Indian politics/south-Asian affairs/West-Asian affairs

The presence of about 6 million Indians in the Gulf is reflective of a mutually beneficial relationship between the Gulf states and India. The Indian migrants are preferred over others owing to their skills and non-involvement in the domestic affairs of the host country, and this particular preference has ensured a steady flow of remittances back home. The Indian migrants’ 40 year sojourn in the Gulf has helped build the foundation of a strong bilateral relationship with most of the countries in the region. In view of recent developments, however, there is a need to examine if migration of Indians to the region will continue at the same level in next two decades. Economic slowdown in some countries of the Gulf, internal demographic compulsions, indigenisation policies and political uncertainties plaguing some of the states could have a negative impact on Indian migrants working in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. In this context, this chapter examines the profile of Indian migrants in the region; level of remittances; the immediate impact of renewed indigenisation policies; political uncertainties and possible contingencies in future; bilateral and multilateral initiatives undertaken by the Indian government to aid mutually beneficial migration to the region; and finally, the socio-economic and cultural impact of migration on India and the implications of a large-scale return of migrants from the Gulf. The chapter also identifies some key drivers affecting migration from India to the Gulf region and offers some recommendations.

Despite a number of distinguishing features, Nepal's new Constitution is a controversial document as it denies the aspirations of marginalised people like Madhesis, Tharus and Janjaits. This constitution has also brought about tensions in Nepal's relations with India, though as a bigger neighbours India shoulc have played its policy cautiously.

As the coalition forces prepare to exit Afghanistan, concerns regarding peace and stability in the country and future power balance after their departure are becoming paramount. While there will be a considerable American presence, focus has now shifted to local infrastructure and services -civil, military and political and their ability to further peace and progress in the country. Owing to the geostrategic landscape of Afghanistan, in addition to its long conflict ridden history with a significant presence of the Taliban, concerns regarding revival of conflict and violence are coming to the fore -particularly from traditional South Asian rivals i.e. India and Pakistan. Through an in-depth study of the political, economic, cultural and regional dimensions of this tri-lateral relationship, the following paper examines how there is a significant clash of interests and how there can cooperation between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan.

In-spite of a decisive shift towards Israel in current times, the Government of India officially proclaims that its support for Palestinian self-determination is unwavering and that it forms one of the bed-rocks of India’s foreign policy. Indeed, in the hey days of decolonization in the second quarter of the twentieth century, the anti-colonial struggle in Mandate Palestine and in British India followed parallel, if deeply ironic trajectories.
However for India, the Palestinian struggle was markedly different from all the other movements for self-determination to which it lent support. Zionist aggression on the territory and people of Palestine in particular and towards the Muslim Ummah in general, was unfolding at the same time as a separate Muslim national consciousness consolidated itself in the Indian subcontinent.
To the Indian National Congress (INC), eager to delegitimize the two-nation theory that was increasingly articulated by the Muslim League (ML), the Palestine issue was therefore also a testing ground for proving its stated credentials of upholding the interests of Muslims in the subcontinent. At the same time, because the of the INC’s rejection of the two-nation theory, it was also loathe to admit to a separate Muslim constituency angle in its Palestine policy.
This implicit competition with the Muslim League over the right to speak for the Muslims of the subcontinent remains a constant undercurrent throughout the years leading up to Partition and Independence and gets carried over into the fundamental foreign policy make-up of the States of India and Pakistan.
The paper submits then, that an examination of the INC’s and later the Indian State’s policies towards the Palestine issue, both immediately before and after 1947 is richly revealing of the internal contradictions of India’s own self-image. Acknowledging and potentially theorising the role of Partition in the perpetuation of such contradictions allows for a richer, more nuanced understanding of the character of the Indian State.

Current Indian foreign policy is informed by a realization that a combination of economic reforms and the end of the Cold War has steered India into a position of some influence in the post-9/11 world. This is influence of a kind that India did not have in the years following Independence. What India had then was a moral standing which it could make little use of, boxed in as it was by the contingencies of a Cold War division of the world. This division allowed very little leeway for the Indian policy of non-alignment, which ended up being not so much an alternative as a means of holding the line, until India could find itself in a more favourable geopolitical situation. Further, unlike in the post-Independence phase, India today often appears reluctant to exercise what influence it has outside South Asia and sometimes even within the region, keenly aware of the several continuing limits on its capabilities and having suffered from blowback on the few occasions it did. Even as some old problems continue to keep India off-balance in international affairs, the world has also not stood still and new problems – both traditional and non-traditional – have emerged that have required India to step up and take a position on. And all this, even as the Indian foreign policy establishment remains woefully ill-equipped and understaffed to meet these challenges. What then are the patterns of Indian foreign policy behavior in the new century?