gallese 2003, 2004, 2007. Gallese & Goldman 1998, Goldman in press, Hurley 2005) or whether the function of the simulation is purely related to understanding the action itself (Jeannerod 2006) or maybe related to anticipating upcoming actions (Kilner et al 2004, Csibra 2005, Prinz 2006). 
What seems to be assumed in most of these simulation theories is that the default role of the motor system in social perception is to ‘mirror’ the observed action or that it is only related to the observed action and not my own action motives and plans. It is these basic assumptions of the passivity of motor resonance that I would like to challenge. The question is whether it is misleading to conceptualize motor resonance simply as a mirroring simulation where we covertly ‘echo’ the observed action? Many studies of the functional properties of mirror neurons (MN) and motor facilitation during perception seem to point to a more complex role of the motor system in action perception (di Pellegrino 1992, Gallese et al 1996, Rizzolati & Craighero 2004). This has recently led to some proposals trying to reinterpret the function of motor activity during action perception and in social situations from a simple mirroring process to an anticipatory process (Kilner et al 2004, Csibra 2005, Prinz 2006) – or simply to abandon the idea of simulation altogether (Gallagher 2007). I think these are interesting proposals, but inspired by historic approaches to motor resonance and recent studies I would like to venture a hypothesis of an even more proactive, context and motivation dependent role of motor activity during action perception (Newman-Norlund et al. 2007, Schie et al. In press, Cheng et al. 2007, Keysers & Perrett 2004, 502). Motor resonance during object perception is by many researchers thought of in terms of affordances; i.e. what the object affords the observer to do (Grèzes et al. 2003). My question is why we should not – albeit extra social levels of complexity - see motor resonance during social perception in a similar way, as potential action sketches ‘afforded’ by own present motivational, senori-motor and perceptual situation. My point is not that we never ‘simulate’ or covertly imitate observed actions, but rather that it is questionable why we should think of this as the default process in normal interactive social contexts. Covert imitation might only take place during special cases of action observation where we exactly take on a passive spectator attitude, and that we therefore might need a broader theory of motor resonance that also explains normal active and interactive cases of action perception. Accordingly, I suggest that experimental paradigms with single observers in one-way social situations often carry an ‘imitation bias’, and that we are in dire need of more research of actual interactive social perception. I conclude that theories of motor resonance in social perception as a passive ‘mirroring’ or low-level simulation are faced with serious empirical challenges, and that the motor system might serve a much more proactive role in social cognition than previously thought.

Mind has a number of different cognitive mechanism, which Fodor called "modules". Current research has claimed the existence of a "God Spot" in human brain. I tried to analyze how fodorian modularity looked at this discovery by elaborating on the module criteria initiated by Jerry Fodor.

The first part of the paper develops the argument that geographers should learn to decompose human memory into its constituent parts because then and then alone will we become attuned to the full range of ways in which we incorporate places into our beings. The second part of the paper articulates Stephen Hill's comments on episodic memory with my recent work on wisdom.

El objetivo de este ensayo es examinar la relevancia epistemológica de la tesis de la medularidad de la mente de Jerry Fodor. Trataré de mostrar que esta tesis, por sí misma, no logra refutar al relativista epistemológico puesto que, de un lado, la existencia de un terreno neutral común no excluye la inconmensurabilidad, a menos que se garantice además que en dicho terreno se resuelven los desacuerdos científicos. De otro lado, la teon'a de la medularidad de la mente resulta insuficiente para refutar un holismo semántico de corte relativista y, por último, en la medida en que Fodor acepta la tesis quineana de la subdeterminación empírica de las teon'as, es posible construir una versión del relativismo epistemológico compatible con la tesis de la medularidad de la mente.

The discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ - found to respond both to own actions and the observation of similar actions performed by others - has been enormously influential in the cognitive sciences and beyond. Given the self-other symmetry these neurons have been hypothesized as underlying a ‘mirror mechanism’ that lets us share representations and thereby ground core social cognitive functions from intention understanding to linguistic abilities and empathy. I argue that mirror neurons are important for very different reasons. Rather than a symmetric ubiquitous or context- independent mechanism, I propose that these neurons are part of broader sensorimotor circuits, which help us navigate and predict the social affordance space that we meet others in. To develop both the critical and positive project I analyze the interpretive choices and the debate surrounding the mirror neuron research and show how the field is marred by highly questionable assumptions about respectively motor and social cognition. The discovery of mirror neurons - and the sensorimotor circuits of which these neurons are a part – actually empirically challenge many of these tacit assumptions. Findings of sensorimotor goal representations at levels of abstraction well beyond actual sensory information and kinetic movements challenge the idea of motor cognition as primarily output production. Additionally, the focus on 3rd person mindreading of hidden mental states is misguiding the field of social cognition. Much ‘mind-reading’ seems rooted in sensorimotor representations and a developmentally primary 2nd person understanding of actions and the mental lives of others, which precisely breaks the assumed dichotomy between mind and behavior. I propose a Social Affordance model where parallel fronto-parietal sensorimotor circuits support representations not just of other people’s actions but of the overall social affordance space. It is a process that monitors concrete goals and teleological possibilities that the environment affords respectively oneself and other present agents. With this model I hypothesize that the complex spectrum of sensorimotor integrations are indeed essential not only to normal action choice calibration but also to social cognitive abilities, as the sensorimotor teleological representations let us relate to others and understand their action choices in a shared pragmatic and intentional context.

