Reconsidering "law" in Hebrews

Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James Philip La G. du Toit North-West University Abstract Amidst various interpretative options about the identities of the author and addressees of the Letter of James, one’s interpretation of the letter’s discourse on the concept of law plays a critical role in the way in which these identities are reconstructed. Two laws or principles form part of the discourse in the Letter of James, namely, the Mosaic law (esp. 2:9–11) and the kingdom-principle of freedom (esp. 1:25; 2:8, 12). It is argued that the kingdom-principle of freedom in Christ is presented to the recipients in contrast with a probable tendency among these Judaean Christ-believers to be torahorientated, especially involving the judging of people on the basis of the Mosaic law. In this scenario, the author can be identified as James, the half-brother of Christ, who is not fully torah abiding. It is argued that James uses a rhetorical strategy of frankness in terms of the issues in the congregation he addresses together with a strategy of subtlety in respect of his discourse on law. In his rhetorical strategy on law he contextualises his message in such a manner that he identifies with the recipients’ frame of reference of law. By doing so, he attempts to lead them to a different perception on law and present to them a different principle by which they can become whole in their personal and corporative life. Key Terms Torah; authorship; identity; Apostolic Decree; love command; royal law; kingdom 1 Introduction The Letter of James, its author and its recipients remain to be interpreted in various ways. The main approaches can broadly be categorised along the following lines: (1) While many recent interpreters of the Letter of James understand the letter as representing “Jewish” Christianity (e.g., Adamson 1976, 20–21; Burdick 1981, 162; Davids 1982, 1–3; Kistemaker Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 © New Testament Society of Southern Africa 276 P. la G. du Toit / Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 1986, 6; Barton, Veerman and Wilson 1992, xv; Perkins 1995, 85; Moo 2000; Isaacs 2002, 176; Brosend 2004, 8; Kamell and Blomberg 2008, 35; McCartney 2009, 33; Osborne 2011, 6; Anderson 2017, 23), 1 there exists a growing tendency to see the author as well as the audience of the letter as representing a form of (2) Judaism (e.g., Mussner 1998, 67–78; Neusner 2001, 1–9) or (3) Messianic Judaism (e.g., Bauckham 1999, 142–151; Hartin 2004, 96; 2009, 27; McKnight 2011, 8–13; cf. Allison 2013, 43; 2015). (4) Others come close to the latter two views in respect of the prominence of the Mosaic law in the community that the letter addresses, without necessarily calling the movement Judaism or Messianic Judaism as such (e.g., Guthrie 1990, 732; Jackson-McCabe 2001, 253; Achtemeier, Green and Thompson 2001, 480; Wachob 2004; Holladay 2005, 685–687; Konradt 2008; Van de Sandt 2008; Hartin 2008; Johnson 2010, 455; Strange 2010, 191–194). Admittedly, with many scholars there exists a measure of overlap between these four broad approaches. In approach 1, the letter and its addressees are not necessarily understood as representing (religious) “Jewishness” but rather as indicating the ethnic composition of these early Christians as early recipients of the gospel. But in this approach, the community is normally seen as early Christians, distinct from historical Israel. In approaches 2 and 3, the letter and its addressees are understood as representing an identity that is continued to be marked off by full adherence to the Mosaic law in distinction from gentiles (approach 2) or gentile Christ-believers (approach 3).2 In approach 4, the Mosaic law is seen as prominent in the community’s identity and ethics, without necessarily seeing the community as within “Judaism” or without pertinently describing it as a form of Messianic Judaism. A problem that obscures the reconstruction of the identity of the author of the Letter of James and its recipients is the absence of concrete references to setting or circumstances in the letter. The way in which the original setting of the author and recipients is envisioned, remains a matter of conjecture and mirror reading, which in itself is an inductive, tentative Some argue that “Jewish” materials were adopted by Christianity, which does not necessitate a “Jewish” Christian author (e.g., Dibelius 1976, 24; Laws 1980, 36–37). Since the distinction between “Jewish” and Hellenistic is not so clear cut (see below), some interpreters remain undecided on whether the author is a “Jewish” Christian or a gentile Christian (e.g., Richardson 1997, 39). 2 The Messianic Judaist view is equivalent to the so called Radical New Perspective on Paul (also referred to as the Paul Within Judaism approach) in which separate conditions apply for Judaean and gentile believers: Judaean believers have to adhere to the whole Mosaic law, including ritual requirements such as circumcision and purity laws, whereas gentile believers do not have to adhere to these requirements (see, e.g., Tomson 1990; Eisenbaum 2009; Nanos 2012). 1 Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James 277 enterprise (cf. Barclay 1988, 37–41). In other words, the reconstruction of the letter’s author and setting is ultimately dependent on one’s interpretation of the content of the letter. Since full adherence to the Mosaic law, which includes the observance of ritual requirements such as circumcision, dietary laws, feasts and sabbaths, is considered as marking off “Jewishness,” the above mentioned approaches to the Letter of James largely hinge on how νόμος (“law”) is interpreted in the letter. But a difficulty that underlies any interpretation of νόμος in the letter is the fact that it is silent on ritual or cultic requirements, including circumcision. Those who see the letter within the realm of “Judaism,” tend to interpret this silence such that these ritual requirements are presupposed (esp. approaches 2 and 3). Those who see the letter more as an early “Christian” document, tend to see the silence on ritual requirements as indicating that adherence to them is unnecessary or insignificant, although there are middle positions in the interpretative spectrum. As an example of a middle position, Allison (2015) argues that the letter is a kind of apology that reflects a Christian group that still battles for a place within the “Jewish” community. In other words, they want to be Christian but also remain “Jewish” and thus want to remain faithful members of the synagogue. For Allison, the silence on the ritual laws would thus be a deliberate apologetic strategy to be sensitive to both groups. A factor that has to be kept in mind in this regard is that both Christianity and Judaism are only identifiable as full scale religions after 70 CE (see Mason 2007; Du Toit 2019, 31–39).3 The first aim of this article is to revisit the discourse on νόμος in the letter in order to attempt a reconstruction of the basic identities of both the author and the letter’s recipients that best fits the content and broad rhetorical strategy of the letter. This reconstruction will not attempt to reconstruct all the specifics of the author and recipients, but try to draw broad lines of demarcation in respect of their position towards the Mosaic law. The basic question is thus: Are the letter and its author more “Christian” or more “Jewish” orientated? The second aim is to try and answer the question: What is the rhetorical function of the discourse on νόμος in the letter and how does it relate to our understanding of both the author and the addressees? These two aims will be pursued along the following lines: Some points of connection between the discourse on law in the Letter of James and scholars’ perception of the author’s identity will As a result, the terms “Judaeans” will be used for the Ἰουδαῖοι and the term “Christ-believers” or the like will be used to indicate the new faith community in this article. 3 278 P. la G. du Toit / Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 be highlighted. Broad lines of demarcation of the addressees and the rhetorical situation behind the letter will be sketched in order to better understand the discourse on νόμος. A close reading of the discourse on νόμος will be conducted in relation to some of the main themes in the letter, especially the themes of faith (1:3, 6; 2:1, 5, 14–26; 5:15), love (1:12; 2:5, 8), the word (1:18–23) and mercy (2:13; 3:17; 5:11). In this discussion about νόμος, all instances where the concept of law occurs, will be addressed (1:25; 2:8–13; 4:11–12). In conclusion, the interpretation of νόμος will be applied to the demarcation of the basic identity of both the author and the recipients of the letter, as well as to the aim of the author’s rhetorical strategy on νόμος. 