'Abd al-Jabbar and the Mu'tazila

The Mu’tazilah school of falsafa and kalām has been generally vilified and villainized throughout Muslim theological history, primarily, owing to their overwhelming emphasis upon the rational understanding of the principle and essence of divine unity and its direct relation to, and implication for order in the universe and justice in the affairs of the world. The complexity of their argument rests upon a simple fundamental premise, namely God is one in every possible facet of approaching and understanding the concept of one and his unity is above and beyond any perceivable layers of multiplicity. Even though the Mu’tazilah philosophers used the Qur’ān to both defend and project their position, the orthodox model of theology prevailed at length over the philosophical schools and made the rationalizing attempts of the Mu’tazilah tradition to bear the tag of a heresy. I intend, therefore, to take a rather positive approach to the Mu’tazilah philosophy in this paper in an attempt to critically understand the gist and framework of their rationalization of the Qur’anic metaphysics. The Mu’tazilah, as I propose, ought to be evaluated objectively on the basis of their own philosophy rather than through the lens of the orthodox theology. This will, in all probability, shake the petrified edifice of Islam’s theological epistemology.

The Tathbīt dalāʾil al-nubuwwa of the chief qāḍī of Rayy ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī (d. 1024 or 1025) contains a lengthy digression asserting early Christianity's gradual corruption by the pagan Romans. One of the Muʿtazilī theologian's most striking claims regards the origin of Christmas, which he argues derives from a pagan holiday of the "Romans and Greeks" called the Nativity of Time. Previous scholarship has attempted to identify this holiday as a festival known from the ancient Graeco-Roman Mediterranean world. However, ʿAbd al-Jabbār's construction of "Roman and Greek" paganism is highly indebted to Arabic reports on the Ṣābians of Ḥarrān, whom he mentions before and after his Christmas account. In turn, this article collects references in roughly contemporary Arabic sources to a pagan Aramaean holiday called variously the Festival of the Nativity or the Festival of the Nativity of Time. The article argues that ʿAbd al-Jabbār in fact refers to this holiday, having learned of it from a report on Ḥarrānian religion. To conclude, the article situates the Christmas account within ʿAbd al-Jabbār's broader comparative religious project and briefly treats its influence upon Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328).

Divine Command Theory (DCT) is a moral theory with definite metaphysical assumptions. It has never lacked adherents among the followers of the three Abrahamic traditions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Different aspects of the theory were emphasized by different authors and thus different labels were given to the same theory. George Hourani called it “theistic subjectivism” emphasizing the fact that it denies anything objective in the acts themselves which would make them good or bad (Hourani 1985: 15). It has also been labeled as “theological voluntarism,” emphasizing the fact that, according to this theory, it is the divine free will—which is not subject to any reason or requirements—that establishes morality and renders any action good or evil by command and prohibition. The central assumption of this view, which we choose to call Divine Command Theory (DCT), is that God is absolutely free to command anything, and that entails both aspects emphasized by those who called it ethical voluntarism and theistic subjectivism. What is sometimes called Modified Divine Command Theory which presupposes the goodness, love or purposefulness of God is not really a Divine Command Theory, since the ultimate basis of morality will then lie in the purposes or in a certain conception of good and bad rather than the commands and the prohibitions themselves. A Divine Command Theory which supports its argument by claiming that God is identical to the property of goodness or rightness is properly speaking incoherent and unintelligible. “A Divine Command Theory worthy of the name says that to be right is to be commanded by God, and to be wrong is to be forbidden by God” (Tuggi 2005: 53). It seems that in Christianity, as in Islam, theologians have adhered to the theory in order to preserve God’s free will and omnipotence, since “the view that God’s will is subject to independent standards of right and wrong, good and evil, appears to compromise His omnipotence” (Wainwright 2005: 74). Hence, “the Divine Command Theory has traditionally been associated with a particular conception of God’s nature, one which emphasises His absolute power and freedom, and consequently 316the unknowability of His will by human reason” (Chandler 1985: 238). Nevertheless some hold different views and uphold different versions and interpretations of the theory, and refer to it as a “Modified Divine Command Theory” (Adams 1981).

