Lukács

Bu çalışma, toplumların farklı tarihsel dönemlerinde, savaşlar ve değişen toplumsal koşullar sonucunda edebiyat eserlerine konu olan kahraman imgesinde görülen değişime odaklanır. Çalışmamızın inceleme nesnesi İspanya’nın 16. ve 20. yüzyıl toplumları, bu dönemlerde gözlemlenen toplumsal farklılaşmalar ve bunların roman yazını üzerindeki etkileridir. Söz konusu yüzyıllarda benzer nedenler sonucunda toplumda benzer sonuçların oluştuğu, bunlara koşut olarak da yazarların edebi eserlerde gerçekçi bir anlatıma yöneldiği tespit edilmiştir. İspanyol edebiyatının 16. ve 20. yüzyıldaki en önemli eserlerinden olan Lazarillo de Tormes, El Quijote, La colmena ve La verdad sobre el caso Savolta romanları anti-kahramana dönüşen başkişileriyle okura toplumsal eleştiri yüklü bir içerik sunmuştur. Bunu yaparken de önceki yüzyılların trajik, epik ve romantik kahramanlarından farklı olarak başkişilerini ürkek, asosyal ve genellikle “kaybeden” anti-kahramanlar olarak betimledikleri görülür. 16. yüzyılın pikaresk romanının etik dışı anti-kahraman tiplemesi picaro, İspanya’nın ünlü Orta Çağ kahramanı cesur savaşçı Cid’den çok farklıdır. 12. yüzyılda kaleme alındığı düşünülen İspanyol edebiyatının Orta Çağ’dan bugüne kadar korunmuş epik şiiri Mio Cid’deki gibi korkusuz bir kahramana rastlamak 16. yüzyıldan itibaren neredeyse imkânsızlaşır. Çalışmamızda bir yandan İspanya’nın 16. ve 20. yüzyıllar İspanyası detaylı olarak tanımlanırken, öte yandan ele alınan romanlar aracılığıyla kahraman imgesinin anti-kahramana dönüşümündeki koşutluklar, konuyla ilgili kuramlar ve algısal kategoriler ışığında incelenmektedir.

The concept of the subject is at the core of many social movements that attempt to empower disadvantaged groups by identifying a basic subjectivity underlying and uniting such groups. Though otherwise supportive of such movements, recent continental philosophers and social theorists such as Althusser, Derrida, and Butler have criticized such notions of subjectivity, arguing that they presuppose false and harmful ideas of unity and substantiality as the ‘true’ essence of these groups. In this paper, I propose that one possibility for resolving this debate can be found in the work of Western Marxists such as Georg Lukács, Theodor Adorno, and Walter Benjamin. I argue that they ground an authentically subjective selfhood on the distinct meaningfulness of individual consciousness. Identifying phenomenological motifs in the way they describe consciousness, I suggest that they define meaning by the way different particular experiences recall or relate to one another. By interpreting the many possible meanings of experience, subjects are able to build up an image of themselves, while collective subjectivity can be grounded on the exegesis of shared experiences. Because such meaningfulness is genuinely sui generis, emerging within consciousness, action in accordance with such images counts as autonomous; at the same time, meaning is sufficiently fluid that there can never be one single correct interpretation of it. Ultimately, the Western Marxists suggest, it is in the constant formulation and reformulation of images of oneself through reinterpretation of one’s experience that constitutes subjective selfhood.

This paper sets out the implicit and explicit theories of "totality" in the work of György Lukács and Fredric Jameson. It begins by asking to which problem the proletariat is a solution in the work of the early Lukács. It suggests that this problem is not only historical, but also literary in nature. In the second section, I offer a brief explanation of Lukács' theory of realism, as found in the Marxist aesthetic debates of the 1930s, and as it relates to his concept of totality. Finally, I outline Fredric Jameson's problematisation of Lukács' theory of totality and spell out two key innovations in his use of the term.

Unpublished doctoral thesis on the ideas of freedom, self-consciousness, identity, and experience as the basis of social critique in the thought of Georg Lukács, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and Walter Benjamin, amongst others.

