ASEAN Secretariat

this double issue of Chinese Law and Government highlights the origins, key features, and implications of the current and ongoing dispute over the south china sea with 128 documents that span from the san Francisco Peace conference in 1951 to statements of the Prc ministry of Foreign affairs in 2013.

近年南海领海争端加剧以及中国与日俱增的经济影响，一直在激化亚细安内部的分歧。各成员国立场的差异，从今年六月和七月分别在云南和老挝举办的多国会议上可见。亚细安成员国当时要在南海主权问题上建立基本共识所面对的困难特别明显。今年九月在万象举行的亚细安－中国高峰会议上，各方似乎也只能暂时回避异议，再度同意遵守已有的海军《海上意外相遇规则》(Code for Unexpected Encounters at Sea，简称CUES)。除非亚细安成员国正视并着手整合其组织的内部运作和操作，这个历经冷战和后冷战时期的东南亚区域组织恐怕会面临被现实淘汰的可能。为了开拓亚细安的未来，成员国或许需考虑如何推动内部协调、理顺决策过程，甚至调整心态接受其他东南亚区域组织的存在等改革方向。

（見頁52-55）

Leo Suryadinata's The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas: A Study of Beijing's Changing Policy in Southeast Asia and Beyond is a very welcome addition to the discussion of ties between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and ethnic Chinese living beyond its borders. Suryadinata makes the case in the book that as the PRC becomes more globally prominent, it is increasingly blurring lines in its treatment of PRC citizens and non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese overseas. This claim comes amid allegations of growing PRC efforts to mobilize ethnic Chinese communities abroad to serve its national interests, be they economic, political, or strategic. These concerns are not new and are in fact a throwback to the past. They give the book an added timeliness and importance.
For much of the Cold War, ethnic Chinese communities in non-communist parts of Southeast Asia faced the suspicion of being a possible subversive fifth column for the PRC, especially if they seemed left-leaning. Such perspectives diminished as the PRC engaged in economic reform from the late 1970s, eschewed radical revolution, and passed a nationality law in 1980 clearly demarcating non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese abroad from PRC citizens. Recent reports of PRC efforts to lobby and police opinion in foreign countries using members of local ethnic Chinese communities ranging from Europe and North America to Oceania and Southeast Asia have again brought these long-dormant issues to the fore.1 This is an issue on which Suryadinata has previously written, and he provides readers a brief reminder of these themes in Chapter 3.2 [End Page 151]
An Awkward Closeness
Suryadinata organizes the book into four parts. Part I (Chapters 1–3) discusses the PRC's rise to prominence from the 1980s till the present, changes in ethnic Chinese communities outside the PRC, and the organization of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO). The OCAO is the government body responsible for managing official ties with ethnic Chinese communities outside the PRC, be they PRC citizens abroad or ethnic Chinese who do not hold PRC citizenship. Within these pages, Suryadinata introduces his main observation—that Beijing seems to be reverting to its older policy of reducing distinctions between PRC citizens and non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese in foreign jurisdictions. The key motivation behind this move, according to Suryadinata, is PRC efforts to advance and protect its interests and concerns overseas.
Part II (Chapters 4–8) examines how the PRC responds officially to events outside its borders that affect ethnic Chinese and PRC citizens. Each chapter contains a case where ethnic Chinese come under threat from developments outside China and assess the PRC position. Beijing's reaction to the 1998 anti-Chinese race riots in Indonesia and violence in the South Pacific, Middle East, and Africa indicates a willingness to evacuate PRC citizens, especially those who work for PRC state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 2014 anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam, triggered by a Beijing-initiated escalation in its maritime dispute with Hanoi, suggests that the PRC is not above placing its citizens overseas in danger for the pursuit of more important interests.
However, contrasting PRC responses to incidents involving ethnic Chinese in Malaysia and Myanmar point toward an evolution in Beijing's position. Beijing responded to alleged ill-treatment of its citizens by Malaysian police in 2005 as well as political pressure, even violence, toward ethnic Chinese Myanmar citizens in the Kokang region along the PRC border in 2015 with diplomatic entreaties. Such actions resulted from Beijing's desire to maintain positive official relations with Malaysia and Myanmar. Threats against ethnic Chinese Malaysians in 2015, in comparison, saw the then-PRC ambassador to Malaysia publicly expressing an intention to protect these co-ethnics even though this was tantamount to intervention and divided local opinion. This step appears to portend an effort by Beijing to extend influence over non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese communities overseas, even at the risk of upsetting foreign governments.
The next four chapters in Part III examine the ways domestic considerations in the...

