Economics of Regulation

Purpose: identify the determining factors of the Numerus Clausus Policy within an extremely restrictive Portuguese higher education medical sector and point on future implications.

Methodology: Public-Choice Theory (A. Downs, 1957; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Olson, 1965); Rent-Seeking Theory (J. Buchanan; Tollison; G. Tullock (1980) consonant with Chicago School: Stigler (1971); Posner (1971, 1974) and Peltzman (1976, 1989).

ABSTRACT

This is a very brief textbook that introduces a basic explanation about the relationship between Law and Economics. In Chile, the study of Economics for Law Schools began in the middle of 20th century using the denomination “ Economic Law”. The text assumes that the expression “ Economic Law” is not updated  and is not related to the current state of the art on law and Economics, Regulation and Antitrust law. The text, primarily oriented to students of Law Schools,  analyzes several areas of intersection between Law and Microeconomics, focused on the foundations, the main topics and the outcomes of the regulatory process.


Este es un muy breve libro de texto que introduce una explicación básica sobre la relación entre derecho y economía. En Chile, el estudio de la economía de las facultades de derecho se inició a mediados del siglo 20 utilizando la denominación "Derecho Económico". El texto supone que la expresión "Derecho Económico" no se actualiza y no está relacionado con el estado actual de la técnica en el Derecho y Economía, Regulación y Derecho de la competencia. El texto, orientado principalmente a los estudiantes de las facultades de Derecho, analiza varias zonas de intersección entre la Ley y Microeconomía, se centró en las bases, los temas principales y los resultados del proceso regulatorio.

This postgraduate essay worn the 1st Award: Competition Authority of Kenya Essay Writing Competition, 2014.

The essay begins by describing what mergers are and providing a short synopsis of merger regulations. The essay then prescribes a criteria that the Competition Authority of Kenya can use to benchmark mergers for efficiency and various approaches that can be used.

"Economics of Natural Gas Transportation".  Research Report no. 53  Lillehammer College August  2000. 64 pages.  ISSN 0807-2647  ISBN 82-7184-2269

This report demonstrates that the existence of significant economies of scale and scope in the European gas industry make many transmission and local distribution companies natural monopolies in the markets in which they operate. Often, this gives them a strong market power and little competitive pressure. Substantial parts of the rent in the gas chain are accrued in the transportation segment rather than in production and/or to the benefit of consumers. This gives reason for public interventions into the functioning of the market, as seen under the initiatives taken by the European Commission, such as the “Gas Directive”. The report discusses gas transport regulations; arrangements that goes beyond the present EU initiatives. No schedule seems to secure any first-best outcome. However, different types of multipart tariffs and price discrimination under Ramsey principles may bring about social acceptable second-best results. The complexity of regulations and the huge interests at stake make it doubtful that such regulations are attainable throughout Europe in the coming decade. The report discusses a game between a public authority and the transporters where various level of conflict and cooperation will influence how far regulations will go and how they will be designed. Changing property rights (nationalization) and the use of market forces is discussed as alternatives to regulation.

Jörg Brettschneider untersucht die Frage, inwieweit die normative Theorie der Regulierung bzw. die Theorie vom Marktversagen geeignet ist, rechtspolitische Handlungsempfehlungen zu geben. Es erfolgt zunächst eine Betrachtung der aus dem Modell der vollständigen Konkurrenz abgeleiteten Marktversagenstatbestände. Es zeigt sich, dass die Marktversagenstatbestände sehr unscharfe Kategorien sind. Dies liegt daran, dass sie sehr weit sind und die Feststellung ihrer Verwirklichung oft eine Bewertung voraussetzt. Die Folge ist, dass sich - auch in Verbindung mit einer vergleichenden institutionellen Betrachtung (die ebenfalls mit erheblichen Anwendungsproblemen verbunden ist) - nur sehr begrenzt Aussagen über vorhandenen Regulierungsbedarf treffen lassen. Dem rechtspolitisch tätigen Juristen bleibt deswegen nur, die von der normativen Theorie der Regulierung genannten Marktversagenstatbestände als Argumente (neben anderen) zur Kenntnis zu nehmen. Die normative Theorie der Regulierung kann deswegen Ihr Versprechen, rechtspolitisch verwertbare Maßstäbe zu liefern, nur in wesentlich eingeschränkterem Maße erfüllen als von der herrschenden Ökonomik behauptet.

http://www.duncker-humblot.de/index.php/catalog/product/view/id/35922/s/staat-4-2015/category/687/

