ACEH'S SURPRISING ELECTION RESULTS

No Need for Panic: Planned and Unplanned Releases of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia ©2013 IPAC ACEH’S SURPRISING ELECTION RESULTS 30 April 2014 IPAC Report No.10 A c ont e nts I. Overview ......................................................................................................... 1 II. he Results ...................................................................................................... 2 A. Dissatisfaction with Partai Aceh ........................................................ 2 B. NasDem’s Strength............................................................................... 3 C. PNA’s Disarray ..................................................................................... 3 D. Gerindra’s Weakness ........................................................................... 4 E. he ALA-ABAS Areas ......................................................................... 4 III. he Election Process ...................................................................................... 5 IV. Issues in the DPRA ........................................................................................ 6 V. he Presidential Election .............................................................................. 7 IV. Conclusions .................................................................................................... 8 Appendix A Election Results 2014 .................................................................................... 9 Appendix B National Election Commission Map of Voting Areas in Aceh .............12 Aceh’s Surprising Election Results ©2014 IPAC I. 1 OVERVIEW he 9 April 2014 legislative elections in Aceh produced three surprises. First, voters sent a strong message of displeasure to the ruling Partai Aceh (PA), the party controlled by leaders of the former rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). PA still came out on top but with signiicantly reduced percentages in its east coast strongholds. Second, its major competition came not from a rival GAM-led local party but from national parties, particularly the newcomer NasDem. And third, despite its alliance with PA, Gerindra, the party of Prabowo Subianto, proved weaker than expected. In the provincial legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh, DPRA), Partai Aceh dropped from 33 out of 69 seats to 29 out of 81 seats, or a drop from 47.8 per cent to just under 36 per cent. he drop was particularly striking given the party’s perceived control over the electoral machinery and widespread allegations of fraud in the counting process—factors that many Acehnese saw as more important than the violence that marred the campaign period. Partai Aceh’s most serious opponent proved not to be the local Partai Nasional Aceh, as expected, but national parties. NasDem made a particularly strong showing, beneiting from being fresh and untainted by previous involvement in government. It also had good candidates, lots of money, and an Acehnese at the top, media magnate Surya Paloh. NasDem and Golkar each secured nine DPRA seats, while the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) received eight, up from ive in 2009. PNA only received three ater a poorly resourced and disorganised campaign, as well as intimidation of its supporters by PA sympathisers. Gerindra, the party of presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto, which entered into an alliance with Partai Aceh in 2013, did worse than expected, securing only two seats from Aceh in the national parliament. It had targeted six. In 2009, President Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat had a similar alliance with PA and won seven. here appears to be no enthusiasm in Aceh for Prabowo as president, but with Partai Aceh’s backing, he will almost certainly do better than Jakarta governor Jokowi in the July 2014 presidential contest, if not with the extraordinary numbers that Yudhoyono received in 2009—93.2 per cent of the vote. Jokowi’s Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDIP) is widely seen as hostile toward Aceh, since its leadership formally objected to several points of the 2005 Helsinki peace agreement. It does not help that the one PDIP leader elected to the national parliament in these elections, Tagore Abubakar, is known for his leadership of a movement that wants to carve a new province out of Aceh. hat said, Jokowi himself seems to have a reasonably positive image and could attract both voters who want a new face and those in the anyone-but-Prabowo camp. It could also help that he lived in