Deception / Lying (Deception Lying)

Though Odysseus’ tales to Eumaios and Aninoos in Odyssey 14.199–359 and 17.417–44, respectively, are presented as fictional tales within Homer’s larger myth, some elements have striking analogs in Late Bronze–Early Iron Age reality.

This article examines these portions of the hero’s false ainoi within their fictive context for the purpose of identifying and evaluating those elements. Particular focus is given to Odysseus’ declaration that he led nine successful maritime raids prior to the Trojan War; to his twice–described ill–fated assault on Egypt; and to his claim not only to have been spared in the wake of that Egyptian raid, but to have spent a subsequent seven years in the land of the pharaohs, during which he gathered great wealth.

Through a comparative examination of literary and archaeological evidence from the Late Bronze–Early Iron transition in the Eastern Mediterranean, it is shown that these aspects of Odysseus’ stories are not only reflective of the historical reality surrounding the time in which the epic is set, but that Odysseus’ fictive experience is remarkably similar to that of one specific member of the ‘Sea Peoples’ groups best known from 19th and 20th dynasty Egyptian records: the ‘Sherden of the Sea.’

This article presents findings of qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews with a group of "frequent liars" and another of "rare liars" who provided their subjective perspectives on the phenomenon of lying. Participants in this study previously had maintained a diary of their social interactions and lies over the course of one week, which allowed to assign them to one of the two groups: frequent or rare liars. Thematic analysis of the material followed by elements of theory formulation resulted in an extended lying typology that includes not only the target of the lie (the liar vs. other) but also the motivation (protection vs. bringing benefits). We offer an analysis of what prevents from telling the truth, i.e. penalties, relationship losses, distress of the lied-to, and anticipated lack of criticism for telling the truth. We also focus on understanding moderatorsof consequences of lying (significance of the area of life, the type of lie and capacity ...

In this chapter I examine the writings of Mark Twain on lying, especially his essays  "On the decay of the Art of Lying" and "My First Lie, and How I Got Out of It." I show that Twain held that there were two kinds of lies: the spoken lie and the silent lie. The silent lie is the lie of not saying what one is thinking, and is far more common than the spoken lie. The greatest silent lies, according to Twain, were the national silent lies that there was nothing wrong with slavery (the U.S.), that there was nothing wrong with the prosecution of Alfred Dreyfus (France), and that there was nothing wrong with imperialism (UK). According to Twain, lying is unavoidable. Since lying is unavoidable, one must simply avoid injurious lies, and tell beneficial lies.

