Mind body

The conservation of energy law, a law of physics that states that the total energy of any closed system is always conserved, is a bedrock principle that has achieved both broad theoretical and experimental support. Yet if interactive dualism is correct, it is thought that the mind can affect physical objects in violation of the conservation of energy. Thus, some claim, the conservation of energy grounds an argument for physicalism. Although critics of the argument focus on the implausibility of causation requiring the transference of energy, I argue that even if causation requires the transference of energy, once we accept the other required premises of the argument that lie behind any supposed argument from the conservation of energy the law of the conservation of energy is revealed as irrelevant to the question of whether the mental is physical.

Current events in science imply that a new scientific revolution in physics is unfolding. This new revolution will be as much about mind and consciousness as it is about matter and physics. It will bring a new theory of physical reality that includes the consciousness that senses, interprets and interacts with physical reality. The new theory of consciousness will lead to explanatory models of the paranormal as well as explain how consciousness survives death. This prediction is not an optimistic 'pipe dream', but our present and future. A theory of this type has already been developed. It is based on a five-dimensional Einstein-Kaluza model of the space-time continuum. ‘Single field theory' or SOFT can easily account for paranormal phenomena and the survival of consciousness. Whatever theory finally succeeds in bridging the gap between mind and matter, indications are that it will have many of the characteristics of SOFT if it is not SOFT. Whatever the case may be, a valid theory that combines physical reality and consciousness is truly a theory to die for!

"Although numerous books and articles have recently talked about the gut instincts as valuable in giving us useful hunches in the decision-making process, "What's Behind Your Belly Button?" goes much further and explains how gut feelings not only have a psychological intelligence of their own, but are also understandably rational in their functioning. The authors explore how gut feelings are like a gas gauge in our guts indicating through an emotional feeling of emptiness or fullness how well the two instinctive human needs for acceptance (attention from others) and of control of one's own responses (freedom) in our lives are being met and how our behavior attempts to keep these two instinctive needs in balance at all times. They explore how these two instinctive needs motivate nearly all our behaviors all through our lives and that the feeling memory of how well these needs are met from moment-to-moment may be accessed through somatic awareness of our gut feelings of empty and full by using the Somatic Reflection Process the authors have developed.

In 1998, neurological research at Columbia University published the work of Dr. Michael Gershon that identified the enteric nervous system as a center of feeling-intelligence in the gut, which he called the "Second Brain". The authors carefully examined this material and accepted the research findings as pointing to the same universal feeling intelligence they experienced in counseling with hundreds of people. Utilizing the research of Dr. Gershon, the work of Dr. Lise Eliot who charts the development of children from conception through the first five years of life, recent research of their own in the Psychology Department at Sonoma State University, and their vast clinical experience, the authors have presented an interpretation of recent medical research into a Gut Psychology and a more accurate behavioral understanding of the Self and human nature than has previously been available. They share a complete protocol and results of clinical research findings for the Somatic Reflection Process that they have created and used successfully, with themselves and hundreds of people, to assist the process of getting in touch with the voice of the gut and learning to follow its wisdom toward a healthy life--unifying the body-mind split in the individuation process.

Over a period of 45 years, there has been a utilization of further graduate studies in Depth Psychology and Religious Education on the part of the authors, and giant steps forward in the fields of Neurology and Human Psychology, which help form a new more accurate image of human nature. The authors present this new image of human nature and the meaning of its understanding in making positive changes in our lives. They suggest that we are at the beginning of a Renaissance in human consciousness and that understanding our true human nature is the way to thrive in this present era. This book also discusses the implications of this new image of human nature in education and for rehabilitation of those incarcerated. The authors suggest that early in the child learning process, care be taken to offer the experience of freedom and acceptance to the preschool child to form a positive self-concept and to self-regulate his and her behavior as part of the learning process in becoming a loving, caring person.