C. S. Peirce introduced the term “icon” for sign-vehicles that signify their objects in virtue of some shared quality. This qualitative kinship, however, threatens to collapse the relata of the sign into one and the same thing. Accordingly, the late-medieval philosopher of signs John Poinsot held that, “no matter how perfect, a concept [...] always retains a distinction, therefore, between the thing signified and itself signifying.” Poinsot is touted by his present-day advocates as a realist, but I believe that, judged by realist standards, his requirement of minimal dissimilarity backfires. Poinsot thinks that, in analyzing the sign, we should stop before a full merger between sign-vehicle and object is reached. Peirce, by contrast, saw good reason to push the analysis all the way down to one isolated quality. Because such a qualitative merger can lend support to realism, I favour Peirce’s stance.

In a short period of time, open design went from an unknown notion to a buzzword in the Dutch design world. This development is usually attributed to the proliferation of bottom-up activities fostered by a typically open Dutch society. However, although open design is commonly associated with grassroots, bottom-up activities, in the Netherlands, the most visible effort at widespread dissemination of these ideals has been the result of a highly centralized effort largely supported by government funding. Why were the government and cultural organizations interested in fostering open design practices? And what type of open practices has this top-down model engendered? Advancing from a constructivist approach, we examine how this discourse has been formed by the convergence of actors with distinct agendas, and position it in relation to its cultural and economic contexts.

Intro This is a condensed part of a much larger argument that comes from my forthcoming book which attempts to provide a multi-level conception of noise that brings out its full significance without hypostatizing or fetishizing it I elaborate this within a broadly information-theoretic modal realist metaphysical frame allowing for a description of the processes and structures underlying both the continuities and discontinuities between physical, biological, and cognitive systems, and giving a functionalist computationalist theory of mind as a pragmatically elaborated hierarchically nested non-equilibrium thermodynamic system it is broadly information-theoretic in the sense in which information provides the unifying framework for the analysis of structures, processes and systems at diverse levels of organization modal realism just means that modalities such as actuality, possibility, and necessity, are not just attributions by the mind that can be eliminated by reduction to some foundationalist level of description (composed of individuals such as atoms) but that what really exists are modal relations that hold across and between those diverse levels of structures and processes importantly, even though the description of anything that IS can be fully achieved within this unifying information-theoretic framework (in terms of degrees of randomness or patterns of structural organization), such a description is not adequate even to those complex systems displaying historicity, such as living systems, let alone to the mind (or to the social systems in which mind is necessarily embedded) As Negarestani asserts, mind is a project for which a complete description is not possible even though mind is causally reducible to the physical and chemical processes that compose it, in constraining and coordinating behaviour according to pragmatic proprieties and normative attitudes, it is logically irreducible to its information theoretic description the title of my talk refers to the notion of Autopoiesis developed in second-order cybernetics, where systems are observing rather than merely observed – where reflexivity, recursion, and self-referentiality are intrinsic factors, and systems are analysed in terms of their structural coupling with the environment, with which they form a single circuit with a doubled feedback the maintenance of internal order is no longer due to the robustness of the system to noise but to its resilience to perturbations (this moves from Schrodinger's reproduction of internal consistency by order-from-order to Von Foerster's notion of order-from-noise) so autopoietic systems dynamically self-organise at a number of different scales of observation

This writing appears as a blog for the Association for Humanistic Psychology (AHP) to call attention to the power of gratitude during the season of family togetherness, giving thanks, and giving gifts.  As AHP President, the message is also intended to be a brief reminder that gratitude is a common experience for all human beings on the planet for all cultures.