In un suo articolo del 1946, George Orwell ha sostenuto che "il linguaggio politico è concepito in modo da far sembrare le bugie sincere, e l'omicidio rispettabile". Lo sa bene chi ha vissuto in Italia: qui, la menzogna ha sempre avuto un ruolo d'eccezione in politica, dalle prime promesse di Berlusconi sino alle più recenti disavventure di Oscar Giannino e del suo Master fasullo. Ciò nonostante, la menzogna non ha suscitato interesse nel dibattito filosofico italiano -laddove ad esempio in ambito anglosassone vi è un vivace dibattito sulla questione (vedi ad es. J. Saul, Lying, Misleading and What is Said, Oxford University Press, 2012). Il breve saggio divulgativo di Franca d'Agostini Menzogna (Bollati Boringhieri, 2012) rimedia a questo silenzio. Semplice e lineare, si tratta di un'ottima introduzione alla "filosofia della bugia", che affronta in maniera comprensiva molte delle questioni filosofiche legate alla menzogna -con un occhio di riguardo per il ruolo che la bugia svolge all'interno della vita democratica. Il tratto originale di questo volume è che l'analisi della bugia viene condotta "nella prospettiva del concetto di verità", laddove generalmente (negli studi filosofici sulla menzogna) l'accento è posto sulle credenze soggettive del bugiardo, in quanto indipendenti dai fatti. Ciò è dovuto al fatto che la D'Agostini riprende un'indagine sulla verità già elaborata in maniera più sistematica in testi precedenti (Disavventure della Verità, Einaudi, 2002; Verità Avvelenata, Bollati Boringhieri, 2010; Introduzione alla Verità, 2011). L'obiettivo principale della riflessione sulla bugia è quindi riscoprire, attraverso la menzogna, il fascino della verità -quella verità che si oppone alle mistificazioni mediatiche, e che consente di difendersi dalle "menzogne" dei politici e degli affabulatori. Lo scopo del libro è duplice: da un lato, difendere le vittime della menzogna, smascherando i meccanismi attraverso i quali il falso si fa strada a discapito della verità; dall'altro, rivendicare contro gli attacchi del nichilismo aletico (ovvero contro coloro che negano che vi sia la verità) che la verità è il presupposto imprescindibile del dibattito democratico, come criterio di valutazione delle argomentazioni divergenti (tesi sottesa a un'altra pubblicazione della D'Agostini, di stampo però manualistico, dove l'accento si sposta sull'analisi delle argomentazioni: I mondi possibili -Logica per la filosofia e il ragionamento comune, Bollati Boringhieri, 2012). Il libro, di facile e piacevole lettura, si sviluppa perciò su due binari paralleli (verità e menzogna), attraverso quattro capitoli. Nel primo si affronta la questione complessa della verità, appianando molti degli insidiosi fraintendimenti che spesso derivano dalla sua strutturale "fragilità", "invisibilità" e "incompletezza". Nei successivi capitoli l'attenzione è invece rivolta soprattutto alla menzogna: si distingue fra menzogna e errore, e vengono introdotti i concetti liminari di inganno, fuorviamento, manipolazione e plagio. Il terzo capitolo si concentra poi su una questione classica per la filosofia delle menzogna: se possano esistere bugie "buone", e quale possa esserne la natura. Il capitolo conclusivo è dedicato a una comprensiva tassonomia dei possibili modi di mentire, e costituisce il contributo più originale del libro alla riflessione sulla menzogna. Già il filosofo scettico Montaigne aveva notato che, mentre la verità è una sola, "il rovescio della verità ha centomila aspetti e un campo indefinito". La D'Agostini fa ordine in questa giungla, introducendo categorie come quelle di meta-menzogna (negare di

In this paper, we propose a Six Channel Analysis System (SCAnS) for the (semi-)automatic investigation of potential deception across all communication channels. SCAnS builds on our current system: Six Channel Analysis in Realtime (SCAnR). SCAnR users are trained to code – as Points of Interest (PIns) – relevant occurrences of twenty-seven criteria relating to the six channels, when they appear to point to inconsistencies with respect to the speaker's account (the story they are trying to convey), their apparent baseline and the context. Our experiences to date confirm the view that multi-channel approaches have the potential to lead to higher accuracy rates of deception detection than is possible when using individual methods of detection and/or when focussing on one communication channel independently (Vrij et al., 2000: 257), especially when combined with cognitive elicitation strategies. However, we recognise the importance of (in)validating the relevance of the twenty-seven criteria through ongoing research. SCAnS will provide a (semi-)automated means of achieving this. Given our audience, we focus on the usefulness of content-analysis tools like Wmatrix (Rayson, 2008) for this purpose. More broadly, our research has implications for the analysis of data in forensic contexts, across all available channels of communication, and for the coding of (para)linguistic features.

Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, by Sissela Bok is the single most influential and groundbreaking piece of literature on the subject of lying. This book explores the ethics of lying, motivations for lying, and in which scenarios that lying is justified.

If we are being truly honest with ourselves, we can accept that lying is one of most common wrong acts that we commit on a daily basis. From early childhood, well into adulthood, a person will lie thousands of time. There are many reasons why a person lies: they could be exaggerating a “fishing story,” covering up a misdeed or wrongdoing, failing to keep a commitment, trying to make sure they don’t hurt someone else’s feelings, or even intentionally trying to inflict harm on another. Thus we see, lying is simply a part of life and we must accept the fact that we are all liars. This is why it is important to understand the very act of lying at its core.

In her book, Bok defines a lie as, “an intentionally deceptive message in the form of a statement” (636-637). Upon concluding my study of this book, I have come to accept any lie that one may attempt to justify and deem necessary should be studied through multiple scopes: the perspectives of the parties being involved, the principle of veracity, the doctrine of utilitarianism, and the intent of the lie in question. Bok takes time to explain the rational for each of these scopes, while leading us through an exploration of lying and the role it plays in society.

