Superpower and Small-State Mediation in the Qatar Gulf Crisis

The International Spectator Italian Journal of International Affairs ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rspe20 Superpower and Small-State Mediation in the Qatar Gulf Crisis Ibrahim Fraihat To cite this article: Ibrahim Fraihat (2020) Superpower and Small-State Mediation in the Qatar Gulf Crisis, The International Spectator, 55:2, 79-91, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2020.1741268 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1741268 © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Published online: 15 May 2020. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1393 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 1 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rspe20 THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 2020, VOL. 55, NO. 2, 79–91 https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1741268 Superpower and Small-State Mediation in the Qatar Gulf Crisis Ibrahim Fraihat Doha Institute for Graduate Studies ABSTRACT KEYWORDS The Qatar Gulf crisis of 2017 saw a number of mediation initiatives, including those of the United States and Kuwait. However, the two countries present two substantially distinct models of third-party intervention: superpower mediation (the United States) and smallstate mediation (Kuwait). Comparing the two types of intervention in this crisis in terms of their ability to de-escalate tension and effectively resolve the Gulf crisis with respect to three variables – timing of mediation, leverage of the mediator (hard power versus legitimacy) and interest of the mediator – it would seem that smallstate mediation has been more effective in crisis de-escalation, while superpower mediation has further exacerbated the crisis. Qatar crisis; mediation; Gulf; Kuwait; Saudi Arabia On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Egypt (the so-called Arab Quartet) severed their diplomatic relationships with Qatar and imposed a land, air and sea blockade against the country. On 23 June this so-called ‘Quartet’ announced a list of 13 demands that Qatar was expected to comply with to end the blockade. Among others, the list included closing the Al Jazeera broadcaster, significantly reducing relations with Iran and “end[ing] contact with groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and submit[ting] to monthly external compliance checks” (Wintour 2019). Qatar rejected the list and considered the demands a violation of its sovereignty. The outbreak of the crisis immediately triggered third-party intervention from a number of countries. Oman, Pakistan and a number of European countries tried to mediate and help de-escalate the crisis. However, two countries approached third-party intervention in a more structured and nuanced way, Kuwait and the United States. The two countries are major stakeholders in this crisis, as each one has strong links to the primary parties of the conflict and the issues at stake in a specific way, and therefore both have a vested and direct interest in the final outcome of the crisis. The primary interest of Kuwait is in keeping the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) united and strong, which is at the core of its national security strategy for responding to external threats. A united GCC is also a key factor in any future US confrontation with Iran in the Gulf region. However, the US primary interest in this crisis has been to strengthen security collaboration, especially counterterrorism, and to increase arms sales to the Gulf States. CONTACT Ibrahim Fraihat [email protected] © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. 80 I. FRAIHAT One major reason that the United States and Kuwait are uniquely qualified to mediate in this crisis is that both of them have leverage over the disputants, which can definitely aid the process, especially at times of stalemate. Kuwait is a founding member of the GCC, and its Emir, Sheikh Sabah Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, is highly respected by all GCC heads of states, which gives him the moral power to apply pressure when needed. The United States, on the other hand, is the primary security partner of all parties of the GCC crisis, meaning that its intervention can substantially impact the balance of power between them. However, the United States and Kuwait present two substantially distinct models of third-party intervention: small-state mediation (Kuwait), and superpower mediation (the United States). This article compares the two types of mediation in this crisis in terms of their ability to de-escalate tension and effectively resolve the crisis. It compares the two models of mediation with respect to three variables: timing of mediation, leverage of the mediator (hard power versus legitimacy) and interest of the mediator. In terms of outcomes, it argues that small-state mediation has been more effective in crisis deescalation, while superpower mediation has further exacerbated the crisis. The crisis cannot be seen independently of historical relations between Qatar and its neighbours. The tension between Qatar and its neighbours started in 1995 when Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani, father of the current ruler, came to power in a bloodless coup and significantly shifted the direction of his country’s foreign policy. While Doha’s foreign policy was more in line with that of Saudi Arabia prior to 1995, the Emir adopted a new strategy of openness and diversification of relationships with the region and the world. As a small country with limited ability to build traditional hard power, Qatar focused on enhancing its soft