Due to the situation in a social context, the theory of mind (ToM) has inevitably moral coordinates. Even if it is formatted in the context of evolution, having the character of a survival strategy, it is shaped by ethical vectors as well. In Law there are two institutions whose existence is based on a ToM: negligence and intention and in both cases operated the presumption of the ability to know what was in the mind of the person at the time of committing an illegal act or of the intent of this type. Both situations presume the ability of an adequate ToM capable of understanding a person's mental states. The demonstration of ToM legal role is the proof of its moral role; the discussions about the ToM have significant consequences for ethics. If we admit that ethics is based on the ToM as a mediator of relations with the other, we can consider that the space of ethics is open by every appeal to a ToM. If we accept the access in varying degrees to an adequate ToM and if we also accept the role of the ToM in the knowledge and moral behaviour, then the access to the theory of mind becomes an important variable for morality. If the access to an adequate ToM is dependent on the cognitive abilities and if the competence in the development of the ToM has a significant impact on moral behaviour, the cognitive development is an essential variable of moral competence.

To jest wersja robocza artykuªu. Wersja ostateczna opublikowana w: Modularno±¢ umysªu, Szymon Wróbel (red.), Pozna«-Kalisz: WP-A UAM, 2007, s. 179-206. Cytowa¢ prosz¦ wersj¦ ostateczn¡. Streszczenie W artykule prezentuj¦ koncepcj¦ modularnego umysªu w wersji zaproponowanej przez Fodora oraz zmodykowane uj¦cie moduªu zaprezentowane przez Jackendoa. W szczegól-no±ci interesuj¡ mnie konsekwencje uj¦cia modularno±ci dla charakterystyki zdolno±ci j¦zykowych i konstrukcji modelu kognitywnego tych»e. Model kompetencji i performancji j¦zykowej oparty o modularno±¢ ograniczon¡ struktur¡ Jackendoa stanowi podstaw¦ implementacji z wykorzystaniem architektury systemu SNePS: gramatyk GATN i sieci semantycznych.

Use of New Product Development Methods (NPD) may benefit New Zealand SMEs and entrepreneurial firms in gaining greater market share. In this paper we review the literature on New Product Development, NPD theory, and methods for early stage product design and development. Our reading suggests that product design has greater success when the customer is involved in the design effort. It also recommends methods of approach to new markets in the (NPD) life cycle. The literature further elucidates methods for identification of product design criteria based on customer needs identification. In essence, customer-product interaction in the early stages of product development is important to product success in new markets for entrepreneurial firms and SMEs. Of particular interest are early-stage NPD research methods and their influence on the company's marketing strategy.

Citation:
Coleman, E. B., Frederick, H., & Mellalieu, P. J. (2006). Customer-Product Interaction - A Model for New Product Development in Entrepreneurial Firms. In Third AGSE International Entrepreneurship Research Exchange (AIREX-2006). Auckland: Unitec Institute of Technology. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/1513318/Customer-Product_Interaction_-_A_Model_for_New_Product_Development_in_Entrepreneurial_Firms

Related:
Coleman, E. B. (2004). Water & Food Safety Testing Products for New Zealand Mollusc Aquaculture Organisations: A Case Study in New Product Development (Industry-Based Research Project Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Innovation and Entrepreneurship). Unitec Institute of Technology, Auckland. Retrieved from http://fgcu.academia.edu/ElizabethBColeman/Papers/1629049/

This article considers the configuration of modular and temporary organization designs. By drawing on two prominent developer firms, namely,Valve Inc. and Linden Lab, respectively,“cabals” and “studios” are explored.The results of interviews conducted with employees of these firms are used as evidence. The article demonstrates that, to various extents, these organization designs organize, facilitate, and maintain how work is accomplished and coordinated within the boundaries of a permanent firm. It extends our understanding of how these designs provide a structure to how tasks are constituted in conjunction with the nature of the product.

My aim in this paper is to defend the view that the processes underlying early vision are informationally encapsulated. Following Marr (1982) and Pylyshyn (1999) I take early vision to be a cognitive process that takes sensory information as its input and produces the so-called primal sketches or shallow visual outputs: informational states that represent visual objects in terms of their shape, location, size, colour and luminosity. Recently, some researchers (Schirillo 1999, Macpherson 2012) have attempted to undermine the idea of the informational encapsulation of early vision by referring to experiments that seem to show that colour recognition is affected by the subject's beliefs about the typical colour of objects. In my view, however, one can reconcile the results of these experiments with the position that early vision is informationally encapsulated. Namely, I put forth a hypothesis according to which the early vision system has access to a local database that I call the mental palette and define as a network of associative links whose nodes stands for shapes and colours. The function of the palette is to facilitate colour recognition without employing central processes. I also describe two experiments by which the mental palette hypothesis can be tested.

This paper starts by distinguishing three views about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. 'Low-level theorists' argue that perceptual experience is reducible to the experience of low-level properties (textures, shapes, colors), 'high-level theorists' argue that we have perceptual experiences of high-level properties (functional properties, causal relations, etc.), while 'disunified view theorists' argue that perceptual seemings can present high-level properties. The paper explores how cognitive states can penetrate perceptual experience and provides an interpretation of cognitive penetration that offers some support for the high-level view.