NEGOTIATION: A 3 - D collaboration

NEGOTIATION: A 3 - D collaboration Papakonstantinidis L.A Summary In the third decade of the 21st century , dogmas related to competition in negotiations are now considered outdated New shapes, new 3 - D negotiation strategies emerge through practice In this work, the equilibrium points of a three-dimensional strategy are examined, as well as a three-dimensional perception of a negotiation that has the characteristics of cooperation and not competition In a three-dimensional solidity it turns out that there is one and only equilibrium point that simultaneously answers the triple question, namely (1) what is best for me from this negotiation (2) what is best for you with whom I am working, and (3) what is better for the community in which we work PART I NEGOTIATION: Competition or cooperation? Negotiation is a dialogue between two or more individuals or parties to achieve a desired outcome regarding one or more issues of conflict. It is an interaction between entities that aspire to agree on matters of mutual interest. The arrangement may be beneficial to all or some of the parties involved. Negotiators should determine their own needs and wants while seeking to understand the wants and needs of others involved in order to increase their chances of closing deals, avoiding conflict, building relationships with other parties, or maximizing the mutual benefits Adnan, Muhamad Hariz Muhamad; Hassan, Mohd Fadzil; Aziz, Izzatdin; Paputungan, Irving V (August 2016). "Protocols for agent-based autonomous negotiations: A review". 2016 3rd International Conference on Computer and Information Sciences (ICCOINS). Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: IEEE: 622–626.. The goal of negotiation is to resolve points of difference, gain an advantage for an individual or collective, or create outcomes to satisfy various interests. Distributive negotiations, or compromises, are conducted by projecting a position and making concessions to reach an agreement. The degree to which the negotiating parties trust each other to implement the negotiated solution is an important factor in determining the success of a negotiation de Felice, Fortune Barthélémy (1976). "The 50% Solution". In Zartman, I William ( ed .). Negotiation, or the art of Negotiating . United States: Doubleday Anchor. p. 549. . People negotiate every day, often without thinking of it as a negotiation. Negotiations take place in organizations including businesses, non-profits and governments, as well as sales and legal processes, and personal situations such as marriage, divorce, parenting, friendship, etc. negotiators are often specialized. Examples of professional negotiators include union negotiators, leveraged buyout negotiators, peace negotiators, or hostage negotiators. They may also work with other titles, such as diplomats, legislators, or brokers. Trading can also be conducted by algorithms or machines in what is known as automated trading. In automated negotiation, the participants and the process must be properly modeled  Fisher, Roger; Ury, William (1984). Patton, Bruce ( ed .). Getting to yes: negotiating agreement without giving in (Reprint ed.). New York: Penguin Books. Negotiation is a basic process of life. We negotiate from the moment we are born. For example, a baby's cry is an invitation to negotiate. We negotiate life all the time: We negotiate with friends, with neighbors, with colleagues, with relatives. We negotiate for purchases, for sales, for compromise for satisfaction Δημοσθένης Παπακωνσταντίνου ¨Negotiation: The basics you need to know – pro-seminars . Negotiation is making a decision. It is one of the methods that exist to make a decision. The difference of negotiation with all other decision methods is that we need the acceptance (in the decision) of the other side, but at the same time the other side must also have our consent. . So negotiation is used when neither side has the power or the right to enforce their decision. NEGOTIATION AND BARGAINING One of the words that cause a lot of confusion, with Negotiation, is Bargaining Some authors have defined negotiation as synonymous with bargaining . Bargaining is an agreement between two or more parties as to what each party will do for the other, or a thing bought or offered for sale cheaper than is usually or expected. Negotiation , on the other hand, is a discussion that involves consideration and discussion of many issues of an agreement. Bargaining, as the definition suggests, is more likely to be about one issue, and that is price ART OF NEGOTIATION: NEGOTIATION V/S BARGAININ Ghttps://blog.spjain.org/thought-leadership/art-of-negotiation-negotiation-vs-bargaining . For example, when the negotiating parties continue to haggle over the price of the product and do not consider the other aspects of an agreement, bargaining takes place . This happens when the product in the agreement is a commodity or when both parties do not understand the concept of "value" in the negotiation. In the last part of the series, I have mentioned the concept of "value" and its application in negotiation. In other words, you have a holistic view of any deal, or rather, only focused attention Bargaining is a discussion about what the other side wants. Negotiation is a discussion about why they want it. You can't fully engage the other side in a conversation about what they want until you understand why they want it. A bargain is an agreement between two or more parties as to what each party will do for the other, or a thing bought or offered for sale cheaper than is usually or expected. Negotiation , on the other hand, is a discussion that involves consideration and discussion of many issues of an agreement . "Negotiation" and "bargaining" are two different words with different meanings. The dictionary meanings of these two words are almost the same, but they are certainly not synonymous with each other. Bargaining deals only with price On the other hand, negotiation is not only used in relation to price. This term can also be applied to legal situations where two parties want to reach an agreement. Typically, bargaining is often done in an informal situation, while negotiation can be used as a description for situations other than price and basically for legal scenarios. In addition, negotiations involving mainly verbal communication. Bargaining is all about winning According to their definitions and usage, bargaining can be characterized as a discussion that aims to reach an outcome where one of the two parties reaps the benefits. Negotiation, on the other hand, aims to achieve a result where both sides are in a win-win situation. Unlike bargaining where being on the winning side is more important, here reaching the right decision is prioritized over personal gains. Negotiation is logical Bargaining is more of a selfish discussion, but again, negotiation is a logical discussion. In negotiations, both people focus on getting their desires met sometimes without even trying to be reasonable. In negotiation , the parties involved are not interested in winning or satisfaction of any kind. They focus more on finding a solution that is favorable to both. Discussion v/s communication Negotiation is like discussion. The person with good handling and verbal skills tends to win in this situation. Negotiation is a broader term that is actually communication between two parties seeking a proper settlement . Surabhi Kedia November 18, 2019 https://www.marketingmind.in/what-is-the-difference-between-negotiation-bargaining/. From the traditional selfish bargaining ( win - lose , bargaining ) we "passed" ( Nash ) to negotiation-cooperation ( win - win , negotiation ) and from there, we propose integrated community negotiation ( win - win - win , integrated community negotiation ) In essence, bargaining is absorbed by win - win negotiations and this negotiation from win - win - win completion Etymology The word “ negotiation ” came from the early 15th century from the Old French negociacion from the Latin negotiatio from neg - “ no ” and otium “free time” "negotiation | Origin and meaning of negotiation by Online Etymology Dictionary" . www.etymonline.com . Retrieved 19 August 2019 These terms mean “business, trade, movement”. By the late 1570s, negotiations had the definition, "to communicate in search of mutual agreement". With this new introduction and this meaning, it showed a shift in "business" to "negotiation" for business The word “ bargain ” came from Middle English bargainen (“to bargain, to pledge for sale”), from Old French bargaigner (“to bargain”), from Frankish * borganjan (“to lend, lend”) , from Proto-Germanic * burgijan ą ("to lend, lend"), from Proto-Indo-European * b ʰ erg ʰ- ("to protect, secure"). Cognate with Old High German borag ē n , borg ē n (‘take care of, look after’) (German borgen ), Old English borgian (‘borrow, lend, pledge’). 888 STRATEGIES - FORMS OF NEGOTIATION Strategies There are many different ways of categorizing the basics of negotiation. A view of negotiation includes three basic elements: process, behavior, and substance. Process refers to how the parties negotiate: the context of the negotiations, the parties to the negotiations, the tactics used by the parties, and the order and stages in which these all take place. Behavior refers to the relationships between these parties, the communication between them and the styles they adopt. The substance refers to what the parties are negotiating: the agenda, the issues (positions and – more helpfully – interests), the options and the agreement(s) reached at the end.  Duening, Thomas N.; Hisrich, Robert D.; Lechter, Michael A. (2010). "Negotiating Fundamentals". Technology Entrepreneurship (1st ed .). Academic Press. Another view of negotiation includes four elements: strategy, process, tools, and tactics. The strategy includes the top-level objectives. which usually include the relation and the result. The procedures and tools include the steps to follow and the roles to assume when preparing and negotiating with the other parties. Tactics include more detailed statements and actions and responses to others' statements and actions. Some add to this persuasion and influence, arguing that these have become integral to modern negotiation success, and thus should not be omitted. Strategic approaches to making concessions include considering the optimal time to make a concession, making concessions in installments, not all at once, and ensuring that the adversary knows that a concession has been made, rather than a restatement of a position that has already been outlined and knows the costs involved in the concession, especially when the other party is generally less knowledgeable about the nature of the business or product being negotiated. Malhotra, D., Four Strategies for Making Concessions , Harvard Business School, Working Knowledge, published 6 March 2006, accesses 2 June 2021 Distributive negotiation Distributive bargaining, compromise, positional bargaining, or hard bargaining attempt to distribute a "fixed pie" of benefits. Distributive bargaining operates under zero-sum conditions, where it is assumed that any gain by one party will be at the expense of the other. Negotiating price in an open market, such as buying a car or house, is an example of distributive bargaining. In a distributive negotiation, each side often adopts an extreme or fixed position that it knows will not be accepted and then seeks to concede as little as possible before reaching an agreement. Distributive negotiators understand negotiation as a process of distributing a fixed amount of value. A distributive negotiation often involves people who have never had a previous interactive relationship with each other and are unlikely to do so again in the near future, although all negotiations usually have some distributive element. Since Prospect Theory suggests that people tend to prioritize minimizing losses over maximizing gains, this form of negotiation is likely to be harsher and less productive in agreement. Integrated negotiation as a strategy ( integrated ) should not be confused with integrated win - win ( integrative ) negotiation, a different concept related to a non-zero sum approach to creating value in negotiations. Integrative negotiation _ Integrated negotiation is called interest-based, merit-based or principle-based negotiation. It is a set of techniques that attempt to improve the quality and likelihood of a negotiated agreement by exploiting the fact that different parties often value different outcomes differently. John Nash, "The Bargaining problem," Econometrica XVIII 1:155-162, 1950; GC Homans, Social Behavior. Harcourt, Brace and world, 1961 While distributive bargaining assumes that there is a fixed amount of value (a "fixed pie") to be divided between the parties, integrative bargaining tries to create value during the negotiation ("expanding the pie") either by "compensating" the losing one element with gains from another ("trade-offs" or logrolling ), or by constructing or reframing the issues of conflict in such a way that both parties benefit (" win - win " negotiation) Integrated Negotiation Integrated negotiation is a strategic effort to maximize value in each individual negotiation through the intelligent linking and sequencing of other negotiations and decisions related to one's business activities. This approach to complex settings is performed by mapping all potentially relevant trade-offs, conflicts and operational decisions in order to incorporate useful connections between them while minimizing any harmful connections (see examples below). Comprehensive negotiation was first recognized and highlighted by international negotiator and author Peter Johnston in his book Negotiating with Giants Johnston, Peter D (2008). Negotiating with Giants . United States: Negotiation Press. pp. Pages 4 to 5. One of the examples cited in Johnston's book is that of JD Rockefeller deciding where to build his first major oil refinery . Rather than take the easier, cheaper route from the oil fields to refine his oil in Pittsburgh, Rockefeller chose to build his refinery in Cleveland because he recognized that he would have to negotiate with the railroad companies that transported his refined oil to Buy. Pittsburgh had only one major railroad, which could therefore dictate prices in negotiations, while Cleveland had three railroads that Rockefeller knew would compete for his business, possibly reducing his costs significantly. The leverage gained in these railroad negotiations more than offset the added operating costs of shipping his oil to Cleveland for refining, helping to establish the Rockefeller empire while undermining his competitors who failed to integrate their key business decisions with their negotiating ones. strategies.  