power by attempting to balance its relationship with all parties regardless of the level of hostility between them. It built a strong relationship with the United States, hosting the Al Udeid air base, the largest American military base in the Middle East, and opened five American university branch campuses in its Education City project. At the same time, Qatar strengthened its relationship with parties that Washington does not want to talk to directly, such as the Afghani Taliban and Palestinian Hamas. Also, at the centre of the building of its soft power, Qatar established the Al Jazeera news channel in 1996. The network tackles sensitive political issues that are traditionally considered taboo for public discussion in the Arab world. As a result, its offices have been closed a number of times in several Arab countries since its inception. Qatar and its neighbours took diverging paths in 2011 with the advent of the Arab Spring, as each country responded differently to the changes sweeping the region. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, among other countries inside and outside the region, chose stability over change, thereby giving credit to the strongman theory and backing army generals who could restore order to the region, like Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt and Khalifa Haftar in Libya. Instead, Qatar chose to support change and revolutionary forces in Arab Spring countries like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Specifically, Qatar’s stance towards the Muslim Brotherhood differed from that of its neighbours: while Qatar supported the Brotherhood where it won elections in the Arab Spring countries, Saudi Arabia and the UAE considered (and still consider) the group a terrorist organisation that should be banned and excluded from any political role in the region. The rift between Qatar and the Arab Quartet significantly deepened on 30 June 2013, when a military coup removed the first democratically elected President, Muslim Brotherhood-backed Mohamed Morsi, THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 81 from power, leaving the Gulf countries divided on the way forward in Egypt.1 As a result, in early 2014, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar, marking the crescendo of a crisis that lasted for nine months (Kabalan 2017). The crisis in 2017 was thus seen by many, especially the Quartet, as an extension of the 2014 crisis that had not been fundamentally resolved. Small-state versus superpower mediation Whether voluntary or by direct request from the parties involved, conflict generally expands to include the mediation of third parties with the goal of resolving, containing or at least managing the parties’ dispute. Third-party mediation can be defined as a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law (Bercovitch et al. 1991, 8). International mediation has historically been practiced by parties with different capacities, including small states, and has not been limited solely to superpowers. Small states have important characteristics that make their intervention particularly significant. As Randa Slim (1992) explains, “The strategic weaknesses of the small states do usually endow their attempts at mediation with a moral superiority, to which superpowers cannot claim rights” (207). Because of the highly sensitive context of international conflicts, parties often accept small states’ initiatives to mediate, as they are generally perceived as non-threatening to the parties. Small state mediation can therefore be helpful to both powerful and weak parties alike: For the powerful party, a small state can provide a face-saver to whom capitulations can be made without threatening the public-bargaining posture of the powerful party. For the weaker party, a smaller state can provide a sympathetic ally who can understand what it means to negotiate from weakness (Ibid.) Because of their lack of direct involvement in international crises, small states often have the ability to offer peacekeeping missions to conflict zones which powerful parties would sometimes be unable to provide (Holsti 1970, 246). Through this type of involvement, small states can contribute to de-escalation and trust-building measures. Rather than coercion, small states generally resort to persuasion in international mediation. As a result, small-state mediation does not often leave the feelings of resentment that sometimes result from superpower interventions. Especially for conflicts originating from an imbalance of power, small states can prove helpful in reducing the power gap between the parties and as a result help in reaching agreements (Slim 1992). However, in order for small-state mediation to be effective, parties have to have the political will to negotiate. Small states do not have the leverage to pressure parties into negotiating and thus are limited in the extent to which they can move conflict parties 1 Qatar had actively supported Morsi’s presidency. For example, after meeting with Morsi in summer 2012, the Emir of Qatar had deposited USD 2 billion in Egypt’s Central Bank (Ahram Online 2012). 