Gillian Rose’s magnum opus was her second book, Hegel Contra Sociology (1981).  Preceding this was The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno (1978), a work which charted Rose’s approach to the relation of Marxism to Hegel.  Hegel provided Rose with the standard for critical thinking on social modernity, whose threshold she found nearly all others to fall below, including thinkers she otherwise respected such as Adorno and Marx.  Rose read Marx as an important disciple of Hegel who misapprehended key aspects of Hegel’s thought.  According to Rose, this left Marxism at the mercy of prevailing Kantian preoccupations such as the dichotomy of "theory and practice," etc.  Rose’s misunderstanding of Marxism limits the direction and reach of the rousing call for a "critical Marxism" with which she concluded her book.  Rose failed to note how Lukács and Adorno deeply internalized the Hegelian problematic of Marxism, how Marxism was not the (mis)application but the reconstruction of the Hegelian dialectic under the changed social-historical conditions of capital.  But Rose’s perspective remains that of Hegel -- pre-industrial capital.

Interpretations of Georg Lukács's theory of reification and consciousness have typically assumed that Lukács relies on an essentialized notion of subjectivity that can be restored by dereification. I argue instead that he treats subjectivity as a formally-defined position within the totality of consciousness. To do this, I highlight striking similarities between Lukács and the art theorist Alois Riegl: Lukács's account of consciousness, I suggest, closely parallels Riegl's account of the spectator as a formally-defined component of works of art. Both Lukács and Riegl incorporate notions of agency and active involvement in the forms of representation into these accounts of subjectivity: what Riegl finds in the Kunstwollen of different works of art, Lukács finds in the formal structures of social reality. I use this to reinterpret reification as the formal definition of the subject as an isolated individual playing no active part in the structure of social forms. Finally, I use Riegl's suggestion that Dutch group portraits incorporate spectators as active constitutors of artistic form to offer some suggestions regarding Lukács's theory of the party.

The understanding of the Marxian concept of Praxis has always been closely linked to the interpretation of the so-called Theses on Feuerbach (1845), which has become the canonical text on the subject. This has occurred for at least two reasons. One is that in the Theses, more than anywhere else, Praxis is explicitly defined and postulated as a key element. The second reason is that two other important writings in which Marx alludes to Praxis in similar terms were not made public until well into the twentieth century, namely the ones we know today as Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) and The German Ideology (1845-1846). However, it was precisely the impossibility of consulting these two texts, especially the second one, which also contains critical passages written by Marx on Feuerbach, what facilitated the misreading of some key phrases from the Theses, starting with the definition of Praxis as ‘human sensuous activity’ (menschliche sinnliche Tätigkeit). This formula refers to a human activity that is part of the same sensuous, material, extramental, objective reality which it constantly changes, thereby conditioning all cognitive activity, all form of consciousness. The comparison with other writings from the same period, beginning with those already mentioned, leaves no doubt about it. But a reading of the Theses that is isolated from those writings, as the one made by many authors who could not know them, led to think that Marx did not understand Praxis as an activity that is evident to the senses, but as an activity of the senses themselves. These authors, among which stand out the young György Lukács and several Italians, as Giovanni Gentile, Arturo Labriola, Rodolfo Mondolfo and Antonio Gramsci, consider Praxis not only as an activity that conditions knowledge, but also as a knowing activity itself which is the very creator of all objectivity. Praxis then becomes a confusing synonymous of human activity in general, but always under the primacy of conscience and will. In this manner, the materialist concept of Praxis introduced by Marx becomes inevitably subjectivist (i.e. idealistic) and it is no longer possible to properly distinguish between the notions of labour, criticism, praxis, and revolutionary praxis.