Chernow, Ron (2004). Titan, The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr . United States: Penguin Random House. pp. Pages 111 to 112 Other examples of integrated negotiation include the following: In sports, athletes in the final year of their contracts will ideally be at peak performance so that strong, long-term contracts can be negotiated in their favor. Athletes' performance declines following contract years" . ScienceDaily. 22 January 2014. A union must negotiate and resolve any significant internal conflicts to maximize its collective influence before going to the table to negotiate a new contract with management. If purchases for similar goods or services are made independently of each other in different government services, recognizing this and consolidating orders into one high-volume market can help create market leverage and save costs in supplier negotiations. A technology start-up looking to negotiate its acquisition by a larger industry player in the future it can improve the chances of this happening by ensuring, where possible, that its systems, technology, capabilities and culture are as compatible as possible with those of the likely acquirer. Johnston, Peter D. (2008). Negotiating with Giants . United States: Negotiation Press. pp. Page 4 A politician negotiating support for a presidential bid may want to avoid incorporating high-profile supporters who risk alienating other important potential supporters while avoiding any unexpected new policies that could also limit the size of their growing coalition. Compromise People who enjoy solving each other's problems and maintaining their personal relationships. Hosts are sensitive to other parties' emotional states, body language, and verbal signals. They can, however, feel taken advantage of in situations where the other party places little emphasis on the relationship. Accommodation is a passive but pro-social approach to conflict. People resolve both large and small conflicts by giving in to the demands of others. Sometimes, they back down because they realize their position is wrong, so they agree with the view others take. In other cases, however, they may withdraw their claims without really being convinced that the other side is right, but for the sake of team unity or in the interest of time - they withdraw all complaints. Thus, performance may reflect either genuine conversion or superficial compliance. Avoiding People who do not like to negotiate and do not do so unless justified. When negotiating, avoidants tend to postpone and avoid the confrontational aspects of the negotiation. However, they can be perceived as tactful and diplomatic. Inaction is a passive means of dealing with disputes. Conflict avoiders take a wait-and-see attitude, hoping that problems will resolve themselves. Avoidants often tolerate conflicts, allowing them to simmer without doing anything to minimize them. Instead of openly discussing disagreements, avoidant individuals change the subject, skip meetings, or even leave the group altogether (Bayazit & Mannix, 2003). Sometimes they just agree to disagree (a modus vivendi). Collaborators People who enjoy negotiations that involve solving difficult problems in creative ways. Partners are good at using negotiation to understand the concerns and interests of the other parties. Cooperation is an active, pro-social and pro-self approach to conflict resolution. Collaborative individuals identify the issues underlying the dispute and then work together to identify a solution that is satisfactory to both parties. This orientation, also described as a cooperative, problem-solving, or win-win orientation, invites both sides in a dispute to consider their opponent's outcomes as well as their own . something. Competitive negotiators have strong instincts for all aspects of negotiation and are often strategic. Because their style can dominate the negotiation process, competitive negotiators often neglect the importance of relationships. Competition is an active, self-friendly means of dealing with conflict that involves forcing others to accept one's point of view. Those who use this strategy tend to see conflict as a win-lose situation and therefore use competitive, forceful tactics to intimidate others. Fighting (coercion, dominance, or conflict) can take many forms, including bossing, challenging, arguing, insults, accusations, complaints, revenge, and even physical violence (Morrill, 1995). These conflict resolution methods are all questionable because they involve forcing one's solution on the other party. Conciliators People who wish to close the deal by doing what is fair and equal for all parties involved in the negotiation. Conciliators can be useful when there is limited time to complete the agreement. However, negotiators often unnecessarily rush the negotiation process and make concessions too quickly.  The first three Fundamental "rules" of negotiation   1st: Negotiation has communication Without communication, without discussion there is no negotiation. If one side does not -really- communicate, there is no negotiation. That's why a good negotiator must also be good at communication.   2nd: Negotiation has a cost (not just benefit) for each side.. We negotiate to have some benefit, profit. But to get from the other side, it is obvious that we have to give her something too. After all, why should she give us what we want, if she doesn't get something of what she asks for? If you are not willing to pay a cost, don't negotiate. To get you have to give. H Negotiation is Exchange Before starting a negotiation, study WHAT you can give (of what the other side will probably ask for) to be able to get what you ask for. Cost and benefit can be distinguished in many dimensions: Money, Time, Effort, Lost Opportunities, Better than Worst, etc.   3rd: Everything is negotiable There is nothing that is not negotiable. This is perhaps her greatest rule. If it is not implemented, what they suggest is easily accepted. If not implemented there is an easy compromise. The set of advantages and disadvantages that must be distributed in a negotiation is depicted by the term negotiation pie. Jung/Krebs, The Essentials of Contract Negotiation, p. 125 (keyword: Negotiation Pie).The course of the trade can either lead to an increase, contraction or stagnation of these values. If the negotiating parties are able to expand the total pie, a win-win situation is possible, provided that both parties benefit from the expansion of the pie. In practice, however, this maximization approach is often hampered by the so-called small-pie bias, that is, the psychological underestimation of the size of the bargaining pie. Similarly, the probability of pie growth may be underestimated due to the so-called incompatibility bias. Jung /Krebs, The Essentials of Contract Negotiation, p. 126 (keyword: Negotiation Pie).In contrast to the enlargement of the pie, the pie can also shrink during negotiations e.g. due to (excessive) transaction costs. Stages in the negotiation process The negotiation process has four stages: The preparation The conversation The exchanges Closing the deal Preparation is the most important stage of a negotiation. Preparation gives confidence and strength. This stage includes Personal preparation of the negotiator and Information about the other side. Negotiators need not sacrifice effective negotiation in favor of a positive relationship between the parties. Instead of conceding, each side can appreciate that the other has their own feelings and motivations and use them to their advantage in discussing the issue. In fact, understanding perspectives can help the parties move toward a more comprehensive solution. Fisher et al. explain some techniques that effectively improve prospecting in the book Getting to Yes, and through the following, negotiators can separate people from the problem itself: Put yourself in their shoes – People tend to look for information that confirms their own beliefs and often ignore information that contradicts prior beliefs. In order to negotiate effectively, it is important to empathize with the other party's point of view. One should be open to other points of view and try to approach an issue from the other's point of view. Discuss each other's perceptions – A more direct approach to understanding the other party is to explicitly discuss the other's perceptions. Each person should share their perceptions openly and honestly without placing blame or judgment on the other. Find opportunities to act inconsistently with his/her views – The other party may have preconceived notions and expectations about the other side. The other side may act in a way that directly contradicts these biases, effectively conveying that the party is interested in a comprehensive negotiation. Face-saving – This approach justifies a stance based on the principles and values previously expressed in a negotiation. This approach to an issue is less arbitrary, and therefore, more understandable from the opponent's perspective. In addition, negotiators can use specific communication techniques to build a stronger relationship and develop more meaningful negotiation solutions. Active Listening – Listening is more than just hearing what the other side is saying. Active listening involves paying close attention to what is being said verbally and nonverbally. It involves periodically seeking further clarification from the individual. By asking the person exactly what they mean, they can realize that you are not just following a routine, but rather taking it seriously. Speak to a purpose – Too much information can be just as harmful as too little. Before discussing an important point, determine exactly what you want to communicate to the other party. Identify the exact purpose this shared information will serve Kenneth _ W. _ Thomas identified five negotiation styles or responses Thomas, Kenneth W (21 November 2006). "Conflict and conflict management: Reflections and update" (PDF). Journal of Organizational Behavior . 13 (3): 265–274. These five strategies have been frequently described in the literature and are based on the dual concern model. is based on two themes or dimensions  Marks, M; Harold, C (2011). "Who Asks and Who Receives in Salary Negotiation". Journal of Organizational Behavior . 32 (3): 371–394 A concern for self (i.e., assertiveness) and A concern for others (i.e., empathy). According to this model, individuals balance concern for personal needs and interests with needs and interests of others. The following five styles can be used based on individual preferences, depending on their pro-social goals. These styles may change over time, and individuals may have strong dispositions toward several styles Sorenson, R; Morse, E; Savage, G (1999). "The Test of the Motivations Underlying Choice of Conflict Strategies in the Dual-Concern Model". The International Journal of Conflict Management . 10: 25–44. Individual preparation is three-dimensional The biological, be rested and in good physical condition. The psychological, to be in good psychology and with positive energy. The spiritual, to know the subject very well. Preparing for the other side includes knowledge of the other side's agency and person. Information about the other side is very important and many trade and international negotiations have proven it. He knew everything about the other side! In preparation also, the following three decisions must be made: 1st What is the Goal of the negotiation 2nd What is the Limit 3rd What will be the Initial position These three decisions made before the negotiation begins are the Core of the negotiation . Goals are what the negotiator realistically wants They are recorded and evaluated according to their value. We propose to divide them into three groups: a) I definitely want to, b) it's good to take, c) it is useful to have By all means, prepare exchanges! Limit is the ultimate point of retreat. Limit means that we are ready to "lose" the customer, supplier, contract etc. if our limit is not accepted. It never, ever "changes" the limit during trading. The limit is not violated because if the other side notices it will not stop. Perhaps the most important decision is to set and stick to the limit. The third decision, after the target and the limit, is to decide the Start position Never take your original position. You will never accept the original position of the other side. NEGOTIATOR Negotiation is Acquired We are not born with the knowledge and skill of negotiation. Unfortunately many people think they are good negotiators and that they were born with this ability. But, unfortunately, many of them often do not understand "what they are leaving on the table". Experience or intelligence alone are not sufficient and sufficient to make one an effective negotiator. But the good thing is that negotiation has "rules" that are learned. You can learn it like you learned your science and your job. Types of Negotiators Three basic types of negotiators have been identified by researchers involved in The Harvard Negotiation Project. These types of negotiators are: soft negotiators, hard negotiators, and principled negotiators. Soft These people see negotiation as too close to competition, so they choose a soft negotiation style. The offers they make are not in their own interest, they give in to the demands of others, avoid confrontations and maintain good relations with their colleagues. Their perception of others is friendship and their goal is agreement. They