Takengon, Central Aceh from 1985 to 1989 as a businessman and knows the province well. Women candidates did better this time at the provincial level, with three women elected from PA, as opposed to one in 2009, and the percentage of women in the DPRA rising from 7.25 per cent in 2009 to 14.8 per cent in 2014. he percentage of women elected to district councils was only 8.8 per cent. With PA’s reduced but still strong showing, its leaders could go one of two ways over the next ive years. hey could take this vote as a warning that voters want change and work more seriously to improve social services, protect forests, clean up corruption, end extortion and generally improve governance. Alternatively, they could see it as a reminder that this may be their last chance for serious rent-seeking and exploit it to the fullest. If they want re-election in 2019, they should choose the irst. 2 Aceh’s Surprising Election Results ©2014 IPAC II. THE RESULTS Several aspects of the 2014 election need explanation: PA’s decline but ultimate victory; the surprisingly strong showing of several national parties, not including Gerindra; and the poor performance of PNA. Despite a major campaign efort, PA does not seem to have made signiicant inroads in the non-Acehnese areas of the central highlands and southwestern parts of the province. A. Dissatisfaction with Partai Aceh Disappointment with PA’s performance in oice is the most potent explanation for its decline. It should have done better. It had a grassroots-based political structure that no party could rival.1 It had far more resources that other parties, even according to oicial campaign inance reports.2 Its cadres had no hesitation about using intimidation and violence to warn other parties of— PNA in particular—even though everyone interviewed for this report agreed that PA’s machine would have ensured a victory even without such tactics. It was involved in the selection of poll workers at every level up to and including the Independent Election Commission (Komisi Independen Pemilu, KIP) in Banda Aceh, whose members had to be approved by PA-dominated Commission A in the provincial assembly. Said PNA leader Irwansyah: he bodies responsible for implementing the election—from KIP Aceh to the subdistrict election committees to the lowest-level counting committees—were formed by the ruling party and some are clearly members and supporters of that party.3 But ive years in power have not brought much tangible improvement to the lives of ordinary Acehnese, poverty remains endemic, and corruption is rife, as is extortion by former GAM commanders of local businesses and public works projects. he PA-dominated provincial assembly has come in for particular criticism, producing only 47 local regulations or qanun in ive years (as opposed to 107 in the irst post-Soeharto assembly) while allocating huge sums for its own activities.4 Pork-barrel projects to build schools have produced a surfeit of buildings, but teacher competence remains low and of all provinces in the country, Aceh has the highest rate of failure on the national elementary and high school exams. It is the fourth largest spender on healthcare in the country, but maternal mortality actually rose from 2011 to 2012.5 Funding for building of roads and other infrastructure projects has been concentrated in the areas where PA control is strongest—and where PA-ailiated former GAM commanders routinely secure lucrative construction contracts.6 Governance remains poor, and in interview ater interview, Acehnese spoke of PA’s unfulilled promises. Even PA members themselves portrayed the government as dysfunctional. Governor Zaini Abdullah, now 76, is seen as decent but weak, a poor manager who has systematically replaced the top echelons of the civil service with PA loyalists rather than professionals. He reportedly has strained relations with deputy governor Muzakkir Manaf who as former GAM military 1 2 3 4 5 6 For background on how Partai Aceh came to power, see the series of reports produced on Aceh by the International Crisis Group between 2005 and 2013. All are available online at www.crisisgroup.org. According to oicial 2014 inance reports posted at the KIP oice in Banda Aceh, PA received Rp.9,311,960,300 ($800,828) from its candidates. Its closest competitor was Golkar with Rp.7,937,587,694 ($682,632) from its candidates. PNA, by contrast, reported receipts of only Rp.606 million ($52,116). In addition to candidate contributions, PA reported corporate contributions totalling another $800,000 from several companies: PT Putra Seinar Desa, PT Sinar Pusaka, PT Beuna Setiakawan Anda, PT Sinar Harapan Kuala, PT