82 I. FRAIHAT from their original positions. For this reason, small states usually end up using facilitation and, to a certain extent, procedural strategies and rarely use manipulation in the way superpowers do. Facilitation can take the form of message-carrying; the procedural strategy moves a step further and involves management of the process, whereas manipulation can be seen as using leverage to move parties from their positions (Beardsley et al. 2006). Superpowers, on the other hand, mediate from a different angle. The most important characteristic of superpower mediation is its ability to use leverage, which is a key factor in persuading conflict parties to engage in negotiating possible settlements of their conflicts. Saadia Touval explains how leverage contributes to successful mediation. He argues: Leverage comes, first, from the parties’ need for a solution (when such a need develops) that the mediator can provide; second, from the parties’ susceptibility to the shifting weight that the mediator can apply; and third, from the parties’ interest in side payments that the mediator can either offer (‘carrots’), or withhold (‘sticks’) (Touval 1992, 233). Because of the serious leverage they bring to the table, superpowers can become the guarantors of an agreement once reached (Ibid.). All parties want to be assured that someone, a superpower mediator in this case, is able to pressure whoever refuses into delivering its commitment once implementation of agreements begin. This helps the parties feel the importance of the mediation process, and can bring them to negotiate more seriously. Parties want to avoid having a superpower mediator turn against them. As Touval (1992, 239) highlights, having a superpower as mediator might be preferable to having it aligning with one’s enemy. However, the major challenge of superpower mediation is the conflict between serving their own interests or the interests of the parties in conflict to reach an agreement. States mediate based on strategic calculations (Melin 2013, 78-90), so that, even if the interest is not perceived in the short run, long-term interest can direct superpower mediation: “Because of their extensive global involvements, many conflicts in various parts of the globe are perceived by the superpowers as affecting their interests” (Touval 1992, 233). The most dangerous aspect of this dynamic is that superpowers possess the means to manipulate situations and, as a result, their mediation can end up exacerbating the conflict situation so that it serves their own interest. Mediation efforts in the Gulf crisis On 31 May 2017, only a few days before the crisis officially broke out (5 June), the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, paid a visit to the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, to discuss the tension in the Gulf, among other issues. The visit could be considered as the formal beginning of Kuwaiti mediation efforts to contain the crisis and find a solution to it. Building on his key role in containing the previous crisis between Qatar and the other three Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain) in 2014, Sheikh Sabah did not hesitate to step in to mediate the crisis. He realised the danger that the crisis presented not only to the primary parties, but also to the entire framework of collaboration among GCC countries. Speaking at a parliamentary session in THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 83 October 2017, Sheikh Sabah warned that the Gulf crisis “may escalate and could lead the GCC to collapse” (Middle East Monitor 2017). Sheikh Sabah invested highly in the mediation of the crisis by associating himself closely with the process and the objective of preventing escalation, especially in the early days of the crisis. He visited Saudi Arabia the second day of the blockade, 6 June, and the UAE on 7 June, to meet with the heads of states. He sent letters, made phone calls and dispatched his Foreign Minister as part of a full-scale mobilisation to de-escalate the crisis. In December 2019, Sheikh Sabah put the Deputy Foreign Minister, Khaled AlJarallah, in charge of a follow up with Qatar’s Emir and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince to ensure Kuwait’s constant intervention throughout the crisis. One major development of Sheikh Sabah’s mediation effort was his meeting with US President Donald Trump in September 2017 to discuss the Gulf crisis. In a joint press conference with Trump, Sheikh Sabah revealed significant information about his mediation efforts: “What is important is that we have stopped any military action”. The Quartet expressed regrets about the Emir’s statement, saying that “the military option was not and will not be (used) in any circumstance” (Oliphant 2017). The Kuwaiti Emir tried not only to mediate and negotiate the conflict issues between the parties, but also attempted to create a dialogue within the GCC to discuss them (Garcia 2019). He engaged in back-channel diplomacy between Riyadh and Doha to overcome the obstacles that had prevented a serious dialogue among the parties. In December 2017, Kuwait hosted the 38th GCC summit with the hope that a breakthrough in the crisis could be achieved, but the summit was attended by only two heads of states (the emirs of Kuwait and Qatar), with the Quartet sending representatives on the ministerial and deputy ministerial levels. Although planned for two days, the summit ended after only two hours due to the challenges it encountered (Deutsche Welle 2017). It was reported that the parties even failed to agree a specific agenda for the summit or a common approach to solve the crisis. Like Kuwait, the United States played a key role in the Gulf crisis from day one. Unlike Trump’s support for the blockading countries in his first statements on the opening day of the crisis, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson treated the crisis as a priority for his foreign policy agenda. He believed that the crisis does not help the Gulf states nor Washington in dealing with the security challenges both parties face. Secretary Tillerson communicated his position publicly, stating that “[r]estoring the unity of Gulf nations remains in the interest of all parties in