2 Views of the Author of the Letter of James in Relation to Law Since the letter continues to be interpreted in various ways, and since one’s view of authorship is largely dependent on one’s interpretation of the content of the letter (see above), especially the discourse on law, the main views on authorship continue to vary from being an early letter, penned by James the Just, the half-brother of Jesus (e.g., Richardson 1997; Moo 2000; 2015; McCartney 2009; Osborne 2011; McKnight 2011; Allison 2013), to being a later, pseudonymous letter written in tribute of James the Just (e.g., Ropes 1916, 47; Perkins 1995; Hartin 2008). Some hold the view that it was written by a later, unknown James (e.g., Isaacs 2002, 176). Many interpreters who advocate for the letter’s authenticity accentuate the underlying prominence of the Mosaic law behind the letter’s rhetoric, which is related to a general perception of James, the half-brother of Jesus, as being more torah-orientated, especially in comparison with Paul (e.g., Bauckham 2003; McKnight 2011). This perception is mainly based on the following five factors: (1) James was the leader of the Jerusalem church, which was seen as generally having mostly Judaean members. Although there were torah-orientated members of the church in Jerusalem (Acts 15:1–5), that does not mean that all its members demanded full torah observance or that such was James’s personal conviction. In fact, Paul, who advocated freedom from the law and did not see himself as being under the law any more (1 Cor 9:20), was also affiliated to the Jerusalem church. (2) James endorsed certain legalistic requirements to be laid on the gentiles, known as the Apostolic Decree (Acts 15:13–21). I have Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James 279 argued elsewhere that the Apostolic Decree can be understood as accommodating certain torah-orientated Judaean believers who were disgruntled with gentiles who did not adhere to Mosaic requirements such as circumcision and other Mosaic (purity) laws (esp. Acts 15:1, 5), rather than being a requirement for gentiles to be members of the believing community. Neither is there evidence that there was a fixed code in the early Judaean church that required all Judaean believers to circumcise and keep all the ritual requirements of the Mosaic law (Du Toit 2016, 2–3). In fact, in Luke’s account of James’s words (Acts 13:13–21), James, in reference to Amos 9:11–12, accentuates the fact that gentiles are part of God’s people and that the best course of action would be “not to trouble” (μὴ παρενοχλεῖν, v. 19) them with the whole Mosaic law, which could be indicative of the notion among (some) Judaean believers that full adherence to the Mosaic law was considered a burden altogether (ibid.).4 (3) James supported the proposal that Paul had to take a Nazarite vow (Acts 21:18–26), but James’s support for such a proposal is not necessarily on the grounds of strong personal conviction about the Mosaic law itself, but might as well be to avoid offence among torahorientated Judaean believers (Guthrie 1990, 738). I have argued that, even though there were many Judaean believers that were zealous for the law in the early Jerusalem church (v. 20), this does not mean that all Judaean believers in the whole church shared such a view of the law (Du Toit 2016, 4–5).5 (4) In respect of the Antioch incident, Paul reports that certain men from James influenced Peter and other Judaean believers not to eat with gentiles (Gal 2:11–14). The fact that certain men from James came and influenced the church in Antioch in such a manner does not necessarily mean that James shared the same zeal for the law as these men (Guthrie 1990, 738). Keener (2019, 146) points out that Paul does not actually say that James “sent” these men. The fact that they “came from” (ἐλθεῖν . . . ἀπό, Gal 2:12) James could merely be a geographical reference without indicating commissioning (so George 1994, 175; Barnett 1999, 285–286; contra DeSilva 2018, 196–198). They could have been “believers who belonged to the party of the Apart from the reference to the law bringing “trouble” to the gentiles on James’s lips (Acts 15:19), see the reference to the “yoke” (ζυγός) of the law on Peter’s lips (Acts 15:10) and the reference to the “burden” (βάρος) of the law in the apostolic letter itself (Acts 15:28). 5 I have also argued that Paul, in taking a Nazarene vow, was faithful to the principle that he lays down in 1 Cor 9:19–23 to be everything to everyone in order to win them for the gospel. 4 280 P. la G. du Toit / Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 Pharisees” (Acts 15:5; Barnett 1999, 285) or they might have been “simply itinerants, very much like the agitators in Galatia, who had put themselves forward in such a way” (Fee 2007, 74; see Acts 15:24).6 (5) Another factor that shapes much of the perception around James being torah-orientated, originates mainly from Hegesippus’s account of James’s death as recorded by Eusebius (Hist. eccl. 2.23), portraying James as a zealot for the law. Hegesippus might have derived his information from the Ebionites, who disregarded Paul and elevated James as the true heir of Jesus’s teaching (Moo 2015, 30–31, 35). Other early apocryphal traditions also portray James as being zealous for the law (see Moo 2000, 16). However, these sources are recognised as tendentious and as capturing James “for their own radically Jewish-Christian agenda” (ibid.; see also Ward 1992). Thus, none of these factors necessarily imply that James, the half-brother of Jesus, was zealous for the law or that he would advocate full torah observance for Judaean believers, including circumcision. In other words, arguing for the authenticity of the Letter of James is not necessarily dependent on James being fully torah-observant or being torah-orientated. Arguments that the Letter of James is written by the apostle James is ultimately dependent on the perceived consistency between the content of the letter and all other evidence we have about James, which in itself remains a tentative, interpretative enterprise. While the main intention of this article is not to settle the issue about authorship, the idea is to see whether a close reading of the discourse on law in the letter can shed new light on the identity of the author and his rhetorical strategy. 3 The Addressees and the Rhetorical Situation behind the Letter of James Although one’s perception of the addressees and the rhetorical situation is related to one’s interpretation of the content of the letter and remains a Das (2014, 207) argues that “those of the circumcision” (τοὺς ἐκ περιτομῆς, Gal 2:12) is a larger group than the group from James, but that the group from James might have represented the interests of the Jerusalem circumcision party. Another possibility is that these men were indeed a delegation from James, but that they came “to express certain practical concerns of Jerusalem believers regarding the expression of the Christian faith at Antioch” (Longenecker 1990, 73), which specifically involved the organisation of table fellowship and not necessarily an agenda to uphold the whole Mosaic law (cf. Dunn 1993, 121–122). Bruce (1982, 130) argues that the intention of discouraging table fellowship with gentiles might be due to a perception among Judaean believers that such a practice could hamper the evangelisation of Judaeans. 6 Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James 281 tentative exercise (see above), some preliminary broad lines of demarcation will be drawn in order to attempt to put the discourse on law in the letter in context of a probable profile of its readers.7 Admittedly, such an endeavour inevitably involves an element of circularity in that one’s interpretation of the content of the letter and one’s view of the addressees are interdependent. The preliminary choices that will be made here are thus intended to be consistent with the view that the author of the Letter of James is not necessarily torah-orientated. The clearest indicator of the identity of the addressees is the reference to the “twelve tribes in the dispersion” (δώδεκα φυλαῖς ταῖς ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ) in 1:1. Although there are some grounds that such a designation is intended as metaphorical (Wall 1997, 12–13;8 Moo 2000, 23;9 cf. Johnson 2010, 451), most commentators agree that the members of the congregation were biological descendants of historical Israel that were literally dispersed (e.g., Kistemaker 1986, 6). Whether the addressees were dispersed within Palestine (Scaer 1993, 28–30; cf. McCartney 2009, 37) or beyond the boundaries of Palestine (Richardson 1997, 39; Kamell and Blomberg 2008, 28, 35; Hartin 2009, 25; McCartney 2009, 33) cannot be established beyond doubt. The other indicator in the letter that has a bearing on the identity of the addressees is the reference to συναγωγή in Jas 2:2. While this could point to a Judaean synagogue building (BDAG, s.v. συναγωγή, §2a; e.g., Allison 2013, 43, 386) or “an assembly-place for Judeo-Christians (Nazarenes)” (BDAG, s.v. συναγωγή, §2b), it could also point to “the members of a synagogue” (ibid., §3) or to “a synagogal meeting” of Judaeans or “Judeo-Christian congregations” (ibid., §4; cf. Bauckham 2003, 1487; McCartney 2009, 138). Most English translations translate the word here with “assembly” (e.g., KJV; NKJV; NRSV; ISV; ESV) or “meeting” (e.g., REB; HCSB; NIV), which agrees with the meaning that BDAG (s.v. συναγωγή, §4) associate with Jas 2:2. Moo (2015, 119–120) argues that the Judaean synagogues did not normally welcome the Christbelieving Judaeans and the fact that the addressees seemed to have control over the conduct in the συναγωγή, suggests that the author is referring to a See Kloppenborg (1999, 758) who argues against Dibelius’s (1976, 3, 129) notion that the Letter of James addresses a fictional audience and cannot be used as a historical source for the actual circumstances of the congregation. 