This report focuses on the latent potential and essentials of impact investing. It is an emerging, innovative form of SDGs investment for realization of the SDGs in ASEAN. Impact investing is distinct in its intentionality in creating and measuring societal impact along with financial return, beyond mitigating risk and incorporating factors related to environment, society and governance (ESG). This report aims to further mobilize financial resources that can be measured in terms of both financial and societal performance to accelerate realization of the SDGs, as part of the “Decade of Action”.

As a profession that dates back the scribes’ time, the secretariat has significantly evolved over time but research on this field seems not to follow the practitioners’ role. Nowadays, the specialization required from the administrative professional involves not only the previously skills that for long time characterized the secretary’s job but also a set of new ones that are more related to the organization’s management. They may include but are not limited to enabling results in a wide sense as getting involved in change management, creativity and entrepreneurship, productivity increasing plans, cost cutting actions, and project management. Due to the complexity that characterizes the business environment and companies’ projects, this article aims at investigating the role of the administrative professional in the management of complex projects. As an exploratory research, three case studies have been conducted with global companies in which complex projects are part of their reality and the administrative professional is officially existent. Findings show that the involvement of this professional has been very positive to project performance due to the way he supported the project manager and the project team. Both secretary’s hard and soft skills were of great importance to project performance, especially communication, negotiation, and attitude. The executive secretariat has moved from an operational to a strategic perspective. To continue growing in the profession the secretary needs to improve his knowledge on project management.

Independent Singapore and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have a historically varied and complex relationship. The two states enjoy excellent economic ties, which have been a key feature of bilateral interactions since the PRC’s “Opening and Reform” initiative in the late 1970s. Substantial cultural, educational and tourist exchanges are also a feature of Singapore–PRC relations. Yet diplomatic ties have only recently reverted to a general cordiality after a protracted two-year period of friction. There have been other, longer periods of estrangement between Singapore and Beijing – Singapore discouraged its citizens from having contact with the PRC during the Cultural Revolution and established official ties with the PRC only in 1992.

Singapore and the PRC are deeply economically intertwined. The PRC is Singapore’s largest trading partner, as well as being the largest of the other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As a major international capital exporter, Singapore is the PRC’s second-largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI). Singaporean investments in the PRC include major government-linked development projects in Suzhou, Tianjin and Chengdu, in addition to regular commercial interests. Globalized production and capital networks mean that the Singaporean and Chinese economies also connect through other economies in the region and beyond.

What must be noted, however, is the diversification of Singapore’s economy: ASEAN, the United States, Europe and Japan remain substantial trading partners for Singapore. Moreover, the United States, Europe and Japan are still larger investors in Singapore than the PRC in terms of both FDI and capital stock. Even if some proportion of trade and investment tilts more favourably towards the PRC, especially as Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) gets underway, Singapore is likely to continue to seek economic options beyond the PRC. These relationships provide Singapore with some buffer against overdependence on the PRC.

The BRI obviously presents opportunities for Singapore. Indeed, Singapore was one of the earliest members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is associated with the project. To the extent that infrastructure development promotes growth in Singapore’s immediate neighbourhood, this could raise demand for Singaporean goods and services. Prosperous neighbours are likely to be more invested in regional security. Of course, Hong Kong is likely to offer competition to Singapore, particularly in terms of financial and finance-related services. Moreover, Singapore’s economy has been diversifying away from maritime services — they now account for only about 7 percent of GDP. This mitigates some of the pressure resulting from enhancements in regional transport infrastructure.

Externalities that could result from the BRI may be cause for greater concern. Economic benefits from the initiative that flow to various business and political elites in Southeast Asia may make the establishment of consensus more difficult among ASEAN members, particularly over issues that Beijing deems sensitive. Limited transparency and unclear corporate governance in the BRI projects may encourage rent-seeking and abuse, as well as distributions of costs and benefits that foster political instability. Furthermore, uncertainty over dispute management stemming from investment projects introduces higher degrees of risk in such projects. “Win–win” approaches and “setting differences aside” are fine until problems that require urgent management or resolution emerge.