the region” (Reuters 2018) and expecting these countries to “immediately take steps to de-escalate the situation and put forth a good faith effort to resolve the grievances they have with each other” (US Embassy in Egypt 2017) As a means of demonstrating its commitment to mediating and helping to resolve the crisis, in August 2017, the US appointed a Special Envoy to the Gulf specifically to negotiate a possible resolution with the parties, General Anthony Zinni, a former commander in the US Central Command. However, in January 2019, Zinni resigned from this post. One US official explained the resignation by stating that “Zinni left because he felt he had reached a dead end, believing there was no forward movement on resolving the stalemate between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors” (Hansler and Atwood 2019). US Secretary of Defense James Mattis also made significant efforts to bring the Gulf parties together. In September 2018, he, along with CENTCOM Head, General Joseph 84 I. FRAIHAT Votel, managed to have army chiefs of all Gulf countries, including Qatar, meet in Kuwait for the first time and discuss regional security matters. Towards an effective approach to mediation: United States and Kuwait The United States and Kuwait have been the primary mediators of the Gulf crisis from day one, adopting two different approaches to mediation: superpower versus smallstate mediation. There has been a high degree of collaboration between the two countries, but each has nevertheless approached mediation from its own angle. Comparing the two approaches reveals a number of differences between the two and important implications for effectiveness. Timing There is a rich scholarly debate on the timing of mediation, which emphasises the advantages and disadvantages with regard to their effectiveness of both early and late mediation. William Zartman (2008), for example, argues that the right moment for effective mediation comes when the parties reach a mutually hurting stalemate and feel that a peace initiative presents an enticing opportunity to exit the stalemate. However, early mediation gives the parties the opportunity to settle their differences before they have invested too much in the conflict, which becomes a hindrance to them exiting the conflict. Both the US and Kuwait acted very early by engaging with all parties to the crisis. The first day after the start of the blockade, the Emir of Kuwait was in Saudi Arabia and then the UAE, communicating his position clearly on what ought to be done. Kuwait’s early intervention did not resolve the crisis. However, according to Sheikh Sabah, this mediation was able to prevent a military escalation (Oliphant 2017). As time passed, Kuwait remained closely engaged with the parties, taking advantage of every opportunity the crisis presented for mediation. In September 2019, after nearly two and a half years of the blockade, the Emir of Kuwait was scheduled to meet with President Trump in Washington to discuss potential resolutions of the crisis, but the meeting was cancelled at the last minute due to the Emir’s medical conditions. However, at the GCC summit in December 2019 and with the help of Kuwait mediation, Saudi Arabia and Qatar came the closest to a breakthrough since the beginning of the crisis even though it fell through in the end. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, meanwhile, stated that “the Kuwait mediation would continue away from the media glare and public eye” (Ulrichsen 2019). The chances for effectiveness of US early mediation were significantly damaged by the division among the American leadership about who to blame for the crisis. The political establishment was divided: while President Trump was making statements in support of the Quartet’s position and criticising Qatar, his Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, and Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, were giving more balanced statements, taking into account the arguments of both parties. On 6 June, the day following the blockade, President Trump stated, “During my recent trip to the Middle East, I stated that there can no longer be funding of radical ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar” (Chiacu 2017). However, the Pentagon was simultaneously making statements THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 85 praising Qatar for its support for regional security. On June 5 2017, Pentagon Spokesman Navy Captain Jeff Davis commented, “We continue to be grateful to the Qataris for their longstanding support for our presence and their enduring commitment to regional security” (Stewart 2017). Because of these mixed messages in the early days of the crisis, US officials missed an important opportunity to maximise the effectiveness of their mediation approach. As a result, “the inconsistency in US policy towards the Gulf crisis has contributed to complicating the issue and made it even more difficult to find a quick solution to the problem” (Kabalan 2018, 33). The mediator: power and legitimacy While the US brings power to the mediation table, Kuwait brings legitimacy. Mediation can be more effective if both power and legitimacy are represented in some way in the mediation process. However, for a mediator to come to the process with only legitimacy, without power, as in the case of Kuwait, mediation will be limited to the strategies that Jacob Bercovitch (2009, 347) calls facilitation and procedural strategies. Facilitation strategies consist of searching, supplying and clarifying information (e.g., acting as a gobetween). Procedural strategies are designed to help the mediator gain and retain control over the process of