8 Wall argues that the congregants were marginalised and alienated from the cultural order because of their piety and now question whether the testing of their faith is worth their devotion to God. 9 Moo shows that in the intertestamental period, the language of “the twelve tribes” was used to denote the true people of God in the last days. 7 282 P. la G. du Toit / Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 meeting separate from the official Judaean synagogue. In other words, by using traditional language, the author would have had any Christian gathering of these Judaean believers in mind. Painter (2012, 91) points out that συναγωγή in 2:2 is used interchangeably with ἐκκλησία in 5:14 to denote a Christian gathering, a tendency that continued up to the third century CE. Nevertheless, it seems reasonably clear that a Judaean Christbelieving community is addressed. As regards the kind of Judaean believers that the letter addresses, on the basis of the fairly eloquent Greek in which the letter is written, it could be assumed that the audience was Hellenised (Laws 1980, 36; Bauckham 2003, 1483; Painter 2012, 22) with at least some that spoke Greek only (Winkler 1888, 14). Hengel (1989), however, warns against drawing too absolute lines of demarcation between “Judaism” and “Hellenism,” arguing that Palestinian Judaism was part of the Hellenistic world (cf. Laws 1980, 36). McKnight (2011, 31–33) argues that James, the brother of Jesus might have had the capacity to write good Greek and/or that an amanuensis could have had an effect on the letter’s style and vocabulary (cf. Anderson 2017, 19), as the letter shows remarkable similarities with James’s brief speech in Acts 15:13–21 and the apostolic letter in Acts 15:23–29 (see Moo 2015, 31–32). As for the congregation’s economic composition, on average, they were probably middle class (Richardson 1997, 38; McCartney 2009, 38) to poor (Davids 1989, 10; Osborne 2011, 6), seeking the attention and goodwill from the rich (Adamson 1976, 31; Perkins 1995, 90), while neglecting the poor in their own community (Perkins 1995, 90). But the congregation probably contained some wealthy individuals too (Davids 1982, 46; see 2:1–3; 4:13–15). Ironically, it was also the rich landowners that oppressed and exploited them (2:6; 5:1–6; Burdick 1981, 163; Kistemaker 1986, 7; Kamell and Blomberg 2008, 31). The letter repudiates the materialism of the merchants within the church (Davids 1982, 31), to such an extent that some in the congregation have “become the persecutors of the poor through their favoritism and thus taken the role of the rich” (ibid., 46). This economic scenario might point to a situation before the death of James, the Lord’s half-brother (Martin 1988, lxxxiv).10 10 On the basis of mainly 2:1–13, Kloppenborg (1999) argues that the author rejects the fundamental mechanism of patronage by which social hierarchy was articulated and by which the redistribution of wealth was effected. For Kloppenborg (1999, 784), the author rather appealed to friendship, advocating a “general reciprocity” rather than “the balanced reciprocity of patronage . . . It is to encourage the language of mutual obligation rather than that of status hierarchies.” Batten (2004) has a similar approach in which God in the Letter of James is not understood as a substitute patron but as an ideal benefactor. Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James 283 As regards the rhetorical situation that the author addresses, the recipients appear to be falling into various trials or tests,11 which seem to result from an inclination to follow their own fleshly desires (1:15; 3:16; 4:1–3). The author perceives them as having a self-centred inclination that is equivalent to being friends with the world, which the letter addresses as a form of adultery (4:4). At heart, their fleshly, selfish inclination is pictured as constituting double-mindedness (1:8; 4:8) or hypocrisy (3:17), and includes things such as envy (3:14, 16; cf. 5:9), divisiveness (3:6, 8), partiality (2:1–4) and even fighting and warring (4:1–2). Another aspect of their self-centred attitude is sketched as involving pride (4:2–3, 6–7, 10; cf. 4:9, 13–15), boasting or arrogance (3:14; 4:16), which leads to oppressing and dishonouring the poor (1:27; 2:2–6, 15–16). Their perceived pride also relates to being opinionated (1:19; 3:2–18) and having worldly/false wisdom (3:13, 15), which involves swearing (5:12) as well as cursing (3:9–11), speaking evil (4:11) and judging others (2:4, 12– 13; 4:10–12; cf. 5:12). In claiming to be wise (3:13, 15), they were teaching others (3:1), while they probably did not practise what they preached. In fact, their faith seemed to be too theoretical, not leading to love in action (2:14–26; cf. 1:26–27). When real trials or tests came, they seem to have doubted (1:6). In addressing these problems, the author of the Letter of James generally follows a very direct, confrontational approach, which is essentially a call to repentance (esp. 4:7–10). Yet the references to the “Lord Jesus Christ” (1:1; 2:1), the “coming of the Lord” (5:7, 8) and “the name of the Lord” (5:10, 14) indicate that the addressees were believers and followers of Christ. Their call to repentance is thus not an appeal to come to the Christian faith for the first time, but rather a call to renew their faith and confess their sins and self-centredness. Apart from the often mentioned notion that the author bases much of his rhetoric on Jesus’s teachings that predate the gospel formulations (e.g., Moo 2000, 32; McCartney 2009, 31; McKnight 2011, 6), the Christian character of the letter is arguably further indicated by the references to faith (1:3, 6; 2:1, 5, 14–26; 5:15), love (1:12; 2:5, 8), the word (1:18–23), and mercy (2:13; 3:17; 5:11; see below). The same is probably true of addressing the readers as brothers (1:2, 9, 16, 19; 2:1, 5, 14, 15; 3:1, 10, 12; 4:11; 5:7, 9, 10, 12, 19) and sisters (2:15; e.g., Hogan 1997, 81–82; Holladay 2005, 681). The word πειρασμός (1:2, 12) can point to both a test and a trial (see BDAG, s.v. πειρασμός, §1). 11 284 4 P. la G. du Toit / Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 Νόμος in the Letter of James The concept of law is a prominent feature of the Letter of James. The term νόμος occurs in Jas 1:25; 2:8, 9, 10, 11, 12; 4:11 (four times) and the term νομοθέτης (“Lawgiver”) in 4:12. These references can neatly be arranged under three units, 1:25; 2:8–12 and 4:11–12, and will be discussed in that order. Given the probable profile of the addressees as discussed above, the question is, what is the rhetorical function of the letter’s references to νόμος? The prevalence of this concept in itself might indicate a deliberate rhetorical strategy that identifies with a high regard for the Mosaic law under the addressees. Specific references or allusions to the Mosaic law (2:9–11) would confirm such a possibility, but it might also imply that the congregants judged others on the basis of the Mosaic law without showing mercy (2:12–13; 3:17; 4:11–12; cf. 5:6, 11). In other words, the author might have used law-rhetoric to mirror the addressees’ attitude and behaviour back to them in their own terms. This possibility will be pursued further below. 4.1 The νόμος of liberty as the implanted word (James 1:25) The metaphor of the “the perfect law of liberty” in Jas 1:25, has to be traced back to at least v. 18, in which the author refers to “us” (ἡμᾶς), the author and addressees, who have been “brought forth” (ἀπεκύησεν) by the “word of truth” (λόγῳ ἀληθείας) to be the “firstfruit(s)” (ἀπαρχή) of God’s “creatures” (κτισμάτων). Although birth-imagery is found in the OT (e.g., Deut 32:18; Pss 22:9; 90:2), it is often mentioned in the NT in connection with Christian rebirth (John 1:13; 3:3–8; Rom 12:2; 1 Cor 4:15; Eph 1:5; Titus 3:5; 1 Pet 1:3, 23; 1 John 3:9; 4:10; cf. Gal 4:19; Phlm 10). Some argue that an allusion to creation might be intended by the letter’s reference to “creatures” (e.g., Davids 1982, 89; Moo 2000, 79). But the “new creation” terminology in reference to the new, regenerated identity in the NT (2 Cor 5:17; Gal 6:15; Eph 2:10; cf. Eph 4:17–24; Col 3:1–11), references to “firstfruit(s)” in the NT as Christ-believers (2 Thess 2:13; Rom 16:5; 1 Cor 16:15; cf. Rev 14:4), and especially the reference to “the word of truth,” which probably signifies the gospel message (see 2 Cor 6:7; Eph 1:13; Col 1:5; 2 Tim 2:15)12 make it likely that the language here in Jas 1:18 points to rebirth on the basis of the gospel (Ropes 1916, 166; There is a reference to the “word of truth” (λόγον ἀληθείας) in Ps 118:43LXX, but the context is that of God’s Law (see Ps 118:44–45) not to be taken out of the psalmist’s mouth. However, the idea that God would bring forth people by his Law is an unlikely referent here. 12 Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James 285 Dibelius 1976, 104–105; Davids 1982, 89; Martin 1988, 39; Richardson 1997, 87; Moo 2000, 79; McCartney 2009, 110; cf. Hogan 1997, 87; McKnight 2011, 129–130). Such a notion is supported by the way in which 1 Pet 1:23 makes a pertinent connection between rebirth and the word, which probably points to reliance on the same earlier tradition(s) as the Letter of James (see Ropes 1916, 23; Allison 2013, 68). The new birth can be considered as a gift of God (1:17). On the basis of the new birth in Christ, the readers are called to be swift to hear, slow to speak and slow to anger, which does not produce righteousness (Jas 1:19–20). Then, in v. 21, the addressees are urged to lay aside filthiness and wickedness and “receive/accept with meekness the implanted word, which is able to save” (ἐν πραΰτητι δέξασθε τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι) their souls. In reference to this verse, BDAG (s.v. δέχομαι, §5) translate δέχομαι here as indicating “approval or conviction by accepting, be receptive of, be open to, approve, accept.” L&N (§57.125) explain the