Introduction: The BRICS in Global and Regional Governance

Chapter 1 Introduction: The BRICS in Global and Regional Governance Stephen Kingah and Cintia Quiliconi Leaving aside their differences and the problem to categorize them as a group, there is little question that BRICS are increasingly seen as key actors in the international system (Mansfield 2014), thus there is an important space in the international political economy debate to analyse the meaning of the rise of these countries for their regions and the international system. Systematic studies of the role of the BRICS at the global and regional levels are still scarce, however the debate has been clearly divided in two camps. On one hand, a group considers the rise of BRICS as a challenge to the current US hegemonic driven order; leading to political and economic instability. On the other hand, another group considers that the US hegemonic power is still alive given that BRICS face important domestic challenges, need to build trust in their group and many of their members are reluctant to lead in global affairs (Donno and Rudra 2014). This book addresses some of these debates opening up the role of each of the BRICS countries at the global and regional levels and also exploring the potential for their projection as a group in international and regional organizations in light of the challenges they face. The book is the fruit of the research carried out under the project on Global Re-ordering: Evolution through European Networks (GR:EEN), that was undertaken under the Framework Program 7 of the European Union (EU). Within the S. Kingah (*) Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies, United Nations University (UNU-CRIS), Bruges, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] C. Quiliconi Department of International Relations, FLACSO Argentina, Buenos Aires, Argentina FLACSO Ecuador, Quito, Ecuador e-mail: [email protected] © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 S. Kingah, C. Quiliconi (eds.), Global and Regional Leadership of BRICS Countries, United Nations University Series on Regionalism 11, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-22972-0_1 1 2 S. Kingah and C. Quiliconi GR:EEN work package on regional leadership the United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS); the Latin American School of Social Sciences – (FLACSO/Argentina) and the University of Cape Town were in charge of this task. The three institutions decided to bring together scholars who could focus on a constellation of countries that are not only regarded as regional leaders in their respective regions but also that aspire to global leadership in spite of the fact that global reach is hard and regional action appears in some cases more realistic (Mearsheimer 2010, pp. 387–388). In selecting Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) we decided to take a risk in assessing and road testing the usefulness of the category. That is partly why we went for a diversity of authors the majority of whom are from or working in the BRICS. It also explains why we selected the option of open themes in the chapters albeit with a sharper emphasis on economic and security issues and global and regional projection of each of these emerging powers. This choice amply captures the complexity and diversity of the BRICS’ leadership in their various regions and beyond. Given the EU’s interest in these new actors we include some policy insights for future engagement in the final conclusions in Chap. 14. Much has been rehearsed about the growing influence of BRICS in shaping regional and global governance. Given their moniker as status challengers it is understandable that their assertiveness on many global issues is often accompanied by fervour in many quarters. They all gained international attention simultaneously as they recorded good economic performance (Lin Yueqin 2010). But there are many reasons to reconsider the robustness and cohesion of the group as a joint economic or political entity. Beyond the growth and economic benchmarks used to categorize them (Osang 2012, p. 520), it is argued that little else holds them together (Armijo 2007; The Economist 2008). There are actually strong historical, strategic, geographical, cultural and even economic reasons why the BRICS will face many tests as a unit of inquiry. Even the very economic premise used to justify the club, is increasingly strained (Sharma 2013). However as a political platform of countries keen to revise the current status quo of international governance, it opens up fascinating lines of investigation. Beyond the resources which they have (Krueger 2012, p. 450) they all strongly believe, as Hurrell argues that they are entitled to a more influential role in world affairs even as they share a sense of uncertainty and vulnerability (Hurrell 2006, pp. 2 and 18). For actors such as the European Union having such a platform is useful. Given the fast changing scope of international affairs especially in light of the actions of Russia in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, it is important to have avenues through which dialogue with BRICS countries such as Russia may be conducted in a more multilateral fashion. If the other emerging countries within the block especially China can use good offices within the loose alliance to encourage constructive dialogue with Moscow then it could be foolhardy to dismiss the utility of the platform. Yet, it is unsettling to embrace such an assumption without question. The BRICS are increasingly defined less by similarities as they are by a fleeting sense of disconnect between them and the tools needed to achieve what they hope for mindful of the challenges they face in terms of