The COVID-19 Pandemic: A Pretext for Expanding Power in Hungary

Περιμένοντας τους Bαρβάρους. Law in a Time of Constitutional Crisis., 2021

The main aim of this paper is to describes how the illiberal government of Hungary introduced autocratic measures as a reaction to the Corona virus. Even the less destructive nature of the first wave of the COVID-19 in Hungary provided a pretext for the Orbán government to dismantle the remnants of democratic character of its already 'illiberal' state by introducing almost unlimited emergency power of the executive. The misuse of crisis situation again raise the question, whether 'illiberal democracy' is the proper conceptual frameworks to descibe the perils of new authoritarianism, and also whether the transnational responses, for instance that of the European Union towards its backsliding Member States can adequately cope with them.

DGAP Commentary, 2020

Springer eBooks, 2021

Populists in Hungary had to manage the crisis from government position. Orbán has shown strong leadership during the crisis and dominated the political context of the issue. However, the usual elements of the 'populist myth' characterizing Orbán's and Fidesz's ordinary communication were adopted to interpret and frame the COVID-19 crisis. Within this narrative, the leader and its people together fight for 'the Hungarians' national interests and freedom against the interconnected international and national enemies who seriously threat these interests and freedom for their own political and economic benefits. The pro-government political and media actors' communication were characterized by strong people-centrism, criticism towards the EU and the international 'liberal mainstream' including NGOs and media, and polarizing narratives that presented opposition actors as serving foreign political interests. As a reversed form of politicization, any criticism coming from social or political actors were immediately labelled as 'political'

Review of Central and East European Law, 2021

This paper discusses the Hungarian constitutionalism and the emergency model which can be called an ‘autocratic’ emergency model in which the government’s main aim is to create an emergency regime without real threat. That was the case in Hungary before 2020, but as the new coronavirus flourished the Hungarian constitutionalism and the rule of law withered. As the article asserts the declaration of the state of danger was unconstitutional because human epidemic is not involved in the listing of the constitution. The constitutional concerns have become even more complicated after the acceptance of the “Enabling Act” which gave unconstrained power for the Government. The spirit of Carl Schmitt’s theory is again emerged. As the coronavirus and its immediate effect necessitated extra-legal measures, the threshold between the rule of law and exceptionalism was fading swiftly and legal constitutionalism became a pleasant memory.

Verfassungsblog, 2021

A year ago, the first lockdowns were introduced in Europe. Since then, European governments have been busy introducing Covid-19 containment measures, including social distancing rules and mask mandates. For two months, they have been vaccinating the people. Ostensibly, the EU countries have taken similar steps. This piece provides a sketch of how the Hungarian government has handled the pandemic.

Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Brussels's Blog, 2020

The recent introduction of the Enabling Act in Hungary has been interpreted by some as a sudden authoritarian turn, designed to meet the unique challenges of the coronavirus outbreak. But, argues Attila Antal, Victor Orbán’s government has merely used the crisis as an opportunity to build on an existing project of neoliberal autocracy, with a view towards the consolidation of power in the post-pandemic world. https://www.brexitblog-rosalux.eu/2020/04/07/orbans-enabling-act-ruling-the-post-pandemic-world/