Keluarga Mangat Sabee, PT Rizki Rezi Umama, and Grand Transit Hotel. “PNA tolak pemilu legislatif di Aceh,” bbc.co.uk, 24 April 2014. “Otsus Pendidikan Sedikit Untuk Peningkatan Mutu”, belanjapublikaceh.org, 6 September 2013; “Aceh Peringkat Pertama Tidak Lulus Ujian Nasional”, tvri.co.id, 24 May 2013. “Bidan Cukup, Kematian Ibu Masih Tinggi”, belanjapublikaceh.org, 27 August 2013. “Dana Otsus dan Kondisi Jalan: Belum Sesuai Kebutuhan”, belanjapublikaceh.org, 4 September 2013. Aceh’s Surprising Election Results ©2014 IPAC 3 commander and current head of the party has more authority over the party rank and ile. Muzakkir also serves as head of the Aceh Transition Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh, KPA), the post-conlict incarnation of the old GAM military structure, which forms an important part of PA’s political machine down to the village level. Muzakkir himself is said to struggle to keep KPA members and other former subordinates under control as resources available at the district level have enabled the creation of local power bases with a high degree of independence – and GAM was always a very decentralised organisation. Nevertheless, PA can still draw on the residual loyalty of many Acehnese, who see its leaders as having ended the conlict that brought them such misery. One PA member rejected discontent as the reason for her party’s decline. She said the amount of money and other goods being doled out by candidates was so great that it inluenced votes. She said she had urged her aunt to vote for PA but her aunt had just accepted a sarong from the National Mandate Party (PAN) and said, “I couldn’t not vote for them now, it wouldn’t be right.” She said in urban areas, people took the blandishments ofered and voted the way they wanted to, but it was diferent in rural areas: if you took a git, you were obliged to reciprocate.7 B. NasDem’s Strength Of the national parties, the newcomer NasDem made a surprisingly strong showing in its irst electoral test in Aceh, securing nine seats, enough to have its own bloc and thus control over at least one legislative committee in the DPRA. Its biggest selling point was that it was new. he Acehnese, like other Indonesians, like to give new faces a chance, hoping that they will turn out to be less venal and more professional than their predecessors. he party attracted good people as candidates, many of them young professionals but also many older community leaders who were already well-known locally. Some deserted other national parties to join but NasDem also attracted voters who wanted to register disafection with PA and who saw Partai Nasional Aceh as more of the same, another party under GAM leadership, only with fewer resources and less clout.8 NasDem also had unassailable “Acehnese-ness”. It was founded in Jakarta in 2011 by Acehnese media tycoon Surya Paloh, owner of Metro TV and the newspaper Media Indonesia. Its slogan in Aceh was “Time for Aceh to lead Indonesia”, an idea that appealed to local pride while at the same time embracing the country as a whole. Not surprisingly, its media campaign was polished, and its posters were everywhere. It also had the advantage of being No.1 in the list of parties on the ballot. NasDem lirted briely with the idea of an alliance with PNA against PA, but in the end went its own way. In addition to the nine seats in the DPRA, it secured 58 in local district councils (DPRK), including ive in Pidie, a PA stronghold; ive in Aceh Besar; and four each in Banda Aceh, Pidie Jaya, Aceh Utara and Aceh Tengah. It also is sending two representatives to the national parliament. C. PNA’s Disarray he other surprise was how poorly PNA performed. Created ater the 2012 gubernatorial elections by defeated candidate and former governor Irwandi Yusuf, many thought it would collect the anti-PA vote. he intra-GAM rivalry between Irwandi and the old leadership-in-exile, now represented by PA, goes back more than a decade and reached a climax in 2011-2012 when PA decided not only not to endorse Irwandi’s bid for a second term as governor but tried to actively 7 8 IPAC interview, PA member, Banda Aceh, 23 April 2014. IPAC interview, NasDem oicial, Banda Aceh, 24 April 2014. 