Resumen
Es mediante la apelación a algunos críticos relevantes de la modernidad – Freud, Simmel, Adorno, Horkheimer, Shestov, Müller-Hill, Kafka, etc.– que Bauman se esfuerza por construir una auténtica ontología de la modernidad, así como una fenomenología crítica de sus implicaciones culturales, morales y políticas, y de sus límites –perfilados por la presencia infranqueable de la ambivalencia–, con las que su texto adquiere el rango de una aportación señera a esta misma tradición moderna de la sospecha.2 Bauman, apoyado en autores como Horkheimer y Adorno, quienes realizan una crítica demoledora de la Ilustración y dejan entrever un influjo de desconfianza y pesimismo sobre buena parte de la literatura filosófica europea de la segunda mitad del siglo XX. Es Horkheimer, uno de los miembros fundadores de la Escuela de Frankfurt, quien desarrolla la “teoría critica”3, a partir del predominio de una racionalidad procedimental a partir de la cual el conocimiento humano no opera según presupuestos jerárquicos-metafísicos (teoría tradicional) sino pragmático-procedimentales (teoría crítica) al interior de las comunidades científicas y de los contextos socio-culturales del mundo. Esto significa que todo modo de conocer es interesado y, que sólo conocemos por el interés. Con lo que sienta las bases de la Ecuela de la Sospecha. De allí que Bauman en Modernidad y ambivalencia4 pretendiera, como bien lo apunta Wellmer, complementar la tarea emprendida por los pensadores más destacados de la primera generación de la Escuela de Frankfurt. Bauman “intenta envolver con carne histórica y sociológica el esqueleto de la Dialéctica de la Ilustración”.6 Lo que dota a Bauman de una particular originalidad a la vez que de una filiciación a tradiciones filosóficas reconocibles y contrapuestas: “por un lado, la que originándose en Schopenhauer, pasa por Nietzsche para acabar alcanzando a Klages y, por otro, la que desde Hegel, pasando por Marx y Weber, arriba hasta el joven Lukács”.

The Influence of the Frankfurt School in Zygmunt Bauman and Richard Rorty: From Theory Criticism of Liquid Modernity and Pragmatism

Abstract
It is by appealing to some important critics of Freud, Simmel, Adorno, Horkheimer, Shestov, Müller-Hill, Kafka, etc. Bauman strives to build a real ontology of modernity modernity, and a critical phenomenology cultural, moral and political implications, and its limits -perfilados by the impassable presence of ambivalence with which the text acquires the status of a landmark to this very modern tradition of sospecha.1 Bauman contribution, based on authors as Horkheimer and Adorno, who made a devastating critique of the Enlightenment and glimpse an influx of mistrust and pessimism over much of European philosophical literature in the second half of the twentieth century. It Horkheimer, one of the founding members of the Frankfurt School, who developed the "critical theory" from the predominance of a procedural rationality from which human knowledge does not operate as hierarchical-metaphysical assumptions (traditional theory) but pragmatic-procedural (critical theory) within scientific communities and socio-cultural contexts of the world. This means that every mode of knowing is concerned, and we know only the interest. Thus the basis of Ecuela of Suspicion. Hence Bauman in Modernity and ambivalencia pretend, as well as pointing Wellmer, complement the work undertaken by the leading thinkers of the first generation of the Frankfurt School. Bauman "try wrapping with historical and sociological flesh the skeleton of the Dialectic of Enlightenment". What Bauman gives a particular originality while a filiciación a recognizable and competing philosophical traditions: "first, which originating from Schopenhauer, passes Nietzsche6 to finish reaching Klages and, secondly, that from Hegel, Marx and Weber through, up until the young Lukács".

Palabras clave
Modernidad, individualismo, sociedad, miedo, posmodernidad, globalización, Escuela de Frankfurt, Teoría crítica, Dialéctica de la Ilustración, pragmatismo, ironismo, contingencia.
Keywords
Modernity, individualism, society, fear, postmodernism, globalization, Frankfurt School Critical Theory, Dialectic of Enlightenment, pragmatism, ironism, contingency.