(in corso di pubblicazione su APhEx) Neri Marsili -Università di Torino [email protected] "Mindfucking: a critique of mental manipulation" è un libro che ha un titolo quanto meno originale. Il lettore che non conosce il testo, di fronte a un nome del genere, potrebbe ipotizzare che si tratti di un romanzo rosa, o di uno stravagante manuale di psicologia, o ancora di un libro che rasenta la pornografia. Niente di tutto questo: si tratta di filosofia analitica, e nello specifico di un piccolo saggio di analisi concettuale. L'autore è Colin McGinn; non un semplice scrittore incline all'ironia, ma un affermato e rispettabile professore universitario. McGinn ha una cattedra di Filosofia presso l'Università di Miami; precedentemente è stato Professore di Filosofia a Rutgers e Wilde Reader a Oxford. È noto per il suo lavoro nell'ambito della filosofia della mente, sebbene abbia scritto su temi che attraversano tutta la filosofia contemporanea.

The Muslim question in Late Imperial Russia is investigated through the deceptive strategeis of a Muslim journalist, an impostor and double-dealer, M.-B. Hadjetlaché.. A micro-historical approach is developped, aimed at constructing the 'macro-contest' of the problem via the 'micro-case' under study.

Using the term parafiction to name situations in which a fiction is temporarily experienced as fact, this essay examines the aesthetics, ethics, and politics of contemporary art  that puts viewers through such experiences. Why has this kind of art become so common?  Works by Walid Raad, Michael Blum, the Yes Men and others. Sometimes funny, frequently moving, and arguably cruel, parafiction exemplifies art's culture-shifting power, pushing alternatives from the possible to the plausible. (N.B. I now start discussions of this geneaology in the early 1990s, finding in the work of Coco Fusco and Guillermo Gomez-Peña, Andrea Fraser, Fred Wilson and others a model of epistemological critique).

This article draws attention to how the ethics of democratic representation operates as a discreet factor in a crisis of representation afflicting Western democracies by identifying the ways a disregard for truthfulness can harm democratic representation. We argue that such a disregard undermines democratic representation by (a) reducing freedom and equality, (b) weakening accountability, (c) undermining citizens' trust in democratic institutions, and (d) jeopardising the ability to compromise.

We illustrate the processes that produce these effects by analysing examples of untruthful communication about Brexit by senior British politicians in the post-referendum debates. We show how all four of these effects were triggered by the ways they misled the public by (1) making claims about overwhelming popular support for their policy, (2) misrepresenting the power relations between the EU and the national government, and (3) seriously downplaying the complexity of negotiations involved in leaving the EU and reaching trade deals thereafter.

Philosophy has a long tradition of understanding lying as giving a subject false information with the intent to deceive them, but is this assumption true? Can someone lie without maligning their listener, or further still, can a lie be altruistic?  There are those that believe that in some situations a lie can do justifiable good. In this paper, I will argue against the existence of the altruistic white lie. In section I, I will discuss the traditional definition of a lie. In section II, I will direct my focus to the nature of altruistic white lies. In section III, I will argue that true altruism cannot be associated with lying. In section IV, I will conclude that altruistic white lies are a myth.

Trust is essential in an effective clinician-patient relationship, and the default assumption is that clinicians have an obligation to be truthful with their patients. This assumption is tested in cases when patients are incapable of engaging in autonomous action due to a cognitive impairment. A case study is explored which illustrates when engaging in deception may be acting in the patient's best interest. The decision flowchart in Sokol is explored as a means of justifying deception.

In this article, I argue that being a lie disqualifies something from being a literary work. If something is a lie then it is not a literary work of any kind, and if something is a literary work of any kind then it is not a lie. Being a literary work, and being a lie, are mutually exclusive categories.

Detecting Deception is part of the Wiley Series Psychology of Crime, Policing and Law. The purpose of this series is to inform practitioners involved in the many aspects of the judicial process about the latest research ndings which may have implications for real world policy and practice in crime investigation, detection, policing, and Law. Detecting
Deception is eectively an update on two previous books in the series, Detecting Lies and Deceit: The Psychology of Lying and the Implications for Professional Practice (2000) and Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities (2008) by Aldert Vrij, Professor of Applied Social Psychology at the University of Portsmouth. However, this latest
publication is an edited book, with fourteen chapters written by leading psychology researchers in the field, providing readers with the most comprehensive review of the state of deception detection research, theory, and practice at the present time.