interaction (e.g., setting the agenda, controlling the environment). To use manipulation strategies, however, the mediator must have power, not just the legitimacy of intervention. Manipulation strategies are where the mediator is directly involved “in changing the parties’ decision-making process (e.g., through rewards, offering solutions, or exerting pressure)” (Bercovitch and Wells 1993, 7). Where does Kuwait get its legitimacy of intervention? Kuwait was a founding member of the GCC in 1981 – a body that was established mainly as a security framework for its members. Sheikh Sabah himself was the Foreign Minister of Kuwait when the GCC was established, and so was personally involved in building the GCC framework for security, cultural and economic cooperation. Age and status give him the contextual legitimacy to intervene and discuss the most politically sensitive issues within what is called al-bayt alkhaleeji (the Gulf House). In other words, Kuwait and Sheikh Sabah in particular are the party most legitimised to act as a mediator in this crisis. In this context, legitimacy has many implications for mediation. It allows the legitimised mediator to discuss sensitive political issues inside al-bayt al-khaleeji that others may not be in a position to discuss. Furthermore, legitimacy grants the mediator a moral power to influence disputants. In addition, legitimacy translates into trust between the parties and the mediator, and this has been the case in this crisis, as Sheikh Sabah has been successful in maintaining the trust of the parties. Indeed, it is no wonder that the Emir of Qatar’s first step after the hacking of the Qatar News Agency on 24 May 2017 was to pay an immediate visit to the Kuwaiti Emir. The Saudis, too, have repeatedly stated that the solution to the Gulf crisis “will only be through Kuwaiti mediation and through the GCC system” (Al Rai 2019). However, there is one important component missing in the Kuwaiti mediation that has thus far hampered its effectiveness: power. However legitimised, without this, the mediation will still be lacking the most important factor in making it effective, the political will of the parties to reach a solution, something which has obviously not been 86 I. FRAIHAT present during the crisis. This lack of power explains why the Kuwaiti mediation has still not been able to yield concrete results, in terms of resolution. In fact, to use a stronger strategy, the manipulation strategy, the mediator must have power, not just the legitimacy of intervention. The US has such leverage. All parties to the crisis need the US, as their security strategies are mostly dependent on it. Furthermore, they are historical partners of the US since the days of the Cold War against the Soviet Union. These facts put the US in a special position to be able to impact the unfolding of the crisis. Yet, during its mediation efforts, and especially after the appointment of the Special Envoy Anthony Zinni in August 2017, the US seemed not to have used its leverage to convince the parties to come to the mediation table or to engage in serious scenarios for resolution. Until his resignation in January 2019, the Special Envoy kept a low profile, with no breakthroughs to report concerning US mediation between the parties. Nor has a replacement been appointed since Zinni’s resignation in January 2019. This suggests a lack of serious interest in contributing to the resolution of this crisis. The crisis is not affecting US interests in the region and therefore the Trump administration sees no reason to use its leverage to convince the parties to sit down and talk or even to commit resources (that is, by appointing another Special Envoy) to try to resolve it. This scenario leads us to the important question of whether the US is genuinely interested in mediating a resolution to the conflict. It seems that what matters to the Trump administration is how each scenario – resolution vs stalemate – serves US interests, not necessarily those of the parties to the conflict. Interest The interest of a third-party mediator has a significant potential to affect the mediation process and its final outcome. That is why the interest of a third party should always be examined to understand what impact it could have in mediating a conflict. Examining the Gulf crisis, it could be argued that, for Kuwait, successful mediation is a national security interest. Kuwait’s primary interest is a peaceful resolution that leads to a united and strong GCC as a security umbrella for its six members. Kuwait has no choice but to succeed in reconciling the rift among GCC member states. A divided GCC means that Kuwait is weaker not only compared to Iran but compared to other countries like Iraq too. The GCC must be united and powerful for Kuwait to achieve its national security objectives in the Gulf region. As one Kuwaiti scholar put it, Kuwait lives in a triangle of three major powers with large geographic and population densities (Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia). [. . .] For example, Kuwait was the target of Saudi aggression in the years 1793 and 1797 and has gone through the bitter experiment of the Saddam invasion of 1990 from its Iraqi neighbor and of course the constant Iranian threats at the present time (Alajmi 2018, 538). Therefore, a balance among them is a necessity. With the recent escalation in conflict between Iran and the US, the Gulf is going through one of the tightest security moments of the past few decades. The Gulf has to remain strong and united to face such challenges. THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 87 It is also one of Kuwait’s core interests that this crisis be