The Moral Perspective Reflections on Ethics and Practice (review)

The European Legacy Toward New Paradigms ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cele20 The Moral Perspective: Reflections on Ethics and Practice by Vilhjálmur Árnason, translated by Barbara B. Nelson and Mikael M. Karlsson, Reykjavík, University of Iceland Press, 2018, 103 pp., npg (paper) Giorgio Baruchello To cite this article: Giorgio Baruchello (2021): The Moral Perspective: Reflections on Ethics and Practice, The European Legacy, DOI: 10.1080/10848770.2021.1999378 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2021.1999378 Published online: 28 Oct 2021. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cele20 THE EUROPEAN LEGACY BOOK REVIEW The Moral Perspective: Reflections on Ethics and Practice, by Vilhjálmur Árnason, translated by Barbara B. Nelson and Mikael M. Karlsson, Reykjavík, University of Iceland Press, 2018, 103 pp., npg (paper) In the aftermath of the dramatic collapse of the Icelandic bubble economy in 2008, the Centre for Ethics of the University of Iceland felt all the more compelled to find ways to promote ethical reflection among university students and prepare them for professional life qua decent individuals, who might be less likely to scheme as, or go along uncritically with, callous moneygrabbing incarnations of homo œconomicus in whatever line of trade they may eventually end up. The opening chapter of Vilhjálmur Árnason’s 1993 book Siðfræði lífs og dauða [The ethics of life and death] was thus adapted into the 2016 short book Siðfræðikver [lit. booklet of ethics; but also, ethical catechism] and, in 2018, translated into English by Barbara Nelson and Mikael Karlsson. The booklet deals with “ethics” as “the perspective of moral discussion as a practice—as a way to develop moral abilities, characteristics and competence” vis-à-vis thorny issues and difficult decisions in personal and professional life (10). Such an approach presupposes an indemonstrable, quasi-universal assumption of nearly all contemporary moral praxes, theories, mentalities and legal institutions, namely the equal moral worth of all human beings qua persons deserving respect (neo-Nazis, Randian objectivists, social Darwinists and old-fashioned Stalinists may disagree on this, of course). In order to clarify the meaning and the chief implications of the notion of person, the author introduces, and comments upon, Immanuel Kant’s distinctions between “thing” and “self,” “value for us” and “in itself,” “end” and “means,” and “love” and “respect” (13, 15), as well as John Stuart Mill’s conception of the human being as a “progressive being” rather than the insatiable appetitive machine that the same nineteenth-century British thinker posited ab initio in his writings on political economy (18). Referring to these two classic ethicists, who belong to two sharply different traditions in moral philosophy (i.e., deontology and consequentialism), helps Vilhjálmur Árnason to explain why moral issues (e.g., what is right/wrong, which good ought one to pursue, etc.) cannot be reduced to technical issues, which competent experts can resolve once and for all by means of undisputed and undisputable standardised methods. At the same time, it helps him to introduce a theme that is to resurface several times in the booklet: though each person must eventually make moral decisions and take responsibility for them, moral issues are not reducible to subjective preferences without rational basis, but situations to which we must respond by making use of our resources (e.g., emotions, habits, traditions, maxims) on the basis of the best reasons that we are capable of producing, especially when the issues are difficult ones (e.g., keeping a patient alive for as long as possible or letting him/her die with dignity). The best reasons are those that identify “that which deserves general agreement” within the context of “rational discussion” of suitable principles, rules, and so forth, rather than blind adherence to custom and regulation, cavalier indifference and irresponsible formalism (e.g., following the letter but not the spirit of the law), or resorting to violence (40). Additional important distinctions are introduced and commented upon, which can assist the reader in acquiring a keener sense of what the field of morality comprises and of what makes it unique. Inter alia, genuine moral issues are distinguished from “matters of fact,” “the efficiency of techniques,” “economic interventions . . . in the light of experience,” and 2 BOOK REVIEW “subjective preferences” or claims (32–33); “written,” “unwritten” and “traditional” rules from their rational justification (39); judgments about “moral goods or values” (e.g., justice, respect, etc.) from those concerning “general duties” or “moral imperatives” (e.g., keeping promises) and “context-depending moral judgments” (e.g., selling faulty financial products to unsuspecting customers because that is what my bosses require of me) (34–35); and, depending on emphasis, “theoretical” from “applied” ethics (63). As the elements of moral decision-making and rational discussion on moral issues are presented and reflected upon, it becomes clearer and clearer that sceptical and relativist stances are naïve at best, most likely academic, or psychotic at worst. No society and, a fortiori, no human being could ever hope to function without morality and, whenever things get tough, without ethics, the discipline studying morality, exploring its complexities, cultivating the relevant abilities and strategies, developing theories, and seeking all along the way to serve paramount moral goods (aka values). Ethics is a normative discipline, not just a descriptive one; its aim is not simply that of telling us what things are like but, fundamentally, “that which we ought to do” (61). As a discipline, it is as old as philosophy itself, and ethicists have been specialising in acquiring modes of reasoning about moral issues that can facilitate the resolution, whether flawless or merely contextually convenient, of moral issues for which rulebooks and common-sense do not suffice. Short and deceivingly easy to read, this booklet is neither shallow nor simplistic. Aimed at as vast a potential audience of educated readers as possible, it is the distillate of careful reflections on the grounds of normativity, their expression in our culture as values, duties, and personal virtues, and their cultivation in view of resolving moral issues that can arise in a variety of professional fields, such as “sports . . . management, marketing and custom relations,” healthcare, engineering and wherever else “important human interests are at stake” (69–70). Ideally, this booklet should be made available to university students worldwide, not just in Iceland, whatever degree programme they may be enrolled in. Its eloquent translation makes it an excellent option to all academic settings where English is the language of instruction, the lingua franca to be acquired in order to function in academe internationally. [email protected] Giorgio Baruchello University of Akureyri, Iceland http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9933-5561 © 2021 Giorgio Baruchello https://doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2021.1999378