Introducción:

El influjo del pensamiento de Nietzsche, en los varios niveles de la cultura occidental, se insertó en un ambiente espiritual acompañado de otros movimientos, enraizados en el proyecto de una nueva moralidad y religiosidad postcristianas. Movimientos contemporáneos y ligados muchas veces al nietzscheanismo han sido el wagnerismo, el espiritismo y el ocultismo, las sectas antroposóficas y teosóficas, algunas formas de socialismo o de anarquismo, y grupos análogos, que buscaban en este tipo de filosofías, y en las ciencias contemporáneas, la justificación de su visión del mundo y de sus prácticas heterodoxas neopaganas. En este contexto Nietzsche influyó de modo notable en la praxis de la psicología en sus mismos orígenes, aún antes y más fuertemente que en filosofía. Un ejemplo claro de ello es Ludwig Klages, uno de los fundadores de la caracterología y de la grafología. La psicología klagesiana se funda en su pensamiento filosófico nietzscheano que inspiró su militancia en círculos teosóficos y ocultistas pro-arios y antisemitas -algunos lo consideran como uno de los fundamentos teóricos del nacionalsocialismo-. La "psicología del futuro", si quiere ser fecunda, afirma Klages, debe inspirarse en las intuiciones nietzscheanas. Sobre todo, el psicólogo debe, como Nietzsche, superar su misma humanidad, poniéndose más allá del bien y del mal, descubriendo la malicia esencial del corazón humano. Para Klages, finalmente, el psicoanálisis es una versión vulgarizada de la psicología de Nietzsche. Klages es hoy un autor casi olvidado, tal vez por su vinculación con el nacionalsocialismo, y fue vencido por el psicoanálisis. Sin embargo, su influjo fue grande en sus contemporáneos, sobre todo en aquellos dedicados al estudio del carácter. Además de su discípulo Hans Prinzhorn, podemos nombrar entre los autores que se inspiran enormemente en el caracterólogo alemán a Philipp Lersch, tercer sucesor de Wundt en Leipzig, y después profesor en Munich.

In the Anthropocene humans are said to wield more power than ever over the rest of nature, but at the same time they feel helpless in the face of forces which they themselves have created. This chapter deals with the question of why the forms that structure our relationship to nature appear so resistant to change and how these forms can be criticized and resisted. I start by turning to the question of reification, which is central to my discussion since it helps us understand why the social forms of capitalism appear resistant to change. While on the one hand defending a Lukácian concept of reification against Honneth’s attempt to reformulate it, on the other hand I point to the need to interpret Lukács’ concept of reification so as to make it applicable not only to society but also to nature. Secondly, I ask how a de-reification of nature is possible. Within critical theory, efforts to answer this question have repeatedly run up against the so-called “Lukács problem”: if dialectics is needed to overcome reification but is limited to the social realm of human praxis, as Lukács appeared to claim, how can it be used to de-reify nature? Thirdly, I argue that Adorno’s idea of constellations points to a solution to this problem. In Adorno, however, the link between constellations and praxis is unclear. Before concluding the chapter, I therefore turn to recent examples of environmental activism to illustrate that link.

Georg Lukács’s concept of reification has won many admirers for its account of how individual subjectivity is affected by capitalist society. However, even its admirers have rejected the way Lukács uses this to argue that the proletariat can develop a revolutionary class consciousness out of reification: they argue that he relies too much on flawed Romantic models of subjectivity. In contrast to this, I outline a phenomenological reading of Lukács’s theory, comparing his thought to Edmund Husserl and Emil Lask. This makes consciousness a mode of being rather than an epistemological question. Thus, categories of consciousness affect the existence of objects: the way society appears is, for Lukács, the way it exists. Ultimately, this leads to a new appreciation of the role of the revolutionary Party in Lukács’s theory: his preference for a Luxemburgian party gives a theoretical foundation for describing performed social action as “free.”