After careful examination of life's processes, they conclude that of all the mammals in the animal kingdom, humans seem to be the only species that has been denied the open use of their natural instincts. Out of ignorance, fear or wanton control by others--"we are denied the use of the brains we were born with". This awareness is of growing concern since the absence of the use of the feeling intelligence of the body interferes with a major stabilizing force--built into the human system--that can affect human behavior, provide a sense of well-being, and the ability of the body to combat disease."

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This article is a brief response to the issues highlighted by Synesiou’s article in this issue, and Hetherington’s response to the article. Both contributors raise important points but especially the reflexive question of what is a body and where was it when they were writing their articles? Our moment-to-moment felt sense of ‘body’ brings us back to our first person experience, offering a touchstone for any explorations around ‘body’.

The model of mind and body in Tibetan medical practice is based on Buddhist theory, and is neither dualistic in a Cartesian sense, nor monistic. Rather, it represents a genuine alternative to these positions by presenting mind/body interaction as a dynamic process that is situated within the context of the individual's relationships with others and the environment. Due to the distinctiveness, yet interdependence, of mind and body, the physician's task is to heal the patient's mind (blo-gso) as well as body. This in turn emphasizes the central importance of 'compassion' in the physician/patient relationship. This article investigates how Tibetan medical practitioners understand and enact the mind/ body and physician/patient relationships, and how this relates to theoretical explications of these relationships in Tibetan medical and Buddhist teachings. Furthermore, Tibetan medicine provides an interesting model for comparison with embodied theories of cognition, which see consciousness, the body and its environment as integral parts of a complex, dynamical cognitive system.

Wellness is commonly conceptualized as having many dimensions, but little effort has been made to evaluate how spiritual and psychological dimensions are related to overall wellness. To explore the relationship between measures of spiritual and psychological wellness and perceived wellness in a college student population, the authors administered a series of survey instruments to 1 12 undergraduate students under quiet classroom conditions. They used the Life Attitude Profile to measure spiritual wellness, the Life Orientation Test and the Sense of Coherence Scale to measure psychological wellness, and the Perceived Wellness Survey to measure overall wellness. Path analysis performed with a proposed theoretical model revealed that the effect of life purpose on perceived wellness was mediated by optimism and sense of coherence, which had independent effects on perceived wellness beyond that of life purpose. The findings suggested that an optimistic outlook and sense of coherence must be present for life purpose to enhance a sense of overall well-being.

.....the double bind as constituting an entirely new, non-material, principle of evolution, major conceptual revisions may need to be made in our general understanding of evolution as contained within the “modern evolutionary synthesis”.

KEYWORDS:
behavior, communication, context, contradiction, deutero-learning, double bind, epistemology, evolution, incompleteness theorum, kinesics, learning, logical type theory, metacommunication, metamessages, metatheory, mystification, paradox, relationships, schismogenesis, schizophrenia,  scientific elegance, symmathesy, teleology, temporality, transcontextual, transdisciplinary, trauma

Questo volume è stato stampato presso Sograte, Città di Castello (PG) Stampato in Italia -Printed in Italy Le fotocopie per uso personale del lettore possono essere effettuate nei limiti del 15% di ciascun volume/fascicolo di periodico dietro pagamento alla SIAE del compenso previsto dall'art. 68, commi 4 e 5, della legge 22 aprile 1941 n. 633. Le riproduzioni effettuate per finalità di carattere professionale, economico o commerciale o comunque per uso diverso da quello personale possono essere effettuate a seguito di specifica autorizzazione rilasciata da AIDRO, Corso di Porta Romana n. 108, Milano 20122, [email protected] e www.aidro.org Elena Mignosi * Le traduzioni in Italiano dei brani dei testi citati dalle edizioni inglesi o francesi sono della scrivente 1 Benché, fin dalle origini della psicoanalisi abbia teorizzato che l'esperienza del corpo, derivata da sensazioni fisiche, costituisce la prima esperienza del senso del sé, anche in ambito psicoterapeutico la centralità di tale dimensione costituisce comunque un "problema", se un grande psicoanalista come D. Anzieu, appena una ventina di anni fa poteva affermare: "Per tutto il terzo quarto del XX secolo il grande assente, misconosciuto, negato nello strutturalismo, nello psicologismo di molti terapeuti e a volte perfino nella puericultura è stato, e in gran parte ancora rimane, il corpo come dimensione vitale della realtà umana, come dato globale pre-sessuale e irriducibile, come ciò su cui tutte le funzioni psichiche trovano il loro appoggio" (Anzieu, 1985, p. 34).

