Judicial protection

This article underlines the role of courts in ensuring the protection of fundamental rights in the digital environment. In particular, the focus will be on the European and the US judicial dimension, looking at the right of freedom of expression and data protection. Section 2 underlines how judges rely on metaphors to address digital matters. Sections 3 and 4 respectively look at the role of courts in shaping the protection of freedom of expression and of privacy and personal data across the Atlantic. Section 5 provides two examples of the role of European courts in extending values across the Atlantic.

В статье рассматриваются некоторые аспекты унификации правил гражданского
и административного судопроизводства на примере норм об отказе в принятии заявления. С доктринальных позиций исследуется проблема соотношения этих норм с задачами и базовыми, исходными началами цивилистического процесса. Анализируется судебная практика об отказе в принятии заявления ввиду неподведомственности дела. В рамках исследуемой темы дана оценка некоторым положениям законопроекта Верховного Суда РФ о внесении изменений в ГПК РФ, АПК РФ, КАС РФ. Автором высказаны предложения, реализация которых повысит эффективность судебной защиты заинтересованных лиц, обеспечит доступность правосудия по гражданским и административным делам и будет способствовать процессуальной экономии.
The paper discusses some aspects of the unification of the rules of civil and administrative procedure following the example of the rules on refusal to accept a statement. From the doctrinal point of view, the problem of the relationship of these norms with the tasks and basic initial principles of the civil process is investigated.
Court practice on the refusal to accept the application due to the lack of jurisdiction of the case is analyzed. Within the framework of the topic under the study, some provisions of the draft law of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on amendments to the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, the agrarian and industrial complex of the Russian Federation, the CAS of the Russian Federation are assessed. The author makes suggestions, the implementation of which will increase the effectiveness of judicial protection of interested persons, will ensure the availability of justice in civil and administrative cases and will contribute to procedural economy.

We demonstrate that the CJEU’s Achmea judgment has resulted in significantly more damage beyond the termination of intra-EU BITs. It made the application of EU law difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, it has opened the floodgate to deficient judicial protection in the face of structural backsliding of the rule of law in some EU Member States. While the motives of the CJEU and by extension the European Commission to safeguard their ultimate control over the internal market by exclusively relying on the preliminary ruling system of integrated European judiciary may be understandable, they cannot serve as a credible justification for the long-term consequences of disempowering investors in the name of an ideological stance regarding EU judiciary, which cannot work in the backsliding Member States, where the ‘integration of the EU’s judiciary’ could stand for the absence of independent adjudication. Consequently, the Achmea judgment and post-Achmea developments such as the recently signed Termination Agreement to terminate the intra-EU BITs have been leading to significant—possibly irreparable in the short- to medium-term—lowering of the procedural and substantive protection standards for European investors in times when they are in need of more rather than less protection.

The authors of the article explore the digital rights management in judicial
protection of intellectual property rights through the lens of civil law principles. The
principle of protection of civil rights and interests is defined as one of the basic
principles of civil law regulation. The specifics of this principle, which are caused by
the specificity of the objects of intellectual property rights, the peculiarities of
obtaining legal protection, are determined. The provisions of the theory and the
current legislation are analyzed in terms of defining ways of protecting intellectual
property rights as one of the factors that determine the peculiarities of the
implementation of the principle of protection of civil rights and protected interests in
the field of intellectual property.

This paper analyses how the European courts refrain from providing full judicial review of lists of terrorist suspects adopted under European law. In a second part, the paper demonstrates that judicial protection could be offered under the law as it stands.

The paper is divided into four parts. Part two briefly introduces the two different types of sanctions. Part three analyses the judicial protection from sanctions originating at the UN level. Part four does the same for individual sanctions originating at the European level. Both types of sanctions are examples of multi-layered regulation originating at the UN level, followed by implementation measures at both the European and at the national level. It is argued that judicial protection should be provided before the Luxembourg and the Strasbourg courts, as well as in the national courts. Special attention is given to the question of whether the lack of judicial protection in the Luxembourg courts is in line with the settled case law of the ECJ. Part five looks briefly at the interplay between the ECtHR, the Luxembourg courts and the national courts.

In the attempt to fight international terrorism, the European Union (EU) has begun to sanction individuals. Alarmingly, these sanctions are adopted in a judicial vacuum. The EU labels natural and legal persons as terrorists without providing the necessary procedural remedies to challenge such allegations and thereby infringes the right of access to justice of those sanctioned. In particular, the second (Common Foreign and Security Policy — CFSP) and third (Justice and Home Affairs — JHA) pillars of the EU do not provide the judicial protection required for such measures in a state of law. An incidental judicial review of those listings is possible only where they are followed by an actual freezing of assets under the first pillar. Otherwise, they remain unchallengeable official accusations infringing the individual’s right of access to justice (Article 6 ECHR) and her right to reputation (recognised under Article 8 ECHR), not to mention the potentially disastrous economic consequences.