4 Aceh’s Surprising Election Results ©2014 IPAC prevent him from standing at all. Eventually he did stand as a non-party candidate and lost decisively to the PA slate of Zaini Abdullah and Muzakkir Manaf. he problems of that campaign foreshadowed PNA’s diiculties two years later. As one PNA oicial said about the party’s poor showing, “It was 50 per cent cheating [by PA] and 50 per cent us.” Despite welcoming many civil society activists into its ranks, it was never able to project a reformist image. Instead, many Acehnese saw it as “Irwandi’s party”, identifying it solely with the former governor, or as a party of disgruntled GAM commanders with the same ideology as PA. Irwandi himself did not put much time into it. In its messages, the party focused on the past rather than the future, reminding voters of the popular health insurance program known as JKA that Irwandi had initiated (its slogan was “Remember JKA, choose PNA”). But the program had not helped Irwandi win a second term and it was not enough now. Scarce resources were poorly deployed, with Rp.200 million (about $17,250) reportedly being spent on military-like uniforms for the party’s security unit at a time when candidates were scrambling to cover transportation expenses. he disorganisation and lack of planning that plagued Irwandi’s 2012 campaign were in evidence again. he party failed to make strategic use of its most attractive candidates and was marred by constant internal squabbling. Combined with the lack of a grassroots structure to compete with PA’s, these factors probably would have assured its defeat, even if there had been no violence and the election machinery had been completely neutral. D. Gerindra’s Weakness Gerindra partnered with Partai Aceh in the hopes of securing at least six seats in the national parliament and ensuring Prabowo Subianto’s victory in the July 2014 presidential election. As a local party, Partai Aceh cannot ield its own candidates for parliament, and therefore an alliance with a national party is crucial, especially when much uninished business remains in Jakarta implementing the 2005 Helsinki peace agreement. In 2009, when Partai Aceh allied with President Yudhoyno’s Partai Demokrat, the latter won seven seats. In 2014, Gerindra only won two. What went wrong? he most common explanation was that Gerindra remains totally identiied with Prabowo, Prabowo remains identiied with Kopassus (the army special forces) in Aceh, and Kopassus has a black reputation in Aceh for the abuses attributed to it during the conlict. In 2009, PA sources aid, Yudhoyono was genuinely popular and the PA rank-and-ile had no problem following their leaders’ instructions to vote for his Partai Demokrat. But the alliance with Prabowo is not only problematic at the grassroots level, it has also reportedly caused consternation and tensions within the Partai Aceh leadership. In March 2014, when Prabowo visited Lhokseumawe and asked Acehnese to forgive Kopassus for any “mistakes” of his subordinates during the conlict, some Acehnese said it would have been better if he had kept quiet; the apology only served to remind people of his Kopassus past.9 he biggest champion of the alliance within PA from the beginning has been Muzakkir Manaf, who serves as chair of Gerindra’s advisory board in Aceh. His major concern was ensuring that PA had enough inancial support from Prabowo and his family to run the 2014 campaign. In February 2014, he told thousands of party cadres, “Prabowo Subianto as head of Gerindra has helped Partai Aceh in many ways, so now, for the national parliament, I’m asking you to help Gerindra.”10 Prabowo’s past was not the only reason that Gerindra failed to meet its goal. Muzakkir also seems to have unintentionally undercut support by reminding people that it was haram (forbidden) to vote for Gerindra at a local level, where PA was the only acceptable choice for district 9 10 IPAC interview, Acehnese legislative candidate, Banda Aceh, 23 April 2014. See also “Prabowo: Lupakan Masa Lalu, Maakan Kopassus di Aceh,” acehterkini.com, 12 March 2014. “Yuswardi A. Suud, “Mengapa Harus Gerindra?” Atjehpost.com, 26 February 2014. Aceh’s Surprising Election Results ©2014 IPAC 5 and provincial seats; Gerindra was the option only at the national level. Some voters may have just registered the haram message and avoided Gerindra altogether as a result. Finally, Gerindra was up against stronger competition from other national parties, particularly Nasdem, than Partai Demokrat was in 2009. E. he ALA-ABAS Areas Election results were particularly interesting in the central highlands and southwestern parts of Aceh dominated by non-Acehnese ethnic groups. hese are the areas that periodically demand separate provinces. One, to be called Aceh Leuser Antara or ALA, has been championed by ethnic Gayo and would include the districts of Aceh Tengah, Bener Meriah, Aceh Singkil, Gayo Lues and Aceh Tenggara. A second, to be called Aceh Barat Selatan or ABAS, would consist of Aceh Jaya, Aceh Barat, Nagan Raya, Aceh Barat Daya (Abdya), Aceh Selatan and Simeulue. In