Many organizations are drowning in a flood of corporate bullshit, and this is particularly true of organizations in trouble, whose managers tend to make up stuff on the fly and with little regard for future consequences. Bullshitting and lying are not synonymous. While the liar knows the truth and wittingly bends it to suit their purpose, the bullshitter simply does not care about the truth. Managers can actually do something about organizational bullshit, and this Executive Digest provides a sequential framework that enables them to do so. They can comprehend it, they can recognize it for what it is, they can act against it, and they can take steps to prevent it from happening in the future. While it is unlikely that any organization will ever be able to rid itself of bullshit entirely, this article argues that by taking these steps, astute managers can work toward stemming its flood.

The frequency with which Old Testament figures use mendacious means to achieve good and even holy ends presents a challenge to John Calvins exegesis of the Hebrew Scriptures. Following Augustine, Calvin takes a hard line against all forms of intentional deception. He rejects the solu tion offered by some in the Christian tradition that there are situations that call for a 'dutiful lie' (mendacium officiosum). This necessitates some exegetical acrobatics on Calvins part when he interprets texts in which liars are blessed, rewarded, and praised for their actions. Calvin does not, however, reject all forms of dissimulation, which is all the more surpris ing given his opposition to the half-truths employed by the Nicodemites. While Calvin strives for a consistent ethic of veracity in his exegesis, how ever, there remains the question of how consistently truthful Calvin was in his own practices, particularly in his use of Renaissance flattery and pseudonyms.

Con le figure di Mario Francesconi.
Per inaugurare la Collana Alfabeto è stato scelto Le avventure di Pinocchio di Carlo Collodi, uno dei libri più belli della letteratura italiana, diventato ormai da gran tempo un consolidato classico della letteratura universale. Il Pinocchio di Ronzani è certo da rileggere, ancora una volta, per la sua miracolosa qualità letteraria (il testo si attiene a quello stabilito nell'edizione critica dell'Accademia della Crusca), ma a farne un libro speciale e assolutamente nuovo è l'apparato figurativo che lo accompagna.
Il pittore Mario Francesconi ha realizzato per questa edizione una formidabile serie di ‘ritratti' di Pinocchio, tante estrose variazioni sull'immagine del burattino più famoso del mondo eseguite con le tecniche e i materiali più diversi. Il personaggio inventato da Collodi, insieme ingenuo e sfuggente, misterioso e concreto, ha sospinto l'arte di Francesconi verso una sorprendente esplorazione di forme, figure, effetti cromatici e stilizzazioni, che candidano sicuramente questo Pinocchio a un ruolo del tutto originale, e di prim'ordine, nella lunga tradizione di edizioni illustrate dedicate a questo classico senza tempo.

Mario Francesconi (Viareggio, 1934), è un artista che dalla fine degli anni Cinquanta ha attraversato le stagioni dell'arte italiana ed europea con una ricerca spiccatamente personale di forme e di tecniche. Peculiare è stato sempre il legame di questa ricerca con la letteratura, in progetti che hanno coinvolto letterati e poeti come Leonardo Sciascia, Manlio Cancogni, Mario Tobino, Cesare Garboli, Mario Luzi.

We lie and deceive on a regular basis. To make clear that we are so doing, though, is subject to some kind of infelicity. This paper develops a conceptual analysis of lying and deceiving in a reciprocal fashion by pointing their anti-griciness as a common logical factor, despite their obvious differences. Lying is anti-gricy, for to make clear that one’s lying is a non-play considering assertion but assertion is required for lying. Deceiving is anti-gricy, for to make clear that one’s is deceiving is tantamount to expel oneself of the communicative chain one’s is trying to take advantage of.

Oversupply of information, irrelevance, and repetition in political and administrative text and talk have received considerable scholarly attention, but the tendency to date has been to analyse these phenomena separately. In this article, I argue that it would be fruitful to explore these aspects in combination, as constitutive dimensions of calculated overcommunicative behaviour in public administration.