Rules, procedures, norms, laws, processes, and their practice, especially as they pertain to strategic restraint by the powerful, are especially important to Singapore. This is an area of some divergence between Beijing and Singapore. Singapore tends to favour stronger, binding processes that guarantee a degree of even-handedness.

An area where Singapore–PRC differences over rules and processes are especially noticeable is over the rule of law in the South China Sea. When the Philippines sought an interpretation from an arbitral tribunal over claims on maritime features in waters it disputes with Beijing, the PRC called the processes flawed, refused direct participation and rejected the ruling of the tribunal. Singapore, in comparison, stressed the importance of the legal process and the binding nature of its findings even though it is not a South China Sea claimant. Rather, Singapore felt that complying with such internationally established legal procedures offered a better means of handling differences, maintaining stability and protecting its interests. A similar distinction appears to divide Singapore and the PRC over the degree to which a South China Sea code of conduct should be binding. Such differences recently presented key points of contention and friction between the PRC and Singapore.

More knotty for Singapore is, perhaps, the way ethnicity intersects with PRC nationalism. Given that Singapore’s population is 70 per cent ethnic Han Chinese, many PRC citizens and even officials believe that Singapore should be particularly understanding of, if not sympathetic to, PRC concerns. This includes issues such as the PRC’s various territorial disputes and suspicions of the United States and Japan. There is sometimes surprise, a sense of betrayal, and even anger from PRC official quarters when Singapore’s official position diverges from that of Beijing. Such perspectives come from a sense of Chinese nationalism that rests heavily on linking ethnicity to political loyalty to the PRC.

Singapore and its Chinese citizens, however, do not and should not share the same sense of nationalism as in the PRC. Despite historical linkages between Chinese nationalist movements, ethnic Chinese in Singapore now have very different political loyalties. Even though Singaporean Chinese may speak languages and share cultural practices that originated from what is today the PRC, they are no more Chinese citizens than French-Canadians are French citizens. Singapore’s post-independence nation-building project continues to be about creating distinct Singapore citizens. Such a position is critical given the need to hold together Singapore’s multi-ethnic population and avoid characterisation as a potentially hostile Chinese “fifth column” by its neighbours.

The PRC is one of Singapore’s most important foreign relationships. Much of this comes from the fact that the PRC is critical to prosperity and stability in Asia. Singapore’s future is in many ways tied to the PRC doing well. However, Singapore will continue to seek other partnerships, inside its region and out, for the simple reason that such diversification of ties is an effective risk management strategy. This means that Singapore has an incentive to continue engagement with Europe, Australia, India, Japan, the United States and others. Singapore also has a longstanding interest in binding international rules that it prefers major powers, including the PRC, to abide by.

To the extent that Beijing accepts an open and inclusive Southeast Asia as well as established and binding rules, the Singapore–PRC relationship is likely to continue smoothly. That said, predictability and comfort in the Singapore–PRC relationship also depend on a continued commitment to the region by Singapore’s other international partners. The positive trajectory of Singapore’s current ties with the PRC rests on such conditions being sustained. If this situation changes, as may arguably be the case at present, Singapore’s relationship with the PRC may become more fraught and require some recalibration.

Comprising ten Southeast Asian countries, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the most prominent regional organisation in the region. However, ASEAN remains highly ambiguous to many scholars. Not only does ASEAN fundamentally differ from other regional organisations, but theoretical and empirical analyses of ASEAN in clear, objective perspectives have been considerably scarce. Thus, this thesis aims to disambiguate ASEAN’s decision-making procedures and institutional architecture using neo-functionalist and neo-realist approaches. What are ASEAN’s designed functions? How effective is ASEAN in achieving them? What is the relevance of ASEAN today? The thesis finds that ASEAN is built around the organisation’s consensus-based decision-making process and the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of the member states, collectively known as ‘the ASEAN Way’. In-depth case study of the ongoing Myanmar coup crisis reveals that the ASEAN Way is not unique to the region or is strictly adhered to without exception. The consensus-based decision-making process has been a key characteristic of the European Council, and the principle of non-interference is deeply embedded in international law, e.g. Article 2, UN Charter. Furthermore, I argue that the only function served by the ASEAN Way is reinforcing the regime stability of member states. All other values for democracy and the protection of human rights—enshrined in the ASEAN Charter—are secondary. The thesis concludes by asserting that theories of European integration are indeed valuable for the study of regional integration in Southeast Asia because the newly independent post-colonial states are going through very much the same process that their European counterparts experienced centuries ago. It is thus suggested that other modern theories of regional politics, such as the regional security complex theory and historical institutionalism, could be used in future research of transnational relations in Southeast Asia and perhaps even in other regions with little to no regional integration progress.