use of δέχομαι in this context as “to receive or accept an object of benefit for which the initiative rests with the giver, but the focus of attention in the transfer is upon the receiver.” Yet the action of acceptance or reception of the implanted word can hardly be seen as having any merit on the part of the receiver. In fact, the qualification to accept the implanted word “with meekness” (ἐν πραΰτητι) can be understood as “the quality of not being overly impressed by a sense of one’s self-importance” (BDAG, s.v. πραΰτης), which focuses the attention more on God as the giver of the implanted word than on the person who receives it. The object of that which is accepted is τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον. BDAG (s.v. ἔμφυτος) explain the hapax legomenon ἔμφυτος here as follows: “as someth. implanted the word is permanently established in the individual and like inborn assets functions in an exceptional manner.” According to L&N (§85.31) ἔμφυτος means “to be permanently in place, with the implication of development—‘placed in, permanently established in, implanted.’” Ropes (1916, 172) sees ἔμφυτος as conveying the idea of being “innate,” “intrinsic,” or “deep-rooted.” It is this idea that has led Allison (2013, 313) to think that the implanted word corresponds to the Stoic idea of a cosmic law that is innately inside human beings. However, the main problem with such an idea is that something that is inborn cannot be received or accepted (Davids 1982, 95; adopted by Martin 1988, 49 and Whitlark 2010, 152, 163; cf. McKnight 2011, 143).13 In its relationship 13 For a comprehensive treatment on the different views of ἔμφυτος λόγος, see Whitlark (2010). 286 P. la G. du Toit / Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 with v. 18 (see Blomberg and Kamell 2008, 100; Hartin 2009, 98), the implanted word rather refers to the word of the gospel (Laws 1980, 82; Blomberg and Kamell 2008, 100; McCartney 2009, 118; Whitlark 2010, 145; Vlachos 2013, 57), which brought about rebirth or new spiritual life in believers (cf. Kamell 2011, 24). The implanted word is thus “an entity that has taken up residence within believers” (Moo 2000, 87). The author’s urge in this verse is thus not a call to accept the gospel for the first time (Ropes 1916, 172; Lenski 1966, 552; Dibelius 1976, 114; Burdick 1981, 175), but rather an urge to accept the continual influence of the implanted word in the life and actions of a believer. As Kistemaker (1986) points out, the “implant”-imagery might imply that a plant needs constant care. If a plant is deprived of water and nurture, it will die. Thus if the readers who have heard the Word fail to pay attention, they will die a spiritual death. The Word needs diligent care and application, so that the readers may grow and increase spiritually. (p. 58) Within the imagery of the implanted word, an allusion to the writing of God’s law (or will) on people’s hearts and minds through a new covenant, as is put forth in Jer 31:33, is within reach (so Martin 1988, 45; Moo 2000, 87; McCartney 2009, 118; Kamell 2011, 26–27). The salvation of the “soul” (ψυχή), which likely refers to the whole person, as is normally the case in Hebrew (Moo 2000, 88; Blomberg and Kamell 2008, 100; Hartin 2009, 98; Painter 2012, 77; Vlachos 2013, 58),14 is thus not referring to immediate salvation at the point of acceptance, but points to “the believer’s ultimate deliverance from sin and death that takes place at the time of Christ’s return in glory” (Moo 2000, 88; cf. Osborne 2011, 40). Such an understanding would then be parallel to the notion that the readers must be patient until the coming of the Lord (5:7). Salvation in the Letter of James is arguably holistic (cf. Kistemaker 1986, 59) and has both a realised (5:15; 5:20)15 and future dimension (1:21; 2:14; 4:12; cf. Richardson 1997, 92). In other words, the idea is that rebirth through the word of the gospel creates a resident reality that needs to be accepted and acted upon on a continuous basis (Davids 1982, 95; Hartin 2009, 98; McCartney 2009, 117–118). In this process, believers also have to grow Cf. the use of ψυχή in 5:20 where the salvation of the sinner’s “soul” certainly points to the salvation of the whole person. 15 Admittedly, these verses could also be interpreted as pointing to futuristic salvation, but in context they seem to convey the immediate effect of prayer (5:15) or turning from sin (5:20). 14 Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James 287 and mature in their spiritual understanding of the implanted word (Burdick 1981, 175). The imagery in this verse thus relates to the inherent tension between the “already” and the “not yet” (McCartney 2009, 118) or the indicative and the imperative: believers need to act upon the gifts of God (1:17), of which the implanted word (1:21) is paramount. Even the discourse on faith that needs to be accompanied by acts of love (2:14–26, see below), underscores the same principle. It is no good that someone believes the gospel-word but does not act on it. Such faith would not eventually prove to be real, saving faith (2:14; cf. Martin 1988, 49). The call to act upon the indicatives inherent to the gospel word, is exactly the notion that Jas 1:22 conveys (cf. Matt 7:21–28). In describing a person who does not act upon the implanted word, vv. 23–24 compare (ἔοικα, v. 23) such a person with a man that “looks” (κατενόησεν, v. 24) at his “natural face” (BDAG, s.v. γένεσις, §2a) in a mirror but “immediately forgets16 what kind of [person] he was” (εὐθέως ἐπελάθετο ὁποῖος ἦν, v. 24). In respect of vv. 23–24, McKnight (2011, 151–153) considers the ontological view, which relates the comparison that is drawn with being made in God’s likeness (see 3:9; Gen 1:26–27; cf. Vlachos 2013, 60), but ultimately opts for the moral view (cf. Deut 4:9, 23, 31; 6:12; 8:14; Prov 2:17) in which a person sees his or her own sinfulness like in a mirror and walks away without doing something about it. But commentators generally seem to miss the positive imagery here. Rather than seeing one’s own sinfulness, the comparison of seeing one’s “natural face” rather resembles one’s new identity in Christ, which has been brought forth by God’s gospel-word (v. 18). The fact that the author refers to “us” (ἡμᾶς) who have been brought forth (v. 18), seems to confirm a focus on a new personhood or identity. This new identity is also identified with God’s gospel-word that has been implanted in newly created believers’ lives (v. 21). The notion behind vv. 23 to 24 would then be that someone who observes his or her new identity in Christ but does not act upon it, is like someone who sees his or her natural face in a mirror but forgets its image. Now, in 1:25, the author contrasts the above imagery with someone who “looks into” (παρακύψας εἰς) the νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, which is normally translated with “the perfect law of liberty” (NIV; ESV; cf. NRSV; NASB). BDAG (s.v. παρακύπτω, §2) translate the word παρακύπτω here with “to try to find out someth. intellectually, look (in, into).” Vlachos (2013, 61) argues that in this context, the word The aorists κατενόησεν and ἐπελάθετο are probably both gnomic and thus translated in the present (Vlachos 2013, 60). 16 288 P. la G. du Toit / Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 παρακύπτω, which is used together with εἰς, does not convey the physical motion of looking down into something (e.g., John 20:5, 11), but “appears to connote not a hasty peek but a penetrating look,” similar to the NIV that translates the phrase with “looks intently into” and the GNB that translates it with “look closely into” (cf. Martin 1988, 50; Moo 2000, 93). In its contrast with the man that perceives his new identity but forgets it, looking into the νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας certainly continues the underlying theme of the new identity in Christ as put forth by the imagery of being brought forth by God’s gospel-word (v. 18) and the gospel-word being implanted in believers’ lives (v. 21). This continuation of the theme of the gospel-word of vv. 18 and 21–23 in the νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας is acknowledged by most commentators (e.g., Moffatt 1928, 28; Lenski 1966, 557–558; Adamson 1976, 84; Martin 1988, 51; Johnson 1995, 214; Richardson 1997, 96–97; Moo 2000, 94; McCartney 2009, 122–123; Vlachos 2013, 61). In other words, in context, looking deep into the νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας involves that someone continues or perseveres (παραμείνας) in his or her new identity in Christ. Such a person is “no hearer who forgets” (οὐκ ἀκροατὴς ἐπιλησμονῆς) the new identity, but is “a doer who acts” (ποιητὴς ἔργου) upon it. But although the νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας points to the newly acquired identity in Christ, it is not a mere synonym for this identity. It is specifically called a νόμος. Some scholars identify νόμος here with the Mosaic law (e.g., Johnson 1995, 209, 214; Holladay 2005, 685; Hartin 2004, 96–98; 2008, 292; 2009, 100; Van de Sandt 2008, 315– 316; Allison 2013, 334–337).17 That the Mosaic law might be part of the connotation or at least figure in the background, is quite likely (cf. Moo 2000, 94),18 especially if the probable identity of the readers (Judaean believers) are taken into account (see above). The author also refers to the Mosaic law in 2:8–11 specifically (see below). It would thus be possible to see νόμος in 1:25 as either “the law of Moses as interpreted and supplemented by Christ” (Moo 2000, 94;19 cf. Hogan 1997, 91; McCartney 2009, 123; McKnight 2011, 158), “Jesus’ reinterpretation of the law as a 17 Dibelius (1976, 116–120) argues for the possibility that the law of liberty might point to the concept in Hellenistic Judaism of a free life in accordance with “reason,” which would be a way of describing the Mosaic law (see, e.g., 4 Macc. 14:2; Philo, That Every Good Person Is Free 45–46; see also McKnight 2011, 155–156). 