don't separate the people from the problem, but they are soft on both. They avoid contests of wills and insist on agreement, offering solutions and easily trusting others and changing their opinions. Tough These people use challenging strategies to influence, using phrases like "this is my final offer" and "take it or leave it." They threaten, mistrust others, stand their ground and press for negotiations. They see others as rivals and their ultimate goal is victory. Furthermore, they look for a single answer and insist that you agree to it. They do not separate the people from the problem (as soft negotiators do), but are tough on both the people involved and the problem. Committed to Principles People who negotiate this way seek comprehensive solutions and do so by bypassing commitment to specific positions. They focus on the problem rather than the intentions, motivations and needs of the people involved. They separate people from the problem, explore interests, avoid dead ends, and arrive at results based on standards independent of personal will. They base their choices on objective criteria and not on force, pressure, self-interest or an arbitrary decision-making process. These criteria can be drawn from ethical standards, principles of justice, professional standards, and tradition. Researchers from The Harvard Negotiation Project recommend that negotiators explore a range of tactics to find the best solution to their problems, but this is often not the case. (as when you may be dealing with a person who uses soft or hard negotiation tactics) (Forsyth , 2010). Tactics Tactics are always an important part of the negotiation process. Most of the time they are subtle, hard to recognize and used for multiple purposes. Tactics are most often used in distributive negotiations and when the focus is to take as much value off the table as possible  Gates, Steve (2011). The Negotiation Book . United Kingdom: A John Wiley and Sons, LTD., Publication. p. 232 There are many negotiation tactics. Below are some common tactics. Auction: The bidding process is designed to create competition Gates, Steve (2011). The Negotiation Book . United Kingdom: A John Wiley & Sons Ltd., Publication. p. 240When multiple parties want the same thing, pit them against each other. When people know they can lose something, they want it even more. Not only do they want the thing they're bidding on, they also want to win, just to win. Capitalizing on one's competitive nature can drive up the price. High-security diplomacy: One party aggressively pursues a set of terms to the point that the other negotiating party must either agree or walk away. Brinkmanship is a type of "hard nut" approach to negotiation in which one party pushes the other party to the "brink" or edge of what they are willing to accept. Successful conflict convinces the other party that they have no choice but to accept the offer and there is no acceptable alternative to the proposed agreement.  Goldman, Alvin (1991). Settling For More: Mastering Negotiating Strategies and Techniques . Washington, DC: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. Phantom: Negotiators use the bower tactic to pretend that an issue of little or no importance is very important  Lewicki, RJ; DM Saunders; JW Minton (2001). Essentials of Negotiation . New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education. p. 82. . Then, later in the negotiation, the issue can be traded for a major concession of real importance. Appeal of higher authority: To moderate overextended concessions, de-escalate, or overcome an impasse, a party makes the further negotiation process dependent on the decision of a decision-maker, who is not present at the negotiating table. Chicken: Negotiators suggest extreme measures often in the form of bluffs to force the other party to cave and give them what they want. This tactic can be dangerous when the parties are unwilling to back down and go to extremes. Defense in depth: Multiple levels of decision-making authority are used to allow further concessions each time the agreement passes through a different level of authority. In other words, every time the offer goes to a decision maker, that decision maker asks to add another concession to close the deal. Some characteristics of non-verbal negotiation Non-verbal communication Communication is a key element of negotiation. Effective negotiation requires participants to convey and interpret information effectively. Participants in a negotiation communicate information not only verbally but also non-verbally through body language and gestures. By understanding how nonverbal communication works, a negotiator is better equipped to interpret the information that other participants leak nonverbally, while keeping secret those things that would hinder his or her ability to negotiate Hui, Zhou? Tingqin Zhang. "Body Language in Business Negotiation". International Journal of Business and Management. 3 (2). Examples of Nonverbal "Anchoring" In a Negotiation , a person can gain the advantage by verbalizing a position first. By establishing one's position one determines the position from which the negotiation proceeds. Similarly, one can "anchor" and gain an advantage with non-verbal (body language) cues. Dominant physical position: By leaning back and whispering, one can effectively create a dominant physical position that can give the upper hand in negotiations. Personal space: The face at the head of the table is the ostensible symbol of power. Negotiators can negate this strategic advantage by placing allies in the room to surround this person. First impression: Start the negotiation with positive gestures and enthusiasm. Look the person in the eye honestly. If you can't maintain eye contact, the other person may think you're hiding something or that you're being insincere. Give a firm handshake  Human, Hanz (2017). Body Language Magic . Lulu.com . Reading Non-Verbal Communication The ability to read another person's non-verbal communication can greatly aid the communication process. By being aware of inconsistencies between a person's verbal and nonverbal communication and reconciling them, negotiators can arrive at better solutions. Examples of incongruity in body language include: Nervous laughter: A laugh that doesn't match the situation. This can be a sign of nervousness or discomfort. When this happens, it may be a good idea to probe with questions to discover the person's true feelings. Positive words but negative body language: If someone asks the other person if they are upset, and the person pumps their fist and responds sharply, "what makes you think something is bothering me?" Donaldson, Michael C. (18 April 2011). Negotiating For Dummies. Indianapolis, Indiana: Wiley Publishing, Inc. p. 125. Hands raised in a clenched position: The person raising their hands in this posture reveals frustration even while smiling. This is a signal that the person doing it can hold a negative attitude. If possible, it can be helpful for negotiating partners to spend time together in a comfortable environment outside the negotiation room. Knowing how each partner communicates nonverbally outside of the negotiation context helps negotiation partners perceive the discrepancy between verbal and nonverbal communication. Transmission of receptivity The way negotiation partners position their bodies in relation to each other can affect how receptive each person is to the other person's message and ideas. Face and eyes: Receptive negotiators smile, make plenty of eye contact. This conveys the idea that there is more interest in the person than in what is being said. On the other hand, non-receptive negotiators make little to no eye contact. Their eyes may be downcast, their jaw muscles clenched, and their head turned slightly away from the speaker Arms and hands: To show receptivity, negotiators should extend their arms and spread their hands on the table or relax in their arms. Negotiators show poor receptivity when their hands are clenched, crossed, placed in front of their mouth, or when they rub the back of their neck. Legs and feet: Receptive negotiators sit with their feet together or one leg slightly in front of the another. When standing, they evenly distribute their weight and place their hands on their hips with their body leaning towards the speaker. Non-receptive negotiators stand cross-legged, pointing away from the speaker. Torse a twisted band or wreath by which a heraldic crest is joined to the helmet: Receptive negotiators sit on the edge of their chair, unbuttoning their coats with their bodies leaning toward the speaker. Non-receptive negotiators may lean back in their chair and keep their coat buttoned. Responsive negotiators tend to appear relaxed with their arms open and palms prominently displayed Donaldson, Michael C.; Donaldson, Mimi (1996). Negotiating for dummies . New York: Hungry Minds. Obstacles Tough Negotiators Lack of Trust Information Gaps and Negotiator's Dilemma Structural Barriers Spoilers Cultural and Gender Differences Communication Problems The Power of Dialogue  Luecke, Richard (2003). Negotiation . Harvard Business Essentials. Boston: Harvard Business School Press Feeling Emotions play an important role in the negotiation process, although only in recent years has their effect been studied. Emotions have the potential to play either a positive or negative role in negotiation. During negotiations, the decision whether or not to settle is partly based on emotional factors. Negative emotions can cause intense, even irrational behavior, and can cause conflicts to escalate and negotiations to break down, but they can be instrumental in achieving concessions. On the other hand, positive emotions often facilitate reaching an agreement and help maximize joint gains, but they can also be instrumental in reaching concessions. Positive and negative distinct emotions can be strategically projected to influence task and relationship outcomes and may play out differently across cultural boundaries. Affect- Affect- Affect dispositions Kopelman, S. and Rosette, AS (2008). "Cultural variation in response to strategic display of emotions in negotiations". Special Is affect various stages of the negotiation: which strategies to use, which strategies are actually chosen  Forgas, JP (1998). "On feeling good and getting your way: Mood effects on negotiator cognition and behavior". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 74 (3): 565–577 , how the other party is perceived and its intentions, Van Kleef, GA; De Dreu, CKW; Manstead, ASR (2006). "Supplication and Appeasement in Conflict and Negotiation: The Interpersonal Effects of Disappointment, Worry, Guilt, and Regret" (PDF). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology . 91 (1): 124–142its willingness to reach an agreement, and the final outcomes of the negotiations. Positive affectivity (PA) and negative affectivity (NA) of one or more of the negotiating parties can lead to very different outcomes. Positive effect Even before the negotiation process begins, people in a positive mood have more self-confidence Kramer, RM; Newton, E.; Pommerenke, PL (1993). "Self-enhancement biases and negotiator judgment: Effects of self-esteem and mood". Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 56: 110–133and higher propensities to plan to use a cooperative strategy. During negotiation, negotiators who are in a positive mood tend to enjoy the interaction more, show less confrontational behavior, use less aggressive tactics and more cooperative strategies This in turn increases the likelihood that the parties will achieve their primary goals and enhance the ability to find integrative gains Carnevale, PJD; Isen, AM (1986). "The influence of positive affect and visual access on the discovery of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation" (PDF). Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 37: 1–13. Indeed, compared to negotiators with negative or natural affectivity, negotiators with positive affectivity reached more agreements and tended to stick to those agreements more. These favorable outcomes are due to better decision-making processes, such as flexible thinking, creative problem-solving, respect for others' perspectives, willingness to take risks, and greater self-confidence Barry, B.; Fulmer, IS; & Van Kleef, GA (2004) "I laughed, I cried, I settled: The role of emotion in negotiation". In MJ Gelfand & JM Brett (Eds.), The handbook of negotiation and culture (pp. 71–94). Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.. The positive post-negotiation outcome also has beneficial consequences. It increases satisfaction with the achieved outcome and influences one's desire for future interactions. The PA induced by reaching an agreement facilitates the dyadic relationship, which brings commitment that sets the stage for subsequent interactions. PA also has its drawbacks: it distorts the perception of self-performance so that performance is judged to be relatively better than it actually is. Thus, studies that include self-reports of achieved outcomes may be biased. Negative affect Negative affect has detrimental effects at various stages of the negotiation process. Although various negative emotions affect negotiation outcomes, by far the most researched is anger. Angry negotiators plan to use more competitive strategies and cooperate less, even before the negotiation  Forgas, JP (1998). "On feeling good and getting your way: Mood effects on negotiator cognition and behavior". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology . 74 (3): 565–577 begins These competitive strategies are associated with reduced joint outcomes. During negotiations, anger disrupts the process by reducing the level of trust, clouding the judgment of the parties, narrowing the focus of the parties' attention, and changing their central goal from reaching an agreement to retaliating against the other side Maiese, Michelle "Emotions" Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: July 2005 downloaded: 30 August 2007. Angry negotiators give less attention to the opponent's interests and are less accurate in their judgment of their interests, thus achieving lower joint profits. Furthermore  Allred, KG; Mallozzi, JS; Matsui, F.; Raia, CP (1997). "The influence of anger and compassion on negotiation performance". Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 70 (3): 175–187 , because anger makes negotiators more self-centered in their preferences, it increases the likelihood that they will reject profitable offers. Opponents who get really angry (or cry or losing control) are more likely to make mistakes: make sure they're in your favor. Anger doesn't help achieve negotiation goals either: it reduces joint benefits and doesn't enhance personal benefits, as angry negotiators fail. Furthermore, negative emotions lead to the acceptance of settlements that are not in the positive utility function but rather have negative utility  Davidson, MN; Greenhalgh, L. (1999). "The role of emotion in negotiation: The impact of anger and race". Research on Negotiation in Organizations. 7 : 3–26. However, expressing negative emotions during negotiation can sometimes be beneficial: legitimately expressed anger can be an effective way to to show one's commitment, sincerity and needs. Furthermore, although NA reduces gains in integration tasks, it is a better strategy than PA in distributive tasks (such as zero sum). In his work on arousal of negative emotion and white noise, Seidner found support for the existence of a mechanism of arousal of negative emotion through observations about underestimating speakers of other ethnic backgrounds. Negotiation can be negatively affected, in turn, by pent-up hostility towards an ethnic or gender group Seidner, Stanley S. (1991). Negative Affect Arousal Reactions from Mexican and Puerto Rican Respondents . Washington, DC: ERIC. PART II Reformulation of integrative negotiation ADAM 's Wealth of Nations Adam Smith An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations W. Strahan and T. Cadell, London-1776 SMITH is widely considered to be the first modern work in the field of economics With self-interest as a reference point Adam Smith defined the capitalist edifice One hundred and seventy-four years later (1950) o John F. _ Nash was able to "see" the team ( trust theory ) through the transaction, considering that in this way the system "closes", turning competition into cooperation Fifty-two years later (2002) we considered that the system remains open, with respect to society as a whole: The system is completed by including society as the third invisible "partner" in a transaction-cooperation between two Briefly I. Adam Smith: The tendency to promote the social whole through transaction aimed at individual gain [win-lose] (1776) II. JF Nash: The tendency to promote society through transactions aimed at individual benefit on the one hand and the benefit of the GROUP on the other (TRUST THEORY) - governing dynamics: The beautiful mind – [win-win] (1950) III. The proposal: The tendency to promote the social whole through the transaction aimed at the individual benefit, the benefit of the GROUP and the benefit of the community (empathy) [win-win-win] -2002 It must be clarified at the outset that negotiation is not rivalry, but cooperation and based on the conflict strategy of T. Schelling (1960) deals with the equilibrium conditions and the strategy between empathy and conflict: we investigate whether the win - win - win model papakonstantinidis as a conflict strategy could co-exist with empathy as a pure behavioral condition that focuses on improving bargaining power In detail we explore the interaction, empathy-global agreement, in a subjective and objective way 1. Objectively as a conflict strategy that is inherent to every entity and 2 subjectively, through empathy and sensitivity We explore win - win - win papakonstantinidis from the perspective of empathy Specifically, we investigate whether empathy is included in conflict strategies Definitions of empathy include a wide range of emotional states, including caring for other people and wanting to help them ? experiencing emotions that match another person's feelings; discerning what another person is thinking or feeling. and make the differences between self and other less distinct. It can also be understood to have the diversity of self-definition and another fuzzy Intuitive Negotiation and Limited Reality in Life's Jackpot The combined work of all 4 authors (Nash, Harsanyi, Selten, Gigerenzer) has certainly demonstrated the physical and psychological limitations on (cooperative/non-cooperative) bargaining and negotiation processes, with reference to economic gambling behavior, decision-making and legal interaction of players. As a result, we can safely assume that the "information gap" is the dominant key factor for people to "make a living". The process of raising awareness of the Papaconstantinidis model of the 3rd victory can achieve the full "angel limit", about a process of collective bargaining from the bottom up, pushing the post-capitalist evolution forward, in terms of participatory capital formation. The intuitive 3 win approach requires negotiated reciprocity (based on capital) and has its analogy with the many living examples of biological mutualism. A TWO-PERSON bargaining situation involves two people who have the opportunity to work together for mutual benefit in more ways than one. In the simplest case, no action taken by one of the persons without the consent of the other can affect the welfare of the other Finally, it is an agreement between the parties that settles what each gives or receives in a transaction between them, or what course of action or policy each follows in relation to the other Club Due to globalization and growing business trends, negotiation in the form of teams is widely adopted. Teams can work together effectively to break down a complex negotiation. There is more knowledge and wisdom scattered in a group than in a single mind. Writing, listening, and speaking are specific roles that team members must fulfill. A team's capacity base reduces the number of errors and increases familiarity in a negotiation Sparks, DB (1993). The Dynamics of Effective Negotiation (second edition). Houston: Gulf Publishing Co. However, if a team cannot properly utilize the full potential of its options, effectiveness may suffer. One factor in the effectiveness of group bargaining is a problem that occurs through solidarity behavior. Solidarity behavior occurs when a group member reduces his own utility (benefit) in order to increase the benefits of other group members. This behavior is likely to occur when conflicts of interest increase. When the utility/needs of the negotiating opponent do not align with the interests of each team member, team members begin to make concessions and balance the benefits gained among the team Wang, Jian; Gong, Jingqiu (2016). Team negotiation based on solidarity behavior: A concession strategy in the team. 17th IEEE/ACIS International Conference on Software Engineering, Artificial Intelligence, Networking and Parallel/Distributed Computing. IEEE. Intuitively, this may seem like a cooperative approach. However, although a group may aim to negotiate in a cooperative or collaborative manner, the outcome may be less successful than possible, especially when integration is possible. Embed ability is possible when different negotiation topics have different importance for each team member. Integration opportunities are often lost due to a lack of awareness of each member's interests and preferences. Ultimately, this leads to a worse negotiation outcome. Thus, a group can perform more effectively if each member reveals his or her preferences before the negotiation. This step will allow the team to identify and organize the team's common priorities, which it can take into account when dealing with the opposing side of the negotiation. Because a group is more likely to discuss common information and common interests, groups should make an active effort to promote and incorporate unique perspectives from experts from different fields. Research by Daniel Thiemann Daniel Thiemann Tanja Engelmann (2015) Computer-Supported Preference Awareness in Negotiation Teams for Fostering Accurate Joint Priorities February 2015 The ACM Full-Text Collection, which focused heavily on computer-supported collaborative tasks, found that the Preference Awareness method is an effective tool for enhancing knowledge about shared priorities and further helping the team to judge which negotiation issues were paramount importance. Triple negotiation What stands between you and the yes you want? In our analysis of hundreds of negotiations, we have uncovered barriers along three complementary dimensions: The first is tactical. The second is the design deal and the third is the setup. Each dimension is critical, but many negotiators and much of the negotiation literature focus only on the first two. Negotiation is defined as "the reasonable communication of two or more parties with the aim of reaching an agreement or resolving a dispute, through processes based on communication, persuasion and the establishment of trust" (Tsoussi, 2006) TSAOUSIS G. DIMITRIOS(2006) HUMAN SOCIETY AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY 2006 GUTENBERG. As we understand it, the above concept of negotiation is a general definition, which can be specialized on a case-by-case basis - but not radically changed - depending on the circumstances in which it is used. Indeed, if we consider that every dispute that arises in our daily life and at the international level, needs a rational discussion between the disputing parties in order to be resolved, "negotiation" corresponds exactly to the description of the process in question that leads to the reaching of a final agreement between the parties. Given that negotiations in general take place in many different fields, they also involve different sciences that have tried to standardize them, both as a concept and in their process. According to Richard Shell Richard Shell (2006) Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation Strategies for Reasonable People Paperback – May 2, 2006, the main reason we need to properly prepare for a negotiation is in order to achieve the development of a specific plan of action. Having as criteria on the one hand the strength of the parties' desire to continue the relationship between them, regardless of the negotiation, and on the other hand, the expected intensity of their conflict regarding the negotiation issue at stake, four (4) basic negotiation situations have emerged, namely 1. tacit coordination, 2. transactions, 3. relationships and 4. balanced concerns (Shell, 2018 3rd ed.) 13. Tacit coordination (Tacit coordination) Tacit coordination negotiations refer to negotiations where the dispute about the stake of the negotiation between all parties is of low intensity and the parties do not have an increased desire to maintain communication between them, since the interpersonal element dominates. So there, the parties instinctively and implicitly, without even going through a process of verbal negotiation, coordinate and resolve in this way this issue that needs solutions. Characteristic examples of this type of negotiation are highway intersections, where implicitly the drivers at the intersections enter the highway based on the existing traffic and, on the other hand, the drivers already moving on the highway allow - if the conditions - the entry of cars at intersections ARETI MELETIOU (2019) THE NEGOTIATION WAY AS A MEANS OF RESOLVING DISPUTES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS Diplomatic Thesis PAN-MAK GRADUATE STUDIES PROGRAM IN LAW AND ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY OF MACEDONIA , but also waiting in a line to be served by a service or also, finding our seat on a plane. Dr. Andreas Nikolopoulos, Scientific Manager of CIN ( Certificate in Negotiations - Athens University of Economics and Business (OPA) poses a question The question of what is negotiation seems commonplace and very theoretical, when in fact it is topical and practical.   For example: I am hired on April 15th with a three-month probationary period. This means that after three months I will meet with the Manager, to discuss matters of my employment (salary, hours, responsibilities, etc.) or to be notified of the termination of our cooperation. Following this, on July 15, at 09.00 am, our meeting takes place and lasts 30'. Question: how long did the negotiation last? According to the international prevailing opinion, the negotiation lasted 30' and to be successful, I should be dressed accordingly, use the appropriate words, understand what the interests of the Manager are, show flexibility and generally avoid emotional conflicts with the Manager.   