Motives and Obligations: 'Abd alJabbar's Refutation of Theistic Subjectivism As a key philosopher in the Mu'tazila school of Islamic thought, 'Abd alJabbar argued against the doctrine of Theistic Subjectivism. Although this debate continues amongst theologians today, 'Abd alJabbar presents a logical and overall successful series of arguments for the case of an objective morality that supersedes both God and man. While not all of his points are logically fortified, 'Abd alJabbar portrays an objective reality through his examination of predestination, utilizing a metaphysical analysis of commandment and prohibition, and ingeniously applying this analysis to a practical world.

This chapter aims at developing a doctrine of moral pluralism based on Islamic intellectual tradition. It draws upon modern concepts to differentiate between religious and moral pluralism on ones side and moral pluralism and ethical relativism on the other side. It shows that two concepts form the foundation of moral pluralism, namely the concept of universality, which includes core moral principles and the concept of the plurality of moral values. The two essential concepts are identified in the Islamic intellectual tradition represented by the MuꜤtazilite and AshꜤarite theories. Those are the theory of rational obligation developed by the MuꜤtazila and the theory of maqāṣid al-shariꜤa or the purposes of law developed by the late AshꜤarites. The two theories combined can provide us with a theory of moral pluralism that is authentic and contemporary.

An analysis of the response to the Barāhima in the Mughnī of ‘Abd al-Jabbār (d.415/1025) and the Ziyādāt Sharḥ al-Uṣūl of Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq (d. 424/1033). Submitted for the Dissertation Requirement of the M.Phil in Islamic Studies and History, University of Oxford, Summer 2015.

The majority of scholarship on maṣlaḥa has focused on its application as a technical term within the field of jurisprudence (fiqh) rather than on its significance within the field of dialectical theology (kalām). Although recent studies have indicated a potential Mu‘tazilī background to the employment of maṣlaḥa theories in Ḥanafī and Shāfi‘ī legal literature during the 10th and 11th centuries, there has been little detailed analysis of the delineation and function of maṣlaḥa within the Mu‘tazilī discourses of this period. By exploring the wider conceptual parameters of maṣlaḥa, we may be better placed to appreciate its position within the nexus between legal and theological theory, thus potentially indicating new pathways for analysing the development of the term within juristic discourse.

This paper outlines the initial steps of such an analysis by exploring the role of maṣlaḥa within two Baṣran Mu‘tazilī treatises: the Shubhat al-Barāhima in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s (d. 415/1025) al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-‘adl, and al-Radd ‘alā l-Barāhima in the Ziyādāt sharḥ al-uṣūl attributed to Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq bi-al-Ḥaqq (d. 952/1033). This paper aima to demonstrate how, in response to the Barāhima’s accusations that the revealed law was irrational and superfluous, the concept of maṣlaḥa provided the Baṣrans with a crucial means of defending the sharī‘a as not only being consistent with reason, but as a necessary and irreplaceable supplement to moral existence. This paper also explores how this particular articulation of maṣlaḥa, demarcated by the various theological and apologetic commitments of the Baṣran Mu‘tazilī school, may shed further light on the restricted usages of maṣlaḥa in the legal literature of this period.

The Muʿtazila was not an exclusively Muslim phenomenon, since their teachings were also adopted by medieval Jewish savants. In recent years, a number of Muʿtazilī works were rediscovered or substantially completed by adopting a comparative methodology, which was based on both Muslim and Jewish sources. This article deals with a lost work composed by qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, entitled al-Jumal wa-l-ʿuqūd. I will give an overview of the sources in Zaydī and Karaite collections that provide us with a more detailed picture of the dissemination of the text. On the basis of quotations by later theologians, I will propose a hypothesis on the content of al-Jumal wa-l-ʿuqūd. I will then discuss a possible relationship between ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s text and a manuscript from the Firkovitch collection in the National Library of Russia, which has recently been identified as a work entitled Taʿlīq al-Jumal wa-l-ʿuqūd.‬

1992 survey of the life and work of Israeli Scholar Shlomo Pines with reference to his discovery of evidence for a 9th century sect of Jewish Christians in the writings of Moslem apologist Abd al-Jabbar. When his views were made public they were met with strong criticism from S M Stern and others. Today (2021) with the shift of paradigms from "the parting of the ways" to "the ways that never parted" his studies may be included as evidence of the continuity of Jewish disciples of Jesus from earliest days to the present.

After 30 years see also the evaluation by Gabriel Said Reynolds, A Muslim Theologian in the Sectarian Milieu: Abd al-Jabbar and the Critique of Christian Origins (Islamic History and Civilization) E J Brill, 2004, 4-17. Reynolds reviews more recent literature and accepts Stern's view against Pines' theory.