18 Moo (2000, 94) shows that God’s law is described as “perfect” (Pss 19:7; 119) and even as liberating in later rabbinic texts (m. ’Abot 3:5; 6:2). In reference to Ps 119, McCartney (2009, 123) notes, however, that the law “is not a scholastic analysis of a legal text independent of its author; it is a listening to the redemptive story because it is the living speech of the author.” 19 Moo argues that the addition of the word “perfect” would point to the law in its eschatological, perfected form. Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James 289 new law” (Davids 1982, 100; cf. Richardson 1997, 97) or “the sum total of God’s revealed truth—not merely the preliminary portion found in the OT, but also the final revelation made through Christ and his apostles that was soon to be inscripturated in the NT” (Burdick 1981, 176). But it seems to better fit the context if νόμος is translated here as “principle . . . of life under the lordship of Jesus Christ as ‘new law’ or ‘system’ of conduct that constitutes an unwritten tradition” (BDAG, s.v. νόμος, §1, 1b), “a norm of conduct” (Martin 1988, 51) or more specifically, “the gospel revelation as a rule for life” (Moffatt 1928, 28), especially in view of the fact that νόμος does not stand on its own, but is qualified. In this regard, W. Gutbrod (TDNT 4:1081) writes that the addition τέλειος τῆς ἐλευθερίας is thus designed to protect the term against the misunderstanding that the commandment of the OT Law is meant. In so far as the evangelical message claims a man’s life for action, it can be called νόμος, but in contrast to the old Law it is a perfect law of liberty. The first qualification of νόμος is with the word τέλειος, which is used twice in 1:4 and once in 1:17. In 1:4 it is used together with ὁλόκληρος, which carries the notion of being “complete” (BDAG, s.v. ὁλόκληρος; e.g., NRSV; NIV; ESV). The notion of completion forms part of the connotation(s) to τέλειος in certain contexts.20 BDAG (s.v. τέλειος, §4a) interpret the use of τέλειος in both 1:4b and 3:2 as being perfect in a moral sense. In the NT, the verb τελειόω mostly carries the connotation of completing, bringing to an end/goal, finishing or accomplishing (so McCartney 2011, 123;21 see BDAG, s.v. τελειόω, §1–2; cf. Jas 2:22). Since νόμος here relates to the new identity that has been brought forth by the gospel-word, which is an act of God (esp. v. 17), the new identity could be described as a perfect or completed work in believers, which involves a resident, implanted principle that believers should live by. For Martin (1988, 51), the word τέλειος “takes on a salvation-historical character . . . as it yields the fruit of a character that has been touched and renewed by God’s salvation.” E.g., in Col 4:12, it is used with πεπληροφορημένοι to indicate maturity or being fully developed (BDAG, s.v. τέλειος, §4a; cf. Matt 19:21). 21 McCartney takes this in a slightly different direction in that he sees the completion of the law as Jesus’s completion of the Mosaic law (Matt 5:17) and as reaching “its ultimate redemptive purpose.” This might well be part of the connotation here, but arguably figures in the background. 20 290 P. la G. du Toit / Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 The second qualification of νόμος is that it is a principle τῆς ἐλευθερίας: a principle “of freedom” or “of liberty.” BDAG (s.v. ἐλευθερία) explain the word ἐλευθερία as “the state of being free.” If νόμος points to a principle, the notion of the first part of Jas 1:25 is that one looks deep into the perfect or completed principle that results from being brought into a state of freedom through the newly created identity in Christ. In Rom 8:2, Paul advances a very similar idea by his reference to the “principle” (νόμος; L&N, §33.333; BDAG, s.v. νόμος, §1b) that the Spirit of life represents in having “made” believers “free” (ἐλευθερόω) from the “principle” or “power” (Moo 2018, 497–499; cf. Fee 1994, 522– 524; Matera 2010, 191)22 of sin and death (cf. Martin 1988, 97). Davids (1982, 100) argues that “[a]lthough in James one is in a different area of Christianity than in Paul, he nonetheless finds similar ideas, especially when looking at what Paul says about James’s sphere of concern.” But there is another dimension to the completed principle of freedom, which pertains to the last part of Jas 1:25. The author ends off this verse by stating that a person who looks deep into this principle and continues to act upon it “will be blessed” (μακάριος . . . ἔσται) in such action. The natural question here would be: what kind of action does this refer to? As noted by Painter (2012, 80), the idea of being blessed harks back to 1:12, in which the person who endures temptation or testing and “has been approved” (δόκιμος γενόμενος; NKJV) or “has stood the test” (NRSV; ESV; cf. NIV), receives the crown of life, which the Lord has promised “to those who love him” (τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν). Endurance during trials thus constitutes an act of love towards God, which is the first part of the double love-command that Jesus taught (e.g., Matt 22:37). If the nature of the required action as put forth in 1:26–27 is considered, the double love command strongly rings in the background. The reference in v. 26 to people who think they are “religious” (θρησκὸς) but do not bridle their tongue, means that their “heart is not right” with God and towards their fellow believers and “their attempt to hide this lack of love only heightens their self-deception” (Kistemaker 1986, 64). The pure and undefiled “religion” (θρησκεία) that is described in v. 27, which involves visiting orphans and widows in their trouble and keeping oneself unstained from the world, can be seen as acts of love towards God (Kistemaker 1986, 64–65) and others (Reicke 1964, 25; Lenski 1966, 560; Burdick 1981, 176; Kistemaker 1986, 64–65; Richardson 1997, 103). 22 As Moo (2018, 497) points out, this is the majority view among commentators in respect of both occurrences of νόμος in Rom 8:2. Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James 291 Keeping oneself unstained from the world (1:27) specifically pertains to countering double-mindedness (1:8; 4:8) and friendship with the world (4:4), and thus constitutes wholehearted, undivided love for God. Being attentive to your speech (1:26) and reaching out to orphans and widows (1:27) specifically pertains to loving others. These acts of love are already intended in the action required on the basis of the perfect principle of freedom in 1:25 (e.g., Martin 1988, 51; Richardson 1997, 98). To this effect, Martin (1988, 51) writes that the freedom of νόμος in 1:25 “connotes a release from self-interest and a new capacity to practice God’s will in the interests of one’s needy neighbour” (cf. Kistemaker 1986, 62) and Moffatt (1928, 28) pointedly states that “the gospel revelation of the Word binds us to a service of practical love, which is at once an impulse and an obligation.” But it is Elliott (1993) who probably captures the nuances of the νόμος of freedom the best, when he writes that fidelity to the complete and royal law of freedom (1:25; 2:8, 12), inspired by the wisdom from above, entails an integrity of hearing-completed-in-doing (1:19–27), of seeing-completed-indoing (1:23–25), of speaking-completed-in-doing (1:13, 19, 26; 2:3, 7, 12, 14–26; 3:1–12, 14; 4:3, 11–12, 13–17; 5:9, 12, 13–18), and of faith-activated-in-love (2:1–26). (p. 78) 4.2 The royal νόμος of liberty versus the Mosaic law (James 2:8–12) James 2 starts with a reprimand about partiality (vv. 1–4), especially the notion to seek the attention of rich people at the expense of reaching out to the poor. In other words, the readers are admonished for not acting in the spirit of love (cf. 1:27) when they are assembled (v. 2). In v. 4, the author asks whether the addressees have not become “judges” (κριταί) with evil thoughts, which is an important concept to be revisited later in his discourse on νόμος (vv. 12–13). In v. 5, the readers are called to “listen,” which follows on the earlier references to the importance of acting on what is heard (1:19, 22–25). The author asks whether it is not so that God has chosen the poor to be rich in faith and to be “heirs of the kingdom,” and then significantly adds: “which he promised to those who love him” (cf. 1:12). But the addressees seem to have done the opposite; they have dishonoured the poor, even while the rich people oppress them and drag them to the courts (v. 6). In other words, they did not seem to show love for the poor, which ultimately reflects on their love for God. While it is 292 P. la G. du Toit / Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 possible that the “noble name” by which the believers were called (v. 7) is the Antiochene name “Christians” (e.g., Adamson 1976, 112; see Acts 11:26), it is more probable in light of the reference to “our Lord Jesus Christ” in v. 1 that it points to the name “Christ” (Ropes 1916, 196; Burdick 1981, 179; Moo 2000, 109; Vlachos 2013, 74), “Jesus” (Laws 1980, 105; Dibelius 1976, 141; Davids 1982, 113; Kistemaker 1986, 80; Hartin 2009, 121; Painter 2012, 95)23 or “Jesus