On the contrary, in our view, the negotiation lasted three months and 30 minutes. In the period of these three months, I should have understood what they want from me, I should have built the appropriate profile for third parties, I should have formed the corresponding alliances in the field, I should have culturally adapted to the company, I should have cultivated alternative solutions in case I do not reach a recruitment agreement - Excellent Alternative (VATNA), etc. And in addition during the 30' meeting to do the aforementioned. Our difference from the other points of view also arises from the definition we give for negotiation: "Any relationship of interaction aimed at securing interests ". In this way we incorporate both the "negotiating crisis" (of 30 minutes, based on our example), and the time period that preceded it. . Moreover, according to our definition, we do not limit our manipulations to verbal exchanges, but extend them to negotiation mixes that include not only direct negotiations, but also indirect (virtual) negotiations and even unilateral actions. These negotiation mixes are aimed at shaping a landscape as friendly as possible to achieve the desired outcomes. Our difference from the other points of view also arises from the definition we give for negotiation: "Any relationship of interaction aimed at securing interests ". In this way we incorporate both the "negotiating crisis" (of 30 minutes, based on our example), and the time period that preceded it. First of all, we need to define BATNA What is BATNA ? BATNA is an acronym of the words Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement Richard Shell (2006) Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation Strategies for Reasonable People Paperback – May 2, 2006 It is defined as the most advantageous alternative that a negotiating party can pursue if negotiations fail and no agreement can be reached. In other words, a party's BATNA is a party's fallback if negotiations are unsuccessful. The term BATNA was first used by Roger Fisher and William Ury in their 1981 book "Getting to Yes: Negotiating Without Giving In". Defining, or the ability to identify, a negotiator's best alternative to a deal under negotiation is among the many pieces of information negotiators seek when formulating deal-making and negotiation strategies. If the current negotiation reaches an impasse, what is your best outside option? BATNA is the course of action to be taken if reaching an agreement in current negotiations is not possible. It is not rare that the negotiator avoids specifying his alternative because he feels that it may be unpleasant. Thus he prefers to consider as the best alternative what he would like to happen in case of non-agreement rather than what is more likely to happen. Finding the best alternative to a negotiated agreement is particularly important because it is extremely difficult to make a wise decision about whether it is wise to accept a deal or not if we do not know what the possible alternatives are. How does BATNA help negotiators? BATNA is an objective criterion for whether an agreement is worth reaching, leading us away from setting groundless or random parameters for its acceptance or rejection, criteria that more often than not prove to be arbitrary, misleading or irrelevant to the decision to be made. we receive. Unfortunately, many people enter a negotiation without having explored what their best alternative is in the event of a no-deal, or without having analyzed how the best alternative affects or should affect their negotiation strategy. However, entering a negotiation without knowing what your BATNA is can be detrimental to your interests because it can lead you to reject a deal you should accept and vice versa. When must the agreement be accepted? BATNA helps a negotiator know when to accept a deal and when to walk away from a negotiation, as if the deal being negotiated is worse than their VATNA there is no reason to continue negotiating, if it is not better then they should to accept the agreement proposed to him. Without VATNA, one risks rejecting deals that are good, but not as good as one would like, without thinking about their subsequent course of action. BATNA helps a negotiator understand that an agreement should be accepted, even if it is not what he considers ideal, when his no-deal alternative is worse. Those who have not determined their VATNA tend to reject deals unnecessarily, thinking that their alternative will be better than the deal on the table without basing this belief on any verifiable criteria other than hope that, unfortunately, especially in negotiations , is not a strategy and often leads to wrong decisions. In other words, it is a method that helps the parties to formulate their strategy for the best alternative for them in case of failure of the negotiation. This particular method, as a negotiation tool, precedes the start of the negotiation process. In fact, as can be seen from the following phrase which has become of axiomatic importance "You should not expect success in negotiation unless you are able to make the other side an offer they find more attractive than their BATNA" ("You should not expect success in negotiation unless you are able to make the other side an offer that it considers more attractive than its BATNA” (Fisher et al., 2011 2nd ed.) Roger Fischer and alle(2011) “Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In” Paperback – Illustrated, May 3, 2011, in order for each party to identify its own BATNA, it becomes necessary the determination of both its own interests and those of the other side, since only if each party knows what the counter-negotiator is looking for will it be able to offer him an attractive solution for him regarding the object at stake. In this way, by definition, the chances of a successful negotiation increase. When it comes to identifying interests, what we need to keep in mind is that the most basic needs of individuals are usually the most powerful and dominant interests. Indicatively, some of these needs are met in the continuous pursuit of individuals for security, economic well-being, recognition and respect for their human status and their person in general, but also in preserving the feeling both that they belong somewhere and that life it is fully controlled by them. So in the event that the parties succeed in distinguishing the hidden interests of the other parties through their already declared position and are able to serve them - even to a certain extent -, then it is extremely likely that an agreement will be reached between the parties, an agreement in fact Fisher, R., Ury, W. and Patton, B. (2011 2nd ed .). the _ p , p . 85. None of us wants to lose in our Negotiations Andreas Nikolopoulos, Scientific Officer of CIN ( Certificate in Negotiations - Athens University of Economics and Business (ATH). For this purpose, we identify the following five reasons - pitfalls, which we consider to be the most common. 1st Reason – Pitfall: Insufficient knowledge of the subject you are negotiating Each negotiation requires the corresponding special knowledge. If you think that your knowledge is sufficient for every subject, then you will lose. Suggested solutions: 1st Solution : You seek the support of an expert in the subject you are negotiating 2nd Solution: You cover the gap in your knowledge in time. 2nd Reason – Trap: Decreased ability to react Negotiating under pressure, due to the parallel burdens of additional and usually unrelated matters, leads to loss. This is because our load tolerances are limited. Therefore, our overload negatively affects our ability to process data and therefore our correct reaction. This fact is sought to be exploited and/or provoked by the adversary, pushing for a quick and burdensome agreement. Suggested solutions: 1st Solution: You don't negotiate "under pressure". You postpone the Negotiation in a time of reduced charges. 2nd Solution: You reduce your burdens by outsourcing cases to third parties 3rd Solution: You close the less important "fronts" to deal with the most important current ones. 3rd Reason – Trap: The evil BATNA Suggested solutions: 1st Solution: Before the negotiation you configure a "decent" BATNA. In the case of long-term relationships, this pursuit of yours is of a corresponding duration. 2nd Solution: You don't reveal your bad BATNA – you avoid talking about it. 3rd Solution: If your opponent knows your bad BATNA, show that you don't care about the outcome by invoking your redline or making them uncertain about your intentions. 4th Solution: You avoid bluffing about your BATNA since your opponent can learn how bad it is. 5th Solution: You take care of the depreciation of your opponent's BATNA 4th Reason – Trap: You Show Vulnerable Bottom – Line / Red Line Once your opponent understands your vulnerable Bottom Line / Red Line, then he will exploit it and "chop" the benefits he intends to negotiate, escalating his demands accordingly. 5th Reason – Trap: You are easily impressed What your opponent "serves up" is not reality, but the one that will bend your resistances and achieve his goals at your expense. He usually uses supposed Prestige, Strength, overly optimistic Predictions, but still his supposed inability to hurt you. Solution: Don't look at the "showcase" but what lies behind it. For example, most negotiation books focus on how executives can master the tactics—the interactions at the negotiating table. Common barriers to yes on this dimension include a lack of trust between the parties, poor communication and negotiators' "hard" attitudes. So the books offer useful tips on reading body language, adapting your style to the negotiation situation, active listening, persuasively framing your case, deciding on offers and counter-offers, managing deadlines, dealing with dirty tricks, avoiding intercultural gaps, etc. The second dimension, that of deal design—or the ability of negotiators to strike a deal at the table that creates lasting value—also receives attention. When a deal doesn't deliver enough value to all sides, or when its structure doesn't allow for success, effective 2-D negotiators work to diagnose the underlying sources of financial and non-financial value and then craft deals that can unlock that potential. value for the parties. Does some kind of trade between the sides make sense, and if so, on what terms? Should it be a phased deal, perhaps with contingencies and risk-sharing provisions? A deal with a more creative concept and structure? The one that satisfies ego needs as well as financial ones? Beyond the interpersonal and deal-making challenges that executives face in 1-D and 2-D negotiations are three-dimensional obstacles—flaws in the negotiation setup itself. Common problems in this oft-neglected third dimension include negotiating with the wrong parties or on the wrong set of issues, involving parties in the wrong order or at the wrong time, and irreconcilable or unattractive non-deal options. 3D negotiators, however, reshape the scope and order of the game itself to achieve the desired outcome. By acting businesslike, away from the table, they ensure that the right parties are approached in the right order to address the right issues, with the right means, at the right time, under the right set of expectations, and facing the right no-deal options. Former US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, who has negotiated with hundreds of companies, governments and non-governmental organizations to spearhead agreements on goods, services and intellectual property, describes successful 3D negotiations as follows: “Table tactics are only the liquidation. work. Many people confuse tactics with the underlying substance and relentless efforts away from the table that are required to create the most hopeful situation possible once you face your counterpart. When you know what you need and have a broader strategy in place, then the negotiating tactics will flow.” The 3 dimensions of negotiations focus Common obstacles approach 1-D tactics Interpersonal issues-poor communication Action on the table to improve interpersonal processes and tactics 2- D Negotiation plan Desired agreements Go back to the original plan to design deals that unlock the remaining values 3-D Scope setting - consequences Better alternatives and other evidence that does not support sustainable agreements Make moves away from the negotiating table that produce more desirable scopes and consequences 3D negotiation in action Even managers with superior interpersonal negotiation skills can fail when barriers to agreement fall into the 3D realm. During the 1960s, Kennecott 's Kennecott, also known as Kennicott and Kennecott Mines, is an abandoned mining camp in the Copper River Census Area in the U.S. state of Alaska that was the center of activity for several copper mines. It is located beside the Kennicott Glacier, northeast of Valdez, inside Wrangell-St. Elias National Park and Preserve. The camp and mines are now a National Historic Landmark District administered by the National Park Service. long-term contract Copper with low royalty that governs the massive El mine Teniente in Chile was at high risk of renegotiation. the political situation in Chile had changed drastically since the convention was originally drawn up, making the terms of the agreement unstable. Chile had what appeared to be a very attractive alternative - or in negotiation parlance, a BATNA (best alternative to negotiated agreement). Acting unilaterally, the Chilean government could fundamentally change the financial terms of the deal or even expropriate the mine. Kennecott 's BATNA appeared poor: Submit to new terms or be expropriated. Imagine that Kennecott had adopted a 1 - D strategy that focuses primarily on interpersonal actions at the bargaining table. Using this approach, Kennecott 's management team would assess the personalities of the ministers with whom it would negotiate. She would try to be culturally sensitive and might choose fancy restaurants to meet. Indeed, the Kennecott team took such sensible actions. But this approach was not promising enough given the threatening reality of the situation. Chilean officials seemed to hold all the cards: They didn't need Kennecott to operate the mine. the country had its own experienced managers and engineers. And Kennecott 's hands seemed tied: He could not move the copper mine, had no lock on processing or trading the precious metal, and no realistic prospect, as in an earlier era, of appealing to the US fleet. Fortunately for Kennecott , its negotiators adopted a three-dimensional strategy and arranged the upcoming talks in the most favorable way. The team took six steps and completely changed the pitch. First, somewhat to the government's surprise, Kennecott offered to sell a majority stake in the mine in Chile. Second, to sweeten that offer, the company proposed using the proceeds from the equity sale, along with money from an Export-Import Bank loan, to finance a major mine expansion. Third, he induced the Chilean government to guarantee this loan and subject the guarantee to New York state law. Fourth, Kennecott insured as much of its assets as possible under the US guarantee against expropriation. Fifth, it arranged to sell the expanded mine's production under long-term contracts with North American and European customers. And sixth, the rights to collect on these contracts were sold to a consortium of European, American and Japanese financial institutions. These actions fundamentally