addition to indigenous non-Acehnese ethnic groups (that is, groups indigenous to the region but who do not speak Acehnese and have their own language and cultural traditions), the ALA districts include areas with large Javanese and other migrant populations. hey were home to several anti-GAM militias armed and trained by the Indonesian military during the conlict. For these elections, several prominent former regional military commanders now working with Partai Aceh made a concerted efort to get out the militia vote for PA. hey made little headway in the ALA heartland of Aceh Tengah and Bener Meriah, where PA received only 11.7 per cent of the vote that was spread fairly evenly across the parties, even though it was second only to Golkar in terms of total votes received. PA seats in the district councils either stayed even (Bener Meriah) or declined by one seat (Aceh Tengah). Given PA’s sharp decline elsewhere, the steady-state outcome might be seen as a win of sorts for the miitary lobbying. In the rest of the ALA area, PA picked up several seats, doing better than in 2009 in Aceh Tenggara, Gayo Lues, Singkil and Subussalam. More interesting was the election of the biggest booster of a separate ALA province, Tagore Abubakar, who ran for the national parliament as a member of PDIP. Many Acehnese assume that PDIP is hostile to Aceh, as it was on former president and party leader Megawati Sukarnoputri’s watch in 2003 that martial law was declared. Tagore’s election is not going to dispel that assumption. In the ABAS area, support for PA appears to have sharply declined, though results from Nagan Raya and Aceh Jaya were unavailable when this report went to press. Golkar emerged as the dominant party in Aceh Tenggara, Nagan Raya, Aceh Singkil and Aceh Tengah and was accused of same kind of chicanery in counting that PA was accused of elsewhere.11 III. THE ELECTION PROCESS In a sentiment many across Indonesia would share, Acehnese interviewed were unanimous in saying that this was one of the dirtiest, most corrupt elections in years. Two issues in particular stood out: problematic counting and intra-party manipulation of votes. here were also allegations of pre-punched ballots and partisan poll workers. In a case that received widespread media coverage, the head of the election commission for East Aceh was arrested at 5 a.m. on 8 April, the day before the elections, carrying a ballot box and unmarked ballots in his car in violation of election procedures. Reports that they were already 11 “Golkar Kuasai Lima Daerah”. Serambi Indonesia, 12 April 2014. 6 Aceh’s Surprising Election Results ©2014 IPAC punched were not true. He was let go the same day but questions remain about why he was transporting the election materials without an escort as required. On 25 April, an organisation called Consortium for Clean Elections in Aceh (Konsorsium Pemilu Bersih Aceh, KPBA) held a press conference in Banda Aceh in which they released a tape that they said showed Muzakkir Manaf in a meeting with East Aceh KIP oicials before the elections, urging them to ind a way to ensure Partai Aceh’s victory. hey turned over the tape to the Election Oversight Body, Bawaslu.12 In a separate incident, police on April 9 found 406 ballots already marked with the names of two Partai Aceh candidates in seven diferent neighbourhoods in Titue, Pidie.13 Outrage over counting erupted everywhere. he complicated ballots meant that counting at individual polling places (TPS), which was supposed to be over by 6 pm, went on far into the night. In one TPS in Bireuen, counting only inished at 5 am. In addition to allegations of deliberate changing of numbers by poll workers, some suggested that sheer exhaustion raised the possibility of human error. Also, smaller parties ran out of money to pay their witnesses, and some went simply went home. Accusations of miscounting, deliberate or inadvertent, at the TPS and subdistrict levels caused anger across the province and led eight national to announce on 24 April that they were rejecting the election results because of “organised, massive and systematic fraud” and were demanding a recount based on the initial TPS calculations.14 As in other parts of Indonesia, allegations of intra-party manipulation of the results were also common. In one case, a reformist PA candidate running for a seat in the DPRA from Pidie got well over the number of votes in his electoral district that would ensure him a seat. When the inal tally was published, however, his votes were signiicantly less than originally reported and he did not get in. One source said that he was out of favour with the party boss