Pretendeu-se apreender a tese marxista de interdependência entre subjetividade e objetividade,
entre as condições materiais de reprodução social e a formação das consciências humanas.
Sendo o trabalho a esfera central na produção e reprodução social, as condições postas
materialmente para que o trabalho seja executado, incidirão na própria subjetividade humana, na
forma de interação entre homem e natureza. Longe de ter um caráter exclusivamente econômico,
a perspectiva marxista considera como indispensável para analisar a sociedade a subjetividade
humana, os sentimentos e as emoções que perpassam e conduzem as relações sociais. Todavia,
não se confunde subjetividade com moralismo ou eticismo, como se os sentimentos e a
consciência humana brotassem do vácuo, ou fossem inseridos num ciclo vicioso e formassem
uma fórmula tautológica entre estes, um gerando e sendo gerado pela outro. É preciso analisar de
forma dialética a relação da consciência humana com as atividades práticas e as condições
estabelecidas que as influenciam e limitam. Deve-se romper com uma visão idealista, trazendo o
homem concreto para sua realidade concreta, para seus problemas terrenos e, a partir daqui,
conduzir as categorias para um entendimento da totalidade.

The continued effects of the 2008 economic crisis and its aftershocks have contributed to the electoral collapse across the world of technocratic centrist parties that had come to dominate in the previous decades. In their place, a number of authoritarian populists such as Donald Trump and Rodrigo Duterte have risen, explicitly setting themselves against the logic of late capitalism. For Georg Lukács, such an opposition is integral to capitalism: he noted the conflicting tendencies in bourgeois thought towards fatalistic belief in an unalterable social system on the one hand, and an irrational faith in so-called ‘great men’ on the other. Drawing on Lukács’s analysis of the logic of the commodity structure as social form, I will explain this through the way capitalist society determines itself as rational in its abstract, quantifiable universality, and excludes all specific content as ‘irrational.’ In this way, I suggest, it symbolically defines its own antithesis – not a revolutionary proletariat, but a mystical nationalism based on a belief in a ‘spiritual’ unity.

O principal tema dessa investigação está voltado para as influências idealistas na intepretação espiritualista de Max Weber. O problema adquirido por herança do idealismo alemão, denominado inicialmente de “problema do mundo invertido”, corresponde à dificuldade que desafia a intepretação histórica dos valores práticos. Ele será identificado no interior da interpretação de Max Weber tanto dos fenômenos éticos como estéticos. Tal como o subtítulo sugere, trata-se de uma investigação em duas instâncias; a primeira abordará a fragmentação estética, o surgimento de valores conflitantes segundo os fenômenos do campo da arte. A segunda parte abordará a crise ética, tomando essa expressão no seu sentido mais literal, como um rompimento, uma cisão no mundo ético. Essas duas interpretações poderão ser justapostas por se remeterem tanto ao diagnóstico de Weber de um politeísmo, como ao problema da teodiceia. Uma vez que a teoria weberiana dos valores for propriamente identificada, ela poderá então nos conduzir a uma conclusão acerca da relação entre a interpretação espiritualista e materialista que compõe o principal interesse de Max Weber na ética econômica das religiões mundiais.

The main subject of this investigation is concerned with the idealistic influences on Max Weber spiritualistic interpretation. The problem gained as heritage from German idealism, initially referred as an “inverted world”, since it can be understood as the difficulty that challenges the historic interpretation of practical values, this problem may be also identified inside Max Weber’s interpretation of both, ethical and aesthetical phenomena. This investigation is twofold, as the subtitle indicates; the first part shall deal with the aesthetical fragmentation, the emergence of conflictive values in the artistic phenomena. The second part shall deal with the ethical crisis, undertaking this expression in the most literal sense, as a breakdown or a rupture of the ethical world. Both interpretations shall joint together, composing the Weberian diagnosis of an absolute polytheism and of the problem of theodicy. The Weberian theory of values once properly grasped shall finally guide us to draw a conclusion about the relation between spiritualistic and materialistic interpretations, as presented in the guidelines of Max Weber’s greatest interests in the economic ethics of the world religions.