changed the negotiations. A bigger mine, with Chile as the majority owner, meant a bigger and more valuable pie for the host country: The proposal would bring in more revenue for Chile and meet the country's interest in maintaining at least nominal sovereignty over its own natural resources. Furthermore, a wide range of customers, governments and creditors now shared Kennecott 's concerns about future political changes in Chile and were very cautious about Chile's ability to operate the mine effectively over time. Instead of facing the initial negotiation with Kennecott alone , Chile now faced a multilateral negotiation with players who would have future dealings with that country - not only in the mining sector but also in the economic, industrial, legal and public sectors. Chile 's original BATNA —to unceremoniously expel Kennecott —is now much less attractive than it was at first, since Kennecott 's wound jeopardized a broader set of Chile's current and future interests. And finally, warranties, insurance and other contracts improved Kennecott 's BATNA . If no deal was reached and Chile acted to expropriate the business, Kennecott would have a number of parties on his side. Although the mine was finally nationalized a few years later, Chile's deteriorating alternatives gave Kennecott a better operating position and additional years of cash flow compared to similar companies that did not take such actions. This case underscores our central message: Don't just skillfully play the negotiating game you're given. change its underlying design for the better. It is unlikely that 1- D tactical or interpersonal brilliance at the table—whether in the form of steely-faced culturally sensitive observations, or careful and thoughtful listening to all parties—could have saved Kennecott from his fundamentally disadvantageous negotiating position. However, the three-dimensional moves the company made away from the table changed the makeup of the negotiation (the parties involved, the interests they saw at stake, their BATNAs ) and ultimately created more value for all involved—many of whom Kennecott he claimed for himself. How 3D motion works Successful 3D negotiators motivate target players to say yes by improving the proposed deal, enhancing their own BATNAs, and worsening those of the other parties. 3-D players intend such moves primarily to claim value for themselves but also to create value for all parties. Value Claim. 3D negotiators rely on several common practices to claim value, including seeking outside bids or bringing new players into the game, sometimes to create a formal or informal auction. After negotiating a series of alliances and acquisitions that took Millennium Pharmaceuticals from a small start-up in 1993 to a multibillion-dollar company less than a decade later, then-chief business officer Steve Holtzman explained the rationale for adding parties to the negotiations: Whenever we feel there is a possibility of a deal with someone, we immediately call six more people. It drives you crazy, trying to outsmart them all. But number one, it will change the perception on the other side of the table. And number two, it will change your perception of yourself. If you think there are other people interested, your bluff is no longer a bluff. It's real. He's going to be faced with a whole other level of belief." (For more on Millennium, see “Strategic Agreement at Millennium Pharmaceuticals,” HBS Case No. 9-800-032.) While negotiators should generally strive to improve their BATNAs, they should also be aware that some of the moves they make may inadvertently worsen their options. For example, several years ago, we worked with an American construction company in its negotiations for a joint venture in Mexico. The company had already researched potential cultural barriers and ranked its three potential partners according to the competencies it deemed most desirable in those companies. After approaching the negotiations in a culturally sensitive spirit, and with a very logical sequence, the US team had nevertheless reached an impasse with the most attractive partner. The team abandoned those talks and were now deep into the process with the second most desirable candidate - again, things were going badly. Imagine subsequent negotiations with the third, less acceptable, partner if the second round of talks had also been established - in an industry where everyone would quickly know the results of previous negotiations. As each round of negotiations failed, the American company's BATNA—an agreement with another Mexican company or no joint venture at all—gradually deteriorated. Fortunately, the US company opened exploratory discussions with the third company alongside the second. This helped the US company discover which potential partner really made the most business sense, avoid closing options early and take advantage of the competition between Mexican companies. The US firm should have arranged the process so that the prospect of a deal with the most desirable Mexican partner would act as a BATNA in talks with the second most desirable partner and so on. In short, doing so would have created the equivalent of a simultaneous quadrilateral negotiation (structured as one US company negotiating alongside each of the three Mexican companies) rather than three consecutive bilateral negotiations. This most promising 3-D layout would have greatly enhanced whatever one-dimensional cultural insight and tactical ingenuity the US company could muster. In addition to strengthening their own position, 3D negotiators who add parties and issues to an agreement can weaken the other side's BATNA. For example, when Edgar Bronfman, former CEO of Seagram's and head of the World Jewish Congress, first approached Swiss banks asking them to compensate Holocaust survivors whose family assets had been wrongfully held since World War II , he felt stoned. Swiss bank executives saw no reason to collude with Bronfman. they believed they had strong legal ground because the issue of restitution had been settled years ago. But after eight months of lobbying by Bronfman, the World Jewish Congress and others, the negotiations expanded dramatically — to the detriment of the Swiss. Bankers faced a de facto coalition of interests that credibly threatened the lucrative Swiss share of public finances in states like California and New York. They faced the divestment by huge US pension funds of shares in Swiss banks as well as all Swiss companies. a delay in the merger between Swiss Bank and UBS over the "distinctive capacity" license vital to doing business in New York; expensive and intrusive lawsuits brought by some of the most formidable US lawyers; and the wider displeasure of the US government, which had been active in brokering a settlement. Given the bleak BATNA the Swiss bankers faced, it is not surprising that the parties reached an agreement, including a commitment by the Swiss bankers to pay $1.25 billion to the survivors. It was, however, an almost unthinkable result at the start of the small, initially private game in which the Swiss seemed to hold all the cards. Another way for negotiators to claim value is to shift the issues under discussion and the interests at stake. Consider how Microsoft won the browser war negotiations. In 1996, AOL was in dire need of a cutting-edge Internet browser, and both Netscape and Microsoft were competing for the deal. The technically superior, market-dominant Netscape Navigator competed with the more confusing Internet Explorer, which was then fighting for a market place, but was considered by Bill Gates a strategic priority. Netscape confidently, even arrogantly, pushed for a technically based "browser for dollars" deal. In the book aol.com, Jean Villanueva, a senior AOL executive, observed: “The deal was Netscape's to lose. They were dominant. We had to get what the market wanted. Most importantly, we saw ourselves as smaller companies fighting the same enemy - Microsoft. But when all was said and done, it was Microsoft that had cut a deal with AOL. The software giant would provide Explorer to AOL for free and had promised a number of technical tweaks in the future. Microsoft had also agreed that AOL's client software would be bundled with the new Windows operating system. Microsoft—a direct competitor to AOL—would place the AOL icon on the Windows desktop right next to the icon for its own online service, the Microsoft Network (MSN). AOL's position on "the world's most valuable desktop real estate" would allow it to reach an additional 50 million people a year at no substantial cost, compared to the $40 to $80 per customer acquisition cost incurred with "carpet bombing " in the country. with AOL discs. In fact, Bill Gates sacrificed MSN's mid-term position to his larger goal of winning the browser war. How did 3D motion swing the negotiations in Microsoft's favor? Microsoft's web browser was technically inferior to Netscape's, so the chances of Microsoft winning on these grounds were slim, regardless of its negotiating skills and table tactics. Instead, Microsoft shifted negotiations from Netscape's technical dollar browser deal to broader business issues in which it had a decisive advantage. Instead of focusing on selling to technologists, Microsoft focused on selling to AOL's business people. As AOL's chief negotiator and head of business development, David Colburn, stated in his 1998 Supreme Court testimony, "Microsoft's willingness to combine AOL in some form with the Windows operating system was an extremely important competitive factor that was impossible for Netscape to match." Instead of skillfully trying to play a bad hand when dealing with the X side of issues A and B, Microsoft changed the game to a more compliant Y counterpart, emphasizing issues C, D, and E, in which she was strong. Microsoft shifted negotiations from Netscape's technical dollar browser deal to broader business issues in which it had a decisive advantage. These examples of 3D value-assertion moves contrast with the standard 1-D interpersonal approach to negotiation. The actions taken off the table—changing hot spots and issues, restructuring and resetting the process, changing BATNAs—are not primarily about one-dimensional interpersonal skills but rather about strengthening the underlying arrangement of the negotiation itself David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius (2022) 3-D Negotiation: Playing the Whole Game Harvard Business Review. 2. game-balance Formally, let be the set of all possible strategies for player n Let be a strategy profile, a set consisting of one strategy for each player, where denotes the strategies of all players except Let be the player's payoff as a function of strategies. The strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if for everything the A game can have more than one Nash equilibrium. Even if the equilibrium is unique, it can be weak: a player can be indifferent between many strategies given the choices of the other players. It is unique and called a strict Nash equilibrium if the inequality is strict, so a strategy is the single best response: for everything the Coordination game The coordination game is a classic two-player, two-strategy game, as shown in the payoff matrix example to the right. There are two pure strategy equilibria, (A, A) with payoff 4 for each player and (B, B) with payoff 2 for each player. The combination (B,B) is a Nash equilibrium because if a player unilaterally changes his strategy from B to A, his payoff will drop from 2 to 1. A coordination game showing the expected payoffs for player 1 (row A ) /player 2 (column) Player 1 strategy Player 2 Strategy Player 2 adopts strategy A Player 2 adopts strategy B Player 1 adopts strategy A 4 4 3 1 Player 1 adopts strategy B 1 3 2 2 A famous example of a coordination game is deer hunting. Two players can choose to hunt a deer or a rabbit, with the deer providing more meat (4 utility units, 2 for each player) than the rabbit (1 utility unit). The caveat is that the deer must be hunted cooperatively, so if one player attempts to hunt the deer while the other the rabbit, the deer hunter will fail completely, for a reward of 0, while the rabbit hunter will succeed, for a reward of 1. game has two equilibria, (deer, deer) and (rabbit, rabbit), because a player's optimal strategy depends on his expectations of what the other player will do. If one hunter trusts the other to hunt the deer, he should hunt the deer. However, if he thinks that the other person will chase the rabbit, he will also chase the rabbit. This game is used as an analogy for social cooperation, since much of the benefit that people in society derive depends on people cooperating and implicitly trusting each other to act in a cooperative manner. Player 1 strategy Player 2 strategy Deer hunting Rabbit hunting Deer hunting 2 2 1 0 Rabbit hunting 0 1 1 1 Utility theory of the individual A person who is offered 2 predictions can decide which is preferable or if both are desirable The resulting preference classification is transitive. If A is preferable to B and B is preferable to C, then A is preferable to C Suppose we start with two equally desirable states. Each possible combination of these states will be just as desirable as either of them individually. If A0,B,C are as in assumption (2) then there is a combination of probabilities of A and C that is as desirable as B. This is equivalent to an assumption for continuity If both A and B are equally desirable, then A is equally desirable Also if A and B are equally desirable, then A can be replaced by B in any desirability relation that is satisfied by B These conditions are sufficient to show the existence of a satisfactory utility/utility function which corresponds to each prediction of an individual a real number This utility/utility function is not unique, i.e. if u is such a function, then so is if Using uppercase letters for the predictions and lowercase letters for the actual numbers then such a function will satisfy the following properties: is equivalent to A being preferable to B If then, This is the important property of the linearity of a utility/utility