inequalities and lack of innovation (Beausang 1 Introduction: The BRICS in Global and Regional Governance 3 2012, p. 9). It is true that in the past decade they have made strides in terms of economic growth (O’Neill 2001, 2013). But there are also many countries that have grown economically and even demographically that are not included in the BRICS fold but are considered as emerging markets or rising powers and have in some cases even better prospects than BRICS. Stretching this further, there are actually strong indications that the high levels of growth that have heretofore characterized them could be waning (Sharma 2013). It appears that as the years go by, experiences and events only provide corroboration as to how wanting and unhelpful the BRICS are as a unit of analysis (Armijo 2007). Beyond intellectual excitement about a loose coalition of emerging markets designed for strictly corporate conveniences (Zoellick 2010) it seems baffling why they have garnered such interest. In a sense, this fervour about their role and collaboration could be attributed to the nature of the entity that first came up with the idea and also to a quest by many around the world to see a major upset in a current global architecture bereft of novelties. Citizens are keen to see a renewal in the institutions that sanction national and international rules. It is no secret that developing such institutions is a boring, tedious and protracted exercise. Forging stopgap outfits such as the loose BRICS has the allure of a cheap cop-out. Beyond the excitement, will it last? 1.1 Strategic Interest and Willingness The internal politics within each of the BRICS is a key factor in understanding how these countries will position themselves in the foreseeable future. In Brazil led by Dilma Rousseff from the Workers’ Party, the government has realized not even the politics of soccer has gone unscathed by the anger of the streets. What appears patent in Brazilian political landscape is that the challenges faced domestically by the rulers to ensure growth and social mobility seems to be dwarfed by a strong willingness by the country to be seen by the outside world as a player that matters. It is keen to project its desires in this respect by claiming and assuming leadership in such forums as the World Trade Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization and even within the World Bank. But this external projection of power globally that is also corroborated by the reach of Brazilian infrastructure money in South America as well as the desire of its companies to widen their investments around the world stand in contrast to economic problems faced by the economically vulnerable within Brazil. This picture of paradoxes is unlikely to change soon but is setting Rouseff in an uncomfortable situation that cast a shadow of doubt about her capacity to rally the country in her second term of office. The outreach to the BRICS will remain a key plank of the policy of the government. This will continue to be the case as it accords Brazil a unique platform where it can assume a self-appointed role as the mouthpiece of nations of South America. Of all the BRICS, the wildcat is Russia. Unlike the others, Russia is more industrialized and is not from the traditional ‘South.’ This makes its position within the BRICS fold awkward. Russia is a former empire ruled by an individual who looks 4 S. Kingah and C. Quiliconi back to the era of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) with great nostalgia. And so, this fervour for Mother Russia has now found expression through the full embrace of the Karaganov doctrine, which estimates that treatment and sentiments of ethnic Russians living in Russia’s neighbouring countries (‘near abroad’) should serve as legitimate justification for Russian expansion. Russia takes its BRICS partners seriously especially as its ambitions are now flying at crosspurposes with the West’s. In a way President Putin increasingly finds the BRICS fold as a comfort zone in which he can find support in hard times. What stands out in Russia’s approach moving forward, which is leaving many worried, is not only its operational ambiguity but its strategic unpredictability. With very high poll number at home, President Putin is under no pressure to change course. The election of Narendra Modi in May 2014 may well be a landmark in India’s history. The former First Minister of Gujarat has a reputation as a Hindu nationalist and efficient business loving enforcer who is poised to lead India into the path of sustained growth. What remains unclear is how he will engage with the outside world, especially Pakistan and the United States (US). A strategic decision adopted in New Delhi has been to be deliberately ambiguous about the discourse on India’s rise. However, as the US pulls out of Afghanistan and as Premier Nawaz Shariff makes greater overtures to India, it would be hard to predict a stagnant foreign policy for India under Modi. The country’s approach to the BRICS will not change overnight and the engagement will continue with a focus on pragmatism. The nature of the landslide victory that brought Modi to power while thumping Congress speaks to the powerful mandate he has to steer the country toward a fundamentally different path. More than anything else, India’s policies could to be sharper and clearer. The virtues of clarity and sharpness are at the heart of the Chinese Communist Party (CPP) machinery. President Xi has been keen in his first term to focus on addressing corruption domestically. Foreign policy and defence are now firmly in his grip. Three major issues, that are unsettling even for party chiefs in Beijing, include the disputes with neighbours in the South China Sea; currency