Why read Georg Lukács today? Especially when his most famous work, History and Class Consciousness, is so clearly an expression of its specific historical moment, the aborted world revolution of 1917–19 in which he participated, attempting to follow Vladimir Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. Are there “philosophical” lessons to be learned or principles to be gleaned from Lukács’s work, or is there, rather, the danger, as the Communist Party of Great Britain’s Mike Macnair has put it, of “theoretical overkill,” stymieing of political possibilities, closing up the struggle for socialism in tiny authoritarian and politically sterile sects founded on “theoretical agreement?” A certain relation of theory to practice is a matter specific to the modern era, and moreover a problem specific to the era of capitalism, that is, after the Industrial Revolution, the emergence of the modern proletarianized working class and its struggle for socialism, and the crisis of bourgeois social relations and thus of consciousness of society involved in this process. Critical theory recognizes that the role of theory in the attempt to transform society is not to justify or legitimate or provide normative sanction, not to rationalize what is happening anyway, but rather to critique, to explore conditions of possibility for change. The role of such critical theory is not to describe how things are, but rather how they might become, how things could and should be, but are not, yet.

Marquant à sa façon le centenaire de La Théorie du roman, cette brève étude se propose de jeter les bases d’une « homologie » des postures politique et esthétique de Lukács, à savoir, de son appréhension historique et (idéo)logique à la fois. À partir des préférences littéraires de Lukács qui bien souvent ne correspondent pas à l’esthétique stalinienne, on s’attache ici à débrouiller les liens complexes existant entre cette œuvre de jeunesse et la production lukacsienne depuis les années 1930, ce qui permet également de relever des « correspondances homologiques » entre l’évolution de la pensée de Lukács sur le plan théorique et l’involution mise en œuvre par Staline sur le plan politique.

On the occasion of the centenary of The Theory of the Novel, this brief study aims at setting the basis for a «homology» between Lukács’s political and aesthetic claims, namely considering both his historical and (ideo)logical understanding. Starting from Lukács’s literary preferences – which often do not conform to the Stalinist’s aesthetic – I try to disentangle the complex links between his early works and the post 1930 production. Along this line, I identify « homologous correspondences » between the evolution of Lukács’s theoretical thought and the involution deployed by Stalin’s political plan.

This document is the sixth chapter of my book-length project, Reification Revalued: Lukács’s Phenomenology of Capitalism. The book as a whole offers a new reading of Lukács through the lens of his earlier attempts to write a philosophy of art while studying in Heidelberg between 1912 and 1918. Rediscovered and published after his death, these drafts reveal the young Lukács’s explicit engagement with a series of thinkers whose influence on his thought has been underexplored for too long – particularly Edmund Husserl, Emil Lask, Konrad Fiedler, and Alois Riegl.

I argue that his most important work of Marxist thought, History and Class Consciousness, drew heavily on the model of meaning that he developed in his earlier work. Lukács presents social being as a sphere in which objects are constituted as meaningful through a set of intentional practices that may be analysed phenomenologically. Earlier chapters in the book re-examine some of the central arguments of History and Class Consciousness through this lens – with a particular focus on his account of subjectivity. In this chapter, I try to apply this re-reading of Lukács to an area he paid relatively little explicit attention to – that of nature, and the relation between the social and the natural. To do so, I draw on two significant criticisms of HCC – that of Lukács himself in his final years, and that made more recently by Andrew Feenberg. While conceding that Lukács’s account is deficient in many regards, I suggest that there is more to his view than is normally allowed.

For more information on the book as a whole, please see the prospectus at http://goo.gl/bBhQyK

For European literati of the early twentieth century, Fyodor Dostoevsky represented a mythically-Russian spirituality in contrast to a soulless, rationalized West. One such enthusiast was Georg Lukács, who in 1915 began a never-completed book about Dostoevsky's work a model of spiritual community that could redeem a fallen world. Though framing his analysis in the language and themes of broader Dostoevsky reception, Lukács used this idiom innovatively to go beyond the reactionary implications this model might connote. Highlighting similarities with Max Weber's account of political ethics, I argue that Lukács developed an ethic derived from his reading of Dostoevsky, which focused on the idea of a hero defined by an ability to resolve the specific ethical dilemma of adherence to duty and moral law on the one hand, and the need to restore spontaneous human community at a time when the social institutions embodying such laws had fallen into decay on the other. Crucially, he deployed the same framework after his conversion to Marxism to justify revolutionary terror. However different his position from Dostoevsky's, it was through engagement with these novels that Lukács not only clarified his thought but also came to identify Lenin as a Dostoevskyan hero figure.