function n -person game theory contains the 2-person bargaining problem as a special case In its win - win - win version, the bargaining problem contains 3 persons n -person games should have values, i.e. there should be a set of numbers that depend continuously on the set of quantities that make up the mathematical description of the game and that express the utility/utility of each player if he has the chance to join the game We can define a prediction for 2 people as a combination of 2 predictions each for a person So we have 2 people, each with a certain expectation about their future environment We can consider the utility functions of a person , as applicable to binomial predictions, each will give the result that would result from the corresponding prediction of an individual, and which is one of the 2 parts of the binomial prediction A combination of probabilities of two such binomial predictions is defined by creating the corresponding combinations of their components So if [A,B] is a binomial projection and then the will be defined as It is obvious that the individual utility functions will here have the same linear property as in the classical one-person case. From this point on, when we use the word prediction we will refer to binomial prediction In the case of negotiations there is one prediction that stands out: it is the prediction where the negotiators will fail. It is therefore reasonable to use utility functions for the two negotiators that give the number zero in this prediction. This means that the utility function of each individual is defined upwards as the product of some positive real number From here on, then, all utility functions used will be of this form We can construct a graph of the situation the two face by choosing a utility function for each and plotting the utilities/utilities of all possible predictions on a flat graph It is necessary to introduce assumptions about the nature of the set we obtain in this way. We assume that this set is compact and convex in the mathematical sense. ends 2 points of the set can always be obtained with the appropriate combinations of probabilities of two predictions depicted in these two points From the condition of compactness it follows on the one hand that the set of points should be closed, i.e. that they are all contained in a sufficiently large square of the level On the other hand, any continuous function of benefits/utilities takes its maximum value at some point of the set Bargaining Officers Nash ( N. E ) John Forbes Nash Jr J.F.Nash (1950) The bargaining Problem Econometrica, Volume 18, Issue 2 (Apr., 1950), 155-162. suggested that a solution should satisfy certain axioms: Invariant to affine transformations or Invariant to equivalent utility representations Pareto optimality Independence of unrelated alternatives Symmetry Resolution of the Negotiation We will consider 2 predictions which give the same utility/utility for each utility function corresponding to each individual as equivalent so that the graph is a complete representation of the essential features of the situation Of course the graph is specified only as the chosen scale (and changes when the scale changes) as long as we have not fully defined utility functions Now, since our solution should consist of rational expectations of profits by the 2 negotiators, these expectations should be realizable by a suitable agreement between of the two For this there must be a prediction available which gives each the amount of satisfaction they would expect to receive It is reasonable to assume that these two, if they are rational, will simply agree on this prediction, the in an equivalent Therefore, we can consider, that a point of the entire graph represents the solution and so on equal represents all provisions on which the two may agree in a fair negotiation We will develop the theory by presenting the conditions that should hold (in terms of the relationship between this solution and the set) so as to find a simple condition that will determine the point of the solution We will consider only those cases, where both people can benefit from the negotiation This does not exclude cases where in the end only one person will benefit, because "fair negotiation" is the joint decision to solve the problem through a lottery (eg tossing a coin) that will determine who gets what in the end Every combination of possible available predictions is an available prediction Let u 1 and u 2 be the utility functions of the 2 individuals Let C ( S ) represent the solution point in a set S which is compact and convex and contains the origin of the axes (A set X is called compact if every sequence of its points contains a subsequence which converges to a point of X) We assume that: If α is a point of S such that there exists another point β of S with the property u1(β)> u 1(α) and u 2 (β)> u 2(α) then If the set T contains the set S and c ( T ) is in S then c ( T )= c ( S ) We will say that a set S is symmetric if there are utility operators u 1 and u 2 such that when (a , b ) is contained in S , ( b , a ) is also contained in S – this means that the graph is symmetric about the line u 1= u 2 – see figure 1 If S is symmetric and u 1 and u 2 are as above, then c ( S ) is a point of the form (a, a) i.e. a point of the line u 1= u 2 The first assumption expresses the idea that each atom wishes to maximize his own utility/utility in the final negotiation The third assumption is equivalent to the postulate that the two negotiators have identical bargaining abilities The second assumption is more complicated: If two rational people agree that c ( T ) could be a fair deal, when T is the set of possible deals, then they should be able to make a less restrictive deal and not attempt reach some of the agreements represented by points outside the set S , since T contains c ( T ) If S were contained in T their state reduces to a , where the set of possible contingencies is S Thus c ( S ) should equal c ( T ) We will now show that these conditions require that the solution be the set point in the first quadrant where the product u 1* u 2 is maximized But we know that such a point exists because of the solidity property. Also, the convexity property leads to the conclusion that this point is unique Now let's choose the utility functions so that the point we mentioned above goes to (1,1) Since this is done by multiplying the utilities by fixed parameters, (1,1) will be the one at which it is maximized the product ( u 1* u 2) For any point of the set we will not have u 1+ u 2>2 since if there was a point of the set with u 1+ u 2>2 that joins (1,1) to the point this, the product u 1* u 2 would take a value greater than one We can now construct a square inside the region where u 1+ u 2<2 which is symmetric to the line u 1= u 2 , has a side on the line u 1+ u 2=2 and completely encloses all alternative agreements Considering the generated square region, as the set of alternative agreements, instead of the older set, it is obvious that (1,1) is the only point that satisfies assumptions (6) and (8) Now, using assumption (7) we can conclude Note that (1,1) must also be a point of the solution, when our original (transformed) set is the set of alternative agreements-end The Papakonstantinidis win-win-win model what is? Decisions arise from people answering for themselves the question, " What does (rules) a person like me (identity) do in a situation like this (identity)?" ( DM Messick, 1999 ) Messick, DM (1999). Models of decision making in social dilemmas. In M. Foddy, M. Smithson, S. Schneider, & M. Hogg (Eds.), Resolving social dilemmas: Dynamic, structural, and intergroup aspects (pp. 209–217). Psychology Press.. This logic of appropriateness contrasts with the dominant "logic of consequences" or EU models. The logic of consequence sees decisions as "based on an evaluation of alternatives in terms of their consequences for preferences" suggests that the logic of fitness may have more explanatory power in social dilemmas than such expected utility models. To act, people must answer for themselves the question, "What kind of situation is this?" We have seen that the appropriateness framework suggests that people who make decisions ask themselves (expressly or implicitly), ( What does a person like me do in a situation like this? » This question identifies 3 important factors: recognition and classification of the type of situation encountered , the identity of the decision maker, and the application of rules or heuristics in guiding behavioral choice Win-win-win: good for me, good for you, great for the community Win-Win-Win vs. Win-Win: SUGGESTION In the present study we go one step further by noting that negotiation can be defined as “a form of decision-making in which two or more parties discuss with each other in an attempt to resolve their conflicting interests”. This definition refers to the two main aspects of human behavior in negotiation: the duality of interests that negotiators have to deal with and the desire (or lack of desire) to create cooperation with their opponent. On the other hand, bargaining is a subset of negotiations and defines the act of bargaining for a specific position . The concept of win-win-win Papaconstantinidis is based on the prevailing dynamics, that is, the 3-person negotiation view that answers the questions and the 3-person transferred utilities 1. What is best for me? ​​– Individualization 2. Which one is best for you? – Socialism/Empathy 3. What is best for the community in which the negotiations are taking place? – Community oriented Balance is achieved when the triatomic approach (three self-questions) is satisfied to the greatest extent possible The fact that individual preferences (Arrow) cannot be summed up is cured by Amartya Sen's observation that “No poor farmer can have a summer mood and feel happy and satisfied with a small offering ; ». The situation of tripartite utility-transferred negotiators becomes optimistic when the product of their benefits becomes maximal, taking into account PARETO efficiency (Pareto efficiency or Pareto optimality is a situation where no single criterion or preference criterion can be better without there is at least one person or a preference criterion for worse or no loss Here is a subtle difference: O John Nash established his bargaining problem John F. Nash, Jr (1950) The Bargaining Problem Econometrica, Volume 18, Issue 2 (Apr., 1950), 155-162.  on the concept of "group" which was the trigger for the trust theory . His amazing contribution was that with his axiomatic " win - win " theory he made a great leap over the coldly individualistic conception of Adam Smith Adam Smith (1776) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations W. Strahan and T. Cadell, London, 1776(the general good is better promoted and served if each Man would simply promote his individual benefit) With the addition of "Team" they say that John Nash a 22-year-old Princeton postdoctoral fellow University "looked into" Adam 's eyes Smith challenging a 174-year path then taken for granted (1950-1776) In the 21st century, critical objections to the win - win theory are increasing. It seems to be shaken by the very nature and complexity of human relationships. trends: Either the system tends to its self-destruction, with the prevalence of the unrestrained and without individualism limits - entropy Either, at the last moment the system will "self-heal" through new unprecedented forms. Already, there are the first signs (Corporate Social Responsibility - CSR , Non-Governmental Organizations-NGOs...the adoption of entire countries, social enterprises, social cooperatives-social economy...etc) On this basis - we try - if possible to "build" an idea the " win - win - win " idea , which attempts, if possible, to overcome the win - win concept in the field of negotiation-interaction The tri-partization of negotiation with the acceptance of empathy (putting myself in the shoes of the other) is not wishful thinking but the result of cold logical thinking: Man possesses logic and adaptability: If we suppose that there are three people on an uninhabited island, each of them, expressing the his individual benefit will try to prevail, "throwing down" the other two ( win , Adam Smith ) To achieve his goal he tries to associate one of the other two ( win - win ) However, the two "partners" now have 2 solutions...either to eat the third one or to associate him I believe that the second thought will prevail , ( win - win - win ) given that with cooperation it is possible that they all build a boat together, for example to leave the island. A third party is always needed... John Forbes Nash Jr. suggested that a solution should satisfy certain axioms: Invariant to affine transformations or Invariant to equivalent utility representations Pareto optimality Independence of unrelated alternatives Symmetry Analytically 1. Pareto optimal: there should be no feasible outcome that all actors consider equally aggressive, and at least one actor finds it more desirable than the one chosen from the solution: the chosen outcome must belong to the set which is "not Pareto dominated". 2. Symmetry: if the problem is symmetric with respect to the 45° line, the result of the solution must have equal coordinates.-see figure 3. Stability with respect to changes of scale: one the von Neumann - Morgenstern utilities are unique under positive homoparallel transformations, the chosen outcome must be invariant under such transformations. 