wars and above all the row with the US over the stealing US trade secrets. These are very sensitive issues and President Xi and CCP leadership will be keen to make sure that China remains on top of these issues and that the US is kept at bay and off its ambitions of being the triton in the Asia-Pacific. It will not be surprising that Beijing increasingly uses the BRICS platform to garner support for its positions on these issues. The gas deal worth $400 billion US dollars sealed with Russia in 2014 is a sign of things to come. The re-election of President Jacob Zuma in South Africa was predicted. However, the support for his African National Congress was dented by a strong performance of the Opposition Democratic Alliance and the new rookies: the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) of Julius Malema. The country’s posture toward the BRICS will not change. ANC leaders lobbied hard to join the club and they would continue on this path of selling the brand image of the country as a rising power from Africa. Nevertheless, internal challenges to Zuma, especially related to mismanagement of 1 Introduction: The BRICS in Global and Regional Governance 5 public funds and the rise of Nigeria as Africa’s number one economy, may dilute the allure of Tshwane. 1.2 Historical and Emotive Disjoint In the discussions on global governance, it is often hard to conduct a serious debate without acknowledging the elephant in the room: The United States. The historical ties between the US and every region and country of the world are evident and this factor partly explains the depth of the influence that the US has in every country and region of the world (Krauthammer 1990; cf: Huntington 1999, p. 40). None of the BRICS matches such gravitas. This speaks to the crucial aspect of legitimacy or acceptance of the actions of given actors at the regional and global levels. Even if Russia, China and their BRICS counterparts may complain about the dominance of the US and its liberal model of economic and political dealings, they are all part of the liberal loop and find it hard to delink themselves from the sheer ubiquity and influence of the liberal and capitalist models that make up the bedrocks of modern political economy (Ikenberry 2008). During the Cold War era Russia (as the USSR) could stake a claim in this respect. But with the ushering of Glasnost and Perestroika under Gorbachev and the subsequent collapse of the USSR emotive and historical bonds have since waned. This has in no small measure been attributed to the role of the European Union and its expansion into the Kremlin’s sphere of influence. With the consecutive enlargements of the Union, Russia has been consistently brought closer to the EU’s borders. For the nostalgic such as those occupying the Kremlin today, Moscow would do all in its powers to resist this silent revolution. That is why the sensitivities surrounding Crimea and the fate of Eastern Ukraine should be taken seriously. The battle for Ukraine is just starting and Russia is determined to resist further incursions (EU and especially NATO enlargements) into its sphere of influence. The acceptance of this approach from Moscow is hardly catholic amongst neighbours. There are resistant forces in Kiev and even in Georgia (previous victim of direct Russian assertiveness). The real issue for Russia is whether its renewed claim to empire would have resonance beyond the Caucasus, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The separatist movements within Russia itself present very sensitive questions regarding Moscow’s leadership. Its writ may reign in Sevastopol and may be Donetsk, but overreach in Kiev would be fiercely resisted. These actions also risk being considered power mongering beyond Russia’s own immediate neighbourhood. Amongst the BRICS the only countries with strong claims to global historical coherence and influence that come tangentially close to what the US currently enjoys regionally and globally are China and India. Brazil has had historical influences in Europe and Africa but not so in Asia. South Africa has also not had any strong historical links to Asia or the Middle East. There have been some links with the Americas but its ties are much more developed with Europe. India and China are 6 S. Kingah and C. Quiliconi custodians of very deep and rich traditions and civilizations that have had ripple effects in every region of the world. While some may contend that the events in the Crimea and the willingness of Russia to overtly challenge the West in Ukraine show that Moscow is poised to prefer a broader revisionist alternative to what is now on offer, it is a fallacy. To begin, there are few nations that stand in support of the approach of the Kremlin to regain pieces of the former USSR. As difficult as the choices over Ukraine are, it cannot serve as ample indicator that Russia or its BRICS partners are poised to offer a grand alternative in terms of the ideological moorings for global economic and political relations. 1.3 The Road Map The contribution by Van Langenhove, Zwartjes and Papanagnou provides an understanding of regional leadership, which is based on the constructivist paradigm of positioning theory. They sketch three main determinants of regional leadership: willingness, capacity and acceptance. For them, regional leadership entails ‘the capacity to influence the policy vision of fellow states so that they adopt, to varying degrees, the preferences of the regional leader.’ What is vital for them, as it was for Gramsci, is leadership as leading the formation of common goals and processes of collective institution building irrespective of underlying economic structures. They argue that by leaning on positioning theory one can better understand how leadership functions by looking at speech acts, positions and storylines crafted around and by leaders: ‘Being positioned in a certain way,’ they posit, ‘carries obligations or expectations about how to behave.’ Their framework that assesses capacity, willingness and acceptance of BRICS in terms of their leadership at the regional and global levels has been used as a guiding structure for the chapters in this book. Quiliconi, Saguier and Tussie in Chap. 3 paint a canvass of changing global and regional orders and the role that the BRICS are playing in these. A vital point raised in their chapter is that the rise of this first tier of developing countries places them in an objectively distinct analytical category from the bunch of other developing states. They show how internal politics (dynamics of inclusion and exclusion) and challenges in the BRICS themselves have shaped their external outlooks and preferences. They indicate how the more assertive positions adopted by the BRICS, such as the move to forge a BRICS Development Bank, are a direct response to the timid efforts in reforming global economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The decision by the BRICS to create a Contingent Reserve Agreement to pool reserves is also to be read in this light. All the BRICS are developing unique ways to respond to critical infrastructure needs in developing countries and are also increasingly assertive on globally relevant security matters such as the Syrian crisis. They hint on the durability of the BRICS as an entity noting that: ‘As power shifts and as interests of the new players evolve, so dominant patterns of institutionalization will automatically follow.’ For them, moving from a 1 Introduction: The BRICS in Global and Regional Governance 7 coordinating club to a full-scale mechanism for strategic interaction is the challenge for the BRICS. Sounding an important note that would be useful for the BRICS as they lay claim to global and regional leadership, they assert that leadership is also ‘about a project and a purpose for using given attributes and for pursuing preferences.’ Deciancio introduces us to the first dimension of BRICS leadership, which is that of Brazil at the global level. This is followed by Pinheiro and Gaio, who expose readers to the nature of Brazil’s regional leadership. In Chap. 4, Deciancio dwells on the manner in which the Lula Administration managed to strengthen its position as a regional leader through global governance channels. She contends that while Brazil’s neighbours took little issue with Brazil’s leadership in global forums, they have been less sanguine in Brazil’s forays to lead within the region of South America. While focusing on the global reach of Brazil she argues that this global activism by Brasilia is intrinsically linked to its role as a leader in South America. Pinheiro and Gaio examine Brazil’s leadership in South America. They take a more nuanced position from Deciancio’s arguing that the country has been more successful in inward regional leadership than outward (external) regional leadership. Instead of using its global and club diplomacy to enhance its regional leadership as opined by Deciancio, they argue that Brazil has sought to use club diplomacy as well as summitry in South America to enhance its global leadership role. They show how Brazilian companies are active in South America in major projects in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Venezuela. For them, despite the fact that its leadership on development in the region has been successful, this has not borne results in terms of allowing Brazil to use this leverage to represent the region at the global level. So Brazil’s political masters under Lula made a calculated decision to actually shun the region as a source of leverage for global ambitions. Rather to realize its global ambitions, it is leaning more on disparate clubs like IBSA and BRICS. In a unique manner, Chaps. 4 and 5 on Brazil reveal a useful tension. While there are some scholars who believe that Brazil’s foreign policy target is leadership in South America, others, especially those in Brazil, hold that their country is really aiming at global leadership. This tension is corroborative of the complex nature of Brazil’s new posture as a relevant actor both in South America and beyond. Chapters 6 and 7 shift gears to an actor whose recent actions within its region is having reverberations globally: Russia. In discussing Russia’s global leadership roles, Korobkov, Kingah and Jovic paint a canvass of some of the thorny themes that mark tensions between Russia and the West. They contend that for all the actors concerned both in Moscow and in the West, the real challenge is to find and build on those areas where there are shared interests albeit differing tactics of approach to common challenges. Such challenges include terrorism and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Moving forward, a critical component to make the ties work will be mutual respect underlain by a deeper sense of understanding of the actors’ strategic interests and how to accommodate these in a peaceful way. They assert that since the collapse of the Communist Bloc in 1989, the Russian Federation lacks an alternative moral narrative including a comprehensive coherent value set. The chapter by Molchanov moves from the global considerations of Russia’s lead- 8 S. Kingah and C. Quiliconi ership and refocuses the discussions on Russia within a regional context. Ties between Russia and its immediate neighbours are not easy to qualify as they swerve between a deep sense of suspicion and cooperation. He notes that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) for