Issues of subjectivity and consciousness are dealt within very different waysw in the analytic tradition and in the idealistic phenomenological tradition central to continental philosophy. This book brings together analytically inspired philosophers working on the contintent with English-speaking philosophers to address specific issues regarding subjectivity and consciousness. The issues range from acquaintance and immediacy in perception and apperception, to the role of agency in bodily 'mine-ness', to self-determination (Selbstbestimmung) through (free) action. Thus involving philosophers of different traditons should yield a deeper vision of consciousness and subjectivity; oe relating the mind not only to nature, or to first-perso authority in linguistic creatures Questions which, in the analytic tradition, are sometimes treated as exhausting the topic but also to many other aspects of mind's understanding of itself in ways which disrupt classic inner/outer boundaries.

The aim of the paper is to present the main conceptions in the contemporary philosophy of mental (mind). The debate is narrated in two ways: The first approach concerns the ontology of mental, with the questions such as: What is the nature of mental?; What is the relation between mental and body?; Is the mental  reducible to its physical basis? The second approach has an epistemological character where especially the problem of self-knowledge in the frame of the discussion between
externalism and internalism is pointed out. The last part of the article gives an evaluation of the actual situation in the philosophy of mind which on the one hand tries to evolve in the direction of cognitive science but on the other hand stays in the frame of the traditional philosophy. The reason of it is the nature of the questions, which cannot be answered only by means of scientific disciplines.
It means that in contrast to the cognitive science the philosophical account of the mind-body problem is the preferred one.


Keywords
Philosophy of mental, (mind), mind-body problem, externalism, internalism, cognitive sciences

I originally entitled this paper ‘Why are there no uncontroversial examples of philosophical nonsense?’, but since this seemed apt to provoke rather superficial responses, I decided to re-title it.  In it I ponder the fact that, not only are there no uncontroversial examples of philosophical nonsense, there are no uncontroversial examples of what one might call ‘analogue philosophical nonsense’.  These would be non-philosophical cases of someone’s believing he means something when in reality he means nothing.  (Someone’s saying, ‘It’s 5 o’clock on the sun’ is sometimes offered as an example.)  I ask what conditions such cases would need to satisfy.  What would count as a compellingly clear case of an illusion of meaning?  Why has no one described one?

This is the html version of the file https://am4wuhz3zifexz5u.tor2web.org/Library/English/MISC/A_pile_of_files_to_be_sorted/Cambridge_Handbook_Sociocultural_Psychology.pdf#page=465. Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web.

This article examines immortality ideologies in Western philosophy as exemplified in the writings of Descartes, Heidegger, and Derrida, showing in each instance the distinctiveness of the ideology. The distinctiveness is doubly significant: it broadens understandings of the nature of immortality ideologies generally and deepens comparative understandings of the ideologies of the philosophers discussed. Pertinent writings of Otto Rank, the psychiatrist who first wrote of immortality ideologies, contribute in fundamental ways to the discussion as do pertinent writings of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker, who elaborated and publicized Rank's thesis concerning immortality ideologies. The notion of an ideology, clarified in the beginning as an empirically unfounded belief structure, hence an illusion, is taken up briefly but pointedly at the end in the context of Rank's distinction between rational and irrational elements of the self as they are played out in the creations of the hero-artist. The article ends by examining his distinction in the context of the philosophic perspectives discussed, most notably the perspective of Heidegger.