resolved through negotiation, rather than one side imposing its conditions on the other. For a big country like Saudi Arabia to impose its demands on a small Gulf state like Qatar would send the wrong message to other small states like Kuwait and Oman. They would no doubt wonder if they could then be next. Such an imposition could create a precedent for other similar moves in the future. Indeed, Qatar supports the Muslim Brotherhood, which Saudi Arabia and the UAE consider a terrorist organisation, and this was one of the causes that led to the blockade. In Kuwait, notably, the Muslim Brotherhood enjoys the rights of political activism and is represented in the country’s parliament. Again, a negotiated and inclusive solution to the Gulf crisis is at the core of Kuwait’s interests, so that it will not have to face in the future what Qatar is facing today. The Trump administration’s mediation, on the other hand, seems to have been motivated by maintaining the status quo, not allowing the crisis to escalate into a war nor in a hurry to resolve it either. Analysts from the Gulf region share the concern that solving the crisis in the Gulf is not something Trump is interested in. “The general atmosphere is not ready for a comprehensive dialogue under American direction” (al-Ansari 2018, 44). It could be argued that the Trump administration’s primary interest in this crisis is to maximise military sales, forge new security arrangements and manage its conflict with Iran better. The United States provides security protection (El-Katiri 2014) to all GCC countries, not only against external powers but also against each other (Habibi 2019). Thus its position has significant weight on the direction the crisis could take. By sending mixed signals about where it stands (Lynch 2017), especially in the early stages of the crisis, the Trump administration created confusion among the parties and subsequently pushed the crisis into a state of prolonged stalemate. First, President Trump made it a priority for his administration to maximise its arms sales to the Gulf and the crisis neatly served this purpose in his view. Commenting on his meeting with Qatar’s Sheikh Al-Thani in May 2017, Trump said that the two countries have been friends for a long time and that they discussed Qatar’s purchase of “lots of beautiful military equipment” (Borger 2017). As Majed al-Ansari (2018, 44) pointed out, “Washington’s biggest shortcoming is its lack of readiness: it has no clear strategy toward the Gulf except for the president’s insistence on [. . .] Gulf states [. . .] buying more American weapons to help the American job market”. A few days after the blockade, Qatar signed a deal to purchase F-15 fighter jets from the United States for USD 12 billion (Capaccio and Wadhams 2017). Furthermore, in 2019, during Qatar Emir’s visit to the US, Trump stated that Qatar agreed to buy “tremendous amounts of military equipment” (Sink and Black 2019). Yet, increased business activities between the two countries have not been limited to arms sales but have also expanded to other areas. For example, in 2019, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) announced plans to increase its investments in the US from USD 30 billion to USD 45 billion over two years (Khalel 2019). Arms sales to Saudi Arabia have also increased since the crisis began. Donald Trump has repeatedly confirmed that Saudi Arabia signed contracts with the US for USD 110 billion, especially after his visit to Riyadh in May 2017. Some experts argue that the number is inflated,2 but statistics nevertheless show that Saudi Arabia is maintaining its position as “America’s no. 1 weapons customer” (Ivanoca 2018). Furthermore, in 2 See for example Riedel (2017) and Kessler (2018). 88 I. FRAIHAT May 2019, Trump defied Congress by allocating “$8 billion-plus in weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, UAE” (Zengerle 2019). The second major strategic interest the US seems to have in mediating in this crisis is forging new security arrangements, especially with regard to counterterrorism, and increasing security collaboration with the parties to the conflict. To this end, only one month after the blockade, the US and Qatar signed a new security memorandum of understanding (MoU) on “combating terrorism financing”. Secretary of State Tillerson commented on the day of the signing that “the memorandum lays out a series of steps that each country will take in coming months and years to interrupt and disable terror financing flows and intensify counter-terrorism activities globally” (Finn 2017). Also on the issue of increasing security collaboration, in January 2019, the US signed an MoU with Qatar to expand support to the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, used as US headquarters during the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) and currently home to more than 10,000 US military personnel. At the signing ceremony, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated: As the host of thousands of US military personnel and the US Central Command (CENTCOM) forward headquarters, this base is key to American security and our shared efforts to promote regional stability. We thank Qatar for its dedication to improving and modernizing it (Airforce Technology 2019). It was also reported that the two sides had a discussion over making the base permanent (Cafiero 2019, 143). Third, US management of its conflict with Iran is an important consideration. Theoretically, a polarised Gulf negatively affects the US interest in keeping the GCC countries fully united to confront Iran. Indeed, after the blockade, Qatar restored diplomatic relations with Iran and increased