Christ” (McKnight 2011, 201; cf. McCartney 2009, 143), and prepares for what follows in v. 8, which is again about the love command. The double love command was one of Jesus’s most profound teachings (Matt 22:37–40; Mark 12:30–31; Luke 10:27) and the main reason why the author reverts to the love command here in v. 8, is that it conveys the opposite attitude of partiality, which violates the principle of love (see vv. 1–4, 9; cf. Davids 1982, 114; Richardson 1997, 120; Moo 2000, 110, 113). In v. 8, νόμος is qualified with the word βασιλικός. Moo (2000, 111) notes that βασιλικός can be translated with “supreme” or “governing,” which would mean that the command of love governs and takes precedence over all others (e.g., Hort 1909, 53; 24 Moffatt 1928, 35; Lenski 1966, 570; Adamson 1976, 114; Burdick 1981, 179; Martin 1988, 67; McCartney 2009, 147; cf. Dibelius 1976, 142–143;25 Kistemaker 1986, 81) and can be understood as a new law (Dibelius 1976, 143; Martin 1988, 67–68). The love command that is referenced here (Lev 19:18) can in fact be seen as the epitome of the Torah and as constituting its essence (Martin 1988, 68). The fulfilment of the love command of Lev 19:18 can thus be understood as fulfilling the whole Mosaic law, similar to what Paul argues for in Gal 5:14 (McCartney 2009, 148). The principle set forth in Lev 19:18 can thus be described as the law of love, in which “law” hardly carries the connotation of a system of commandments. Yet Moo (2000, 111) rather opts for the meaning “royal” (βασιλικός) as denoting belonging to a king. By implication, the law would belong to God. Many interpreters thus see the “royal law” as denoting God’s Mosaic law (e.g., Ropes 1916, 198; Bauckham 1999, 142; Holladay 2005, 685; Hartin 2008, 292; 2009, 121; Konradt 2008, 278; Van de Sandt 2008, 315–316; Allison 2013, 401–402). But even in seeing νόμον βασιλικόν as the “royal law,” it can be identified with the love command that follows (e.g., Laws 1980, Some understand the aorist ἐπικληθὲν as pointing to the addressees’ baptism, when Jesus’s name was called upon (Dibelius 1976, 141; Davids 1982, 113; Hartin 2009, 121; McKnight 2011, 202; Painter 2012, 95). 24 Hort references Matt 23:23, which implies that there are less weighty parts of the law. 25 Dibelius argues that βασιλικός indicates that the law has royal authority. 23 Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James 293 108–109; NIV; cf. Davids 1982, 115). Yet Moo (2000, 111) ultimately chooses against this view “in that the NT usually refers to an entire body of commandments rather than to a single commandment” and points to the connection between βασιλικός in v. 8 and βασιλεία in v. 5. In combination with the love command that is quoted in v. 8 (Lev 19:18), Moo (2000, 112) and others (Johnson 1995, 230; Osborne 2011, 53; Painter 2012, 95; BDAG, s.v. βασιλικός) argue that βασιλικός pertains to the kingdom of God. Moo (2000, 112) further states that the “‘royal law’ might be James’s way of referring to the sum total of demands that God, through Jesus, imposes on believers,” implying that the royal law extends “beyond the Mosaic law as fulfilled and reinterpreted by Jesus to include the teaching of Jesus” (cf. Johnson 1995, 231; Blomberg and Kamell 2008, 139; McKnight 2011, 207). The νόμον βασιλικόν can indeed be understood as pertaining to God’s kingdom, but Moo’s (2000, 111) complaint against the idea that the νόμον βασιλικόν cannot point to a supreme principle on the basis that the NT usually refers to an entire body of commandments, can be taken into question if νόμος in v. 8 denotes a “principle,” such as in Rom 8:2 (see also Rom 3:27; 7:21, 23, 25; Gal 6:2; BDAG, s.v. νόμος, §1a–b), rather than a system of laws as such. As argued above, that is most probably the meaning of νόμος in Jas 1:25. BDAG (s.v. νόμος, §1b) indeed group the occurrence of νόμος here in 2:8 together with 1:25 and 2:12, denoting a “rule,” “principle” or “norm . . . under the lordship of Jesus Christ as a ‘new law’ or ‘system’ of conduct that constitutes an unwritten tradition” (cf. Moffatt 1928, 36; Via 1969, 260; Kistemaker 1986, 80; McCartney 2009, 47). It is quite evident that judgment through νόμου ἐλευθερίας (“the principle of freedom”) in 2:12 harks back to νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας (“the perfect/completed principle of freedom”) in 1:25 and thus points to the same thing. Yet the royal or supreme νόμος that needs to be “kept” (τελέω; e.g., McKnight 2011, 206) or “fulfilled” (e.g., Laws 1980, 107) according to 2:8, reminds of the use of τέλειος in 1:25, which can there be interpreted as a perfected or completed principle that results from the new identity, which forms part of the gospel-word that was implanted within believers at rebirth (see above). In other words, the completed (1:25), implanted principle of freedom also needs to be kept or fulfilled (2:8). One’s interpretation of the meaning of the phrase νόμον βασιλικόν thus does not necessitate a choice between denoting either God’s kingdom or a supreme principle. The phrase arguably refers to both and can be 294 P. la G. du Toit / Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 described as a “supreme kingdom-principle” of love (cf. McCartney 2009, 147). The “completed principle of freedom” in 1:25, the “supreme kingdom-principle” in 2:8 and the “principle of freedom” in 2:12 can thus all be understood as pointing to the same thing, but to different aspects of it: (1) The “completed principle of freedom” in 1:25 mainly involves the indicative work of God by which he gives birth to believers through the gospel-word (1:18) and implants the gospel-word within them (1:25), constituting a new identity in Christ that sets believers free and empowers them (see esp. Whitlark 2010, 146, 151, 162) to act in love (1:12, 25–27). Believers must receive the implanted word with meekness (1:21) and continuously have to “look deep into” (1:25) this principle so that they can keep understanding where they come from and who they are (their new identity in Christ) in order to be empowered by it to continuously act upon it. (2) The “supreme kingdom-principle” (2:8) or the “principle of freedom” (2:12) mainly constitutes the imperative of love that springs forth from the indicative of the new identity and the implanted word, which believers must fulfil (2:8) and by which their acts must be judged (2:12) in order to show the authenticity and richness (2:5) of their faith (see 1:3, 6; 2:1, 5, 14–26; 5:15). However, the indicative and imperative aspects of the supreme principle of freedom are intricately and inseparably related. In fact, in the same way in which the indicative and imperative aspects of the supreme kingdom-principle of freedom are related, so faith and works are intricately and inseparably related (2:14–26). Just as the hearer of the implanted word is empowered to but also ought to continuously act upon it in love (1:21–27), so someone who has faith is empowered to but also ought to do the works of love in order to show its authenticity (2:14–15; cf. Davids 1982, 199; Hartin 2009, 157). There is even correspondence between the kingdom-principle of freedom and faith in respect of salvation. According to 1:21, the implanted word is said to be able to ultimately save the soul of the recipient, which implies that the recipient must continually receive it (1:21) and continually look into it and act upon it (1:22–25) after which salvation follows. Without going too deep into the much debated faith-works relationship in the Letter of James, the main point is arguably that the kind of faith that ultimately saves, is faith that is accompanied by works of love (2:14; cf. Ropes 1916, 207; Martin 1988, Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James 295 91; Moo 2000, 120; McCartney 2009, 165; McKnight 2011, 229). Within the inseparable relationship between the indicative and imperative, it is not that the acts of love (relating to the imperative) in themselves or on their own save. But neither can faith (relating to the indicative) without works of love save, for such faith is inauthentic and incomplete (see τελειόω in 2:22) and in fact dead (2:20, 26). It is not so much that faith and acts of love need to work together to save, it is rather that authentic, saving faith ought to be characterised by acts of love. The intricate relationship between the indicative and imperative also relates to the social concept of maintaining the wholeness and integrity of the personal and social body in the congregation, which is arguably an underlying concept beneath the whole letter. The underlying concept of wholeness can also be traced in the juxtaposition of concepts of pollution and purity throughout the letter (see esp. 1:27; 3:17; Elliott 1993; cf. Botha 2005, 407). Having identified νόμος in 1:25; 2:8 and 12 with the principle of freedom, expressed in acts of love, apart from the reference to Lev 19:18 in 2:8, there is still a definite reference to the Mosaic law in 2:9–11. The question is, what is the function of the references to the Mosaic law here, and how do they relate to the supreme kingdom-principle? Some interpreters point to the probability that a contrast between the love principle and the Mosaic law can be identified here, especially in light of the fact that in 1:25; 2:8 and 2:12, νόμος is qualified in some way, whereas in 2:9–11 νόμος occurs without a qualifier (Gutbrod in TDNT 4:1081; Via 1969, 260; Evans 1983, 34; cf. Adamson 1976, 117). Additionally, the δέ in v. 9 conveys a contrast with the love principle of v. 8 in that the author reverts back to their partiality, which