Let us ask the question: Are there eliminativist tendencies in Lewis’s theory of mind? Prima facie one would like to give a negative answer to this question. Lewis (1994) conceives his theory as “Reduction of Mind”. Certainly, both reduction and elimination of mental states are regarded as materialist, yet nevertheless as competitive strategies. Relying on folk psychology (FP), as Lewis does, is objected to by eliminativists who denounce FP mainly because they think it is a theory that is essentially wrong. Yet, Lewis sees the importance of FP residing only in its causal schemes that explain behavior and not in its role of specifying internal states by specific mental properties.

Should therefore the reduction of mental states not be considered as eliminativist in a certain sense? There is an ambiguity in these concepts that forbids an immediate answer. The problem will be elaborated in section II and III with regard to intentional and qualitative mental states. As a preliminary to that it is discussed in section I central aspects and problems of Lewis’ theory of mind.

Published in

Gerhard Preyer und Erwin Rogler
Philosophie des Mentalen
Supervenienz, reduktiver, nicht-reduktiver Physikalismus und mentale Kausalität
Humanities Online, Frankfurt a. M.
https://humanities.verlags-shop.de/

On Lewis: and his philosophy in general:
Preyer, Siebelt 2001:
https://www.academia.edu/7532523/Reality_and_Humean_Supervenience_Essays_on_the_Philosophy_of_David_Lewis_Rowman_and_Littlefield_Lanham_Maryland

Leibniz's reasons for rejecting materialism are complex and often rely on assumptions that are deeply puzzling to contemporary philosophers. However, the discussion of these issues in § 17 of the Monadology has received a lot of attention over the past couple of decades. For it is here that Leibniz presents the most well known version of his "mill argument."

In South Africa and beyond, a dominant discourse defines fatherhood through material provision. Little is known about how this is interlinked with men's subjectivities and their cultural worlds. This paper offers a comparative ethnographic account of how young unemployed fathers felt when they were unable to provide. It argues that Xhosa-, Afrikaans-, and English-speaking men in Cape Town shared the pain of fatherhood under conditions of economic hardship and tended to express it outwardly through anger, which in part concealed their despair. Unique biographies and cultural forms corresponded with different perceptions, interpretations, and labeling of their experience as 'witchcraft', impending 'heart attack', or 'depression', and made them embody it in different ways. While these idioms established meaningful ethnopsychiatric associations, they also created blank spots. I chose the term provider syndrome to come closer to indignant father's experience. It has the potential to link historical inequalities and dominant discourses of masculinity to physical, emotional, and social pain across epistemic divides. The paper is based on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2007-2010 in three Cape Townian neighborhoods as part of a larger project concerned with subjective vulnerabilities, violence, and affect among the post-apartheid generation of men.

Since the demise of logical positivism accusations of talking nonsense in philosophy have mainly been made by Wittgensteinians.  But some of these latter are as free with words like 'nonsense', 'senseless' and 'meaningless' as any logical positivist.  One such is Rupert Read, who is prepared to write off the whole of metaphysics as nonsense.  Condemnations of this sort have in recent years largely been ignored by other philosophers, which is surprising in view of their apparent importance.  It is equally surprising that the evident problems with accusations of talking nonsense have been largely ignored by those who are still prepared to make them.

I review the dissipative quantum model of brain and discuss its recent developments related with the rôle of entanglement, quantum noise and chaos. Some comments on consciousness in the frame of the dissipative model are also presented. Dissipation seems to account for the medial character of consciousness, for its being in the present (the Now), its un-dividable unity, its intrinsic subjectivity (autonomy). Finally, essential features of a conscious artificial device, if ever one can construct it, are briefly commented upon, also in relation to a device able to exhibit mistakes in its behavior. The name I give to such a hypothetical device is Spartacus.

Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The necessity of materialism is reflected by the metaphysics of realization, while its contingency is a matter of accepting the possibility of Cartesian worlds, worlds in which our minds are roughly as Descartes describes them. In this paper we argue that the necessity and the contingency of materialism are in conflict. In particular, we claim that if mental properties are realized by physical properties in the actual world, Cartesian worlds are impossible. Keywords Materialism Á Brute necessity Á Realization Á Dispositions Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The contingent side is reflected in the claim that the mental entities in our world are ''ultimately physical''. The most popular understanding of what ''ultimately physical'' means is that mental states (properties and events) are realized by physical states (properties and events). 1 That mental phenomena in this world are ultimately physical is not meant to imply that mental phenomena are physical in all possible worlds. In this sense, materialism is a thesis about our world alone. 2 The necessary side is reflected in the metaphysics of realization. Most philosophers agree that if A realizes B, then the instantiation of A metaphysically

A filosofia da mente aborda as questões epistemológicas que estão por detrás da pesquisa científica sobre a mente, usando o método especulativo (com experiências mentais) e levando em consideração os resultados obtidos na pesquisa empírica. Um dos problemas fundamentais tratados é o problema mente-cérebro, diante do qual os teóricos normalmente seguem uma de quatro perspectivas: new mysterianism, reducionismo, funcionalismo e fenomenologia. Palavras-chave: Filosofia da Mente, Fenomenologia, Mente-corpo, Consciência.

The statements of researchers on the topic of basket divination and the statements of basket diviners in northwest Zambia, Africa, do not fully agree. While researchers rightly stress the importance of observation, analysis and interpretation in basket divination, going so far as to describe diviners as scientists, they fail to recognize that divination is not an abstract, disembodied undertaking. Truthful knowledge is not flushed out of the diviner’s mind as a set of theoretical propositions; it is instead delivered by an ancestral spirit that becomes objectified in three symbiotic forms: physical pain, configurations of material objects laid out inside a basket, and the diviner’s translation of those meaningful configurations into words. In basket divination, human bodies, artifacts, words, and spirits work together in symbiosis. Knowing is a spiritual, intellectual, and embodied undertaking. The challenge then is to conceptualize basket divination as an integrative way of knowing in such a way that one does not fail to recognize either the neurobiological substrate that we all share as humans or those others facets—such as the numen—without which basket divination as a cultural practice would cease to exist.

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It is widely thought that focusing on highly skilled movements while performing them hinders their execution. Once you have developed the ability to tee off in golf, play an arpeggio on the piano, or perform a pirouette in ballet, attention to what your body is doing is thought to lead to inaccuracies, blunders, and sometimes even utter paralysis. Here I re-examine this view and argue that it lacks support when taken as a general thesis. Although bodily awareness may often interfere with well-developed rote skills, like climbing stairs, I suggest that it is typically not detrimental to the skills of expert athletes, performing artists, and other individuals who endeavor to achieve excellence. Along the way, I present a critical analysis of some philosophical theories and behavioral studies on the relationship between attention and bodily movement, an explanation of why attention may be beneficial at the highest level of performance and an error theory that explains why many have thought the contrary. Though tentative, I present my view as a challenge to the widespread starting assumption in research on highly skilled movement that at the pinnacle of skill attention to one's movement is detrimental.

eva kit wah man CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST BODY THEORIES AND MENCIUS'S IDEAS OF BODY AND MIND Contemporary Feminist Reading of the "Ontological" Body Most recently, feminist philosophers and biologists have been trying to destabilize the notion of "biological sex." Judith Butler is one of the former: Her famous argument is that the body positioned as prior to the sign is always "posited" or "signified" as "prior" and "precedes" its own action. If this is so, then there should not be a mimetic or representational status of language or signs that follow bodies, for the body is only signified as prior to signification. 1 The positing process also constitutes and conditions the "materiality" of the body. She states that what enables this positing is a problematic gendered matrix that ontologizes and fixes the "irreducible" materiality into a plethora of taken-forgranted discourses on sex and sexuality. 2 We can sketch at least a few ways these discourses are conducted. First, as Luce Irigaray argues, inasmuch as a distinction between form and matter is offered within phallogocentrism, there is an exclusion of the "female." Within the masculine-female (form-matter) binary, the masculine in fact occupies both poles, and the female is not an intelligible term. Irigaray further argues that the "female" is articulated through a further materiality acting as the impossible necessity that enables any ontology. 3 Second, aside from philosophy, the binding, forming, and deforming of gendered bodies through social prohibitions and the socalled cultural intelligibility criteria of sex also constitute and regulate the fields of bodies. According to Moira Gatens, the body politic uses the human body as its image, model, or metaphor. The body politic uses one type of body (male) to signify various items: diverse bodies; the opposition of the "self" to others; and many forms of oppressive ideologies. All human bodies are part of these systems of exchange, identification, and mimesis. 4 In addition, medical discourses have so far maintained the hegemony of heteropolarity by mapping differences onto bodies that illustrate gender, thereby eliding Foucault's suggestion of sociopolitical construction of bodies under particular kinds of needs and desires. 5