Les théoriciens arabes du langage -grammairiens, mais aussi philosophes, juristes et théologiens -ont réfl échi sur les rapports entre l'énoncé (lafẓ) et le sens (ma'nā). Je ne reviendrai pas en détail sur la reconstitution des rapports historiques entre ces deux notions tels qu'ils ont été mis en lumière par Djamel Eddine Kouloughli dans un article majeur 1 . L'idée essentielle qu'il y a développée est la découverte progressive -encore que non linéaire -d'une correspondance bi-univoque entre lafẓ et ma'nā, culminant avec la mise au jour, par 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ğurǧānī (XI e siècle), d'une distinction qu'on peut assimiler à celle que la linguistique moderne postule entre signifi ant et signifi é. Djamel E. Kouloughli a montré comment, partant d'une vision plus simple où à un seul sens pouvait correspondre plusieurs expressions et où, du même coup, le « sens » (ma'nā) est avant tout lié à la visée ou intention du locuteur, les grammairiens arabes se sont progressivement dirigés vers une autre vision des choses, où le sens s'apparente au signifi é. Comme l'auteur en est bien sûr parfaitement conscient, il ne s'agit pas seulement, à la fi n de ce parcours, avec Ğurǧānī donc, de l'idée innocente qu'à toute expression correspond un seul sens. Il s'agit, bien plutôt, d'une construction grammaticale rigoureuse de l'isomorphie, passant par la théorisation précise des catégories du langage comme système de signes. C'est parce que le langage n'est, en termes leibniziens, rien d'autre qu'une caractéristique, c'est-à-dire que l'expression d'un système de relations par un autre, que la doctrine d'al-Ğurǧānī dépasse le statut d'un postulat lexical qu'on pourrait retrouver dans d'autres contextes -qu'on pense, par exemple, à l'oikeios logos d'Antisthène 2 .

The book investigate the theories and ideas that are developed in Arabo-Islamic thought and underscore its ethical significance.  The introduction sketches the development of Islamic ethical though, reviews previous literature on Islamic ethics, explains the framework and the methodology and explains concepts and theories used in the rest of the chapter such as normative ethic, metaethics and ethical voluntarism.

First chapter: "Theoretical and historical backgrounds" analyses Euthyphro's dialogue and underscores its relevance to Islamic ethics and sheds light on some historical developments relevant to Euthyphro's dilemma.

Second chapter: "Ethical Presuppositions of the Qur'an and the Hadith" focuses on Divine justice and human free will in the Qur'an, the ontological status of ethical values concepts and the source of ethical knowledge according to Islamic scripture.

Third chapter: "Pre-Mu'tazilite Ethical Doctrines" focuses on the ethically significant doctrines of the Kharijites and the Murji'ites.

The fourth chapter: "Mu'tazilites ethics" provides a moral interpretation of their five principles.

The fifth chapter: "Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar" studies the presuppositions of ethical judgments of al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Asadabadi.

The sixth chapter "Analysis of Normative ethical Judgments" analyses normative judgments developed by the Mu'tazilites and sheds some light on the post-Mu'tazilite or Ash'arite moral theory.

The last two chapters are primarily concerned  in interpreting Mu'tazilite ethics and reconstruct a moral theory, based on the Basrian Mu'tazilite moral thought, that can appeal to the contemporary reader interested in moral philosophy.

This article is about the criticism of al-Ghazālī against Mu‘tazilah on the point of al-husn and al-qubh rationality. The article investigates the extent to which al-Ghazālī’s defiance of Mu‘tazilah is indeed the reason for his knowledge of moral actions. An ontological debate as to the cause of the al-husn and the al-qubh nature of things is beyond the scope of this article. The main problem of the study is the consistency of judgment, which al-Ghazālī’s compared to Mu‘tazilah. al-Ghazālī claims that the reason/‘aql used by Mu‘tazilah in the reasoning of moral actions is a prior reason/al-‘aql innate. In the article, I act on the assumption that al-Ghazālī’s claim on the matter is not justified.
Therefore, the article aims to prove that al-Ghazālī’s claim is not justified and that his claims against Mu‘tazilah are false. The article follows the methods of content analysis and comparative analysis. Thus, it is foreseen to contribute to the literature by correcting a common mistake in tradition.