The Theory and Practice of Legislation, 2020

Hungary and Poland have started their illiberal remodelling in 2010 and 2015 respectively. Both governments routinely apply the illiberal version of the Rule of Law (illiberal legality), which involves that every situation has the potential to be exploited for political gain. Both states opportunistically apply their constitutions and selectively invoke favourable constitutional provisions. And yet, this paper claims that the Hungarian Fundamental Law and the Polish Constitution are equipped with adequate emergency measures to provide for a proper framework for emergency legislation. In illiberal emergency constitutionalism, Hungary uses and abuses its Fundamental Law, while Poland is disregarding its binding 1997 Constitution and, at the same time, creates its new invisible illiberal constitution. This paper explores how it is done during the current human pandemic crisis by focusing on, first, the emergency regimes the constitutions provide for and their (non-)application. Second, it compares the operation of the parliaments as the Sejm chaotically passes crisis management related omnibus legislation and amendments on the presidential election during the extra-constitutional 'state of epidemic'. The Hungarian Parliament operates under the 'danger of crisis'. Yet, it still delivers regular legislative activities, as the emergency 'legislation' is done through governmental decree as per the Coronavirus Act 2020, which is unconstitutional. These phenomena necessitate an in-depth inquiry about the nature, form, and content of the Hungarian and Polish emergency legislation and governmental decrees. It is concluded that, under normal circumstances, the Hungarian and Polish constitutional measures set for guiding the authorities in emergencies are adequate. In the current political and constitutional setting and COVID-19 crisis, the form and the content of some essential Hungarian and Polish emergency measures stay below standards. It is a further warning sign for the European community to take Hungarian and Poland illiberal constitutionalism seriously. Their pushing the envelope will not end by itself.

MTA Law Working Papers https://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp/hungarian-abuse-of-constitutional-emergency-regimes-also-in-the-light-of-the-covid-19-crisis, 2020

This paper belongs to a wider project I have been conducting with Professor Agnieszka Bień-Kacała on illiberal constitutionalism. Therefore, this paper has two distinct but interrelated and unevenly discussed focuses: how the emergency power can be abused even in a constitutionally well-equipped emergency regime (primary focus), and whether the actual abuse and misuse of these powers have effectuated any changes in Hungarian illiberal constitutionalism until 30 April 2020 (consequential result). The constitutions of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, including the Hungarian Fundamental Law, exemplify a judicial or constitutional model for emergencies and emergency powers. This paper claims that Hungary could exemplify how to be constitutionally well equipped to deal with emergencies and still able to abuse them. It concludes that the abuse and misuse of constitutional emergency regimes, in Hungary, have two layers: the actual abuse of emergency powers, be those extra-constitutional (the "crisis situation caused by mass migration" since 2015) or (partially) non-constitutional (COVID-19 crisis, 2020), and the abusive regulation of emergencies and powers (2015, 2016, 2020) by bypassing constitutional procedures and resorting to secrecy, including the non-transparency of decisions and vague drafting. The paper holds the view that-as long as we do not see what the Government does at the end of the COVID-19 crisis and how all the emergency measures and other illiberal actions taken in and before 2020 add up-Hungary continues with its illiberal constitutionalism.

Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 2023

This paper aims to examine the manifestations and abuses of the exceptionalist legal order in Hungary during the period of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the refugee crisis of 2015, the Orbán regime has been using the instruments of exceptional governance in a continuous way, which has become more and more pronounced in the context of the crises of recent years, especially the COVID-19 pandemic. In this paper, the author first presents the literature on the state of exception and its use by authoritarian populist regimes. Then, the author will discuss how the Orbán regime employs the tools of exceptional governance in an authoritarian manner, with a particular focus on how the tools of exceptional governance have become part of the constitutional structure. Finally, the author will explain the risks and anti-democratic dangers of the use of extraordinary measures of governance without checks and balances.

2021

The Hungarian government's crisis management fit well the illiberal logic of the current regime. It was characterized by strong leadership of Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán who personally controlled the first wave of fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. His unquestionable leadership was further reinforced by a controversial law that provoked intense internal and international criticism. These criticisms were used by the progovernment camp to present that the government and PM struggle for the safety of Hungarian people is under constant political attack of the liberal and global enemies of the regime. During the crisis similar discursive strategies were used as usual in Hungarian politics: the threat of immigration, the decline of the Western world and the EU, the adversarial role of George Soros, the Hungarian opposition, the media and the international liberal mainstream, and the effectiveness of nation-states were recurring topics during the crisis. Overall, the country was less affected by the virus, and according to the polls people positively evaluate the crisis management.