György Lukács a voué les dernières années de sa vie à rédiger l'Ontologie de l'être social. Cette œuvre
monumentale devait servir de fondement à l’articulation d’une théorie éthique achevée. Notre propos sera
donc de tenter de dégager, à partir des prémisses ontologiques, une conception de la responsabilité
introduite en contrebande. La difficulté et l’originalité de György Lukács est de nous présenter une théorie
ontologique où l’homme construit le monde qui le construit, où le devenir de l’individu est inhérent au
devenir de l’être social et où la responsabilité à laquelle l'engage la conscience devient le ressort de la
liberté. Nous verrons ainsi que la responsabilité, dans la mesure où elle met en rapport les modalités du
« devenir-homme de l’homme » et s'appuie sur une conception unitaire de l'homme et de l'être social,
franchit le cadre juridique et moral pour devenir un impératif lié à l'être et au devenir de l'individu.
Abstract
György Lukács dedicated the last years of his life to the writing of The Ontology of Social Being. This
monumental work was aimed to fundamentally developed a complete ethical theory. The object of our study
lies in an attempt to find, from the ontological assumptions, a conception of responsibility introduced on
the side. György Lukacs's difficulty and originality is to introduce us an ontological theory where man
constructs the world that constructs him, where the individual becoming is inherent to the social being
becoming and where responsibility engaged by the conscience becomes the question of liberty. We will see
that responsibility, as far as it links the modalities of the « becoming-man of man » and relies on a unitary
conception of man and social being, crosses the juridical and moral boundaries to become an imperative
associated to the being and the becoming of the individual.

Hace unos pocos años, Georg Lukács era una referencia intelectual obliga-da en toda consideración de problemas estéticas y de crítica literaria. En am-bientes más restringidos se discutía sobre su obra de filosofía política más co-nocida, Historia y consciencia de clase. En nuestro país se puso en marcha la tarea de publicar sus obras completas en una prestigiosa editorial. Hoy, una losa de silencio oculta toda referencia a la obra del autor húngaro. Algo funciona mal en el mundo cultural de un país cuando las referencias obligadas en un momento determinado pierden todo tipo de consideración en un momento posterior, como si el momento presente pudiera explicarse al margen del pa-sado más o menos inmediato. La creencia de que eso no es posible constituye uno de los motivos por los que podemos volver a reflexioilar sobre Lukács. En los análisis de la obra de Lukács, pocas veces ha sido objeto de aten-ción específica su período de conformación intelectual, es decir, la etapa previa a Historia y consciencia de clase. Sin embargo, se trata de un momento cultural de la mayor importancia para comprender la filosofía y el pensamiento de nuestro tiempo. Lukács desarrolla sus tentativas intelectuales en una atmósfe-ra dominada por la cultura alemana de principios de siglo. Ya en Budapest trabó conocimiento de las obras de Max Were y Georg Simmel. Posteriormen-te, durante varios años residirá en Heidelberg, donde realizó estudios con Sim-mel, fue influido por Dilthey y mantuvo estrechos contactos con E. Lask, H. Rickert, W. Windelband y Max Weber, entre otras figuras del pensamiento alemán. Entre sus amigos, se contaban E. Bloch y Martin Buber. En contacto con esta atmósfera intelectual, Lukács escribió dos obras bá-sicas, El alma y las formas (publicada en 1910) y La teoría de la novela (es

The Hungarian theorist Georg Lukács is known for his reintroduction of Hegelian thought to Marxist philosophy—but I argue that his account of the subjectivity of the proletariat owes just as much to the Danish philosopher and theologian Søren Kierkegaard. Despite strong differences in their outlook, their accounts of subjectivity have strong structural similarities. For both, a division of the self against itself produces suffering that leads in turn to a growing consciousness of the roots of the problem; in the end, the self is restored through a relation to itself grounded in the absolute, and thereby becomes capable of freedom. Lukács’s theory of subjectivity is, thus, predicated on changing the orientation of the proletariat towards itself—in ways that are deeply indebted to the peculiar theology of Kierkegaard.