Hedging is a common approach that regional states in the Asia-Pacific seek to adopt in order to navigate between an ascendant China and a still dominant USA. Undergirding such a strategy is a desire among regional states to avoid “choosing” between the USA and China. However, there tends to be less policy and scholarly attention paid to how hedging strategies actually fare in securing the interests of regional states during power transition. This is of particular concern given the increasing tensions that seem to be afflicting the Asia-Pacific in spite of efforts by regional states to hedge, particularly following the American rebalance to Asia. This chapter examines the downside risks that may result from efforts by regional states to hedge between China and the USA.

A key feature of Singapore’s foreign and security policy is its insistence to not ‘choose sides’ between the United States and China. Singapore’s longstanding approach has so far relied on substantive overlaps in US and Chinese strategic interests. But changing strategic orientations in Beijing and Washington now see greater Chinese willingness to apply pressure to achieve its interests, as well as less US attentiveness to the region. Singapore’s traditional political space may be shrinking, as might that of its traditional partners in ASEAN and elsewhere in the Asia Pacific. These developments may press the city-state to fundamentally recalibrate its strategic outlook.

Differing perspectives on the South China Sea territorial disputes, the nature of Singapore–US ties and Singapore’s unilateral military training in Taiwan have made Singapore a target for popular and sometimes official criticism in China. Beijing apparently snubbed Singapore by not inviting its prime minister to the inaugural Belt and Road Forum. China also consistently warns Singapore ‘not to take sides’ when it articulates positions that depart from China’s, even when such statements simply reflect Singapore’s own interests. This suggests China’s preference for silence from Singapore on key issues.

In comparison, the past year has seen Washington’s Asia policy vacillate from opposing China’s expansive maritime claims to disinterest in the region. Such events make Singapore’s external environment much more uncertain.

With Asia caught between greater US–China friction, the range of realistic options for Singapore when it comes to not choosing sides is shrinking. Should the United States effectively cede its Asian influence to China, not choosing sides may come to mean that Singapore should refrain from actions or voicing concerns that Beijing finds objectionable. Such issues would at best emerge behind closed doors in bilateral settings where Beijing wields a significant advantage, given the stark power asymmetry. Singaporean concerns would be dependent on China’s pleasure.

Singapore’s increasingly restricted options may limit it to a policy of strict neutrality that leaves both Washington and Beijing dissatisfied. Not only might such conditions reduce Singapore’s ability to exercise initiative, but would also invite the United States and China to coerce Singapore into a sympathetic position or result in the city-state’s isolation.

Indeed, Singapore may have to accept ‘Finlandisation’ in the face of Chinese regional primacy, deferring to China on all foreign policy but keeping nominal independence. This is arguably already happening with some of its ASEAN neighbours. Under such an arrangement, Singapore’s future prosperity and security would be in the hands of Beijing’s largesse.

Self-neutralisation is another possible response to greater US–China contention in Asia, but this would risk making Singapore either irrelevant or an object of competition between the two major powers. There is of course the choice of picking between Washington and Beijing, but such a move introduces the danger of betting on the wrong ally, provoking major power ire, or being reduced to a major power proxy.

Another reaction could be to work with like-minded regional actors facing similar circumstances on regulating regional affairs in ways that go beyond the ASEAN framework. Candidates include Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and potentially Malaysia — all have long-term interests in maintaining substantive autonomy alongside regional stability, prosperity and sustainability. Such partnerships, if successful, can effectively manage key aspects of regional affairs even-handedly and blunt Washington and Beijing’s need to directly oversee regional developments or compete for influence.

Nonetheless, establishing an enhanced basis for jointly handling regional affairs must overcome significant collective action problems and major power opposition. The enormity of such tasks places Singapore’s fate in the hands of potential collaborators and ad-hoc cooperation rather than the established institutions and regimes to which Singapore is accustomed.