its economic activities with Tehran. It is therefore assumed that US mediation would mean using its leverage to end the crisis and bring the GCC parties back together to help with US policies to confront Iran. Instead, what US mediation has achieved so far is to elicit military collaboration between the GCC countries so that the crisis does not affect US military interests in the Gulf, while all other differences remain intact. That is, though the Quartet severed all relations – diplomatic, military and economic – with Qatar, in September 2018, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis managed to gather all GCC army chiefs, including Qatar, together in a meeting in Kuwait to discuss military collaboration. The US wanted to form what it called an ‘Arab NATO’ (al-Wasmi 2018) to have this force “act as a counterbalance to Iran’s growing expansionist agenda in the Arab world”. Egypt and Jordan were expected to join the force as well. That was the first meeting on this level to take place since the Qatar blockade was announced. The foregoing discussion shows how Kuwait’s primary interest has been in resolving the crisis and reunifying the Gulf Cooperation Council, while the Trump administration has linked its interest to increasing arms sales and security collaboration with the parties to the conflict. Thus, the US has preferred to maintain the status quo, neither resolving the crisis nor allowing it to escalate into a war as both options would seriously affect its interests in the Gulf region. THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 89 Conclusion The differences in Kuwaiti and US mediation efforts in the Gulf crisis shed light on areas of limitations and effectiveness of small-state and superpower mediation. In principle, it seems that mediation does make a difference, not necessarily by resolving conflicts, but at least by contributing to containment and de-escalation of the crisis. Yet, mediation is an interest-driven act. Mediators do not intervene solely for the sake of making peace, as they too have vested interests in the outcome. Thus, mediators tend to influence the development of a crisis to serve their own interests, even if this means preventing an immediate solution. Since the beginning of the blockade, Kuwait has seriously tried to end the crisis and restore the unity of the GCC, which is in line with its national security strategy. However, the Trump administration’s primary interest has not been in reaching an agreement soon, or at least not until the desired arms sales are completed and new security agreements in the Gulf (e.g. expansion of the Al Udeid Air Base, collaboration on combating terrorism) put in place. This suggests that those who mediate should ideally be the ones whose interest is in reaching a peaceful outcome of a crisis as soon as possible. Small-state mediation (as represented by Kuwait) embodies legitimacy, while superpower mediation (as represented by the US) signifies power. Legitimacy and power are not mutually exclusive in mediation. It is not an either/or situation, and the two attributes are not, and should not be, in competition. Indeed, such a combination would be strongly positioned to make a difference. However, neither US nor Kuwaiti mediation has resolved the crisis, not due to a lack of potential in the power-legitimacy combination, but because the Trump administration has chosen not to use its leverage to resolve the crisis, and instead has pursued the maximisation of its own gains: arms sales and new security arrangements in the region. Early mediation remains a key factor for both small-state and superpower mediation. The Emir of Kuwait’s intervention on the first day of the crisis had a significant impact on containing the crisis and preventing further escalation. The confusion of superpower mediation in the early days of the crisis reflected itself on the overall environment, resulting in a fragmented, and thus less effective, mediation approach by Kuwait and the US. It prevented the formulation of what could have become an effective model of mediation that combines both power and legitimacy. Small-state mediation, though it represents legitimacy and less intimidation as compared to superpower mediation, remains limited in terms of its conflict resolution capacity and reliant on the political will of the parties to proceed effectively. Kuwaiti mediation was effective in areas related to containment and de-escalation but fell short of resolution in the absence of a clear political will of the parties to resolve their conflict. As stated by the Emir of Kuwait, his intensive intervention in the early days of the crisis led to the neutralisation of a military option by the Quartet against Qatar. Finally, the absence of a powerful mediator is a problem, but its presence can present an even bigger problem and further exacerbation of the conflict development. Power is, of course, helpful for mediation as legitimacy of mediation is often not sufficient to address factors like the absence of political will among the parties. The starting point for resolving such a dilemma can be seen as the accurate identification of the interests of the 90 I. FRAIHAT superpower mediator(s). In order for the mediation to be used effectively, these interests have to be in resolving the conflict. This has been missing in the Trump administration’s intervention in the Gulf crisis and helps to explain its failure to this point. Notes on contributor Ibrahim Fraihat is Associate Professor in International Conflict Resolution at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha, Qatar. References Ahram Online. 2012. 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