‘Teoria della Distruzione del Valore’: teoria elaborata da Massimo Morigi afferente al ‘Repubblicanesimo Geopolitico’, al ‘Repubblicanesimo’, al ‘Neo-repubblicanesimo’, al ‘Marxismo’ e al ‘Neo-marxismo’. Pur condividendo la critica di Karl Marx all’individualismo metodologico dell’economia classica (in specie la critica ad Adam Smith e David Ricardo, individualismo metodologico che poi sarà in seguito trasmesso anche all’economia neoclassica o marginalismo), la ‘Teoria della Distruzione del Valore’ rovescia la teoria del plusvalore di Karl Marx, affermando che il rapporto sociale che va sotto il nome di ‘capitalismo’ non opera una sottrazione del valore del lavoro erogato dal lavoratore a vantaggio del capitale ma, invece, una distruzione del valore di questo lavoro, distruzione del valore che si evidenzia sul “libero mercato” dove s’incontrano – entrambi formalmente liberi – gli operai (decisori omega-strategici), che apportano su questo mercato un lavoro svalutato (distrutto quindi nel suo valore) originatosi proprio dalla libertà di questo mercato (ossia dalla sua mancanza di regole) e i datori di lavoro capitalisti (decisori alfa-strategici) che così possono avvalersi di questo valore-lavoro effettivamente svalutato (o, meglio, distrutto).

The Hungarian theorist Georg Lukács is known for his reintroduction of Hegelian thought to Marxist philosophy—but I argue that his account of the subjectivity of the proletariat owes just as much to the Danish philosopher and theologian Søren Kierkegaard. Despite strong differences in their outlook, their accounts of subjectivity have strong structural similarities. For both, a division of the self against itself produces suffering that leads in turn to a growing consciousness of the roots of the problem; in the end, the self is restored through a relation to itself grounded in the absolute, and thereby becomes capable of freedom. Lukács’s theory of subjectivity is, thus, predicated on changing the orientation of the proletariat towards itself—in ways that are deeply indebted to the peculiar theology of Kierkegaard.

O Rótulo de uma " ciência burguesa " foi empregado por Lukács em sua obra A Destruição da razão bem como em outros escritos, remetendo-se aos limites da consciência reificada. Em oposição a esse padrão exigia-se um sentido novo de ciência, uma ciência que não imponha limites formais à crítica. Mas ao mesmo tempo que permeava algo que parecia poder nos excetuar, só o fazia pela miragem de um padrão de ciência superior a essa, mas que tão logo se desfazia diante da sempre presente limitação ideológica, produto de um tempo e de um presente que nos limita a consciência de fora para dentro. Adorno, embora não produza diagnóstico muito diferente, encontra algo de instrutivo na maneira como a postura teórica de Weber deparava-se frequentemente com limites, não precisamente os já conhecidos limites da teoria do conhecimento, algo diferente. Por essas diferenças de perspectiva, ambos reavaliaram o dilema apresentado por Weber entre ciência e diletantismo, especialmente quando se pensa no marxismo como ciência.

György Lukács dedicou os últimos anos de sua vida a escrever Para uma Ontologia do Ser Social. Esta obra monumental
serviria de fundamento para a articulação de uma teoria ética completa. Nosso propósito será o de tentar extrair, a
partir das premissas ontológicas, uma concepção da responsabilidade introduzida de forma indireta. A dificuldade
e a originalidade de György Lukács se dão na apresentação de uma teoria ontológica em que o homem constrói o
mundo que o constrói, em que o devir do indivíduo é inerente ao devir do ser social e em que a responsabilidade
na qual a consciência o engaja vem a ser a fonte da liberdade. Veremos, assim, que a responsabilidade, na medida
em que relaciona as modalidades do “tornar-se homem do homem”, e que se apoia numa concepção unitária do
homem e do ser social, atravessa os âmbitos jurídico e moral para se tornar um imperativo ligado ao ser e ao vir a
ser do indivíduo.