Based on a multidisciplinary review of literature on cognitive manipulation, prolixity, (ir)relevance, discourse repetition, and administrative behaviour, I propose an original ‘overcommunication framework’ for explicating certain discursive macro-strategies of positive self-presentation used by public officeholders. In particular, I discuss how governments may use calculated overcommunication to avoid or deflect blame, to signal democratic openness, and to perform swiftness.

By problematising the notion of ‘overcommunication’ and introducing it into discourse studies, I seek to open up new avenues of understanding and investigating political and organisational communication.

This study examines the accuracy of 54 online dating photographs posted by heterosexual daters. We report data on (a1) online daters' self-reported accuracy, (b) independent judges' perceptions of accuracy, and (c) inconsistencies in the profile photograph identified by trained coders. While online daters rated their photos as relatively accurate, independent judges rated approximately 1/3 of the photographs as not accurate. Female photographs were judged as less accurate than male photographs, and were more likely to be older, to be retouched or taken by a professional photographer, and to contain inconsistencies, including changes in hair style and skin quality. The findings are discussed in terms of the tensions experienced by online daters to (a) enhance their physical attractiveness and (b) present a photograph that would not be judged deceptive in subsequent face-to-face meetings. The paper extends the theoretical concept of selective self-presentation to online photographs, and discusses issues of self-deception and social desirability bias.

In this article we explore the ethics of manipulating verbal information for the sake of influencing health-outcomes through placebo and nocebo responses. Recent scientific research on placebo and nocebo effects has drawn attention to the ways in which communication by health professionals may modulate the symptoms of patients across an array of highly prevalent conditions such as pain, depression, anxiety, insomnia, irritable bowel syndrome, migraine and Parkinson’s disease. The positive and negative effects of clinicians’ communication on patient outcomes pose important ethical issues, which we describe in this article under the label of “the ethics of therapeutic communication” (TC). We begin by reviewing available evidence supporting the claim that doctor-patient communication has therapeutic effects. We then identify in truthfulness, helpfulness and pragmatism three morally relevant considerations that can guide clinicians in therapeutic communication with their patients. Finally, we examine the ethics of using TC to enhance the effectiveness of proven medical interventions and open-label placebos.

The definition of a lie as asserting a falsehood as if it were true to someone who has the right to know is a problematic definition of lying.  This paper shows such a definition, as founded by Hugo Grotius, is unreasonable and leads to a host of difficulties.
NOTE:  an updated and revised version of this paper has been published in the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.  Please cite the published version.

The Arab nations of Egypt and Syria achieved strategic surprise in the Yom Kippur War.  Understanding of Israeli cognitive biases allowed the Arabs to craft a denial and deception plan that fed the Israeli's beliefs and clouded their judgment.

The Russian military utilized Operations Security (OPSEC) masterfully during its opening days of the invasion of Crimea. While holding the former Ukrainian region would require a deployment of thousands of troops over several weeks the victory goes to an initial small force that used confusion and secrecy to set conditions for a near bloodless invasion by the Russian military.

It has recently been found that during recognition memory tests participants’ pupils dilate more when they view old items compared to novel items. This thesis sought to replicate this novel ‘‘Pupil Old/New Effect’’ (PONE) and to determine its relationship to implicit and explicit mnemonic processes, the veracity of participants’ responses, and the analogous Event-Related Potential (ERP) old/new effect. Across 9 experiments, pupil-size was measured with a video-based eye-tracker during a variety of recognition tasks, and, in the case of Experiment 8, with concurrent Electroencephalography (EEG).

The main findings of this thesis are that:
- the PONE occurs in a standard explicit test of recognition memory but not in “implicit” tests of either perceptual fluency or artificial grammar learning;
- the PONE is present even when participants are asked to give false behavioural answers in a malingering task, or are asked not to respond at all;
- the PONE is present when attention is divided both at learning and during recognition;
- the PONE is accompanied by a posterior ERP old/new effect;
- the PONE does not occur when participants are asked to read previously encountered words without making a recognition decision;
- the PONE does not occur if participants preload an “old/new” response;
- the PONE is not enhanced by repetition during learning.

These findings are discussed in the context of current models of recognition memory and other psychophysiological indices of mnemonic processes. It is argued that together these findings suggest that the increase in pupil-size which occurs when participants encounter previously studied items is not under conscious control and may reflect primarily recollective processes associated with recognition memory.

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