Since January 1, 2014 licenses needed to execute a tour guide profession in Poland (with exception of mountain tour guiding) have been abandoned. This study attempts to examine whether regulation paucity affected prices and quality of service at the tour guiding market.
A majority of findings refers to the results of questionnaires conducted among tour guides during annual meeting of tour guides’ association which was supported with structured interviews with heads of tour guide associations. The questionnaires were divided into three parts which are related to information asymmetry, price changes and quantity of service on the market after deregulation.
Most of interrogated tour guides believe that tour operators may correctly assess a quality of their services and their licenses still act as a quality certificates. A majority did neither experience a price fall of their services nor they observed new tour guides on the market. However a half of interviewed tour guides observed that tour guides widen their services into fields previously restricted (e.g. other area). Hence, deregulation benefited mostly existing group of tour guides.
Findings of this study may serve as an case study for tourism policy makers in other areas where regulation of tour guide profession is going to be modified. Some insights might be implemented also to the process of deregulation of other occupations. Scientific implications are elaborated.

Este paper considera el efecto del cargo por confiabilidad sobre el precio spot de la energía eléctrica en Colombia, implementado en 2006 con el fin de incentivar a los generadores existentes o nuevos inversionistas para mejorar la confiabilidad de la prestación del servicio, lo que conduce a incrementar la capacidad instalada en el mercado de energía mayorista. Se describe el funcionamiento de este mecanismo en Colombia y analiza el comportamiento de algunas variables estructurales en el funcionamiento de este mercado, como la relación entre la demanda comercial y la disponibilidad real, el fenómeno de El Niño y La Niña, el nivel de embalse y algunas medidas de carácter regulatorio. El precio spot presenta alta volatilidad haciendo que la especificación adecuada corresponda a un modelo de regresión con estructura ARCH (Engle, 1982). Los resultados obtenidos evidencian que el cargo por confiabilidad es estadísticamente significativo y positivo, es decir hace que el precio spot aumente. Además, El Niño presenta un impacto positivo sobre el precio spot, debido a la gran participación hidráulica de este mercado.

A “pay-as-offered” or discriminatory price auction (DPA) has been proposed to solve the problem of inflated and volatile wholesale electricity prices. Using the experimental method we compare the DPA with a uniform price auction (UPA), strictly controlling for unilateral market power. We find that a DPA indeed substantially reduces price volatility. However, in a no market power design, prices in a DPA converge to the high prices of a uniform price auction with structural market power. That is, the DPA in a no market power environment is as anti-competitive as a UPA with structurally introduced market power.

This report demonstrates that the existence of significant economies of scale and scope in the European gas industry make many transmission and local distribution companies natural monopolies in the markets in which they operate. Often, this gives them a strong market power and little competitive pressure. Substantial parts of the rent in the gas chain are accrued in the transportation segment rather than in production and/or to the benefit of consumers. This gives reason for public interventions into the functioning of the market, as seen under the initiatives taken by the European Commission, such as the "Gas Directive". The report also discusses gas transport regulations; arrangements that goes far beyond the present EU initiatives. No schedule seems to secure any first-best outcome. However, different types of multipart tariffs and price discrimination under Ramsey principles may bring about social acceptable second-best results. The complexity of regulations and the huge interests at stake make it doubtful that such regulations are attainable throughout Europe in the coming decade. The report discusses a game between the public authority and the transporters where various level of conflict and cooperation will influence how far regulations will go and how they will be designed. Changing property rights (nationalization) and the use of market forces is discussed as alternatives to regulation.

Przedmiotem pracy jest regulacja mezosystemów gospodarczych. Przez
system gospodarczy rozumie się zbiór wzajemnie powiązanych podmiotów
(przedsiębiorstw, konsumentów, organizacji itp.) uczestniczących w procesach
wymiany towarowo-pieniężnej. Zgodnie z podejściem utrwalonym w tradycji
neoklasycznej w analizie systemów gospodarczych uprzywilejowany charakter
nadawany jest często podmiotom, kosztem analizy związków między nimi.
Działalność podmiotów, producentów i konsumentów powiązana (koordynowana)
jest przez rynki, które traktowane są na zasadzie czarnych skrzynek.
W niniejszej pracy akcent położony jest na powiązania pomiędzy podmiotami.
Ze względu na charakter tych powiązań w każdym systemie można wyróżnić
dwie sfery: realną i regulacji. Sfera realna obejmuje związki realne, a więc takie,
które dotyczą przepływów towarów i usług między podmiotami. W sferze
regulacyjnej występują natomiast związki regulacyjne, czyli powiązania informacyjno-decyzyjne.
Spełniają one funkcje koordynacji i regulacji powiązań
realnych. Procesy regulacyjne zachodzące w systemach gospodarczych kształ­
tują zachowania podmiotów wchodzących w skład tych systemów. Niniejsza
praca dotyczy powiązań regulacyjnych między podmiotami tworzącymi system
gospodarczy.