because he had not been a combatant, and there was still a sense among some in PA that combatants should be given irst crack at the available slots. A PA boss in Bireuen reportedly dropped winning candidates if he felt they had not contributed enough to the party. Elsewhere in Pidie, an angry PA mob from Bintang Hoe, Batee subdistrict, Pidie set ire to the local PA oice on 24 April 2014 ater they believed the votes of the man they supported had been deliberately switched to beneit a more favoured contender. hey claimed their candidate, a man named Jailani, had received 1,700 votes whereas the local village head, who only received 750, was declared the winner of the seat in question.15 But other parties were equally manipulative. A Demokrat candidate found that a member of her own campaign team had brokered the transfer of her votes to another candidate in the same party. When she called up a member of the subdistrict counting team to check, he asked her, “How many votes do you need?” and was prepared to sell her the requisite number. She refused.16 IV. ISSUES IN THE DPRA Now that the seats have been allocated in the provincial legislature, the manoeuvring has begun to select a chair and determine the number of legislative committees and party blocs. Much of this is taking place within Partai Aceh. he current DPRA chair, Hasbi Abdullah, the governor’s brother, decided not to stand for election this year and will be stepping down. A senior PA legislator who might have wanted the position, Adnan Beuransyah, lost his seat. he names most frequently mentioned for chair, Rid12 13 14 15 16 “Terungkap, Dugaan Muzakir Manag Minta KIP Menangkan PA,” leuserantara.com, 27 April 2014. “406 Surat Suara Telah Dicoblos”, Serambi Indonesia, 28 April 2014. “8 Parpol Tolak Hasil Pemilu,” Serambi Indonesia, 25 April 2014. “Massa Bakar Kantor Partai Aceh,” tribunnews.com, 28 April 2014. IPAC interview, Demokrat candidate, Banda Aceh, 24 April 2014. Aceh’s Surprising Election Results ©2014 IPAC 7 wan Abubakar and Ermiadi, represent PA interests in East Aceh and North Aceh respectively, and the ultimate choice may be determined more by which area needs more attention from the PA hierarchy, rather than by the qualities of the individuals themselves. A long shot for chair would be Mariati, one of the few women in the upper ranks of the party. In the current 69-member DPRA, parties needed ive members to constitute an oicial bloc or fraksi that entitled them to chair a legislative committee. he committees were A, Governance; B, Economy; C, Finance; D, Development; E, People’s Welfare; F, Aceh Special Autonomy; and G, Religious Afairs (led by PKS). By law, the number of committees has to equal the number of party blocs, so the smaller the number of committees, the larger the number of members required to constitute a bloc. he maximum number of committees, according to the 2006 Law on Governing Aceh, is eight. With the expansion of the Aceh provincial parliament to 81 seats, the number of seats necessary to constitute a bloc will also rise.17 PA, with its 33 seats, was actually able to control 60 per cent of the seats through alliances with PAN and four other one-member parties. his time PAN secured eight seats, almost certainly enough for its own bloc and has no interest in any alliance with PA, especially as it says it got nothing out of the 2009-2014 partnership—it was supposed to get a position as deputy DPRA chair that never materialised. If PAN, NasDem, Golkar and Demokrat all have their own blocs with one combined bloc consisting of PKS and smaller parties, they might be able to serve as an efective check on PA power. At the moment, PA’s major agenda is to secure the presidential decrees and ministerial regulations that will permit full implementation of the 2005 Helsinki agreement. It is hoping to use President Yudhoyono’s coming departure – he inishes his second and inal term in October 2014 – as a deadline to inalise agreements on shared revenues of oil and gas, extent of ofshore area under provincial control and transfer of all authority on land issues to the provincial government through the creation of a separate land bureau, independent of the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional). Governor Zaini suggested that if these three issues were settled, PA would be willing to ind a solution to the problem that most concerns Jakarta, the adoption by the DPRA of the old GAM lag as the provincial banner.18 here appears to be no concern in Aceh among any of the parties over two issues of most concern to the international community, the December 2013 qanun that makes Islamic law applicable to non-Muslims and a series of decisions, including a February 2014 governor’s decree that opens the Leuser Ecosystem up to economic exploitation (the subject of a forthcoming IPAC report). V. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION What does all this mean for the presidential election? Neither Jokowi nor Prabowo is particularly attractive to Acehnese, but Prabowo has the edge because of the PA machine. Prabowo and his family have been a source of funds for PA, but they have a stronger bond: a common dislike of Irwandi. According to one account that came up several times in interviews, Prabowo was very annoyed by the closure of his industrial tree concession (pines) that was cancelled when Irwandi issued his 2007 province-wide moratorium on logging. Prabowo’s company, PT Tusam Hutani Lestari, controlled 97,300 ha in Bener Meriah and Aceh Tengah, 17 18 he rise in the number of seats was due to population growth and a determination that the population now exceeded 5 million. “Menlu Ingkatkan Soal Perdamaian Aceh”, Serambi Indonesia, 28 April 2014. For background on this issue see International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Tensions Over Aceh’s Flag”, Asia Brieing No.139, 7 May 2013. he government sees adoption of the GAM lag as violating a 2007 decree banning the use of separatist symbols. PA has efectively used the lag issue as a bargaining chip to press for full implementation of the Helsinki accord. 8 Aceh’s Surprising Election Results ©2014 IPAC according to the concession permit issued in 2004 by the Forestry Ministry. Anger over the cancelled concession reportedly led Prabowo to back Irwandi’s opponent, Zaini Abdullah in the 2012 election.19 Once elected, Zaini gave a permit to Nations Petroleum to explore for oil and gas in Singkil.20 Nations Petroleum is a Canadian company, registered in Calgary; the chair is Prabowo’s brother, Hasyim Djojohadikusumo. Prabowo’s interests in Aceh therefore go beyond the political. Partai Aceh has been interested in Prabowo’s money, but they also wanted to back a winner, as they had with Yudhoyono, to ensure that communications with Jakarta would be smooth and that their interests would be well represented, as they certainly have been over the last ive years. At the time the alliance was announced in early 2013, Prabowo seemed destined for the top. Jokowi, newly elected governor of Jakarta—with Prabowo’s help—did not enter anyone’s head as a possible threat. Now that Jokowi not only is a threat but seems to be beating Prabowo in all the polls, even some Partai Aceh leaders are said to be quietly reaching out to his camp. On the other hand, no one in Aceh has much good to say about PDIP, the party backing Jokowi. It is viewed with extreme suspicion in the Acehnese heartland along the east coast, where the bulk of voters are concentrated. It was under Megawati that negotiations broke down in 2003, GAM negotiators were arrested, and martial law declared. It was PDIP that was most opposed to the 2005 Helsinki agreement and raised the most objections to the 2006 law that enshrined its provisions. he only area of PDIP strength in Aceh is the central highlands that produced the iercest anti-GAM militias and as noted above, has now sent an anti-GAM champion to the national parliament. If Jokowi chooses Jusuf Kalla as his running mate, sentiment could shit, as there is huge affection for Kalla for the instrumental role he played in brokering peace. Also, Acehnese bear no animus toward Jokowi personally and his image nationally as a clean and caring politician could ultimately draw many to his side. On balance, however, Prabowo could still win the province. In electoral terms, it will not mean very much, as Aceh’s population of about 5 million pales beside the population of Java. But in terms of how the PA government relates to Jakarta, the outcome of the presidential election is crucial. VI. CONCLUSIONS Indonesian elections always throw up surprises, and the results in Aceh prove the point. Acehnese voters have shown their discontent with the ruling party. he question is how PA will respond. It could change its ways and work for the betterment of the people or it could step up extortion and rent-seeking in the belief that this was could be its last chance in power. More likely is a stepped-up efort of local PA leaders at the district level to entrench their own local power base, hedging against the possibility that the province falls to another party in 2019. he assumption now is that Muzakkir Manaf will run for governor in 2017. hree GAM ex-commanders interested in being his running mate are all serving now as district heads: Hasballah Bin M. haib aka Rocky from Aceh Timur, Jufri from Aceh Barat, and Sarjani from Pidie. he question now is whether PA’s reduced legislative clout will enhance the chances of a non-PA gubernatorial candidate to contest that race. Aceh has produced a few surprises this time round; it may have more in the electoral contests ahead. 