Political dynamics in Asia may ultimately compel Singapore to re-examine its long-held position on external affairs. The old, comfortable approach of working with Washington for security and Beijing for prosperity — having its cake and eating it too — may be becoming increasingly unsustainable. Adjustments in US–China relations might turn Singapore’s fence-sitting from strategic advantage into cause for consternation.

Going forward, Singapore may have to be less complacent and more active in taking steps to handle the changing nature of Sino–US relations and its consequences for Asia as disentanglement becomes more difficult. It may even need to demonstrate visible leadership on tricky issues ranging from managing disputes to regulating regional relations or tackling cross-border crime. This means being prepared to take political risks. Singapore and other actors can no longer simply hope for a happy middle ground between Washington and Beijing, and must instead address a much more uncertain and unpredictable reality.

Ja Ian Chong is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore (NUS).

As a profession that dates back the scribes’ time, the secretariat has significantly evolved over time but research on this field seems not to follow the practitioners’ role. Nowadays, the specialization required from the administrative professional involves not only the previously skills that for long time characterized the secretary’s job but also a set of new ones that are more related to the organization’s management. They may include but are not limited to enabling results in a wide sense as getting involved in change management, creativity and entrepreneurship, productivity increasing plans, cost cutting actions, and project management. Due to the complexity that characterizes the business environment and companies’ projects, this article aims at investigating the role of the administrative professional in the management of complex projects. As an exploratory research, three case studies have been conducted with global companies in which complex projects are part of their reality and the administrative professional is officially existent. Findings show that the involvement of this professional has been very positive to project performance due to the way he supported the project manager and the project team. Both secretary’s hard and soft skills were of great importance to project performance, especially communication, negotiation, and attitude. The executive secretariat has moved from an operational to a strategic perspective. To continue growing in the profession the secretary needs to improve his knowledge on project management.

Southeast Asia as a region has a unique history, and the evolving relationships between its communities, states, regional organisations and the international community reflect this. Given this context, there is a need to better understand the motivations of the actors in negotiations, to account for the finished agreement and its impact on the region both in the short and long terms. This paper investigates the motivations behind two regional responses in two different periods of time. The first case under investigation is the set of ...

As US President Donald Trump seeks to rede ne American engagement with the region through his “Indo-Paci c” strategic concept, we invite five eminent scholars to analyse what this means for Southeast Asia and beyond.

https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ASEANFocusDec17.pdf

In July 2017, a rare public debate occurred within Singapore’s foreign policy establishment. In contention was whether the city-state should defer to major powers or insist on pursuing its longstanding foreign policy principles.

This discussion came against a backdrop of China’s new willingness to assert its foreign policy preferences, apparent fissures within ASEAN as well as US capriciousness. Such developments have the potential to shake longstanding pillars of Singapore’s external relations. The debate reflects unease about shifts in East Asian politics and uncertainty over how best to respond.

Engaging China — especially in terms of economics — while encouraging comprehensive US engagement in Asia are integral to Singapore’s longstanding approach of ‘not choosing sides’ between Beijing and Washington. This policy assumes significant overlap in US and Chinese interests, shared major power desire for self-restraint and mutual accommodation and US commitment to the liberal international order it created after World War II. Recent developments seem to cast doubt on these long-held presumptions. In fact, the 2017 Qatar Crisis that sparked the debate stemmed partially from US disinterest and ambivalence.

Singapore is especially discomforted by China’s reclamation and arming of artificial islands in the South China Sea despite widespread opposition, and Beijing’s non-participation in and lambasting of the Philippines-initiated arbitration tribunal process. Beijing was also exceptionally harsh in criticising Singapore over the latter’s insistence on the rule of law in relation to maritime issues and the arbitration tribunal. The detention in Hong Kong of Singaporean armoured vehicles en route from Taiwan and the apparent exclusion of the Singapore Prime Minister from Beijing’s Belt and Road Forum further heightened Singaporean concerns.

One of Donald Trump’s first moves as US President was to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Other major trade arrangements hang in the balance as the US administration threatens punitive action against trade partners. The rashness with which President Trump seems to treat North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons could also destabilise the region. Potential US global retreat is similarly disconcerting despite reports that the Trump administration dropped calls to make security commitments contingent on payment from allies and partners. Such actions detract from efforts by US officials to assure East Asia of active and consistent US engagement.