one has gone through many turbulent times with some questioning its relevance. However, it has served specific functional ends and Moscow is keen to maintain the CIS because its leadership in the grouping further fortifies the Kremlin’s strategic primacy in the former Soviet space. However, Russia’s leadership in Eurasia is also contested especially as Beijing’s interest in the region has grown. Within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) they effectively compete within an institutionally confined boundary. He notes that in recent events between Russia and Ukraine, it is clear that the country is willing to maintain a tight grip in its sphere of influence. But acceptance is more difficult and many young people, especially those below 25 years in neighbouring countries, see no reason for deferring to Moscow on key issues mindful that they have no re-collection of the historical significance of the USSR. It appears that smaller states are keen on using regional integration more as a balancing tool against Russia. But its neighbours seem to have accepted the Crimean annexation as a fait accompli. On capacity, Russia has the ability as the fifth largest economy and it will be in its own interest to use this capability to build a long-lasting relationship with its regional neighbours that is based on trust. In Chap. 8, Robanni starts off the discussions on the world’s largest democracy (India) by expatiating on why India matters at the global level. He argues that contrary to the perceived view that India is reluctant to lead, it has actually been a leader within the South and not just only in South Asia. While it is accepted and respected for its economic performance, many security issues constitute a dent in the expectations that many harbour for India as a global leader. In Chap. 9, Tripathi reveals how India’s policy in South Asia has evolved from cautious reticence to deliberate engagement. The sinews of this new approach hark back to the Gujral Doctrine postulating the need for India to act benevolently towards its neighbours on nonreciprocal basis that benefit the smaller states. The author specifically considers the complex relationships between India and each of its neighbours in South Asia. The complicated tapestry of relations ranges from strategic volatility (with Pakistan) to cordial engagement (with Bhutan). However, for him, the real litmus test for India’s regional leadership would be for India to work toward a peaceful Afghanistan without getting into a strategic dogfight with Pakistan. Mark Beeson and Xu take on the global leadership of China. In Chap. 10, they argue that while China’s leaders clearly have the willingness to play a more prominent international role, their ability to act or even lead is constrained by both domestic capacity hurdles and the reluctance of others especially its neighbours to accept Chinese leadership. The latter dimension of its acceptance conundrum is amply corroborated by China’s approach toward unsolved maritime disputes and responses from neighbours. Besides contrasting the softness of China’s and US’ power and leadership realities at the global level they tease out the implications of the complex nature of China’s foreign policy making process that renders it more contested and less focused. This has serious fallout on key foreign policy issues 1 Introduction: The BRICS in Global and Regional Governance 9 such as the South China Sea dispute with policies that appear uncoordinated, unpredictable and ad hoc. In Chap. 11, Wang Yong postulates that in East Asia China easily serves in many cases for some countries as a convenient pretext for those states to justify a fortification of military build-up in the region. He discusses the power relations between China and its neighbours in a context where the US is keen to refocus on Asia-Pacific. One approach China has used to retain a foothold in its region has been to develop closer ties with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) even as relations with specific ASEAN nations have varied. He shows how China’s regional ambitions are rendered complicated by the alliance especially between Japan and the US. For him, the cost of non-cooperation between Japan and China is very high for actors with a stake in East Asia. He asserts that unlike the protector, which many believe the US to be in East Asia that it is actually a shrewd balancer, which is keen to use its strategic partners in the region to tame China’s rise. In Chap. 12, Kingah and degli Uberti consider the global aspirations of South Africa as a leader. They note that South Africa has the potential to be an important country within Africa and at the global stage. However, the lack of a commonly defined coherent and clear grand strategy means that there are serious lapses in terms of ambition, credibility and capabilities for South Africa to fully live up to the expectations to which it is often associated. The chapter discusses some of the challenges that have hampered the definition and realization of a South African grand strategy: a strategy that marshals hard, soft and smart leadership capabilities to secure South African interests. They argue that while South Africa has important traits that reveal willingness, acceptance and capacity of its role as a global actor, important challenges make it difficult for the country to amply craft and implement such a grand strategy. Overcoming these challenges will not be easy in a postMandela era. However, it is contended that there are important steps which political masters in Tshwane/Pretoria can embrace and pursue in order to engineer and aggressively apply a grand strategy that goes beyond the diplomacy of solidarity to include a deliberate