in turn is linked with both vv. 10 and 11 by γάρ. Οὕτως (“thus/likewise”), which introduces v. 12, thus logically refers back to the principle laid out in v. 8. Verses 9–11 can thus be seen as a kind of a digression. But if a contrast between the principle of love and the Mosaic law is intended, what would the function of such a contrast be? In answer to the above question, I propose that we come to one of the fundamental aspects that help us to understand the letter’s rhetorical style and especially its rhetoric on νόμος. One of the fundamental issues in the congregation that the author perceived was that they judged others (2:4, 12–13; 4:10–12; cf. 5:12). Elliott (1993, 75) sees their tendency to judge others as forming part of a “social-economic disequilibrium among the believers” which “had become the seed-bed for discrimination of social classes and the currying of favor from wealthy and powerful patrons 296 P. la G. du Toit / Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 from outside the community” (cf. Kloppenborg 1999; Batten 2004). But one can further ask: how did they judge others or on what basis did they judge them? I further propose that the addressees tended to judge others on the basis of the Mosaic law, while they did not live up to its standards themselves, especially the standard of love set forth in Lev 19:18, being hypocritical and not accompanying their faith with acts of love. In other words, what the author is holding up to the congregants in 2:9–11 is what is expected of someone if the Mosaic law is used as yardstick for judgment. According to the author’s logic in 2:9–11, if you break only one command of the Mosaic law, then you are guilty of all (v. 10). Although the author might see their partiality as a form of murder in terms of the way in which Jesus interpreted the commandments (e.g., Moo 2000, 115; cf. Davids 1982, 117; Martin 1988, 70; Mc Knight 2011, 2014), this is probably not the author’s main point in the reference to the examples from the Mosaic law in v. 11. His main point is arguably that one cannot judge others if one breaks any one of the law’s commandments, for then you are judged by the same law with which you judge others. In fact, their partiality meant that they broke the love commandment, which the author portrays as a fundamental principle that also governs the Mosaic law or all morality for that matter. But when the author admonishes the addressees that they should speak and act according to the “principle of freedom” in 2:12, he does not only imply that the congregants judge others on the basis of another law (the Mosaic law), he contrasts their inclination to judge others on the basis of the Mosaic law with judgment on the basis of the law or principle of freedom. In using the Mosaic law as yardstick for judgment, according to the letter’s logic, all people are guilty and all people are judged by default, which means that anyone who judges someone else on the basis of the Mosaic law does not only bring judgment on him- or herself, but is also hypocritical (esp. 3:17). As pointed out above, hypocrisy seems to be one of the main underlying problems in the congregation, which relates to double-mindedness and ultimately to not being whole individually or corporately. Judgment on the basis of the principle of freedom (2:12) is of a totally different nature. Instead of judging someone on the basis of a list of specific requirements, judgment is on the basis of a principle of freedom, which means that believers are judged on the basis of their love for God (1:12; 2:5) and others (2:8). Yet the principle of love also involves the principle of mercy (2:13; 3:17; 5:11). To have mercy in judgment lies on Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James 297 the side of using the kingdom-principle of freedom as criterion for judgment. This is made clear by the relationship between 2:12 and 13 (see γάρ in v. 13), in which the author actually goes further and relates the severity of judgment to the abundance of mercy. In other words, living by the love-principle does not only enable mercy to be shown to others, it tempers judgment relative to the measure of mercy shown. But the same principle probably also means that if believers abide in the love principle, God will judge them on the basis of that same principle, which means that God’s ultimate judgment will be tempered according to the measure of mercy they show (cf. Matt 5:7). That 2:13 also has God’s mercy in judgment in mind is likely in view of 5:11 in which it is stated “that the Lord is exceedingly/very compassionate and merciful” (πολύσπλαγχνός ἐστιν ὁ κύριος καὶ οἰκτίρμων). If 2:12–13 implied that judging and being judged on the basis of the principle of freedom actually averts judgment completely, the whole idea of associating judgment with the principle of love (v. 12) would constitute an oxymoron. The point is rather that judgment according to the principle of love still involves ultimate judgment, but the severity of such judgment is averted, being triumphed over by mercy. It can be noted at this point that if the way in which the Mosaic law functions as proposed, it is comparable to the notion advanced by Paul that if someone places him- or herself under the Mosaic law by being circumcised for example, such a person is obligated to keep the whole law (Gal 5:3; so, e.g., Davids 1982, 116; Kistemaker 1986, 82; Dibelius 1976, 144, 146; Moo 2000, 114; McCartney 2011, 148). In other words, the law places one under a curse to adhere to every individual command in it (Gal 3:10). Paul contrasts strict adherence to the Mosaic law with “faith working through love” (Gal 5:6), with “the principle of Christ,” and elsewhere with being under the rule and the principle of the Spirit (Rom 8:2; see BDAG, s.v. νόμος, §1b), which implies that one is not under the authority or the power of the law any more (Gal 5:18). Although the Letter of James does not venture into language about the Spirit versus the law or Spirit against flesh, if the author’s discourse on νόμος is understood as proposed above, he seems to hold the same basic principles as Paul on these matters. While the notion of literary dependence of the Letter of James on Paul is disputed,26 the Letter of James does not have to postdate 26 See Mitchell (2007, esp. pp. 77–79) who argues for literary dependence of the Letter of James on Paul’s writings. 298 P. la G. du Toit / Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 the Pauline literature for the letter to share the same theological tradition as Paul (see esp. Dibelius 1976, 146). But the question still remains: If the Letter of James shares the same basic sentiments about the Mosaic law as Paul, and if the author of the Letter of James is quite frank in the way in which he addresses the readers, why is he not more explicit in his sentiments about the Mosaic law? The answer to this question arguably lies within the author’s rhetorical strategy. According to Thurén (2001, 592–593), judged by the Letter of James’s level of Greek and wide range of stylistic devices, its author was rhetorically competent. Thurén argues that the author’s use of “appellative words and imperative forms” indicates that he was “very conscious of his audience” and that in his non-theoretical style, he “emphasizes the theme of the text, the connection between conviction and action, by keeping the line between theory and practice as low as possible.” Yet in addressing his readers, the author possibly “avoids clear signals” of rhetoric, “because in order to be persuaded the addressees must not cognitively identify his rhetorical techniques.” In other words, the author uses subtle rhetoric in order to persuade. But the latter must not be confused by the letter’s frankness. In fact, Thurén (ibid., 595) goes as far as to argue that the author’s rhetorical strategy is “hazardous” in that he leaves the “impression of speaking frankly and directly,” albeit “giving commands without explanations and motivations.” It is this frankness in address but subtleness in rhetoric that does not only make the Letter of James difficult to understand (cf. ibid., 596), but arguably accounts for the author’s subtleness about his true disposition towards the Torah. More specifically, the ingenuity of the rhetoric of the Letter of James in respect of νόμος, and especially in respect of the Mosaic law, seems to lie in the author’s identification with his audience. In other words, he addresses them in their own terms. Such a strategy is in fact a powerful strategy in that it can be seen as a form of contextualisation. In other words, the author would address his readers in familiar language symbols and metaphors in order to deepen his persuasion and enhance the effect of his rhetoric. Hence, in identifying with the symbolic world of his addressees, what the author does is: he shows to them the consequences of their own logic and conduct (i.e., judging people on the basis of the Mosaic law) but arguably deconstructs their own logic at the same time. But he also offers them an alternative (the kingdom-principle of freedom) that would be relatable in terms of their own frame of reference. Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James 4.3 299 Νόμος in James 4:11–12 In closing the Letter of James’s profound call to submission to God and repentance (4:7–9), the author calls the congregants to humble themselves in the Lord’s sight, which prepares the way for what he is about to say in 4:11 and 12. They are reprimanded not to “speak [evil] against” (καταλαλέω) one another, for, as the author argues, he who speaks evil against a brother and judges his brother speaks evil against νόμος and judges νόμος. But if someone judges νόμος he is not a doer of νόμος but a judge (v. 11). The author then points out that there is one “Lawgiver” (νομοθέτης) who is able to save and destroy, and concludes with the question: “But who are you to judge a/your neighbour?” (σὺ δὲ τίς εἶ ὁ κρίνων τὸν πλησίον;). Many interpreters see νόμος here as the Mosaic law with a specific focus on the love command. This view is mainly based on the following two factors: (1) the term πλησίον (“neighbour”) occurs in v. 12, which is argued to correspond with the love command of Lev 19:18. (2) The concept of slandering occurs in Lev 19:16 and the ideas of taking vengeance and bearing a grudge occur in Lev 19:18. These texts are part of the Mosaic law but specifically in close proximity of the love command (Lev 19:18). In respect of these concepts that occur in Lev 19:16 and 18, all or one of them is understood as corresponding with the concept of καταλαλέω in Jas 4:11 (e.g., Martin 1988, 163; Moo 2000, 198; Hartin 2009, 2018; McKnight 2011, 362–363; Allison 2013, 635). Other views include that νόμος harks back to the perfect/royal law of freedom of 1:25 and 2:8 (e.g., Lenski 1966, 637; Gutbrod in TDNT 4:1082; Blomberg and Kamell 2008, 259; cf. Kistemaker 1986, 144) or that it specifically has the law of love of Lev 19:18 in mind (e.g., Ropes 1916, 274; Ross 1954, 82; Dibelius 1976, 228; Laws 1980, 187; Burdick 1981, 196; Johnson 1995, 293; cf. Martin 1988:163; Painter 2012, 150). Yet commentators generally seem to miss that Lev 19:15 specifically speaks against doing injustice in judgment (‫מ ְׁשפָּ ט‬, ִ MT; κρίσις, LXX), being partial (λήμψῃ πρόσωπον) to the poor (‫דַּ ל‬, MT; πτωχός, LXX) and honouring/favouring a great/mighty (‫גָּדֹול‬, MT; δυνάστης, LXX) person.27 The specific commandment is then given to judge (‫שָּ פַּ ט‬, MT; κρίνω, LXX) one’s neighbour (‫עָּמית‬, ִ MT; πλησίον, LXX) in righteousness (‫צֶ דֶ ק‬, MT; δικαιοσύνη, LXX). The scenario described in this verse shows 27 Yet Kloppenborg (1999, 760) notes the similarity to Lev 19:15 here, which implies that the addressees in being judges constitute “the contrary of God.” 300 P. la G. du Toit / Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 an uncanny resemblance to the kind of problems that the Letter of James addresses. In other words, the author might also have this verse in mind in his reference to judging one’s neighbour in 4:12. In respect of these possible interpretations, it is noteworthy that νόμος occurs with the article in 2:9–10 in which it indicates the Mosaic law (see above), but here in 4:11 it is anarthrous, which might suggest that νόμος is thought of in a qualitative sense as God’s will (Hiebert 1979, 268; Blomberg and Kamell 2008, 259) or as “the law in its essence” (Vlachos 2013, 148; contra Ropes 1916, 274). As seen above, from the possible interpretations at hand, the Letter of James’s reference to νόμος in 4:11 could either be to the kingdomprinciple of freedom as in 1:25; 2:8, 12 or to the Mosaic law as in 2:9–11. But the anarthrous use of νόμος might in fact mean that the author deliberately alludes to both of these laws or principles, or that he is unspecific on purpose. The possibility that the author specifically addresses a tendency among the congregants to judge people on the basis of the Mosaic law (see above), would place 4:11 in perspective. Then it means that the author could include both laws or principles, for in judging others, especially in respect of the way in which they regard the rich and poor (cf. Lev 19:15), they would speak against both the Mosaic law and the kingdom-principle of freedom. Neither would they be doers of either one of the two laws. But more importantly, by judging others, it means that one does not only appoint oneself as judge of others but also as judge of law (4:11). But what does the latter mean? It probably means that human beings decide which law to judge by. In other words, human beings “play God” and “play Lawgiver” (cf. Davids 1982, 170; Martin 1988, 164; Richardson 1997, 194–195; Blomberg and Kamell 2008, 259; McCartney 2009, 221) in choosing their own law or principle (i.e., the Mosaic law), which is the direct opposite of an attitude of humbleness (4:10) and acceptance of God who is the only rightful Judge and Giver of law. 5 Conclusion I have argued that one’s perception of the identity of the author and readers of the Letter of James is dependent on one’s interpretation of its content. Since the Mosaic law was central in marking off identity, the letter’s discourse on law is central to how one describes and categorises the author and its addressees, especially their relationship to the Mosaic law. Since there is no conclusive evidence that James the Just, the halfbrother of Jesus, was torah-orientated or zealous for the law, it is likely Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James 301 that James the Just was in fact the author of the Letter of James and shared a similar stance towards the Mosaic law as Paul without implying direct dependence on Paul. But if one takes into account that the addressees of the Letter of James were predominantly Judaean Christ-believers with whom James was familiar, it would likely shape his rhetorical style. I have argued that one of the central problems that the author wanted to address is the addressees’ inclination towards the Mosaic law, and specifically that they probably judged others by using the Torah as yardstick. If the Letter of James is authentic, in order to address the addressees, James’s rhetoric can be seen as frank in respect of pointing out the congregants’ blatant hypocrisy and double-mindedness in their tendency to judge others, among other things. But the same familiarity would have caused James to be subtle in his rhetoric around law, because he probably did not want them to detect that he is using rhetorical techniques in order to persuade them. To this end, James’s rhetoric around law would have involved using familiar and relatable imagery with which his addressees could identify. In other words, James seems to have mirrored their own attitude towards the Mosaic law back to them, so that their own perceptions and perceptions of law would deconstruct itself. But at the same time, James seems to have offered them a profound alternative, namely to identify with and to live by the kingdom-principle of freedom, which is rooted in the implanted new identity in Christ and embodies the essence of all morality and conduct towards others. This principle of love would not only triumph over their inclination towards the Mosaic law, but empower and enable the addressees to embrace the principles of freedom, love and mercy, which would ultimately lead to the community’s wholeness and salvation. Lastly, it is proposed that although James probably did not adhere to cultic or ritual requirements himself (e.g., circumcision, Sabbath observance, purity laws), his silence on these requirements can be interpreted as forming part of a rhetorical strategy to be subtle about his position towards the Mosaic law. If the recipients were indeed inclined towards the Torah, his rhetorical strategy could imply that in subtly criticising their convictions about the law, he also wanted to be accommodating to their point of view, similar to the strategy that Paul lays out in 1 Cor 9:19–23 to be everything to everyone. But it might also be that James as leader of the Jerusalem church would not want to make ructions, especially since there were torah-orientated believers in the Jerusalem church too (Acts 15:1–5). Although these lines of reasoning are 302 P. la G. du Toit / Neotestamentica 54.2 (2020) 275–305 not new in themselves (cf., e.g., Lightfoot 1874, 292–374) the point here is that the way in which James’s rhetorical strategy coheres with the idea that James was not fully torah-observant or torah-orientated can be understood in ways that deserves further exploration. Bibliography Adamson, J. B. 1976. The Epistle of James. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans [NICNT]. Achtemeier, P. J., J. B. Green and M. M. 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James and Jude. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic [Paideia Commentaries on the New Testament]. Perkins, P. 1995. First and Second Peter, James, and Jude. Louisville: John Knox [Interpretation]. Reconsidering “Law” in the Letter of James 305 Reicke, B. I. 1964. The Epistles of James, Peter and Jude. Garden City: Doubleday [AB 37]. Richardson, K. A. 1997. James. Nashville: Broadman & Holman [NAC]. Ropes, J. H. 1916. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle of St. James. New York: Scribner’s Sons [ICC]. Ross, A. 1954. The Epistles of James and John. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans [NICNT]. Scaer, D. P. 1993. James: The Apostle of Faith. St. Louis: Concordia. Strange, J. R. 2010. The Moral World of James: Setting the Epistle in its Greco-Roman and Judaic Environments. New York: Peter Lang. Thurén, L. 2001. Chapter 19: The General New Testament Writings. Pages 587–607 in Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C.–A.D. 400. Edited by S. E. Porter. Boston: Brill. 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Ἔμφυτος Λόγος: A New Covenant Motif in the Letter of James. HBT 32:144–165. Winkler, E. T. 1888. Commentary on the Epistle of James. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. [email protected] North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, Private Bag X2046, Mmabatho 2735, South Africa