Ethics of Violence

A prominent conception of terrorism, held by Igor Primoratz, Stephen Nathanson, C. A. J. Coady, Uwe Steinhoff, and Jeff McMahan, claims that it (i) is gravely and distinctively wrong, compared to other forms of violence; and (ii) necessarily harms those who are not responsible for, or morally innocent of, the terrorists’ grievance. Moreover, the conception holds that these two views preserve and explain the conventional moral judgment that terrorism is almost always wrong. This paper challenges that against-moral-innocents (AMI) conception. I argue that AMI, unlike other terrorism-conceptions, incentivizes lay non-philosophers adhering to it to see all terrorists as radically evil agents who pose an existential threat. But if so, then those layfolk will have reasons, provided by the AMI conception, for engaging in morally regrettable deliberation about how to respond to terrorism. That, the paper argues, provides a reason for doubting such conceptions. In making that argument, the paper analyzes the nature of conventional-morality-capturing conceptions like AMI, distinguishes AMI from other terrorism-conceptions, examines four prima facie wrongs which AMI-viewed terrorism will be seen to do, compares these to the fewer prima facie wrongs which other terrorism-conceptions take terrorism to do, and considers how lay people’s seeing AMI-viewed terrorism as radically evil figured in the response to the recent Boston Marathon bombings and in the War on Terror.

A penultimate version is available for download. Please cite the published version, available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phil.12021/abstract

In this article, I deconstruct the concept of legitimacy (notably in the form elaborated by Max Weber) by emphasising its conceptual complicity with the notion of sovereignty. Through an analysis of Derrida's critique of Austin's theory of performativity, I elaborate another, non-ontological 'concept' of legitimacy, located before and beyond sociological methodology, International Relations theory, and performative ontologies of power. This legitimation-to-come signifies the structural fallibility and pervertibility of the performative, and instantiates the archi-originary force of an unconditional resistance, conditioning both the position and the deconstruction of ontologies of sovereign ipseity (ipsocracy). Pursuing the efforts of Cynthia Weber and Rob Walker, I attempt to sketch the implications of this post-performative legitimacy with respect to the protocols of legitimation of International Relations theory and sociological methodologies, through an analysis of their persistent ontological presuppositions.

In How Terrorism Is Wrong (Oxford UP, 2008), Virginia Held argues that terrorism is not necessarily morally unjustifiable (pp. 77-81, 88-89). Call this “the Non-necessity Thesis.” Held has a powerful and illuminating argument to this thesis. The argument asserts what we may call “the Violations Distribution Principle” (VDP): If we must have rights violations, then a more equitable distribution of such violations is better than a less equitable; from this principle, Held then argues that terrorism may sometimes be less unjustifiable than accepting continued rights violations. Among Held’s motivations for arguing the Non-necessity thesis is that terrorism may sometimes be the only means the weak and oppressed have to effectively combat the systematized violation of their rights.

In this critical response, I accept the VDP, as well as Held’s motivation for urging the Non-necessity thesis. But I shall nevertheless try to refute that thesis. Terrorism, I shall argue, is always wrong; but it sometimes should be excused and partly forgiven. Rather than ask whether terrorism is always wrong or sometimes justified, I shall argue that we do better to ask what kind of wrong a particular terrorist act or campaign is. Moral wrongs, I shall argue, can be divided into four types: delicts, offenses, iniquities, and enormities; a delict being the least grave, an enormity the most. Moreover, offenses, inquities, and enormities are injustices, while a delict is not. A terrorist act simpliciter is an offense, a terrorist campaign an iniquity. But terrorist acts can, if they aim to end a systematized and massive violation of human rights, and if they are the only feasible means of taking the society to a less inequitable distribution of rights-violations, be excused to the status of delicts, and, mutatis mutandis, terrorist campaigns to the status of offenses. Hence terrorism is always wrong, but need not be unjust.

This article considers how the musar (virtue-focused) tradition in Jewish ethics may shape Jewish moral judgments on questions of war and peace, focusing on various constructions of the virtue of humility in modern Jewish thought. It gives particular attention to concepts of humility advanced by Menachem Mendel Lefin, the leading figure of the Polish Haskalah, and it suggests that Lefin’s model of critical self-assessment, especially if carried out in partnership with those from different nations or traditions, could help to restrain the misplaced pride, enthusiasm, and impulses to dehumanize enemies that may emerge at times of war. The article brings Lefin’s approach into dialogue with three Jewish thinkers who argued that proper humility should in some cases encourage the use of violence and even the dehumanization of enemies: the Lithuanian Orthodox rabbi Simhah Zissel Ziv, the American Reform rabbi Kaufmann Kohler, and the militant Israeli Orthodox rabbi Meir Kahane.

The just war-criterion of legitimate authority – as it is traditionally framed – restricts the right to wage war to state actors. However, agents engaged in violent conflicts are often sub-state or non-state actors. Former liberation movements and their leaders have in the past become internationally recognized as legitimate political forces and legitimate leaders. But what makes it appropriate to consider particular violent non-state actors to legitimate violent agents and others not? This article will examine four criteria, including ‘popular support and representation of a people’; ‘monopoly of violence and effective control over a people’; ‘compliance with international legal and just war standards’; and ‘predisposition to strive for a lasting peace’. It will be shown that out of these four criteria only the first can be defended. Furthermore, it will be illustrated that non-state violent agents may perfectly well satisfy this criterion. In contrast, state actors may clearly fail in this regard. But, it will also become obvious that in exceptional circumstances violent agents do not require explicit approval from the people on whose behalf they act. Finally, the article will argue that – in principle – individuals should be entitled to employ violence for political objectives.

On behalf of the editorial board of „Edukacja Etyczna” (Ethical Education) Journal (ISSN 2083-8972), we would like to invite scholars to submit articles for the forthcoming 2019 issue. The 2019 issue of our journal will be entirely dedicated to the contemporary studies of the relationship between ethics and violence. As our journal is primarily interested in the education of ethics, we will be especially interested in original articles, relating to the possibility of using ethical education as
a means to counter the consequences of social and political violence. Articles in philosophy and ethics are welcome, however, given our interdisciplinary nature, we are also anticipating propositions from social sciences, offering sociological, anthropological, cultural and political analysis of contemporary studies in violence. Ph.D. students, working on thesis concentrating on the relationship between violence and ethics are also welcome to submit their research. Specific themes of proposals can be related (although certainly not limited) to the following issues:
• Contemporary ethical theories and the question of violence
• Violence, injustice, and ethics
• Racial violence and ethical education
• Feminist ethics versus violence against women
• Violence against animals and against the environment (ecological crime) and the role of ethical education
• Education in ethics as a means to limit social and/or political violence
• Efficacy of ethical protests against acts of violence
• Violence in social protests and moral responsibility of protesters
• Contemporary theories and applications of non-violence
• Violence and neo-colonialism in ethical perspectives
• The relationship between violence and social organization