Export Cartels

Companiile recurg la opțiunea unei alianțe strategice având la bază o serie de motivaţii care să le asigure un confort strategic pe piaţă. Cele mai des întâlnite motive al deciziilor de fuziune şi achiziţie sunt cele legate de sinergiiatunci când competenţe similare sau între care exită o legătură, pot fi combinate pentru a facilita dezvoltarea unor noi inovaţii şi crearea unor noi linii de activităţii aducătoare de valoare, îmbunătăţind eficienţa operaţională prin economiile de scară şi de scop sau scad costurile de capital prin nivelarea fluxurilor de numerar, realizând economii financiare de scară şi o mai bună corelare a oportunităţilor de investiţii cu fluxurile interne de numerar. Decizia adoptării unei strategii globale implică două direcţii pentru a creşte profitabilitatea companiei -reducerea costurilor și realizarea economiilor de scară. Practic aceste companii se concentrează pe o strategie de cost-leadership. Departamentele de producţie, marketing şi cercetare-dezvoltare sunt concentrate în câteva locaţii cheie. Firmele globale oferă mai degrabă produse standardizate decât adaptate pieţelor locale sau regionale, având totodată şi o strategie de marketing globală, tocmai pentru că adaptarea duce la creşterea costurilor, ca urmarea a diminuării producţiei şi duplicarea funcţiilor.

Whether due to a need to act quickly or a lack of a functioning government with whom to negotiate, the UN often needs to authorize the deployment of peacekeepers and other peace support personnel without the benefit of a Status-of-Forces Agreement (“SOFA”). Unless or until this initial failure to have a SOFA is later cured by the conclusion of a SOFA, the problem arises what immunities UN-mandated peacekeeping forces may enjoy in the absence of a SOFA. UN-mandated peacekeeping operations have traditionally been present in host States with the consent of the State involved. However, the UN Security Council has taken the dramatic step of authorizing the constitution of peacekeeping forces without the consent of the host State. If there is no consent, then State immunity does not apply and we must look to other sources of immunity or comparable protection. These sources can include international humanitarian law, the UN Charter, the UN Immunities Convention, the UN Safety Convention, and customary international law. This paper attempts to assess all of these potential sources of immunities and determine the protections available for UN peacekeepers in the absence of a SOFA.

The benefits of bilateral agreements in regard to international cartels are clear: only a synchronized and international approach will help the developing nations in protecting their markets from unfair competition practices. This article shows the state of anti-cartel policies and legislation in selected jurisdictions, the present state of the coordination of competition policies through promotion and cooperation at the bi-national and international level and highlighted some examples of more publicized anti competition cases. One observation is that more could be done by the developing NIC nations to increase the collaborative ties of their anti competition policies and organs as well as ensure that they fall under the wider umbrella of regional competition regimes such as in the case of South Africa and the European Union. The necessity to safeguard consumer welfare through effective domestic anti competition frameworks was highlighted in the discussed cartel cases. Time will tell whether the emerging economies will be able to balance competition policy and consumer welfare in an effective and progressive way without affecting their trade and investment policies.

This study analyses the decision of the Turkish Competition Authority in which it has granted total immunity to SunExpress and reduced the amount of fine of Condor by 50 percent, after SunExpress applied for leniency and disclosed the existence of the agreements it signed with Condor pursuant to which Condor undertook to determine the seat-only ticket prices of SunExpress.

After the entry of a guilty verdict in a criminal antitrust proceeding, the district court will typically order the Probation Office in the district to prepare a presentencing report that sets forth information about the defendant, the offence, and other issues. 5 This report will also calculate the relevant sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines. 6 In cases where the court determines that the trial record contains sufficient information on which to base a calculation of a 2

The chapter describes and compares the extraterritorial reach of US Antitrust and EU Competition Law. Beside providing a general overview of the unilateral extraterritorial enforcement, comity considerations and bilateral agreements, the chapter focuses especially on the current developments in the qualification of the effects doctrine, especially the qualifiers that the effects have to be 'direct' (or 'immediate'), 'substantial' and 'foreseeable'.

Some courts in the US have recently begun to take the 'directness' qualifier too literally. There is a danger that this will allow infringements with substantial and foreseeable domestic effects to go without antitrust scrutiny. The chapter argues that a criterion of 'directness' makes no sense where economic effects are concerned. In the US, where the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) prescribes the qualifiers by statute, the directness qualifier should be interpreted as coextensive with the foreseeability qualifier. In the EU, where no statute prescribes the qualifiers established by the General Court in the Gencor decision, the directness/immediacy qualifier should be dropped altogether.