Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.
To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to upgrade your browser.
2020, Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasia
…
8 pages
1 file
Eurasia is a supercontinent spanning the landmass from the Atlantic to the Pacific. It is home to 70 percent of the world's population and is a source of the world's most enduring security challenges. In the course, we will examine Eurasian security through the foreign policy of its largest state, Russia. Writing in 1881 at a time when the Russian Empire was expanding into Central Asia, Fyodor Dostoyevsky concluded that Russia needed to look East " because Russia is not only in Europe, but also in Asia; because a Russian is not only European, but an Asiatic too. Not only that: in our coming destiny, perhaps it is precisely Asia that represents our way out. " As ties with the West have deteriorated following the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, assassinations on British soil, and alleged electoral interference, Russia is increasingly cultivating ties in Asia. Since announcing its pivot to the East in 2013, Russia intervened militarily in Syria in 2015 to support the Bashar al-Assad regime, started work on a $55 billion gas pipeline to China and launched the Eurasian Economic Union, creating a single market among five former Soviet states. In addressing these issues, we ask: what is driving Russia's policies in Asia? How do its policies vary across space and time? What strategies has Russia adopted to pursue its interests in Asia? How effective has Russia been in securing these interests? How do Asian states perceive Russia's ambitions in Asia? What strategies have these states adopted to counter or resist Russian influence? We will explore these and other questions by examining Russia's policies towards the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, considered part of the " Near Abroad, " an area within Russia's sphere of influence. We will also explore Russia's relations with states in the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia.
Dissertation submitted to the University of Oxford for the Postgraduate Diploma in Diplomatic Studies, 2017
The war in Syria is one of the main issues in global politics. The dynamics of the conflict brought Teheran and Moscow together. Some analysts claim that this cooperation marks a new chapter in Russian-Iranian. Russian foreign policy is based on series of deeply rooted assumptions. They contain the belief that Russia is a global power, that should dominate Eurasia and be included in world decision-making process. Therefore the only equal partner for Russia is another global power. Today this power is represented by the US. Accordingly - Moscow and Washington should jointly decide on global issues. These beliefs serve as a basis for Kremlin's policy towards Iran. Historically Iran was the weaker actor, that Kremlin could control. Gradually it became a more confident regional player. Therefore Russia's policy became more complex than in the past. On the one hand, Moscow tries to penetrate Iran and deepen its dependence. On the other - it acts to counter IRI's actions aimed at strengthening its regional position. Historical evidence also suggests that when Kremlin is forced to concentrate its resources on stabilising the own internal situation, it would be more inclined to conduct appeasement policy towards Teheran. When stability is assured - Moscow would resort to more aggressive actions. The comparison of the cooperation between Russia and Iran in Tajikistan and Syrian civil wars reveals that both countries' actions can complement each other and bring positive results. However, it also shows that both capitals will pressure for solid peace solutions only when they would see a given conflict to be an imminent threat to their security. The situation in Afghanistan forced them to find the solution to the conflict in Tajikistan. Unfortunately the Syrian conflict - at least at its current stage - does not provide this element. Russian actions towards Iran within the framework of the Syrian civil war should be seen as instrumental. Teheran remains a second-level ally for Moscow, useful in conducting policy against Washington and in returning to the global decision-making process. The cooperation of both countries on that issue does not exceed traditional dynamic of their collaboration. Therefore - cannot be understood as the beginning of a new stage of strategic partnership.