19 20 See Ahmady Mueraxa, “Kisah di Balik Kerjasama Gerindra dan Partai Aceh”, www.ahmadymeuraxa.blogspot.com, 7 May 2013. “Gubernur Izinkan Ekplorasi Migas Singkil”, Serambi Indonesia, 15 April 2013. Aceh’s Surprising Election Results ©2014 IPAC 9 Appendix A: Election Results 2014 he tables that follow give results from the 2014 legislative elections at the district, provincial and national levels. Table 1 ills in the chart appended to IPAC’s pre-election report of 31 March 2014, “Aceh’s Elections: A Do-It-Yourself Analysis”, and compares results from 2009 and 2014. he irst two columns compare the percentage of votes won by Partai Aceh in each election district in the race for provincial legislature (DPRK). he fourth column compares Partai Aceh’s votes in each district council (DPRK), with the 2014 election results in bold type. Note that ive districts have changed seat allotments for 2014, with Pidie and Aceh Barat shrinking and Aceh Tenggara, Bireuen and Aceh Timur expanding. Results for the districts of Aceh Jaya, Nagan Raya and Simeulue were not available when this report went to press. Table 1: ELECTION RESULTS 1 Dapil 2014 and and PA% in DPRA Dapil 2009 and PA% in DPRA Kab/Kota PA seats won in 2009 & 2014 in DPRK Party of executive (year elected) DP1 20.8% DP1 31% Banda Aceh 6/30 4/30 6/20 7/20 10/35 9/35 34/45 23 /40 16/25 9/25 25/35 13/40 3/30 2/30 3/25 3/25 32/45 24/45 13/25 10/25 25/35 23/40 7/30 6/30 6/25 6/25 1/25 3/30 1/20 3/20 0/25 2/25 0/20 3/20 10/30 5/30 9/25 5/25 2/20 PD-PKS 2012 % Vote for governor in 2012 Pilkada for Zaini Abdullah (PA) compared to Irwandi (independent) 25.7% PA; 44.6% Irwandi PA 2012 36.5% PA; 43.0% Irwandi PA 2012 40.1%PA; 31.8% Irwandi PA 2012 74.6%PA;11.1% Irwandi PA 2013 68.7%PA; 10.1% Irwandi PA 2012 57.6%PA; 33.5% Irwandi PD 2012 25.1%PA; 57.8% Irwandi PD 2012 36.0%PA; 47.1% Irwandi PA 2012 76.3%PA; 14.8% Irwandi PA 2012 61.9%PA; 25.2% Irwandi PA 2012 73.4%PA; 14.0% Irwandi PAN-PBR 2012 42.4%PA; 42.5% Irwandi PA- 2012 39.2%PA; 42.2% Irwandi Golkar 2012 39.2%PA; 47.7% Irwandi Golkar 2012 68.2%PA; 20.4% Irwandi PBR 2012 23.9%PA; 59.8% Irwandi Golkar 23.7%PA; 63.4% Irwandi PD-PKB-PAN 2013 53.2%PA; 35.4% Irwandi PA 2012 72.2%PA; 15.8% Irwandi PD-PPP 2012 49.2%PA; 35.4% Irwandi Golkar 2012 56.7 %PA; 28.4% Irwandi Aceh Jaya 7/30 5 /25 14/20 PA 2012 64.6%PA; 19.5% Irwandi Nagan Raya 5/25 Golkar 2012 57.7%PA; 25.8% Irwandi 2 Sabang 3 Aceh Besar 4 DP 2 48.7% DP2 74% 5 6 7 Pidie Jaya DP3 34.5% DP4 11.7% DP4 45% Bener Meriah DP5 56.6% DP5 69% 10 11 12 DP6 50.6% DP7 20.8% DP6 54% Langsa DP8 22.4% DP7 8% DP9 18.9% Aceh Singkil Subussalam 18 DP8 40% 19 23 Aceh Selatan Aceh Barat Daya DP10 24.3% Simeulue 21 22 Aceh Tenggara Gayo Lues 17 20 Aceh Timur Aceh Tamiang 15 16 Aceh Utara Lhokseumawe 13 14 Bireuen Aceh Tengah 8 9 Pidie ** Aceh Barat DP3 36% Table 2: Seats in the Provincial Legislature (DPRA) after the 2009 and 2014 elections Parties PA PD Golkar PAN PPP PKS Partai Patriot PKB PKPI Partai Daulat Aceh PBB Nasdem PNA Gerindra TOTAL 2009 33 10 8 5 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 69 2014 29 7 9 8 6 4 1 1 1 1 9 3 2 81 Table 3: Seats in the National Parliament (*Incumbent) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 2009 Elected MPs 2014 Elected MPs Nasir Jamil (PKS) H. Raihan Iskandar (PKS) T Riefky Harsya (Demokrat) Muslim (Demokrat) Ali Yacob (Demokrat) Mirwan Amir (Demokrat) Ir Nova Iriansyah (Demokrat) Ir. Muh Azhari (Demokrat) Teuku Irwan (Demokrat) Marzuki Daud (Golkar) Sayed Fuad Zakaria (Golkar) Sayed Mustafa Usab (PAN) Tgk. Mohd. Faisal Amin (PPP) Nasir Jamil (PKS)* T Riefky Harsya (Demokrat)* Muslim (Demokrat)* Anwar Idris (PPP) Irmawan (PKB) Tagore Abu Bakar (PDIP) Firmandez (Golkar) M Salim Fachry (Golkar) Muslim Aiyub (PAN) Khaidir (Gerindra) Fadhullah (Gerindra) Zulvan Linden (Nasdem) Bachtiar Aly (Nasdem) 10 Aceh’s Surprising Election Results ©2014 IPAC Appendix B: National Election Commission Map of Voting Areas in Aceh Source: KPU, www.kpu.go.id INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (IPAC) The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conlict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle that accurate analysis is a critical irst step toward preventing violent conlict. 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