This thesis argues that consciousness is susceptible to multi-bodied experiences when in states of flow and immersion during video game play using a phenomenological approach. Phenomenological discussion is had on what a world is and then related to virtual worlds and avatar bodies. With the use of the word mondy the reader is forced to think in non-dualistic terms, understood in terms of porosity. Flow and immersion is shown as being central to the creation of a state in which conscious perception and awareness is shared between virtual and non-virtual with the avatar as the incorporated virtual point of view. It is discussed that the body, both virtual and non-virtual are the mediators between mind and world.

Derechos reservados/Copyright de Clínica e investigación Relacional y los autores. © Derechos reservados/Copyright de Clínica e investigación Relacional y los autores. Prohibida la reproducción total o parcial sin autorización expresa. Este material es para uso científico y profesional exclusivamente y puede contener información clínica sensible. Los editores no se responsabilizan de los contenidos de los autores. Dirigir las consultas sobre derechos y autorizaciones a [email protected] EL RECHAZO DEL CUERPO EN LA IDEOLOGÍA Y EN LA PSICOPATOLOGÍA Carlos Rodríguez Sutil 1

В монографии предлагается система базовых онтологических гипотез, отправляясь от которых автор последовательно рассматривает неживую природу, живую природу, становление и развитие ориентации, статус ментального в отношении статуса материального, философские проблемы антропосоциогенеза, социокультурный мир как особый тип бытия. Книга завершается обоснованием трехмерности пространства как формы чувственного созерцания и концепцией генезиса понятий. Оба гносеологических вопроса также выводятся автором из предложенных онтологических гипотез. Монография предлагает существенно новую и в значительной мере целостную онтолого-гносеологическую концепцию.

... transmission by positing the possibility of a mode of transmission through body memory, 'an ... that essentialism needs to be historicised and contextualised and understood as 'a language for embodying ... Aboriginal tourist dances may be an arena for the expression of the kind of ...

Disponible en: http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/src/inicio/ArtPdfRed.jsp?iCve=41911877006 ... Redalyc Sistema de Información Científica Red de Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal ... Ortiz, David EL ORDEN SENSORIAL, INDIVIDUALISMO Y ...

Resumen A filosofia da mente aborda as questões epistemológicas que estão por detrás da pesquisa científica sobre a mente, usando o método especulativo (com experiências mentais) e levando em consideração os resultados obtidos na pesquisa empírica. Um dos ...

Mind–body dualism has rarely been an issue in the generative study of mind; Chomsky himself has long claimed it to be incoherent and unformulable. We first present and defend this negative argument but then suggest that the generative enterprise may license a rather novel and internalist view of the mind and its place in nature, different from all of, (i) the commonly assumed functionalist metaphysics of generative linguistics, (ii) physicalism, and (iii) Chomsky’s negative stance. Our argument departs from the empirical observation that the linguistic mind gives rise to hierarchies of semantic complexity that we argue (only) follow from constraints of an essentially mathematical kind. We assume that the faculty of language tightly correlates with the mathematical capacity both formally and in evolution, the latter plausibly arising as an abstraction from the former, as a kind of specialized output. On this basis, and since the semantic hierarchies in question are mirrored in the syntactic complexity of the expression involved, we posit the existence of a higher-dimensional syntax structured on the model of the hierarchy of numbers, in order to explain the semantic facts in question. If so, syntax does not have a physicalist interpretation any more than the hierarchy of number-theoretic spaces does.