Russia and the Former Soviet Space, Instrumentalizing Security, Legitimizing Intervention, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017
A chapter in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY by Andrei Tsygankov due to be published 2018
Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2019
The Russian Federation has been for several years characterized as having both domestic resources and the corresponding desire to re-establish some of the influences in the international affairs, resembling the ones it used to have during the Soviet times. In this manner, it seeks to re-establish the status not only by military means, but by diplomatic tools as well, which are at the center of this research. To be more concrete, the purpose of this research paper is to map and explain Russian non-military strategies on the Arctic region. The main questions are, therefore, as follows: (a) What is the attitude of the Russian Federation toward the Arctic region? and (b) What are the factors that contribute to this attitude? As indicated by many, the states with political ambitions share conservatism mainly related to economics and relative suspicion toward the well-established multilateral institutions, while preferring bilateral relations or being establishing partners in emerging organizations. Apart from what has been mentioned above, this paper intends to develop such an argument and test it on the particular case of the Arctic region. It, in essence, argues that Russia prefers bilateral approach in case of negotiations over the issues of its core national interests and is inclined to multilateral options in case of soft issue areas. However, although Russian bilateral relations attract sufficient scholarly attention, its presence in multilateral institutions is still an under-researched area. This research paper aims at contributing to global discussion by providing an answer on what is Russian attitude in multilateral institutions and what factors contribute to this behavior. As for the hypothesis, it shall be tested on the empirical data from content analysis of official documents (press releases and governmental statements), provided by the online archive of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2016
Almost 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process of‘re-composition’ of a Moscow-dominated political space is still under way. Under the influence of different traditions, factors, events and interests, Russia seems to have developed a new version of the ‘power state’ that dominated European history until the 20th century's tragedies. What was the weight of the Soviet legacy and of the crises of the 1990s in this development? What has been the influence of political leaders and intellectuals, siloviki, and economic elites on the current Russian political thought? To what extent have external factors contributed to shape this thought? What place for minorities and cultural differences does this political trend leave? This volume is based on the proceedings of ‘The Evolution of Russian Political Thought After 1991 workshop organized by Reset-Dialogues on Civilizations (Berlin, 22-23 June 2015) and collects the essays written by Pavel K. Baev, Giancarlo Bosetti, Timothy J. Colton, Riccardo Mario Cucciolla, Alexander Golts, Lev Gudkov, Stephen E. Hanson, Mark Kramer, Marlene Laruelle, Alexey Miller, Olga Pavlenko and Victoria I. Zhuravleva.
The discursive reconstruction of the Indo-Pacific regional stability created dynamic structural international new world order. It strengthens Indonesia's national security position internationally as considerable regional actor in maintain regional security through soft, hard, and smart power. The Indo-Pacific region reflects how Indonesia expand influencing approach by having and improving closer defense cooperation along with political economy benefits to involving parties including Russia Federation, ASEAN, and other major East Asian countries. Since 20 October 2014, under President Joko Widodo leadership, Indonesia foreign and defense policy-makers routinely promotes specific unique conception of Indonesia's international identity and roles through free and active foreign policy with various major actors as a means to facilitate strategic partnership. It creates significant geographical and policy overlaps and breeds inconsistency and unfair competition that might contribute to Indonesia's preferred low-cost, low-commitment version of cooperation. Thus, the Indo-Pacific projected agenda represents one albeit important example of the Indonesian national leadership's conversion of Nawacita ideas perceived by policy makers that dynamics international contestation as strategic environment into political realism. However, by balancing its competing roles and relationships, Indonesia must maintain a multi-vector foreign policy in collaborating defense cooperation with Russia that is flexible, unencumbered by restrictive alliances, and oriented towards sovereignty, greater power, and strength.
2018
This paper attempts to analyse the European Union’s (EU) cultural diplomacy (CD) efforts in five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, hereinafter ‘Central Asia’). Beginning in the early 2000s, EU Member States looked at the region with increased interest. Aside from major engagements on trade, energy and security, education and intercultural dialogue were stressed as priority areas in the 2007 EU Strategy for Central Asia. To measure EU effectiveness as a CD actor in Central Asia, a comparative dimension is proposed by analysing the role Russia has pursued. At law and policy level, since Putin’s return to the Presidency in 2012, Russia has reaffirmed its ambitions to strengthen both hard and soft presence in Central Asia, viewing the region within its sphere of influence. This engagement was reiterated in the 2015 Strategy of National Security and in the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept. To draw a comparison, actors’ CD effectiveness is measured in terms of willingness, capacity, and acceptance, based on the theoretical framework proposed by Kingah, Amaya and Van Langenhove. This paper finds that European CD efforts had mixed results due to an inconsistent policy towards the region. Although EU cultural heritage and educational influence are widely acknowledged, Russia remains today the major foreign actor in Central Asia, displaying strong levels of attractiveness among citizenry and elites. Historical and cultural ties, but also institutional and economic efforts allowed Moscow to keep its leading position. However, Russia’s future regional leadership should not be taken for granted, as all Central Asian states have been looking at Moscow’s cultural engagement with increased scepticism.
Mediaevalia Transilvanica, 2001
Limits of Life: Reflections on Life, Death, and the Body in the Age of Technoscience, 2024
Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy, Third Edition, 2015
Water 11(1):156, 2019
Archives of Thermodynamics, 2013
Pre-print papers of The 18th International Saga Conference - Sagas and the Circum-Baltic Arena., 2022
2024
Journal Article, 2020
Frontiers of Architecture and Civil Engineering in China, 2010
Revista de Iniciação Científica e Extensão da Faculdade de Direito de Franca, 2019
Frontiers in medicine, 2024
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Studia universitatis hereditati, 2022