15 июня Министерство информации Республики Беларусь своим приказом № 233 ограничило доступ к интернет-ресурсу KYKY.org.

В данной ситуации интересным является вопрос возможности обжалования решения Мининформа об ограничении доступа к интернет-ресурсу или его части. В качестве ружья, выстрелившего в третьем акте, Мининформом были использованы ст. 51-1 Закона Республики Беларусь от 17 июля 2008 г. № 427-З «О средствах массовой информации», появившаяся благодаря Закону от 20 декабря 2014 г. № 213-З и Положение о порядке ограничения доступа к информационным ресурсам (их составным частям), размещенным в глобальной компьютерной сети Интернет, утвержденном совместным Постановлением ОАЦ при Президенте Республики Беларусь и Министерства связи и информатизации от 19.02.2015 № 6/8.

Одной из претензий юристов к ст. 51-1 Закона и Положению стало то, что они не предусматривают ясного и недвусмысленного механизма обжалования решения об ограничении доступа к интернет-ресурсу. На это счет есть две основные позиции.

Мне, лично, больше импонирует мнение о возможности судебного обжалования решения об ограничении доступа к интернет-ресурсу, т.к. для этого есть все правовые основания.

В практике отечественного Конституционного Суда имеется достаточно количество правовых позиций, ясно и недвусмысленно указывающих на неотъемлемое право граждан и организаций на судебную защиту нарушенных прав, свобод и законных интересов, релевантных, в том числе и к ситуации обжалования ограничения доступа к интернет-ресурсу, распространяющего продукцию СМИ. Тем не менее, изъяны юридической техники ст. 51-1 Закона о СМИ, можно счесть основаниями для обращения в Конституционный Суд Республики Беларусь в рамках производства по делам об устранении пробелов, исключения правовой неопределенности и коллизий.

La distribución de asuntos entre secciones de órganos judiciales de un mismo orden jurisdiccional responde a unas normas de reparto. Pese a que se ha considerado que esta cuestión es de naturaleza gubernativa y no afecta al derecho fundamental a un juez predeterminado, lo cierto es que la asignación de asuntos a las secciones puede condicionar la orientación de la respuesta judicial.
Los sesgos derivados de una determinada sub-especialización pueden conducir a que en función de la asignación a una u otra sección se reflejen sensibilidades diversas. Este estudio de caso sobre la cuestión de la vivienda y el alojamiento colaborativo quiere señalar interrogantes sobre la naturaleza jurídica, alcance e incidencia en el comportamiento judicial de las normas de reparto.
The distribution of cases between sections of judicial organs of the same jurisdictional order is governed by court business rules. Although this issue
has been considered to have a governmental nature and does not affect the
fundamental right to a predetermined judge, the allocation of cases to sections may condition the scope of the judicial response. The biases deriving from a particular sub-specialization may lead to different sensitivities being reflected depending on the assignment to one or another section. This case study on theissue of housing and collaborative housing is intended to raise questions about the legal nature, scope and impact on judicial behaviour of distribution rules.

This introduction celebrates the career of Professor Laurence W. Gormley, who has been one of the key navigators of the EU Internal Market. In the narrative of European integration, the EU Internal Market has long played the role of the movie Bright Eyes’ Good Ship Lollipop, steering the peoples of Europe towards the candy land of an ever-closer union, ‘where bon-bons play on the sunny beach of peppermint bay’. As we demonstrate in this contribution, however, in many ways the EU Internal Market is also a carnivalesque Ship of Fools like the one decorating the cover of the Essays in Honour of Laurence W. Gormley. First, we outline the main contributions of Professor Gormley to, among others, tax law, public procurement, judicial protection, and especially, free movement of goods. Then, from the perspective of both the Good Ship Lollipop and the Ship of Fools, we discuss the EU Internal Market’s promise of a better future on the basis of Professor Gormley’s work on the foundations of the Common Market, the fundamental distinction between a Common Market and an Internal Market, the functioning of Article 34 TFEU, including the infamous Keck judgment, and the EU’s system of judicial protection. Whether we conceive the Good Ship Internal Market as a “Good Ship Lollipop” or a “Ship of Fools” – and both metaphors contain a lot of truth – for every student of EU law, Professor Gormley has been impossible to miss as the steersman in the Ship’s crow’s nest who keeps the good directions of the EU Internal Market. In the presence of many fools among us aboard our Ship, Laurence’s role in the project of European integration cannot be overestimated, as a true navigator of good directions, a torchbearer of sound and communautaire reasoning, and, aptly in line with the epilogue of this book, a guardian of the duties of the EU Internal Market’s sanctity.