Behaviour by Beijing and Washington endangers another important pillar of Singapore’s foreign policy: its preference for international law, institutions and norms. Such mechanisms give smaller states a degree of formal equality with major powers, since all actors are technically restrained by the same rules, requirements, and procedures. Notably, participants in the July 2017 debate agreed on Singapore’s need for institutions such as the United Nations and ASEAN as well as international law to be robust. They differed on how strongly to advance such arrangements.

Beijing’s rejection, mobilisation against and dismissal of the South China Sea arbitration tribunal process along with its expansive maritime claims and broad interpretation of exclusive economic zone rights suggests a desire to adjust internationals laws in fact if not in form. China’s ability to break ASEAN consensus on positions Beijing deems inimical to its interests and Washington’s new suspicion of multilateral institutions — seen in the TPP withdrawal and its criticism of the UN — portend greater pressure on key institutions.

Some ASEAN members seem ready to accede to China on the promise of economic gain, even as Washington appears to be turning into an increasingly unreliable institutional partner. Then there is worry about major powers eroding sovereign autonomy by intervening domestically through business, academia and other sectors. Prevailing laws, institutions and norms are familiar to Singapore and it has historically excelled in working with them to its own benefit. Shifts on these fronts — which Singapore cannot influence — are cause for anxiety.

The debate abated with a reiteration of longstanding principles by Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan without new policies or strategic directions. Such trepidation is unsurprising given the many complex variables currently at play. Circumstances surrounding China’s rise and the United States’ relative decline are unprecedented for Singapore, and the country is on the cusp of a generational leadership transition. ASEAN is no longer the same conservative, anti-communist Cold War club, where member interests were relatively predictable and consensus was easier to develop. Climate change, long-term economic sustainability, and terrorism too present serious challenges.

Singapore is not alone in trying to find its foreign policy footing — the July debate parallels ongoing discussions in Australia, Japan, South Korea and elsewhere about how to reposition strategic priorities. Singapore may ultimately wish to re-examine how best to pursue its enduring interests in maintaining freedom of action, economic openness and the containment of tensions given the evolving external environment.

Possible considerations range from reducing reliance on ASEAN in favour of other partnerships to investing in far-reaching ASEAN reform, perhaps at some expense to autonomy. Contemplating such change, particularly in public, may be uncomfortable for Singapore’s foreign policy traditionalists, but it is necessary for charting the city-state’s future in an increasingly uncertain world and hence deserving of sustained and open discussion.

Ja Ian Chong is Associate Professor of Political Science at National University of Singapore.

My piece with East Asia Forum re-printed by Today.
Full disclosure: Please note some changes from the original apart from the title.
___________
"Beijing apparently snubbed Singapore by not inviting its prime minister to the inaugural Belt and Road Forum. " - Original
"Beijing did not invite Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to the inaugural Belt and Road Forum, prompting speculation as to whether it was a deliberate snub." - edits by Today.
____________
"Indeed, Singapore may have to accept ‘Finlandisation’ in the face of Chinese regional primacy, deferring to China on all foreign policy but keeping nominal independence. This is arguably already happening with some of its ASEAN neighbours. Under such an arrangement, Singapore’s future prosperity and security would be in the hands of Beijing’s largesse." - Original
"One risk of Chinese dominance for Singapore over time is Finlandisation, even if many find this option unpalatable.
Singapore’s future prosperity and security would be subject to Beijing’s largesse; Singapore would have to defer to China under such an arrangement. The concept comes from Finland’s relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, in which Helsinki kept all the formal trappings of sovereignty, but submitted to Moscow’s preferences on foreign and security policy.
Sovereignty is not a dichotomous quality — it can be parsed into different components, each to varying degrees. Finlandisation is arguably already happening in South-east Asia at some level, given China’s growing regional dominance."

Please find a link to the full piece on Today here: http://www.todayonline.com/commentary/navigating-between-rock-and-hard-embrace
Please see the original from East Asia Forum here: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/17/singapore-caught-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-embrace/

Synopsis - Despite the release of Aung San Suu Kyi on 13 November 2010 following the controversial national elections in Myanmar, the key challenges faced by people remain to be extreme poverty and national reconciliation. Is there a role for her to address these challenges?