and calculated promotion of democratic ideals, global health diplomacy, disarmament including denuclearization and contributions in the realm of reconciliation and justice in post-traumatic societies. Soko and Balchin in Chap. 13 look at South Africa from a regional prism. They contend that although South Africa is willing to act as a leader in Africa and has the political and diplomatic means as well as economic capacity to do as much, its dominance in Africa is not only contested but is also incomplete. Acceptance of South Africa’s status as a leader on the African continent is by no means catholic, especially outside of the immediate Southern African sub-region. In certain cases, as shown in this chapter as well as in the case of Brazil, regional disciplines might actually serve as constraints to a specific hegemon’s global leadership ambitions. In sum, the chapters offer a varied analysis about how BRICS leadership is unfolding in their own regions and at the global level. Until recently, most studies on the power dimension of regional leadership and governance focused on the power of the US in each corresponding region (Nolte 2011). This book proposes a new analytical scheme to analyse regional powers in their global and regional 10 S. Kingah and C. Quiliconi dimensions, keeping in mind that the US still plays a vital role in regional orders, the book places BRICS at the centre of the analysis of each of their regions assessing their willingness, capacity and acceptance to exercise their leadership. References Armijo, L. E. (2007). The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries as analytical category: Mirage or insight? Asian Perspective, 31(4), 7–42. Beausang, F. (2012). Globalization and the BRICs: Why the BRICs will not rule the world for long. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Donno, D., & Rudra, N. (2014). To fear or not to fear? BRICs and the developing world. International Studies Review, 16, 447–452. Huntington, S. P. (1999). The lonely superpower. Foreign Affairs, 78(2), 35–49. Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: What space for would-be great powers? International Affairs, 82(1), 1–19. Ikenberry, G. J. (2008). The rise of China and the future of the West: Can the liberal system survive? Foreign Affairs, 87, 23–37. Krauthammer, C. (1990). The unipolar moment. Foreign Affairs, 70(1), 23–33. Krueger, A. (2012). The rise of the emerging markets. Law and Business Review of the Americas, 118, 445–454. Lin Yueqin (2010). The rise of emerging powers and the BRICs Chase to catch up. China Economist, 5(2). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1576932 Mansfield, E. (2014). Rising powers in the global economy: Issues and questions. International Studies Review, 16, 437–466. Mearsheimer, J. (2010). The gathering storm: China’s challenge to US power in Asia. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3, 381–396. Nolte, D. (2011). Regional powers and regional governance. In N. Godehart & D. Nabers (Eds.), Regional powers and regional orders. New York: Routledge. O’Neill, J. (2001). Building better global economic BRICs. Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, 66. (30th Nov). http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/ build-better-brics.pdf O’Neill, J. (2013). The growth map: Economic opportunity in the BRICs and beyond. Milton Keynes: Penguin. Osang, T. (2012). World trade and investment: Where do the BRICs stand? Law and Business Review of the Americas, 118, 515–536. Sharma, R. (2013). Breakout nations. New York: Norton. The Economist (2008). Another brick in the wall: The perils of overestimating emerging markets. The Economist, 21st Aug. Zoellick, R. B. (2010). The end of the third World? Modernizing multilateralism for a multipolar world. Law and Business Review of the Americas, 16, 371–381. Stephen Kingah is research fellow at the United Nations University (Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies, UNU-CRIS), in Bruges. He holds a PhD in law from the Free University of Brussels (VUB). Following his PhD studies he worked as ad hoc administrator in the European Commission charged with the European Union’s relations par rapport international financial institutions, with emphasis on the World Bank and the African Development Bank. He lectures in the governance program at the University of Maastricht. Stephen has published in many periodicals including the International and Comparative Law Quarterly, International Organizations Law Review, European Foreign Affairs Review, Proceedings of the American Society 1 Introduction: The BRICS in Global and Regional Governance 11 of International Law, South African Journal of International Affairs, European Law Journal, World Bank Legal Review, amongst others. Cintia Quiliconi has a PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Southern California; an M.A. in Politics from New York University and a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Buenos Aires. She is research fellow at the Argentine National Council of Scientific and Technical Research based at the Department of International Relations, FLACSO-Argentina. She is also a professor at the Department of International Studies and Communication at FLACSOEcuador. She has been consultant to various international organizations such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations Development Program. She was Program Co-Chair of the FLACSO-International Studies Association (ISA) joint conference 2014 in Buenos Aires. Her research interests include international political economy and development, trade negotiations and agreements, regionalism and regional powers in Latin America and, EU and U.S.-Latin American economic relations.