4. Independence from the contraction of the feasible set: if, holding the disagreement point constant, the feasible set shrinks but the originally chosen outcome remains feasible, then this should remain the chosen outcome for the new problem. The Nash Theorem: the Nash bargaining solution is the only solution that satisfies Pareto optimality, symmetry, invariance from changes in scale (measuring bargaining utility/utility), and independence from contraction of the feasible set. Nash proved that the solutions satisfying these axioms are exactly the points that maximize the following expression: If we were to add "integration" as the fifth postulate, we would have a three-dimensional result PART II INTEGRATION The literature indicates a number of game theoretic contributions with application to the international economy and, in particular, to international trade, just to make the point that the analysis of strategy games is particularly well suited to provide insightful spaces for research on the issue of integration . An edited and thoroughly researched literature section sheds light on these key contributions, which could enrich the practical meaning of strategic negotiations in the context of integration. In order to stick to this central issue and still arrive at valid conclusions based on substantive research, an inevitable compromise must be made with relatively peripheral issues. This has almost no effect on the flow of arguments. Rich conceptual developments, as well as a comprehensive literature review, place the study on an appropriately balanced research path to a variety of approaches that have made up the theory and policy of economic integration over the past 50 years, including challenging debates about macroeconomic implications. . An indicative point is the analysis of the goals pursued by the negotiating countries on the way to integration, and especially in this context that characterizes the European process. On the other hand, it is always united by a common threat, such as that which comes from the possibility of destruction of the natural environment: This union, with its constant repetitions, implies an integration of everyone in the process of protection against a common threat. The "invisible" strategic interactions introduce the element of integration in the final analysis The choice of the appropriate approach to the subject has been facilitated by an important scientific tradition. Research on explaining strategic interactions through game-theoretic concepts has long made significant progress. From the early development of the theory in the interwar period, the approach gradually gained acceptance until its "virtual dominance in economics" around the late 1980s. The explosive dominance of game theory as an analytical tool has to do with a wide range of disciplines, such as industrial organization, labor economics, public finance, monetary policy, economic history, law, marketing, political science or sociology, to accept and explain the behavior of firms. , governments or groups of actors regarding strategic choices. In the field of international trade alone, interest spans an increasingly wide range of issues, from trade liberalization games or dispute resolution to new theories of strategic trade policy or trade policy. At the same time, arguments arising from adjacent fields such as economic development economic history institutional economics political science industrial organization international relations have all contributed to the addition of new knowledge and obviously broadened the view of international trade issues on a unified background. One of the findings suggested by this rich literature is that little improvement can be expected for both trade theory and game mathematics. Instead, the main benefit of the new approach has proven to be an improved and practical understanding of how states and companies implement trade policies when their interests interact. Schelling's work Thomas C. Schelling (1960) The Strategy of Conflict- VOOK , new edition Harvard University Press, 1981has the merit of pioneering the strategic analysis of interdependence between nations and highlighting the danger of misusing game theory to understand the proper importance of decision-making processes in conflict situations. He observes: We change the character of the game when we drastically change the amount of contextual detail it contains... It is often the contextual detail that can lead players to discover a consistent or at least mutually non-destructive outcome. We must recognize that the kinds of things that determine the outcome are those that a highly abstract analysis might consider irrelevant detail. COJANU, VALENTIN (2004) The Integration Game: Strategic Interaction in the Process of the EU Enlargement Editura AGER - Economistul, 2004 What makes this approach more problematic is its flexibility in producing provocative results even if the texture between theory and economics is somewhat loose. Economists have to deal with a theoretical construct imported from mathematics that has its own laws and develops as such autonomously. Snidal . Snidal, Duncan. "The Game Theory of International Politics." World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations, 1985, 25–57conceptualizes this dilemma in the following statement: To directly apply the deductive power of game theory, we need to strengthen the correspondences between empirical situations and game models and separate hypotheses from predictions. As we do this, the model and theory will provide a guide to relevant empirical evidence, just as the evidence will provide a guide to model evaluation and revision. It follows that integration-integration plays a decisive role both in large schemes (e.g. the European Union) and in our daily dealings . this same negotiation (through continuous integrations) to its completion This, i.e. the COMPLETION of the negotiation is proposed (beyond the 4 Nash Axioms , i.e. (1) Invariant to affine transformations or Invariant to equivalent utility representations (2) Pareto optimality (3) Independence of unrelated alternatives (4) Symmetry) (5) integration as the FIFTH Axiom implying the triple convergence of three-plus poles in the win - win - win final deal More than three decades have passed since the initial proposal of the behavioral negotiation framework. The world has evolved tremendously - technological advances have provided negotiators with new means of communication that can shape negotiators' knowledge and behavior. Globalization has brought more and more complex structures and involved more parties in negotiations. The expansion of the global economy has given people unprecedented power to shape choices for future generations. and the mobility enjoyed by a larger part of the population has brought together different cultures that integrate, clash or coexist without clear boundaries. These new trends have stimulated waves of managerial and academic interest in negotiation. Over the past 30 years researchers have not only advanced our understanding of the contexts and outcomes of negotiations, but have also explored new outcomes arising from the interaction of the two and the changing world that shapes them. We suggest that efforts are needed to integrate recent developments in negotiation research and that the behavioral negotiation perspective, because of its simultaneous simplicity and flexibility, is suitable and effective for integrating the various streams of negotiation research into a systematic framework. Importantly, this framework highlights the dynamic interplay between the two levels and leaves much room for further exploration of these dynamics. Min Li, Leigh Plunkett Tost and Kimberly Wade-Benzoni (2007) The dynamic interaction of context and negotiator effects A review and commentary on current and emerging areas in negotiation 2007 International Journal of Conflict Management Volume 18 Issue 3 Emerald Group Publishing Limited Coherence of three-dimensional space In mathematics, especially general topology and metric topology, a compact space is a mathematical topological space in which any infinite sequence of points chosen from the space must eventually be taken arbitrarily close to some point in the space. 3D space A compactness measure for 3D shapes composed of voxels is presented. The work proposed here improves and extends the measure of discrete compactness from a 2D (two-dimensional) field to a 3D one E. Bribiesca A measure of compactness for 3D shapes Computers & Mathematics with Applications Volume 40, Issues 10–11, November–December 2000, Pages 1275-1284. The discrete compactness measure proposed corresponds to the sum of the contact areas of the face-connected voxels of the 3D shapes. A relationship between the surface area enclosing the volume and the contact area is presented. The concept of contact surfaces is extended to 3D shapes consisting of different polyhedra, which divide the space creating different 3D grids. The measure proposed here for discrete compactness is invariant under translation, rotation, and scaling. The term "compact" does not refer to point set topology, but relates to intrinsic properties of objects. Finally, to prove our compactness measure, we calculate the discrete compactness measures of different focal points Voxel In 3D computer graphics, a voxel represents a value on a regular grid in 3D space. As with pixels in a 2D bitmap , the voxels themselves do not typically have their position (i.e. coordinates) explicitly encoded with their values. Instead, rendering systems infer the position of a voxel based on its position relative to other voxels (ie, its position in the data structure that composes a single volumetric image). Figure 1. A solid composed of voxels. This is a volumetric representation for solids through a spatial arrangement. The classical solid C of a solid can be measured by the ratio (area3)/(volume2), which is dimensionless and is minimized by a sphere. So, for a sphere: A = 4nr2 and V = (4/3)nr3. Therefore, C = 36π is the minimum compactness of a solid, since the sphere encloses maximum volume for constant surface area. The measure of compactness is an intrinsic property of objects. Therefore, the compactness measure is invariant under geometric transformations such as: translation, rotation and scaling. In the digital domain, most solids do not have well-defined enclosing surfaces, due to the noise of the input devices used. The aforementioned may create noisy confinement surfaces and consequently larger surfaces, which will affect the compactness measure. On the other hand, the measure proposed here for discrete compactness depends strongly on the sum of the contact areas of neighboring polyhedra of the solids. An advantage of using this measure of discrete solidity is that the accuracy of the enclosed surface area and the volume are measured using the same unit (the polyhedron). To introduce the proposed measure of discrete solid use we use a volumetric representation for rigid solids through arrays of spatial occupation. Thus, solids are represented as three-dimensional arrays of polyhedra marked as filled with matter. Furthermore, the shape is referred to as the shape of the object, and an object is considered a geometric solid composed of regular polyhedra (voxels). In the context of this paper, area is a numerical value that expresses two-dimensional extent in a plane, but is sometimes used to mean internal area itself. Another consideration is the assumption that an entity is isolated from the real world. This is called a rigid solid and is defined as the result of previous processing. Figure 1 shows a solid composed of regular polyhedra, in this case voxels. We use the tips and mechanisms suggested in to draw rigid solids consisting of a large number of voxels. In this work, we only use rigid solids consisting of face-connected voxels, and the length of all voxel edges is assumed to be equal to one. In order to introduce the proposed compactness measurement method, a series of geometrical concepts are presented below. We present the contact surfaces for rigid solids composed of polyhedra. We also present the relationship between the contact surface and the volume enclosing surface. This relationship between surface areas can be used on different polyhedra, which fill 3 spaces. In this case, we give an illustration using hexahedra and octahedra. The area A of the enclosing surface of a rigid solid consisting of a finite number n of polyhedra (for example, voxels), corresponds to the sum of the areas of the outer polygon planes of the polyhedra that form the visible faces of the solid. Unlike pixels and voxels , polygons are often represented explicitly by the coordinates of their vertices (as points). A direct consequence of this difference is that polygons can effectively represent simple 3D structures with a lot of empty or homogeneously filled space, while voxels excel at representing regular sample spaces that are not homogeneously filled. 888 Balance in 3D illustration Conflicts with Momentum The win - win - win equilibrium That is, now the set of all possible strategies for the player Let be a strategy profile, a set consisting of one strategy for each player, where denotes the strategies of all players except Let be the player's payoff as a function of strategies. The strategy profile is a win - win - win equilibrium if for everything the ◉ Division Now, if u ( x ) is the utility predictor function of continuing trading and u ( d ) the point function predicting the termination of trading c ( z ) the utility function of the community ( c = community ) and c ( d ) the function of predicting the termination of the negotiation for the community (or rather those points at which the community finds it more profitable to terminate the negotiation than to continue it. Thus, we get the following "triangular" relationship ◉ That is, if the points of disagreement are zero then We have the maximum RESULT of the utilities for the parties as well as the community (society of angels) The win - win - win model (papakonstantinidis model) Papakonstantinidis LA (2002) “the win-win-win model” Euracademy Guide, Visby University, Gotland Campus, SW-sharing problem Basic requirements: But, … LL \ Papaconstantinidis 2015 Conclusion It follows that in a mental three-dimensional coherence it is possible to find a unique equilibrium point of a three-dimensional strategy that answers positively the triple question (1) what is best for me (2) what is best for you with whom I cooperate and not compete and (3) what is best for the community in which we work; The ideal share of this partnership is 1/3 of the total pie we share Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis 2022-9-22 60 The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model